

STALIN AND THE COLD WAR, 1945-1953

A COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT DOCUMENT READER

Compiled and edited by Christian F. Ostermann,
with Mike Thurman, Nancy Meyers, and the conference participants

For the conference
"Stalin and the Cold War, 1945-1953"

Organized by

The Cold War International History Project
(Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars)

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International Security Studies (Yale University)

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C. Ostermann

Note to the Readers

We are pleased to present the participants of the conference "Stalin and the Cold War, 1945-1953" (Yale University, 23-26 September 1999) with the following collection of documents. The documents were gathered as a multi-year, multi-national effort, the "Stalin Project," which was launched by the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) in 1997. The "Stalin Project" included conferences in Budapest (October 1997), Beijing (October 1997), and Moscow (March 1998).

CWIHP is planning to publish many of these and other documents in a forthcoming special issue of the *CWIHP Bulletin* (Winter 2000). The translations included in this document reader should be considered as draft translations, which will be further edited and finalized for publication. Nevertheless, even at this stage they may add some additional "documentary impetus" to the discussions at the conference and the final conference papers.

Generous and crucial support for the translation and publication of these documents has been provided by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (Chicago) and the Smith Richardson Foundation (Westport, CT). We would also like to thank our co-sponsors, Yale University's Council of European Studies and the Woodrow Wilson International Center's Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, as well as the co-organizers, the Institute of World History of the Russian Federation Academy of Sciences, the Cold War Studies Center (Moscow), and the Stalin Era Archive and Research Project of the University of Toronto.

As always, an undertaking of this sort requires the time and creative energies of many people. The CWIHP team, which included Mike Thurman, Nancy Meyers, and interns Nathan Converse, Antonio Kourchencko-Raab, Scott Smith, and Greg Domber, spent countless and often late-night hours scanning, retyping, editing, translating, and formatting these documents. We gratefully recognize the various contributions made by Galina Murashko, Csaba Bekes, Chen Jian, Ruud van Dijk, Jordan Baev, John Lewis Gaddis, Ilya, Gaiduk, Leonid Gibiansky, Jonathan Haslam, Jim Hershberg, Jochen Laufer, Rob Litwak, Eduard Mark, Vojtech Mastny, Krzysztof Persak, Karin Mueller, Silvio Pons, Janos Rainer, David Reynolds, Svetlana Savranskaya, William Taubman, Robert Tucker, Kathryn Weathersby, David Wolff, Vladislav Zubok, and Jan Chowaniec to the production of this compilation.

For the Cold War International History Project team,

Christian F. Ostermann
Director, Cold war International History Project

Conversations With Stalin

Documents in the reader are indicated with an "X" in the right column.

Date	Name	Country	Source	Document in Reader
2 Feb 1944	Harriman Stevens Kerr	USA Great Britain	<u>Foreign Relations of the United States</u> , 1944, vol. 4, pp. 942-44; Harriman and Abel, <u>Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946</u> , pp. 296-99, 323-24.	
2 Feb 1944	Kerr Burns	Great Britain		
28 Feb 1944	Kerr Birse	Great Britain		
3 Mar 1944	Harriman Stevens	USA	Harriman and Abel, <u>Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946</u> , pp. 315-16, 324-25.	
3 Mar 1944	Erkoli (Togliatti)	Italy		
13 Mar 1944	Berling	Poland		
16 Mar 1944	Berling and Command of Polish Army	Poland	Press communique in <u>Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials</u> , vol. 2, <u>January 1, 1944 - December 31, 1944</u> , p. 58	
22(24) Apr 1944	Spychalski Rola-Zymierski	Poland	W. Gomulka, <u>Pamiętniki</u> , vol. 2, pp. 418-19.	
25 Apr 1944	Berling	Poland		
28 April 1944	Orlemanski	Poland/ USA	"Record of Conversation between I. V. Stalin and Roman Catholic Priest St. Orlemanski about the Feelings of the Polish Nationals in the United States toward the USSR," <u>Vostochnaja Evropa</u> , vol. 1, edited by G.P. Murashko, et al, pp. 36-42 (AVPRF, f. 6, op. 6, p. 42, d. 548, l. 9-15); "Statement by Rev. Stanislaw Orlemanski at a Press Conference," in <u>Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials</u> , vol. 2, <u>January 1, 1944 - December 31, 1944</u> , pp. 78-80.	X
17 May 1944	Lange	Poland/ USA	"Record of the Conversation of Comrade I.V. Stalin and Comrade V.M. Molotov with the Polish Professor Lange," <u>AVPRF</u> , f.6, op. 6, p. 42, d. 546, l. 53-70; "Statement by Professor Oscar Lange," in <u>Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials</u> , vol. 2, <u>January 1, 1944 - December 31, 1944</u> , pp. 82-83.	X
17 May 1944	Wasilewska	Poland		
19 May 1944	Tersic Djilas	Yugoslavia	Djilas, M., <u>Conversations with Stalin</u> , pp. 13-15, 56-66; Press communique in <u>Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials</u> , vol. 2, <u>January 1,</u>	

			1944 - December 31, 1944, p. 82.	
19 May 1944	Berling	Poland		
22 May 1944	Turski Sidor Osobka-Morawski Wasilewski	Poland	W. Gomulka, <u>Pamiętniki</u> , vol. 2, pp. 415-17; Press communique in <u>Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials</u> , vol. 2, <u>January 1, 1944 - December 31, 1944</u> , p. 83.	
23 May 1944	Wasilewska Spsychalski	Poland	Spsychalski, M., <u>Początek walki</u> , pp. 206-215.	
10 June 1944	Harriman Page	USA	<u>Foreign Relations of the United States</u> , 1944, vol. 4, pp. 965-67; idem, 1944, vol. 3, pp. 1282-83; Harriman and Abel, <u>Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946</u> , pp. 314, 329-30.	
10 June 1944	Turski Hanecki Osobka-Morawski Hardy	Poland		
22 June 1944	Wasilewska Osobka-Morawski Turski Hanecki Hardy	Poland		
23 June 1944	Polish Delegation	Poland	"Notes of Stalin's Speech during a Reception at the Kremlin on 23 June 1944 to Celebrate the Achievement of the Agreement to Create the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity," in W. Góra and A. Kocharński, "Rozmowy polityczne w sprawie utworzenia Tymczasowego Rządu Jedności Narodowej (czerwiec 1945)," <u>Archiwum Ruchu Robotniczego</u> , vol. 9 (1984), pp. 133-134.	X
24 June 1944	Berling Zawadzki	Poland		
26 June 1944	Johnston Harriman Page	USA	<u>Foreign Relations of the United States</u> , 1944, vol. 4, p. 972; idem, 1945, vol. 5, pp. 994-96: "Presentation to J.V. Stalin by Mr. W.A. Harriman, U.S. Ambassador, of Addresses of Honour from President Roosevelt for Stalingrad and Leningrad," in <u>Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials</u> , vol. 2, <u>January 1, 1944 - December 31, 1944</u> , pp. 90-91.	
15 July 1944	Wasilewska Rola-Zymieski	Poland		
19 (18?) July 1944	Rola-Zymierski Osobka-Morawski Kotek-Agroszewski Haneman Turski Minc Berman Drobner Grubski	Poland	W. Gomulka, <u>Pamiętniki</u> , vol. 2, pp. 412-23.	

	Radkiewich Sommerstein Witos			
21 July 1944	Morawski Rola-Zymierski Witos Trubetskoy Radkiewicz Berman Minc Sommerstein Werblowski Sksheshevskii Zhemovskii Prestiger Boreisha Sztachelski Hanecki Turski Spsychalski Kotek	Poland		
26 July 1944	Rola-Zymierski Witos Drobner Trubetskoy Minc Osobka-Morawski	Poland	Spsychalski, M., <u>Poczatek walki</u> , pp. 230-37.	
3 Aug 1944	Mikolajczyk Grabski Romer Mniszek Wasilewska	Poland	Mikolajczyk, S., <u>The Rape of Poland</u> , pp. 72-74; Harriman and Abel, <u>Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946</u> , pp. 338-39; Press communique in <u>Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials</u> , vol. 2, <u>January 1, 1944 - December 31, 1944</u> , p 97.	
5 Aug 1944	Bierut Osobka-Morawski Rola-Zymierski Witos Spsychalski Berman Wasilewska	Poland		
7 Aug 1944	Bierut Osobka-Morawski Rola-Zymierski Witos Wasilewska	Poland	Press communique in <u>Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials</u> , vol. 2, <u>January 1, 1944 - December 31, 1944</u> , p. 99.	
9 Aug 1944	Mikolajczyk Romer Grabski Mniszek	Poland	Harriman and Abel, <u>Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946</u> , pp. 338-39; Press communique in <u>Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials</u> , vol. 2, <u>January 1, 1944 - December 31, 1944</u> , p. 99.	
27 Aug 1944	Wasilewska Bierut Minc	Poland	Antony Polonsky, <u>The Beginning of Communist Rule in Poland</u> , p. 268.	

	Berman Weslaw			
Sept 1944	Tito	Yugoslavia	V. Dedijer, <u>Dokumenti 1948</u> , pp. 27-28.	
Sept 1944	Tito	Yugoslavia	V. Dedijer, <u>Dokumenti 1948</u> , pp. 28-30; idem, <u>Novi Prilozi za Biografiju Josipa Broza Tita</u> , pp. 382-86.	
23 Sept 1944	Harriman Page Kerr Burns	USA Great Britain	Harriman and Abel, <u>Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946</u> , pp. 347-53; Press communique in <u>Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials</u> , vol. 2, <u>January 1, 1944 - December 31, 1944</u> , p. 139.	
29 Sept 1944	Bierut Morawskii Witos Rola-Zymierski Jedrzychowski Rzymowski Minc	Poland	Polonsky, <u>The Beginning of Communist Rule in Poland</u> , pp. 298-99; W. Gomulka, <u>Pamietniki</u> , vol. 2, pp. 471-74; Press communique in <u>Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials</u> , vol. 2, <u>January 1, 1944 - December 31, 1944</u> , p. 141.	
29 Sept 1944	Wasilewska	Poland	Polonsky, <u>The Beginning of Communist Rule in Poland</u> , pp. 298-99.	
1 Oct 1944	Wasilewska Bierut Osobka-Morawski Rola-Zymierski	Poland		
4 Oct 1944 *	Churchill	Great Britain	V. Dedijer, <u>Dokumenti 1948</u> , pp. 31-64.	
4 Oct 1944	Harriman Page	USA	<u>Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944</u> , vol. 4, p. 1003-07, 1012-15; Harriman and Abel, <u>Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946</u> , pp. 355-56; M. Djilas, <u>Conversations with Stalin</u> ; Press communique in <u>Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials</u> , vol. 2, <u>January 1, 1944 - December 31, 1944</u> , p. 143.	
9 Oct 1944 *	Churchill	Great Britain	"Record of Meeting at the Kremlin, Moscow, 9th October, 1944 at 10 p.m.," <u>Public Record Office</u> , pp. 4-9; Harriman and Abel, <u>Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946</u> , pp. 356-57; Berezhkov, <u>At Stalin's Side</u> , pp. 303-06; Press communique in <u>Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials</u> , vol. 2, <u>January 1, 1944 - December 31, 1944</u> , p. 145.	X
10 Oct 1944 *	Kerr Harvey Birse (Molotov conducted the meeting; Stalin was not present)	Great Britain	"Record of Meeting at the Kremlin, Moscow on 10th October, 1944 at 7 p.m.," <u>Public Record Office</u> , pp. 10-15.	X
10 Oct 1944	Churchill Eden	Great Britain	Press communique in <u>Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials</u> , vol. 2, <u>January 1,</u>	

	Brooke Harriman Deane Wilgress Maloney Boswell	USA Canada Australia New Zealand	<u>1944 - December 31, 1944, p. 145.</u>	
11 Oct 1944	Churchill Eden Brooke Harriman Deane Wilgress Maloney Boswell	Great Britain USA Canada Australia New Zealand	Press communique in <u>Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials</u> , vol. 2, <u>January 1, 1944 - December 31, 1944, p. 155.</u>	
13 Oct 1944	Mikolajczyk Grabski Tabor Romer Churchill Eden Birse Harriman	Poland Great Britain USA	"Record of Meeting Held at Spiridonovka House on the 13th October at 5 p.m.," <u>Public Record Office</u> , pp. 20-26; "Record of Meeting Held at Spiridonovka House on the 13th October at 10 p.m.," <u>Public Record Office</u> , pp. 27-31; Birse, <u>Memoirs of an Interpreter</u> , pp. 171-75; Mikosłajczyk, S., <u>The Rape of Poland</u> , pp. 93-101.	X
14 Oct 1944	Churchill	Great Britain		
16 Oct 1944	Churchill	Great Britain		
17 Oct 1944	Churchill Eden Kerr Page	Great Britain USA	"Record of Meeting Held at the Kremlin on the 17th of October, 1944, at 10 p.m." <u>Public Record Office</u> , pp. 38-42.	X
18 Oct 1944	Churchill Eden Brooke Harriman Deane Wilgress Maloney Boswell	Great Britain USA Canada Australia New Zealand	Press communique in <u>Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials</u> , vol. 2, <u>January 1, 1944 - December 31, 1944, p. 159.</u>	
18 Oct 1944	Mikolajczyk Mniszek	Poland	"Minutes of the PWP CC Meetings on 22 October 1944; Bierut's Account of the Conference with Stalin and Churchill Held on 13 October 1944, and of a Conversation with Stalin on 18 October 1944," in <u>Protokoły posiedzeń Biura Politycznego KC PPR 1944-1945</u> , edited by A. Kocharński, pp. 30-37.	X
19 Nov 1944	Thorez	France	"Record of the Conversation of Comrade I.V. Stalin With the General Secretary of the CC French Communist Party, Comrade Thorez," in "Anglichanine i Amerikantsy khotiat vezde sozdat' reaktsionnye pravitel'stva," <u>Istochnik</u> , 1995,	X

			no. 4, pp. 152-58.	
22 Nov 1944	Subasic Kardelj Simic	Yugoslavia	Kardelj, <u>Borba za priznanje nezavisnost nove Jugoslavije 1944-1947</u> , pp. 65-73; Press communique in <u>Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials</u> , vol. 2, <u>January 1, 1944 - December 31, 1944</u> , pp. 183-84.	
2 Dec 1944	De Gaulle Garreau	France	"Meeting between General De Gaulle and Stalin," <u>Documents Diplomatiques Francais</u> , 1944, vol. 2, pp. 351-53; Harriman and Abel, <u>Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946</u> , pp. 375-78; Press communique in <u>Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials</u> , vol. 2, <u>January 1, 1944 - December 31, 1944</u> , pp. 186-87.	X
3 Dec 1944	De Gaulle Garreau Bidault Dejean Juin Petit	France	Harriman and Abel, <u>Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946</u> , pp. 378-80; Press communique in <u>Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials</u> , vol. 2, <u>January 1, 1944 - December 31, 1944</u> , p. 187.	
6 Dec 1944	De Gaulle Garreau Bidault Dejean	France	"Meeting between General De Gaulle and Stalin," <u>Documents Diplomatiques Francais</u> , 1944, vol. 2, pp. 387-94; Press communique in <u>Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials</u> , vol. 2, <u>January 1, 1944 - December 31, 1944</u> , p. 188.	X
6 Dec 1944	Bierut	Poland	"Bierut's Account of Three Conversations with Stalin Held between 6 and 14 December 1944; Minutes from a Meeting of the Military Division of the CC PPR Relating to Information Provided by Gen. Rola-Żymierski from his Talks with Stalin on Personnel Policy in the Military," in <u>Protokoły posiedzeń Biura Politycznego KC PPR 1944-1945</u> , edited by A. Kochański, pp. 71-77.	X
8 Dec 1944	De Gaulle Bidault Garreau	France	"Meeting between General De Gaulle and Stalin," <u>Documents Diplomatiques Francais</u> , 1944, vol. 2, pp. 419-22; Press communique in <u>Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials</u> , vol. 2, <u>January 1, 1944 - December 31, 1944</u> , p. 188.	X
9 Dec 1944	DeGaulle Bidault Dejean Petit Juin Harriman Deane Balfour Archer	France USA Great Britain	Press communique in <u>Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials</u> , vol. 2, <u>January 1, 1944 - December 31, 1944</u> , p. 189; Press communique in <u>Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials</u> , vol. 2, <u>January 1, 1944 - December 31, 1944</u> , p. 192.	
14 Dec 1944	Harriman Page	USA	Harriman and Abel, <u>Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946</u> , pp. 378-80.	
14 Dec 1944	Bierut	Poland	"Bierut's Account of Three Conversations with Stalin Held between 6 and 14 December 1944; Minutes from a Meeting of the Military Division of the CC PPR Relating to Information Provided by Gen. Rola-Żymierski from his Talks with Stalin on Personnel Policy in the Military," in <u>Protokoły posiedzeń Biura Politycznego KC PPR 1944-</u>	X

			1945, edited by A. Kochariski, pp. 71-77.	
6 Jan 1945	Kintanija (Mexican Ambassador)	Mexico		
9 Jan 1945	Dimitrov (phone call from Stalin)	Bulgaria	"Notes of G. Dimitrov on a phone call from Stalin," <u>CDA</u> , Fond 146 B, op. 2, ae. 15.	X
9 Jan 1945	Hebrang	Yugoslavia	"Record of I. V. Stalin's Conversation with Head of the Delegation of the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia A. Hebrang About Building Armed Forces in Yugoslavia, Its Territorial Problems, and Its Relations with Bulgaria and Albania," in <u>Vostochnaia Evropa</u> , vol. 1, edited by G.P. Murashko, et al, pp. 118-33 (AVPRF, f. 06, op. 7, p. 53, d. 872, l. 8-28).	X
15 Jan 1945	Tedder Ball Archer Deane Betts Birse	Great Britain USA	Harriman and Abel, <u>Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946</u> , pp. 380-81; Birse, <u>Memoirs of an Interpreter</u> , pp. 176-77.	
24 Jan 1945	Georgiev Yugov Piade Hebrang	Bulgaria Yugoslavia		
28 Jan 1945	Dimitrov Kolarov Kostov Georgiev Yugov Mihalchev Piade Hebrang Popovich	Bulgaria Yugoslavia	"Notes of V. Kolarov from a meeting with J. Stalin," <u>CDA</u> , f. 147 B, op. 2, ae. 1025, l. 1-6.	X
18 Feb 1945	Bierut Osobka-Morawski Rola-Zymierski	Poland		
23 Feb 1945	Ibarruri Galego Uribe	Spain		
17 Mar 1945	Dimitrov	Bulgaria		
19 Mar 1945	Benesh Shramek Fierlinger	Czechoslovakia		
31 Mar 1945	Harriman Deane Kerr Archer Birse	USA Great Britain		
6 Apr	Tito	Yugoslavia		

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7 Apr 1945	Churchill (Mrs.?) Johnson (Mrs.?)	Great Britain	
12 Apr 1945	Dimitrov Tito Djilas	Bulgaria Yugoslavia	
11-13 Apr 1945	Tito Djilas Subasic Andrejev Petrovich	Yugoslavia	Djilas, <u>Conversations with Stalin</u> , pp. 97-99, 102-17; V. Dedijer, <u>Dokumenti 1948</u> , p. 72.
13 Apr 1945	Harriman Page	USA	<u>Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945</u> , vol. 5, pp. 826-29, 839-42; Harriman and Abel, <u>Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946</u> , pp. 441-42.
15 Apr 1945	Harriman Hurley Page	USA	<u>Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945</u> , vol. 5, pp. 223-24.
19 Apr 1945	Bierut Osobka-Morawski Rola-Zymierski Medzelewski	Poland	
21 Apr 1945	Bierut Osobka-Morawski Gomulka Rola-Zymierski Minc Modzelski Kowalski Berman Wasilewska Spychalski Olszewski	Poland	
26 May 1945	Hopkins Harriman Bohlen	USA	<u>Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945</u> , vol. 5, p. 299; idem, <u>Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945</u> , Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), vol. 1, pp. 24-31; Harriman and Abel, <u>Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946</u> , pp. 463-75; Bohlen, <u>Witness to History</u> , pp. 218-21.
27 May 1945	Harriman Harriman Bohlen	USA	<u>Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945</u> , Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), vol. 1, pp. 31-41; Harriman and Abel, <u>Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946</u> , pp. 463-75.
28 May 1945	Harriman Hopkins Hopkins (Mrs.) Bohlen	USA	<u>Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945</u> , vol. 5, p. 300; idem, 1945, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), vol. 1, pp. 41-52; Harriman and Abel, <u>Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946</u> , pp. 463-75.
30 May 1945	Hopkins Harriman Bohlen	USA	<u>Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945</u> , vol. 5, pp. 301-07; idem, 1945, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), vol. 1, pp. 53-57; Harriman and Abel, <u>Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946</u> , pp. 463-75.
31 May 1945	Harriman Hopkins	USA	<u>Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945</u> , vol. 5, pp. 307-13; idem, 1945, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), vol.

	Bohlen		1, pp. 57-59; Harriman and Abel, <u>Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946</u> , pp. 463-75.	
4 June 1945	Ulbricht Ackermann Sobottka	Germany	"Consultation on 6.4.1945 at 6 o'clock with Stalin, Molotov, Zhdanov," in <u>Wilhelm Pieck: Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik 1945-1953</u> , edited by Rolf Badstübner and Wilfried Loth, pp. 50-52 (ZPA [Central Party Archive] NL 36/ 629, pp. 62-66).	X
6 June 1945	Harriman Hopkins Bohlen	USA	<u>Foreign Relations of the United States</u> , 1945, vol. 5, pp. 328-31; idem, 1945, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), vol. 1, pp. 60-62; Paraphrase of Cable by A. Harriman, <u>W.A. Harriman Papers</u> , Library of Congress; Harriman and Abel, <u>Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946</u> , pp. 463-75.	X
7 June 1945	Dimitrov Pieck Ulbricht Ackermann Sobotka	Bulgaria Germany		
13 June 1945	Bierut Osobka-Morawski Gomulka	Poland		
17 June 1945	Bierut Osobka-Morawski Gomulka Modzelski	Poland		
21 June 1945	Bierut Osobka-Morawski Gomulka Rozhomovskii Modzelski Shwalbe	Poland		
26 June 1945	Bierut Osobka-Morawski Gomulka	Poland		
28 June 1945	Fierlinger Clementis	Czechoslovakia	"Record of I. V. Stalin's Conversation with The Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia Z. Fierlinger and Deputy Foreign Minister V. Clementis on the Issues of the Transcarpathian Ukraine, the Teshin Region, and the Trophy Property," in <u>Vostochnaia Evropa</u> , vol. 1, edited by G.P. Murashko, et al, pp. 229-33 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 393, l. 65-69).	X
29 June 1945	Velchev Kinov Berginer	Bulgaria		
29 June 1945	Rascanu Ionescu Cambria	Romania		
30 June 1945	Soong Hoo Bin Chan Fu	China	Record of Meeting Between T. Soong and Stalin, <u>Hoover Institution Archives</u> , Folder 6-9; Cable by W.A. Harriman (July 1, 1945), <u>W.A. Harriman Papers</u> , Library of Congress.	X
2 July	Soong	China	Record of Meeting Between T. Soong and Stalin, <u>Hoover</u>	X

1945	Hoo Bin Chan Fu Chiang Chin Kuo		<u>Institution Archives</u> , Folder 6-9; Memcon A. Harriman - T. Soong, July 3, 1945, <u>W.A. Harriman Papers</u> , Library of Congress.	
5 July 1945	Modzelski	Poland		
5 July 1945	Choibalsan	Mongolia		
6 July 1945	Johnson			
7 July 1945	Soong Hoo Bin Chan Fu Chiang Chin Kuo	China	Record of Meeting Between T. Soong and Stalin, <u>Hoover Institution Archives</u> , Folder 6-9; Cable by A. Harriman, <u>W.A. Harriman Papers</u> , Library of Congress.	X
9 July 1945	Soong Hoo Bin Chan Fu Chiang Chin Kuo	China	Record of Meeting Between T. Soong and Stalin, <u>Hoover Institution Archives</u> , Folder 6-9.	X
11 July 1945	Soong Hoo Bin Chan Fu Chiang Chin Kuo	China	Record of Meeting Between T. Soong and Stalin, <u>Hoover Institution Archives</u> , Folder 6-9; Paraphrase of Cable by A. Harriman, <u>W.A. Harriman Papers</u> , Library of Congress.	X
12-13 July 1945	Soong Hoo Bin Chan Fu Chiang Chin Kuo	China	Record of Meeting Between T. Soong and Stalin, <u>Hoover Institution Archives</u> , Folder 6-9; Memcon A. Harriman - T. Soong, <u>W.A. Harriman Papers</u> , Library of Congress; Paraphrase of Cable by A. Harriman, <u>W.A. Harriman Papers</u> , Library of Congress.	X
7 Aug 1945	Soong Hoo Bin Chan Fu Shih Chieh Chiang Chin Kuo	China	Record of Meeting Between T. Soong and Stalin, <u>Hoover Institution Archives</u> , Folder 6-9	X
8 Aug 1945	Harriman Kennan	USA	Memorandum of Conversation Between W.A. Harriman and Stalin, <u>W.A. Harriman Papers</u> , Library of Congress.	X
9 Aug 1945	Bierut Osobka-Morawski	Poland		
10 Aug 1945	Soong Hoo Bin Chan Fu Chiang Chin Kuo Van Bin Tse	China	Record of Meeting Between T. Soong and Stalin, <u>Hoover Institution Archives</u> , Folder 6-9; Paraphrase of Navy Cable, <u>W.A. Harriman Papers</u> , Library of Congress.	X
12 Aug 1945	Bierut, Osobka-Morawski,	Poland	Mikoslajczyk, S., <u>The Rape of Poland</u> , pp. 142-144	
13 Aug 1945	Soong Hoo Bin Chan Fu Chiang Chin Kuo Van Bin Tse	China	Record of Meeting Between T. Soong and Stalin, <u>Hoover Institution Archives</u> , Folder 6-9; Paraphrase of Cable by A. Harriman, <u>W.A. Harriman Papers</u> , Library of Congress; Cable to Harriman Concerning the Stalin-Soong Talks.	X
14 Aug 1945	Bierut Modzelewski Minc	Poland		
27 Aug	Harriman	USA		

1945	Page			
20 Aug 1945	Dimitrov Kolarov Kostov Chervenkov	Bulgaria	"Notes on Stalin's Statement from a Meeting with a Bulgarian Delegation," <u>CDA</u> , f. 146B, op. 4, ae. 639, l. 20-28. Note: It is possible that this is a description of the August 30 meeting.	X
30 Aug 1945	Dimitrov Kostov Chervenkov Kolarov	Bulgaria		
30 Aug 1945	Delegation of Czechoslovakians from auto-factory "Tatra" bringing a gift to Stalin:	Czecho- slovakia		
30 Aug 1945	Dobr Kraus Vyganskii Shtepanek Ulrich Dana Vermirovskii Golechek Strochek	Czecho- slovakia		
30 Aug 1945	Dimitrov Kostov	Bulgaria		
4 Sept 1945	Groza Tatarescu Voitec Gelmenjanu Gheorghiu-Dej Iorad Shkoda	Romania		
1st half Sept 1945	Berman	Poland	"Jakub Berman's Handwritten Notes of a Conversation with Stalin or a Letter to Stalin: a Report on the Situation in Poland and Request for Advice and Help, 1945 September (first half)," <u>AAA, Jakub Berman Collection</u> , 325/33, pp. 22-26.	X
14 Sept 1945	Colmer Hope LeFevre Simpson Walcott Walverton Zimmerman Adelsoerg Smith Kennan Pepper Page	USA	<u>Foreign Relations of the United States</u> , 1945, vol. 5, pp. 881-4, 1039.	

8 Oct 1945	Helo, I. Helo, L. Riuemia Vuilikki Kuusinen Viljanen Khelman Pessi Kalima Suomela Iulianne Saaristo	Finland		
24-25 Oct 1945	Harriman (at Stalin's vacation home in the Crimea)	USA	Memorandum of Conversation Between W.A. Harriman and Stalin, <u>W.A. Harriman Papers</u> , Library of Congress; Memorandum of Conversation Between W.A. Harriman and Stalin, idem; Harriman and Abel, <u>Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946</u> , pp. 511-16.	X
14 Nov 1945	Gomulka Minc	Poland	"I.V. Stalin's Conversation with W. Gomulka and G. Minc about the Situation in Poland," in <u>Vostochnaia Evropa</u> , vol. 1, edited by G.P. Murashko, et al, pp. 301-03 (<u>APRF</u> , f. 45, op. 1, d. 355, l. 8-11); Andrzej Werblan, "New Evidence on Poland in the Early Cold War," <u>Cold War International History Project Bulletin</u> , no. 11 (Winter 1998), pp. 134-40.	X
19 Dec 1945	Burns Harriman Bohlen	USA		
19 Dec 1945	Bevin Kerr Cadogan Makkasaffa	Great Britain		
23 Dec 1945	Harriman Bohlen Burns	USA		
24 Dec 1945	Bevin Kerr Cadogan Makkasaffa	Great Britain		
30 Dec 1945	Chiang Chin Kuo Bin Chan Fu	China		
3 Jan 1946	Krzhitskii	USA		
3 Jan 1946	Chiang Chin Kuo Bin Chan Fu	China		
7 Jan 1946	Georgiev Stainov Yugov Mihalchev	Bulgaria	"Record of I.V. Stalin's Conversation with Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Bulgaria K. Georgiev, Ministers P. Stainov, A. Yugov, and Envoy to the USSR D. Mihalchev about Implementation of the Decisions of the Moscow Conference of Three Foreign Ministers on Bulgaria," in <u>Vostochnaia Evropa</u> , vol. 1, edited by G.P. Murashko, et al, pp. 355-61 (<u>APRF</u> , f. 45, op. 1, d. 252, l. 28-29).	X
8 Jan	Georgiev	Bulgaria		

1946	Stainov Yugov Mihalchev			
23 Jan 1946	Harriman Page	USA	<u>Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946</u> , vol. 6, pp. 531-35, 679-83; Harriman and Abel, <u>Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946</u> , pp. 531-35.	
25 Jan 1946	Kerr	Great Britain		
30 Jan 1946	Bierut Gomulka Berman	Poland		
2 Feb 1946 *(Feb.6: Loth)	Ulbricht Oelsner	Germany	"Report by Walter Ulbricht on a Meeting with Stalin on 2.6.1946 at Nine in the Evening," in <u>Wilhelm Pieck: Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik 1945-1953</u> , edited by Rolf Badstübner and Wilfried Loth, pp. 68-70 (<u>ZPA [Central Party Archive] NL 36/631, pp. 33-34, 49</u>).	X
21 Feb 1946	Parkhon Aeriu Mager Rosseti Petrovich Atset Kitteridge Eftimiu Massini Popper Papidonola Rudenko	Italy		
21 Feb 1946	Qawami-es Sultani	Iran		
22 Feb 1946	Choibalsan, Marshal	Mongolia		
4 Mar 1946	Qawami-es Sultani	Iran		
22 Mar 1946	Rusinek Shensniak, Iuzef Maloletin Shensniak, Anel Keshchenski Kowalchik Ezerskaia Poliak Sovchak Zubritskaia Kvechinski Lesovski Endzheevski Buze Pomianowski Kuzheliia Sikorski	Poland		

	Ferenc Orlowski Ezhik Krawchinski Kral Widawski Wosh			
22 Mar 1946	Gilmore	USA	"Answers to the Questions of Mr. E. Gilmore," in I.V. Stalin, <u>Sochineniia</u> , vol. 16, p. 32.	X
1 Apr 1946	Rákósi Gheorghiu-Dej Georgescu Zeitser	Hungary		
4 Apr 1946	Smith	USA	Cable from B. Smith to Secretary of State, <u>Foreign Relations of the United States</u> , 1946, vol. 6, pp. 732-36; Smith, <u>My Three Years in Moscow</u> , pp. 46-54	X
7 Apr 1946	Bierut	Poland	"Bierut's Telephone Conversation with Stalin on 7 April 1946 at 6 p.m.," <u>AAN, KC PZPR</u> , 2724, k. 181-86.	X
10 Apr 1946	Nagy Sakashich Dsendeshi Gero Gyongyosi Szekfu	Hungary	Nagy, <u>The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain</u> , pp. 205-14.	
11 Apr 1946	Ripka.	Czecho- slovakia	Kaplan, <u>The Short March: The Communist Takeover in Czechoslovakia, 1945 - 1948</u> , pp. 69-70.	
18 Apr 1946	Pakkonen Pekalla Svento Leino Takki Terngren Vesterinen Sundstrem	Finland		
23 May 1946	Bierut Osobka-Morawski Shwalbe Gomulka Rola-Zymierski Minc Spsychalski Kowalski	Poland		
24 May 1946	Bierut Osobka-Morawski Shwalbe Gomulka Rola-Zymierski Minc Spsychalski Kowalski Raabe	Poland		

27 May 1946	Peterson	Great Britain	<u>Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, vol. 6, 758-9.</u>	
27 May 1946	Tito Rankovich Popovich, Kocha Neshkovich Kodrich Popovich (Ambassador of Yugoslavia to the USSR)	Yugoslavia	Leonid Gibianskii, "The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War: Archival Documents on Stalin's Meetings with Communist Leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 1946-48," <u>Cold War International History Project Bulletin</u> , no. 10 (March 1998), pp. 112-34; M. Djilas, <u>Conversations with Stalin</u> , pp.130-01; V. Dedijer, <u>Dokumenti 1948</u> , pp. 95-10; V. Dedijer, <u>Novi Prilozi za Biografiju Josipa Broza Tita</u> , pp. 415-422.	X
1 June 1946	Tito Rankovich Dimitrov Kolarov Kostov	Yugoslavia Bulgaria	V. Dedijer, <u>Dokumenti 1948</u> , pp. 101-103	
6 June 1946	Rasmussen Axel	Denmark	"Record of the Conversation of Comrade I.V. Stalin with Rasmussen, Denmark Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Prince Axel, Chief of the [Danish] Trade Delegation," <u>AVPRF</u> , f. 06, op. 8, p. 33, d. 519, l. 19-27.	X
6 June 1946	Ahmad-Khan	Iran?		
6 June 1946	Dimitrov Kolarov Kostov	Bulgaria		
10 June 1946	Tito Neshkovich Popovich Rankovich Popovich Dimitrov Kolarov Kostov	Yugoslavia Bulgaria		
15 June 1946	Soderblom	Sweden	Report of the meeting published by the Swedish Foreign Ministry in 1957 (source: Ingmar Oldberg)	
15 June 1946	Bark-Khol'st	?		
20 July 1946	Pahlavi (Princess)	Iran		
20 July 1946	Gottwald	Czechoslovakia		
23 July 1946	Tryvge Lie	Norway		
23 July 1946	Bierut Minc Weslow	Poland		
24 July 1946	Gottwald Clementis	Czechoslovakia		
24 July 1946	Bierut Minc	Poland		

25 July 1946	Gottwald Masaryk Clementis Horak	Czechoslovakia		
25 July 1946	Bierut Minc Weslow	Poland		
7 Aug 1946	Laski Philips Clay Bacon	Great Britain	"Report of the Labour Party on its Goodwill Mission to the USSR," <u>Labour Party Archives</u> .	X
19 Aug 1946	Osobka-Morawski Shwalbe Cyrankiewicz	Poland		
29 Aug 1946	LaGuardia Jackson	USA		
29 Aug 1946	Osobka-Morawski Gomulka Berman Cyrankiewicz Zandrowski.	Poland	"Bierut's Notes of a Conversation with Stalin on the Situation in the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and Preparations for Parliamentary Elections in Poland 28(?) August 1946," in A. Werblan, "Tajemne karty z dziejów powojennej PPS," <u>Dziś. Przegląd Społeczny</u> , vol. 3 (1992), no. 12, pp. 52-58; .Mikoslajczyk, <u>The Rape of Poland</u> , pp. 170-71.	X
2 Sept 1946	Dimitrov	Bulgaria		
17 Sept 1946	Werth	Great Britain	"Answers to the Questions Posed by A. Werth, Moscow Correspondent for the <i>Sunday Times</i> ," in I.V. Stalin <u>Sochineniia</u> , vol. 16, pp. 37-39; Coates, <u>A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations</u> , vol. 2, 1943 - 1950, pp. 192-93.	X
21 Sept 1946	Roosevelt	USA	"Interview with Elliot Roosevelt," in I.V. Stalin, <u>Sochineniia</u> , vol. 16, pp. 45-48	X
26 Oct 1946	Bailey	USA	"Answers to the Questions of Mr. H. Bailey, President of the American Agency 'United Press'," in I.V. Stalin <u>Sochineniia</u> , vol. 16, pp. 40-43.	X
24 Nov 1946	Osobka-Morawski	Poland	"Osóbka Morawski's Notes of a Conversation with Stalin in Sochi Held by PPR and PPS Delegations on 24 November 1946," in A. Werblan, "Tajemne karty z dziejów powojennej PPS," <u>Dziś. Przegląd Społeczny</u> , vol. 3 (1992), no. 12, pp. 70-71.	X
21 Dec 1946	Roosevelt Emerson	USA		
10 Jan 1947	Montgomery	Great Britain	"Report to Washington on Montgomery's Conversation with Stalin,"	X
31 Jan 1947	Pieck Grotewohl Ulbricht	Germany	Bernd Bonwetsch and Gennadij Bordjugov, "Stalin und die SBZ: Ein Besuch der SED Führung in Moskau vom 30. Januar—7. Februar 1947," <u>Vierteljahrshefte für</u>	X

	Fechner Oelsner		<u>Zeitgeschichte</u> , vol. 42 (1994), no. 2, pp. 279-303 [record of the meeting pp. 294-301] (RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 128, d. 1091, ll. 43-54); "Record of the Meeting between J.V. Stalin and the SED Delegation with Participation from V.M. Molotov, W. Pieck, O. Grotewohl, W. Ulbricht, M. Fechner, F. Oelßner, M.A. Suslov, and V.S. Semenov, January 31 1947, 21-24h.," <u>Wilhelm Pieck: Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik</u> , edited by Rolf Badstübner and Wilfried Loth, pp. 111-14 (<u>ZPA</u> [Central Party Archive] NL 36/694, pp. 3-7, 25-26).	
2 Feb 1947	Pauker Gheorghiu-Dej	Romania		
10 Feb 1947	Gheorghiu-Dej Susaikov Shkoda	Romania		
25 Feb 1947	Gomulka Minc Cyrankiewicz	Poland		
Mar 1947	Kardelj Simic	Yugoslavia	V. Dedijer, <u>Dokumenti 1948</u> , pp. 118-41.	
4 Mar 1947	Cyrankiewicz Gomulka	Poland		
17 Mar 1947	Bidault Catroux	France		
24 Mar 1947	Bevin Peterson Dickson Smith	Great Britain		
9 Apr 1947	Stassen Cook Mattison	USA	"Interview with Mr. Stassen," in I.V. Stalin, <u>Sochineniia</u> , vol. 16, pp. 57-67.	X
15 Apr 1947	Marshall Smith Bohlen	USA	<u>Foreign Relations of the United States</u> , 1947, vol. 2, pp. 337-44; Smith, <u>My Three Years in Moscow</u> , pp. 220-22, 227-28.	
19 Apr 1947	Kardelj Simic Popovich	Yugoslavia	Kardelj, <u>Borba za priznanje nezavisnost nove Jugoslavje 1944-1947</u> , pp. 99-103; V. Dedijer, <u>Novi Prilozi za Biografiju Josipa Broza Tita</u> , pp. 430-33.	
23 May 1947	Zakhariadis	Greece		
4 June 1947	Gomulka	Poland		
9 July 1947	Masaryk	Czecho- slovakia	"Record of I.V. Stalin's Conversation with the Czechoslovak Government Delegation on the Issue of Their Position Regarding the Marshall Plan and the Prospects for Economic Cooperation with the USSR," in <u>Vostochnaia Evropa</u> , vol. 1, edited by G.P. Murashko, et al, pp. 672-75	X

			(APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 393, l. 101-05); Ripka, <u>Czechoslovakia Enslaved</u> , pp. 57-58, 63-71; Kaplan, <u>The Short March: The Communist Takeover in Czechoslovakia, 1945 - 1948</u> , pp. 72-73.	
9 July 1947	Gomulka	Poland		
11 July 1947	Gottwald	Czechoslovakia	"I.V. Stalin's Notes Regarding E. Benesh's Memorandum on Czechoslovakian Foreign Policy," in <u>Vostochnaia Evropa</u> , vol. 1, edited by G.P. Murashko, et al, pp. 676-77 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 393, l. 107-08).	X
16 July 1947	Hoxha	Albania	Enver Hoxha, <u>With Stalin: Memoirs</u> , pp. 53-87.	
25 July 1947	Hoxha	Albania	Enver Hoxha, <u>With Stalin: Memoirs</u> , pp. 53-87.	
8 Aug 1947	Dimitrov	Bulgaria		
12 Aug 1947	Dimitrov	Bulgaria		
14 Aug 1947	Antonov Iurnashev Dimitrov Kinov Halachev	Bulgaria		
18 Nov 1947	Thorez	France		
9 Dec 1947	Rakosi	Hungary		
14 Dec 1947	Secchia	Italy		
15 Jan 1948	Gomulka Minc	Poland		
16 Jan 1948	Gomulka Minc Rola-Zymierski Nashkowski Cyrankiewicz	Poland		
16 Jan 1948	Djilas	Yugoslavia	M. Djilas, <u>Conversations with Stalin</u> , p.137-38, 142-61; Djilas, <u>Rise and Fall</u> , pp.150-59.	
3 Feb 1948	Gheorghiu-Dej Groza Pauker Vladescu-Rakoasa Kotliar Luca	Romania		
10 Feb 1948	Kardelj Bakarich Djilas	Yugoslavia	Leonid Gibianskii, "The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War: Archival Documents on Stalin's Meetings with Communist Leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria,	X

	Dimitrov Kolarov Kostov	Bulgaria	1946-48," <u>Cold War International History Project Bulletin</u> , no. 10 (March 1998), pp. 112-34 (<u>Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita</u> , Fond Kabinet Marshala Jugoslavije I-3-b-651, ll.33-40); M. Djilas, <u>Conversations with Stalin</u> , pp. 171-85; V. Dedijer, <u>Dokumenti 1948</u> , pp. 168-85; V. Dedijer, <u>Novi Prilozi za Biografiju Josipa Broza Tita</u> , pp. 461-67.	
17 Feb 1948	Tildi Dinesh Rakosi Sakashich Molnar Veresh Dobi Szekfu	Hungary		
14 Mar 1948	CPSU Politburo	Soviet Union	"Stenographic Record of a Speech by Comrade J. V. Stalin at a Special Session of the Politburo, March 14, 1948," in Brian Murray, "Stalin, the Cold War, and the Division of China: A Multi-Archival Mystery, <u>Cold War International History Project Working Paper</u> , no. 12, pp. 18-22 (<u>ROC-MFA 105.11/61.15</u>).	X
16 Mar 1948	Dimitrov Kolarov	Bulgaria		
18 Mar 1948	Dimitrov Kolarov	Bulgaria		
20 Mar 1948	Dimitrov Kolarov Kostov Georgiev Dobrev Petrovsky Hristov	Bulgaria		
26 Mar 1948	Pieck Grotewohl Oelsner	Germany	<u>Wilhelm Pieck: Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik 1945-1953</u> , edited by Rolf Badstübner and Wilfried Loth, pp. 190-202.	
8 June 1948	Iudin	Yugoslavia		
14 June 1948	Zakhariadis	Greece		
15 June 1948	Lavrentev	Yugoslavia		
16 June 1948	Zakhariadis	Greece		
2 Aug 1948	Smith Roberts	USA		
5 Aug 1948	Ibarruri Francisco Carillio	Spain		
15 Aug 1948	Bierut	Poland	"Bolesław Bierut's Notes to a Conversation with Josef Stalin on approximately 15 August 1948," <u>AAN, KC</u>	X

			<u>PZPR</u> , 2727, k. 113-20.	
23 Aug 1948	Smith Roberts	USA		
23 Aug 1948	Chataigneau	France		
23 Aug 1948	Fonskolom			
6 Dec 1948	Dimitrov Kostov Chervenkov Bierut Minc Berman	Bulgaria Poland		
7 Dec 1948	Dimitrov. Kostov Chervenkov	Bulgaria		
8 Dec 1948	Zapotocky Kliment	Czecho- slovakia		
16 Dec 1948	Gheorghiu-Dej Pauker Rakosi Luca	Romania Hungary Romania		
18 Dec 1948	Pieck Grotewohl Ulbricht Oelsner	Germany	"Result of the 4-hour Meeting on 12.18.1948," <u>Wilhelm Pieck: Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik 1945-1953</u> , edited by Rolf Badstübner and Wilfried Loth, pp. 259-63 (<u>ZPA</u> [Central Party Archive] NL 36/695, pp. 42-47).	X
28 Dec 1948	Zakharedias	Greece		
8 Jan 1949	Kolarov Yugov Terpeshev Gero Farkas Minc Gheorghiu-Dej Luca Vassile Slanskyii Gregor Lashtovichka	Bulgaria Hungary Poland Romania Czecho- slovakia		
Late Jan 1949	Smith	Great Britain	Coates, <u>A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations</u> , vol. 2, <u>1943 - 1950</u> , pp. 320-21.	
26 Feb 1949	Bierut	Poland		
5 Mar 1949	Song, Kim Il	North Korea	Kathryn Weathersby, "To Attack, or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War," <u>Cold War International History Project Bulletin</u> , no. 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1-9 (<u>AVPRF</u> , f. 059a, op. 5a, d. 3, p. 11, l. 10-20).	X

14 Mar 1949	Song, Kim Il	North Korea		
23 Mar 1949	Hoxha. Koleka Prifti	Albania	Enver Hoxha, <u>With Stalin: Memoirs</u> , pp. 87-127; "Record of I. V. Stalin's Conversation with E. Hoxha concerning Albanian-Yugoslavian Relations and the Foreign and Domestic Policy of Albania," in <u>Vostochnaia Evropa</u> , vol. 2, edited by G.P. Murashenko, pp. 44-57 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 249, l. 55-74).	X
13 Apr 1949	Chervenkov Yugov	Bulgaria		
16 Apr 1949	Zakharidias	Greece		
28 Apr 1949	Minc	Poland		
27 June 1949	Liu Shaoqi Gao Gang Wang Jiaxiang	China		
29 June 1949	Gheorghiu-Dej Gaston Postin	Romania		
18 July 1949	Kelly Garrison Hayward	Great Britain	Cable from Moscow to the Foreign Office, <u>Public record Office; Foreign Relations of the United States</u> , 1949, vol. 5, pp. 632-34.	X
29 July 1949	Chervenkov Damyanov Yugov	Bulgaria	"Record of I. V. Stalin's Conversation with V. Chervenkov, P. Damyanov, and A. Yugov on the Issues of Bulgaria's Internal Political Life," in <u>Vostochnaia Evropa</u> , vol. 2, edited by G.P. Murashko, et al, pp. 192-202 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 254, l. 7-21).	X
1 Aug 1949	Bierut Minc	Poland		
2 Aug 1949	Bierut Minc	Poland		
5 Aug 1949	Liu Shaoqi Van Tsiaxian	China		
15 Aug 1949	Kirk	USA	<u>Foreign Relations of the United States</u> , 1949, vol. 5, pp. 646-48, 651-54, 725-26.	
24-25? Nov 1949	Hoxha	Albania	Enver Hoxha, <u>With Stalin: Memoirs</u> , pp. 127-63.	
16 Dec 1949	Mao Zedong	China	"Stalin's Conversations with Chinese Leaders," <u>Cold War International History Project Bulletin</u> , no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 4-29 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, ll. 9-17); Manuscript of Shi Zhe's memoirs, provided by Chen Jian, pp. 1-10.	X
21 Dec 1949	Chervenkov Chankov	Bulgaria		

26 Dec 1949	Ulbricht	Germany		
26 Dec 1949	Togliatti Secchia	Italy		
Jan 1950	Giap, Nguyen	Vietnam	Nguyen Giap, <u>Chien dau trong vong vay</u> , pp.411-13.	
14 Jan 1950	Radhakrishnan Dayal	India		
22 Jan 1950	Mao Zedong Zhou Enlai Li Fuchun Wang Jiaxiang Van Tsiaxian Chen Boda	China	"Stalin's Conversations with Chinese Leaders," <u>Cold War International History Project Bulletin</u> , no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 4-29 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, ll. 29-38); Manuscript of Shi Zhe's memoirs, provided by Chen Jian, pp. 10-31.	X
23 Jan 1950	Mao Zedong Zhou Enlai Wang Jiaxiang Li Fuchun	China	Manuscript of Shi Zhe's memoirs, provided by Chen Jian, pp. 18-19.	X
24 Jan 1950	Hoxha Shehu Zakhariadis Partsalides	Albania Greece	Enver Hoxha, <u>With Stalin: Memoirs</u> , pp. 163-201.	
6 Feb 1950	Gheorghiu-Dej	Romania		
16 Mar 1950	Bierut Minc	Poland		
17 Mar 1950	Bierut Minc	Poland		
10 Apr 1950	Kim Il Sung Pak Hon Yong Mun-Il	North Korea		
26 Apr 1950	Chervenkov Poptomov	Bulgaria		
4-5 May 1950	Pieck Oelsner Ulbricht Grotewohl	Germany	<u>Wilhelm Pieck: Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik 1945-1953</u> , edited by Rolf Badstübner and Wilfried Loth, pp. 345-48.	
15 May 1950	Trygve Lie	Norway	Coates, <u>A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations</u> , vol. 2, <u>1943 - 1950</u> , pp. 402-04.	
31 May 1950	Pollitt	Great Britain		
13 June 1950	Kekkonen Siukiiainen	Finland		
5 Jan 1951	Pollitt	Great Britain		
9-12 Jan	East European	Poland	"Did NATO Win the Cold War? [Documentary	X

1951	Delegation	Czechoslovakia Hungary Rumania Bulgaria	supplement to Vojtech Mastny, 'Did NATO Win the Cold War? Looking Over the Wall,' <u>Foreign Affairs</u> , vol. 78, no. 3 (May-June 1999), pp. 176-89], http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive/NSAEBB/NSAEBB14/index.htm .	
13 Jan 1951	Togliatti	Italy		
18 Jan 1951	Togliatti Longo Secchia	Italy		
12 Feb 1951	Togliatti Secchia Colombi	Italy		
28 Mar 1951	Gheorghiu-Dej Pauker Barladeanu Konstantinescu	Romania		
2 Apr 1951	Hoxha Balucu	Albania	Enver Hoxha, <u>With Stalin: Memoirs</u> , pp. 201-19; "Record of I. V. Stalin's Conversation with E. Hodja about Certain Foreign and Domestic Problems of Albania," in <u>Vostochnaia Evropa</u> , vol. 2, edited by G.P. Murashko, et al, pp. 504-09 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 249, l. 90-97).	X
23 July 1951	Chervenkov	Bulgaria		
23 July 1951	Cepicka	Czechoslovakia		
1 Apr 1952	Pieck Oelsner Ulbricht Grotewohl	Germany	"Meetings on 4.1&7.1952," Wilhelm Pieck: <u>Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik 1945-1953</u> , edited by Rolf Badstübner and Wilfried Loth, pp. 395-97 (ZPA [Central Party Archive] NL 36/696, pp. 26-28, 38).	X
5 Apr 1952	Radhakrishnan Tandeviya	India		
7 Apr 1952	Pieck Grotewohl Ulbricht Oelsner	Germany	"Stalin and the SED Leadership, 7 April 1952: 'You Must Organize Your Own State'," <u>Cold War International History Project Bulletin</u> , no. 4 (Fall 1994), pp. 34-5, 48 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 303, l. 179); "Meetings on 4.1&7.1952," Wilhelm Pieck: <u>Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik 1945-1953</u> , edited by Rolf Badstübner and Wilfried Loth, pp. 395-97 (ZPA [Central Party Archive] NL 36/696, pp. 26-28, 38); <u>Cold War International History Project Bulletin</u> : 5, pp. 35, 48; APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 303, l. 179.	X
Aug 1952	Nenni	Italy	Salisbury, <u>Moscow Journal: The End of Stalin</u> , pp. 270-74.	
20 Aug 1952	Chou Enlai Yun Hen	China	"Stalin's Conversations with Chinese Leaders," <u>Cold War International History Project Bulletin</u> , no. 6-7 (Winter	X

	Fu Hun Li Su Iui Shi Zhe Chzhan Ven Tian		1995/1996), pp. 4-29 (<u>APRF</u> , f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, ll. 54-72).	
22 Aug 1952	Joxe Bribanval	France		
3 Sept 1952	Zhiou En Lai Yun Hen Fu Hun Li Su Iui Shi Zhe Chzhan Ven Tian	China	"Stalin's Conversations with Chinese Leaders," <u>Cold War International History Project Bulletin</u> , no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 4-29 (<u>APRF</u> , f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, ll. 75-87).	X
4 Sept 1952	Chou Enlai Yun Hen Fu Hun Li Su Iui Shi Zhe Chzhan Ven Tian	China		
4 Sept 1952	Kim Il Sung Hon Yong Pak Moon Il Pen Dehuai	North Korea		
5 Sept 1952	Tsedenbal Sambu Idomjab Chou Enlai (at Kremlin banquet)	Mongolia China		
19 Sept 1952	Chou Enlai Shi Zhe	China	"Stalin's Conversations with Chinese Leaders," <u>Cold War International History Project Bulletin</u> , no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 4-29 (<u>APRF</u> , f. 45, op. 1, d. 343, ll. 97-103).	X
24 Oct 1952	Liu Shao Tsi Yun Hen Van Tszia Sian Shi Zhe	China		
5 Jan 1953	Liu Shao Tsi Van Tszia Sian Li Li Liu Shao Tsi	China		
6 Jan 1953	Liu Shao Tsi Van Tszia Sian Li Li Chzhan Shan Min Aidit Neto Asmu	China Indonesia		
13 Jan 1953	Mo Ruo Go Tszin Lin Sun	China		

17 Feb 1953	Menon Kitchlu (separate meetings)	India	K.P.S. Menon, <u>The Flying Troika</u> , pp. 26-32; Salisbury, <u>Moscow Journal: The End of Stalin</u> , pp. 331-32.	X
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**Record of a Conversation between I. V. Stalin
and the Roman Catholic Priest St. Orlemanski
about the Feelings of the Polish Nationals in the United States
toward the USSR**

Moscow

April 28, 1944
22 hours 00 minutes
SECRET

Comrade V. M. Molotov was present.

Greeting Comrade Stalin, Orlemanski says that first of all he would like to pass a small gift from his sister to Comrade Stalin. He opens his briefcase, takes out two book weights shaped as American eagles, and gives them to Comrade Stalin.

Comrade Stalin thanks him and notes that the eagles do not look like eagles. They do not look like the Polish eagles. They look rather like doves.

Orlemanski says that these are real American eagles.

Orlemanski states that he would like to tell Comrade Stalin about the situation with the Polish nationals in the United States of America. He will give Comrade Stalin the real picture. At the present time, the situation is rather difficult. Polish organizations and clergy are inclined against the Soviet Union. The goal of Orlemanski's visit to the Soviet Union is to find out how to split them. He was working on this issue successfully in America. He was in Canada where he spoke to the representatives of all the Polish circles. They supported his actions. There are many Poles in America. For example, there are 330 thousand Polish nationals in Detroit. After he returns from Moscow, he could go there, make a speech and win them to his side. The Poles in America represent a major force; there are about 5 million Poles in America. There are half a million Polish nationals in Chicago alone. The Poles play a significant role in the election of the President of the United States. Therefore, Roosevelt has to be very careful in terms of open speeches on the Polish issue. He, Orlemanski, would like to win the American Poles to his side and to prepare the ground for Roosevelt's open speeches on the Polish issue. The Poles in America often discuss the rumors that the Polish children and adult Polish nationals who live in the Soviet Union are treated badly. He, Orlemanski, came here and he has already seen the Polish children and the adults. He thinks that the Polish people should be thankful to Russia and to Stalin for everything that Russia has already given and is now giving to the Poles.

Comrade Stalin says that we are not cannibals.

Orlemanski laughs and says that he saw everything he wanted to see. He had a conversation with Molotov¹, and he is satisfied with everything that Molotov told him. He agrees with Molotov. But the strongest argument that the Polish Catholics in America have against the

¹ Orlemanski is speaking about the conversation of April 26, 1944 in which they touched upon the issues of Polish post-war borders, Soviet-polish relations and others. (Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation, Fond 06, Finding aid 6.II.41. File 545, pp. 12-16).

Soviet Union is that Russia allegedly is planning to destroy the Catholic church in Poland. He, Orlemanski, knows that this is not correct and when he returns to the United States he will inform the Poles correctly about the true state of affairs. If he, Orlemanski, wins the Polish priests in America over to his side, it would be a big help for us because it will affect the mood of the Polish clergy in Poland proper, and they will cooperate with the Soviet people when the latter enter Poland. He wants to know how to do that. He thinks that he can do it, even though it is quite a difficult task.

Comrade Stalin responds that there are all kinds of stories about the Soviet people. They say that they want to destroy the religion. These rumors originate from the fact that during the initial period of the existence of the Soviet government we experienced a cruel struggle between the representatives of the Orthodox church and the representatives of the Soviet government in Russia. When the new government, which was led by Lenin, emerged in Russia after the revolution in October 1917, the leaders of the Orthodox church and of other religious groups declared that the Soviet government was anathema, and called for the population to disobey its orders.

Orlemanski mentions that separation of church from the government is a very good thing.

Comrade Stalin continues to say that we, Bolsheviks, have a point in our program that guaranties the freedom of religious expression. From the first days of the existence of the Soviet state, we set ourselves a goal to implement that point in our life. But the rebellious actions of the activists of the Orthodox church eliminated the possibility to implement that point in real life, and the government was forced to accept the confrontation after the church condemned the Soviet government. The misunderstandings and problems between the representatives of the religion and of the Soviet government emerged precisely on these grounds. This was before the war with the Germans. After the beginning of the war with the Germans, people and things have changed. The war eliminated the contradictions between the church and the state. The believers abandoned their positions of rebellion, and the Soviet government abandoned its own militant position toward the religion.

Orlemanski notes that he completely understands it.

Comrade Stalin says that as far as Poland is concerned, the Soviet government has no intentions to interfere in its internal affairs, let alone interfere in religious affairs. The kind of political, social or religious order that will exist in Poland is the business of the Poles themselves. What would we, the Soviet people, like to have in Poland? We would like Poland to have a government that would understand and value good relations with its Eastern neighbor and that would be willing to preserve these relations in the interests of the struggle with our common enemy, Germany, which regardless of how we defeat it, will renew itself again. This is our main goal.

It is interesting to point out that the first German attack on France happened in 1870. Germany won the war because during that time there were many neutral countries. Germany attacked France for the second time in 1914. Germany lost the First World War because many states did not stay on the positions on neutrality to the end of the war, and because they turned against Germany. Therefore, the breaks between the acts of German aggression were

becoming shorter and shorter. The first period lasted for 40 - 42 years, second period lasted for 21 years, counting from 1918 to 1939. He, Comrade Stalin, thinks that Germany will be able to renew itself in some 15 years. That is why we must think not only about how to end this war, which we will most probably end with a victory, but also about what would happen in 20 years, when Germany revives itself. This is why an alliance between Russia and Poland is absolutely necessary in order not to let the Germans become an aggressor once again. During the last 140 - 150 years, since the time of Napoleon, Russia was invaded three times. Napoleon's invasion was the first one. During the last World War the Germans invaded Russia, and, finally, they did it once again. All these invasions happened through Poland, which was turned into some kind of a corridor for foreign invaders. Regardless of whether the aggressors were defeated or successful, the Poles had to suffer. He, Comrade Stalin, thinks that the Poles are tired of serving as a corridor, and the Russians are tired of the fact that troops of aggressors come to Russia through Poland. Therefore, he, Comrade Stalin, thinks that if Poland and Russia have an alliance, only the Poles and the Russians would be the winners and the German aggressors would be the losers. He, Comrade Stalin, could give Orlemanski the example of Grunwald battle, during which the Slavic peoples united against the members of the German order of Knights of the Sword. The united Poles, Russians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians then defeated the Germans. He, Comrade Stalin, thinks that we should revive the policy of Grunwald on a broad basis. This is his dream. He, Comrade Stalin, would like to know what doubts Orlemanski has regarding the Soviet government's position on the Polish issue. He, Comrade Stalin, could give him explanations on this issue.

Orlemanski responds that he personally has no doubts.

Comrade Stalin says that the question of borders between Poland and the Soviet Union and between Poland and Germany creates some doubts. He, Comrade Stalin, thinks that an alliance between Russia and Poland, Poland and Ukraine, and Poland and Byelorussia will work only under the condition that none of the countries mentioned above will take over lands of another country. It seems to Comrade Stalin that after these countries abandoned their claims toward each other, they would be able to improve friendship between them. This is what the Soviet government had in mind when it proposed the Curzon line. He, Comrade Stalin, has to say that the Curzon line was initially proposed against the will of the Soviet government, and without its agreement. This line was developed during the Paris Peace Conference. The work on it began in 1918 and was completed in 1919 when it was announced. The Polish delegation in Versailles did not agree with this line; neither did the Soviet government. It would be impossible to rein in the German aggressor in the future without a serious, large, and independent Poland. It is important that Poland is not isolated, but rather has connections with Russia and with the Western allies. As far as the Western borders of Poland are concerned, first of all we need to talk about it with the Polish representatives. Roosevelt and Churchill asked Stalin in Teheran about the Western borders of Poland. He, Comrade Stalin, together with Molotov, said that in their opinion the Western border of Poland should go along Oder and even to the west of Oder. It would be advisable to include Stettin in the Polish territory, it is a good port, and maybe Breslau. Roosevelt was asking how they could achieve that. He, Comrade Stalin, responded that they would have to defeat Germany, and then they would help Poland do it. That was our position. What he,

Comrade Stalin, just presented is not simply our platonic desire. We will be fighting for Poland to get those territories.

Orlemanski expresses his approval of what Comrade Stalin has just said, and adds that they would truly need to fight for it. If there is friendship between Russia and Poland, then the Germans would not be moving eastward. They would be moving to the West.

Comrade Stalin notes, that we would not let the Germans move to the West either, because Russia and Poland would be also allied with the Western countries - Britain and France.

Orlemanski says that if we want to achieve that, then we should not let the Polish nobility and rich people who abandoned Poland and who live now in luxurious mansions in London and New York return to Poland. If they come back to Poland, they will turn everything there upside down. They will incite the Polish people to hostile actions against the Soviet Union. The trouble is that Poland always had bad leaders. They always live in the past, looking back to their traditions.

Comrade Stalin responds that the Polish people is a good people. The Poles are courageous soldiers. Regarding the Polish aristocrats and the rich people whom Orlemanski has just mentioned, it seems to him, Comrade Stalin, that the Polish peasants, workers and the intelligentsia would not let them return to the country. The Polish peasants, workers and the intelligentsia had to suffer too much during the entire German occupation. It is just a miracle how they survived all the nightmares of their existence, after all that they have lived through. Of course, they will not let these people back who brought all the present suffering to Poland. Such are the feelings of the Polish people as far as he, Comrade Stalin, knows about them.

Orlemanski says that he is full of willingness to work in order to split the Polish émigré clique. He was very happy to meet with Stalin. Once he returns to America, he will get to work and he will inform Stalin about everything. However, as he has already said to Molotov, he would like his visit here not to be widely publicized.

Comrade Molotov mentions that the American press is already writing about Orlemanski's visit to Moscow. For example, *The New York Herald Tribune*.

Orlemanski states that he would like his trip to Moscow be publicized only after his work achieves certain results, after he gets back to America. At that time it would be appropriate to publish his picture with Stalin. He, Orlemanski, would like to know if he could count on being photographed together with Stalin.

Comrade Stalin responds positively and calls the photographer. He asks Orlemanski if he would agree to a statement being published tomorrow in our newspapers about today's reception.

Orlemanski states that now, because the American press is writing about his trip to the Soviet Union, we could published the proposed statement.

Comrade Molotov drafts a statement, and Orlemanski agrees with the text of the draft.

Orlemanski asks whether Comrade Stalin views it as more desirable that he, Orlemanski, not visit the Polish Army in the Soviet Union, but instead leave and return to the United States in order to take part in the Polish Congress. He, Orlemanski, thinks that the trip to the Polish Army would take 10 days and he would be late for the opening of the Congress.

Comrade Stalin responds that Orlemanski could make a visit to the Polish Army to see it and maybe to give his blessing. He would have a special train to do it. The trip to the Polish Army and his return to Moscow would take no more than five or six days. Orlemanski could leave Moscow tomorrow at noon on the special train.

Orlemanski says that he will follow Stalin's advice and visit the Polish Army.

Orlemanski asks to call a representative of the Associated Press to meet with him at 8 a.m. so that he could make a statement about his trip to Moscow.

Comrade Molotov responds that it will be done.

Orlemanski asks if he could visit Stalingrad, because when he returns to America, people will ask him whether he visited Stalingrad.

Comrade Stalin responds that his trip to Stalingrad could be organized.

Orlemanski states that when he returns to America he will inform the Soviet General Consulate in New York or the Soviet Embassy in Washington about his work. In turn, he would like to ask for a permission to call the Embassy and the General Consulate for information that interests him.

Comrade Stalin expresses his appreciation to Orlemanski, and says that of course he can call on our Embassy and the General Consulate for information that interests him.

Upon leaving, Orlemanski states that Comrade Stalin is doing miracles for his country and for his people, and that he will live through ages. He, Orlemanski, is very happy that he had an opportunity to meet with Stalin.

Comrade Stalin thanks Orlemanski for the present and asks him to pass his thanks to Orlemanski's sister for that present.

Orlemanski says, that the present is not very valuable as such, but Orlemanski's sister gave it to Stalin from all her heart. After the war, he, Orlemanski, would like to come here with his two sisters, and he would like to ask Stalin to give him a promise that he would receive them.

Comrade Stalin responds in the affirmative.

The conversation lasted for two hours.

Recorded by V. PAVLOV

Original

Source: Vostochnaia Evropa, vol. 1, edited by G.P. Murashko, et al, pp. 36-42 (AVPRF, f. 6, op. 6, p. 42, d. 548, l. 9-15).

Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.

**Record of the Conversation of Comrade I.V. Stalin and Comrade V.M. Molotov
with the Polish Professor Lange**

Top Secret

May 17, 1944

Lange thanks Comrade Stalin for receiving him and for the fact that he, Lange, has been able to familiarize himself with the Polish army in the USSR and the activities of the Union of Polish Patriots. He, Lange, now has a concrete idea of what constitutes the Polish army and Union of Polish Patriots. He, Lange, spoke with the soldiers, and now knows this is of the people, as well as what they are thinking.

Comrade Stalin asks whether or not Lange saw Berling.

Lange answers that Berling accompanied him on his trip to see the Polish army units.

Comrade Stalin notes that in America they have begun to slander Orlemanski. Orlemanski has been hurt by the fact that he is a very effusive and militant (*bojevoy*) man. But he is a honest man and loves Poland. That is our impression. Now Orlemanski is reassuring us, declaring that this is only the beginning of the struggle.

Lange says that he, Lange, is afraid that Orlemanski could break with the church.

Comrade Stalin remarks "What of the crocodiles? Why are they attacking Orlemanski?"

Lange says that this is mainly the Irish, the more reactionary group of the Catholics. The bishop O'Leary, to whom Orlemanski is subordinate, is also Irish.

Comrade Stalin asks whether or not the Poles are the majority in Orlemanski's parish.

Lange answers in the affirmative.

Comrade Molotov says that there are reports that they have remitted Orlemanski's punishment.

Comrade Stalin remarks "What a lot of crocodiles! There's democracy for you! They didn't even call Orlemanski in for an explanation and they imposed a punishment on him."

Lange answers that the Polish army in the USSR has made a good impression on him.

Comrade Stalin answers that the Poles are good military material. History has proven this. We will give the Poles better weaponry [lit. "technology"].

Lange says that the Polish army is a major political force. It will grow.

Comrade Stalin answers that the Polish army might grow to one million men.

Lange agrees with this and says that he held conversations with the soldiers in order to get an idea of their political outlook. All of them desire the creation of a new democratic Poland. No one wants to return to the pre-war Poland. They want agrarian reform, but with [lit. "under conditions of"] the retention of individual property, and not on the basis of collectivization.

Comrade Stalin remarks that there is no initiative for collectivization in Poland.

Lange answers that the soldiers are talking about cooperative associations in Poland.

Comrade Stalin answers that this is a good thought.

Lange declares that the Polish soldiers would like it if there were stations organized in Poland from which agricultural machinery and equipment could be purchased. In general, he must say that the Polish soldiers go further on some questions than the Union of Polish Patriots. The Polish soldiers speak of the desirability of nationalizing large-scale industry and banks in Poland. In this respect there is almost complete unanimity.

Comrade Stalin remarks that this is not bad.

Lange says that when the Polish army arrives in Poland its attitude will be even more radical.

Comrade Stalin says that if the London government arrives in Poland, the mood in Poland will be more radical. If another government, a democratic government, arrives in Poland, radical over-indulgence will diminish [lit. "drop off"].

Lange says that at present kulaks and [illegible] are prevalent in the Polish army in the USSR. But they will meet the industrial proletariat in Poland and will dissolve into the wider strata of the Polish population.

Comrade Stalin answers that the German yoke has placed the kulaks and the impoverished together [lit. "in the same row"]. There will be no conflict between these strata [of the population]. There will be conflict with the large landowners.

Lange remarks that among certain members of the Union of Polish Patriots and especially among Communists, there is an underestimation of the possibility of more radical development of events in Poland.

Comrade Stalin answers that this is possible. We are holding them back from radicalism.

Lange says that all of the soldiers in the Polish army are asking about the situation of their families in the USSR. They are very anxious about this matter.

Comrade Stalin answers that now we can improve the situation of the families of Polish military personnel, we can help them. It would be nice if we had as much material as we had families. Maybe it would be worthwhile for them to move closer to the Dnepr [River, in the Urals], so that the Polish soldiers can see their relatives.

Lange announces that this makes them uneasy. The Polish soldiers spoke about this in the presence of Berling. There is another matter. When the Polish soldiers move into Poland, they will influence the opinion of the Polish population concerning the USSR.

Comrade Stalin answers that Kot and his group provoked the Soviet Government on certain steps concerning the Poles in the USSR. We constrained them. But let them tell the whole truth in Poland.

Lange says that war overshadows these attitudes. After returning to America he will think of how to organize aid to the Polish population after the Red Army frees Polish territory. The affair is complicated by the fact that the London Polish government is represented in the ___NMRA [illegible].

Comrade Stalin says that it is necessary to have a provisional government or committee that will be recognized by the Americans and the English.

Lange answers that this would be possible if the London government could overcome the schism. He thinks that the English government either cannot or does not want to overcome the split.

Comrade Molotov remarks that the English are rallying the Poles in London.

Comrade Stalin says that some circles in England are doing everything so that the conflict between the Russians and the Poles will not be eliminated. They desire a fight between the Poles and the Russians. They desire a weakening of Poland and Russia.

Lange says that this is not the attitude of the American government.

Comrade Stalin says that the American government is not of that disposition.

Lange asks if Comrade Stalin thinks that it would be possible to turn to Mikolajczyk as a private individual.

Comrade Stalin answers that he is not against that, but that one must know what Mikolajczyk is. He is apparently a weak-willed man. Sosnkowski plays the main role. He has spies and his own agents in Polish embassies and in Poland. Sosnkowski is a man with character. But he has the wrong orientation (*No on ne tuda smotrit*). Mikolajczyk is in his hands. The members of the Polish government in London are compromised in Poland.

Lange says that he nevertheless believes that [Mikolajczyk] has influence in Poland.

Comrade Stalin declares that Soviet power has existed here for 26 years, yet he still cannot say that 90 percent of the population is behind Soviet power. How do the London Poles know that all of the population of Poland is behind them? It is very difficult to know this, considering that the German vampires are surrounding Poland. Sikorski was stronger than Mikolajczyk, and more experienced and authoritative. It was better doing business with him.

Lange says that it is too bad that now there aren't authoritative people among the Poles.

Comrade Stalin says that they will appear again. Sosnkowski and others—they are people of the past. They don't believe in the alliance of Russia and Poland. They think that modern Russia, like Tsarist Russia, will try to eat up Poland, for example, by way of sovietization. They don't understand the changes that have taken place. Everything that they think of sovietization is stupidity. Lenin prepared the soviets for 14 years and didn't resolve to implement them even during the period of the Provisional Government. The whole time he sought out compromise[s]. As regards collectivization, we began [it] only in 1930. Before then, we continually checked up on what the peasantry thought of it. The foundation for collectivization was the joint tilling of land (*supryaga*), which existed earlier among the Slavs. Collective farms must grow on their own.

Lange, agreeing with this, declares that in Poland there is a possibility of creating cooperative associations like those that exist in Denmark.

Comrade Stalin remarks that it would be good to transfer certain sectors of industry to the state. If the state doesn't have industry, then, as the present war has shown, it will become the object of intrigue [lit. "games"] for the internal capitalist forces.

Lange says that nationalization of large-scale industry in Poland is also necessary from the point of view of international relations.

Comrade Stalin says that this is correct. But he, Comrade Stalin, is interested in the internal problem. If the state wishes to be strong, then it must have at its disposal a land fund so that it can sell land to the peasants. The state must also have certain major enterprises in its hands. If a part of the enterprises in Poland are transferred to the state, for example, those that went to serve the Germans, and if the state has at its disposal a land fund, then it can be powerful. It would also be good if the state held part of the railroads as its property.

Lange says that in Poland there never were private railroads, with exception of small branch [lines].

Comrade Stalin says that the Poles in the USSR want to create a State Committee. Once they even passed a resolution concerning this. But we withheld this resolution, in consideration of Lange's telegram. Now among the Polish military there are conversations to the effect that there is a [Polish] government in London, but not in the USSR. It is necessary to try to form a unified government of Poles living in England, America, and Russia. Such a government would be recognized by England and America. We and the Poles are interested in there

being a strong Poland. It is difficult for us to take on the weight of the aggressor all by ourselves. We can take on this burden once, but cannot withstand it a second time. Therefore we are interested in creating a strong Poland with an army. This is not a game. This is our purpose (*ustanovka*). Somehow Kerr talks about how Mikolajczyk can stand at the head of the new Polish government. But this will not work out. We and the Americans do not want this.

Lange says that the people in the London government represent nothing. These are people of the past; these are weak people. They have historical connections with pre-war Poland, and this makes an impression on England and America. If certain ones of these people are invited into the new Polish government, then this will make it easier to resolve the entire Polish question. He, Lange, doesn't know if it is possible to do this. Perhaps it would be possible if the English government talked about this with Mikolajczyk. But he, Lange, has doubts if the English government will agree to do it.

Comrade Molotov remarks that as of yet there are no indications of this.

Comrade Stalin says that in this case, if the Soviet, English, and American governments begin to dictate to the Poles, then it would create an unpleasant [lit. "not entirely pleasant"] situation. The best [scenario] would be the creation of a provisional government like a National Committee in the region of Poland, which would force England and America to recognize it.

Lange says that he has exactly the same idea. He also thinks that in its first manifesto the National Committee must declare that it is a provisional organ of power and that in order to be a fully representative organ it is inviting other Poles to participate in it.

Comrade Stalin says that, at present, the conditions do not exist for the creation of a Polish government. When people who work in Poland enter [the government], then it can invite other Poles who live outside the borders of Poland.

As regards the Premier of the Polish government, [they] point to Mikolajczyk. But he cannot be Premier. He represents the Polish peasantry, and has ties with them. Such a man could, of course, be useful to in the government. Moreover, [people] point out Stanczyk. Who else can Lange name?

Lange answers that they spoke about Banaczyk. However, this Banaczyk is another version of Mikolajczyk. He does not know what kind of an impression Romer makes.

Comrade Stalin answers that that Romer did not make a bad impression on him.

Lange answers that there is also General Zeligowski.

Comrade Stalin says that at present Zeligowski leads the struggle in the National Council.

Lange says that Zeligowski has a name. No one says that he is Moscow's man [lit. "from Moscow"]. Of course, he is already an old man.

Comrade Stalin answers that, against the Germans, even an old man could prove useful to a democratic Poland.

Lange says that he hopes that someone among the Poles who presently live in Poland enters the Polish government. For example, Witos lives there. Although his stance [on the issues] is unknown.

Comrade Stalin says that apparently Witos has been arrested by the Germans.

Lange says that the Germans could kill him.

Comrade Stalin declares that it would be necessary to free Witos. The partisans could do this.

Comrade Stalin says that the other day it was said that Sosnkowski has two partisan divisions in Poland, the leaders of which are trying to establish contact with Soviet troops. In fact, our troops met a one of Sosnkowski's partisan divisions on one of the sections of our front. The fighters of this division go about in full dress German uniforms and, because of this, our troops, taking them for Germans, fired at them. The Poles let us know that they weren't Germans. A meeting took place between the leader of Sosnkowski's division and the command of the Red Army. The Poles declared that they were under Sosnkowski and asked what would be done with them. Our command answered that in war one cannot have two bosses and, promising them weapons, proposed that the Poles participate in operations together with the Red Army. After the conversation, these partisans, arriving from Bug, left for there. Apparently, they did not agree with the conditions of the Soviet command. Lately the divisions of Sosnkowski have started to fall apart and people have gone over to the Soviet side in the tens. A part of these deserters are now in the army of Berling. This is the type of underground organization that Sosnkowski has. There were two divisions, and now there isn't even one. As regards the relations of the Polish population with the Red Army, they are meeting the Red Army and the Ukrainian partisans well. The Poles are asking when the Russians will come and free them from the Germans. Mikolajczyk is mistaken when asserts that 90 percent of the Polish population is behind the Polish government in London.

Lange says that Mikolajczyk is misleading [people].

Comrade Stalin says that therefore we need a National Committee from a purely military point of view. We will not act in Poland the same way as AMGOT in Italy. Some sort of organ of power must exist in Poland. The Union of Polish Patriots is a cultural-educational and military organization, which cannot fulfill administrative functions in Poland. We also cannot burden the Polish army with the duties of civil government. There must be an organ of power that would have a dialog with the Polish peasantry, intelligentsia, and workers.

Lange says that this organ of power must not carry out agrarian reform immediately. As regards the nationalization of large scale industry, it can be postponed until the creation of a constitutional government.

Comrade Stalin says that the Polish government must have a material base. If the state had certain trade organizations under its purview, then this would be highly beneficial. For example, if we have a state fulfilling trade functions, it can regulate prices. And raising them, for example, by the kopeck, we can obtain greater funds [lit. "means"] than any state could obtain with taxes. The opening of commercial food shops at the present time influenced prices in the collective farm markets and forced the collective farmers put goods of a higher quality on the market. Now we have even fewer goods [on the market]. But in time we will lower prices. There is another example of how our state influences market prices. When the Red Army entered Lithuania in 1940, bread prices in Lithuania were very high. We imported grain into Lithuania and prices dropped by 30 percent. It would be good if the state in Poland controlled certain industrial and trade enterprises.

Comrade Stalin asks if Lange has been in London.

Lange answers that he had not been to London. But he would like to ask what goal he might have for a trip to London.

Comrade Stalin says that Lange is a private [non-governmental] figure who might be able to talk with Mikolajczyk and other Poles in London and tell them what he saw in the Soviet Union. It would be beneficial to do this if Lange has a suitable opportunity.

Lange says that, evidently, this would require making some changes in his passport.

Comrade Stalin asks if it wouldn't be a feigned maneuver if Lange goes from here to the USA, and then to London.

Lange says that it would be easier in the USA to get a visa for a trip to London. In any case, he will ask the American government about this.

Comrade Stalin says that in London Lange could tell the Poles that we are not entirely against beginning negotiations with the London government.

Lange asks if he must say that he had a discussion with I.V. Stalin.

Comrade Stalin says that Lange can declare to the Poles in London that he, Comrade Stalin, told him that a new Polish government must be created that includes people from the Polish emigres in America, Russia, and England. Until now, when the Soviet government wanted to find out something or other from the Polish government, either Churchill or Eden appeared as a mediator. It would be good to negotiate directly with someone or other from among the Poles. He, Comrade Stalin, does not discount the possibility Sosnkowski will change [lit. "does not entirely consider that Sosnkowski cannot change"]. He, Comrade Stalin, with certain reservations, considers Sosnkowski and other Poles in London to be Polish patriots.

Lange could tell the Poles in London that we do not have a pre-conceived opinion that it is impossible to converse with them. But we want to talk with live Poles and not with Churchill or Eden. Lange can explain to them that we do not desire a conflict with them. We, under certain conditions, are prepared to agree with them that they were not with Hitler against us.

Lange remarks that the Poles in London seem to [lit. "must"] have the same policy as Benesh.

Comrade Stalin remarks that Benesh is more flexible than the London Poles.

Comrade Molotov declares that, in Benesh's opinion, the Polish aristocracy is always looking backward. However, one can find people among them who are moving to the side of the Russians. The Germans taught them a good lesson.

Comrade Stalin asks where Kozlowski is, adding that Kozlowski, like Sikorski, deceived the Soviet government.

Lange answers that he only knows that Kozlowski is in Germany.

He, Lange, would like to ask if I.V. Stalin wouldn't think it more appropriate if someone from the Union of Polish Patriots went, let's say, to Sweden for negotiations with the Poles.

Comrade Stalin answers that Lange is in a better position to negotiate with the Poles, since he stands outside the fray.

Lange answers that he will ask the American government. He doesn't believe [lit. "see"] that the American government will impede his journey to London.

Comrade Stalin says that Lange might still find Stanczyk in America.

He, Comrade Stalin, also thinks that the American government will not hold up Lange's trip to London. The English government will hardly hinder this journey.

Lange answers that he could ask Kerr about this now.

Comrade Stalin declares that he does not advise this at present. He thinks that it would be good for Lange to go to America first and discuss [the matter] with Stanczyk, who might be able to invite him to London. On his arrival in London, Lange might be able to set up a discussion and say that in Russia they don't consider the London Poles to be enemies of Poland.

Lange says that the London Poles have an incorrect perception [of affairs]. They don't understand the present alignment of forces.

Comrade Stalin says that already three times Poland has served as a corridor through which an aggressor passed to attack Russia. The Poles must be sick of being a transit corridor.

They must understand that in alliance with Russia, England, and America they can defend themselves. Zeligowski is correct when he says that the Germans are trying to cause a quarrel between Poland and Russia.

Lange says that he has yet another question. He would like to know whether I.V. Stalin considers that the ambition of the members of the Union of Polish Patriots to include Silesia and German territory up to the Oder into Poland is too great. He also [would like to know] if this ambition can be realized, since it is linked with the resolution of the problem of Germany, and with its inclusion into the European system.

Comrade Stalin says that this question was discussed in Tehran. A formal resolution was not adopted. He, Comrade Stalin, noted that Stettin and Breslau could be included into Poland. Churchill said that it would be better for the Polish state and asked if the Soviet Union would help create such a Poland. He, Comrade Stalin, answered that the Soviet Union would help Poland obtain these territories. This topic was discussed as part of the general question of weakening Germany.

Lange asks wouldn't the reduction of German territory complicate the internal problems of Germany. At present, American public opinion is uneasy over whether reduction of German territory will lead to the development of German nationalism.

Comrade Stalin answers that Roosevelt presented a plan to break Germany up into five states, proposing to simultaneously occupy outlets to the sea - Hamburg and other ports - and eliminate Germany as a unified state. Churchill wavered [on this question]. He, Comrade Stalin, agreed with the opinion of Roosevelt.

Lange says that the breakup of Germany is possible in the event that there is no conflict between the United States, England, and Russia.

Comrade Stalin says that with regard to Germany it was necessary to conclude [lit. "enter into"] a half-hearted peace in the form of the Versailles Treaty. Versailles became a half-hearted peace when they began to give privileges to Germany. Such a peace not only stimulated [lit. "promoted the conception of"] the idea of revenge, but also made this revenge possible. It would be possible to conclude a different peace, leaving Germany with its territories, Sudetenland to Czechoslovakia, and Alsace-Lorraine to the French. But this is a very dangerous combination. A third combination is to weaken Germany - take away its industry, disarm its army and thus weaken Germany by 50 years. He, Comrade Stalin, believes that [it is] exactly this combination [that] must be adopted.

In 1871, Germany attacked France. Other states of Europe were neutral then. Forty years later, in 1914, Germany attacked again. After the last World War, Germany restored its strength and began to wage war in 1939. Germany possesses an immense regenerative capability. Therefore he, Comrade Stalin, thinks that if a half-hearted decision is made regarding Germany, we will have a new war in 15 years.

Lange says that if Germany is broken up, German nationalism will develop, but that German nationalists will be denied the possibilities to engage in any sort of action. The latter, however, is possible only under condition of agreement among England, America, and Russia.

Comrade Stalin answers that we observe our agreements. Our partners, however, hold to another opinion in this regard. We, probably, were immature and gullible [lit. "did not live up to this" - *ne dorosli do etogo*]. However he, Comrade Stalin, hardly thinks that England will violate its agreements. America is interested in destroying the industry of Germany and Japan. Germany and Japan have cheap labor. It is difficult to compete with Japan. Japan quickly copies the technical achievements [of others] and has a force of cheap labor. The only way to eliminate Germany and Japan as competitors is to destroy their industry. This is beneficial even to us. Only when we break the Hitlerite government and state, will we, that is the United States, England, and Russia, be in the same camp. He, Comrade Stalin, considers that this is in our general interests. This is his Bolshevik view of this question.

Lange says that under these circumstances [the matter of] Poland is entirely clear. He, Lange, would like to ask the opinion of I.V. Stalin on what to do with the Germans in Poland. The Polish soldiers say that it is necessary to resettle the Germans outside of Poland.

Comrade Stalin says that we will hire part of the Germans as workers. Part of the Germans can be dispatched to South America. Let the Germans make room [for others]. After all, they compelled the entire world to make room [for them].

Lange asks whether Stalin considers that the influence of Marxism has entirely disappeared in Germany.

Comrade Stalin answers that there were 180,000 to 200,000 Marxist cadres in Germany, but these people were beaten down (*perebiti*) and the masses that followed them came undone, since they were fair weather socialists [lit. - "lived by their moods"].

Lange asks whether a socialist or non-socialist system is possible in Germany.

Comrade Stalin remarks that socialism will not come quickly in Germany.

Lange asks if Stalin considers that a change is possible in the Curzon Line.

Comrade Stalin says that he considers a change is possible within the limits of three to four kilometers in either direction.

Lange declares that the Polish soldiers say that the further the western boundary of Poland is extended, the better. They are unanimous in this opinion. When the topic of discussion is the eastern border of Poland, the soldiers give various answers. Some say that first of all it is necessary to defeat Germany. Others say that they trust the USSR and hope that the USSR will not harm Poland. Other declare that it is necessary to come to an agreement with the Byelorussians and the Ukrainians. But many soldiers speak for the old borders of Poland.

Certain ones agree with the Curzon Line under the conditions that Vilnius and Lwow remain in Poland. One soldier said that the Poles must own Galician oil. But not all of this is said seriously. At the same time, he had to say that at while Vilnius did not provoke especial interest, the question of Lwow was greatly emphasized.

Comrade Stalin answers that the Ukrainians had become horrible nationalists. They are very suspicious. We had to fight with the Ukrainians because of Lwow.

Lange declares that Professor Zawacki, who lives in the United States, considers that it is impossible to resolve the question of Lwow without simultaneously insulting the Ukrainians and Poles. But he believes that the loss of Lwow will be greater for the Poles than the Ukrainians. On the other hand, according to his very approximate statistical research, it turns out that between 600,000 and 700,000 Ukrainians remain west of the Curzon Line. Finally, he sets forth a third consideration, that excluding Lwow from Poland might complicate the internal political affairs of the Polish government. Zawacki is afraid that this could serve as a source of anti-Soviet intrigue in Poland.

Comrade Stalin answers that this is a very complicated problem, and that it must be studied. The point is that one million Ukrainians are fighting very well in our army.

Lange says that the Poles are suspicious about the western border of Poland.

Comrade Stalin answers that there was no disagreement between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Comrade Stalin concerning the western border of Poland.

Lange answers that they don't know about this in America.

Lange asks if Stalin thinks that the government of Beck cooperated with the Germans in order to wage war with them against Russia.

Comrade Stalin answers that we do not have information [lit. "materials"] proving that Beck cooperated with the Germans in the matter of a joint attack on the Soviet Union. But the Beck government incited the Germans against the Soviet Union. The Poles had a plan to expand Poland to the Dnepr [River]. Evidently, they were counting upon accomplishing this under circumstances of an English and American fight with Russia. But this was an illusion. They do not understand that it is no accident that England and American are united with Russia. They do not understand that this alliance was not caused by opportunism, but is long-term.

Lange asks whether Stalin considers that France will quickly become a great power.

Comrade Stalin answers that this will not happen quickly. In France economic and military cadres are corrupted. There is little patriotism there. Several years ago the French novelist Sel'e [Celine?] wrote a novel in which he sang the praises of a hero who declared that it is all the same to the French if a German or _alats'e [illegible] stands at the head of the French government. In the opinion of the hero, it would be better if a German headed the

government. It was necessary to banish the author to New Caledonia. However, this novel was purchased extensively in France. If you take the English intelligentsia, they are patriotic. The French [intelligentsia], on the contrary is unpatriotic.

Pétain submitted to the Germans. If Hitler did not presently have France, things would be entirely bad for him. He presently obtains livestock and labor from France, and forms his divisions there. It will take decades for France to be able to revive itself as great power. Presently De Gaulle is in France. But he is surrounded by Vichy deserters. He, Comrade Stalin, doesn't know if these deserters are reliable or not. Now De Gaulle is setting up courts for traitors of France, but he, Comrade Stalin, doesn't know if this will help De Gaulle.

Lange answers that, under these circumstances, England, the United States, and Russia will remain as the great powers.

Comrade Stalin answers that for the time being it will be like this. He, Comrade Stalin, would thank his lucky stars if France rises earlier than he anticipates. However, he thinks that France will need 12 years for this. It is necessary that a new generation grow up in France. Previously France considered that the French had to be allied with their enemy in the past World War, the Germans. In France, they expected to win from this. In fact, Pétain was made out to be a fool. Nevertheless, the French still dream about a German victory. Such was the attitude of older cadres in France. It is impossible to teach these old cadres again. It is necessary that a new generation grow up.

Lange answers that in the Soviet Union they did this very well.

Comrade Stalin answers that we unleashed the strength of the people. He, Comrade Stalin, thinks that nowhere else do scientists [lit. "people of science"] enjoy such attention as in the Soviet Union. In France, whoever is rich is honored. If they find a clever person, they hire him. There is no honor in society for a clever person. Among us, on the other hand, we foster [lit. "create"] respect for scientists within society. Such is our policy. Every state must pay attention to scientists. The tragedy of France consists of the fact that there people have been debauched by an alliance with the Germans. The Germans are masters of breaking people down. Their policy consist of awakening inhuman feelings in people and destroying all that is human. The Germans do not believe in human feelings. These masters of the degradation of humans have already ruled in France for three years.

Lange declares that there are elements of revival in the French underground.

Comrade Stalin answers that De Gaulle is playing his role, but he has few cadres and cannot do anything quickly. The Americans and English are [also] hindering him a little.

Lange says that now he would like to pose a technical question to Comrade Stalin. Should he, Lange, announce to foreign correspondents, who he will receive before his departure from Moscow, that he, Lange, met with I.V. Stalin?

Comrade Stalin says that there is nothing to hide, and it will become known all the same. Lange can tell the correspondents that he, Lange, spoke with him, Comrade Stalin, concerning the Polish army; that the Soviet government wants to increase [the ranks of] the Polish army; that he, Lange spoke about the Poles at the home front in Russia; that the Soviet government will improve the conditions for these Poles as much as possible, and that this would have [already] been done if it were not for the war. Lange can speak about his impressions concerning whether the Soviet government desires good or ill for the Poles. He can also talk about the “sovietization” of Poland.

Lange says that he will speak about this. He will begin with the fact that the Soviet leaders made a declaration concerning Poland. He, Lange, wanted to convince himself whether or not to believe this declaration. Concerning sovietization, he will say that if the Soviet government was intending to sovietize Poland, then this would be impossible with the Polish army that is presently in the Soviet Union. This would require a different Polish army. In his, Lange’s, opinion, this will serve as the best proof of the sincere intentions of the Soviet government, and as proof that the creation of a Polish army in the Soviet Union is not any sort of maneuver. He, Lange, could also say that in his opinion the Soviet leaders of Poland must play an important role in the post-war world.

Comrade Stalin remarks that Poland must play an important role not only after the war, but also during the war.

Lange answers that intends to take a flight [from Russia] on approximately May 30, and that he doesn’t need a special plane.

Comrade Molotov answers that at this time, of course, there will be planes [available].

Comrade Stalin asks if Lange will see Orlemanski.

Lange says that there has been information that Orlemanski must go to a monastery.

Comrade Molotov says that there have been reports that this decision has been abrogated.

Comrade Stalin says that apparently in America some circles are offended that Orlemanski, and not a more senior [lit. “higher up”] individual, proposed to begin improved relations. “There’s [a bunch of] crocodiles for you!” remarks Comrade Stalin.

Comrade Stalin asks Lange to extend his greetings to Orlemanski.

Lange thanks him for the discussion.

The discussion lasted two hours and 15 minutes.

Source: AVPRF, f.6, op. 6, p. 42, d. 546, l. 53-70.

Contributed by Anna Cienciala and translated by Michael Thurman.



**Notes of Stalin's Speech during a Reception at the Kremlin on 23 June 1944
to Celebrate the Achievement of the Agreement
to Create the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity**

(A sketch recorded from memory)

Mr. Żulawski is right saying that between the Polish and Russian people there lies blood. Poland and Russia have been fighting wars with one another throughout the centuries, from which only Germany was profiting. The Poles had been capturing Moscow twice - the Russians were giving them tit for tat. In the past the Poles had many reasons to hate Russia. Greater guilt for the relationship between Poland and Russia, that had been shaped over the centuries was that of Russia's, as she was stronger than Poland. The old Tsarist Russia and its people were conducting repressive policies towards the Poles. It took new people to be found in Russia to change the policy practiced by Tsarist Russia. It was, first of all, Lenin, who during World War I conceded Poland's right to exist as an independent state. Beginning with the November Revolution, Poland did not have a reason to hate Russia. In Russia new people were already in power. But in Poland at that time people who would want an understanding with a new Russia could not be found. Poland had paid for it dearly. Not till World War II new people were found in Poland, who were willing to seek an understanding with Russia. Such a person is Osóbka-Morawski. He is not a communist, he is a socialist and a symbol of new people who have been found in Poland and reached an understanding with new people in Russia. A symbol of the old people, harmful to Poland and Russia is Arciszewski.

We do not want to be belied by word. Nobody should believe in word. Let the facts and deeds prove about relations of Russia to Poland. And our mutual relations should be governed by them. Poland will be a great and strong state. For Poland it won't be enough to have an alliance only with one state. She must have alliances with several great states. Poland needs alliances with the Western states, with Great Britain, France and friendly relations with America. History teaches us that one must not wait long for recovery of the German power. It's enough twenty years and Germany may regain its power and threaten with a new war. That is why Poland needs to conclude new alliances. There is a need for an agreement of four states: Poland - the Soviet Union - England - America².

Source: W. Góra and A. Kochański, "Rozmowy polityczne w sprawie utworzenia Tymczasowego Rządu Jedności Narodowej (czerwiec 1945)," Archiwum Ruchu Robotniczego, vol. 9 (1984), pp. 133-134.

Translated by Jan Chowaniec.

² To the record made by the same, unknown person, there was also attached a text of Stalin's statement, most likely from June 27, 1945, on S. Mikołajczyk's position regarding Poland's western borders:

".....Check him once again. Adopt a resolution to the effect that you have come to a preliminary agreement with us regarding the eastern borders and at the same time a resolution on your territorial claims in the West. An official resolution in the presence of Mikołajczyk. Let the Government approach us with an official letter on this matter. Let's see if Mikołajczyk won't withdraw due to England's position".

Who are these Men who Sleep so well?
(Excerpt from a Memorandum by George Kennan)

Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, now in the sixty-fifth year of his life and the twentieth year of his power in Russia, is the most powerful and the least known of the world's rulers. Only a handful of foreigners have ever seen him. None have ever had any intimate contact with him. No one knows exactly where, or with whom, he lives. His personal life remains a mystery which not even the curiosity of the American press has been able to penetrate. Only his political figure is apparent; and that figure is revealed at best in a series of brief and enigmatic glimpses.

From the standpoint of one who would understand Russia today, there are certain points about Stalin which it is important to remember.

First - that he is a Georgian. That strange law of psychology which has more than once caused great peoples to accept the rule of obscure and untypical persons from their own peripheries has brought Stalin from the barren hills of Georgia to the seclusion of the Kremlin. He does not now consider himself much of a Georgian; and history will have to admit that he has become one of the greatest of Russian national figures. But he has not lost the characteristics of his native environment. Courageous but wary; quick to anger and suspicion but patient and persistent in the execution of his purposes; capable of acting with great decision or of waiting and dissembling, as circumstances may require; outwardly modest and simple, but jealous of the prestige and dignity of the state which he heads; not learned, yet shrewd and pitilessly realistic; exacting in his demands for loyalty, respect and obedience; a keen and unsentimental student of men - he can be, like a true Georgian hero, a great and good friend or an implacable, dangerous enemy. It is difficult for him to be anything in between.

Second - his ignorance of the western world. Stalin's youth is shrouded in the mists of underworld revolutionary activity - largely in his native Caucasus. From that he graduated into the Dostoyevskian atmosphere of revolutionary conspiracy in European Russia. His life has known only what Lenin called "the incredibly swift transition from wild violence to the most delicate deceit". A brief glimpse of Stockholm, in his younger days, left little or no impression on his fevered imagination. Of western life in general, he could not possibly understand very much. The placid give and take of Anglo-Saxon life, in particular: the tempering of all enmity and all intimacy, the balancing function of personal self-respect, the free play of opposing interests - these things would remain incomprehensible, implausible, to him.

Third - his seclusion. Foreign representatives, fretting over their isolation in Moscow's diplomatic ghetto, should bear in mind that of all the people in Moscow Stalin himself is probably the most isolated. It is doubtful if in the course of the past fifteen years he has ever had the sensation of being alone or of mingling unobserved with other people. During all this time, he has probably never known what it is to walk down a street by the light of day, like anybody else, and to see life as others see it. If not even the humble diplomatic secretary can visit a Russian

provincial town quietly and normally, on his own, without swarms of guides and escorts, without elaborate preparations for his reception, without vodka and caviar and speeches, think what it must be for Stalin to try to catch his countrymen off guard. His bent from his Kremlin office to his datcha is no more revealing than the well-worn cowpaths of the Moscow diplomatic corps; and the precautions taken for his safety must make it nearly as hard for him to survey Moscow as it is for Moscow to survey him. The Moscow police, they say, are instructed to view with suspicion diplomats found to be anywhere except in an automobile, in a museum, or at the "Swan Lake" ballet. Stalin's life is even poorer. His visits to the ballet are few. And the whole Kremlin, when closely observed, bears a depressing resemblance to a vast and chilly museum.

Why do I single out for attention these three aspects of Stalin's life and character? I single them out because they all point to the same thing: namely, to his extreme dependence on his own friends and advisors. In every authoritarian state, political life too readily becomes a struggle for access to the ruler and for the control of his sources of information. In Russia, with its passion for secrecy and conspiracy, this has been particularly pronounced. In the case of Stalin's relations to the western world the role of his political intimates-- in view of his own ignorance, his extreme seclusion, and his suspicious Georgian nature-- be little short of decisive. In the conviction of the writer it is here, in the relations between Stalin and his advisors, that we must seek the explanations for the puzzling, often contradictory, manifestations of the Soviet attitude toward western nations.

* * * * *

The most indisputable, and perhaps the most important, point about Stalin's advisors is that for the past six years there has been practically no change among them. After a period of turn-over in high government positions unprecedented except in the most wildly revolutionary eras, Russian political life suddenly froze, about 1938, into an equally unprecedented immobility. There were not even any noteworthy deaths. The Kremlin, having successfully defied so many other rules of human behavior, seemed now to have defied even the laws of human frailty. The deductions of those cynical wits among the foreign observers who insisted that no one could survive the purges who was not endowed with the gift of immortality now seem to be finding confirmation. For years there have been, as far as the outside world is aware, no changes of note in the composition of the Politbureau, the Central Committee of the Party, or even the leading provincial party positions. This is extraordinary enough for a country that has been through two major reorientations of foreign policy and a military ordeal which rocked the state to its foundations. It is even more extraordinary for a political system which has never before failed to produce a few sacrificial political victims for every major reverse in the fortunes of the country. At best, it is an unhealthy situation, and one which will take on added importance when the war is over. The danger, in Russian circumstances, is that if changes are not made gradually and in good time, they may come all at once and start another landslide of panic, intrigue and denunciation similar to that which took place at the time of the purges.

What strikes the western observer most strongly about this state of affairs is that it means there is not a single person in a prominent position in Russia who is in any way personally identified with the present policy of collaboration with the western democracies. There is not a person who was not doing business pretty much at the same old stand back in the days when policies - and let us hope convictions - were entirely different.

To those who have come to Russia recently for the first time there is nothing unusual in the association of such men as Molotov, Vyshinski, Lozovski, and Manuilski with the policies of Moscow and Teheran. But in the minds of those whose memories of Russia are longer these names arouse strange images.

One can see the figure of Molotov at the Ceremonial Meeting of the Moscow Soviet in the Great Theatre, on November 6, 1939, denouncing England and France (" who are constantly dragging into war not only their own population but also the populations of the dominions and colonies") for opposing Hitler in this " criminal" war. They recall that only a few days earlier, at the Session of the Supreme Soviet, he had called England and France " the instigators of the second imperialist war" and had accused them of portraying themselves deceitfully " as fighters for the democratic rights of the peoples" .

One sees before him once again the figure of Vyshinski in the Prosecutor's box in the Hall of Columns. It is the trial of Bukharin; and Vyshinski is sounding the cry of suspicious, secretive Russia against the fancied hostility of the outside world. It is not only Germany he talks about. " Here in this dock" , he thunders, pointing an accusing finger at the last of the great names of the Revolution, " is not just one anti-Soviet group, the agents of just one foreign intelligence service. Here in the dock are a number of anti-Soviet groups, the agents of the intelligence services of a number of foreign powers hostile to the U.S.S.R. Implicated in the case are at least four foreign intelligence services, the Japanese, German, Polish, and British and - it goes without saying, all the other foreign intelligence services which maintain friendly, so-called operative contact with the above-mentioned intelligence services" . " This trial" , one can hear him conclude, " has reminded us again that two worlds face each other as irreconcilable and deadly enemies - the world of capitalism and the world of socialism" .

Memories shift to Lozovski the old operative head of the Red International of Labor Unions, now - like Vyshinski, - Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. For years on end he harangued despairing foreign workers of the Profintern, gathered together in Moscow for the improvement of their morals. He pleaded with them above all things to understand that apparent Soviet departures from the quest of world revolution did not mean that the goal had been lost sight of. The situation has changed, he would cry, and the tactics change. If any particular slogan has outlived its usefulness or any particular formula needs to be changed for a new one, that doesn't mean that everything that there was in the past was wrong. Could he say that today, one wonders? And would he still maintain, as he was maintaining in 1935, that no force

in the world will prevent the collapse of capitalism and the victory of the working class over the bourgeoisie.

And Manuilski, the old work-horse of the Comintern, now People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Ukraine. At the recent armistice negotiations with the Rumanians, which he attended as the foreign minister of a neighboring state to Rumania, he was friendly, agreeable, concerned for the condition of his liberated Ukraine, anxious that the British and American Ambassadors should come to Kiev and view the destruction wrought by the Germans there. Did he really want their sympathy? Had he forgotten that in 1939 he was saying: The years will pass. Not a stone will remain unturned of the cursed capitalistic structure, of its wars, its reaction, its vileness, its bestiality and its progressive savagery. People will think back on the days of capitalism as on a bad dream. Poor Manuilski. The years have passed. The upturned stones are to be found everywhere: in socialism and in capitalism alike - in Kiev as well as in London. The bad dreams of this age are of war and occupation, not of capitalism. Does he know that his analysis was unsound? Does he regret the words of 1939?

The men I have mentioned are all men prominently connected with Russia's formal diplomatic relations with the western world. They are men who have contact with foreigners in their work and presumably access to the foreign press and foreign literature. Possibly this has indeed widened their horizons to some extent. But what about those other leading figures of the regime whose voice in the inner councils of state is obviously greater than the voice of any of these four, except possibly Molotov? What about such men as Beriya, Zhdanov, Shcherbakov, Andreyev, Kaganovich, etc.? What advice do these men give to Stalin about foreign policy?

These prominent Soviet leaders know little of the outside world. They have no personal knowledge of foreign statesmen. To them, the vast pattern of international life, political and economic, can provide no associations, can hold no significance, except in what they conceive to be its bearing on the problems of Russian security and Russian internal life. It is possible that the conceptions of these men might occasionally achieve a rough approximation to reality, and their judgments a similar approximation to fairness; but it is not likely. Independence of judgment has never been a strong quality of leading Communist figures. There is evidence that they are as often as not the victims of their own slogans, the slaves of their own propaganda. To keep a level head in the welter of propaganda and auto-suggestion with which Russia has faced the world for the past twenty years would tax the best efforts of a cosmopolitan scholar and philosopher. These men are anything but that. God knows what strange images and impressions are created in their minds by what they hear of life beyond Russia's borders. God knows what conclusions they draw from all this, and what recommendations they make on the basis of those conclusions.

There is serious evidence for the hypothesis that there are influences in the Kremlin which place the preservation of a rigid police regime in Russia far ahead of the [ILLEGIBLE] development of Russia's foreign relations, and which are therefore strongly opposed to any association of Russia with foreign powers except on Russia's own terms. These terms would include the rigid preservation of the conspiratorial nature of the Communist party, of the secrecy of the working of the Soviet

state, of the isolation of the population from external influences, of feelings of mistrust of the outside world and dependence on the Soviet regime among the population, of the extreme restriction of all activities of foreigners in the Soviet Union, and the use of every means to conceal Soviet reality from world opinion.

There is reason to believe that these influences have a certain measure of control over the information and advice that reach Stalin. Certainly there has been an appreciable relaxation, as compared with seven years ago, in the restrictions on association between foreigners and Russians; and representatives of Russia's allies continue to be treated today with no less suspicion than was shown to German representatives in the days of the most violent anti-Fascist press polemics, prior to the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact. Fortunately, however, there is as yet no reason to conclude that this issue is finally decided and that the isolationists have entirely won the day. The overwhelming sentiment of the country is against them, so much so that this may become a serious internal issue in the aftermath of the war. So is the pressure of events in international life. They are undoubtedly balanced off by many men who have a healthier, a saner, and a more worthy conception of Russia's mission in the world. But that this xenophobic group exists and that it speaks with a powerful voice in the secret councils of the Kremlin is evident. And that it is in no way accessible to the pleas or arguments of responsible people in the outside world is no less clear.

As long as this situation endures, the great nations of the west will unavoidably be in a precarious position in their relations with Russia. They will never be able to be sure when, unbeknownst to them, people of whom they have no knowledge, acting on motives utterly obscure, will go to Stalin with misleading information and with arguments to be used to their disadvantage - information which they cannot correct and arguments which they have no opportunity to rebut. As long as this possibility exists, as long as it is not corrected by a freer atmosphere for the forming of acquaintances and the exchange of views, it is questionable whether ever the friendliest of relations could be considered sound and dependable.

Those men of good will, among the foreign representatives in Moscow, for whom the relations of Russia with the world at large have become one of the great experiences and hopes of contemporary life, may go on with their patient work of unraveling the never-ending tangle of misunderstanding and difficulties which lie across the path of Russia's foreign relations. They will continue to be borne up in this trial of patience by their unanimous faith in the greatness of the Russian people and by their knowledge of the need of the world for Russia's talents. But at heart they all know that until the Chinese wall of the spirit has been broken down, as the actual Chinese wall of Moscow's business district was recently broken - until new avenues of contact and of vision are opened up between the Kremlin and the world around it - they can have no guarantee that their efforts will meet with success and that the vast creative abilities of Russia will not lead to the tragedy, rather than to the rescue, of western civilization.

Source: George Kennan, memo, "Russia - Seven Years Later," Sept. 1944, pp. 20-26: copy given to British Embassy, Moscow, and retained in FO 800/302

(Public Record Office, Kew). Excerpts also in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, vol. IV (1966), pp. 902-14.

**RECORD OF MEETING AT THE KREMLIN, MOSCOW,
9th OCTOBER, 1944, AT 10 p.m.**

Present:

The Prime Minister.
The Secretary of State.
Sir A. Clark Kerr.
Mr. A Birse.

Marshal Stalin.
M. Molotov.
M. Pavlov.

THE PRIME MINISTER gave Marshal Stalin a signed photograph of himself in return for the one sent him some weeks ago by the Marshal.

THE PRIME MINISTER hoped they might clear away many questions about which they had been writing to each other for a long time. As time had passed many things had arisen, but they were out of all proportion to the greatness of the common struggle. By talking to each other he and Stalin could avoid innumerable telegrams and letters - and they could give the Ambassador a holiday.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that he was ready to discuss anything.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested beginning with the most tiresome question - Poland. He said that they should have a common policy in regard to Poland. At present each had a game cock in his hand.

MARSHAL STALIN said (with a laugh) that it was difficult to do without cocks. They gave the morning signal.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that the question of the frontier was settled as agreed. He would like presently to check up on the frontier with a map.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that if the frontier was agreed on the Curzon Line it would help their discussion.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he wanted to explain what was in his and the Secretary of State's mind as they understood the situation. The time would come when they would meet at the armistice table, and that might also be the peace table. The Americans would find it easier to settle at an armistice table, because there the President could decide, whereas at a peace table the Senate would have to be consulted. At the armistice table the Prime Minister would support the frontier line as fixed at Tehran and he thought it likely that the United States would do the same. That decision had been endorsed by the British War Cabinet, and he felt it would be approved by his country. He would say it was right, fair and necessary for the safety and future of Russia. If some General Sosnkowski objected it would not matter, because Britain and United States thought it right and fair. He and Mr. Eden had for months been trying to get Sosnkowski sacked. He had now been sacked and as for General Bor, the Germans were looking after him.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that the Poles were now without a Commander-in-Chief.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that some colourless man had been left. He could not remember his name. The Prime Minister went on to ask Marshal Stalin a question. Would he think it worth while to bring Mikolajczyk and Romer to Moscow? He had them tied up in an aircraft and it would only take 36 hours to Moscow.

MARSHAL STALIN asked whether they had the authority to settle questions with the Polish Committee for National Liberation.

THE PRIME MINISTER was not sure, but he thought they would not be anxious to go to bed with the Committee. If, however, they were in Moscow they could, with British and Russian agreement, be forced to settle.

MARSHAL STALIN had no objection to making another attempt, but Mikolajczyk would have to make contact with the Committee. The latter now had an army at its disposal and represented a force.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that the other side also thought they had an army, and part of which had held out in Warsaw. They also had a brave army corps in Italy, where they lost seven or eight thousand men. Then there was the armoured division, one brigade of which was in France. A Polish division which had gone to Switzerland when France fell was coming out in dribbles. They were well equipped and they had many friends in England. They were good and brave men. The difficulty about the Poles was that they had unwise political leaders. Where there were two Poles there was one quarrel.

MARSHAL STALIN added that where there was one Pole he would begin to quarrel with himself through sheer boredom.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that Marshal Stalin and he himself as well as M. Molotov and Mr. Eden between them had more chance of bringing the Poles together. The British would bring pressure to bear on their Poles, while the Poles in the East were already in agreement with the Soviet Government.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed to try.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked if there was any objection to M. Grabski's coming to Moscow.

MARSHAL STALIN had no objection.

THE PRIME MINISTER then referred to the armistice terms for the satellites who had been coerced by Germany and had not distinguished themselves in the war. If Marshal Stalin agreed, the Prime Minister thought that M. Molotov or Mr. Eden might discuss these

terms. The terms for Hungary were important. He hoped the Russians would soon be in Budapest.

MARSHAL STALIN said it was possible.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that there were two countries in which the British had particular interest, one was Greece. He was not worrying much about Roumania. That was very much a Russian affair and the treaty the Soviet Government had proposed was reasonable and showed much statecraft in the interests of general peace in the future. But in Greece it was different. Britain must be the leading Mediterranean Power and he hoped Marshal Stalin would let him have the first say about Greece in the same way as Marshal Stalin about Roumania. Of course, the British Government would keep in touch with the Soviet Government.

MARSHAL STALIN understood that Britain had suffered very much owing to her communications in the Mediterranean having been cut by the Germans. It was a serious matter for Britain when the Mediterranean route was not in her hands. In that respect Greece was very important. He agreed with the Prime Minister that Britain should have the first say in Greece.

THE PRIME MINISTER said it was better to express these things in diplomatic terms and not to use the phrase "dividing into spheres," because the Americans might be shocked. But as long as he and Marshal understood each other he could explain matters to the President.

MARSHAL STALIN interrupted to say that he had received a message from President Roosevelt. The President wanted Mr. Harriman to attend their talks as an observer and that the decisions reached between them should be of a preliminary nature.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed. He had told the President - he and the President had no secrets - that he would welcome Mr. Harriman to a good number of their talks, but he did not want this to prevent intimate talk between Marshal Stalin and himself. He would keep the President informed. Mr. Harriman might come in for any formal talks as an observer. Mr. Harriman was not quite in the same position as they were.

MARSHAL STALIN said he had only sent a reply to the effect that he did not know what questions would be discussed, but as soon as he did know he would tell the President. He had noticed some signs of alarm in the President's message about their talks and on the whole did not like the message. It seemed to demand too many rights for the United States leaving too little for the Soviet Union and Great Britain, who, after all, had a treaty of common assistance.

MARSHAL STALIN went on to say that he had no objection to Mr. Harriman's attending the formal talks.

THE PRIME MINISTER referred to the Conference at Dumbarton Oaks. The President had not wanted this to be discussed in Moscow but only when the three heads got together. The President had not said so, but he must have had in mind the coming election. The President would be more free to talk in about a month's time. It was fair to say that while at first His Majesty's Government had inclined to the American view they now saw a great deal of force in the other point of view. Supposing China asked Britain to give up Hong Kong, China and Britain would have to leave the room while Russia and the United States settled the question. Or, if the Argentine and the United States had a quarrel they would object if England, China and Russia had to settle it. The Prime Minister pointed out that all this was off the record. The wise thing was not to refer in Moscow to this question, but to wait until the meeting of the three heads, when it could be settled.

THE PRIME MINISTER then raised the question of the interests of the two governments in the various Balkan countries and the need to work in harmony in each of them. After some discussion it was agreed that as regards Hungary and Yugoslavia each of the two Governments was equally interested, that Russia had a major interest in Roumania and that Britain was in the same position with regard to Greece. The Prime Minister suggested that where Bulgaria was concerned the British interest was greater than it was in Roumania. This led to some discussion about the crimes committed by Bulgaria.

MARSHAL STALIN recalled the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, where the Bulgarians had been on the German side and three divisions had fought against the Russians in the last war.

THE PRIME MINISTER declared that Bulgaria owed more to Russia than to any other country. He said that in Roumania Britain had been a spectator. In Bulgaria she had to be a little more than a spectator.

M. MOLOTOV asked whether the Turkish question related to this matter.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he had not touched upon Turkey. He was only saying what was in his mind. He was glad to see how near it was to the Russian mind.

M. MOLOTOV remarked that the Convention of Montreux still remained.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that was a Turkish question and not a Bulgarian.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that Turkey was also a Balkan country. According to the Convention of Montreux Japan had as much right as Russia. Everything had been adjusted to the League of Nations and the League of Nations no longer existed. If Turkey were threatened she could close the Straits and Turkey herself had to decide when she was faced with a real threat. All the paragraphs in the Montreux Convention were controlled by Turkey. This was an anachronism. Marshal Stalin had put this question in Tehran and the Prime Minister had expressed his sympathy. Now that they were discussing the Balkan question and Turkey was a Balkan country, did the Prime Minister think it appropriate to discuss it?

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed.

MARSHAL STALIN pointed out that if Britain were interested in the Mediterranean then Russia was equally interested in the Black Sea.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that Turkey had missed her chance after the Tehran conference. The reason she was frightened was because she had no modern weapons, she thought she had a good army, whereas nowadays an army was not everything. Turkey was not clever.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that Turkey had 26 divisions in Thrace and asked against whom they were directed.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied they were directed against Bulgaria, because Bulgaria was armed with French weapons taken by the Germans. The Prime Minister went on to say that, taking a long view of the future of the world it was no part of British policy to grudge Soviet Russia access to warm-water ports and to the great oceans and seas of the world. On the contrary, it was part of their friendship to help the Soviet Union. They no longer followed the policy of Disraeli or Lord Curzon. They were not going to stop Russia. They wished to help. What did Marshal Stalin think about the kind of changes required in the Montreux Convention?

MARSHAL STALIN could not say what point required amendment, but he felt the convention was unsuitable in present circumstances and the spearhead was directed against Russia. It should be dropped. If the Prime Minister agreed in principle with that point of view it might be possible to discuss the required changes. It was quite impossible for Russia to remain subject to Turkey, who could close the Straits and hamper Russian imports and exports and even her defences. What would Britain do if Spain or Egypt were given this right to close the Suez Canal, or what would the United States Government say if some South American Republic had the right to close the Panamá Canal? Russia was in a worse situation. Marshal Stalin did not want to restrict Turkey's sovereignty. But at the same time he did not want Turkey to abuse her sovereignty and to grip Russian trade by the throat.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that in principle he shared that point of view. He suggested that the Russians should let us know in due course what was required. Otherwise Turkey might be frightened that Istanbul was to be taken. When the three heads met later on there would not be the same difficulty. He was in favour of Russia's having free access to the Mediterranean for her merchant ships and ships of war. Britain hoped to work in a friendly way with the Soviet Union, but wanted to bring Turkey along by gentle steps, not to frighten her.

MARSHAL STALIN said he understood.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that, if they were sitting at the armistice table and Marshal Stalin asked him for free passage through the Straits for merchant ships and

warships, he personally would say that Britain had no objection. Britain had no ties with Turkey except the Montreux Convention, which was inadmissible to-day and obsolete.

MARSHAL STALIN said he did not want to hurry the Prime Minister, but only to point out that the question existed in their minds and he was anxious that it should be admitted that their claim was justified.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought Marshal Stalin should take the initiative and tell the United States what was in his mind. The Prime Minister thought Russia had a right and moral claim. Looking at the Balkans he thought they should do something to prevent the risk of civil war between the political ideologies in those countries. They could not allow a lot of little wars after the Great World War. They should be stopped by the authority of the three Great Powers.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he wanted to talk about Kings. In no case would Britain try to force a King on Italy, Greece or Yugoslavia. At the same time the people ought to be left to decide matters by a free plebiscite in time of tranquillity. They could then say whether they wanted a republic or a monarchy. The people should have a fair chance of freedom of expression. Northern Italy was in the power of the Anglo-American armies. Britain did not care for the Italian King, but above all they did not want civil war after the troops had been withdrawn or before their withdrawal. Britain would like the Soviet Union to soft-pedal the Communists in Italy and not to stir them up. Pure democracy would settle what the people wanted, but he did not want to have disturbances in Turin or Milan and clashes between the troops and the people. The Italians were in a miserable condition. He did not think much of them as a people, but they had a good many votes in New York State. This was off the record.

The Prime Minister went on to say that he did not want to have trouble in Italy before the United States left it. The President was their best friend. They would never have such a good one. That was why he petted the Italians, though he did not like them much. He had not meant that the Soviet Union should influence the Communist vote in New York. He was referring to the Communists in Italy.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that it was difficult to influence Italian Communists. The position of Communists differed in different countries. It depended upon their national situation. If Ercoli were in Moscow Marshal Stalin might influence him. But he was in Italy, where the circumstances were different. He could send Marshal Stalin to the devil. Ercoli could say he was an Italian and tell Marshal Stalin to mind his own business. When the Red Army entered Bulgaria, Bulgarian Communists proceeded to form Soviets. The Red Army stopped it. The Communists arrested the Bulgarian police and the Red Army freed the police. However, Ercoli was a wise man, not an extremist, and would not start an adventure in Italy.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he was only asking that they should not be stirred up.

MARSHAL STALIN expressed his fear that the Communists would send him to the devil. As regards the King, Ercoli had his own views. He had said he would collaborate with the King if the King stood by the people. Ercoli had referred to Germany, where there was no King, but where there was a man who was worse than the greatest despot.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed. He then said that he had been talking the whole time and that it was now Marshal Stalin's turn.

MARSHAL STALIN reverted to the Balkans and suggested that our interest in Bulgaria was not, in fact, as great as the Prime Minister had claimed.

MR. EDEN remarked that Britain wanted more in Bulgaria than in Roumania.

MARSHAL STALIN claimed that Bulgaria was a Black Sea country. Was Britain afraid of anything? Was she afraid of a Soviet campaign against Turkey? The Soviet Union had no such intention.

MR. EDEN said Britain was not afraid of anything.

MARSHAL STALIN asked whether the Prime Minister thought Bulgaria was being punished less than she deserved. Bulgaria should be punished for her two wars on the side of Germany.

MR. EDEN reminded Marshal Stalin that Britain had been at war with Bulgaria for three years and wanted a small share in the control of that country after Germany's defeat.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that M. Molotov and Mr. Eden should go into details. This was agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that in the presence of Mr. Harriman they might have a talk about the future of Germany. He suggested that for about a month or so they should not say anything publicly because it would make the Germans fight harder. He had been shy of breathing fire and slaughter, but they might discuss it quietly among themselves.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he was all for hard terms. Opinions were divided in the United States. The best thing would be to beat the Germans into unconditional surrender and then tell them what to do. He wanted to hear Marshal Stalin's opinion about the régime to be applied and how Germany was to be divided, what was to be done with Prussia, the Saar and the Ruhr, and with German weapons. Russian factories had been destroyed as well as Belgian and Dutch and the machines taken away would have to be replaced. Perhaps the Foreign Secretaries could discuss this matter with M. Molotov and Mr. Harriman.

The President was for hard terms. Others were for soft. The problem was how to prevent Germany getting on her feet in the lifetime of our grandchildren.

MARSHAL STALIN thought the Versailles peace was inadequate. It had not removed the possibility of revenge. Hard measures would stir a desire for revenge. The problem was to create such a peace that the possibility of revenge would be denied to Germany. Her heavy industry would have to be destroyed. The State would have to be split up. How that was to be done would have to be discussed. Her heavy industry would have to be reduced to a minimum.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested it should apply to the electrical and chemical industries also.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed that it should apply to all industry producing war material. Germany should be deprived of the possibility of revenge. Otherwise every twenty-five or thirty years there would be a new world war which would exterminate the young generation. If approached from that angle the harshest measures would prove to be the most humane. Eight to ten million Germans had been lost after every war. Reprisals in Germany might not affect only one and a half million Germans. As regards concrete proposals, Mr. Eden and M. Molotov should get together.

M. MOLOTOV asked what was the Prime Minister's opinion of the Morgenthau plan.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the President and Mr. Morgenthau were not very happy about its reception. The Prime Minister went on to say that as he had declared in Tehran, Britain would not agree to mass executions of Germans, because one day British public opinion would cry out. But it was necessary to kill as many as possible in the field. The others should be made to work to repair the damage done to other countries. They might use the Gestapo on such work and the Hitler Youth should be re-educated to learn that it was more difficult to build than to destroy.

MARSHAL STALIN thought that a long occupation of Germany would be necessary.

THE PRIME MINISTER did not think that the Americans would stay very long.

MARSHAL STALIN said France should provide some forces.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed.

MARSHAL STALIN suggested the use of the small countries.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought United Poland could be employed.

MARSHAL STALIN said Silesia would go to the Poles and part of East Prussia. The Soviet Union would take Koenigsberg and the Poles would be very interested in the occupation of Germany.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought the population might be moved from Silesia and East Prussia to Germany. If seven million had been killed in the war there would be plenty of room for them. He suggested that M. Molotov and Mr. Eden, with Mr. Harriman, should talk this over and get a picture of the general proposals for Marshal Stalin and himself to think about, and thus when the end came they would not be without something unprobed. They should also decide what part the European Advisory Commission should play.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER turned to the Anglo-American war against Japan. He pointed out that here again the utmost secrecy was required. He remarked how wonderfully well secrecy had been maintained considering the declaration made by Marshal Stalin at Tehran about Japan. The Prime Minister had asked the President to give a statement for use as an outline of the American plan for 1945 in the Pacific. Plans were moving quickly and the position was changing very much as island after island was taken, but the President had given Mr. Harriman and General Deane an outline of the plan which he (the Prime Minister) was to be shown and it was to be discussed with the Soviet Generals. He suggested that conversations should begin with Mr. Harriman and his General and that afterwards they might go away and talk separately, technically.

MARSHAL STALIN said that the Soviet military leaders had been informed of the existence of the President's plan and General Deane was to have had a talk with the Soviet High Command, but the latter were awaiting information from the Far East about Japanese strength. Marshal Stalin did not know details of the plan just as the Prime Minister did not know them, but he was prepared to acquaint himself with it. If they could all meet and examine the plan that would be better.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he thought that Mr. Harriman and General Deane had been authorised to tell Marshal Stalin in broad outline about the plan, but he thought it should be discussed with General Brooke, who was also a member of the Suvorov Order. General Brooke was going to take a ride in a tram as he was entitled to do, but he could not spare the time for a visit to the seaside. These were his privileges as a member of the Order of Suvorov. General Brooke was also ready to give an account of the operations in the West, in France and Italy and to tell how affairs stood. He would like Marshal Stalin to know that the British had as many divisions fighting against Germany in Italy and France as the United States and we had nearly as many as the United States fighting against Japan. Altogether 60 divisions of 40,000 men including a heavy backing of commissariat, artillery, &c.

Source: Public Record Office.

**RECORD OF MEETING AT THE KREMLIN, MOSCOW.
ON 10th OCTOBER, 1944, AT 7 p.m.**

Present:

Secretary of State.
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.
Mr. Oliver Harvey.
Mr. A. Birse.

M. Molotov.
M. Vyshinski.
M. Gusev.
M. Pavlov.

Mr. EDEN suggested they should talk about Bulgaria and the Balkans in general.

M. MOLOTOV suggested that they should first discuss Hungary in connexion with what Marshal Stalin had said to the Prime Minister. Marshal Stalin thought that after learning of the considerable losses sustained by the Red Army in Hungary, the army would not understand it if a principle of 50/50 were allotted. M. Molotov had been instructed by the Marshal to raise this question and to give his opinion.

Mr. EDEN said he would be glad to hear M. Molotov's opinion.

M MOLOTOV began by saying that the 75/25 principle was what the Soviet Government proposed, for the reason that Hungary bordered on the Soviet Union and the Red Army was operating in that country and suffering losses. Hungary had been and always would be a bordering country. Russia's interest was therefore comprehensible. Russia did not want Hungary to be on the side of the aggressor in the future. At the same time, Russia had no territorial claims in Hungary.

Mr. EDEN remarked that His Majesty's Government would certainly consider the question of Hungary but he would prefer to have a chance of thinking it over.

Mr. Eden went on to say that he would speak frankly. His Majesty's Government were unhappy over the whole situation in the Balkans. They were being presented with *faits accomplis*. Some months ago when Tito was in difficulties the British had given him refuge on the island of Vis under the protection of the Royal Navy and R.A.F., and it was only through British action that he was saved from complete extinction. The British had armed him and supported him and now, without a word or information from himself or from the Soviet Ally, he had left Vis and come to Moscow and was making an agreement about the Bulgarians in Yugoslavia which was quite unacceptable to the British. The Bulgarians treated the British as if Bulgaria had won the war and Britain had lost it. British Officers in Northern Greece had, by order of the Bulgarian authorities, been confined to their houses. His Majesty's Government must ask the Soviet Union for support and for this to be brought to an end. Mr. Eden was ready to discuss armistice terms for Bulgaria and he felt he was entitled to ask that instructions be sent through the Soviet Marshal in Sofia to the Bulgarians

in Greece to treat British officers with proper respect pending the withdrawal of the Bulgarians from Greece.

M. MOLOTOV readily agreed that the matter should be put in order and that the Bulgarians must be made to feel they were not the victors. They had done enough damage to the Soviet Union and to the Allies and though Bulgaria had a new Government she should be held responsible for her past misdeeds. It was necessary to take practical measures to regulate these questions, and for Bulgaria to be taught to show respect to the Allies in Bulgaria. The Soviet Government appreciated the British claim.

Mr. EDEN did not know whether he had made himself clear. The trouble had occurred not where the Russians were stationed in Bulgaria but in Northern Greece. Orders had been given to British officers to keep to their houses and he would like M. Molotov to telegraph to the Soviet Marshal in Sofia to tell the Bulgarians to instruct their authorities in Northern Greece to treat British representatives with proper respect. In that connection His Majesty's Government were sending, in conjunction with the Greek Government, some further British Officers to Northern Greece. He did not want them to be put in prison.

M. MOLOTOV pointed out that at the outset it had been agreed to make some preliminary conditions in the case of Bulgaria for the withdrawal of her troops from Greece and Yugoslavia. So far the Soviet Government had not interfered in affairs beyond the borders of Bulgaria.

Mr. EDEN remarked that he understood and suggested, without asking for Soviet interference outside of Bulgaria, that British officers while in Greece should receive fair treatment and this the Bulgarians would do if they received instructions from the Soviet Government.

M. MOLOTOV thought they could reach an agreement on this point, but repeated that they had not interfered in affairs outside of Bulgaria and, in particular, in Greece. The question was how agreement could be reached. He would speak to Marshal Stalin.

Mr. EDEN said he would be ready to discuss the armistice terms but the above question would have to be settled. He thought that if the Soviet Government sent a telegram to their representative in Sofia to the effect that they understood some British officers in Northern Greece had been put under arrest by the Bulgarians and instructing the Soviet representative to request the Bulgarians immediately to put an end to this state of affairs, this would be enough to make the Bulgarians behave in Northern Greece until they withdrew. He hoped it would be soon.

M. MOLOTOV repeated that he would speak to Marshal Stalin.

Mr. EDEN then turned to the armistice terms. He suggested they should first discuss the difficult points. These would have to be finally settled and passed through the European Advisory Commission and agreed with their American friends. He thought that if they could agree on the general lines in Moscow they could telegraph to their representatives and then

matters could be quickly arranged. The first question in dispute was where the negotiations were to be held.

M. MOLOTOV asked if this was important.

Mr. EDEN replied by asking the same question of M. Molotov.

M. MOLOTOV did not think it was important. They should take place where a speedy settlement could be made. That could be done in Moscow, where they had the experienced Moscow Commission.

Mr. EDEN said that the point was important. He was prepared to make concessions and he would suggest Moscow. The London Commission would have to agree certain terms and then the Allied representatives would meet the Bulgarians. The question was: Where? M. Molotov had suggested Moscow and Mr. Eden agreed.

M. MOLOTOV said they preferred Moscow, where they could have the help of Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

Mr. EDEN said that the difficulty was the following, and he could not give way on it: His Majesty's Government insisted on some share in the Control Commission after the war with Germany was over. The Americans were also not prepared to give way on this point. He asked M. Molotov to understand that Britain had been at war with Bulgaria for three years and it simply would not be understood by the British people if Britain had no part in the Control Commission after the war with Germany was over. In other words, he would have to insist upon the amendment as proposed by the Americans about the future of the Control Commission.

M. MOLOTOV suggested that, before discussing that amendment, he would like to make one concession in return for Mr. Eden's concession about the place for negotiations. It was about the signature. He did not know whether Mr. Eden attached importance to the danger which lay in the wish to have two signatures, namely, Marshal Tolbukhin and General Wilson. Marshal Tolbukhin was not a naval man, but in so far as the Red Army had anything to do with the sea it was with the Black Sea. The signature of General Wilson meant that a general was signing who had something to do with Mediterranean affairs. If there was a Mediterranean General, and a Black Sea General, then Bulgaria might claim that she was not only a Black Sea Power but also a Mediterranean Power.

Mr. EDEN replied that there was no question of Bulgaria being a Mediterranean Power.

M. MOLOTOV said he understood and that Bulgaria should be punished for the help she had given to Germany. However, if this danger did not appear so great then the Soviet Government agreed to two signatures. This was a concession to British public opinion if they felt that they must have a greater share in Bulgarian affairs. The concession was greater than that made by Mr. Eden.

Mr. EDEN said he was grateful for the gesture. It would have a good effect, and the Americans would also appreciate it. He could promise that the Royal Navy would keep the Bulgarians out of the Mediterranean.

M. MOLOTOV claimed that he could not understand the American amendment. In the case of the Control Commission in Italy and Roumania all was clear. It was clear who was responsible for the activities of the Control Commission. Experience had shown that the procedure was satisfactory. But what would happen if a new method were adopted for Bulgaria after the German surrender? Three people would be responsible for the activities of the Commission. There might be confusion which would lead to friction.

Mr. EDEN said that he did not mind so much about the machinery, but he was anxious to make plain that we had some share in the Control Commission. Roumania was quite different. The American proposal was possibly a way out because it was the same as in the case of Germany. However, he was ready to look at any proposal the Soviet Government might make provided the British and Americans were not observers as in Roumania but played a part in the Control Commission.

M. MOLOTOV pointed out that in Germany there would be three zones of occupation and the comparison with Germany was not clear. He had not heard of zones in Bulgaria. Marshal Stalin had said with regard to Bulgaria that it would be right for Russia to have 90 per cent interest in Bulgaria. If they could agree on a proportion of 90/10 then agreement could easily be reached on all the rest.

Mr. EDEN pointed out that this would put Britain in the same position as in Roumania.

M. MOLOTOV agreed it would be so as regards the principle, but as regards the form of procedure a way could be found. It might be possible to think out a way to meet American and British wishes. For instance the conditions might be discussed in London. The machinery of the Control Commission might be made more favourable for Britain.

Mr. EDEN said the American formula if accepted by the Soviet Government attracted him, but he was quite ready to consider anything the Russians proposed provided Britain had a little more in Bulgaria. It was necessary to act with speed. Delay was bad.

M. MOLOTOV agreed about the necessity for speed, but said he could not understand the American proposal. How would three representatives act in Bulgaria where there were no zones? Did the Americans and British contemplate stationing troops in Bulgaria. How could there be proper management in Bulgaria after the end of the war with Germany? It was obscure and might mean friction. He considered that 90/10 as proposed by Marshal Stalin was fair.

MR. EDEN replied that there was no intention to station troops in Bulgaria. He suggested there might be a permanent Soviet chairman on the Control Commission.

M. MOLOTOV refused to consider this as the three representatives would decide affairs which would mean that the British and Americans would have 33 per cent each and the Soviet Union 1 per cent more than they because the President was a Soviet citizen. They would have 34 percent instead of 90 percent. He asked what was the object of the proposal.

Mr. EDEN pointed out that in Roumania the British and American officers were observers. For the period of hostilities with Germany they accepted that position also in Bulgaria. But after the surrender of Germany they would like to be more than observers and have active participation. He had no views as to how to express this. Britain's share was less than the Russian because Russia had troops and administration in Bulgaria.

M. MOLOTOV thought it would be a strange kind of management where no indication was given of who was responsible.

Mr. EDEN said the main responsibility would lie with the Soviet Union.

M. MOLOTOV declared that despite this responsibility the Soviet Union was asking for 90 percent and not 100 percent.

Mr. EDEN said he did not know much about these percentages. All he wanted was a greater share than we already had in Roumania. In Roumania we had 10 percent which was almost nothing.

M. MOLOTOV pointed out that the idea of percentages arose from the meeting on the previous day, and it was worthy of consideration. Could they not agree on the following: Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia 75/25 per cent each?

Mr. EDEN said that would be worse than on the previous day.

M. MOLOTOV then suggested 90/10 for Bulgaria, 50/50 for Yugoslavia and Hungary subject to an amendment.

Mr. EDEN pointed out that they had not agreed about Bulgaria.

M. MOLOTOV remarked that he thought 90/10 was an ultimatum and meant the unconditional surrender of Moscow. However something would have to be done which would be acceptable to all three.

Mr. EDEN said he was ready to meet M. Molotov's wishes with regard to Hungary, but he asked for M. Molotov's help to get some participation in Bulgaria after the Germans had been beaten. Possibly some other formula would be accepted. For instance we and the Americans might each have an officer on the Control Commission who would not be as important as the Soviet representative.

M. MOLOTOV then suggested 75/25 for Hungary.

M. MOLOTOV continued that they had not finished with Bulgaria. If Hungary was 75/25, then Bulgaria should be 75/25 and Yugoslavia 60/40. This was the limit to which he could go.

Mr. EDEN said he could not make this suggestion to the Prime Minister who was greatly interested in Yugoslavia. He had been at pains to champion Tito and to furnish arms. Any change in Yugoslavian percentages would upset him. Mr. Eden then suggested Hungary 75/25; Bulgaria 80/20; Yugoslavia 50/50.

M. MOLOTOV was ready to agree to 50/50 for Yugoslavia if Bulgaria were 90/10. If the figure for Bulgaria had to be amended then Yugoslavia would also have to be changed.

Mr. EDEN pointed out that with regard to Hungary we had made a concession.

M. MOLOTOV repeated that Hungary bordered on Russia and not on Britain. The Russians had suffered losses in Hungary. Marshal Stalin had mentioned this to the Prime Minister. What did 60/40 for Yugoslavia mean? It meant the coast where Russia would have less interest and would not interfere, but they were to have a greater influence in the centre.

Mr. EDEN repeated that Britain had been at war with Bulgaria for three years. The Bulgarians had treated us badly. They had beaten British and American prisoners. Russia had been at war with Bulgaria for 48 hours, and then Britain had been warned off Bulgaria who had received favorable treatment.

M. MOLOTOV did not agree. Russia had suffered more than Britain from the Bulgarians, to say nothing of the last war, but the Soviet Union did not want to increase its number of enemies. It had had the intention several times to declare war on Bulgaria. The harm done by Bulgaria to the Soviet Union was many times greater than that done to anyone else. Roumania and Bulgaria were Black Sea Powers. Neither of them had access to the Mediterranean so that Britain should have little interest in those countries. M. Molotov was not speaking of Greece. The Soviet Union was prepared to help Britain to be strong in the Mediterranean, but hoped that Britain would help the Soviet Union in the Black Sea. That was why they were interested in Bulgaria. Bulgaria was not Greece, Italy, Spain or even Yugoslavia.

Mr. EDEN said that they had little interest in Bulgaria and they were therefore asking for very little. But we had been at war with her and the question should be looked at through British eyes. Tito happened to have been accessible and Britain had helped him with arms. He had now come to Moscow but Britain had been kept in ignorance. When the British public found this out there would be criticism and rightly so. He was making an arrangement for Bulgarian troops to stay in Yugoslavia, an arrangement between Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Russia. A bad impression would be created and suspicion aroused as to Russian intentions.

M. MOLOTOV said he thought Marshal Stalin would agree to the following: 75/25 for Bulgaria, but 60/40 for Yugoslavia. He did not think that British sailors would call the Black Sea a "sea," but only a lake.

Mr. EDEN said it was the Soviet Union's lake.

M. MOLOTOV remarked that he had in mind the British point of view. The Black Sea was a lake. After such a war and the sacrifices of the Soviet Union anyone would understand that they had to make sure of their safety. As regards Marshal Tito, he had seen him for the first time now in Moscow and Marshal Stalin had not seen him before. His impression was that Tito was an honest man and friendly to the Allies. There was no doubt of it. Mr. Churchill's son had met him and would be able to speak of Tito's influence. He would confirm what M. Molotov had said about his honesty and friendliness. Tito had not told the British and Americans about his visit to Moscow. That was a double mistake and he was spoiling with the British and Americans to his own detriment. In the second place he was treating his meeting with Stalin as an advertisement to increase his prestige. In Italy he had met the Prime Minister. M. Molotov thought he was rather provincial. He had spent too much time in the mountains. He liked mystery, but he had no ill will.

Mr. EDEN said he was sorry that His Majesty's Government had not been informed. For some time Tito could not be found. But he was not in the hills. He was on the island of Vis.

M. MOLOTOV thought he would soon be in Belgrade and his provincialism would fade away.

Mr. EDEN pointed out that meanwhile he was making an agreement with the Bulgarians.

M. MOLOTOV thought that if they told him what he was to do he could remedy his mistakes. He thought they could reach agreement on that point. As regards Bulgaria M. Molotov had proposed two alternatives. He would speak to Marshal Stalin. He asked Mr. Eden which alternative he preferred.

Mr. EDEN said he did not care so much about the figures. He understood Russia's interest in Bulgaria and Britain accepted it. But Britain asked for something more there than in Roumania. If M. Molotov did not like the American formula, any other proposed by the Russians would be considered. For example, instead of calling it the Allied Control Commission it might be called the Soviet Control Commission, with an American and British representative.

M. MOLOTOV asked whether they could reach agreement in regard to Yugoslavia.

Mr. EDEN asked what they had to decide.

M. MOLOTOV claimed more weight for the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had nothing to do with regard to affairs on the coast. They were ready to stay on their "lake."

Mr. EDEN preferred to have a common policy. There were various questions to decide. When Yugoslavia was free there was the question of the relations between Tito and the Government in London. Were they to come together? Was there to be joint administration? It was desirable that the Allies should pursue the same ideas.

M. MOLOTOV agreed that the question required attention. He asked Sir Archibald Clark Kerr for his advice how to proceed.

SIR ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR thought the best way was to bring Tito and Subasić together if the Soviet Government and His Majesty's Government used their influence in that direction and then they could decide what form of government they wanted—monarchy, or republic or anything else.

M. MOLOTOV said he would report to Marshal Stalin and thought they could find a way out. He thanked Sir Archibald for his help.

Mr. EDEN, summing up, said the one question outstanding about Bulgaria was the Control Commission after the war with Germany was over. They had agreed that the discussions should take place in Moscow, and about the joint signature.

M. MOLOTOV claimed that this was bound up with Yugoslavia.

Mr. EDEN disagreed. He appealed for a settlement of the Bulgarian question within 24 hours as the delay was embarrassing in all reports.

M. MOLOTOV said that he would do his best for a settlement in 24 hours.

Source: Public Record Office.

**RECORD OF MEETING HELD AT SPIRIDONOVKA HOUSE ON
THE 13th OCTOBER AT 5 p.m.**

Present:

Prime Minister.	Marshal Stalin.	M. Mikolajczyk.
Secretary of State.	M. Molotov.	M. Romer.
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.	M. Gusev.	M. Grabski.
Mr. Allen.	M. Pavlov.	M. Minishek.
Mr. A. Birse.		

M. MOLOTOV opened the meeting by stating that there were present the representatives of the Soviet Union, the British and American Governments and their guests M. Mikolajczyk, M. Grabski and M. Romer. He thought it best if M. Mikolajczyk were to begin as the meeting had been called on his initiative.

M. MIKOLAJCZYK thanked Marshal Stalin and M. Molotov for their invitation and the Prime Minister for not having forgotten them. He referred to the memorandum of the Polish Government which he thought would be the best basis for the solution of the Polish problem. During his last visit to Moscow the Soviet Government had signed an agreement with the Polish Committee for National Liberation. He took into consideration the prestige of the Soviet Union who signed that document. On his return to London he had decided to write the memorandum which would be a basis for re-establishing good relations with the Soviet Union. The memorandum spoke of the relations between the two Governments and of a plan about Polish internal affairs.

MARSHAL STALIN asked when the memorandum had been written.

M. MIKOLAJCZYK replied that it was his memorandum of the 29th August. All the Polish people wanted to have friendly relations with the Soviet Union. The memorandum spoke of the reconstruction of the Polish Government after the liberation of Warsaw, the capital of Poland. The basis of the Polish Government was the five political parties: peasants, national democratic, socialists, Christian democratic and Workers. The next paragraph spoke of those who could not form part of the Government, namely the followers of Pilsudski and the Fascist party. He thought that was the wisest basis which might unite all the democratic parties. Such a government had to be nominated by the President of the Republic. If such a government were recognized by all the Allied Powers it would establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. There would be agreement about administration in liberated territory and after the defeat of Germany there would be a treaty regarding the relation between the Polish forces and the Red Army. After the end of hostilities the Red Army would have to leave Polish territory which was self-explanatory.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked whether M. Mikolajczyk had thought of the communications of the Red Army.

M. MIKOLAJCZYK replied that he had. He went on to say that the next paragraph dealt with internal affairs. As he had declared in Paris in 1939 the Polish Government intended to hold elections as soon as possible which would be based on a democratic vote. Parliament would make a new Constitution and elect a new President. The memorandum then dealt with social matters and the appointment of a National Council formed of five parties which would act as a sort of parliament until the elections were over. It then dealt with an alliance between the Soviet Union and Poland both for the duration of the war and in the post-war period. The alliance would be based on cooperation in the political and economic fields. It would respect the sovereignty of both countries and would be based on non-interference of either of them. An important point was to exclude German interference with Central Europe. It spoke of alliances with Great Britain, Czechoslovakia and close friendship with the United States. Polish co-operation would act as a guarantee of peace. Poland would participate in the occupation of Germany. The memorandum then dealt with the frontier question. The Polish Government hoped that Poland would come out of this war undiminished. They would like the chief centres of cultural life in the East of Poland and raw material centres to be left to Poland. As to German territory which Poland was to receive, they would want to move the German population from that territory. The memorandum discussed the question of nationality and the return of all Poles deported to the Soviet Union and arrested there. With regard to the treaty about the frontier there would have to be an exchange of populations. Poles would have to return to Poland while Ukrainians would return to the Soviet Union. This would be subject to the wishes of the population. The last paragraph dealt with Military matters. They did not want a military government in Poland and therefore did not contemplate appointing a Commander-in-Chief. They wanted the army subjected to the Government. The military part of the Cabinet would deal with war questions. Their aims were as follows:—

First, the continuation of the war;

Secondly, mutual co-operation; with all Poles, with Great Britain and other countries. An important point was that all Polish forces on any front were to continue the war against Germany.

M. MIKOLAJCZYK explained that the memorandum had been sent to Poland and had been approved by Polish parties.

MARSHAL STALIN asked which parties.

M. MIKOLAJCZYK said it had been approved by the four parties which formed the basis of the present Government.

MARSHAL STALIN asked whether they existed.

M. MIKOLAJCZYK replied that they did and that they formed the basis of the Government, namely the peasants' party, the national-democrats, the socialists and the workers.

MARSHAL STALIN asked whether the memorandum had been published and whether it had been stated that the parties approved of it. Some special Party Congress might have approved of it.

M. MIKOLAJCZYK said that the memorandum had been sent to their representatives in Warsaw during the heavy fighting there. Without publishing details of the memorandum he had announced that it had been approved in Poland.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that that was not the proper way of giving approval. It was the first time that a party had approved of anything without holding a conference.

M. MIKOLAJCZYK said that he knew that Marshal Stalin before becoming the leader of the great Soviet nation had worked underground and understood how to speak to his friends. This memorandum had been communicated in the same manner during the German occupation of Warsaw and the whole of Poland had approved.

MARSHAL STALIN said that in those times when in Russia political parties were forbidden, his party had held six congresses and twelve conferences and twenty or twenty-five meetings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. That was his "illegal" experience.

M. MIKOLAJCZYK replied that he respected that way of fighting underground, but he also respected his colleagues who had for five years of German occupation found means to communicate with each other. He emphasised his deepest conviction that this memorandum was the best way of uniting all forces of the Polish nation for friendly co-operation with the Soviet Union.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that there were points in the memorandum which he liked.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that he had not noticed them.

M. GRABSKI said that when the memorandum had been made he went to M. Lebedev, the Soviet Ambassador, to hand it to him and to give any necessary explanations. It appeared to him that the Soviet Ambassador gave the matter some attention because he called a stenographer, who made some notes. He had called the attention of M. Lebedev to the fact that the memorandum had been approved in Poland. It did not mean that in principle the Government had held that the Constitution of 1935 was sacred. They had criticised that Constitution. But the Constitution of 1921 and that of 1935 provided for the appointment of a President. While the greater part of Poland was still occupied by the Germans there was no legal means of changing the Constitution and electing a President. They had looked upon this as a temporary period. M. Grabski drew attention to the fact that he had defended the Constitution of 1921 and had fought against that of 1935. He had then told the President that if the five parties agreed to form a new Government and a new national Council in place of Parliament, personalities would not be important.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he had read a note on this conversation. It did not seem to be on the same footing as the memorandum. He had understood that the memorandum was intended to be a basis for further discussion in order to reach a compromise between the Polish Government and the Polish Committee. For instance, it was proposed that the five-party basis was not intended to reduce the participation of the Committee to 20 per cent. He hoped there would be a more even balance. Was that so?

M. MIKOLAJCZYK said he was a realist and that unity between the Polish Government and the Polish Committee was impossible. He wanted to go deeper. The basis of the Polish Government was the four parties: the peasant party, the national-democrats, the socialists and the workers. The Committee was based on one party although it maintained that it had the support of others. It was best not to argue about this but to go deeper and to base the new Polish Government on five parties; each party would have a participation of one fifth.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought the idea had been to work out an arrangement with the Polish Committee and to discuss the matter here. It was a matter for discussion. He understood that M. Mikolajczyk and his colleagues were prepared to discuss it and to agree about the Constitution with the Committee and the Soviet Government. He was making these points because he was anxious that it should be realised that the memorandum was a basis for discussion, a give-and-take by all parties. It was important that this should be affirmed. He asked whether he had misrepresented M. Mikolajczyk in saying this.

M. MIKOLAJCZYK explained that the facts were as follows: The Soviet Government had made an agreement with the Committee. The Polish Government had been recognised by the British and American Governments. A Polish Government would have to be formed which would be recognised by all the United Nations.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he thought this memorandum was a basis for discussion.

M. MIKOLAJCZYK thought it was the best proposal made so far.

MARSHAL STALIN declared that the memorandum suffered from two defects which might prevent agreement. In the first place it ignored the existence of the Polish Committee. How could it be ignored? One could not shut one's eyes to the facts. M. Mikolajczyk knew that in liberated territory much work was going on. A short time ago there had been a Congress of socialists and peasants and various questions had been discussed. The Congress had declared itself to be in favour of the Polish Committee. The Polish Committee have a large army. Whoever ignores these facts was an opponent of a compromise. If one analysed the situation in Poland one would conclude that Poland had no Government or had two Governments, which was equal to no Government. A Government should be formed on a compromise of the two groups which called themselves Governments. The chief defect was that the memorandum ignored the Polish Committee. In the second place, the memorandum made no mention of the Curzon Line. If the Poles wanted good relations with the Soviet Union, then without recognition of the Curzon Line, there could be

no good relations. He asked, what were the advantages in the memorandum? It was a plan for establishing relations between the Soviet Union and Poland after the war. That could certainly find favour with anyone who wished to have good relations between Poland and Russia, but that was a question for the future. But they had to think of the present, and in that respect the memorandum was weak. He thought the Constitution of 1921 was better than that of 1935. But that question could not be a stumbling-block for establishing relations between the Soviet Union and Poland. The question of the Constitution must be left to the Poles to decide for themselves.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that it seemed to him from Marshal Stalin's words that a hopeful note had been struck. He understood that it was the intention of the Polish Government to seek to reach a friendly agreement with the Polish National Council. It was their wish. The memorandum was no obstacle to that. If agreed, it met Marshal Stalin's criticisms. As regards the frontier he would like to make a statement explaining the point of view of the British Government. The British Government considered that Russia had suffered severely from the German invasion and the Russian armies were the only means by which Polish liberation could be achieved. The British Government considered that the Curzon Line was the only line in the East to form the boundaries of Poland. He had told this to the Poles all through the past year. He understood, of course, that the Allies would pursue the war against Germany to make sure that Poland received other territory in the West and in the North—East Prussia and Silesia—other territory which, in his judgment, would be a full balance for the changes made in the East. It would be a great seaboard, they would have the splendid port of Danzig and valuable territory in Silesia. On this basis there could be a great Poland. Not exactly the same as after the Versailles Treaty but nevertheless a home for the Polish race to which Britain attached great importance—a solid home where they might live in safety, freedom and prosperity. There was no doubt about the position of the British Government. If they were at the peace table he would use the same arguments provided he had the confidence of the House of Commons and the British Government.

M. MIKOLAJCZYK remarked that Marshal Stalin had said that the memorandum ignored the Polish Committee. In certain respects it did, but not in others. It should not be overlooked that the Polish Government had devoted all its efforts for five years to organise a large army, air force and navy, which were now fighting on various fronts.

MARSHAL STALIN said he understood and recognised this fact.

M. MIKOLAJCZYK said that the Polish Government had organised the underground struggle in Poland. He pointed out that the Soviet Government now recognised the Polish Committee and not the Polish Government.

MARSHAL STALIN admitted that he did not recognise the Polish Government. Nevertheless, he wished a compromise between them and the Polish Committee.

M. MIKOLAJCZYK said that the Polish Government did not ignore the Polish Committee. It recognised the support of the five parties.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that there was not a single word in the memorandum about the Committee.

M. MIKOLAJCZYK repeated that it went deeper, namely, to the supporters of a new Government. If they spoke of the Congress of Parties in Poland he would like to mention something which had not appeared in the press. The Lublin broadcast had quoted certain names but not the names of the leaders of the parties. It had mentioned the name of Bartnicki, who had only just become a member of this party, and the name of a certain Antonio, who was quite unknown. Telegrams had been sent welcoming the Red Army and expressing the wish to live in a free and independent Poland.

MARSHAL STALIN asked whether M. Mikolajczyk denied the fact that a Congress of the Socialist party had been held.

M. MIKOLAJCZYK did not deny it and said the Congress had sent these telegrams, and they emphasised the recognition of the Polish Government in London.

MARSHAL STALIN said that this had afterwards been refuted in the press.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that they were wasting time on details and that there were more important matters for discussion.

M. MIKOLAJCZYK agreed, but remarked that on liberated territory there were good things and bad things. It were well if they got information about the arrests which were being made in liberated territory.

M. Mikolajczyk went on to deal with the question of the Curzon Line. He was not in a position to argue with Marshal Stalin or Mr. Churchill. The frontier question was not one with which he could deal. It was for the Polish nation to decide. Marshal Stalin and Mr. Churchill would have a wrong impression of him if he agreed to give away 40 percent of Polish territory and 5 million Polish inhabitants.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that it was not Polish but Ukrainian and White Russian territory.

M. MIKOLAJCZYK asserted that there were 11 million people in those territories.

Polish soldiers abroad who were fighting against the Germans thought that they were fighting in the hope of returning to that territory. It would be said that, while the Polish soldiers fought, the Polish politician was giving up this territory.

MARSHAL STALIN retaliated by saying that 14 million Ukrainians and White Russians were fighting for their land, but M. Mikolajczyk perhaps did not know of it. They had suffered much more than all the Poles put together.

M. MIKOLAJCZYK said that he recognized the sacrifices of Ukrainian and White Russian soldiers, but Poland, since 1939, had lost 5 million people, who had been killed by the Germans in the war and during the occupation.

THE PRIME MINISTER intervened to say that they all knew of Poland's sufferings. That was why they wanted a united Polish Government to end the sufferings. If they could not unite there would be more trouble.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed.

M. MIKOLAJCZYK thought the solution lay in the good will of the three Great Powers and in their making a broad gesture. If he had to voluntarily give up territory and remove Polish forces, what guarantee would there be of freedom?

MARSHAL STALIN asked who threatened Poland's freedom? Was it the Soviet Union?

M. MIKOLAJCZYK said he wanted freedom for all Poles.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that arrangements were being made to transfer those people who wished to go to Poland and *vice versa*.

MARSHAL STALIN said that it was already being done.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that they were there to make the best possible arrangement. Great battles were still being fought and still greater battles might have to be fought. He hoped M. Mikolajczyk would be able to say that he recognised the fact that the British Government supported the Soviet Government in the proposed new frontier in the East, and that whatever regrets he might have he recognised the fact, for it was a fact, a powerful fact. He was not asked to say what he wished, but they were thinking of the future of Europe and the territorial arrangements produced would give Poland a natural home. He wished to say that Marshal Stalin was just as resolute as the British and American Allies in the wish to see Poland as a free sovereign and independent State, with the power to lead its own life. They would expect Poland to be friendly to the Soviet Union. Of course, not every individual would be friendly. There were always differences of opinion. But one could not expect the Soviet Government to tolerate an unfriendly Poland after all the blood that had been shed. The British Government supported the proposed frontier because they felt it their duty. Not because Russia was strong but because Russia was right in this matter.

The Prime Minister went on to suggest that the following declaration might be acceptable to the Soviet Government: M. Mikolajczyk might say that the Polish Government accepted the decision as to the frontier for practical purposes subject to the fact that they were not debarred from pleading at the peace conference.

M. MIKOLAJCZYK said the Polish Government had suggested a demarcation line. He did not know that they now had to divide Poland before dealing with other questions.

MARSHAL STALIN pointed out that M. Mikolajczyk had suggested dividing the Ukraine and White Russia. He, Marshal Stalin, was against the division of Poland but he also opposed the division of the Ukraine and White Russia.

M. MIKOLAJCZYK said that he had heard in public a declaration about the division of Poland but not about the division of Germany.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the details had not been defined but they could be settled here. On the other hand if they made a *furor* about it they might stimulate German resistance. He then appealed to M. Mikolajczyk to help the British Government in this matter. Britain went to war because of the attack on Poland although she was ill-prepared. She went to war to prevent the Polish people being trampled on. She would have fulfilled her pledge if at the end of the war there existed a sovereign independent Poland enabling all Poles to have a home. That was her position and it implied the Curzon Line and improvements in the North and South. They could go into further details if they liked. At this stage it was unwise for the Polish Government to separate themselves from Britain. At the time when Britain declared war she stood alone and was nearly destroyed. It all hung upon a hair. He therefore had a claim to ask the Polish Government to make a beau gesture to enable them to find a road to the peace of Europe.

M. MOLOTOV reminded the meeting about what was said in Tehran upon the Polish question. All the participants of the Tehran Conference were present except President Roosevelt. The President had said that he arrived to the Curzon Line but he did not wish it published for the moment. M. Molotov considered they could conclude that the points of view of the Soviet Union, Britain and America were the same. He had thought it necessary to refer to this point because M. Mikolajczyk had appealed to the good will of the Three Powers.

M. MIKOLAJCZYK asked whether the Polish frontier in the West had been mentioned at the Tehran Conference.

M. MOLOTOV replied that the line of the Oder had been suggested and no one had objected.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that Britain had supported it.

Mr. EDEN pointed out that it had been in their minds to allow Poland to go as far West as she wanted up to that line.

THE PRIME MINISTER added that they would have East Prussia west of Königsberg.

MARSHAL STALIN added—South of Königsberg as well.

THE PRIME MINISTER then asked the Polish representative to consider the following: The united Polish Government or what emerged from these discussions, in other words, a new Polish Government, accepted the Curzon line as the *de facto* eastern boundary of Poland subject to the right to discuss particular rights at the Peace Conference.

M. MIKOLAJCZYK said that he was not authorised to make such a declaration.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he did not want M. Mikolajczyk to say anything that would be repudiated by his supporters, but this would be the best chance of bringing into being a united Polish State.

M. MIKOLAJCZYCK repeated that he could not agree. He had heard that the Polish Committee had hopes of getting Lwów.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that the Soviet Union did not sell land. There was no foundation for the rumour. They would not have Lwów.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that as he looked at it he thought Danzig was a possession of equal importance. He asked Marshal Stalin whether they could not postpone the meeting and allow their Polish friends to consider the matter a little more.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that the Russians had in mind not the question of Danzig but also of Stettin. They would support that.

THE PRIME MINISTER said there were two things for consideration: (1) *de facto* acceptance of the Curzon Line with interchange of population; (2) a friendly discussion with the Polish Committee so that a united Poland might be established. Changes would take place in the future, but if it were done now that would be best for the future of Poland, especially at this closing period of the war. He asked the Poles carefully to consider the matter that night. He and Mr. Eden would be at their disposal. It was essential for them to make contact with the Polish Committee and to accept the Curzon Line as a working arrangement subject to discussion at the Peace Conference on a *de facto* basis.

MARSHAL STALIN wished to make it clear that the Soviet Government could not agree. They could only accept that formula with an amendment. The Curzon Line could only be a basis for the future frontier. They could not have one frontier to-day and another to-morrow. The political systems of Poland and the Soviet Union were different. As the Red Army advanced the population was restoring Soviet authority and the collective farms. To leave the frontier question undecided would mean great hardship. The population had to be considered. For that reason they wanted a definite frontier like they had with Roumania and Finland. This might surprise their allies, but there was no other way out owing to the difference in the system of government. In other respects he agreed with the formula.

M. MIKOLAJCZYK asked whether this meant that the frontier of 1939 would be restored.

MARSHAL STALIN said it would be the Curzon Line which was well known. It gave Poland places like Bialystok, Lonza, Przemysl, &c.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that no doubt Mr. Harriman would report this overture to the President.

Source: Public Record Office.

**RECORD OF MEETING AT THE SPIRIDONOVKA HOUSE,
ON 13th OCTOBER, 1944, AT 10 p.m.**

Present:

Prime Minister.	Mr. Harriman.	Marshal Stalin.
Secretary of State.	Mr. Stevenson.	M. Molotov
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.		Mr. Gusev.
Mr. Allen.		Mr. Pavlov.
Mr. Birse.		Mr. Potrubach.
		Mr. Potserob.
	M. Berut.	
	M. Osobka-Morawski.	
	General Rola-Zymierski.	

M. MOLOTOV opened the meeting by asking what would be the programme. He introduced the Polish delegates present. At 5 p.m. that day they had had their first meeting with M. Mikolajczyk, M. Grabski and M. Romer. M. Mikolajczyk had communicated the contents of his memorandum of the 29th August and had suggested it as a basis for discussion.

MARSHAL STALIN intervened to say he did not think it was necessary to go over the ground again. The question of a compromise had been discussed between the National Council and the Polish Government in London. That was the question.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he was glad to have the opportunity of meeting the Lublin Committee. British aims were well known. They were to unite all Poles in the fight against the Nazis and to create a decent country for them to live in. He was glad to see the other Poles who had the same desire to give their people a chance of existence and freedom to govern themselves and to put Poland in the ranks of the States of Europe. He had been upset by the differences between the Poles. All Poles seemed to be against each other. It was painful to see such bitter divergencies among men who had lost nearly everything, to see differences at this moment when, instead of being comrades, they had hatred against each other. The world would get tired of it, of these Polish quarrels. He had said so to his Polish friends that afternoon. He was there to try and create unity, an entity of Poland as a living thing the possibility of which had been created by the Red Army's victories. He wanted to save suffering and to end the war. But if all the Poles made nothing of each other, the world would get tired of it. Many men were tired of it already. The British government wanted unity and compromise. The British Government stood by their Soviet Ally on the basis of the Curzon Line. He hoped the Polish Committee realised the position of the British Government. Britain had gone to war with Germany because Poland had been invaded. It was not the cause, but one of the occasions. Britain rallied and helped the Poles with equipment, those Poles who came out

of the French debacle, and Marshal Stalin had sent some 80,000 Poles to Persia whom Britain had equipped. Those men had been fighting bravely in Italy and now in France. The British Government had received in Britain the Polish Government who had followed Sikorski. Britain had worked with them and had abided by the ties formed in those days. Everywhere the Poles had been in England they had won a good reputation and people liked them. There was a warm feeling for the Poles in England. Britain, of course, recognised the Polish Government that came to England five years ago. He thought it was also the position of the United States Government. They could not desert the people with whom they had worked. Britain tried to make loyalties endure to the end of the struggle. As he said to their compatriots, Britain was nearly destroyed, it depended on the toss of a coin. Britain took pride in adhering faithfully to her friendships and he hoped Marshal Stalin would say that Britain deserved credit for adhering to the friendship as far as his country was concerned. The friendship with Britain would be all the stronger because of the unity of a Poland friendly with the Soviet Union.

M. BERUT replied that he was grateful to Mr. Churchill for his kind words. On behalf of the Polish State which was being restored he wanted to thank the Prime Minister for his friendly feelings towards the Polish people. The Polish people connected all their hopes with the victory of the three Allies and wanted to do all they could to help in that victory. The unity among Poles was the basic need for Poland. It was the slogan of the National Council of which he was President. During their five years' struggle with the Germans it had been their main idea. It was not only a condition of victory but a condition for the future of Poland. The Polish people connected their future with democratic principles which united all the nations fighting against Germany.

In Poland, before the war, those principles of democracy had been departed from. In 1933 Poland's neighbouring State had declared against democracy and the influence of those tendencies had had a strong influence in Poland. This had been expressed by the introduction by the Polish Government of the new Constitution of 1935. That Constitution had been forced upon the Polish people. The nation had not approved it and had struggled against it because it was deprived of all its rights. The Polish Government had departed from democratic principles.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that Sikorski and Mikolajczyk and their supporters had opposed the 1935 Constitution and had been thrown out.

M. BERUT agreed but claimed that the Polish *émigré* Government was based on the 1935 constitution.

MARSHAL STALIN asked whether Sikorski and Mikolajczyk were against it.

M. BERUT said they had been but they had been under the influence of those circles which governed until 1939. If it were not for the anti-national principles of the 1935 Constitution, there would have been no division between the Poles. Division had come about owing to Mikolajczyk's Government being based on that Constitution. The first condition if sincere unity is desired is the abandonment by Mikolajczyk and his supporters of the anti-national Constitution of 1935. That was the wish of very many Poles.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he understood that that was a matter for discussion. The British did not want to interfere in a purely Polish question. He had gathered from Marshal Stalin that he too thought it was a matter for the Poles to settle for themselves.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that Mikolajczyk had publicly declared that he was against the 1935 Constitution. He hoped it would be removed.

M. BERUT admitted that Mikolajczyk had said this and that the 1921 Constitution met the interests of the Polish nation. Yet all the juridical and political relations on which the programme of Mikolajczyk's Government was based were founded on the 1935 Constitution.

THE PRIME MINISTER said the first thing was to drive out the Germans. The Constitution of 1921 might be improved if all the Poles worked together.

M. BERUT said that in this question they had fundamental differences with Mikolajczyk because of the policy of the *émigré* government, which failed to help in the struggle against the Germans. The policy was to sow discord between the Allies and to spread the belief that the enemy was not only Germany but also the Soviet Union, the most active participant in the struggle against Germany. Within the country the groups fighting against the Nazis were now united under the National Council and were fighting as partisans: this was contrary to Mikolajczyk's policy.

THE PRIME MINISTER hoped M. Berut appreciated that he, the Prime Minister, was trying to remove the obstacles. Anyone could make obstacles, especially in a country which had been devastated, but he did not think that the Constitution was not susceptible to reasonable argument. If that was the only trouble, it would be easy.

M. BERUT admitted it was not the only obstacle, but it was a big one. The second obstacle was Mikolajczyk's attitude to the Soviet Union. The Poles thought they could and wished to have friendly relations with their neighbours, especially with the Soviet Union.

MARSHAL STALIN suggested the two parties might work out a joint programme of certain basic principles taken from the Constitution and other documents.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he was convinced that the future of Poland depended on that State being friendly with the Soviet Union. The policy of His Majesty's Government was to help in that direction.

M. BERUT said he would draw his conclusions. The question of the Eastern frontier should be decided with the Soviet Union not by war, but a friendly Treaty. Poland could not claim the Ukraine and White Russian land which, by its national status, had been the cause of disputes within Poland for the past 20 years. As Poland wanted independence, so they wanted the Ukraine and White Russia to be independent. The Poles wanted to settle the

question by recognising the Curzon Line as the true frontier between basic Poland and the Ukraine or White Russia, but they asked the Great Powers to help Poland to get back the territory which in historic times Germany had taken away. They asked for support of this just claim.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that M. Berut was trying to break through an open door, as this had already been agreed, although the Polish Government, or as they preferred to call them, the Poles in London had not yet been able to accept the proposal. He associated himself with the Soviet Government. That was another obstacle removed.

M. BERUT accepted this with gratitude. Two months ago he had had talks with M. Mikolajczyk about the unity of the Polish nation and a compromise between the Polish Committee of National Liberation and the Polish Government. During those talks he had put before Mikolajczyk the conditions under which they might combine the two parts of Polish political life. These conditions were: (1) Recognition of the 1921 Constitution and (2) Recognition of the principles set out in the Manifesto of the Polish Committee, including foreign policy and necessary reforms, especially the land reform for which the people had been waiting for 200 years.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that if they had waited so long, they might wait another few months until the war was over. M. Mikolajczyk had made a statement with full proposals about land reform, but, of course, before you reform land the enemy has to be driven from it.

M. BERUT agreed. First the enemy had to be driven out. However, land reform had been promised by various Governments but had never been realised. The nation was now asking whether it was realisable. Mikolajczyk two months ago had agreed to the principles discussed and had promised to influence his supporters within the country in order to unite them in the struggle against the Germans. He said he was returning to London to obtain agreement on the questions discussed and promised to take decisions on them. But two months had passed and Mikolajczyk had not carried out his promises.

Mr. EDEN observed that Land Reform had been on Mikolajczyk's programme.

M. BERUT said that many parties had had Land Reform in their programme, but the question did not lie in the promise, but in the deed. The Polish Committee would agree with Mikolajczyk if he agreed that the reform was to be put through at once as the country was being liberated.

THE PRIME MINISTER said it was very hard to make a change in the system while the armies were still there. He thought a few months would be a reasonable period to make a Bill of such a magnitude. But he thought there could be no difference in principle about the reform. What form it would take he could not say.

Mr. EDEN observed that it was not a big point of difference between them. The question was whether it be done now or when Poland had been liberated.

M. BERUT said they had in mind Land Reform in the liberated territories and as territory was being liberated. The question was not such a difficulty—the differences were small. In general, during the talks with Mikolajczyk, he had recognised the slogans about democracy and admitted the questions which had been put up. But while recognising them he seemed to hope for something else. He had agreed in principle two months ago, but had not carried out his promises. Now he appeared ready to talk. But would he be sincere with his promises? Mikolajczyk agreed in words, but he hesitated to put them into effect. He had not recognised the Committee. He claimed that the only Government was that which was based on the Constitution of 1935. He had meanwhile organised his supporters for a struggle against the Polish Committee. He had the support of officers of the National Army (Krajowa Armija). These were fighting cruelly against the Committee. Mikolajczyk hesitated because he hoped by subversive ways to achieve success. That was the main difference between them and made unity between them very difficult. There was a difference between words and deeds.

THE PRIME MINISTER declared that if there was civil war he would be against anyone who started it. It was the last thing he wanted. He would do everything to prevent it.

M. BERUT said the people wanted unity, but it did not appear to be Mikolajczyk's policy. If he had agreed to a compromise two months ago, then agreement would have been possible.

THE PRIME MINISTER emphasised that M. Berut must see that it was bad for Poland and the larger interests of the United Nations if Britain recognised one Government and her sworn Allies and Treaty-bound friends another. The advantage would go to the Germans and it would be vexatious for the Allies. They were sick of the Polish problem. He hoped they would arrange to meet Mikolajczyk with a view to finding common ground to work together. A united Polish Government would be supported by the three Great Powers. He felt sure Marshal Stalin would be glad to have this settled.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed. He wanted the rear of the Red Army in Poland to be secure, for which unity was necessary. There must be no civil war.

As regards Land Reform, it was not quite so simple. If they waited a few months and passed the reform after the liberation of Poland, it would be unacceptable to the Polish peasants. What do the Polish politicians know about the peasants? They think the Red Army drove the Germans to the Vistula and, in some parts, beyond. Some of the landowners had gone with the Germans. Some had remained. Those owners who had remained were afraid of cultivating their land because they feared that the harvest might be taken away. In addition, they had no labour for tilling the soil. The peasants were not going to the landowners to work, because they expected the land for themselves. As a result a good part of the land of the landowners had remained uncultivated. The peasants were asking: "Why wait? Give us the land. You promised it." Because of this situation the question of Land Reform was a practical problem. Strife might break out. The peasants would seize the land. The authorities should issue a decree giving it to them in a legal way.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that the greatest possible amount of food should be grown. He asked whether the peasants were pressing for land of the Collective Farms or of the landowners.

MARSHAL STALIN explained that there were no Collective Farms in those parts. The peasants wanted to take the land and divide it among themselves.

THE PRIME MINISTER admitted it was a difficult question for the Poles as a general issue, but for the purposes of the war all arrangements should be made to cultivate the land, if necessary, by means of instructions from the military authorities. Of course it would be better if the Government did this. But food had to be produced. However, he did not think it was a matter which should divide the Poles. The Poles should settle it themselves. This was not an obstacle, provided there was agreement on other matters.

MARSHAL STALIN observed that agents of the London Government had threatened to introduce "terror" and had actually killed many people who had tried to put through this reform. It disturbed him deeply.

THE PRIME MINISTER said there was all the more reason for the two parties to get together. He would do his best to press the Polish Government to reach agreement with the Polish Committee, and soon, on a temporary basis if necessary pending the appearance of a new Constitution.

M. MORAWSKI wished to explain the reasons for lack of unity. The Polish Committee wanted unity - Mikolajczyk did not. The Committee had stated the principles for reaching agreement - Mikolajczyk had not replied. The Committee wanted friendly relations with the Soviet Union and so did Mikolajczyk, but while the Committee maintained those relations, officers of the National Army were shooting soldiers of the Red Army and of the Polish forces. The Committee wanted a strong army and had given orders for mobilisation. Mikolajczyk had boycotted the mobilisation.

MARSHAL STALIN asked if that was true.

M. MORAWSKI said it was.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that M. Morawski was being very unkind to the Poles who were dying in various theatres of war.

M. MORAWSKI went on to say that the Committee wanted to have an army to fight for Poland's freedom, and had organised the equipment of that army. Mikolajczyk had tried to prevent it. The Committee wanted to rebuild the factories and workshops, but Mikolajczyk was putting obstacles in the way. The Committee wanted to rebuild the schools, but Mikolajczyk thought they were unnecessary.

THE PRIME MINISTER interjected that the Committee had all the virtues and Mikolajczyk all the crimes.

M. MORAWSKI said he could produce documents showing how the London Government's agents were organising a struggle between Poles in Poland.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that each side had a hard case against the other. He was not there to encourage the quarrel. He had to hear words of peace. When a country was trampled down, all sorts of diseases appeared. It did not help the world or them. They had all these questions in the British Parliament. People called some of his friends "Tory Landlords" and his friends had called the other side similar names.

M. MORAWSKI claimed that to explain the need for peace it had been necessary to explain the differences between them so that they could be overcome. In the eyes of Mikolajczyk, Bor, who had caused so many sacrifices in Warsaw, unnecessary sacrifices, was a hero. With the Committee he was a criminal.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he had won the admiration of millions not by his wisdom but by his courage.

MARSHAL STALIN said he disagreed with the Prime Minister.

THE PRIME MINISTER said it had been a mistake to appoint Bor in place of Sosnkowski.

M. MORAWSKI said the Committee admired the people who fought in Warsaw, but Bor had different aims.

He went on to say that Mikolajczyk claimed to have the support of four Polish parties. The Congress of those parties had voted for the Committee and against Mikolajczyk. Mikolajczyk said he was against the "Sanneja" (followers of Pilsudski), just as the Committee was against it, but the difference was that the London authorities contained names like Raczkiewicz, Bor and others. Land reform was necessary immediately, otherwise the peasants would seize the land. The Committee wanted to do it in a legal way.

M. MORAWSKI concluded by saying the Committee wanted unity and if Mikolajczyk wanted it he could have it but so far he had not shown any willingness.

MARSHAL STALIN asked whether M. Berut thought unity was possible if an effort were made to achieve it.

M. BERUT said it was possible but only on condition that the democratic Constitution of 1921 is adopted and the introduction of immediate reforms of which they had spoken. If Mikolajczyk's supporters in Poland acted in favour of Polish unity the struggle between them would stop.

MARSHAL STALIN said that there should be no civil war. He asked whether they could meet Mikolajczyk and whether they thought it desirable.

M. BERUT said it was desirable.

A meeting was decided upon for the following day, M. Molotov and Mr. Eden to preside in turn. Mr. Harriman to be present.

Source: Public Record Office.

**RECORD OF MEETING HELD AT THE KREMLIN ON THE
17th OCTOBER 1944, AT 10 p.m.**

Present:

Prime Minister.	Marshal Stalin.
Secretary of State.	M. Molotov.
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.	M. Pavlov.
Mr. Birse.	

THE PRIME MINISTER said he had some notes before him on the dismemberment of Germany.

MARSHAL STALIN interrupted to refer to the Hungarian Question. Horthy had been arrested by the Germans.

Marshal Stalin did not propose to make public that the Hungarian Mission was in Moscow as it might do Horthy harm. Horthy had denied that the Mission had been sent to Moscow. The Hungarian army was disobeying the new Hungarian authorities and there was trouble going on within the country.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked whether the army was trying to save Horthy.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that it was not: because it was too weak in Budapest. He thought some divisions would fight hard against the Russians but some would certainly side with the Red Army.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that this was not so bad.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that the situation was not good but it might have been worse.

Mr. EDEN remarked that it was bad for the Germans internally because they would have to tell their people that they had arrested their old Ally.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed but pointed out that the Germans did not care much for public opinion. The situation for the Germans in Hungary would become worse because they had no sympathisers.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked about the situation of the troops surrounded by the Red Army.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that part had broken through, namely most of the Germans. This referred to two armoured and three infantry divisions of which one was Hungarian. The Red Army had been trying to close the gap and might succeed in capturing a few divisions. This was near Debrecin. In Transylvania the enemy troops had not been

surrounded but were in danger of encirclement (in Eastern Transylvania) Austrian garrisons had been transferred to Hungary.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he hoped we could push forward to Lublyana Gap, as fast as possible. The Americans were sending troops from the Italian front. The weather was in favour of the defenders. We had 28 divisions in Italy. He did not think the war would be over before the Spring on military grounds.

MARSHAL STALIN suggested that it would not be over before the Spring or early Summer.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he hoped the Marshal understood what powerful blows were being delivered by our Air forces in the West. We were destroying cities on the ground: they were advance bases for the Army. 10,000 tons had been dropped in twelve hours on Duisburg.

MARSHAL STALIN said that was good.

THE PRIME MINISTER said it would go on. The war had never been so cruel as now. This war was the most cruel since the Stone Age.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that in the Stone Age prisoners of war were eaten up.

THE PRIME MINISTER said we had made some progress since then. Talking of eating, Britain had managed to arrange for the despatch of 45,000 tons of corned beef to the Soviet Union to meet Marshal Stalin's request. We were also sending 11,000 Soviet ex-prisoners of war to eat the beef.

MARSHAL STALIN said he would not like to eat Hitler. With regard to the Soviet prisoners a great many had been made to fight for the Germans while others had done so willingly.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that that was our difficulty in separating the two. As they had surrendered to us we had the right to speak for them and he hoped that all would be sent back to Russia.

Dismemberment of Germany

MARSHAL STALIN asked what they were to do with Germany.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked Mr. Eden to make his suggestions.

Mr. EDEN explained that we had come to no conclusion but there were three alternative courses :—

- (1) Dismemberment, without any relation to the old German States.
- (2) To use some of the old States as a basis.

(3) To impose a permanent international control on the chief industrial area, the Rhine, the Ruhr, the Saar and Westfalia, after Russia and the other Allies had taken what they needed in material. This area would be separated from Germany.

MARSHAL STALIN asked: Who would exercise control over the industrial area?

MR. EDEN replied: The Allies.

MARSHAL STALIN asked if it would only be economic control.

MR. EDEN replied that it would be a general control.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that Prussia was the root of the evil and the Prussian military caste.

MARSHAL STALIN said that Prussia contributed the man-power.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested the isolation of Prussia and control over the Ruhr and the Saar. How this was to be done could be discussed later. First, it was necessary to take away all the machinery and machine tools that Russia, Belgium, Holland and France needed. He would support Marshal Stalin in repairing the damage to Russia's Western provinces which had suffered so much. It was only fair. The same applied to the smaller Allies. This was the policy which Mr. Morgenthau had laid before the President—to put the Ruhr and Saar out of action. Mr. Morgenthau's hatred of the Germans was indescribable.

MARSHAL STALIN said he must be a second Vansittart.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the President had liked what Morgenthau had said. Continuing, he asked why the British should not make the things needed by Europe in fair competition with other countries. After this war Britain would be the only great debtor nation. Their foreign securities, amounting to £400,000,000 had been sold. Britain's sterling debts now amounted to £3,000 million. She would have to make every effort to increase her exports to buy food. Russia's intention to take away German machinery was in harmony with Britain's interests of filling in the gap in the place of Germany. This was only justice.

MARSHAL STALIN said he would support any steps taken by Britain to receive compensation for the losses she had suffered.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he would support Russia in getting the machine tools required by the Ukraine and other ravaged regions.

The Prime Minister went on to say that they had not been thinking of Germany up to that point. They must now devote their minds to that problem. He would not trust Germany with the development of her metallurgy, chemical or electrical industries. He would stop those altogether for as long as he had a word to say, and he hoped for a generation at least. He had not thought about the division of Prussia, but only of its isolation and of cutting off

those two centres, the Ruhr and the Saar, from Prussia. They were centres of war production and machine building.

MARSHAL STALIN asked if he was to understand that Mr. Churchill's suggestion provided for an independent State of Prussia after the cession of territory to Poland.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that Poland would get a slice of East Prussia and Silesia. The Kiel Canal would be neutralized. The Ruhr and the Saar would be put permanently out of action.

MARSHAL STALIN asked whether the Ruhr and the Saar would be separate States.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had only been thinking of destroying industry. He had a vivid memory of the last war. We had stopped Germany from having an army, navy and air force. We had destroyed her weapons.

MARSHAL STALIN interrupted to say that it was unwise to destroy Germany's weapons. The navy should not be sunk and artillery should not be blown up. They might be useful against Japan.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that Russia could take what she wanted.

MARSHAL STALIN thought Britain could use some of Germany's ships.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that Russia could do the same, but in the future air would be stronger than the fleet.

MARSHAL STALIN said that Great Powers could not be without navies. Germany's mistake was that she had wanted to conquer Europe although she had no fleet. The point was she had no fuel in Europe and was short of food, and a fleet was necessary to carry fuel and food. Germany had not understood this.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that Britain intended to maintain a strong fleet and a strong air component. She would welcome the appearance of a strong Russian fleet on all the seas. She would create no obstacles to Russia's having a fleet.

THE PRIME MINISTER went on to say that after the last war Rathenau had told the Germans after they had been deprived of their army and navy that it would not matter. He would arrange factories and make new weapons. If factories were arranged Germany would become a great Power quicker than any of the others. Brüning carried on with this policy, but no one dared go into production until Hitler appeared. Hitler did not invent this theme. Rathenau and Brüning had thought of it. Hitler only pulled the lever. It should not happen again. Industrial disarmament was the important thing. To begin with, the machine tools must be taken away.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed and added that all metallurgical works should be destroyed. They were difficult to restore. Germany produced four times more pig iron than England.

A map of Germany was then produced.

Marshal Stalin asked whether France wanted access to the Rhine.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that France wanted the West bank of the Rhine internationalised. Czechoslovakia was ready to give up a small area near Eger, but wanted some readjustment of the frontier in the North for strategic reasons.

The Prime Minister suggested that Bavaria and Austria should go together with Vienna as the capital and form a separate State with Würtemberg and Baden. There would be three States in Germany: Bavaria and Austria - soft treatment. Prussia - hard treatment. The industrial area on the Rhine - under international control. Saxony, when stripped, might go to Prussia.

Mr. EDEN pointed out that if in the future Bavaria again wanted to combine with Prussia she might draw Austria after her.

MARSHAL STALIN said that Hungary would have to remain a separate State. Neither the Hungarians nor the Slavs should ever form part of any German State. They were too weak and Germany was too cultured. Germany would quickly dominate them. Marshal Stalin said that the small nations in Europe should be made to police Germany. The Poles would be glad to take a hand in the occupation. The Poles deserved to get territory on their Western borders. They had suffered much for over a century.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked what the Marshal thought of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary forming a separate grouping.

MARSHAL STALIN asked whether it would be an *entente*.

THE PRIME MINISTER explained that it would be more than an *entente*, it would be a Zollverein. The evil in Europe was that travelling across it one used many different currencies, passed a dozen frontiers, many customs barriers, and all this was a great obstacle to trade. He wanted to see Europe prosperous and some of the old glory return to her. In this way perhaps hatred would die. He thought this might be achieved by groupings for commercial and trade purposes.

MARSHAL STALIN suggested that this question might crop up somewhat later but the immediate point was that after this war all States would be very nationalistic. The Hungarians, Czechs and Poles would first want to build up their national life and not restrict their own rights by combining with others. The feeling to live independently would be the strongest. Later, economic feelings would prevail, but in the first period they would be purely nationalistic and therefore groupings would be unwelcome. The fact that Hitler's régime had developed nationalism could be seen in the example of Yugoslavia where Croats, Montenegrins, Slovenes, &c., all wanted something of their own. It was a symptom.

M. MOLOTOV said that after the last war many new small States had been formed. Many of them had failed. It would be dangerous to go to the other extreme after this war and to force States to form groups. It would be impossible for Czechs and Hungarians to unite and to find a common language immediately after his war. Nor could the Czech and Poles do so. They all had a great desire for an independent life. The fact was that their independence had been of short duration.

THE PRIME MINISTER hoped that some of the young men present would see it.

MARSHAL STALIN thought that Mr. Churchill's suggestion would be possible in the future but not just yet.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that Germany should be deprived of all her aviation.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed and suggested that neither civil nor military flying should be allowed. All training schools for pilots should be forbidden.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that Mr. Morgenthau had suggested that Germany should have no merchant shipping. She should be made to hire ships from other countries to carry her goods.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed and said that a merchant fleet provided manpower for the navy. The absence of a merchant fleet prevented the creation of a navy.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that there was very little divergence of opinion between them. It was a pity that when God created the world he had not consulted them.

MARSHAL STALIN said it was God's first mistake.

Mr. EDEN suggested that M. Gusev should get on with the preparatory work in the E.A.C.

MARSHAL STALIN said that the principles should be laid down by the three governments and that the E.A.C. should be given some guidance.

THE PRIME MINISTER hoped that there would be no difficulty in convincing the Chinese.

M. MOLOTOV remarked that they were rather difficult and could not settle their own affairs.

MARSHAL STALIN said he thought they were careless. The Russians had offered to build a factory for them. The Chinese said they would report to their government and for ten years they have been reporting and nothing had been done.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that they should now shape their views and tell the United States what progress had been made in focusing their points of view.

MARSHAL STALIN said he had one more question to discuss and that was about the Straits. He wanted the Prime Minister to remember this subject.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked Marshal Stalin to state secretly what improvement he suggested. In principle he was of opinion that the Montreux Convention ought not to remain in force.

MARSHAL STALIN said he only wanted Mr. Churchill to bear the matter in mind as the Soviet Government would raise it. There would be no great divergence between them and no extravagant demands. The Marshal to send in his requirements. Moreover, under the Convention Japan had the same right as Russia.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that the Suez Canal was open to warships to pass in peace and war.

MARSHAL STALIN said it was intolerable that Turkey if threatened was entitled to close the Straits. Someone else should decide. As regards constructive proposals Marshal Stalin would make them in due course.

M. MOLOTOV raised the question of reparations from Hungary.

MARSHAL STALIN said that if we found £400 million too much would we agree to 200,000,000 dollars to Russia and 100,000,000 dollars for the other countries concerned?

THE PRIME MINISTER and Mr. EDEN thought that was acceptable.

Source: Public Record Office.

**Minutes of the PWP CC Meetings on 22 October 1944;
Bierut's Account of the Conference
with Stalin and Churchill Held on 13 October 1944,
and of a Conversation with Stalin on 18 October 1944**

Minutes of a CC Meeting, Held on October 22, 1944

Present: Wiesław, Tomasz, Jakub, Franek, Zawadzki, Radkiewicz, Marek. In the latter part of the meeting took part comrades Ochab and Romkowski.

The agenda:

- 1) Information on a visit of the PKWN delegation in Moscow³
- 2) Military matters
- 3) Questions relating to Puchała⁴, Gabara⁵ and Stańczyk⁶, or about the morale of party members in the state apparatus.

An account of point 1 is being given by com. Tomasz [Bierut]: Contrary to what the international press was reporting the Polish question has been a secondary matter at the Moscow meetings and served Churchill merely as a supporting argument in Anglo-Soviet talks⁷. The fact that there have been no official talks between the PKWN and Mikołajczyk's delegations testifies to this⁸. The main purpose of Churchill's visit to Moscow was a Balkan question. Due to certain moves by Turkey at the border with Bulgaria (concentration of troops) and an escape of German troops to Bulgaria, which didn't intern them, the USSR declared war on Bulgaria⁹ without any consultations with Britain. The latter one had been frightened about Greece, the Mediterranean and the Adriatic, about a possible bolshevization of the Balkans and that is why he came to see Stalin.

Stalin ordered the arrival of the PKWN delegation on Churchill's request.

³ The delegation of KRN and PKWN (respectively National Domestic Council and the Polish Committee for National Liberation) was in Moscow from October 11-19, 1944. It was composed of: B. Bierut, E. Osóbka-Morawski and general M. Rola-Żymierski).

⁴ No information is available.

⁵ Bronisław Gabara (1891-1956) - at the time a prison chief in Lublin. Charged by the chief of Public Security Division of PKWN on October 3, 1944 with misuse of power, acts unworthy of a public security employee (drinking sprees, sex with volksdeutsch women prisoners), put before a military tribunal and then sent to a penalty company.

⁶ No definite data have been established.

⁷ Winston Churchill was in Moscow from 9 to 19 October 1944.

⁸ The delegation of the Polish Government in Exile, which stayed in Moscow from October 12-21, 1944, was composed, besides S. Mikołajczyk, of minister of foreign affairs Tadeusz Romer and chairman of the National Council Stanisław Grabski.

⁹ It took place on September 5, 1944.

At the Stalin-Churchill-Mikołajczyk conference, with the participation of Eden, Molotov and a plethora of interpreters;¹⁰ whose objective was to get acquainted both England and the Soviets with the position of the Mikołajczyk government about the possibility of reaching an understanding with the PKWN with Stalin's and Churchill's assistance - Mikołajczyk, according to the accounts of com. Stalin, put forward a thesis that the basis for such an agreement should be a memorandum directed by him to the Soviet government shortly after his last meeting with Stalin.¹¹

Stalin responded to Mikołajczyk, that in that memorandum the PKWN had not been mentioned. Which means that mister Mikołajczyk tries to close his eyes to the reality. In talks with the Soviet Union this memorandum cannot be a subject for discussion. He suggested to Mikołajczyk to reach an understanding with the PKWN. However, the Soviet Union is interested mostly in Mr. Mikołajczyk's position regarding Poland's eastern borders.

On this question Mikołajczyk has taken a challenging position, dissenting to the Curzon line.

In that case Churchill intervened and told Mikołajczyk that the question of eastern borders had been agreed upon between England and the USSR, and thus, it could not be a subject for negotiations by Mikołajczyk.

After that statement by Churchill, Mikołajczyk came down a peg or two, put forward a proposal to leave with Poland Lwów and Borysław. Stalin rejected that proposal.

At the Stalin-Churchill conference, in the presence of Molotov, Eden, Kerr,¹² Harriman,¹³ and the whole plethora of interpreters and officials,¹⁴ Molotov introduced Bierut to Churchill. The latter one was dragging his feet in greeting him, but after a few second came up and shook Bierut's hand, saying he had heard a lot of good things about him and is delighted to have an opportunity to meet him.

Churchill took the floor at the opening of the meeting. He is appealing for mutual understanding among the Poles, which lies both in the interests of the Poles, as well as those

¹⁰ That conference was held on October 13, 1944.

¹¹ Reference is made to a memorandum of the Polish Government in Exile of August 29, 1944 on the conditions of resuming Polish-Soviet diplomatic relations. The memorandum was handed over by S. Mikołajczyk to the USSR's Ambassador to the émigré governments in London, Victor Z. Lebedev on August 30, 1944, following Mikołajczyk's visit in Moscow on August 6-9, 1944. For the text see: *Sprawa polska w czasie II wojny światowej na arenie międzynarodowej*. Warszawa 1965, pp. 575-577.

¹² Archibald Clark-Kerr (1882-1951), British Ambassador in Moscow.

¹³ William Averrel Harriman (1891-1986) - U.S. Ambassador in Moscow. He participated in the Soviet-British talks as an observer.

¹⁴ That conference was held on October 13, 1944 towards the evening. W. Churchill in his account of that conference evaluated very critically the "Lublin Poles". See: W. Churchill: *The Second World War*. Vol. VI, London, 1954, p. 205.

of the alliance bloc. He is glorifying Poland and emphasizes great appreciation of England for Poland.

Bierut thanked for recognition for the Polish people. The Polish nation has heroically fought and is still fighting for a democratic Poland and doesn't want a return to the pre-war relations in Poland. The people reject the Constitution of 1935 and put it as one of the conditions for reaching an understanding with Mr. Mikołajczyk.

Churchill: Mikołajczyk is also for a democratic constitution, but first one needs to expel the Germans.

Bierut: We also want to expel the Germans and part of Poland is already free. Thus, Poland needs to be built on the new foundations. The second condition is agricultural reform. The Polish people have been waiting three hundred years for this moment, which has allowed them to possess the land on which they are toiling.

Churchill: If they have been waiting for three hundred years, then they can wait till the war is over. Now is not the time for reforms.

Stalin responded to this observation, saying he doesn't agree with Churchill on this issue. Some part of the landowners has escaped from Poland, part is sabotaging land cultivation, causing unrest and this has to be terminated so that the country will have bread and there will be peace in the back-up of the military front-line. The matter has already become ripe for consideration.

Churchill: Perhaps the military should order land cultivation, because once the peasants are given the land, it will be difficult to change owners.

Stalin: Nobody is going to take back the land from the peasants.

Bierut: The third condition is the question of a fratricidal warfare, initiated by a reactionary group, which wants to spread disorder in the country. He demands from Mikołajczyk to oppose this action. The fourth condition is the question of Poland's eastern borders. Mutual harmony with Poland's neighbors, particularly with the Soviet Union, as well as the interests of Poland demand the recognition of the Curzon line.

Churchill says that he will influence Mikołajczyk and hopes that he will succeed in persuading him to accept that border.

The second speaker was Osóbka-Morawski, who sums up Bierut's arguments and shows what the PKWN wants and what Mikołajczyk wants. At one point Churchill interrupts Osóbka-Morawski, arguing that he (Osóbka) also didn't behave as he should have. Osóbka asks not to be interrupted, as he will come up to those matters. Churchill demonstratively gets up and leaves the table to drink a glass of water. Drinking water he hesitates some time and then returns back to the table. Osóbka, who interrupted his speech, is resuming it, encouraged by Molotov. Churchill interrupts it again when talk is about Bór [Komorowski]

and states that the whole world considers Bór a hero. Osóbka-Morawski: and the Polish people consider him a traitor.

Stalin doesn't agree that Bór is a hero, as he caused huge, unnecessary losses to the Polish people by the Warsaw uprising.

Churchill retreats, saying that the Mikołajczyk government made thoughtless step in nominating Bór to the position of supreme commander.

Stalin, summing up the conferences' results, states that from the PKWN side there has been shown a willingness to reach an understanding with Mr. Mikołajczyk, therefore he suggests to hold a meeting of the PKWN delegation with that of Mikołajczyk's to reach an understanding, with the participation of Eden to exercise pressure on Mikołajczyk, and Molotov to exercise pressure on the PKWN, and Harriman as a mediator. This was agreed upon. The conference was then ended.

The next day the scheduled meeting didn't materialize, as Churchill allegedly was not feeling well. In the evening there was a festive performance in a theater, which was attended by Churchill with the British and American envoys, as well as Stalin with other members of the Soviet government, all sitting in special galleries. Our delegation took its place below. Mikołajczyk didn't get a ticket. When the public at some point realized that Stalin was in the theater, it made him a huge ovation. Stalin left his lodge, leaving Churchill alone. The ovation continued and Molotov leaned out clapping hands, what even more intensified the ovation. Churchill was entranced, thinking that it was all for him. At the break, Bierut and Rola-Żymierski left the performance hall. When Żymierski spotted some French general and walked toward him, leaving Bierut alone, the journalists approached Bierut for an interview. Bierut refused, saying that it's not customary to give interviews before negotiations are concluded. Nevertheless, journalists were asking various questions. They forced him to agree to give to the press a statement that he is an "optimist", that "considering the fact that the matter of an agreement between the PKWN and Mr. Mikołajczyk have taken in their hands such people like Stalin and Mikołajczyk, one can be an optimist".

There were no results on Sunday and Monday.¹⁵ The scheduled meeting didn't take place. Apparently Mikołajczyk had been waiting for the news about the uprising in the country. On Tuesday Mikołajczyk's secretary came to Bierut's hotel with a proposal to hold a private meeting. A discussion aroused regarding the place of such a meeting. It was agreed that the meeting will be held at 5 p.m. in a café. Bierut and Mikołajczyk met in the hall and set down at the table. Mniszek,¹⁶ Mikołajczyk's secretary and a major, Bierut's adjutant,¹⁷ set down separately.

¹⁵ It means the 15th and 16th of October 1944.

¹⁶ Aleksander Mniszek (born 1904) - a diplomat, was, among other, counselor of the Polish Embassy in the USSR in 1941-1943.

¹⁷ Quite possibly. reference is made to major Ignacy Wrzos, who in October 1944 was named chief of the Military Cabinet of chairman of the KRN (National Domestic Council).

Conversation of Bierut with Mikołajczyk. Bierut: How to explain the delay of the meeting?

Mikołajczyk: By the fact that Stalin presented the question of borders in a way that he couldn't personally decide on it. He had to get in touch with London and only then continue the talks.

Bierut: Thus, should we be waiting till he comes back from London?

Mikołajczyk: No, it may take place very soon.

Bierut: Even so, you couldn't have been surprised by the Curzon line.

Mikołajczyk: The Curzon line had two variants: A and B. Variant B had provided leaving Lwów and Borysław with Poland. Since Churchill supported Stalin with variant B, so he is surprised and has to communicate with colleagues. He thinks that the situation for Poland is tragic, though one has to acknowledge it. One has to prepare the American Polonia for this and take into consideration its opinion. He shows his great influence among the Polonia.

Bierut: I propose to put the matter clearly: there are two trends in Europe: a democratic one and reactionary. Societies are divided likewise inside their countries. In Poland the mainstay of the reactionary camp is the London government, based on the Constitution of 1935. Everything that goes with that government, like it or not, has to be included into the reactionary camp. He, Mikołajczyk, is right now himself a banner for the Polish reaction, independent of what he himself thinks. He [Bierut] reminds him that at their first meeting¹⁸ he essentially recognized the PKWN manifesto, but didn't draw from it any consequences. He suggests to him to cut off himself from the reaction, cut off from its camp and come over to the democratic camp, i.e. reach an understanding with the PKWN, independently of the position of other members of his government.

Mikołajczyk defends members of his government as democrats. All of them are honest, he even has in his desk a letter from Raczkiewicz, who is expressing willingness to depart any time. He has removed Sosnkowski.

Bierut: But you have nominated Bór.

Mikołajczyk: He is a military, honest man. He doesn't understand why we are still talking about the Warsaw Uprising. They had submitted plans for the uprising already several months before to the general staff of the alliance. And it was not their fault that the Soviet Union had not been notified about it. Besides, he asks who in his cabinet is a reactionist?

¹⁸ S. Mikołajczyk met with the PKWN representatives in Moscow on 6 and 7 August 1944.

Bierut: How about Kukiel¹⁹ and rev. Kaczyński²⁰.

Mikołajczyk: Kukiel had this misfortune that he had let himself get involved in the Katyń affair.²¹ Rev. Kaczyński is a red mason. Apart from that, there are strong intellectuals in his cabinet, while on our side, except for Bierut, Wasilewska and Jędrychowski²² - these are people who do not qualify for the government. He has high praise for Komarnicki²³ as an outstanding intellectual, and also for Seyda²⁴ and others.

Bierut: You are also supported by Bielecki.²⁵

Mikołajczyk - It's not true.

Bierut: The whole reactionary camp is marching under your banner to the fight against democracy.

Mikołajczyk: It's not my fault. He speaks of Kwapiński²⁶ as a fool. Anyway, he thinks that as far as people are concerned, we could reach an understanding. From among the peasant leaders he has such people as Domański,²⁷ Bień²⁸ and Mierzwa,²⁹ who arrived now

¹⁹ Marian Kukiel (1885-1971) - a historian, brigadier general, at that time minister of national defense in the Polish Government in Exile.

²⁰ Rev. Zygmunt Kaczyński (1894-1953) - a leading figure in the Labor Party, at that time minister for religious affairs and public education in the Polish Government in Exile.

²¹ M. Kukiel as minister of national defense issued a communiqué regarding the missing Polish soldiers in the USSR. See "Dziennik Polski" of April 16, 1943, No. 851, p.1.

²² Stefan Jędrychowski (born 1910) - then a PPR activist, chief of the Information and Propaganda Division of PKWN, and at the same time representative of PKWN in Moscow.

²³ Wacław Komarnicki (1891-1954) - a leading figure in the National Party (SN), then a minister of justice in the Polish Government in Exile.

²⁴ Marian Seyda (1879-1967) - an activist of SN, at the time minister for parliamentary affairs in the Government in Exile.

²⁵ Tomasz Bielecki (1901-1982) - the chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Camp.

²⁶ Jan Kwapiński (1885-1966) - then chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of PPS (Polish Socialist Party), vice premier and minister of industry, trade and shipping in the Government in Exile.

²⁷ Jan Domański (1898-1978) - a member of the Central Leadership of the Peasant Movement. On May 30, 1944 sent to the West as a political emissary of the peasant movement by a British plane which landed near Tarnów. Returned to Poland in the summer of 1945.

²⁸ Adam Bień (born 1899) - then member of the Central Leadership of the Peasant Movement and of the National Council of Ministers.

²⁹ Then member of the Central Leadership of the Peasant Movement and the Council of National Unity.

Both Bień and Mierzwa remained in Poland during World War II. Apparently the transcript of Mikołajczyk's description was not precise.

from the homeland to London. He has also many good peasant leaders in the country. Regarding the Constitution of 1935: he is not supporting it. As if to prove it, he is talking of a democratic electoral law, which they have just worked out in London. He promises to send it to Bierut. He supports agricultural reform similar to the one the PKWN supports, but he doesn't agree on the price of land, which, in his opinion is set too high by the PKWN³⁰. He is proposing a 30-year lease rate as a price of land.

Bierut is proving to him that it would be more expensive than what the PKWN has set. He asks him why doesn't he want to bring himself to such a political step which would cut him off from the reactionaries.

Mikołajczyk: Asks what should he do?

Bierut: Two months ago we proposed you to take over the position of prime minister of PKWN and to cut yourself off from the reactionaries.

Mikołajczyk: You are giving me only four ministerial portfolios. We are standing on the position of our memorandum.

Bierut: Thus, you do not recognize the PKWN.

Mikołajczyk: It's not true, it's wrong interpretation, we recognize all parties making up the PKWN.

Bierut: The memorandum cannot be a basis for negotiations, as PKWN exists, governs, and only on this basis—recognition of PKWN—can we talk.

Mikołajczyk: But you are giving us too few seats.

Bierut: And what do you want?

Mikołajczyk: Half of the seats.

Bierut: If you cut off from the reactionaries and come to the PKWN, then you can gain the whole party and have not just four mandates but a majority in PKWN. If you approve the total PKWN Manifesto, you will have the whole government behind you.

Mikołajczyk is squabbling about his influence in the country, thinking that he enjoys a majority and cannot agree to having just one-fifth of the ministerial seats.

Bierut: You cannot prove this now. Only in the country at party congresses one will be able to assess that. I am proposing you one-fourth of the seats in the government.

³⁰ A decree by PKWN from September 6, 1944 provided the price for the land granted equivalent to the value of one year's crop from that land. It was assumed that on the lands of category III this will be 15 quintals of rye (=6000 zł.).

Mikołajczyk regrets that he won't be able to arrive in London with something more consoling for his colleagues.

Bierut: Till you stop traveling to London for authority it will be difficult to reach an agreement. Shall we thus be parting for good?

Mikołajczyk: I don't think so.

After this conversation Mikołajczyk had another talk with Stalin. He was complaining about the small number of ministerial seats that we had offered. On the question of borders he was conciliatory. He asked Stalin to allow Kwapiński to return to Poland. Stalin referred him on this matter to the PKWN.

A communiqué has been agreed upon with Molotov³¹. It refers to the Mikołajczyk-Bierut conversation, as Mikołajczyk had not reserved himself the right to secrecy.

Besides there were two meetings of the delegation with Stalin. One was right after our arrival, the second one later. Stalin was asking if we want to talk with Mikołajczyk.

Bierut: We would like to reach an understanding, but we would prefer to have it later.

It was agreed with Stalin to give 1/3 of ministerial positions to the London people, with Mikołajczyk taking the position of prime minister. In addition create two deputies, i.e. [Osóbka]-Morawski from the PPS and...from the PPR. Stalin liked such idea of a presidium. There was an extensive discussion about what other positions should be given to the Londoners. Since it was proposed that all important positions should be held in our hands, Molotov observed that also more important positions should be given to them.

It was agreed to give them: 1) premiership, 2) reconstruction of the country, 3) war compensations, 4) finance, 5) culture and arts, 6) social welfare.

Stalin thought that we should take into consideration that they might propose Żeligowski.³² It might be acceptable, provided that Żymierski would be his deputy, situated in the country and a political chief, while Żeligowski would be staying for some time abroad. Besides, he is an old man and one can cope with him. It was agreed that if Mikołajczyk doesn't come up with such proposal, then our delegation will.

With regard to a president, Stalin suggests that Bierut should become a non-party man. At an attempt of protest Stalin said it was necessary to do so for the sake of the nation and it must be done. Stalin referred to a conversation that he had had with Churchill about Bierut. Churchill had asked Stalin if he knew Bierut well. Stalin responded that he had

³¹ For the communiqué see "Rzeczpospolita" of October 21, 1944, No. 79, p. 1.

³² Lucjan Żeligowski (1865-1947) - Lieutenant-General, then member of the National Council of the Republic of Poland in London.

known him from meetings as chairman of the KRN. Churchill noticed that according to his information Bierut had been a political prisoner and as such had been deported to the Soviet Union.³³ Thus, he cannot be president of Poland, as he doesn't give a guarantee of objectivity, being in debt toward the Soviet Union. Stalin replied that he knew nothing about it, whereas he knows that as late as in 1939 Bierut parted with the Communist Party, as he didn't feel comfortable with it ideologically. Since that time Bierut had not been a party member. This being so, Stalin states to Bierut to notify his party that he is resigning, taking it on his conscience.

Stalin was somewhat irritated by the news of desertion of the 31st regiment.³⁴ He is reproaching us that we wanted to put aside the Red Army, that we are treating it as a foreign army, etc. He immediately gave an order by telephone to Rokossowski³⁵ and the NKVD in connection with the situation in Poland. At one point he said that we had misled ourselves and him in appraising the adversary's strength. Now we have to take the adversary by the head and not defend the AK, like once Gorki fell out with Lenin on the question of repression. Nevertheless, he was of the opinion, recalling Marx, that it also has good sides, as counter-revolution stimulates revolution. Without it revolution is losing action. We will also be stimulated by counter-revolution.

In connection with the news on preparations of the AK to actions, he agreed that Bulganin should go to Lublin. He didn't consent to Żymierski's trip.

Generally Stalin was trying to create a very friendly atmosphere, which was also true of the evening spent in wine drinking. At one moment Stalin corrects Beria's toast,³⁶ saying the toast should sound as follows: "Long live the Slavs, headed by a democratic Poland, that should unite them in a great Slav union".

Talking of the current personnel composition of the PKWN, Stalin suggests that now is the time to get rid of unreliable people and introduce a good element. Speaking of Witos he said it was good that we got rid of him. He knows very well that Witos is a reactionary agent.

³³ Bolesław Bierut, served time several times for his communist activity, arrested last time in 1933 was not covered by an exchange of political prisoners between Poland and the USSR in the years 1921-1932.

³⁴ A massive desertion of soldiers of the 31st regiment of infantry took place on October 12, 1944, at a time when the PKWN delegation was in Moscow. Already on October 16th commander-in-chief of the Polish Army issued order to dismantle the regiment. On October 24 an order was issued on behalf of the commander-in-chief (signed by general Karol Świerczewski) in connection with a verdict of the Military Court of the 2nd Army against the officers of that regiment (6 death sentences, but ultimately not executed). That order recommender to use in the future severe punishment for desertion and to upgrade political education ("to use all necessary measures to protect a sound soul of the Polish soldier from influences of the hitlerite-AK agentura"). See also I. Blum: *Sprawa 31 Pułku Piechoty*. "Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny", 1965, No. 3, pp. 40-73.

³⁵ Soviet marshal Konstanty Rokossowski (1896-1968) at that time was in command of the I Belorussian Front of the Red Army.

³⁶ Lavrenti P. Baria (1899-1953) - at the time associate member of Politburo of the VKP(b), deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, member of the Committee of State Defense of the USSR.

Asked if the present talks would not weaken the inter-Atlantic alliance, he said no, on the contrary, they will strengthen the alliance.

Churchill was frightened by advances of Soviet forces in the Balkans. He reassured him by saying the Soviet Union had no intention to enter to Greece, or push through to the Adriatic. We don't need the Adriatic. We have a plan to strike at Germany from the South. We have a Hungarian delegation here, asking for peace. We will strike at Germany through the Moravian Gate. We will also strike at Prussia. In this way we will liberate Poland. There is a need for time, time to prepare such operation. He says Roosevelt is not happy about Churchill's trip to Moscow, he doesn't have time to come here personally, as he is afraid of elections and has to take care of it.³⁷ He would not like to see England influencing the course of events without him and therefore he is dissatisfied with the Churchill visit.

Regarding the question of reconstruction of industry in Poland, and particularly if there is a need for reconstruction of armaments industry, he says that armaments industry is the best school for cadres. It should be reconstructed with a view of educating cadres and independence of Poland.

To a question on the organization of a planned economy in Poland he said it is the most difficult task. Even in the Soviet Union the planned economy has made mistakes.

Kuropatkin³⁸ lost the war with Japan because he didn't have transportation. He asked the tsar to increase the number of trains on the Eastern Line from 4 to 7. The tsar could not do it. The Soviet Union built a new, second track, designed for 35 pairs of trains round the clock, but it turned out that the plan had been worked out so poorly that only 17 pairs can pass. Other chains of transportation connected with it had not been satisfactorily taken into account and therefore the works provided for in the plan had not been realized. That is how difficult it is to plan.

He was interested in our economy, what do we have for exports, etc. He was making plans for coal exports and strongly supported the idea of developing river shipping. He was asking about professional skills of intelligentsia. He recommended to take over all people from behind the front line, as they don't already have any significance there.

Stalin also suggested to include PKWN representatives to every Soviet mission going abroad to Soviet diplomatic missions, what should facilitate our work.

Discussion

³⁷ Reference is here to the U.S. elections set for November 7, 1944. Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected then for the fourth time.

³⁸ Alexei N. Kuropatkin (1848-1925) - adjunct-general, commander of the Manchurian Army, later commander-in-chief of the Russian Army in the Russian-Japanese war of 1904-1905.

Com. Berman informs that Wilanowski³⁹ communicates that a crisis among the emigres is growing. A new PPS is being formed.⁴⁰ There are also possibilities to form a Peasant Party, corresponding to the Peasant Party belonging to the PKWN.

Sommerstein⁴¹ said that there are 5 people in the PKWN who will go with Mikołajczyk.

Com. Tomasz: Janusz said to me that Kotek [-Agroszewski] demands his (Janusz's) resignation. Presidium of the Peasant Party (SL) demanded that Bertold and Janusz leave the PKWN. Janusz demanded a resolution in writing. Bertold is undecided. Kotek refused.

Source: Protokoły posiedzeń Biura Politycznego KC PPR 1944-1945, edited by A. Kocharński, pp. 30-37.

Translated by Jan Chowaniec.

³⁹ Stefan Wilanowski (1900-1978) - an attorney, activist of the peasant movement, at that time president of the Polish Slavic Committee in London, representative of PKWN in London from October 7, 1944.

⁴⁰ Reference is made to a group headed by Tadeusz Ćwik, Julian Hochfeld and Bogusław Kozusznik.

⁴¹ Emil Sommerstein (1883-1957) - a Zionist activist, at that time head of the War Reparations Department of PKWN, chairman of the Central Committee of Jews in Poland.

**Record of the Conversation of Comrade I.V. Stalin with
the General Secretary of the CC French Communist Party, Comrade Thorez**

19 November 1944, 8:00 pm

Present at the conversation were Comrades Molotov and Beria.

After an exchange of mutual greetings com. Stalin asks when com. Thorez intends to travel to France.

Com. Thorez responds that he expects to fly from Moscow tomorrow with his wife and a member of the French Communist Party CC Ramet.

Com. Stalin asks on which plane Com. Thorez will fly.

Com. Thorez responds that to Teheran he takes a Soviet plane, and then a British one, and, if possible, then a French one.

Com. Stalin says that perhaps one should arrange the trip of Thorez on a Soviet plane to Paris. The British might be up to something (*zateiat chego nebut*)...

Com. Molotov says that it is possible to arrange the flight of Com. Thorez on our plane to Paris.

Com. Stalin asks what questions Com. Thorez wants to ask.

Com. Thorez responds that the most important issue for the French communists is a question about how to pass through the current difficult period when the communists are not the masters of France, when they have there both friends and enemies. What they must do to collect their forces and to thwart the reaction's effort to collect its forces.

Com. Stalin asks what kind of person is Bidault (*chto iz sebia predstavliaet*).

Com. Thorez says that before the war Bidault allied with the party of popular democrats. He is a catholic. Before the war he issued newspaper *L'Aube*, an opposition Catholic newspaper.

Com. Stalin asks to whom that newspaper stood in opposition.

Com. Thorez says that that newspaper was in opposition to the official leaders of the Catholic Church. On the issues of foreign policy, Bidault, before the war, took a position close to the position of French Communists. He stood for good relations with the USSR, fought against Munich, against Germany. However, after the breakout of the war he, as well as many people who had heretofore been close to the communists, turned against them more fiercely than other enemies of communists. After the breakout of the war he was recruited, served in the army, was taken prisoner by the Germans, and then was liberated from imprisonment.

Com. Stalin asks if Bidault was set free by the Germans or he fled from captivity.

Com. Thorez responds that Bidault was liberated by the Germans because he was a participant of the First World War, and the Germans set such people free. However, this rule the Germans applied not to all participants of the First World War.

Com. Stalin express surprise on the account that a former prisoner of war holds a post in the government.

Com. Thorez says that there are also other people in the government who were in German captivity. One is General Jouen. He was in German prison and was then liberated and appointed by the Vichy government to Africa as a commander of French troops to replace Weigand whom the Germans did not completely trust. Minister of Finance Le Perq, recently deceased, happened to be in German prison as well.

Com. Stalin asks what is the relationship between the French Communists and the Socialists was.

Com. Thorez responds that the Communists managed to succeed in winning over the masses of socialist workers. However, the leadership of the Socialist Party does not want to cooperate with the Communists. Recently at the Congress of the French Socialist Party its secretary in his speech said that Socialists stood for unity with Communists, but in reality Socialists renounce unity. Socialists declare that everything is fine in France, all people are good, except for the Communists who have to be rehabilitated for the position they took at the outbreak of the war with the Germans. The leadership of the Socialist Party points out that at the beginning of the war, the Communists had not been advocates of defense of motherland, and only after 1941 they became heroes in the struggle with the Germans. Com. Stalin says that there could be pressure applied on the Socialists in order to achieve the isolation of Communists. It is quite possible that de Gaulle might take steps to isolate the Communist Party.

Com Stalin says that he thinks that for this contingency it would be better if the Party had an ally. The party must look around (*prismotretsia*) and look for allies among the radicals who are still perhaps do not constitute formal groups of radicals. One must look for allies among the socialists, as well. One should attempt to create a bloc against reaction. It would be good to attract also the socialists into this bloc. Perhaps there will also some other elements who could be utilized in such a bloc. One should build certain forces grouping around the Communist Party, for defense, and when the situation changes, for an offensive as well. The communists must not search among the socialists for who, when and what was said against the Soviet Union. We know the socialists well. The socialists are the left wing of bourgeoisie. For us the main goal now is to create the leftist bloc. The Communist Party, however strong it could be, must not be the only force struggling against reaction. The Communist Party should not be isolated. The urgent task for the party is building close ties with trade unions, with the youth. The youth must not be called communist youth. It should be taken into account that some people get scared by [red] flags. It should be accounted for.

The communists, Com. Stalin continues, are not so strong to take only upon themselves the burden of struggle against reaction. Com. Stalin says that he wishes the party did not exaggerate its forces. If enemies manage to provoke the party, it would be strangled. Leftist bloc must be built gradually and patiently. If there were successes in this business, then reaction would be less brazen (*budet bolee ostorozhnoi*).

Com. Stalin says that Communists should keep in mind that de Gaulle will be pushed to take measures against Communists even if he would not wish to undertake them by himself; he will be pushed to this by the British and the Americans who would like to create a reactionary government in France, as everywhere, wherever they can pull it off. Therefore, the party at first must have allies, even weak ones. If the leader of the Socialist Party said in his report that the party of socialists stood for unity with the Communist Party, then you should respond "Please!" You must attract also other political groups into a bloc under construction. You should have allies in trade unions, create something like a bloc.

Com. Stalin asks if the Resistance organization has any kind of armed forces.

Com. Thorez responds that there are armed units of patriotic militia which were the main force of resistance during the occupation of France. At the moment those militia units keep their weapons.

Com. Stalin says that one should reckon with the fact that at the moment there is a government in France recognized by the Allied Powers. Under these circumstances it is hard for the communists to maintain parallel armed forces, since there is a regular army. The

communists could be asked why do they need parallel armed units. As long as there was no provisional government, there was no rear zone, where [this government] rules, the existence of those units made certain sense. Why do these units exist now, when there is government which has its army? Such could be the arguments of the enemies of Communists. These arguments can sway a main-street French. Therefore the argument of the Communist Party for maintaining its armed forces is weak and will be weak. It is hard to defend this position. Therefore you must transform the armed units into another organization, into a political organization, and you must hide [your] weapons.

Com. Stalin explains that he touched on this issue only because it seems to him that Communists still do not understand that the situation in France has changed. The communists are flaunting [the enemy] and holding the old line, and meanwhile the situation is already different. They would like to send to the devil all those scoundrels, the Socialists, while they should seek to build a bloc and seek allies among the Socialists. Communists are trying to preserve militia. It will not be this way. The government has been created that is recognized by Great Britain, Soviet Union, United States, and other powers, but Communists continue to act from inertia. Meanwhile the situation is new, different, and it provides de Gaulle with opportunities. The situation has changed and you must take a turn (*sdelat povorot*). The Communist Party is not so strong as to be able to club the government on its head. It must accumulate forces and seek allies. You must take measures so that in case of reactionary offensive the communists could have a solid defense and could say that the reaction would be attacking not communists but people. If the situation were not to change for the better, then the forces rallied against the Party would be useful in its future offensive.

You need a platform for political organization. This platform must include resurrection of industries, granting jobs for unemployed, defense of democracy, punishment of those who had smothered democracy.

Com. Stalin asks what the organization of resistance in France is called.

Com. Thorez responds that this organization is called "The Resistance Movement."

Com. Stalin says that it should be given another name. Perhaps it should be named "Resurrection Front (*front vosstanovleniia*). Before one could speak about liberation of the country, now [one says] bout is resurrection, rehabilitation. It would be good if you consolidate under this banner the forces of the Left, workers, intellectuals, circles of culture.

Com. Thorez says that it would be good to attract also peasants to this movement.

Com. Stalin says that he forgot to mention the peasants. They must certainly be attracted to this movement. There are people among them who might be of use.

The Communist Party must be strong and must be surrounded by allies. Enemies want to isolate the Communist Party. You must not let it happen.

Then Com. Stalin says that this bloc should hardly be named "front." In this case it would remind bourgeoisie of "Popular Front." One should look for another name. Perhaps it can be called: "Movement for strengthening of democracy in France." If one says "Movement of struggle for democracy," some can respond that there is democracy in France, there is a republic, etc. Perhaps the best way to name would be "Movement for resurrection of a strong France and strengthening of democracy." This is of course too long for a name, but French Communists can find a better title themselves. Com. Stalin explains that he only hints at an idea, but French Communists can find specific forms for its implementation.

The platform of this movement, says Com. Stalin, must include, first of all, economic rehabilitation of the country and reinforcement of democracy. The platform should be formulated within this framework.

Com. Stalin says that he gave all remarks he wanted to give, and asks if Com. Thorez has questions with regard to these remarks.

Com. Thorez responds that he has no questions.

Then Com. Stalin says that de Gaulle want to take part in occupation of Germany. In one of his speeches de Gaulle says that the French wants to test their strength before the end of the war. In a word, de Gaulle want to demonstrate what the Galls are. He is not afraid of taking a militant stand towards Germany. Incidentally, de Gaulle complained to our people that he would like to obtain weapons for [the French] party, but the British and the Americans do not give him weapons.

Com. Stalin asks how many divisions de Gaulle has at his disposal.

Com. Thorez responds that de Gaulle has five French divisions, armed by American weapons. Besides, there are French guerrilla units which do not have heavy armament. They are armed only with rifles (*ruzhiami*). By the way, these guerrilla forces block the ports of the French Western coast held by the Germans.

Com. Stalin says that Churchill, when he was in Moscow, touched on the issue about the future of the Rhein region and the Saar. Churchill came out for dismemberment of Germany. He said that Germany, not counting Eastern Prussia that would be annexed to Poland, should be divided into the following three parts: first, Prussia, second, Austria with a center in Vienna, including Southern German provinces—Baaden and Wuertemberg; third, Westfalen and the Rein region which should constitute a separate area under international control. The idea to create such an area will not allow Germany to use iron and coal. Massigli allegedly favors this plan. He once spoke in favor of a separation of the Rhein region and Westfalen [from Germany] and for establishment of international control there.

Com. Stalin says that he does not recommend that Communists hold out a demand to annex the Rein region and the Saar. Situation is unclear. One should find out what would be the attitude of French people to these demands. Meanwhile it would be better to stay away from the slogan of annexation. If the situation changes and it would be clear that public opinion, intelligentsia, people are in favor of [annexation], then it is a different thing. Com. Stalin says that he fears lest the Communists find themselves in one camp with the darkest reactionaries. And then the Communists will be told: "See, who are you with!" This slogan can wait. Wait for a month, perhaps for two months. One should gather data, sound out the ground.

Com. Stalin remarks that de Gaulle in his speech spoke for annexation of German territory, while Bidault spoke against this annexation. What is on? Is it imaginable that a single government can pursue two different political lines [?]

Com. Stalin asks how Bidault treats the issue of Alsace and Lorraine.

Com. Thorez answers that Bidault regards Alsace and Lorraine as part of French territory. Speaking about renunciation of annexations by France, Bidault means that Alsace and Lorraine belong to France.

Com. Thorez says that, in his opinion, Bidault spoke against annexations of German territory with an aim in mind to speak also against the transfer of a part of the current German territory to Poland. French reactionaries want that Poland protrude as deep as possible into the Soviet Union, and therefore it is not in their interest to shift Poland to the

West. French reactionaries, as well as the British, would like to see Poland as a tool against the Soviet Union.

Com. Stalin says that the British and the French certainly want it, but it will not to be. Poles want to obtain rich, developed German regions, and they will lose only the Pinsk marshes.

Com. Stalin asks if military plants now operate in France.

Com. Thorez answers that the plants are mostly inactive. It is usually explained by the lack of raw materials, disorganization of transportation, and similar kinds of reasons. In those places where workers began to operate the plants on their own initiative, the central authorities intervened and disrupted the plants' operation. Thus there is stagnation in the French industry and there are many unemployed.

Com. Stalin says that one of the major tasks of the mass movement for restoration of France must be setting in operation of industrial enterprises, first of all of military industry. Com. Stalin says that in the Soviet Union industry suffered from the war more than the French industry, yet we are managing to restore rather quickly the industry in the regions that were under German occupation. We are also restoring bridges, railroads and some other things.

Com. Thorez says that workers in locals would like to restore industry, but as far as the central authorities are concerned, the matter gets stalled. This is sabotage, says Com. Thorez.

Com. Stalin agrees that this is sabotage and says that it is necessary to fight for restoration of French industry.

Com. Thorez remarks that the British and Americans do not want restoration of industry in France.

Com. Stalin agrees and says that the British and Americans wish that industry existed only in their countries and the whole world buy their goods. That is why their air forces bomb industrial installations in Germany with such appetite. The British and Americans want to destroy more industrial plants in Germany so that it will be harder to get reparations from Germany. Com. Stalin asks what to do if de Gaulle requests weapons from the Soviet Union. Should we give him weapons?

Com. Thorez answers that all depends on how this weapon will be used.

Com. Stalin says that it is hard to make the delivery of weapons conditional in this way. Com. Stalin asks if the British are giving weapons to the French.

Com. Thorez answers that Churchill in one of his announcement promised to give weapons to the French, but in a second declaration he said that in view of the fact that the French had so far received only American weapons, this issue should be reconsidered and one should strive to achieve unification of the types of weapons transferred [to the French]

Com. Stalin asks if the French troops occupy a certain sector of the front against the German troops.

Com. Thorez answers that they have a segment at the southern extremity of the front against Belfort.

Com. Stalin asks if de Gaulle's five French divisions consist of the French or of the colonial troops.

Com. Thorez answers that there is a large portion of colonial troops in these divisions.

Com. Stalin says that old French commanders will seek to preserve colonial forces, since they are very docile. One should strive to have as many French as possible in the

French army. Com. Stalin says that one should also seek that the French forces have their own sector of the front and that the troops at that sector would be under French command.

Com. Thorez says that in his opinion France should have a strong army.

Com. Stalin responds that he agrees with this and the French Communists should not be afraid of creating a large army. They should have their people in the army.

Com. Stalin says that there is a French air squadron "Normandy" fighting on the Soviet-German front. Our people praise the pilots of this air squadron. They say that the French pilots fight well. There are real aces among them. Does Thorez know these pilots?

Com. Thorez answers that he knows, but not everybody. He says that among those pilots there are reactionary personalities, representatives of old noble families. They always stood aside and they were treated with a tinge of suspicion. However, when recently the flight crews of the air squadron received awards, then these pilots received decorations. This impressed the entire squadron. Thorez heard about it the other day from General Petey.

Com. Stalin says that we do not give awards for nothing and those who fight the Germans well get decorations. We are thinking of awarding some of the French pilots the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Com. Stalin asks that perhaps de Gaulle during his visit in the Soviet Union might ask our permission to transfer the squadron "Normandy" to France. Should the pilots be permitted to take their armaments, i.e. planes, with them?

Com. Thorez says that it would be fine and adds that the French pilots are very proud that they fight in such good fighters.

Com. Stalin responds that the planes are rather good indeed and adds that it would be awkward to disarm the pilots before their departure from the Soviet Union. So one has to let them go with their planes. Com. Stalin asks if Thorez have questions for him and the present comrades.

Com. Thorez answers that he has no more questions.

Finishing the conversation, Com. Stalin wishes Thorez success and asks him to send regards to the French comrades, Duclos, Marti and others. Shaking hands of com Stalin in a farewell, Thorez says that he assures him in his allegiance to our cause and to com. Stalin and thanks for the reception.

Com. Stalin answers that it is not appropriate to thank among comrades.

Com. Thorez says that he still thanks Com. Stalin and always needs his advice.

The conversation lasted for 1 hour 45 minutes.

Recorded by Podtserob

Source: "Anglichane i Amerikatsy khotiat vezde sozdat' raktsionnye pravitel'stva," Istochnik, 1995, no. 4, pp. 152-158 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 390, l. 85 - 93).

Translated by Vladislav Zubok.

ACCOUNT OF GENERAL DE GAULLE'S MEETING WITH MARSHAL STALIN

Saturday, December 2 at 21:00 at the Kremlin

C.R.

Very Secret

General de Gaulle was received by Marshal Stalin at the Kremlin December 2 at 21:00.

Attending the meeting: Mr. Molotov, Mr. Bogomolov, Mr. Roger Garreau and the interpreter Podzerov.

The Marshal shakes his visitor's hand and immediately invites him to be seated opposite him at a table with a green tablecloth, where paper and pencils had been prepared. He asks if he had a good trip and, upon an affirmative response from General de Gaulle, begins to draw geometric shapes with red pencil on a sheet of paper, waiting for de Gaulle to continue the conversation.

The General expresses his pleasure at being invited to be the guest of the Soviet government, thanking them for the warm welcome he received from Ambassador Bogomolov.

The Marshal asks the General several questions about his stay in Baku and about the impressions he has after his visit to Stalingrad. The General speaks highly of the reconstruction work which has already been completed in that glorious city; the Marshal asks him in what material state France finds itself after its liberation and whether the resumption of its means of production is proceeding in a satisfying manner. The General describes the serious difficulties the government is attempting to overcome, especially those concerning transportation and raw materials. Some considerable progress has already been made: although more than 4000 bridges and railways have been destroyed, communications have already been reestablished from one end of the country to the other, coal extraction has doubled in two months, etc. But above all the provisional government is preoccupied with equipping the new army, which is burning to take a strong role in the continuation of the war. He presses the American authorities to speed up their provision of indispensable materials, but has unfortunately not been satisfied.

The Marshal pointed out that it would better not to rely too heavily on the assistance of others, but rather to make every effort oneself to get national production under way once again.

General de Gaulle states that that is definitely the goal of his government.

Moving on to the overall situation of France in Europe and in the world, he states that the reestablishment of a strong France, along with a powerful Russia, provides the continent with the greatest guarantee of security. He thanks the Soviet government for having taken the initiative to suggest that France be admitted as an equal and permanent member of the

consultative commission for European affairs. The Marshal believes that this would happen and that France should retake the position which it deserves.

General de Gaulle says that, in effect, the defeat of 1940 was an accident and also a consequence of the fact that, constantly exposed to German aggression, France didn't succeed during the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Versailles, to convince the Allies of the necessity of guaranteeing the security of its borders in a definitive way. The proposals presented by Mr. Clemenceau to the Supreme Council on the subject of the Rhine frontier were, unfortunately, rejected and the guarantees that we had been provided in compensation were illusory. Russia was absent and we missed its concurrence: Russia would have better understood the needs of France, its position vis-à-vis the German menace being the same as ours. It was absolutely necessary to avoid recommitting such a profound error in the regulation of the peace of tomorrow.

The Marshal asks if General de Gaulle has already developed a concrete plan, to which de Gaulle responds that the geographic and historic boundary of France is the Rhine and that that border is the only one that can ensure his country's security.

The Marshal responds: "It is in effect good that France should extend to the Rhine. It is difficult to object to that." Then, after several seconds of reflection, he adds: "Never can any natural frontier, no matter how strong it may be, can give an absolute guarantee of security if it is not protected by a solid nation and a strong army. One must not allow oneself to doze behind an illusion of security such as was the Maginot Line. There are those here who want to take our borders to the Carpathians because that mountain chain constitutes a natural protection for Russia. But security should also be guaranteed by alliances and accords between friendly nations. The history of the two wars has shown that neither France, nor Russia, nor any other two countries together are strong enough to stay on top of Germany. To attain this goal, the concurrence of other powers would be necessary. Thus it is only as a result of a solid entente between the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain, and America that total victory could possibly be obtained and a lasting peace established. The Soviet Union and France could not handle the question of the Rhine frontier alone. Has General de Gaulle already discussed this issue with London and Washington?"

General de Gaulle responds that he shares completely the Marshal's point of view, that agreement between the four great powers is in effect indispensable and that that agreement would be greatly facilitated by the participation of France in the works of the consultative commission for European affairs. Expanding on the reestablishment of the Rhine as the French frontier, de Gaulle hoped that the Soviet Union, because of the similarity of its position to the French position and since it is exposed to the same immediate dangers, would understand the legitimacy of our demand and would support it in the near future alongside the other allied powers.

As the topic of the future of the western border of Germany has been the only topic of discussion thus far, the General continues, he would be happy to hear the views and plans of the Soviet government in regard to Germany's eastern border.

The Marshal responds that the old Polish territories in west Prussia, in Pomerania and in Silesia, should be legitimately restored to Poland. "In sum, the frontier of the Oder?" asks General de Gaulle. "Even the Oder is too far," responds the Marshal. The Oder and the Neisse. And also some changes in the Czechoslovak border, which would like reestablish the borders of 1938.

General de Gaulle states that the outline of these borders inspires the same geographic and historic considerations as well as the same military necessities as those upon which the French base their reclamation of the French border at the Rhine.

The Marshal comes back to the peace and security guarantee that offers the promise of a solid entente between the major allies who are the principal players in the war. The Soviet Union and Great Britain have already, under this plan, concluded a 20-year treaty of alliance.⁴² It would be beneficial for the Soviet Union and France to consider an similar accord to provide against the common danger of any new German aggression.

General de Gaulle responds that that is very much the desire of his government. Our two countries, being immediate neighbors of Germany, are most interested in joining forces for the common defense. The pact of 1935, having been concluded with the same goal, could serve as a base for negotiating a new accord better adapted to the present conditions.

Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov together point out that the pact of 1935 was never put into effect and that the Soviet Union, having learned from this painful experience, does not intend to conclude another accord on paper which is not guaranteed by a sincere and solid will to respect it in letter and spirit. General de Gaulle pointed out that he is not Pierre Laval and that he wishes to conclude a pact with the Soviet Union, to ensure its full application, and to establish a solid entente between France and Russia.

Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov noted this assurance with satisfaction. The envisioned agreement will be integrated in a good understanding and tight collaboration among the Allies and among all of the United Nations.

General de Gaulle asked to take his leave at 23:00.

Source: Documents Diplomatiques Francais, 1944, vol. 2 (3 septembre - 31 decembre), pp. 351-53.

Translated by Scott Smith.

⁴² Regarding the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, enacted May 26, 1942.

**CONVERSATION BETWEEN
GENERAL DE GAULLE AND MARSHAL STALIN**

Friday December 8, 1944

P.V.

Very Secret

French in attendance:

General de Gaulle
Mr. Bidault
Mr. Garreau

Soviets in attendance:

Marshal Stalin
Mr. Molotov
Mr. Bogomolov

General de Gaulle.--Up to this point we have discussed many things. The moment has come to express clearly our position on certain problems of capital importance for you and for us.

For us our main focus, the vital question, is the German question.

The problem of French security in regard to Germany is composed of three elements:

- a. borders
- b. disarmament
- c. alliances

a. and b. As for the German borders, we have no objection to the eastern border being marked at the Oder and the Neisse.

As for Germany's western border, we consider it crucial that the German state or states exert no sovereignty, in any form, west of the Rhine.

Disarmament itself has three aspects: military, economic, and moral.

On the subject of economic disarmament, we will consider not only that heavy industry not be used--even in part--for armament with in Germany, but also that German sovereignty over the Ruhr Valley--with all its resources--should be taken away, placing the area under the control of an international regime, not only for administrative purposes but also to ensure the utilization of mines and factories for peace.

This internationalization of the Ruhr could be in effect less difficult than one would think. Aside from several administrators, the population is composed almost exclusively of workers. They could be made into a cosmopolitan populous. There is already a fair number of foreign workers. Others could be made to come. The cosmopolitan nature of the Ruhr's population, to a certain extent, would facilitate the establishment of an international regime.

As for the southern German border, we believe that it is necessary to return the Sudetenland to the Czechoslovaks and make Austria a free and independent country.

As for Germany itself, we have no preconceptions. We shall see.

c. We now arrive at the topic of alliances. There are two big countries who, because of their geographic positions, are particularly exposed to German aggression: France and the USSR.

Furthermore, these are the only two countries that, because of the nature of things, always have and will maintain large armies. In Great Britain the permanent army is and will always be an object for discussion; both here and in France, the army is an institution.

Because of the nature of things it is natural for us to be allies in the first place, in a way that enables us to act preventively and to respond immediately. We are the only two countries who can do this. If we are associated in such a way, the other states of Europe--for example, the Balkan states--will not be able to go to the other side because we will be the strongest.

In the French point of view, the Franco-Soviet alliance comes in first place.

As for Great Britain, history--above all the twenty years that separated the two wars--shows that it is very hindered from acting preventively and immediately. First, this is because of its geographic position. All other British actions are dependent upon concord with its dominions. They are very remote: they are not directly threatened and they have diverging interests. For all these reasons it is difficult for Great Britain to take preventive measures or immediate measures in the case of conflict.

This is why in 1914 Great Britain hesitated before entering the war. It only acted because Belgium was invaded and thus England immediately felt in peril. If German aggression had been direct not westward but eastward, England would have had problems making a decision. Even though Britain acted in September 1939, it was after a long series of capitulations. In return when the Germans are acting aggressive and Great Britain feels threatened, it acts with steadfastness, courage, and energy. It is certain that Great Britain should be associated with France and the USSR in the defense of the peace. But that is a different level of security.

Security should be seen, in the end, from a global perspective. Here, I think specifically about the participation of America, who is vexed by European quarrels which it does not completely understand, who has a wide range of interests scattered across the globe, whose main concerns are not in regard to Europe and who does not act until the final moment. Roosevelt did not enter the present war until France had been beaten, Britain was greatly strained, and the German army had reached the Caucasus. Within the security structure, America represents the third stage. This stage should not be neglected. It should be constructed. But, it should crown the structure.

You have proposed a tripartite Anglo-Franco-Soviet pact. I should tell you that we have no objection in principal to such a pact. But we believe that it does not address the problem. We much prefer a system of security made up of three levels:

- 1st Franco-Soviet Pact
- 2nd Anglo-Soviet and Franco-Anglo Pact
- 3rd Collective Security (with the inclusion of America)

One point which should be stressed is that a tripartite pact presents some big problems. Between France and the USSR there is no major point of debate. With Great Britain we have always had, and always will have, such debates. You, also, have had disagreements with Britain, such as in Iran. You will possibly have further disagreements in the Far East.

It is therefore not certain that a tripartite pact will be easy to conclude. On the contrary, the process could be marred and even retarded by conflicts of interest; the Germans realize this and could combine such conflicts of interest with further aggression. Thus, we do not believe that a tripartite pact is the best way to achieve security.

Marshal Stalin boasts of the advantages of a tripartite pact. The English would be tied directly to France and to the USSR. This would be serious and solid. We would be able to consult one another, bringing England to action more quickly. Stalin wonders if this would not be better. Then he quickly changes the subject.

After all, we can make a pact between our two countries; France must understand Soviet Russia's fundamental interest in the Polish affair. We cannot allow a Poland which, presently, opposes Moscow as well as Germany. We want a Poland honestly sympathetic to the Allies and resolutely anti-German. This is not possible with the government in London. It represents an anti-Russian spirit which has always existed in Poland. On the contrary, we would be able to find common ground with a different Poland, big, strong, a friend in democracy to both France and the USSR. If you share this point of view, make an agreement with Lublin and we will be able to

conclude a pact with you. Churchill will obviously be very hurt. Oh well. It has happened before. He has offended me frequently as well.

The interpreter clarifies, and General de Gaulle believes it to be a question of a tripartite pact, on the condition that an official arrangement intervenes with the Lublin Committee. He believes that this proposition presents little of interest.

He repeats that the French government wishes to send a delegate to Lublin and to receive a delegate from Lublin in Paris. But he does not want to meet with the Lublin Committee, which he does not know well. France and the USSR have a common interest in a united Poland, but not in an artificial Poland, in which France would have no confidence.

Stalin ends the talks by talking about the flotilla "Normandy" and about the dinner which would take place the following evening at the Kremlin.

Returning to the embassy, General de Gaulle states that Mr. Bidault and Mr. Garreau have different interpretations of Stalin's comments relating to the conclusion of a pact and to the arrangement with Lublin. According to Mr. Bidault and Mr. Garreau, Stalin had envisioned a bilateral Franco-Soviet pact and not a tripartite pact.

Mr. Bidault and Mr. Garreau, at 11:00 p.m., held another interview with Mr. Molotov which confirms this interpretation.

Stalin did offer to conclude a bilateral pact if the Lublin Committee and the Provisional French Government would exchange delegates.

Thereupon, the General decides that Mr. Garreau would receive the following day, Saturday at 13:00 at the embassy, representatives of the Polish Committee for National Liberation, who arrived several days ago in Moscow. During the course of the interview, General de Gaulle would come to the embassy to see them.

Source: Documents Diplomatiques Francais, 1944, vol. 2 (3 septembre - 31 decembre), pp. 419-22.

Translated by Scott Smith.

**CONVERSATION BETWEEN
GENERAL DE GAULLE AND MARSHAL STALIN**

at the Kremlin December 6 1944 from 18:00 to 19:45

P.V.

Very secret

Present:

for the French:

General de Gaulle
Mr. Bidault
Mr. Garreau
Mr. Dejean

for the Soviets:

Marshal Stalin
Mr. Molotov
Mr. Bogomolov
Mr. Podzerov

General de Gaulle -- I asked to see you so that we could use our stay in Moscow to bring up a group of questions which we pose today and will pose tomorrow. We would very much like to hear your opinion, and we will give you ours, if you wish.

Marshal Stalin -- Please, continue.

General de Gaulle -- We have presented you with a plan for a pact related to the measures which France and the USSR could take for common security in regard to Germany. We shall discuss it. Surrounding this pact, there are a certain number of questions which should be clarified between us. Allow me to pose some specific questions. What I am about to say is firm and sincere.

There is the Polish affair.

Let me go back in history.

Marshal Stalin knows that, for a long time and for many different reasons-- civilization, religion, and others, there has existed between France and Poland a sentimental rapport.

Marshal Stalin -- Yes, I know.

General de Gaulle -- For a long time France has tried to maintain an independent Poland in the midst of its neighboring states. We have not succeeded. Poland disappeared.

After the last war, France wanted a Poland capable of opposing Germany. This was the goal of French policy when we contributed to the recreation, after 1918, of an independent Polish state.

We know too well the consequences of the policies followed by Poland between the two wars. Beck's policy--and those of people similar to him--have greatly displeased us and have put us in grave danger, us as well as you.

We evaluate all the dangers to peace which might present themselves, particularly the danger to the Soviet Union posed by a Poland returning to previous policies with regard to a defeated Germany. We know that Germany has always wanted to use Poland for similar policies.

Marshal Stalin -- Germany wants to devour, to annihilate Poland. They have always wanted this.

General de Gaulle -- Before devouring Poland, Germany will always try to use it. We French have an interest in creating conditions which would prevent Germany from doing so again. I say this because it is the truth.

We are not at all opposed to what Marshal Stalin said the other day about the western Polish border. We believe that such a solution would exclude an accord between Germany and Poland.

Marshal Stalin -- You are right.

General de Gaulle -- If, at the same time, the extension of Poland to the west could permit a solution to the problem of the eastern border, we would be in complete agreement.

Marshal Stalin -- The eastern border of Poland has been confirmed by Clemenceau. It is the Curzon Line.

General de Gaulle -- We have no objection to the Curzon Line, if Poland receives compensation to the west.

Marshal Stalin -- It is paramount that Poland receive these territories.

General de Gaulle -- I also believe that Poland should receive them.

Marshal Stalin -- It is an obligatory and necessary condition. Our army will do what is necessary to ensure it.

General de Gaulle -- That is a satisfying solution.

Marshal Stalin -- We believe so as well.

General de Gaulle -- In the meantime, we believe that Poland should remain an independent state, as Marshal Stalin has already said.

Marshal Stalin -- Certainly. There is not the least doubt on this subject.

General de Gaulle -- We know that the current situation has marred Polish spirits. We do not know exactly what the Polish people will think after their liberation by the Red Army. After the initial difficulties and bursts of emotion, a political situation might arise which is good from the point of view of the Poles and favorable for relations between Poland and France and the USSR.

I should tell the Soviet government that at such a time, and even presently, if France has the opportunity and possibility of acting on Polish desires, it will do so. We would do so in consulting with our allies, the USSR, Great Britain, and the United States.

As the Soviet government knows, we have had since the beginning maintained relations with the Polish government in London. This began with Sikorski and has continued. As long as the Poles are not occupying their own territory, we have little business to conduct with them. We are watching the situation unfold. The truth will not appear until Polish territory is liberated. We are ready to exercise our influence over the Poles, over all the Poles, in the sense of a union between them, of their acceptance of the new frontiers, and of a genuinely friendly attitude towards France and the Soviet Union.

Marshal Stalin -- I understand.

General de Gaulle -- What else have we to discuss?

Marshal Stalin -- May I ask you what you mean by a western bloc?

General de Gaulle -- Can I ask the Marshal what he means by that? We have talked quite a bit about such a bloc. We are continentals. We do not imagine that the Empire⁴³ can be divided into several pieces. The idea of a western or eastern bloc, or a southern or northern bloc, means nothing in our eyes. We believe it is paramount to create certain practical things between people interested in the same practical matters. Basically there should be only one bloc in Europe, one made up of those people interested in not being attacked by Germany. That is why the first accord, which we pressed for after the liberation of France, is the one that we propose.

That being said, it is true that we have immediate neighbors: Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Italy. With these states we have certain arrangements to make since we live very close to each other. We will also, without doubt, have similar arrangements with Great Britain, as we do with Belgium, Luxembourg, and possibly Italy.

In spite of these arrangements, there is no bloc.

Marshal Stalin -- Pardon me for having posed such a needless question, if it put you in an odd situation.

General de Gaulle -- I know that there are some who have a different agenda.

⁴³ Read, without a doubt, as "Europe."

Marshal Stalin -- I've heard the declaration by Mr. Pierlot, stating that such a bloc exists.

General de Gaulle -- What could such a declaration mean?

Marshal Stalin -- I don't know. I asked you. I thought you would know.

General de Gaulle -- Belgium has, in the past, concluded and denounced accords for its defense with Great Britain and France. Such arrangements do not make a bloc. Say that Belgium has things to exchange with France or with Great Britain and that it is necessary to make agreements in order to do so. Neither is this a bloc.

Marshal Stalin -- I am accusing no one. I understand the situation in Belgium and the situation in France. Indeed France and Belgium need a solid alliance. I understand that France will also need alliances with bordering countries to prevent against German aggression.

General de Gaulle -- In any case, as for what concerns us, and to end the discussion of blocs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Bidault, recently made, in the name of the Government, a categorical declaration. England has never asked us to form a bloc. Nor have we asked England. We are looking to form a Moscow-Paris-London European bloc. All that remains are local arrangements. I have said so to Marshal Stalin. When one looks closely at the question of blocs, there has, through the course of history, been the block of Germany and its allies, called the Triple Alliance and then the Axis, which could still reform. The other bloc is the Anglo-Franco-Soviet bloc.

Marshal Stalin -- I understand that.

General de Gaulle spoke several minutes ago, among other things, about a mutual assistance and security pact. I think that we could conclude one someday.

As for Poland, General de Gaulle knows that over the course of the past thirty years Poland has twice served as a corridor, as a passageway, for the German army to invade Russia. This cannot continue. The passageway must be closed, and *it must be Poland itself who closes this passage*. It should not be closed from the outside. In order to do this, we need a strong, independent, democratic Poland. A state cannot be strong if it is not democratic. We have an interest in a strong Poland. If Poland is strong, it will not be attacked again.

It is a question of doing an about-face, a turnaround in our policy. Up until this war Poland and Russia lived in a state of conflict. The Poles, over the course of several centuries, occupied Moscow twice. The Russians, two hundred years later, occupied Warsaw twice. This has not gone without repercussions in Polish-Russian relations. We would like to bring an end to this. The last war was a lesson. The Polish-Russian friendship is, for Poland and for Russia, the best guarantee against the German menace. This point of view is accepted by Russia and by better Polish elements. Such is the base of the new policy of Polish-Russian friendship.

History shows us a France both friendly to and protective of Poland and its independence. Herein lies the difference in attitude between France and the other powers towards Poland. The Poles know this. They can consider the current situation in which

France will take a more favorable attitude towards them than will Great Britain or the United States. I have counted on and continue to count on this.

England is tied to the Polish government in exile just as it is tied to Mihailovitch in Yugoslavia. It is difficult for England to extract itself from that situation. At present Mihailovitch is hiding. He is not allowed to enter Yugoslavia. I fear that the same thing might happen to Giraud and Laval in the heart of the government in exile in London.

The political refugees in London are playing at being ministers. Another group in Lublin is doing the work. It has initiated agrarian reform similar to that undertaken in France in the late 18th century, which has served as a basis for French forces. There is a difference between the two groups. One is useless. That is the reason why the Soviet government established good relations with the new, reborn Poland represented by the Polish Committee for National Liberation. I thought that France understood that better than either England or America. I don't doubt that, at some point, Great Britain and the United States will come to understand.

General de Gaulle -- Do you have any information about the opinion of the Polish people as a whole?

Marshal Stalin -- I keep an eye on it. I make observations.

General de Gaulle -- You are obviously better informed than anyone else.

Marshal Stalin -- I wouldn't say that. I am interested. I study it.

General de Gaulle -- The Marshal knows better than anyone else the inconvenience of constructing a government that public opinion will not support.

Marshal Stalin -- I can tell you why the situation of the Polish government in London has deteriorated.

The Polish population watched the Red Army advance, beat the Germans, win victories. As for the Red Army, they watched the Polish troops fight each other. They asked themselves: where is the Polish government in London? Why isn't it in free Poland or freeing itself?

Another moment in the decline of the government in London corresponds to the crushing of the ill-fated insurrection in Warsaw. The Polish people learned that this insurrection had begun without the agreement of the Red Army commander. If the Poles had asked the Soviet government if it was ready to support the revolt, the government certainly would have said no. Our army had just advanced 600 kilometers from Minsk to Warsaw. Its artillery, its munitions were coming from bases situated a further 400 kilometers to the rear. Our troops were not ready to take Warsaw. The question was not asked. The people know that a costly adventure was launched. These are the agents of the government in exile who allowed Germany to gain the victory at Warsaw.

A third factor has arisen. The Lublin Committee has undertaken agrarian reform. Those officials were the victims of agents from the government in London. They took Polish land upon immigrating or leaving with the Germans. They sold them to the peasants. They accomplished what France herself had accomplished at the end of the 18th century, thus

creating its authority as in a democratic state. It was under these conditions that the Polish Committee of Lublin acquired great strength. In parallel, according to information from the Soviet government, the influence of the Polish government in London receded.

General de Gaulle -- I repeat what I said in the beginning. We will see clearly after the liberation. If France has influence over the Poles, we will use it to unify them in friendship with France and with the Soviet Union.

Like other governments, France has relations with the Polish government in London. If there is cause to change that, we will do so in accord with our allies, as the USSR did in recognizing the French government.

On a point mentioned by Marshal Stalin I would like to make a small remark. There are some differences between Mr. Laval and General Giraud. These, whatever they have been, have never worked with the Germans.

Marshal Stalin -- I know about this difference. I don't want to get them together.

General de Gaulle -- And now, what does Marshal Stalin think of the situation in the Balkans?

Marshal Stalin -- We have chased the Germans to the fullest possible extent. Bulgaria has accepted the conditions of armistice. These conditions will certainly be executed; Bulgarian independence will not be affected; Bulgaria will nevertheless receive the deserved punishment.

Our troops have not made advances in Greece. They are not accustomed to advancing simultaneously in all directions. The British navy and troops are in Greece. You should ask them about the situation. As for the Germans, they are leaving Greece. They have been forced to leave.

Yugoslavian independence has been restored. It should remain a federated state.

As for Romania, Mr. Molotov has made a declaration which remains in force. Romania will be punished on the basis of the conditions of the armistice--but it will remain independent.

I think that a new national government will be formed in Hungary. The allies have conducted secret armistice negotiations with Horthy. The armistice is nearly concluded. The Germans have learned of this, but we don't know how: Horthy has been arrested.

Yugoslavia is not entirely liberated. Some German troops remain. Unfortunately we cannot lend much assistance. But, we have helped and will continue to help.

If a democratic government is established in Hungary, we will lend it assistance in turning the situation around, against the Germans.

Such is the situation in the Balkans.

General de Gaulle -- Thank you, Marshal Stalin.

In three months, France has recovered its position and reorganized its forces little by little.

Our first gesture is to turn towards Moscow in order to clarify our position and to suggest a treaty.

As for the other states, we are happy to state that the Soviet Union wishes to see them move towards democracy and towards friendship with the USSR and France.

As we see it, the basis of a democratic regime lies with elections. Wherever possible, we would support such elections in countries which were enslaved by Germany and who are now regaining their freedom. We would like to work with our allies, and especially with the Soviet Union, in order to do what is necessary to develop this policy.

Marshal Stalin --I believe that we will come to an understanding.

It seems to me that General de Gaulle should have declined a visit to the "Normandy" group because of the time. He expressed a desire for the French pilots to come to Moscow. They will be here soon.

General de Gaulle --Thanks you, Marshal.

Marshal Stalin --There is no need for thanks; it is not difficult.

* * *

Mr. Bidault broaches the subject of collective security. He wishes to speak in regard to the French government's vision of such a system of security.

Mr. Bidault -- The plan for a pact put forward by the French is based on an organization which is yet to be created. It is understood that this organization will not in any way alter the functioning of the pact. We want a system of collective security. But, the plan for a pact is inalterable.

Marshal Stalin -- That is true for both parties.

Mr. Bidault -- The collective organization does not remove anything from the pact which we plan to conclude.

As for collective security itself, the overall position of the French government is roughly the following:

1st It seems natural that collective organization would be assumed by and, to a large degree, directed by the great powers with the most weight in regard to political and military affairs. Thus, we believe that the unity of the great powers, in a realistic point of view, will not be broken, particularly in matters which concern the affairs of one or the other powers.

2nd It is essential to bring "smaller powers"--those with narrower interests--into the collective security association, in a way yet to be determined. This should not be done in order to keep the organization in check, but rather to allow these smaller powers to express their views and desires. On this point, there is no significant difference of opinion between the USSR and ourselves.

Marshal Stalin -- That is correct.

General de Gaulle -- As the Minister of Foreign Affairs has stated, we should not revisit the plenary sessions of the League of Nations, with an assembly of small nations and

the requirement of unanimity in order to take action. The assembly must be directed, by the agreement of the great powers, by those who furnish forces for use by the organization.

Mr. Bidault -- Furthermore we believe that these forces should not be made up of *Heimatlos*, but rather of contingents maintaining their national identity and put at the disposition of the collective organization, placed under its responsibility, have its commander.

Marshal Stalin -- It would be impossible to do otherwise.

Mr. Bidault -- We would also like the international organization to be enabled to assume the responsibility for the distribution primary materials and for guiding economic trends.

Marshal Stalin -- The collection and distribution of natural resources should be in the hands of an impartial and international organization. This is very difficult. But, it must happen. Military and economic functions are included in the Dumbarton Oaks Plan. Nothing which Mr. Bidault has said should go beyond the members involved with this plan.

Mr. Bidault -- But it is important that the project be published.

Marshal Stalin -- The point of view expressed by Mr. Bidault is near that of the Soviets and also, I believe, to the English position.

The collective security organization should take into account the needs for democracy and should form an assembly in which lesser powers are equally represented. The directing body of the organization should receive its mandate and its power from the assembly.

As for other matters, they appear clear to us.

* * *

At the conclusion of the talks, Mr. Molotov returns the text of the Soviet government's proposed Franco-Russian pact to Mr. Bidault.

Source: Documents Diplomatiques Francais, 1944, vol. 2 (3 septembre - 31 decembre), pp. 386-94.

Translated by Scott Smith.

**Bierut's Account of Three Conversations with Stalin
Held between 6 and 14 December 1944;
Minutes from a Meeting of the Military Division of the CC PPR
Relating to Information Provided by Gen. Rola-Żymierski
from his Talks with Stalin
on Personnel Policy in the Military**

Top secret
Done in 3 copies

Minutes from a Meeting of the Politburo Held on December 14, 1944

in the presence of comrades: Wiesław, Tomasz, Minc, Jakub, with the participation of comrades Wierbłowski and Radkiewicz.

The agenda:

1) Information from Moscow⁴⁴

The information is provided by com. Tomasz [Bierut]. As there is no orderly record of questions raised at different meetings, he is giving information according to the sequence of meetings.

Right after he had arrived in Moscow, he was called up by Bulganin, with whom he went to see Stalin. At the time there was a Politburo meeting going on in the Kremlin. Stalin showed him a great deal of cordiality, being interested first of all in agricultural reform and in the situation in PPS. He was greatly satisfied with the course of agricultural reform.

Com. Tomasz presented the situation in PPS in the light of two currents visible in that party, i.e. a truly democratic trend represented by [Osóbka] Morawski and a WRN trend, represented by Drobner⁴⁵. There has evolved the following conversation between Stalin and Tomasz on [Osóbka] Morawski:

S.: How is [Osóbka] Morawski doing in the PKWN?

T.: He is sincerely cooperating with us.

S.: Who wrote and approved the articles in "Robotnik" (The Worker)?

T.: [Osóbka] Morawski did, but he was under heavy pressure from the Drobner group.

Stalin invited Tomasz to supper, during which they returned back to the question of PPS.

S.: What do you think of [Osóbka] Morawski?

⁴⁴ A delegation of KRN and PKWN was in Moscow from 6 to 14 December 1944. See the previous minutes.

⁴⁵ Bolesław Drobner (1883-1968) - then chairman of the Main Council of PPS, chief of the Department of Health and Welfare of PKWN.

T.: He is a young man, inexperienced, but of a good will. He stands sincerely on the ground of cooperation with the Soviet Union.

S.: Was [Osóbka] Morawski known before the war to a broader public as a political figure?

T.: No, he was working in the cooperative sector.

S.: And who was known?

T.: Dubois and Barlicki were, but they have been killed by the Germans.

S.: What influence does [Osóbka] Morawski have in the PPS now?

T.: He has a dominant one, larger than Drobner has.

S.: What is his attitude toward the PPR?

T.: Generally it's very correct, one cannot reproach him for anything.

Stalin says that if it's so, then [Osóbka] Morawski may become a communist in the future.

Tomasz shares Stalin's point of view.

Next the talk turned to agricultural reform and Stalin was showing an understanding of the fact that the poor and agricultural workers had received a colossal portion of the land. He was stressing that agricultural reform would tie the masses with the PKWN and would secure durability of our power.

Stalin took a very favorable position towards the Union of Peasants' Self-Assistance⁴⁶. He pointed out that it would not be good if the PPR were to be flooded by the peasant element. PPR has to be based foremost on workers. He was talking slightly of the Peasant Party, which would never become a strong one. It would always be under various influences.

During the supper Tomasz was interlocuting Khrushchev about the behavior of the border guards and authorities at the repatriation of Poles from Ukraine. Khrushchev defended himself against charges, but all the present (Politburo), including Stalin, though in a joking manner, but rather firmly were pressing him and demanded changes towards the repatriating Poles. Tomasz was also intervening with Khrushchev regarding the libraries in Lwów, demanding the Ossolineum and private libraries. Khrushchev stated that on these matters it would be possible to reach an understanding.

Towards the end of the supper Tomasz brought up party matters, i.e. an allotment to the party of 15 automobiles.

S.: We are giving cars to the PKWN. Take it from them.

T.: For us it's not convenient to take it from PKWN. Those autos are at the disposal of [Osóbka] Morawski.

⁴⁶ Reference here is of a positive attitude to the idea of forming a Union of Peasants' Self-Assistance, set up at the Peasants' Congress in Lublin on December 30-31, 1944.

S.: Why have you given these matters into the hands of [Osóbka] Morawski? You should have your own deputy, who would have a say on such matters.

That matter has not been settled then and Stalin was showing dissatisfaction. Later on Stalin was calling Tomasz, informing him that the question of 10 cars for the PPR would be settled by Malenkov⁴⁷ and Shcherbakov, i.e. that the Moscow party organization [VKP(b)] had taken care of us and would meet the needs of our party.

On the third day there was a reception for our whole delegation. Military matters have been settled only partially. Stalin was against the formation of a Polish Front, as the Polish Army was too weak. General Żymierski defended the concept of the Polish Front, conditioning its fighting capacity on supplying it with machinery and tanks.

During the first conversation there took place another talk about Berling. Stalin was talking of him as a provocateur. He said that Wanda [Wasilewska] had had a correct intuition about Berling, though at that time she didn't have arguments against him. Stalin shared the assumption that Berling had been left by Anders on purpose as his agent. In another conversation with Stalin, with the participation of Rola [Żymierski] and Wanda [Wasilewska] it was decided that his wife too should be sent to Moscow. Stalin was of the opinion that if she wouldn't want to go willfully, she should be sent forcefully.

Towards the end of the second meeting a matter of PKWN representation in other countries has been raised. Stalin said that in negotiations with de Gaulle the Soviet Union had raised the question of Polish-French relations. De Gaulle didn't want to establish relations with Poland, arguing that Poland was a secondary state. Stalin called de Gaulle a reactionist. In view of de Gaulle's resistance towards Poland he directed Molotov to reject all his proposals regarding a Soviet-French pact. Subsequently Stalin called Bierut to inform him that under Soviet pressure de Gaulle had agreed to exchange representatives between France and Poland. For the time being they are not going to be official missions, but official representations.

Stalin was strongly supporting the establishment of PKWN's relations with other countries. He was of the opinion that in Hungary there should be formed a government like our own⁴⁸, if only there should be an agricultural reform like in Poland.

On the question of a Polish Front Stalin has not said his last word, having in mind that perhaps only some section might be assigned to the Polish Army.

Stalin acknowledged with approval a military call-up to officers' corp conducted by the PPR⁴⁹, but emphasized the need to select candidates with some education. Bulganin

⁴⁷ Georgii M. Malenkov (1902-1988) - at the time associate member of Politburo and VKP(b) CC Secretary, deputy chairman of the State Committee for Defense of the USSR.

⁴⁸ A Temporary National Government under the leadership of Bella Miklos was formed in Debrecin on December 22, 1944, with the participation of the Smallholders Party, the Communist Party, the Hungarian Social-Democratic Party and the National Peasant Party.

assured us that by the year's end the Polish Army would get 2000 automobiles. And in January it will get the next one thousand.

The third meeting was held with four of us, including Wanda [Wasilewska]. Tomasz had stated already in his previous conversation with Stalin that our intention was to send off Wanda abroad. Stalin had noted that there might be some difficulties, she would be asked who is her husband⁵⁰, what country is she a citizen of, etc. He thinks that Wanda is very undecided as far as her relation to Poland is concerned. In the course of the meeting Stalin asked Wanda why she doesn't accept her work as a Polish citizen. Wanda was opposing very strongly her leaving the Soviet Union. Stalin didn't want to impose on her anything and consented to her staying in the USSR⁵¹.

A visit to de Gaulle:

It took place in the French legation. Present was the whole delegation and de Gaulle with general Garreau⁵². The interpreter - Modzelewski.

De Gaulle: what's going on in Lublin?

T.: it's a turning point, agricultural reform, that France has done long ago. He touched upon the old Polish-French friendship, which should now be continued, even more so that we have a common enemy - Germany.

d.G. agrees, but requests to take into consideration the difficulties posed by the fact that Poland has two political representations - in London and in Lublin. He wishes the Polish nation to be united.

T.: What kind of representation will there be?

d.G. asks not to put emphasis on the character of representation, which will be decided later. He doesn't agree to make public an exchange of representations⁵³.

[Osóbka] Morawski: We want to know who our representatives are going to be, since we cannot agree that they will be treated in a worse manner than the representation of the émigré government. If France cannot afford to recognize the representation, then we can wait.

d.G. pulled out a watch, noted that the time had passed and gave no response.

This conversation and the reception were reported to Molotov. He didn't consider the position taken by [Osóbka] Morawski towards de Gaulle as improper. Later on at a Stalin-de

⁴⁹ See a circular by the CC PPR of November 22, 1944 relating to a draft of volunteers to the Polish Army. PPR, Rezolucje, odezwy, instrukcje i okólniki KC, VIII 1944-XII 1945, Warszawa 1959, p. 83-85.

⁵⁰ Talk is here of Alexander J. Korneichuk (1905-1972), a Soviet writer.

⁵¹ For an account of W. Wasilewska of this conversation see *Archiwum Ruchu Robotniczego*, Vol. VII, Warszawa 1982, p. 418.

⁵² Roger Garreau (born 1891) - the plenipotentiary of the French Government in Moscow. He was not a general, but professional diplomat.

⁵³ For a communiqué on the exchange of representations see "Rzeczpospolita" 27 Dec. 1944, No. 141, p. 1.

Gaulle meeting Stalin stated that for the Soviet Union a pact with France was not necessary, while for France it was indispensable. Thus, Stalin put the matter in such terms that he was ready to conclude the pact on condition that France would recognize the PKWN. De Gaulle was forced to agree⁵⁴, since he didn't want to leave Moscow without the pact. At 2 a.m. the pact was still not signed and the French were to leave in the morning.

During the third conversation Stalin suggested to [Osóbka] Morawski to send off Drobner to Moscow as a PKWN representative.

On military matters Stalin has agreed that Korczyc⁵⁵ be nominated as chief of staff, Popławski⁵⁶ as commander of the 1 Army and Świerczewski as commander of the 2 Army⁵⁷. This has been decided.

After a long discussion on the delivery to Poland of agricultural tractors for post-seed time campaign Poland has been granted 300 caterpillar tractors.

On the organization of cooperative work in the countryside Stalin was giving examples from the first period in the Soviet Union, recommending ploughing with tractors and harvesting by hand.

With regard to the Internal Forces Stalin recommended first of all to educate the officers' corp, and as it goes on an expansion of the Internal Forces will follow. Provision of the Internal Forces will be done through the Stewardship of the Polish Army.

To a question raised by [Osóbka] Morawski if Poland should join the Soviet-Czechoslovak pact⁵⁸, Stalin said there was no need for it, as there is still no pact with the Soviets. Guarantees for Poland's borders by other countries Stalin considered as insulting to Poland. Only bilateral pacts are correct. He expressed himself in favor of establishing official representations between Poland and Ukraine and Belorussia⁵⁹.

Towards the end Stalin returned back to the question of PPS. All were pressing [Osóbka] Morawski, and Stalin suggested to get Drobner out of the Committee. Bulganin

⁵⁴ According to an account of de Gaulle, he had not given any concessions to the Soviet side. The pact had been signed when de Gaulle threatened to leave Moscow without signing it. See Ch. De Gaulle: *War memoirs*, Vol. III. Warsaw 1968, p. 336-341.

⁵⁵ Władysław Korczyc (1893-1966) - then a Major-General, commander of the I Polish Army, was made chief of staff of the Polish Army on December 22, 1944.

⁵⁶ Stanisław Popławski (1902-1973) - then a Major-General, commander of the 2nd Polish Army.

⁵⁷ Consistent with an order of December 19, 1944 S. Popławski and K. Korczyc took over their positions on December 22, 1944.

⁵⁸ Concluded on 12 December 1943.

⁵⁹ No such representations have been set up.

claims that Drobner had allegedly spoke at a PKWN meeting against the militarization of railroads.

[Osóbka] Morawski defended Drobner and in that case Bierut noted that ideologically Drobner is departing from us. He also pointed out to a resolution of the PPS Executive Committee, calling on the PPS emigration to return to Poland.

With regard to Mikołajczyk, Stalin thinks that he has made concessions on the advise of Churchill, who would like to have his people in the Lublin government. Since the Soviet Union has evidence that Mikołajczyk has connections with terrorists in Poland, the Soviet Union will not allow Mikołajczyk to enter Poland as long as the Red Army is there.

The Drobner question has not been definitely decided, though Stalin was strongly pressing to send Drobner off even to Kiev as a PKWN representative.

During a ride in a car after the visit [Osóbka] Morawski blew out at Bierut shouting "You in your ranks have bandits and the "sanacja" people⁶⁰, so you clean up yourselves, not our party!". An unpleasant exchange followed and Bierut left without saying a good-bye to [Osóbka] Morawski.

Done by: Wiesław

Source: Protokoły posiedzeń Biura Politycznego KC PPR 1944-1945, edited by A. Kochański, pp. 71-77.

Translated by Jan Chowanec.

⁶⁰ Translator's not - "sanacja" people refers to Piłsudski's followers after 1926.

Minutes from a Meeting of the Military Division of the CC PPR Relating to Information Provided by Gen. Rola-Żymierski from his Talks with Stalin on Personnel Policy in the Military, Lublin, December 18, 1944

Strictly secret

Participants at the meeting were comrades: Wiesław, Tomasz, gen. Rola, gen. Zawadzki, gen. Świerczewski, Jakub, Minc and Marek.

The agenda:

1. Report by gen. Rola from a visit to Moscow.
2. The question of transfer of com. Marek.
3. Exposé by gen Rola at a meeting of the KRN.
4. Decorations for January 1st.
5. Salaries for political officers of the Polish Army.
6. Miscellaneous.

Before the agenda was adopted there had evolved a longer discussion on the tactics of the A.K., [whose symptom is] the reporting of Lis⁶¹ to the Security Department and his new proposals submitted to gen. Rola for cooperation.

Com. Wiesław familiarized the gathering with a declaration of AK in the Krasnostaw county and with the content of an "understanding" reached between the AK command for Krasnostaw and "representatives of PKWN", regarding the AK coming into the open and enlisting itself into the Polish Army.

The guidelines for the party towards the new policy of AK have been laid down as follows:

1. Use such tactics as to take over AK weapons and to obtain addresses of all AK members, particularly those of the officers.
2. Do not admit them to the Polish Army and isolate those that have been mobilized.
3. Those guilty of fraternal murders bring up to the courts.

Ad. 1. Gen Rola informs that the chief of staff of the Red Army, gen. Antonov has communicated to him that Berling is charging him of supporting AK elements in the Polish Army. This charge is the continuation of a provocative activity of Berling.

In his conversation with Stalin gen. Rola presented to him the situation in the Polish Army as follows:

1. A danger from the AK in the Polish Army has been essentially eliminated. For AK activity, desertion, for organizing hostile and spying activity in the military, military courts during the months of October and November passed sentences to about 500 people, of which about 170 were sentenced to death.

⁶¹ Reference is probably made to second lieutenant Edward Michowski, during the occupation a commander of a partisan unit of the Peasant Battalions (BCh) in the Lublin region.

2. The Polish Army is experiencing a severe shortage of automobiles and tanks, and the promised 2000 automobiles have not been delivered so far.
3. The Main Staff of the Polish Armed Forces doesn't have a chief of staff.
4. [Gen. Rola] has intervened with Stalin for the formation of a Polish Front.

With regard to the automobiles he has received assurance that 2000 of them will be delivered by the end of December, and in January another one thousand. The question of tanks looks bad. Probably we won't get them, as even the Red Army is having a shortage of tanks.

Regarding the formation of a Polish Front Stalin was speaking skeptically. Gen. Rola felt that Stalin apparently doesn't agree to the formation of the Polish Front. The reason - the lack of technical means. From the 2nd Polish Army all munitions were taken for the I Belorussian Front. There may also be changes in operational plans, but there may also be a sense of uncertainty regarding the Polish forces.

On the question of a chief of staff Stalin proposed to transfer Korczyc from the 1st Army and make him the chief of staff. Make gen. Popławski commander of the 1st Army and gen. Świerczewski commander of the 2nd Army.

As far as the expansion of Polish armed forces is concerned, gen Rola got an impression there may arise great difficulties due to provision shortages.

From conversation with Bulganin and his instructions it looks that he is now a superior to the chief of staff of the Red Army. In Bulganin we find a very good friend of Poland.

In addition gen. Rola informs that Stalin was in favor of separating the Militia from the Security services in the sense that they must be separate organizations and pointed out to the need for Militia wearing different uniforms than the military.

In accordance with Stalin's proposals the [Military] Division has decided:

- a) transfer gen. Korczyc to the position of chief of staff of the Polish Army,
- b) transfer gen Popławski to the position of commander of the 1st Army,
- c) to nominate gen. Świerczewski commander of the 2nd Army.

Ad. 2. Com. Marek submits a motion to take final decisions regarding his work and to set the date for his transfer to the Army.

It has been decided that the question of transferring com. Marek to the military, consistent with a resolution of the Party CC, should be positively settled in the beginning of January.

Ad 3. The guidelines for an exposé of gen. Rola for a KRN meeting have been discussed and gen. Rola was obliged to work out the text of the exposé by 24 December.

Ad 4. With regard to decorations in connection with the first anniversary of the creation of KRN and setting up the Provisional Government it has been decided that:

About 1,000 people should be awarded, among them about 600 with a Grunwald Cross, 100 with an Order of Poland's Rebirth and 300 with a Cross of Merit. Assign 400 Grunwald Crosses for the country and about 200 for the ZPP (Union of Polish Patriots).

Com. Marek is made responsible for preparing a list of candidates for rewards from the AL (People's Army) and independence activity from the occupation period.

The lists should be ready by December 25, 1944.

The distribution list for the Orders of Rebirth of Poland and Crosses of Merit was decided as follows: PKWN - 50 pieces, the Lublin voivodship - 50, Rzeszów voivodship - 50, Białystok voivodship - 30, Warsaw voivodship - 30, Kielce voivodship - 20, the city of Lublin - 50, Praga - 70, city of Rzeszów - 20, city of Białystok - 30.

Ad 5. On the question of salaries for political officers it has been decided that they should be equal to the salaries of fighting officers. Regular posts for political officers have to be equal to the deputy fighting officers in the particular military services. Other matters relating to political-educational work in the Polish Army have been postponed till the next meeting.

Ad 6. It was decided to return an automobile left by major Wrzos for the disposal of the CC PPR to its rightful owner, i.e. the military recruitment office in Lublin, and gen Rola took it upon himself to give to the CC PPR one Willis automobile.

Done by: Wiesław

AAA, O/VI. 295-VII/251, pp. 1-4.

Source: Protokoły posiedzeń Biura Politycznego KC PPR 1944-1945, edited by A. Kochański, pp. 71-77.

Translated by Jan Chowaniec.

Excerpts from the Memoirs of Wladyslaw Gomulka Concerning the Polish Communist Leader's Meetings with Stalin in 1944-1945

A turnaround in Moscow's position toward the Homeland National Council (KRN)

The arrival of the KRN delegation in Moscow had entailed many important political consequences and changes in the existing up to now state of affairs involving the above mentioned issues. In the first place, one ought to mention a positive attitude of the highest Soviet authorities both to the creation of the Homeland National Council, and to setting up by it provisional executive bodies in the country at the appropriate moment. This was reflected in a reception given for the KRN delegation by Stalin at the Kremlin, in the presence of Molotov and other party and state leaders of the USSR. Stalin held a preliminary conversation with the delegation on May 19 [1944], and on May 22 the second essential conversation was held in the Kremlin, during which the delegation briefed the top representatives of the USSR with the premises and activities of the KRN and presented the question of weapons delivery for the People's Army (AL). The course of those talks indicated that up to the delegation's arrival in Moscow Stalin either had not known at all about the setting up in Poland of the KRN⁶², or had received on this matter very imprecise and superficial information.

One can be sure that in those days the KRN became for Stalin a gift from heaven. As only a few weeks earlier he had asked Roosevelt to give permission for a trip to the Soviet Union for American citizens of Polish origin, prof. Oskar Lange and rev. Stanisław Orlemański, whom Moscow intended to include into a Polish National Committee or a Provisional Government as non-communist raisins in those executive bodies being created at the time and scheduled to take power in the country. Stalin understood very well how greatly unpopular in the world public opinion and in the Polish society must be a Polish government consisting exclusively of ZPP activists residing in the Soviet Union and hiding under this facade members of the CBKP⁶³. To mitigate that unpopularity, he attempted to introduce into such government the Poles residing in the West.

On the other hand, Wasilewska was instructed to search for candidates to this government in the country. As she didn't have any information on the activities of the PPR, she recommended to the proper Soviet bodies the peasant leader Kazimierz Bagiński as a proper candidate to a Polish government, which were to be set up in Moscow. Dimitrov turned to us with a request to induce Bagiński to depart for the USSR, not knowing that Bagiński was ill-disposed not only towards the PPR, but also towards the USSR, and besides he held a leading position in the central apparatus of the Delegatura⁶⁴. No wonder, he

⁶² This is an unlikely supposition. Stalin had been informed rather in more detail than not. An agreement for arrival of the KRN delegation to the USSR and for engaging in its transportation through the front the Soviet intelligence, partisans and the air force was not possible without Stalin's agreement.

⁶³ CBKP - Centralne Biuro Komunistów Polskich (Central Bureau of Polish Communists).

⁶⁴ Translator's note - Delegatura in this case means the representation of the Polish Émigré Government in London for the Homeland, with its headquarters in Warsaw.

ridiculed the proposed trip to the USSR submitted to him, from my inspiration, by peasant leader Stanisław Bańczyk.

When the KRN delegation found itself in Moscow all those political troubles, connected with the creation by the ZPP a Provisional Polish Government in Moscow suddenly disappeared for Stalin and other Soviet leaders. That is why Stalin in a conversation with our delegation, held on May 22 acknowledged with satisfaction its statement that this homeland representation center should play a decisive role in the future in solving the question of setting up provisional executive bodies in the country and that the ZPP as a Polish émigré center should subordinate itself to the Homeland National Council. [...] ⁶⁵

Consistent with the instructions received in Warsaw, the KRN delegation in the course of further talks declared that it wanted to return back to the country as soon as possible. This intention could not, of course, suit Stalin. Right after the arrival of the KRN delegation in Moscow he noticed in it a perfect political instrument, which he decided to use in his battle with the western allies for a victorious - from the point of view of the USSR's interests - solution to the Polish question. By then the KRN had been already acting in the country for almost five months. The Soviet competent circles, including Dimitrov as a representative of VKP(b), had nothing to do with its creation, preparation of its ideological declaration, mapping out its objectives for today and tomorrow. The KRN's policy was fully consistent with the position that the Soviet government took on the Polish question. Regardless of the extent of KRN's influence in the society, it constituted an authentic homeland center. In a word, it was not a Soviet creature, a "Moscow's agency". And for Stalin this was most important.

Therefore, he not only advised the delegation not to return to Poland, but at the same time he thought it necessary for the whole party leadership center and KRN to relocate to the Soviet Union, to the areas liberated from the Germans, from which it could direct activities in the homeland through the remaining there comrades, constituting there a supplementary center. These suggestions the delegation promised to pass on to the country by radio codes. At the same time it didn't agree to remain in Moscow and consistent with Stalin's suggestion decided to request the PPR and KRN leadership to expand its composition by representatives of the radical wing of SL "Wola Ludu" ("People's Will") and representatives of the Supreme Command of the People's Army.

In those conversations participated also chairwoman of the Main Board of ZPP W. Wasilewska, who proposed that the KRN delegation visits Polish military units in the USSR. Stalin very warmly supported this proposal, saying: "The Homeland National Council doesn't have an army, and the Polish Army doesn't have a government". The delegation renewed further talks with Stalin 22 June 1944, visiting in the meantime the units of the Polish Military.

⁶⁵ Here and in the next few pages for the sake of brevity part of the comprehensive description from meetings and talks of the KRN delegation in Moscow, cited after the publications of Osóbka-Morawski and M. Sychalski, has been omitted.

Prior to the first meeting of the delegation with Stalin, M. Spychalski, acting as a plenipotentiary of the CC PPR, had held talks with CBKP members. It is only then that he learned about its existence, and likewise the CBKP, the ZPP leadership and the command of the Polish Army in the USSR learned about the situation in the country, about activities of the PPR and KRN, about armed struggle with the occupant, [...]

However, change was coming slowly and with evident resistance before the CBKP and the ZPP leadership, acting under distinct pressure from Stalin, decided to recognize - at least formally - the primacy of the homeland, to give up on its independence from the CC PPR and KRN.

The first step along this road was a communiqué placed in the ZPP's paper "Wolna Polska" ("Free Poland") of 23 May 1944 about the arrival in Moscow of the KRN delegation and its reception by Stalin. In that communiqué the ZPP leadership stated that it was recognizing the Homeland National Council as a leadership center of struggle for the liberation of Poland. But nothing more. The question of supremacy over the Polish Army in the USSR was omitted with total silence, as well as the relationship between the ZPP and the KRN.

*

A visit to Stalin

(August 1944)

In this period, when we made this decision, I had already had my first get-together visit with Stalin. In fact I paid it not on my own initiative, but actually fulfilling the will of the remaining members of the Politburo. After my arrival to Lublin I had had such a multitude of work that it didn't occur to me to present myself to Stalin. This matter propped up at a Politburo meeting, at which Bierut was reporting on the above mentioned Moscow talks with Stalin and Mikołajczyk in the first decade of August. It was then that some member of the Politburo made a remark addressed to me: "It's high time to present yourself to Stalin". Initially I reacted rather clumsily, asking: "What for", and I heard "What do you mean what for? - don't you understand that the secretary general of the CC PPR should in this capacity pay a courtesy visit to Stalin?". To all members of the Politburo this was such a natural matter as it is for strong believers to go to church to take part in some religious ceremony. Thus, I shared the point of view of my comrades, expressing consent for this ritual of reporting to Stalin, to let him know me personally.

All formalities connected with my departure for Moscow had been arranged with the assistance of Nikolai Bulganin⁶⁶. In the second decade of August I departed from Lublin by special plane. For me it wasn't a small experience, as it was the first air travel in my life. I withstood it very well, without any nausea or dizziness. I was observing with great interest through a round window of the plane everything what was visible on the flight's route. We landed at an airfield, which had been inoperative already for many years, almost in the center

⁶⁶ Nikolai Bulganin was at that time representative of the USSR at the PKWN.

of today's Moscow. From there we drove by car to the center of the city together with awaiting for me representatives of the CPSU Central Committee, where I was located in some apartment, serving as a party hotel. It was about noon time. As my guide said, a car from the Kremlin was to be expected soon to pick me up.

I continually had a pervasive thought of what I am going to talk about with Stalin. Is he going to seek specific information on the activities of the party and PKWN - what I thought was rather doubtful - or is he just going to get acquainted with me? In case of need I put into my briefcase in Lublin various materials, which might be helpful in my talks. At the same time I also thought up the second alternative, that is narrowing down my meeting to a brief visit. At that time I didn't know his customs, his norms or methods of work, I wasn't aware that he was starting substantial talks with representatives of other parties only from 10.00 p.m. and his official functions start from 2.00 p.m. I was made aware of this only by later practice.

At about 2.00 p.m. came to my place an NKVD officer, probably in the rank of a major and having been assured of my identity, he asked me to follow him to a black limousine awaiting in front of the building, whose windows were covered with curtains. I took the back seat, while my guide - the officer - took the front seat besides the driver, who was also uniformed. Soon the car pulled to a stop in front of the entrance gate to the Kremlin, guarded from both sides by NKVD guards. Beyond the watch-tower on the left side of the gate there was a wicket for pedestrians. An NKVD officer came out from the watch-tower, opened the gate in half and came up to the car. The officer sitting in the car handed him through lowered window an ID or an entrance pass. At the same time from the watch-tower on the other side also came out an officer and stood in front of the still closed second half of gate. In the course of controlling the pass the first officer just gave me a look, then turned back to the officer in the car, pulled back from the door and saluted. At this moment the officer standing in front of the closed half of the gate opened it wide and the car drove in to the Kremlin compound.

Later on this procedure kept repeating itself with this addition that when a delegation would be coming to Stalin in the evening hours - what was a steady rule - the controlled car would be under a stream of glaring lights from reflectors fastened at the gate. The premises where Stalin's cabinet was located was several hundred meters away. After my arrival on the spot my officer-guide passed me over to the hands of guards on the main floor. Right beside there was an elevator. One of the officers from that sentry got into the elevator with me, put it in motion and stopped on second floor. We went out into the corridor leading to a sizable room serving as a cloak-room. There I left my hat. From the cloak-room there was leading again a long corridor bending at straight angle, along which the officer stepping ahead of me led me to a large room occupied by Stalin's security guards, adjacent directly to his cabinet.

Several NKVD officers were there on guard. One of them, very short, of rather misshapen look, with a rank of colonel, later on promoted to general, as far as I recall, by the name of Poskrebishev (Stalin in irritation called him "mezhavetz" ("scoundrel"), was a commander⁶⁷. He knew, of course, that I was going to be received by Stalin. That is why as

⁶⁷ Alexander Poskrebishev, head of Stalin's secretariat.

soon as I came in he greeted me and seeing that I am holding a leather brief-case, he ordered me to leave it at his desk. To my remark that I have in it documents that may be of some use in my talk with Stalin, he said I could take them out from the brief-case and take them with me, but I am not supposed to enter to Stalin with the brief-case. Not knowing what documents I might need, I gave up on them totally and left the brief-case in the room. Poskrebishev seized me with his look from top to bottom as if to check if my pockets don't look suspicious, then leaving me at his desk disappeared beyond the door of Stalin's cabinet. He returned after a while and leaving the door open said to me: "Tovarish Stalin priglashayet Vas" ("Comrade Stalin asks you in").

From the door to Stalin's desk was about 2-3 steps. Coming beyond the door, which Poskrebishev had closed after me, I noticed that from the depth of a long room toward the desk situated at its end, is coming by slow steps towards me, staggering slightly, a rather short man of stocky construction, dressed in military grey tunic, buttoned up to neck and military trousers of the same color with stripes. This was Stalin. We met almost exactly in the middle of the room, which was of rectangular shape of approximately 10 meters wide and 20 meters long. On the left side stood a long, massive, rectangular table, covered with green cloth and at it a row of chairs on both sides. During bilateral meetings the chairs from the wall were taken by representatives of the USSR, and on the opposite side were situated their partners. Stalin's chair stood separately at the head of the table. There were no furniture on the left side of the room, but it had several large windows overlooking the city.

As I have already said, at the rear wall of the room from the windows there was Stalin's desk, and behind it an arm-chair. Right beyond the desk on the same wall there was a door leading to other premises, unknown to me. On the left wall, right beyond Stalin's chair, there was also a door, leading to a labyrinth of corridors. One of them led to a small cinema hall with about fifteen seats. The screen was of normal, large size. There were also tables with bottles of water and glasses. Stalin was a great lover of films. He had admired the picture "Peter the Great", and liked very much his harsh judgement of his own son. If after talks Stalin suggested to us to jointly view some picture, it meant that he didn't intend to invite us for supper.

I am not sure what was reflected in my face when I was approaching Stalin, reaching out with my hand to greet him. I was made aware that I was greeting a great man of the world scale, and that it was on him primarily that the fate of Poland depended. However, I didn't know what he was going to talk about with me. That thought was still piercing in my mind. I was trying to give my face a cheerful, normal look, what - as I know - I am never able to do in moments of excitement or uncertainty.

"Zdrastvuytie tovarishch Stalin" ("Nice to meet you, Comrade Stalin") - I said keeping his hand. I never called him "Yosif Vissarionovich", like I never called any Soviet interlocutor by his name and the name of his father. Without waiting for his response I continued saying that I asked him to be received, as I wanted to be introduced to him and let him know me personally, adding that I had already seen him at close distance. With interest he asked me where and when. I explained that it had been in 1934 at a Moscow metro station, which he had visited a day prior to its opening and public use. At the same time a group of

Polish communists studying at the Leninist school at Kraskov, near Moscow, was also visiting the metro. At one of the underground stations we had been disembarked and in a little while the train pulled up to a stop and Stalin, accompanied by many uniformed people got off. For us at that time it was a great moment.

He listened with interest this story and then asked when had I departed from the Soviet Union and what had been going on with me later. I summed up my response in a few sentences, including my work during the occupation period and on this occasion I clarified the reasons why, despite the calls that we had received within the last few months from Moscow, the party leadership was unable to depart from Poland.

The conversation was going on in a standing position, without taking seats at the table. Stalin didn't invite me to do it. Thus, I realized that by giving consent to this meeting, he just wanted to meet me personally and didn't intend to discuss with me any particular matters. Towards the end I told him briefly about our difficulties and about the lack of experience of our party in building a new Polish statehood. He didn't pick up this topic, though, limiting himself to the statement: "Don't worry, you can always count on our assistance in overcoming your difficulties".

I thanked him for this very warmly and after bidding him good-bye I left his cabinet. He must have known that I could communicate with him in Russian, as he didn't call in an interpreter. The conversation lasted between fifteen and twenty minutes, and Stalin limited himself to asking questions, leaving the rest of time for my answers.

After my return to the apartment I learned from a CC CPSU representative, who was taking care of me, that Dimitrov was inviting me for a talk. I accepted it without enthusiasm, what I didn't even hide, but I agreed to go to his apartment. Dimitrov was behaving stiffly, as if he had swallowed a stick. Apparently he still had not come out of his role as a leader of the Comintern. He was relating to me as a superior. He was interested in justifying Kasman's activities in the Lublin area during the occupation. On other pages of this memoirs I am talking about this activity quite extensively. When I told Dimitrov that the leadership of our party evaluates negatively those activities of Kasman, he made me a declaration more or less like this: "Everything that Kasman did, was it good or bad, he was doing it on our instruction and we are responsible for it". The word "we" - meant the CPSU. To my remark that the leadership of our party had been calling on Moscow many times with criticism of Kasman's activities and demanded his subordination to the PPR and the AL command of the Lublin region, Dimitrov justified the negative position of Moscow by saying that at that time Moscow had not had full and truthful orientation of the situation in the PPR and AL. Seeing that I don't trust it and am referring to a declaration of the KRN, which had explained to Moscow the attitude of the PPR leadership to Kasman and his group, Dimitrov renewed his statement, appealing to me as secretary general of the CC PPR not to draw any consequences toward Kasman by our party's leadership. So, I told him that the leadership of our party has no intention to deliberate over the Kasman's case and will leave him in peace. He was very glad to hear it. At farewell he was trying to be very kind and warm. I have fully kept my promise that I made to him.

My next meetings with Stalin had a different, collective character. I didn't go to him alone. As secretary general of the CC PPR I was always heading party delegations. Included in them were members of the Politburo, almost always Bierut and Minc, and later on occasionally also Berman. During the PKWN period we would sometime include W. Wasilewska, who was formally deputy to PKWN chairman Osóbka-Morawski. None of the meetings with Stalin, held on a party platform, were publicly announced. On the other hand, all official governmental or state visits to the Soviet Union, which usually had been received at the Kremlin by Stalin, were reflected in the public media. During the period of PKWN's activities I had never been included into such delegation. They were always headed by Bierut. Later on in sporadic cases I would be heading multi-party delegations being received by Stalin, what also was not made public, or I would be included formally in state delegations, which were officially received by Stalin and in such cases this was made public.

The question of oath, which I have mentioned above, was probably presented at the first meeting of our party's delegation with Stalin, which took place still before the liberation of Praga, which means more or less in the beginning of September 1944. In that meeting from our side took part, besides me, Bierut and Minc, while Stalin was accompanied by Molotov and Mikoyan, and maybe also Beria. The above mentioned almost always participated in our talks with Stalin, sometimes there was also Malenkov and occasionally also Khrushchev. Other members of the CPSU leadership had been appearing very seldom at suppers at Stalin's villa near Moscow, given in our honor after completion of talks in the Kremlin. I don't recall precisely what was the subject of our talks with Stalin at that particular meeting. From that period I don't have any notes. I remember, though, very well particular, the most important questions that we had been putting then before Stalin, though I am unable to recall either the exact dates of those meetings, or to pinpoint which of those topics were discussed at that particular meeting. Besides, some of them had been discussed a number of times, they didn't recede from the agenda of our meetings. To such topics belongs the question of "war trophies", of which I will talk later on.

From among the questions discussed at that meeting two seem to me indisputable. They relate to an agreement concluded between the PKWN and the governments of the Ukrainian and Belorussian Soviet Republics on mutual repatriation of population, and a memorandum of the émigré government of Mikołajczyk of 29 August 1944, addressed to the USSR government, stating the terms of forming a provisional government in Poland. These questions have been sufficiently described in various historical publications, so I cannot add to it anything new. I will just mention that the Mikołajczyk's memorandum the Soviet government had passed on to the PKWN, what the TASS agency made public. This memorandum the émigré government narrowed down to Mikołajczyk's proposals, which had already been rejected in Moscow during talks held in the first decade of August 1944. So, our delegation agreed with Stalin that the PKWN would leave them without response.

After exhausting the issues on the agenda, Stalin, as usual, turned to us with a question: "Eto vsyo?" (Is it all?) - I responded that we ask him to take position on one more matter, namely on two versions of an oath, which soldiers mobilized to the Polish Army are to take. I put before him two separate typed texts of the oath. Stalin, having read the first and second text, looking at me said: "Tshto za vopros?" ("what a problem?") and pushing toward

me my draft said: "Etot nuzhno prinyat" ("this should be adopted"), then he got up from the table, inviting us for supper to his place.

In this way Stalin settled a dispute between myself and the remaining members of the Politburo, probably not being even aware that such dispute had taken place. He must have been fully aware that introduction of the Soviet Union and the Red Army to the text of the oath taken by soldiers mobilized to the Polish Army would be a political mistake, it would narrow our socio-political base.⁶⁸

Stalin and agricultural reform. The October turnaround

It wasn't always so that Stalin took the right position on Polish affairs, that he showed sufficient understanding of the situation resulting from the existing configuration of political forces in Poland. And it should be emphasized that he was the chief constructor of our party's general line, he had shaped the socio-political image of People's Poland, decided on the incorporation into her new borders the western territories up to the Oder-Neisse line and the northern territories on the Baltic. Unquestionably, it resulted from his long-term political calculation, dictated by vital interests of the Soviet Union. However, it should be remembered that due to this and the PPR's policy of friendship and Polish-Soviet alliance, conducted from its very foundation, Poland sentenced to death by Hitlerite Germany has been able to take advantage the only chance in its history of such favorable configuration of her borders and ensuring her security. And independently of how great claims and charges we, the Poles, and we Polish communists may have against Stalin, nothing can change (...) his personal and decisive contribution, which he had done for Poland in drawing her borders in the Potsdam Agreement. The Polish people in its historical development could not make a bigger mistake if it did not take this fact into consideration, and deleted it from its memory.

[.....]

⁶⁸ The form of a military oath, of which talk is here, was established by a PKWN decree on 31 August 1944. Thus, the talk with Stalin must have taken place earlier than follows from this text.

Stalin came to the conclusion that legalistic forms of our activity and leaving the former owners of estates in their places of residence, constitute the main source of political disorientation among the peasants, their disbelief in the stability of the state power and socio-political relations built by the PKWN and their mistrust to our party's policies, and that is why he decided to change the hitherto existing legalistic course of our party in the implementation of the decree on agricultural reform into a revolutionary one. As a way of accomplishing this change, he used the already described "conversation" with Bierut, which he had conducted with the participation of Molotov in his home near Moscow towards the end of a planned in advance libation, lasting the whole night.

On the basis of various publications it's not difficult to fix the date of this event. Thus, on 28 September 1944 a KRN and PKWN delegation arrived in Moscow, composed of: B. Bierut, E. Osóbka-Morawski, general M. Rola-Żymierski, A. Witos and W. Rzymowski, to conduct talks with representatives of the USSR government on economic questions, and particularly on providing us assistance in the reconstruction of our country. This matter has already been discussed in various publications, so I am not going to deal with it here. On the following day, September 29th in the evening Stalin gave a supper in his home, inviting to it only Bierut, Osóbka and Żymierski. From the Soviet side there were, besides Stalin: Molotov, Mikoyan, Beria and probably also Malenkov. Just towards the end of this supper, when its participants, after drinking champagne from ram horns, stood up from the table and dispersed into three groups to different banquet halls, Stalin and Molotov held with Bierut that "rughatelney rozhavor" ("scolding talk"), whose content Bierut was reporting to us upon his return to Lublin. The brutal scolding of Bierut for the methods of implementation of agricultural reform and for attitude toward the expropriated landowners was really directed at the whole party leadership. Thus, we had to make a sudden turnaround in the party's and PKWN's activities in this area. For understandable reasons the true causes of that turnaround could not be revealed. They were known only to a narrow circle from the central leadership of the party.

Already on the following day Bierut transmitted to Lublin the news on the critical attitude of the VKPB(b) leadership to the position held up to now by our party in the realization of the decree on agricultural reform, essentially not departing from the course adopted by the head of the agricultural department of PKWN A. Witos and forces supporting him in the Peasant Party. The new policy line was defined in a proclamation by the CC PPR issued on 3 October, addressed to workers and peasants under a combative slogan: "Down with the landlords' attempts to sabotage and hinder the reform", [...] ⁶⁹.

The cited proclamation of the leadership of our party, sharply criticizing, with a mixture of demagogy, the attitude of peasant leaders, including A. Witos, on the question of

⁶⁹ An extensive quotation from the CC PPR proclamation has been omitted. It was published, among other things, in: *PPR, Rezolucje, odezwy, instrukcje i okólniki Komitetu Centralnego VIII. 1944 - XII. 1945*, Warszawa 1959, dok. Nr. 10.

agricultural reform, was clearly in contradiction with the spirit and letter of the July Manifesto of PKWN, it constituted a glaring example of breaking up with the policy of democratic national front, proclaimed by our party at the creation of KRN, which at that time had been judged by the CBKP in the USSR as being sectarian. In October 1944, when our party, indeed, started to stray toward the sectarian path, attacking its peasant-allies for their views on agricultural reform, all members of the party leadership who had come from the Soviet Union embraced that policy right away, without the slightest hesitation. They were convinced of its rightfulness by Bierut's report on his visit with Stalin. Personally I had doubts if that new political course was right. Bierut was also aware of it, what prompted him to submit that report. In this situation I could not help but join the position of all remaining members of the Politburo.

In the beginning of October, Bierut, after his return from Moscow, sent a letter on behalf of the KRN Presidium to the chairman of PKWN Osóbka-Morawski requesting the dismissal of A. Witos from his position as head of the agricultural department and also as deputy chairman of PKWN. This demand was justified by a charge that he had been diminishing the role of social organs in implementing agricultural reform and had introduced enemies of the reform to agricultural offices as well as to positions of administrators of the post-landlords' estates. On October 8 A. Witos resigned from his position in the PKWN allegedly for health reasons - as was publicly announced. The position of the PKWN agricultural department was taken over by Osóbka-Morawski, and his deputies became: Stanislaw Bieniek from the PPR and Edward Bertold from the SL.

The dismissal of Witos from the PKWN and criticism of the right wing in the Peasant Party caused a grave political crisis in that party. Together with Witos from the SL leadership departed also Stanislaw Kotek-Agroszewski, who on November 20 also lost the position of the department of public administration in the PKWN. Their other followers were also removed from their leadership positions. New people took over their places. According to a resolution adopted by the main council of SL on its meeting of November 22 and 23, Stanislaw Janusz from the Rzeszów Voivodship, formerly a deputy from the SL "Piastr" became a new president of the main council, and Jan Michal Grubecki (participant from the battle of Stalingrad, before the war rather closer to the nationalists than the peasants) became his deputy. The position of secretary was taken by Józef Ozga-Michalski, an authentic peasant leader from the Kielce region, cooperating with our party and with the AL during the occupation.

[.....]

Collectivization - A Demokleses' sword over the PPR

A ghost of collectivization as a weapon of struggle with our party and the people's power was used by the London underground not only in the PKWN period, but also later, after the creation of the Provisional Government and continuation of agricultural reform across the whole territory of Poland. To some degree this propaganda was aided by various intra-party

leaks related to the role of the Union of Peasant Self-assistance and other agricultural organizations, and particularly pronouncements of some members of our party originating from the KPP (Communist Party of Poland) on the collectivization of agriculture in our country. Though at that time the PPR leadership was deprecating the idea of collectivization, I was personally fighting collectivization designs, appearing here and there in different forms. Nevertheless, nobody could come up against a doctrinal principle of collectivization, which sooner or later - according to the Marxist-Leninist theory - had to come.

That Demokleses' sword, in the form of kolkhozes, was always hanging over our party, but nobody could foresee when the supporting it horse hair will tear off and the sword will fall on our heads. That, in turn, depended mainly on Stalin. Wanting to learn whether this danger was close or distant, I had agreed on the Politburo that I would raise this question at the nearest meeting of our delegation with Stalin.

From Stalin's pronouncement at that meeting I prepared then an extensive note. It appears from its content that this meeting was held prior to the manifestation of the population of Warsaw on April 3, 1945 on the occasion of liberation of Gdańsk, but after submission of a statement by the Provisional Government to the governments of the USSR, USA, Great Britain and China on the admission of Poland to the United Nations Conference in San Francisco. Because in my hand-written note there is no date, so, the above mentioned circumstances indicate that this meeting with Stalin took place toward the end of March 1945.

At that meeting I put before Stalin on behalf of our delegation (Gomulka, Bierut, Minc) several questions with a request to give us his position. To begin with, I informed him about the symptoms of sectarianism in practical activities of the KPP part of our party's activists, as evident in attempts to impose on the PPS and Peasant Party organizations our position in various matters and against this background I raised the question of collectivization of individual farms in Poland. I am going to give Stalin's response on these matters below, based on my reporting note.

Besides the above questions I presented and substantiated to Stalin my critical opinion regarding the arrest in Warsaw on March 27, 1945 of sixteen representatives of the London underground with general Okulicki at the head ("Niedźwiadek" - AK commander and commander of an illegal organization "Nie") and J. St. Jankowski (vice premier of the émigré government) by the NKVD, by the order of general Ivanov (Serov). In this connection I demanded that general Serov be recalled from Poland. Stalin's reaction regarding this matter, according to my records, I will present later.

I raised also several other questions, among others, the question of nationalization and Stalin, on the other hand, informed us about his conversation with Churchill on the formation of a Polish government and explained the position of the Soviet government on the reconstruction of the Provisional Government. I will later discuss also these topics, based on my notes.

Below I am giving Stalin's pronouncement, relating to the first group of questions, according to my notes.

If you want to liberate yourself from sectarianism, you are right. There should be differences of opinion within the coalition. In a coalition it's hard to avoid some freedom for coalition parties. There should be a general basis on which a coalition rests: a democratic Poland, recognition of the provisional government, renouncement of the London émigré government - these are the main rules of coalition cooperation. On other issues there may be differences among the coalition parties. There also should be no renouncement from an alliance with England and America - the people would not understand that.

There should be a clear declaration against collectivization, collectivization should be excluded. In our country collectivization was possible and timely only after twelve years of Soviet power. Collectivization of peasant farms in your country is a pure fantasy. As far as tractors are concerned, their supply to the villages mean assistance to the peasants and that is how one should explain it to them, and the state is providing this assistance for a fee. [talk was here of tractors being at the disposal of the Union of Peasant Self-assistance, whose one of the tasks was to assist in the reconstruction of agriculture through the application of modern machinery in individual agriculture for a full fee - remark by W.G.].

You do not push yourself directly to leading the Peasant Party. This is not how the leading role of the party should be understood. You have more influence among the peasants than you yourself think. You are under the influence of various gossips, whispering propaganda, and you are not able to propagate your assets, you are not able to show them to the masses and openly explain your position. If you remain silent, others will speak for you. Your propaganda is stereotype. You are doing everything according to a "mark-and-cover" formula, while you should be doing it openly. The Peasant Party should be given some latitude. Perhaps it might be proper to create a different, more flexible platform of cooperation. Let the government officially help the Peasant Party, not your party. As for the fact that the peasants are joining the workers' party, there is nothing wrong with it. Let them come.

You want to have everything ideally, to have a peasant sold out to you with soul and body. What you have already achieved with the peasant masses through agricultural reform is quite a lot. That a peasant is giving his contingent reluctantly is understandable. A peasant wants to take, he doesn't want to give. We had forced them to give contingents. It's necessary to treat contingents as a tax in nature. Then you pay only for transportation and related work, not for grain. Now when the peasant sees that we are giving him seeds, tractors, fertilizers, he has got used to it and reconciled himself with contingents. Maybe that it will be necessary to increase a little contingent prices. A peasant is greedy and you would want him to kiss you. It will take years before a peasant is convinced, that there is no combination in the fact that you gave him the land. If there is anyone who lives well in a war time it is the peasants. A worker is naked like a falcon. You should not be worried that the peasants are dissatisfied. I have no doubt that the peasant in his heart is thankful to you. And in a year

time it will be even better, when he is convinced that the land is not being taken away from him.

Give more freedom to the Peasant Party, or otherwise it will become a claqueur, not a party. The peasants, who up to now have been acting illegally, may now come to you, that is to the Peasant Party and become members not only individually, but also in groups, on the condition that they recognize the provisional government and its political platform. Opposition on certain issues doesn't exclude loyalty, but the opposition cannot transfer the government into a (discussion) club. We are still talking about a new Peasant Party. Stop thinking about the old Peasant Party. However, you cannot allow to emerge for such people who would want to do so just to break your neck. You would be suicidal if you would permit such people to be active. In your country the situation is better than in France or Belgium. You are getting up on your feet faster.

[.....]

October 1944

On October 9, 1944 British prime minister Churchill and minister of foreign affairs Eden arrived in Moscow to conduct talks with Stalin and Molotov, including talks on Poland. As Stalin later informed our delegation, the initiative for this meeting had come from Churchill after his long talks with Roosevelt held at a conference in Quebec regarding the war plans of Great Britain and the U.S. Stalin had, indeed, expressed agreement for Churchill's arrival to Moscow, and already the following day, i.e. 10 October held with him a preliminary talk in the Kremlin. During that conversation Churchill suggested to call on Mikołajczyk, Romer and Grabski to arrive immediately to Moscow to hold with them further talks on recognition by the émigré government of the Curzon line as a Polish-Soviet border and to reach an understanding between that government and the PKWN, whose representatives had also arrived in Moscow for this purpose. Stalin approved Churchill's proposal.

There is no doubt that prior to his departure for Moscow Churchill had agreed upon his proposal with Mikołajczyk, who, together with accompanying members of his delegation, arrived in Moscow on October 12. The PKWN delegation, invited by Stalin and composed of B. Bierut, E. Osóbka-Morawski and M. Rola-Żymierski arrived in Moscow on October 11th. [...]⁷⁰

According to Bierut's report on his talks in Moscow, submitted at the Politburo's meeting, Stalin - after the conference at the Kremlin with the participation of Mikołajczyk and after a briefing on his talks with the PKWN delegation - had formed for himself a decidedly negative opinion of Mikołajczyk and about the feasibility of reaching an understanding between him and his group and the PKWN on setting up a provisional Polish

⁷⁰ Over ten pages of discussion on the Moscow Conference in October 1944, based mostly on the work by Włodzimierz T. Kowalski *Wielka Koalicja 1941-1945* and on memoirs of general Stanisław Tatar on Mikołajczyk's visit in Washington in June 1944, published in "Życie Warszawy" on 14 January 1981, have been omitted.

government. He informed Bierut, that, admittedly, in his talks with Churchill he had not told him this openly, but had recognized his proposal to have in the future Polish government an equal share of PKWN and London émigrés with Mikołajczyk having a position of premier as baseless. The PKWN - as Stalin said - has already behind it a great record, significant achievements in all areas of life, while the émigré government and its branches in the country are pursuing sabotage, fighting the PKWN with all methods available, including murders. In those words he had made Churchill understand that in this way the Mikołajczyk group had closed for itself the possibility of introducing its representatives to the future provisional government.

“To admit the London émigrés to participate in exercising power in Poland - Stalin told Bierut - might have had sense during the August talks with Mikołajczyk in Moscow on the conditions of recognizing by them the Curzon line and adoption of the PKWN political platform, what would have contributed to the expansion of its base in the society. Since at that time Mikołajczyk had rejected all of this and up to this day holds unfriendly position toward the USSR and doesn't want to recognize the PKWN - you don't need him. Now we have invited him to Moscow on Churchill's clear wish. He and Roosevelt would like, with Mikołajczyk's assistance, to turn back Poland from the road, on which the PKWN had introduced her, they would like to install in Poland a government of London émigrés, who would be at their disposal. We cannot allow this to happen, we will not yield to their pressure.

The position taken currently at conferences and meetings with Mikołajczyk's participation, dedicated to the Polish question is facilitating us to come to the next stage of building and strengthening state power in Poland. Time is becoming ripe to transform the PKWN into a provisional government. The Mikołajczyk group has rejected not only the Curzon line, but also its participation in that government, as proposed, and thus it has put itself beyond its framework. Thus, you will form a provisional government without the participation of the London émigrés. You don't need to be concerned about them at all, you don't need to even talk about it during the preceding preparatory propaganda action, motivating the need to form a provisional government on the basis of PKWN. Now you should begin internal preparatory works, come to an understanding with the leadership of the remaining allied parties, and within the next few weeks take up this matter publicly. The ultimate date of forming a provisional government by the KRN we will set jointly a little later”.

Perhaps I may have interspersed into the above account of Bierut, reconstructed by me from memory, Stalin's pronouncements from his other talks, conducted later and related to the formation of the provisional government. After all, there had been several such talks, also with a party delegation under my leadership. But I am certainly not mistaken that the basic decision on replacing the PKWN by the provisional government was taken as a result negative results of the October talks conducted with the Mikołajczyk group in Moscow.

[.....]

October 1944

Probably at the same meeting, at which the decision was made to locate the Provisional Government in Warsaw after its liberation, we also approved Stalin's recommendation to have Bolesław Bierut, after his appointment by the Homeland National Council to the position of president, make a public statement to the effect that, desiring to fulfill his duties to the best of his ability as the highest representative of the state and Polish people - he gives up his membership in the Polish Workers' Party and during the period of holding this function he will consider himself as a non-party man.⁷¹

(As is known, the Homeland National Council had adopted the Constitution of the Polish Republic of March 17, 1921 as a legal basis of its activity and, according to its provisions, in setting up the Provisional Government used its terminology: "The Republic of Poland").

Of course, Bierut's declaration on leaving the PPR was of a simulating nature. The non-partisanship of the president was designed first of all to strengthen the new state authorities, expand their base in the society, develop a national front, fighting the enemies' propaganda about a monopoly of power of the PPR. Also from the point of view of the image of political representation of liberated Poland toward the western allies a "non-partisan" president had for us positive values. These premises had decided about our approval of Stalin's suggestion on this matter.

Bierut, of course, had remained a member of the PPR Politburo. His official "non-partisanship" demanded that we organize Politburo meetings outside of the Central Committee headquarters, most often in the official residency of Bierut, which from May 1945 became the Belveder. Systematic visits by the president to the party headquarters would have been in collision with his "non-partisanship", while inviting Politburo members to his headquarters for joint meetings was within his competence. This had lasted till Bierut took over as I secretary of the CC PPR in 1948. Even then it didn't happen without a farce, as several members of the Politburo wrote him a letter in that form requesting him to be included again to the party work.

[.....]

September-October 1944

Shortly after the announcement of the KRN decree on agricultural reform in Poland, Bierut together with Osóbka-Morawski and Rola-Żymierski met in Moscow with Stalin and other leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet Union. This was an official state visit, but I don't recall if it was made public. In those days even official Polish visits to the USSR were not always made public. According to Stalin's custom, after the completion of official talks, lasting usually from 8 p.m. to midnight, Bierut and accompanying him members of the delegation were invited to Stalin's private residence near Moscow. Besides Stalin there were

⁷¹ Decision on the "non-party" status of B. Bierut was taken - on Stalin's recommendation - by the PPR Politburo on October 22, 1944.

also Molotov, Beria and Mikoyan, and maybe someone else from the CPSU leadership. Such receptions were usually an occasion for a drinking-bout and always lasted till about 6 a.m. in the morning. The reception of which I am talking here had an unusual, exceptional character. I am relating it according to a report submitted by Bierut at a PPR Politburo meeting in Lublin right after his return from Moscow.

After several hours of partying, alternated with heavy drinking, when all participants, and particularly the Polish guests got buzzing heads, Stalin proposed to drink now in a Georgian style. Mikoyan, who usually on such occasions served as a butler, called "tamada", pulled out from the dresser large sheep horns, distributed them among those present, filled in with wine and everybody had to empty it to the bottom. This act was preceded by a toast for Stalin's health, raised by someone from the participants.

After that drinking-bout Stalin and Molotov raised up from the table, took Bierut under arms and walked together to another place in a large hall, where the reception was held. Following in their steps, other participants also dispersed in smaller Polish-Soviet groups and held lively disputes in the opposite corners of the room. Apparently Stalin still before the supper must have given a notice to his Soviet comrades what they should do when he and Molotov would leave the table, taking Bierut along.

That conversation had a particular course. Stalin immediately changed his former jovial mood and attacked Bierut in a brutal manner, using vulgar language. As Bierut subsequently related at a Politburo meeting, Stalin had started his attack from the question: "What you, son of a bitch, are doing in Poland? What kind of a communist are you, you son of a bitch". Bierut - as he was telling us - assumed that Stalin, having drunk, was playing with him this was, was simply joking. So he was receiving Stalin's invectives with a smile. It was Molotov who opened his eyes, turning on him, similarly like Stalin, with vulgar words: "You idiot, why are you smiling? It's not a joke, it's a serious matter".

Bierut, having realized that this is really not a joke, dispirited and frightened, started to defend himself, saying that he is lost, doesn't know what it's all about, what pretensions do they have to him, if they think he is not fulfilling his duties or don't have confidence in him, he is ready to step down from the position of chairman of the KRN, as well as to immediately leave his position as a member of the Politburo. That defense - as he was telling - angered even more Stalin and Molotov. New abuses had been pouring upon him, which he didn't specify. To his readiness to leave his positions they responded that had they had the intention to lead up to this, that whole conversation would have been redundant. Finally they clarified to him what it's all about.

Stalin's and Molotov's attack on Bierut had not been caused by his personal delinquencies. Actually it was an attack against the whole leadership of the party, it was an expression of criticism of our political activity in the liberated portion of Poland, and particularly of our conduct toward the landlords, which, according to Stalin - as he also later assessed on different occasions - was liberal, a sort of "Tolstoy-type". The chose Bierut as a transmitter, who were to present their views and position to the whole PPR leadership.

Chiding him with vulgarities, they were chiding, so to say in absence, the whole Politburo of our party.

Criticizing - through the person of Bierut - the policy of our party, Stalin was concerned particularly that having announced a decree on agricultural reform we should have immediately crushed the landlords, some of them send to prisons and the remaining ones relocate from their places of residence. "But you - he was charging Bierut - have left them in their mansions and palaces, which they occupied before the reform". According to Stalin, this was supposed to evoke fears among the peasants, their mistrust in the stability of the people's power, which had announced the reform and left the landlords in peace. This was supposed to be the reason for a rather widely spread phenomenon that the peasants didn't want to take advantage of the reform, had been dragging their feet, or just had been refusing to accept the land apportioned to them.

Here I am putting aside this false reasoning of Stalin. Peasants' mistrust in agricultural reform had resulted not from their fears of the landlords, but an apprehension of collectivization of peasant holdings, an expression of their mistrust in the new people's power.

Surely, Bierut didn't tell at the Politburo all details of that conversation, didn't express fully what he had heard then from Stalin and Molotov. There were no witnesses to that conversation. But one should exclude the possibility that Bierut had overdrawn its course. He didn't have any purpose to distort its content in his disfavor. He could not conceal it before the Politburo, as it was meant to be an order to correct the party's policy, to sharpen its course toward our political enemies, toward the reactionary underground and the London camp and in this context an immediate expulsion of landlords together with their families from their recent estates. It was unthinkable with the then existing composition of the Politburo that Stalin's orders could have been questioned. Bierut, reporting on this matter, had for its justification an argument that could not be challenged - Stalin's position, who in addition had flared up at him and insulted him for an opportunistic policy of the party. Thus, the Politburo had adopted the proper decisions and the political course was sharpened.

In some historical publications, relating to that period, their authors didn't find an answer to the question: what was the reason for such sudden change of the party's policy? They were lost in different conjectures. Of course, none of them could have assumed that this sudden political turnaround had been the result of that "rugatelnovo rozhovora" ("scolding talk") of Stalin with Bierut.

[.....]

April 1945

Starting from the beginning of 1945 the Politburo was sending to Stalin party delegations. There were many issues, which had been solved at that level before they were formally settled in an official manner by the government. There were also issues which were settled exclusively within the party leadership. Party delegations were usually composed of

Bierut, Minc and myself. It was a usual practice that I would be reporting to Stalin on the most sensitive issues. The formal title was my party position, but actually there was a number of issues which nobody else would dare to present to Stalin. It wasn't a pleasant mission, but I never dodged my duties.

I filed a complaint against Serov against the above mentioned events, justifying it in the same spirit. I stated there is no way we can expand our political base if these kind of events were to repeat themselves. Stalin very much detested listening to complaints regarding the military or NKVD bodies. In such cases he was always angry or agitated. However, he was fully in control of himself. This was also true in the case of Serov. He decided to defend him.

He said to us that the arrest of the RJN (Council of National Unity) and Okulicki by the Soviet forces was justified, as those arrested had acted to the detriment of the Red Army and the Soviet Union not only on the territory of Poland, but also on the Soviet territory. He had in mind the lands beyond the Bug River, which had been cut off from the Polish state. Wanting to justify unfairness of complaint against Serov he said that only the imperialist states are using methods of pressure against weaker states, whose governments had arrested their spies. They demand straight on the release of their spies, and in cases of resistance they threaten the weaker. The Soviet Union is not a weak state, it cannot be threatened and therefore the imperialists do not use such methods toward it. If you - said Stalin - arrest our citizen for a crime on your territory, the Soviet government will not intervene on his behalf. Judge him yourself.

This rule would indeed be praiseworthy if the Soviet Union used it in practice. There had been no cases of arresting Soviet citizens by Polish authorities (which doesn't mean that there were no reasons for such acts), so it's difficult to say how the Soviet government would have behaved in case of their arrest. An example of a note of the Soviet government to the Yugoslav government relating to Soviet citizens arrested in Yugoslavia for spying provides an eloquent response. In our country, I think in 1946, the security forces arrested in Lodz a certain individual who had a transmitting-receiving radio and was using it illegally. A Soviet advisor was intervening on his behalf immediately with minister Radkiewicz. It was necessary to release him. Thus, Stalin's words could not be verified in practice.

Stalin was ridiculing western press propaganda and its attacks on the Soviet government for the arrests made in Poland. "The western powers are not going to start war with us over Okulicki - he said - and we just wanted to help you". Despite that defense of Serov, he nevertheless decided to recall him from Poland. He said of him that he was a "good Chekist", but "hardly subtle" ("chutkey"), "he catches a fish in hand, is afraid it will slip away, so he puts it fast into a net".

The recall of Serov was for us a great success. Stalin sent him out to the Soviet occupation zone in Germany, where he too was not forgetting about Polish matters.

Serov, among other, had recruited Piasecki for intelligence. The latter one didn't even hide it. In a conversation with me he had cited Serov's opinion on Osóbka-Morawski, who

was then prime minister. "That s..., whenever we want, we will remove him". I didn't tell this to Stalin. I was ashamed of this⁷². At the same time I have been learning on the facts. The most important problem, which had weighted throughout 1945 and later on Polish-Soviet relations was the dismantlement of factory equipment on the Polish territory. That matter had not been previously settled either in writing or orally with the Soviet government. Thus, after the Soviet Army moving forward, followed the "trofeyneh" ("looting") brigades and everything they considered valuable, they surrounded, dismantled and sent off.

Source: Władysław Gomułka, Pamiętniki, edited by Andrzej Werblan, vol. 2 (Warszawa, BGW, 1994).

Translated by Jan Chowaniec.

⁷² The term "recruited for intelligence" with regard to Bolesław Piasecki doesn't seem to be correct. It looks from published sources on Piasecki's talks with Serov in prison and his letter to the then Polish authorities on May 22, 1945, also written from prison, that Piasecki at that time proposed both the Soviet authorities, and first of all Polish communists a sort of political cooperation, but not of intelligence-spying. See "Polityka" no 39/1990 and "Integracja" no 16/1990.

Notes of G. Dimitrov on a Phone Call from Stalin

Jan.10, 1945

Stalin called me: Yesterday I received a Yugoslav delegation. The Yugoslavs told me that they have proposed to the Bulgarians Bulgaria to enter Yugoslavia with the same rights as Serbia and Croatia. The Bulgarians did not agree to that and insisted that a Bulgarian-Yugoslav confederation with equal rights is established. I told them that the Bulgarians are right, not the Yugoslavs. It is possible to create a dual state, similar to former Austria-Hungary. Otherwise if Bulgaria joins Yugoslavia, Bulgaria will disappear... The Yugoslavs have no experience while the Bulgarians are much more experienced.

I have advised not to start the struggle in Greece. The people of ELAS shouldn't have left Papandreu's government. Obviously they hoped that the Red Army would go down to Aegean Sea... We cannot send our troops to Greece. The Greeks have made a foolish step.

The Yugoslavs want to take over Greek Macedonia. They want also Albania and even parts of Hungary. This is unreasonable. I don't like their attitude.

As far as Kolarov's⁷³ departure to Bulgaria, I am afraid that his arrival may alienate the agrarians and the others and would generate rumors about the sovietization of Bulgaria...

Source: CDA, f. 146 B, op. 2, ae. 15.

Contributed by Jordan Baev and translated by Nedialka Douptcheva.

⁷³ Vassil Kolarov – one of the leaders of the Bulgarian Communists. Secretary General of Comintern (1922-1924), Chairman of the Bulgarian Commission to Comintern. On May 22, 1945 in a letter to Stalin insists once again to be allowed to return to his homeland. In a letter to his wife from Op.gust 18, 1945 he writes: "My return is finally decided, but it will be after the parliamentary elections. The motifs for this are obvious. This is the price of loyalty towards the Allies and I do it in order to prevent any premises for rumors that Moscow wants to exert pressure on the elections. That is why the restoration of the diplomatic relations between our two countries was postponed..." (Personal Archives of Kolarov family) After returning to Bulgaria Kolarov is elected a Chairman of the Bulgarian Parliament, President of the Republic (1946-1947), Minister of Foreign Affairs (1947-1949), Prime Minister (July 1949 – January 1950).

Notes of V. Kolarov from a Meeting⁷⁴ with J. Stalin

Stalin's opinion on certain questions

January 28, 1945

1. Bulgaria and Turkey

The idea of including Turkey in any Balkan federation (supported by Great Britain) is absurd. The Balkan people, who have been under Turkish yoke, will never agree Turkey to increase its presence on the Balkans in one or another way. If Turkey (at someone else's suggestion) tries to invade with force, it will be rejected by force. That is why Bulgaria needs to have a strong and well-equipped army. Bulgaria then shall present its concerns. There is no place for Turkey on the Balkans.

2. The Union between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia (custom, political, cultural and military) will be turned into a federation of the South Slavs when the conditions (internal and external) allow it. However, the problem for the form of the Federation remains unsolved – whether to be a dual federal state between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria (the understanding of Bulgaria) or a federal state including six South Slav districts – Bulgaria, Serbia, Mecedonia, Mentenegro, Croatia and Slovenia (the understanding of the Yugoslavs). One should not take advantage of the difficult for Bulgaria situation and swallow it. In the future Bulgaria will play an important role on the Balkans. Nobody should play tricks on Bulgaria and open frankness is needed from both sides.

3. Bulgaria and Greece

Bulgaria has rights and interests over the Aegean see (Dedeagach, etc.) but force will be needed for the support of these rights. It is absolutely necessary that Bulgaria has a strong army. Reactionary Greece, the enemy of Bulgaria and the Yugoslav-Bulgarian Union, will loose Thessaloniki. The Bulgarian-Yugoslav Union should be built on its armed forces in order to be able to prevent itself from future aggression.

4. The international situation and the Socialism

4.1. THE CAPITALIST WORLD is divided into two hostile blocks – democratic and fascist. The Soviet Union takes advantage of this in order to fight against the most dangerous [country] for the Slavs – Germany. But even after the defeat of Germany the danger of war/invasion will continue to exist. Germany is a great state with large industry, strong organization, employees, and traditions; it shall never accept its defeat and will continue to be dangerous for the Slavonic world, because it sees it as an enemy. The imperialist danger could come from another side.

4.2. THE CRISIS OF CAPITALISM today is caused mainly by the decay and the mutual weakening of the two enemy camps. This is favorable for the victory of socialism in Europe. But we have to forget the idea that the victory of socialism could be realized only through a Soviet rule. It could be presented by some other political systems – for example by a democracy, a parliamentary republic and even by a constitutional monarchy. Do you think that if a monarchy like Britain carries out nationalization of the mining industry, the railways, the land and etc., this should be considered a step towards socialism?

⁷⁴ The participants at the meeting are: from the Yugoslav delegation – Moshe Piade, Andrea Hebrang and Yugoslav ambassador Stanoe Simich and the Bulgarian delegation – Prime Minister Kimon Georgiev, Minister of Internal Affairs Anton Yugov, Bulgarian representative in Moscow Dimitar Mihalchev and the communist leaders Dimitrov, Kolarov and Kostov. Vyacheslav Molotov, Georgi Malenkov, Lavrenti Beria are also present.

4.3. BULGARIA SHALL DEVELOP STRONG INDUSTRY. Bulgaria, itself, should produce the locomotives, wagons, electrical motors, tractors, agricultural and the other types of machinery it needs. It should study its regions and the natural resources (it's quite definite that petroleum could be found) so that you could start the development of the coal and mining industry through the establishment of joint Russian-Bulgarian companies. The assistance of Soviet Russia is GUARANTEED.

Source: CDA, f. 147 B, op. 2, ae. 1025, l. 1-6.

Contributed by Jordan Baev and translated by Nedialka Douptcheva.

**Entry for 23 February 1945,
Concerning Meeting of Churchill with Junior Ministers.**

He gave a vivid picture of Yalta. The Russians had made a tremendous effort to prepare for their reception in two of the old palaces of the nobility of Tsarist times. Everywhere all around was destruction. One day a British officer had asked for a lemon and had been given, with great apologies, an orange. Next day there appeared two lemon trees, each covered with ripe fruit, which were rapidly erected in a flower bed outside the palace where the soldiers were staying. The P.M. spoke very warmly of Stalin. He was sure - and Sir Charles Portal had said the same thing to me at the De La Rue dinner last Wednesday - that, as long as Stalin lasted, Anglo-Russian friendship could be maintained.⁷⁵ Who would succeed him one didn't know. (Portal had said, 'Perhaps Molotov. He's pretty wooden and he stammers and a stammer in Russian is not a pretty sound.') Several times, when we had pressed our points hard, Stalin had suddenly said, 'Yes. I see the strength of your argument. I will withdraw my proposal.' This had come quite suddenly, when things had not looked favourable to agreement. This was the right way to deal with the Russians. The Americans did not always recognise this. Sometimes they failed to press their points hard enough. All three were agreed that they must meet alone without the French. The Russians, in particular, were very insistent that France had not earned her right to join the Big Three. Stalin measured everything by the number of troops, ships and aircraft each of the Allies put in the field. On this count France was nowhere. The Americans take the same line. We, of the three, were the most favourable to France and we had secured for her considerable gains - a zone of occupation in Germany, a place on the International Allied Control Commission at Berlin, a place among the inviting powers for the San Francisco Conference. On the Dumbarton Oaks difficulty about voting, the P.M. thought that we had reached a pretty good compromise. (This will soon be fully explained, and much discussed by all those interested in international political organisation.) The P.M. had finally persuaded Stalin to accept by illustrating it from our position [over] Hong Kong. If the Chinese clamoured to have it back we should be compelled to allow discussion, and permit the Chinese to state their case and others to express their views upon it. We should have no right to stop any of this, or any recommendations made by any Committee which might be appointed to consider it, but if, after all this, we refused to budge, and the Chinese attacked us and tried to turn us out, they would then have become the aggressors. He said that this illustration had made a great impression upon Stalin. There had also been the question of the Russian representation at future conferences of the World Organisation. The Russians had begun by asking for eighteen seats, one for each of their constituent republics. But we had resisted this, though still claiming six seats for the British Empire, which he confessed had struck him, secretly, as rather tall, as against one each for Russia and the U.S.A. Finally we and the Russians agreed that we would keep six and they might have three, including one for the Ukraine and one for White Russia, with a promise never to claim any more. The Americans didn't much like this, but he urged them to try to find some way of having three themselves. Possibly someone from the Senate and someone from the House of Representatives in addition to an official spokesman of the Administration. Roosevelt was going to think this over.

⁷⁵ Marginal insertion: 'P.M. said, "Poor Neville Chamberlain believed he could trust Hitler. He was wrong. But I don't think I'm wrong about Stalin."'

Poland had been much the most difficult question. On this the Big Three had felt more keenly than on anything else which they discussed. After each had stated their opposition, there had been a silence for two or three minutes. Finally an agreement had been arrived at ... Stalin, in the course of the talk on this, had said, 'We are conscious of our great sins against Poland in the past, through occupation and oppression of that country.' The P.M. wasn't sure whether 'sins', the actual word used by the translator, had been quite accurate, but in any case he thought this phrase very significant. No one could tell whether the pledge to make a truly free and independent Poland would be honoured by the Russians or not. We and the Americans would do our best to see that it was. If not, we should be free to continue to recognise the London-Polish government and to refuse approval of the new Polish situation. As regards the taking over of territory previously German, he said that people often spoke of the great difficulties of 'transfer of population', but, in fact, most of the Germans in the territories now taken by the Russians had 'run away already' and this problem would be much easier in practice than had been supposed. He attached great importance to pencilled meetings of the Foreign Secretaries now agreed to and to the undertaking of the Three Great Powers to act together in peace as in war. On the way home he had seen, at Cairo, Ibn Saud⁷⁶ who had never before been outside Saudi Arabia and who had made it clear, when invited by Roosevelt to meet him, that he would not come to Cairo unless he was also going to meet the P.M. ...

Source: The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton, 1940-1945, edited by Ben Pimlott.

⁷⁶ Abdul Aziz II Ibn Saud (1880-1953). Ruler of the newly formed Saudi Arabian Kingdom 1932-53.

**Memorandum by Sir Orme Sargent,
Deputy Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office,
to Winston Churchill, 2 May 1945**

P.M./O.S./45/60

PRIME MINISTER.

It has occurred to us in the Foreign Office that a possible explanation of the hardening of the Soviet attitude towards us on so many outstanding questions just now may be due to the influence of the victorious Soviet Marshals.

2. Hitherto it has been our experience that Marshal Stalin tends to take a broad and statesmanlike line on matters put to him directly. Thus he was personally responsible for the decision to send Molotov to San Francisco on President Roosevelt's death. He was also responsible for the invitation conveyed to Harriman for the Allied representatives to visit Vienna to settle matters on the spot. Again his attitude over the Polish question, both in Moscow last autumn and at Yalta, was comparatively co-operative, though Molotov was more obstructive. But in each case there has been a subsequent hardening due apparently to some mysterious influence. This may come either from the party bosses behind the scenes or from the Soviet Generals.

3. In the case of Poland and Austria it is tempting to connect this with the victorious Marshals who are over-running these countries and insisting that they will not have British and Americans nosing about in their preserves nor allow local governments to be set up which are not thoroughly under their own control.

This/

Source: Memorandum by Sir Orme Sargent, Deputy Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, to Winston Churchill, 2 May 1945, in Prime Minister's Operational Papers, PREM 3/396/14 (Public Record Office, Kew).

Consultation on 6.4.1945 at 6 o'clock with Stalin, Molotov, Zhdanov.

Report — Walter [Ulbricht] [Anton] Ackermann [Gustav] Sobottka

- 1) Question — what complaints in the country?
 - 1) Dismantling of machines in factories
 - 2) Confiscation of farmers' cattle — cows — also happens frequently by departing for[eign] workers
- 2) Border of the zone of occupation
Lübeck — Erfurt — Leipzig — Chemnitz
- 3) Instruction of 5.26,
that parties and unions are permitted so SPD Center — not to be promoted by us
- 4) Formation of the KPD
CC [Central Committee] should act openly — Manifesto with course toward creation party of the working people (workers, productive farmers, intellectuals)
- 5) Creation of a central organ of the party and a state paper of the party for Saxony
only later paper of the party of the working people
- 6) Youth committees
Youth cadres to be schooled for one month
creation free youth organizations

Perspective — there will be 2 Germanies — in spite of all the unity of the allies
Plan for the dismemberment of Germany existed with Engl[ish]-American[s]
Division in North- and South Germany
Rhineland — Bavaria with Austria
Stalin was against this
Secure unity Germany through unified] KPD
unif[ied] CC unif[ied]
party of the working people
at the center unified party

Character of the antifascist battle

Completion of the bourg[eois]-
democratic revolution
bourg[eois]-democr[atic] government
break power of the manor owners
eliminate remainders of feudalism

Administrative arrangement

Engl.-American. create governments for
Bavaria,
Thuringia, Rhine Palatinate, Rhineland
We — state government for Saxony,
provincial government for Berlin-
Brandenburg,
Mecklenburg, Pommeria
whether later for the entire
area of occupation is not clear yet.

Creation of administrations for district, county,
city, municipality

School questions — draft —

use old text books from Weimar
and Austria
no religious instruction in school
do not let popes[Popen] confuse
youth —
religious instruction only outside the
school

Creation sp[ecial] farmers union not

functional
instead include within the party

Creation anti fascist committees not

functional either,
because danger, that next to city- and
municipal administration
unchecked

Use of cadres

with prisoners of war up to colonel

Dissolution of the 3 fronts

a[nd] uni[form] administration with 3
subdivisions
army command with 7th Department

SPD very splintered — majority of the
members for unity

Creation [of a] theoretical journal of the
party

Decisions:

Immediately draft for manifesto — dispos[itions]

draft
elaboration by Ackermann until 6.5
in the afternoon
composition [of the] ed[itorial staff] for
central organ "Deutsche Volkszeit[un]g" [German People's Paper]
leader: Klabner (Wandel)
Erpenbeck
Keilson
Oelsner
Man[ager]: Bauer

State paper KPD for Saxony "Sächsische
Volkszeitung" [Saxon People's Paper]
leader: Leitner
Apelt
Schliebs
Förster

Theoretical journal "Neuer Weg" [New Way]
Ed[itor] Oelsner a[nd] ev[entually] Noffke

List of the cadres for Berlin, Dresden, Rostock
List of the prisoners of war from Nat[ional]
Com[mittee Free Germany]

Composition of the party organs

Politburo 9 (meets every 10 days)
Pieck
Ulbricht
Ackermann
Geschke
Jendretzki
Winzer
Sobottka
Mahle
Mrs. Kunz
Secretariat 5
Pieck
Ulbricht
Klabner ed. (Wandel)
Gyptner
Meyer, Therese
Stern, Heinz (translator)

Organizing Committee for the creation of the
party of the workers
as members also SPD a[nd] others

Associations — Handke

Party school Grätz, Zaisser, Noffke, Roth

District leadership of the party
independent For Berlin Geschke

"Deutsche Zeitung" [German Newspaper] in Stettin

Colonel Mulin secr[etary]
Fiedler
Lore Pieck
in Berlin Hans Pfeiffer
Max Frenzel (not exclud[ed])
Thiele
Jaddasch
Möricke

Budget for CC of the KPD

Bring in comrades from Mexico and
Stockholm

Source: Rolf Badstübner & Wilfried Loth, hrsg., *Wilhelm Pieck: Aufzeichnungen zur
Deutschlandpolitik 1945-1953* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994), pp. 50-52 (ZPA [Central Party
Archive] NL 36/ 629, pp. 62-66).

Translated by Ruud van Dijk, Dickinson College.

PARAPHRASE OF NAVY CABLE JUNE 8, 1945.

~~TOP SECRET~~ AND PERSONAL FROM HARRIMAN FOR THE EYES OF THE PRESIDENT ONLY:

I thought that you might want me, now that Harry has left, to give you a brief report on his visit Moscow.

When we saw Stalin the first time there is no doubt that he was gravely concerned over the adverse developments during the past three months in the relations between our two countries. The firm position taken by President Roosevelt before he died and by you since on several issues has had its effect. Stalin showed that he did not fully understand the basis of the difficulties. In the early talks he took the offensive in complaining about our misdeeds and aggressively indicated that if we did not wish to deal on a friendly basis with the Soviet Union she was strong enough to look after herself. He was clearly glad to see Harry and accepted without question the fact that you sent him as an indication of your desire to work with him (Stalin).

In presenting your views and in explaining the most important matters, particularly Poland, which were causing us concern Harry did a first rate job. I am afraid Stalin does not and never will fully understand our interest in a free Poland as a matter of principle. He is a realist in all of his actions and it is hard for him to appreciate our faith in abstract principles. It is difficult for him to understand why we should want to interfere with Soviet policy in a country like Poland which he considers so important to Russia's security unless we have some ulterior motive. However, he does appreciate that he must deal with the position we have taken and, in addition, from all reports we have from inside Poland he needs our assistance and that of Great Britain in obtaining within that country a stable political situation.

I told you, I believe, that I was certain Molotov did not report to Stalin accurately and in fact truthfully in all cases. This was brought out again in our talks. It is clear also that Molotov is far more suspicious of us and less willing to view matters in our mutual relations from a broad standpoint than is Stalin. The fact that we were able to see Stalin six times and deal directly with him was a great help. Many of our difficulties could be overcome if it were possible to see him more frequently.

The agreement to start the consultations with the Poles in Moscow is a big step forward, but I am afraid we will have trouble with Molotov when it comes to actual working out of the details of the reorganization of the Warsaw Government.

He probably will not continue in the spirit of our recent talks and the Poles themselves will also be difficult. However, I hope to be able to handle the consultations for my part in such a way that we can either come to a conclusion or point up the differences sufficiently clearly to make it possible for you to come to a conclusion with Stalin when you and Churchill meet with him.

I feel that the talks about the Far East were of real value, particularly Stalin's agreement to take up in the first instance with Soong the political matters affecting China in the Yalta Agreement and

also his agreement to allow the Generalissimo's representatives to go into Manchuria with the Russian troops to set up administration for the Chinese National Government.

Our last talk, on voting procedure, was most interesting. It was clear that the Marshal had not understood at all the issue between us. In spite of Molotov's explanation and defense of the Soviet position, Stalin waived him aside and accepted our position. He stated however he did not consider that "a country is virtuous because it is small" and had a good deal to say about the troubles small nations have made in the world. This he said he was quite ready to state publicly as well as privately. He expressed emphatically his unwillingness to allow the Soviet Union's interests to be affected by such countries.

In conclusion, I feel that Harry's visit has been even more successful than I had hoped. Although there are and will continue to be many unsolved problems with the Soviet Government, I believe that his visit has produced a much better atmosphere for your meeting with Stalin.

Harry stood the trip reasonably well physically. The strain of the first week took a lot out of him and it was a good thing that before starting home he had a few days to rest up.

As usual Bohlen's presence was most helpful.

RPM

Source: W.A. Harriman Papers, Library of Congress.

**Record of I. V. Stalin's Conversation with Prime Minister
of Czechoslovakia Z. Fierlinger and
Deputy Foreign Minister V. Clementis
on the Issues of the Transcarpathian Ukraine, the Teshin Region,
and the Trophy Property**

Moscow

June 28, 1945
Secret

V. M. Molotov and V. A. Zorin were present at the conversation

I. V. Stalin asks what questions are of interest to Mr. Fierlinger.

Fierlinger responds that the Czechoslovak government has a number of questions, and proposes to begin the discussion with the issue of the Treaty on the Transcarpathian Ukraine. Fierlinger informs Stalin that the text of the treaty is almost agreed upon, and that they are talking now only about some of the articles of the Protocol to the Treaty.

I. V. Stalin asks whether it is convenient for the Czechoslovak government to sign the Treaty now, and adds, "We are not trying to rush you. Do as you consider necessary in this case."

Fierlinger responds that the Czechoslovak government finds this moment appropriate for signing of this treaty, and therefore, introduced the treaty for signing itself.

The text of the Treaty and the Protocol is being read.

During the reading of Paragraph 2 of the Protocol, V. M. Molotov proposes to determine that the granting of citizenship should be done according to the legislation that exists in each country on this issue. For instance, in the USSR, if the husband is granted citizenship, it does not automatically confer citizenship on the wife, while under the Czechoslovak laws the wife automatically assumes husband's citizenship.

Fierlinger agrees with this suggestion, and proposes to formulate Paragraph 2 accordingly.

After reading Paragraph 3, Fierlinger notes that the financial issues involved in the transfer of the Transcarpathian Ukraine should probably be specified later. Now the Czechoslovak government cannot name an exact sum, which would be required to reimburse the expenses of individual citizens who would have to leave their property in the territory of the Transcarpathian Ukraine, when they move to Czechoslovakia. Therefore, Fierlinger proposes to formulate a general statement on mutual reimbursement of the expenses incurred during the relocation of citizens on the part of the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic, and the USSR, and on subsequent mutual payments between those governments in the 18 months after the ratification of the Treaty.

I. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov agree with this proposal. They propose to edit the drafts of the Treaty and the protocol in the final version, and if possible, to prepare them for the signing by June 29.

Fierlinger then says that the Czechoslovak Government would also be interested in the issue of trophies in Czechoslovakia. He notes that in spite of the categorical statement by Marshal Konev to the effect that plants and other trophies would not be moved out of Czechoslovakia now, and that there would be a corresponding agreement on this issue with the Czechoslovak government, the Czechgov [Czechoslovak Government] has information

about the instances of removal of equipment from some enterprises and about removal of stockpiles of sugar and other food products. Fierlinger asks to solve this problem taking into account the interests of the economic life in Czechoslovakia

I. V. Stalin says that this issue would be settled and that we do not intend to remove plants and equipment from Czechoslovakia, with the exception of a very small portion of it, about which we would negotiate with the Czechoslovak government.

I. V. Stalin suggests that some local commandants and other lower military officials allow themselves some liberty in deciding those issues on the spot. However, the systems of commandants will be abolished in Czechoslovakia on July 5, and commandants will only remain at railway stations to ensure normal railroad communications for military supplies. Storehouses, since the military authorities have not taken them, should remain under the control of the Czechoslovak Government. I. V. Stalin suggests that they should contact Marshal Konev directly regarding all issues of trophies and all actions of our troops in Czechoslovakia, and recommends that the Czechoslovak Government send a permanent representative (one or several) to Konev's Headquarters.

Fierlinger agrees with this proposal and says that the Czechoslovak Government will gladly send such a representative. Then Fierlinger asks to resolve the issue of tobacco still remaining in Czechoslovakia, which the population urgently needs, and about the banks, which the Soviet trophy authorities classify as trophies, but which, essentially, contain only Czechoslovak currency in cash, and some amounts of German currency, which, naturally, could only be as well as burned. Fierlinger asks Stalin to look into the issue of those banks that are considered German, and to take into account that the Germans never invested anything in those banks, and that they solely used the Czechoslovak capital.

I. V. Stalin says that they would be able to reach an agreement with the Czechoslovak Government on the issue of tobacco, and that it would probably agree to share the tobacco with the Red Army. He proposes to investigate the situation with the banks separately. V. M. Molotov says that there are a number of proposals on that issue, and that those would be considered in the nearest future.

I. V. Stalin adds that the Czechoslovak Government should be more decisive in regard to big enterprises, especially those that were captured by the Germans, and in particular, recommends that the government should take the Vitkovits plants under its control.

Fierlinger says that that is exactly what the Czechoslovak Government intends to do.

To I. V. Stalin's question whether the Americans plan to leave Czechoslovakia, Fierlinger responds that the Americans postponed the withdrawal of their troops and are asking when the Soviet troops are going to be withdrawn.

I. V. Stalin informs Fierlinger that the number of Soviet troops will be reduced to three times less than the current strength, and that they would take positions predominantly along the borders. He recommends that the Czechoslovak Government should raise the issue of the U.S. troop withdrawal with the Americans.

Klementis informs Stalin that the note to the Americans on this issue is already on its way, but that the Czechoslovak Government will use the occasion of the withdrawal of the large portion of the Soviet troops in order to once again demand that the Americans withdraw their troops.

Fierlinger then asks what to do with the eviction of Germans and Hungarians from Czechoslovakia.

I. V. Stalin says: "We are not going to hinder your actions. Drive them away. Let them experience what it means to be ruled by others."

Fierlinger asks Stalin to give instructions to the Soviet military to help in this eviction of the Germans and the Hungarians.

I. V. Stalin asks, "Do our military interfere with it?"

Fierlinger says that they do not hamper it, but they would like to receive some active assistance.

Then I. V. Stalin asks Fierlinger if they were able to resolve the contested territorial issues with the Poles amiably.

Fierlinger responds that it was not possible because the Poles would like to split the Teshin region, which no Czechoslovak government would be able to accept.

To I. V. Stalin's question, "Does it mean that no compromise is possible on this issue?"—Fierlinger responds that the Teshin region is a very important part of the Czechoslovak territory, and the Czechoslovak government cannot make any concessions on this issue.

I. V. Stalin notes that in such a case the Poles most probably will not make concessions on any of the other territorial issues, in particular—in the Kladsco region. The Poles will probably be persistent because we have promised this territory to them.

Fierlinger responds that the Poles have received too much territory, and they will not be able to digest it.

I. V. Stalin reiterates the Soviet Government's position regarding the fraternal resolution of contested issues, and says that in cases where such resolution is not achieved, we would have to discuss those issues at the peace conference.

Then Fierlinger asks if they could count on arming the remaining six divisions of the Czechoslovak Army with the help of the Soviet Government, as it was agreed to do during the last visit of the President.

I. V. Stalin says that we will give arms and ammunition to the Czechoslovak Army.

Fierlinger expresses gratitude on behalf of the Czechoslovak Government

In conclusion, Fierlinger presents a gift from the President—a brass statue of Jan Zhizhka

I. V. Stalin asks him to pass his thanks to the President

Recorded by V. Zorin

Original

Source: Vostochnaia Evropa, edited by G.P. Murashko, et al, vol. 1, pp. 229-33 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 393, l. 65-69).

Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.

Record of Meeting Between T. Soong and Stalin

No. 1. Meeting between Marshal Stalin and Dr. Soong

Present: Marshal Stalin Dr. Soong
 Mr. Molotov Ambassador Fu
 Mr. Petrov Dr. Victor Hoo
Interpreter Pavlov

Date: June 30th, 1945 6:30 - 6:45 p.m.

Marshal Stalin first asked Dr. Soong whether he had a good trip, and then asked about the health of President Chiang.

Dr. Soong replied that he has been travelling a good deal from America to China and vice versa. He said that President Chiang was in excellent health and asked him to hand over to Marshal Stalin a personal letter. Dr. Soong thereupon gave that letter to Marshal Stalin.

Stalin asked about the military operations in China against Japan.

Dr. Soong said that the Chinese armies have been advancing. The Japanese are maintaining certain key points but are retreating from elsewhere.

Stalin asked where was General Chang Fah-kwei, and whether he had ever left the National Government.

Dr. Soong replied that General Chang Fah-kwei is in command of the troops in Kwangsi, that he has never left the National Government, and that he had been fighting with him ever since 1923.

Stalin asked Dr. Soong whether he wanted to begin to talk business today or another day.

Dr. Soong said that Marshal Stalin's wish would be his wish.

Stalin said that the host will abide with the wishes of the guest.

Dr. Soong said that he would like today to first make a statement on his general attitude. When he had the honor to work under Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the National Revolution, there was the closest cooperation between

Soviet Russia and China. Then he had a personal opportunity to see what was going on. The hope of all the Chinese beginning from the Generalissimo is that such cooperation should continue. Our relations with Soviet Russia are of an exceptional importance to us. Without the thorough understanding and the sympathy between China and Soviet Russia, China would have no chance in reconstruction. Therefore, if not only for historical reasons, but also for objective reasons, it is important for us to resume a close contact with your great country. The Generalissimo charged him to come on this mission so that he could talk most frankly with Marshal Stalin and his assistants. He hoped to be able to exchange opinions in perfect frankness without the usual politeness of diplomatic ways. If he is honored with Marshal Stalin's confidence in this mission, he would be most grateful.

Stalin said: You can count on our full support. What you said on China's position is also our position. There are new people in power in Russia. In the past, Russia wanted an alliance with Japan in order to break up China. Now, we want an alliance with China to curb Japan. This position of ours has been proved by a number of facts. I think we shall be able to arrive at an agreement. I am sure of it.

Dr. Soong said he is happy to hear of the sentiments of Marshal Stalin.

Marshal Stalin said: You do not need to have any doubt about it.

Source: Hoover Institution Archives, folder 6-9.

Contributed by David Wolff.

PARAPHRASE OF NAVY CABLE JULY 1, 1945 FROM MOSCOW

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~ AND PERSONAL FROM HARRIMAN FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE:

Reference White House Message No. 307 June 29.

This morning I called on Soong at his request. He told me that he and his Ambassador had been received last night by Stalin with Molotov and the Soviet Ambassador to China present. Soong delivered a letter from Chiang which stated that Soong was fully authorized to speak in the name of and on behalf of the Generalissimo on all matters. Soong referred to the cordial relations that had previously existed between Russia and China and expressed the desire that these relations should be reestablished, emphasizing their importance to China. Stalin agreed and stated that such relations were equally important to the Soviet Union. The conversation was general and it was agreed that at the next meeting, which Soong expects to be on Monday, detailed discussions should commence.

I was informed by Soong of his conversations in Washington and the Generalissimo's reaction to his conversations with Hurley. He said he would keep me fully informed of his negotiations with Stalin. I urged him to attempt to reach full agreement on all outstanding subjects as I believed that a better opportunity than the present would never present itself.

Soong discussed with me his problems in detail and I believe I will be in position to report intimately the developments of the negotiations. I will therefore continue, unless instructed otherwise, to use the navy channel of communication in order that the security of messages may be guarded as in the case of messages to and from the White House.

RPM

Source: W.A. Harriman Papers, Library of Congress.

Record of Meeting Between T. Soong and Stalin

Notes taken at Sino-Soviet Conferences

Moscow, 1945

2 July 1945, 8:00 - 10:30 p.m.

Stalin: No news.

Soong: Good news.

Stalin: Are you familiar with this document bearing signature of Stalin (shows Yalta agreement).

Soong: It has been communicated to us. The U.S. communicated to us very much the same way.

In addition to this Americans stated to us that Stalin has taken some undertakings.

Stalin: In conversation with Hopkins what (?) of Chiang transmitted?

Soong: No. Truman communicated to us pledges of Stalin.

Stalin: Let's read.

(Pavlov reads translation)

Stalin: An official of whom, China?

Soong: Yes.

Stalin: All is true. It's my first point of view on condition that you recognize as correct what is said further in this document.

Soong: May I discuss some points?

Stalin: Please.

Soong: Petrov discussed twice with Chiang. Presume he reported these conversations.

Stalin: Yes.

Soong: May I go point by point?

Stalin: O.K.

Soong: As to Outer Mongolia, as Chiang said, this is not a question that can be solved now. Time will solve. Put in abeyance. We will not raise it.

Stalin: Do you want me to reply or you'll go on.

Soong: No, this is first point.

Stalin: We cannot agree to this.

Soong: May I ask reason why?

Stalin: Outer Mongolia has a geographical position from where one can overthrow Soviet Union position in Far East. Before last war Japan near Chita, Irkutsk, tried to advance. If we had no juridicial right to defend ourselves in Outer Mongolia the whole of the far East would have been lost to us. Japan will not be ruined even if one accepts unconditional surrender, like Germany. Both of these nations are very strong. After Versailles, all thought Germany would not raise. 15-20 years, she recovered. Same would happen with Japan even if she is put on her knees. For such cases we must have legal right to defend ourselves in territory of Outer Mongolia. If we are strong it is in China's interest. Should not like to be fools. Outer Mongolia people do not want to join either China or Soviet Union. They want to be independent. More advantageous for China to severe Outer Mongolia. If this does not happen Outer Mongolia will be rallying point for all Mongolians. It's to the detriment of China and us, the unifying of Mongolians, from Inner and Northern Mongolia. Leaders of Outer Mongolia find that to their South there are many Mongolians. So much for Outer Mongolia. This is what guided Russians when they signed that document, and offer it now to Chinese consideration.

Two considerations:

1) Strengthen its strategic position against Japan. As Russia proposes have alliance with China with united forces of China, Russia, America and

Great Britain, will vanquish Japan. Port Arthur, Chinese Eastern Railway, Southern Sakhalin [sic], Outer Mongolia, all is guided by consideration of strengthening our strategic position against Japan. Neither of them is of interest from point of view of profit.

2) We are fighting since four years, shed much blood. People understand we must fight when attacked, as for Germany. But people would not have gone to war with as much fervour if we had attacked first.

Now we are expected to attack Japan who is making eyes at us and is very quiet.

If we attack Japan what will the people say? We finish four years of war and you start a new war. Japan does not touch you and you attack Japan. How shall I be able to justify attack only by saying that we are strengthening ourselves. Please take these two considerations into account in our further discussions.

Soong: As to Outer Mongolia it seems that Stalin does not understand our situation.

Stalin: Please explain it.

Soong: We are in a difficult position. We cannot tell our people that we are giving up any part of our territory. Stalin said that these are part of strategic importance against Japan. We do not raise question now. Let sleeping dog lie. If we are to recognize status quo in Mongolia which has many times been recognized by Soviet Union as integral part of China our position as a government will be badly shaken before our people. Stalin said he wanted to see stable united China. Surely best thing is not to create difficulty on questions which are not essential.

These are my observations on first point. Would like to enter into detail on certain points. As to former right of Russia violated by treacherous attack of Japan in 1904, need analysis as it is too general a statement.

Stalin: You are right.

Soong: Sakhalin, etc. We are only too happy to Support Stalin's position.

Dairen internationalized - what does Stalin mean by internationalized?

Stalin: Commercial international port where ships of all nations can enter, with safeguard preeminent position of Soviet Union. Special agreement is necessary.

Soong: Do you mean free port?

Stalin: If China wishes so.

Soong: What do you mean 'safeguard preeminent position' ...

Stalin: Administration of port, special harbour for Soviet Union. This is improvement upon Sino/Russian treaty of 1898. Good thing to take this treaty and make certain and make certain improvements on it.

Soong: I made inquiry with President Truman on this point. I asked whether it meant free port. He said yes but then administration should be Chinese. Of course Russia being largest shipper, predominant trade will be Russian and Chinese.

Stalin: The masters should be Russian and Chinese. There should be special agreement.

Administrators of the port.

This document states only basic principles.

Soong: Has Foreign Office a prepared document giving a more concrete view?

Stalin: Best to take old treaty and improve.

Soong: Former treaty even without war would have expired. It was a proclamation by Czar. I presume we will not use it as basis.

Stalin: No. Perhaps you have something.

Soong: Our idea of free port is open to commerce of all nations. If Stalin wants Chinese sovereignty over all Manchuria, I think administration should be Chinese. I shall have occasion to make some general observations.

Stalin: It is false idea. There is no need to negotiate treaty for trade. We hope to trade in Canton, Tientsin. If we sign treaty it is to have more rights. Not open port to all nations but implies that there should be administration of preeminent role safeguards.

Soong: Preeminence even compared with China?

Stalin: Compared to China and other countries.

Soong: Does it mean Soviet Union have more rights than China?

Stalin: Perhaps, yes. What does it mean iced free port? That's what that document implies. What's the use of Chinese Eastern Railway if we do not have certain rights in port?

Soong: Do you mean Russian administration?

Stalin: Joint Sino-Russian Society. Chairman Chinese, Russian Chief of Administration, profits to be divided half and half. We are not for concessions. We prefer joint society.

Soong: Port would probably not be profit making. In the interest of trade.

Stalin: After construction it may be profitable. After defeat of Japan, China will need goods. Japan will not import goods into China as Americans are destroying. For long time (10 - 15 years) China will not produce such goods. They will cam from the USA. We can sell some commodities, but not on large scale. England will not be able to deliver much. Dairen will be entry port for Russia and export port for beans. I think this port will be of some importance.

Soong: No doubt. But ports are for facilities and not to make benefits.

Stalin: You are not interested?

Soong: Not for ports. We are more interested in trade.

Stalin: Inner trade.

Soong: We will not tax trade to Russia, in this port.

Stalin: We will see that later. Income from ports is important.

Soong: For Dairen we will not tax. It is different for non free ports where we pay duty. But that is customs tax and not port dues.

Stalin: Document provides for internationalized port but not for free port.

Soong: If there are customs duties then of course they go to China.

Stalin: Half and half. (He laughs).

Soong: Otherwise you kill port of Dairen. Because there are other ports in Manchuria. If we halve income we will naturally send our goods through other ports. It's human.

Stalin: Must discuss in detail.

Soong: Even under Czar it was free port, and under Japanese.

Stalin: Right. I don't want to be more to the right, rather more to the left of Czarists.

Soong: Lease of Port Arthur. Chiang told Petrov: we are willing make port for joint use. For obvious reasons we do not want to have leased territories, but willing use jointly.

Stalin: It would be possible to find here a common language in order to meet wishes of China. Should not like create precedence, harmful to China.

Soong: Thank you.

Railways. What do you mean by joint Sino-Soviet Company?

Stalin: For operations.

Soong: How about ownership of railway?

Stalin: Who has built it?

Soong: Old terms 60 years?

Stalin: Old terms 80 years after construction.

Soong: 1924 changed to 60 years.

Stalin: I did not know.

Soong: There was also condition to redeem.

Stalin: Yes. Even under Czars it was provided.

Soong: What do you want for Chinese Eastern Railway?

Stalin: Term

Principles of operations

Aim: use rail for Port Arthur. Link also between Vladivostock and
Siberia.

Soong: What term?

Stalin: Joint company. Profits to be divided.

Soong: Ownership joint?

Stalin: Operations joint. Soviet Union first owner, then China will take
over. Formerly China had a small share. Joint disposal of ownership not
proper term. For certain period after which Russia will leave railroad.

Soong: How long?

Stalin: Prolong Port Arthur. Shorter for railway. And find an average 10
- 15 years. Which do you prefer? (He laughs)

Soong: I want to explore some more things. What do you mean by preeminent
interest of Soviet Union in railroad.

Stalin: Same as for Dairen, not financial privilege, not to station troops
but chief of railroad should be Russian.

Soong: Do you intend use railroads for troops?

Stalin: Yes, in case of war with Japan.

Soong: That is reasonable. Not move troops in time of peace.

Stalin: No need. We will have few troops, but on the eve of outbreak of
war against Japan. Do you pity Japan?

Soong: I would welcome, but I mean in time of peace you do not intend to
send troops to Manchuria.

Stalin: We will agree. No need of recrudescence an part of Japan, China,
if we have treaty, will ask herself for movement of troops.

Soong: We must have understanding.

Stalin: You are afraid we go to Peking. We have no intention.

Soong: No. Soviet had foreign troop on its soil. We had also bitter experience.

Stalin: Agrees.

Soong: Kuriles. We are very glad.

Stalin: We are closed up. We have no outlet. One should keep Japan vulnerable from all sides, north, west, south, east, then she will keep quiet.

Soong: We fully understand position of Soviet Union as regards Manchuria. Soviet Union want outlet through Dairen. Ready and anxious to give this outlet. But number of things here which need precise understanding. For instance when agreement made not put restore rights treacherous attack because Dairen, Port Arthur have expired. Chinese Eastern Railway theoretically sold to Japan. South Manchurian railway expires in very few years.

Stalin: It applies to Portsmouth Treaty, not implies that are restored with regard to China. We do not want restoration of old rights of Czarist Government vis à vis China. Treaty with China will be drafted differently. Here it is not treaty but principle directed against Japan.

Soong: Glad to hear that. 1924 Soviet Union first to relinquish its privileges and gave example to other countries.

Stalin: That's why Chang Tao-lin arrested Russian Manager. Curious way to thank.

Soong: Chang and Czar are gone. God rest their bones.

Stalin: Chang did not like Japanese. He had good features. That's why Japs killed him.

Soong: Yes. Terms of lease Stalin said 40 - 45 years.

Stalin: 60 for railway - 25 for Fort Arthur - take uniform term - after the term whole thing will be terminated.

Soong: What do you mean Port Arthur can you have map prepared, not whole Liaotung peninsula.

Stalin: We will prepare map if you have no definite proposal?

Soong: I shall be grateful to be more precise. Chiang's views were 20 - 25 years for Port Arthur and railway.

Stalin: Too short. We must still construct. When Czar provided 25 years he foresaw prolongation and deceived China. 25 years too short. Czar wanted to remain and move further South. We have no such intention.

Soong: I am sure of that. 4th point Soviet Union wants to conclude a treaty of friendship and alliance. We have been hoping that but because of German war Soviet Union could not.

Stalin: Chiang asked always. We were tied by Germany. Now we can.

Soong: Do you have your draft?

Stalin: No. We must accept principle, then we can draft.

Soong: We need clarification on some points Stalin is not clear himself.

Stalin: I can give clarification.

Soong: We have gone over Dairen.

Stalin: Did not come to final conclusion.

Soong: We must know what each side means. Why Stalin cannot accept that Dairen must be administered by China and be open port. We will give facilities to Soviet goods, not tax them. It seem all interests of Soviet Union are taken care of.

Stalin: I don't know. Then there would be no need to make treaty. I did not say that there should be Russian administration but Russo-Chinese. Why don't you want to accept?

Soong: When Stalin speaks of sovereignty in Manchuria it should include Dairen.

Stalin: That's administration of port.

Will it be like under Chang Tio-lin, several treaties?

Soong: We had revolution to unify China.

Stalin: High time.

Soong: Another question. Outlet to Dairen. I presume it's for trunk line, not branches.

Stalin: I think so.

Molotov: Coal district.

Soong: They are not on main line. Coal mine can be operated separately and coal sold to railway.

Stalin: Transportation of coal should be safeguarded. We do not want to operate these branch lines. But understanding should be reached for safeguarding coal supplies.

Soong: We want railway to prosper as it will be joint business, so question of supply of coal does not arise.

Stalin: If China undertakes safeguard coal then O.K. We don't want branch lines.

Soong: Appeal again to Soviet Union re Outer Mongolia. Inseparable for Chinese Government.

Stalin: Why?

Soong: We have been speaking of territorial integrity. Why will Stalin not help us on this question. We cannot present to Chinese people.

Stalin: Mongols don't want to stay with China. We renounced Poland (Warsaw) and Finland. I understand it is difficult but should be overcome. We cannot find anything else. For Port Arthur we yielded. You should make concession on this question.

Soong: We are not raising any question on Outer Mongolia.

Stalin: But it will come up and give rise to frictions. We are concluding pact before, so that all reasons of conflict should be eliminated. Soviet Union recognized Outer Mongolia as a part of China. True. But lesson of war changed our views. It will be better for China and Russia if Outer

Mongolia is independent with right of passage for Russian troop in case threat from Japan.

Soong: We are not contesting this.

Stalin: Yes. But this sore point should be eliminated.

Soong: It did not cause us any pain. We are not making any protest against presence of Russian troops.

Molotov: Press publishes about those who want spoil our relations.

Stalin: Outer Mongolia is not wealth to you or us, but geographical position is important.

Soong: Chinese people since Sun Yat-Sen, brought up on integrity of Chinese territory. I do beg Stalin to reconsider this.

Stalin: Sign treaty for independence of Mongolia but make it public after defeat of Japan when China regains her territories.

Soong: I will have to communicate with Chiang Kai-shek. Meanwhile hope Stalin will understand our difficulty and help us.

Stalin: Sign treaty now.

Soong: If this is done we will have difficulty with Thibet. In Washington (Pacific Conference) Churchill made statement on independent Thibet. I had heated argument. We do not want retrograde movements China since revolution has restored many of her rights. Soviet Union has been helping us. For that reason Stalin has to consider other method than lease for Port Arthur.

Stalin: Outer Mongolia is question of defense. Siberian rail can be cut off from Outer Mongolia and whole Siberia is gone. Japan tried. We cannot station troops on Chinese territory. It is graver question than Port Arthur (shows map).

Soong: Allow me to consult Chiang.

Stalin: Please.

Soong: Stalin said you'll welcome representatives of Chiang with troops.

Stalin: Yes.

Soong: Are you ready to enter in agreement.

Stalin: Yes if all this is accepted. I don't like empty words. What I said are you going to bring in some more troops.

Soong: Will talk frankly. Hope Stalin will also be frank. Talk not like diplomat but as realist government undergoing changes, more is going on. We tried to come to agreement with communists last March, wanted war cabinet to introduce Chinese communists which Stalin considers more like agrarians as Hurley said.

Stalin: Good patriots. As to communists question mark...

Soong: We will bring them in. I said I would fly to Yen-an. That was late March. They did not want me to go though I had full powers and was Acting Prime Minister. We want united army, 1 central government. We don't want Chang Tso-lun war lords or any party with separate government and army. If Chinese communist is only party having army and government want to join us, we are ready to introduce them in War Cabinet in government. No intention to persecute them.

Stalin: I mean not only communists during war with Japan. There are now liberals also, not communists only. China must have one government with predomination of Kuomintang. But one Kuomintang will not be able to cope with situation.

Kuomintang must guide, but advantageous to China to have non Kuomintang also in government. This is affair of China. I speak only by the way. I asked because I am interested in the fortunes of China.

Soong: I appreciate what Stalin said. I know it in is interest of China.

Frankly: government wants enlist other people, not Kuomintang. It is our sincere wish. Kuomintang wants to be leading part in Government.

Therefore does not want coalition government which may be upset when other parties withdraw.

Stalin: This is rightful wish of Kuomintang. It's obvious from history of China. What other parties?

Soong: To be brutally frank, no other party. National socialist party would not be allowed anywhere else. Members count on fingers. Youth party: back of it: landlords of Szechuan. Lin Wen-hui, largest landlord supports it. So called democratic front: communists, national socialists, youth is only a fiction set up in juxtaposition to central government. It's blunt facts. There are plenty liberal good men in China but so far have no organized party.

Stalin: Chiang can send his representatives to our army to set up administration as our troops advance.

Soong: Trusteeship for Korea to which you gave your approval. In San Francisco everybody had his own opinion an to trusteeship. How do you think.

Stalin: As Molotov.

Soong: What are your views?

Molotov: You discussed more with Americans. I understand them: trusteeship by one or several states. For Korea four States as proposed by USA. It will be complicated. No precedent. Must find solution in practice. But in principle we accepted.

Stalin: Without army. I stated that if troops are to be sent we will not accept. Roosevelt said no troops. There will be Council of four Powers to supervise so as to prepare country for end of trusteeship. It will be temporary. Must prepare conditions for its abolition with independence in the end. But that was only exchange of views. No binding decision. Verbal agreement.

Soong: Who will maintain order.

Stalin: Koreans themselves. What would be better according to you?

Soong: Some sort of police will be necessary.

Molotov: International?

Soong: Any kind to maintain order. When Japan withdraws, for some time there will be confusion.

Stalin: Should Korea be independent or do you have other plan?

Soong: I don't think Korea can be independent now.

Stalin: But in long run.

Soong: Yes.

Stalin: Is Korean language [the] same as Chinese?

Soong: The written one is the same.

Stalin: Is difference greater between Korean and Manchurian, than between Manchurian and South Chinese.

Soong: Yes.

Stalin: Why China does not adopt phonetic alphabet?

Soong: Some day it will come. Six weeks in American army to acquire great vocabulary. We intend to fight illiteracy with Soviet methods, radio, movies.

Stalin: Has China intention to annex Korea?

Soong: None whatever. People different, separate history.

Stalin: But it was part of China.

Soong: Yes, but we don't want Korea.

Stalin: I oppose police, stationing troops in Korea. Re Trusteeship in San Francisco our views were different from those of the USA and of Great Britain. We consider it as step to independence. British consider it as step to colonization. USA (Roosevelt) had views close to ours. But now seem to have got closer to British.

Molotov: Only our and Chinese draft mentioned independence.

Soong: In 1943 discussed with Roosevelt. He wanted trusteeship for all colonies.

Stalin: But Churchill burst into tears and it was dropped.

Source: Hoover Institution Archives, folder 6-9.

Contributed by David Wolff.

Memcon A. Harriman - Soong

TOP SECRET

Moscow

Conversation

July 3, 1945

Present: W. A. Harriman, American Ambassador
Dr. T. V. Soong

Subject: Far Eastern Conversations with Generalissimo Stalin

One side light on Soong's talk with Stalin July 2 was that Stalin thought the ports would make large profits. Soong tried to explain to Stalin that port facilities were usually operated on a cost basis.

Soong got the impression that Stalin did not place great importance on Port Arthur as a naval base. This might be due to the fact that Soong does not consider it of great naval value because the port has not sufficient depth of water to handle large ships. Stalin wants naval facilities at Dairen.

Soong got the impression that Outer Mongolia was the most important question in Stalin's mind. Stalin showed Soong a map and indicated on it the long reaches of the Siberian frontier which were contiguous and emphasized the danger to the Siberian railroad of unfriendly forces operating from Outer Mongolia, specifically Japanese. The balance of the conversation was substantially covered by navy cable of July 3.

Soong told Stalin that he considered Russia was entitled to the southern half of Sakhalin and was glad to learn that Russia would get the Kurile Islands.

WAH

Source: W.A. Harriman Papers, Library of Congress.

PARAPHRASE OF NAVY CABLE JULY 3, 1945, FROM MOSCOW

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~ AND PERSONAL FROM HARRIMAN TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

This morning I called on Soong at his request. He gave me to read the detailed English notes of his second talk with Stalin which took place last night. Molotov, Lozovsky, Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and Petrov were present at the conversation.

What most disturbed Soong is Stalin's insistence that the interpretation of the phrase "status quo in Outer Mongolia shall be preserved" means that the Chinese Government should recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia.

Soong argued that this should be interpreted to mean that China would not at the present time raise the issue but would allow the situation that presently exists to continue. He told Stalin that China could not agree to the cession of territory, that it would complicate the question of Tibet, and that no Government in China could last if it ceded Outer Mongolia. He explained to me that it was a matter of principle deep in Chinese psychology and that although they recognized they could not exercise suzerainty over Outer Mongolia at the present time, the Chinese would be unwilling to support a Government which gave up Chinese claims to this territory for all time.

The military importance of Outer Mongolia to Russia was emphasized by Stalin, as well as the dangers from possible Japanese recovery and the necessity of Russia having the right to move troops freely in Outer Mongolia.

China, Soong said, would assent to free movement of Russian troops in Outer Mongolia or any other formula which would not finally and permanently give up China's claims. Stalin suggested a secret agreement on the independence of Outer Mongolia which might be published after the defeat of Japan. This Soong objected to also. He is cabling for instructions from Chiang.

Soong asked me what the understanding of President Roosevelt was on this point, and said that he understood President Truman interpreted the Soviet proposal in the same manner that he (Soong) did. I told him that to my knowledge there had been no discussion of interpretation. The words were accepted as written. He has asked me to telegraph urgently to ascertain the interpretation of the United States Government.

[ILLEGIBLE]

of these provisions and particularly what [ILLEGIBLE] connection with the "internationalization" of the port of Darien. He feels that if China herself does not control the operations of the port it would interfere with Chinese sovereignty.

Soong was reassured by Stalin's statements on the question of the sovereignty of China in Manchuria. Stalin agreed that representatives of the Chinese National Government should accompany the Red Army when it advances into Manchuria to organize the government. Stalin told Soong it

was important that competent individuals be appointed by the National Government.

In response to Stalin's inquiry regarding the National Government's attitude toward the communists, Soong told him that the Generalissimo was prepared to bring communist representation into the government but that the Kuomintang should be in control. Soong said Stalin appeared to agree in principle but there was no detailed discussion or agreement as to the understanding to be reached with the communists. Again this discussion appeared to be preliminary.

There was no discussion of the problems in Sinkiang. However, Soong told me that the Generalissimo was considering the appointment of his son as Governor of Sinkiang, believing that this would improve relations with the Soviets in this province because of his sympathetic attitude toward the Soviets.

With reference to Korea, Stalin confirmed to Soong his agreement to establish a 4-power trusteeship. Molotov interjected that this was an unusual arrangement with no parallel and that therefore it would be necessary to come to a detailed understanding. Stalin stated that there should be no foreign troops or foreign police in Korea. Soong understands that the Russians have two Korean divisions trained in Siberia. He believes that these troops will be left in Korea and that there will be Soviet-trained political personnel who will also be brought into the country. He is fearful that under these conditions the Soviets will obtain domination of Korean affairs even with a four-power trusteeship.

RPM

Source: W.A. Harriman Papers, Library of Congress.

PARAPHRASE OF NAVY CABLE FROM MOSCOW JULY 3, 1945

TOP SECRET

FROM W. A. HARRIMAN TO
THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Stalin, in discussing the operation of the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian railroads, proposed that the ownership of the railroads should be Russian, that they should be operated by a joint Soviet-Chinese board, but that the management should be Russian. Soong contended that the ownership of the railroads should be Chinese and that they should be operated by a Soviet-Chinese company with joint responsibility and a mixed management, partly Chinese and partly Russian. Stalin indicated that he was not interested in the subsidiary lines, but only in the main lines. However, Molotov raised the question of control of the coal production for the operation of the railroad. Stalin agreed that Russia should have the right to move troops only in time of war or in preparation for threat of war. He further agreed that Russia should not have the right to station troops in Manchuria.

With reference to the port of Darien, Stalin interpreted "internationalization" as meaning that it should be subject to Chinese and Russian control, that no other country was to be involved and that Russia should have a preeminent interest in the port as against China and there should be a Russian management. Half the revenues of the port should go to Russia and half to China. Soong maintained that the port should be a free port under Chinese administration with some Russian technical assistance and with full rights for Russia to use the port freely.

With reference to Port Arthur, Stalin agreed to eliminate the word "lease" and work for some basis by which both countries could have naval facilities.

Generalissimo Stalin proposed that the agreement regarding the railroads and ports should be for a 45 year period. There was no attempt to arrive at a decision as these discussions were of an exploratory nature.

He was asked by Soong what was the understanding of the United States Government as to the proposed arrangements in connection with the railroads and the ports.

He is hopeful of reaching agreement on the railroads and ports. Stalin is making some expanded demands in connection with the detailed arrangements. . . [ILLEGIBLE]
hopes to be able to . . . [ILLEGIBLE]
understanding. . . [ILLEGIBLE]
this subject. . . [ILLEGIBLE]

The negotiations, says Soong, are at a standstill until the Outer-Mongolian question is settled, and he feels it is essential for him to know the interpretation placed on this provision by the United States Government.

LAX

Source: W.A. Harriman Papers, Library of Congress.

PARAPHRASE OF NAVY CABLE JULY 5, 1945, FROM MOSCOW

TOP SECRET

FROM HARRIMAN, ~~TOP SECRET AND~~ PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

This morning I called on Dr. Soong and carried out the instructions contained in White House Message No. 308 July 4 regarding Outer Mongolia. He repeated what he had said in our first talk, that he was asking for the information for his own guidance and had no intention of bringing the United States' understanding or interpretation of the various provisions of the Yalta Agreement into his discussion with Stalin. He recognizes that this would be unwise from his own standpoint as well as from ours.

Soong expects to see Stalin again tonight and to inform him that he is prepared to accept the Yalta provision on Outer Mongolia as worded. He will tell Stalin again that no government in China could survive if it recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia and he hopes to be able to convince Stalin that the Generalissimo cannot agree to do so. If he can come to an agreement with Stalin over Outer Mongolia he is hopeful that an understanding can be worked out in regard to the railroads and the ports. However, he would greatly appreciate receiving informally our attitude in regard to the questions raised in my message of July 3.

Soong states, however, that the conversations will break down if no agreement can be reached on Outer Mongolia. I urged on him the desirability of arriving at an agreement on a bilateral basis and pointed out the many disadvantages of failure to reach an understanding now.

RPM

Source: W.A. Harriman Papers, Library of Congress.

PERSONAL AND ~~TOP-SECRET~~ FOR
THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE FROM HARRIMAN.

Soong invited [ILLEGIBLE] to tell me of a message he had received from Chiang. He has not repeat not seen Stalin again as he decided to await further instructions from the Generalissimo, receipt of which had evidently been delayed by the Generalissimo's absence from Chungking.

The Generalissimo has now instructed Soong to inform Stalin that he cannot repeat not recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia at this time since this would result in the fall of his Government in China. He proposes, however, that after the war is ended and if the Soviet Government will cooperate with the National Government in obtaining control of Manchuria and Singkiang, he will agree to the holding of a plebiscite in Outer Mongolia. If this plebiscite, as he assumes it will, indicates a popular desire fro [sic] independence, Chiang will support it and recommend to the Chinese Assembly recognition of the independence of Outer Mongolia. Unless Stalin will agree to the above Soong is instructed to leave Moscow at once.

As to Port Arthur, he wants to avoid the term quote lease unquote but agrees to joint use. He wishes Dairen to be a free port under Chinese management with full rights to Russia to freely import and exort [sic]. He hopes also for Stalin's agreement to complete Chinese management of the railroads under joint operation, the profits to be divided. Soong is ready to make more liberal concessions and if he can get over the hurdle of Outer Mongolia he expects to be able to get the Generalissimo to agree to terms more favorable to the Russians.

I again urged on Soong the desirability of reaching an agreement during his present visit, expressing my personal opinion that he would never again have an opportunity to reach an agreement with Stalin on as favorable terms.

Soong hopes to see Stalin tonight.

WAH

Source: W.A. Harriman Papers, Library of Congress.

Record of Meeting Between T. Soong and Stalin

7 July 1945, 11:00 - 11:45 p.m.

Soong: Sorry we delayed a few days.

Stalin: It doesn't depend on me.

Soong: I have reported faithfully my talk with you. Told Chiang that Stalin considers Outer Mongolia question of great importance. Therefore Chiang took great deal of time to consider the question. You remember my position when I left.

Stalin: Yes.

Soong: My position was not to discuss the question.

Stalin: To leave it open.

Soong: I reported how important Stalin considers the question. He has given his reply. Agrees with Yalta formula signed by the Three, i.e., preserve status quo of Outer Mongolia. We cannot recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia. Reason simple: self preservation is first law of nature. No Chinese government can last if it signs agreement amputating Outer Mongolia. But we agree to status quo.

Stalin: How do you understand 'status quo'?

Soong: How it stands today.

Stalin: They don't accept Chinese representative. They proclaimed independence. You put up with this.

Soong: You have troops there. You said in case of threat to Soviet Union you have to send troops to Outer Mongolia. That we are ready to agree. Molotov said that there might be people stirring trouble between Soviet Union and China. If we agree what trouble can arise?

Molotov: I had in view Chinese press.

Soong: It can be told not to stir up trouble.

Molotov: Constitution of Outer Mongolia provides for independence.

Soong: They can do what they like. We are realistic. We do not propose to disturb the status quo.

Stalin: In another half month another conflict will break out. Mongolia cannot go on like that. Chinese people will represent Soviet Union as usurpers, invaders. We should not like to be in this position.

Soong: You will not be in this position because we recognize the status quo.

Stalin: I am afraid nothing will come out from it.

Molotov: A situation which is left indetermined will hamper and spoil the Sino-Soviet relations.

Soong: Yalta agreement was not to disturb status quo. We agreed to that.

Stalin: We understood China will recognize independence.

Soong: This was not my understanding when I discussed in Washington.

Stalin: Status quo is formal recognition of independence. Now Outer Mongolia has no representatives from China. Outer Mongolia proclaimed its independence on two occasions. Chiang said once he recognizes independence of Mongolia Thibet will not follow suit. No analogy. There is representative of China in Thibet and vice-versa. Mongolia has no representatives and China has none.

Soong: I was not at Yalta.

Stalin: You are familiar with the declaration.

Soong: No Chinese government can recognize independence of Outer Mongolia and survive.

Stalin: Why?

Soong: Because public sentiment will not support it.

Stalin: Soviet Union recognized independence of Finland and survived. Finns demanded it and public opinion accepted.

Soong: No parallel. Chiang delayed so long because he considered very carefully the considered opinion of China. He cannot recognize

independence of Outer Mongolia. We have also well considered this question. He thinks nothing will come out of this. Three leaders in Yalta recognized sensitiveness of Chinese public opinion. Therefore it called for preservation of status quo.

Stalin: It's our formula. They signed. I am prepared to repeat that.

Molotov: That's how the matter stood. Independence was meant.

Soong: In spite of everything we cannot recognize independence and survive. It's the opinion of Chiang and his advisers. Soviet Union position is question of military importance. Send troops in case of threat of Japan. We agree to that.

Stalin: Not only that. Mongols do not want to join China or Soviet Union. They want to be independent.

Soong: We are ready to give high degree of autonomy.

Stalin: What is that?

Soong: Right of military and foreign affairs. They could make arrangement with Soviet Union concerning entry of Soviet troops in case of necessity.

Stalin: Will it be part of China? It will be source of conflict between Soviet Union and China. As we propose make alliance with you must eliminate all causes of conflict.

Soong: I stated how realistic we are. Ready accept entry of Soviet troops. You must also be realistic. My Government cannot recognize independence and remain in power.

Stalin: Cannot see why.

Soong: That's in our public opinion. Sun Yat-sen proclaimed our territorial integrity.

Stalin: At time of Sun Yat-sen white Russian troops were in Outer Mongolia.

Soong: Joffe signed agreement with Sun Yat-sen accepting territorial integrity of China.

Stalin: There was no Government authority in Outer Mongolia at that time.

Soong: Our Government does not think it can survive if it recognizes the independence of Outer Mongolia. Even the extreme liberals are not for recognizing independence of Outer Mongolia.

Stalin: Who can overthrow Government? What forces?

Soong: Many forces will take opportunity to overthrow Chiang.

Stalin: There is the Kuomintang. Other forces are communists. Can communists overthrow Kuomintang? If China makes alliance with Soviet Union nobody will overthrow government.

Soong: I am not in agreement with you. There is nobody in Kuomintang who will support recognition of Outer Mongolia. Communists may not openly oppose it, but they would be far from human, if they did not try to use this as means to overthrow.

Molotov: With existence of alliance with Soviet Union?

Soong: Even so. Stalin must know value of intangible factors. No government, the old Manchu Government, Yuan Che-kai, or present Government, can go against public opinion.

Stalin: We cannot make concessions on this point.

Soong: It's only strong governments that can make things as Stalin said. Today is July 7th. 9th anniversary of our war. Our people have suffered tremendously economically and otherwise. The Government is not so strong as Stalin believes that it can affront public opinion. That's simple fact. But we are realistic. Neither Chiang nor I can see reasons of conflict if we recognize status quo and recognize right to send troops.

Stalin: I think of future. Japan will be crushed but she will restore her might in 20, 30 years. Whole plan of our relations with China is based on this. Now our preparations in Far East in case Japan restore might is inadequate. We have one port Vladivostock which is imperfect. Soviet Harbour is another one which is being built. It is not yet a port. 3rd

place is Petropavlosk in Kamtchatka. 2500 klms. of railways are necessary to connect with it. We need 20 to 30 years to equip and build installations in Petropavlosk. There is another port (De Castri?) railways have to be built north of Baikal. This will take 40 years. Therefore we want alliance. Mongolia is part of this plan. We cannot send troops to Chinese territory.

Soong: We have no objection to your stationing troops.

Stalin: Indefinite: today you do not object. Strange to maintain garrison in China but to maintain it in a small state is natural. We have withdrawn troops from Sin-Kiang which were sent there at the request of Shen.

Soong: If military alliance you could station troops.

Stalin: We have draft for 20 years for alliance. We have prepared four drafts.

Molotov: They concern:

- 1) Friendship and alliance;
- 2) Chinese Eastern Railway and South Manchurian Railway;
- 3) Port Arthur and Dalny;
- 4) Declaration on independence of Outer Mongolia.

These are the four questions we want to settle.

Soong: Stalin has been very kind and open in explaining his plans. He looks far ahead. But for us there is present question as well as future. If there in no present there is no future. Self-preservation is first thing we must look upon. Therefore our realistic proposal re Outer Mongolia.

Stalin: It is not realistic.

Soong: Our Government thinks it is realistic.

Stalin: Well, we did not come to an agreement.

Soong: Sorry, so are my instructions.

Stalin: Let's finish now.

Soong: Sorry you cannot see our point. To us in China it is a very real point.

Stalin: Sorry you cannot see our point. Let it go at that.

Source: Hoover Institution Archives, folder 6-9.

Contributed by David Wolff.

Record of Meeting Between T. Soong and Stalin

9 July 1945, 9:00 - 10:40 p.m.

Stalin: What news?

Soong: I reported to Chiang that our meeting was at a deadlock. I told that Stalin wanted remove all questions between two countries so that from now on we can co-operate in friendship without any cause of conflict. I have his reply today. Before translating his reply, I want to give background not by way of argument but to show the magnitude of concession of Chiang.

When I left Washington I had no idea that Outer Mongolia question would be a problem. I told Truman that we might settle this question by not discussing it. I said status quo was that juridicial sovereignty remains with China. It is true we cannot exercise this sovereignty. Truman agreed and also Secretary of State. In Chungking I discussed with Chiang. None of us had any idea that Outer Mongolia would be an obstacle in our discussions. Stalin must understand strength of Chinese national feeling towards alienating any part of its territory. Don't want to draw parallel with Manchuria.

In one sense it's the same: alienation of Chinese sovereign territory. Although we had little strength in comparison with Japan and no hopes of change in world situation we did not yield our juridicial right in Manchuria. Stalin must know attempts of Japan to force our recognition. In the first instance, in 1933, when I was going to the Economic Conference I had been passing Japan. I was invited by Japanese Emperor to meet and discuss question of Manchuria. If we renounce legal title Japan could renounce aggression. I declined. Nevertheless, Shigenutau was sent to Yokohama to persuade me to go to Tokyo. I refused. Because instinct

of China for her sovereign territory is so strong. If Government recognizes independence of Outer Mongolia it would go against instinct of Chinese people. It transcends safety and security of Government. It goes against genuine public opinion. I say this not by way of argument but want Stalin realizes sacrifices Chinese Government is ready to make on the altar of perpetual friendship between China and USSR. We do not treat Outer Mongolia lightly. May I translate telegram from Chiang:

"Chinese Government now willing make greatest sacrifice in the utmost sincerity to find fundamental solution of Chinese/Soviet relations, removing all possible disagreement and rankling unpleasantness so as to secure fundamental co-operation between the two countries in order to complete the will of Dr. Sun Yat-sen which was to co-operate with Soviet Russia. What is the greatest demand for China today: secure administrative integrity and territorial sovereignty and real unity in China. On this there are three items. Anxiously hoping that Soviet Government will give us concrete sympathy and assistance and give concrete and determined reply :

1) Sovereignty and administrative integrity of Manchuria. Stalin has expressed his respect of this point for which we are very grateful.

Stalin: Did you expect anything else from me?

Soong: I am translating textually the telegram.

For common interest of China and Russia, China is ready to afford joint use of Port Arthur. Dairen declared an open port for period 20 years. As to administration of Port Arthur and Dairen this should go to China so that China has real sovereignty and administrative integrity in Manchuria.

Molotov: Port Arthur and Dairen, both?

Soong: Yes. Chinese Eastern Railway and South Manchurian Railway main lines to be operated jointly by Soviet Union. Profits to be divided

equally. Branch lines, other enterprises not connected with exploitation of railways not included in joint administration.

Period also 20 years.

2) Sin-kiang. In the last year or so there broke out rebellion in Sin-kiang so that communication between China and Sin-kiang broken: trade and commerce cannot be maintained. We are anxious that Soviet Russia, in accordance with previous agreement, co-operate with us to eliminate trouble so that trade, communication could be resumed. Altai range: originally belonged to Sin-kiang, should continue form part of Sin-kiang.

3) Chinese Government. Because of Chinese communist administration and army, who are not united within the central government, wish Soviet Government to give to central Chinese Government alone all moral and material support. Any assistance given to China should be confined to the central government.

4) Outer Mongolia. Chinese government regards that since Outer Mongolia question is the stumbling block in Sino-Soviet relations, for common interest of Soviet Union and China and lasting peace, is ready after the defeat of Japan and acceptance of the three points by Soviet Government, to grant Outer Mongolia its independence. On this matter, in order to avoid future disputes to go through form of plebiscite. After plebiscite Chinese government will declare independence. As to area of Outer Mongolia should conform former area set out in our maps. Chinese Government deeply hopes Soviet Government can understand the enormous sacrifice and utmost sincerity of the Chinese Government, so as to secure two countries lasting and fundamental co-operation. Will you please communicate to Stalin without any reservation."

That is the matter.

Stalin: It would be good to have this translated and to think it over.

You can have this translated into English?

He draws analogy between Outer Mongolia and Manchuria.

Soong: I said twice I am not drawing a parallel.

Stalin: In Manchuria there are Chinese. In Mongolia, there are no Chinese.

Soong: There were Chinese in minority. I just pointed out that any alienation of territory is matter of great pain.

Stalin: Status quo in Outer Mongolia is really in fact independence since 1921. We want that this factual situation should be recognized legally.

Soong: Our understanding is like that of the Americans: status quo, retention of juridical sovereignty of China.

Stalin: This sovereignty does not exist.

Soong: For us, even 50 years it does not matter. This is academic question.

Stalin: First point concerned Manchuria. I declared that we recognize full sovereignty. I can make any statement you want.

Soong: I know it.

Stalin: As to communists in China we do not support and don't intend to support. We consider China has one government. If another government calls itself Government it's matter for China. As regards assistance, Chiang told us to send to Central Government. We did so. If we can render help, of course it will be given to government of Chiang.

We do not want to play with China. We want to deal honestly with China and allied nations.

Re terms for Port Arthur, Dairen and Railways, 20 years do not accommodate us. It's too little. We could accept 30 years. We cannot accept less than 30 years instead of 40. That would be the final solution.

Re military Port of Port Arthur. There should be one master in the port. We shall have our troops, navy, there. As to territory of Liao-toung, formerly Port Arthur was included.

Soong: We are talking about Port Arthur. I didn't receive map.

Molotov: (Shows map). We renounce neutral sons, leave the other line.

Stalin: In the area, administration is Chinese, but as regards Port Arthur administration is Russian. Someone should be master and command.

As regards railway Chinese possession is not correct. Assumption that railway to be Chinese not correct. Russians built it. Chinese investment was returned.

Soong: I thought we are not talking of past rights which are changed. It was originally for 80 years. In 1924 changed to 60 years. Only few years left. Besides Chinese Eastern Railway sold to Japan.

(Stalin laughs).

Stalin: We did not use it much.

Soong: It's not our fault.

Stalin: You are right.

Soong: For Chiang to agree on Outer Mongolia he must show something to our people. For main line we agree to joint administration on altar of Sino-Soviet friendship. We make great sacrifice. For 8 years we have suffered. Many properties destroyed by Japanese. We hope to have some compensation.

Stalin: According to Chiang we have no right. We obtain as a favour common possession. Although Russia built the railway, and made investments, we can agree to common possession as you suggested. As regards plebiscite it would be worse for China.

Soong: Only a matter of form. The matter is settled. It is more convenient for Chinese Government to confront Chinese people if there is a plebiscite.

Stalin: What are old frontiers of Outer Mongolia? I don't know.

Molotov: Is it intended to change present frontier?

Soong: We have old maps of China.

Stalin: It would be good to see them.

Soong: Never thought we would discuss that. I did not bring them. We never contemplated that question would be raised when old maps were drawn, so we did not make it bigger or smaller. I have no maps in Moscow but this can be settled by boundary commission.

Stalin: We had argument with jobs. We referred to old map. Don't know whether you have same map in view. After when we killed their General Matsomora, they agreed (Khalkha government?) [sic].

Soong: Hope you will not have to kill our General.

Stalin: We are alive to difference between China and Japan.

Soong: We want to be fair.

Stalin: We gave you the drafts of the agreement. What is your reaction?

Soong: Many of the things are not in accord with our drafts, we have drafted our drafts. Can I go over:

- 1) Friendship and alliance. Little difference with yours. Only we need ratification. Question of days, is only a minor point;
- 2) Stalin said would be glad to have Chinese representative to accompany your troops.

Stalin: As soon as there is an agreement on all points.

Soong: I have a copy here for Molotov.

- 3) Dairen - drafted according to Chiang instructions.
- 4) Port Arthur.
- 5) Administration of railway

(Soong gives draft to Molotov).

Stalin: Re Outer Mongolia. How to understand what you said. Not recognize now but after defeat of Japan? We proposed recognize now but publish after defeat of Japan.

Soong: Yes. After defeat of Japan go through plebiscite, then recognition. I want Staline [sic] believe me in this: matter of substance

is decided now. We can explore the form. We have no intention to evade or be tricky.

Stalin: It is not a matter of honesty but of clarity. From us, China will receive all assurances she asks. We want also assurances from China now. When to publish that's another thing.

Soong: That's fair.

Stalin: Do want to finish first and go, or put it off and go back to China.

Soong: If time allows prefer finish now.

Stalin: Three days at our disposal, 10, 11, 12th.

Soong: I will wire back tonight to Chiang. If you go to meeting, I cannot stay here.

Stalin: We try to postpone for five days.

Molotov: It will be very difficult.

Soong: I understand. Ready to work day and night.

Stalin: No objection. If Molotov deputizes me if I cannot be present, no difference.

Soong: Yes, but on important point would like have privilege to talk to you. In Molotov's draft some points were put before our conversation with Staline [sic]. For instance we spoke of main line.

Stalin: No branches in our draft. We do not think it is not possible to change the draft.

Soong: Yes. Also coal mines. I understand Stalin accepted our guarantee that we will supply.

Stalin: We do not want new mines but contemplate enterprises essential to railways. If joint ownership, Chinese will also be owner like Russians, and in 30 years all goes to China. In such case China not interested in separating the enterprises from the railways.

Soong: I think there was understanding that this is transportation enterprises only.

Stalin: It was question of Fushun but not mines of Chinese Eastern Railway that existed before. China interested that Chinese Eastern Railway works well.

Soong: For that reason we thought it would be only communication enterprises. You want outlet to sea. We will furnish you with that.

Stalin: There are enterprises without which Chinese Eastern Railway cannot subsist.

Soong: What are they?

Stalin: I cannot give you the list now. My people will furnish you with the information.

Soong: Railway guards must be Chinese. If you have guards it is question of soldiers.

Stalin: Guards?

Soong: Railway guards must be Chinese. Stalin knows my objection to foreign troops. If we guard well why should you bother.

Stalin: We wanted supply our experienced officers.

Soong: On this point special instructions from Chiang. Once you have foreign troops whatever you call them, then there will be endless trouble. We don't want.

Stalin: Railway is extra-territorial. Railway bridges, tunnels, stations, to be guarded.

Soong: Railway not extra-territorial. You don't want extra-territoriality
[ILLEGIBLE]

Stalin: In two years we will see.

Soong: Chinese personnel fully adequate. We will send our best men - this is a point I do urge Stalin to consider for me. We do not want foreign troops or gendarmerie in Shanghai or elsewhere. You would help me, the

Chinese people, by agreeing to this which Chiang considers as the most essential condition.

Stalin: We will think it over.

Soong: About Sin-kiang would Stalin help us in suppressing their trouble?

Stalin: How, by sending troops?

Soong: No. Smuggling of arms on border. Want you to stop it. Take additional trouble to stop it.

Stalin: We have no right to interfere.

Soong: Not in China but on border.

Stalin: Does China propose grant rights to population?

Soong: Yes. It's a political and military problem. Without either of them, it cannot be solved.

Stalin: Is the situation so grave?

Soong: Ili is partly occupied by rebels.

Stalin: Ouigurs, Khosaks?

Soong: Lot of mixture. We want to treat all races well. That's the only way to deal. But we want to recover territory occupied by rebels.

Stalin: This is legitimate. Best means is to grant rights. We have various nationalities. This is a question for China to solve. Without the recognition of minima [sic] rights there will be always trouble.

Soong: Agree. We have a great deal to learn from Soviet Union on treatment of minorities. We are willing make concession but if not followed by obedience we must use force.

Stalin: They want to separate?

Soong: They declared new republic.

Stalin: I'll collect information. We may have a talk. As to suppression of contraband on our frontier it's our duty to prevent. We shall do what we can if there are certain holes.

Soong: Rebels are well equipped with arms that never existed there.

Stalin: We can get weapons everywhere now.

Soong: Not in Sin-kiang.

Stalin: Why?

Soong: Because of transportation problems.

Stalin: India will not sell arms?

Stalin: If two States are at war one State is giving arms to rebels.

Soong: Transportation is difficult.

Stalin: You think arms come from our territory?

Soong: Possibly.

Stalin: Let's have a talk. Hardly probable.

Soong: I want assurance that Stalin will do everything possible to stop it. We will try to win rebels by peaceful means.

Stalin: In first war a group of munition factories supplied arms to Germany. Don't you officials sell arms to rebels at high price?

Soong: My answer can be believed. These people possess better arms than what Chinese officials have.

Stalin: You seem better informed.

Soong: We have exploded shells we don't possess. I know Stalin is anxious to help us solve this difficulty as others.

Any observation about communist problem? I talk as Soong to Stalin.

Stalin: What you require? You said not to arm communists, that if we help, we help Chiang. Is that so?

Soong: Yes.

Stalin: O.K. What else. You want us to disarm communists?

Soong: This is fantastic for us to ask you. But we want you to know our point. We want to find a solution by political means.

Stalin: It would be good to find such a solution. They are good patriots. If you find political solution it will be not bad.

Soong: We want their army to merge with ours.

Stalin: It is legitimate. One Government, one army.

Soong: We are ready for their joining the war, the Cabinet and the Military Council, but that cannot happen when they stay apart from us.

Stalin: It makes bad impression.

Soong: We ask Stalin to help us morally.

Stalin: How?

Soong: There has been many attacks on Chiang in Soviet press. That is not helpful to our government. We hope Stalin will restrain them.

Stalin: Very undoubtedly. But Chinese press attacked us more.

Soong: Let us do it mutually.

Stalin: Please.

Soong: How should we proceed?

Molotov: Do we meet at 2 p.m. to-morrow?

Soong: Hope see you before.

Source: Hoover Institution Archives, folder 6-9.

Contributed by David Wolff.

Record of Meeting Between T. Soong and V.M. Molotov

10 July 1945, 2:00-4:00 p.m.

Present: Molotov Soong
 Lossovski Fu
 Petrov Hoo
 X Chang
 Pavlov Liu

I. Draft Treaty

Molotov: Yours is different. Everything against Japan. You don't want to go further?

Soong: Could we mention Japan, Germany and their associates?

Molotov: We have in view not only Japan but also Germany. Of course, it is not necessary that in 19 years you are expected to take part in war against Germany

Soong: Agree

Molotov: Quote paragraph 3 of preamble. We follow our treaties with other countries. Same with article 3 of our draft. Do you accept article 3 of our draft?

Soong: O.K.

Molotov: We avoid mentioning Japan though she is clearly implied. It depends on when we will publish this treaty as we are neutral with regard to Japan. If you agree to publish end August or beginning September then we don't mind mentioning Japan.

Soong: After you take action.

Molotov: Yes, we cannot foresee day exactly. Depends on transportation and supply. If you agree to this we shall have no difference of opinion on the treaty. For the rest no serious difference.

Soong: We need ratification.

Molotov: Agree. When we sign we must agree on publication later. Or sign later at end of August but after initial first.

Soong: Sign it now.

Molotov: O.K. Will report.

Rest to draft by our representatives or we can proceed now.

Soong: You have no objection to article 3?

Molotov: No.

Soong: We mention Security Council.

Molotov: Accept, but draft in wording nearer with San Francisco. We had similar reservation with France and Great Britain [ILLEGIBLE].

Soong: Hoo, Fu, Chang.

Molotov: One jurist, Nagaroff (?) [sic], Petrov.

II. Declaration re Outer Mongolia

Molotov: We have a new draft

Soong: Quotes what Stalin said yesterday. I would like to draw a draft. We agreed in substance. It is question of form and I am sure Soviet government will meet our views re form. Stalin said also Outer Mongolia will not join Soviet Union either. For our home consumption, it would be good if Soviet Union say that after independence soviet Union will respect its territorial integrity.

Molotov: Do not object. Do you accept paragraph 1 on present recognition?

Soong: What difference to you if we say that China has no objection to independence if after plebiscite Outer Mongolia. You are not afraid of plebiscite. I assure you there is no catch.

Molotov: To avoid unclear situation. Stalin wishes us to accept this draft. But if you have other suggestion we will see.

Soong: I will prepare a draft. Substance is same but presentation is different. Will give you this evening.

III. Chinese representative with soviet troops

Soong: "Recovery of national territory instead of "liberation," otherwise like Czech treaty. Three months after recovery, withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Molotov: Correct. Two observations:

- 1) Point 8 you spoke of. Stalin said: we do not want to stay on, but such a term is not in our treaty with Czechs. Thus in order not to create difficulties—having in treaty and not in another— we should not like to mention term.

Soong: Since it is your intention, why no. That will help us to explain Outer Mongolia. Chiang specially asked that.

Molotov: Element of distrust toward the behavior of Soviet troops. Not in Czech treaty, thus it would embarrass us. Ask you to reconsider.

Soong: That is a very important question. With Czech it is settled. It is to us a major point. We could have another exchange of notes.

Molotov: We will think it over. But in the agreement it should not be mentioned.

Soong: We can put it somewhere else not in this agreement, but we do want some form.

Soong: Please report to Stalin. We consider this a main point. Not that we distrust, but Manchuria has been so often the cockpit of many armies. Czech had not that experience. Our public would resist.

Molotov: 2) Please again explain point 2(b) / Chinese armed forces regulars, etc. Chinese representative directs co-operation. But there are two parties in co-operation and there is one to direct. It is not in harmony with point 1 where Soviet is Commander in Chief.

Soong: We will study the wording.

Molotov: "To assist the high command in directing Chinese armed forces, etc."

Soong: It is non-military zone.

Molotov: There is contradiction— since territory is recovered, there is no Japanese forces in it.

IV. Railways

Molotov: Draft calls for amendments. if we take your draft as basis. Take your draft for railways and ours on Port Arthur and Dairen.

Soong: We will see as we go along.

Molotov: Add to your article 1: joint ownership of China and Soviet union.

Soong: Chiang said ownership of China. Stalin says joint ownership. It should be qualified: main trunk line of railway. Point 2 says that again.

Molotov: We will think over these two points.

(Reads article 2). Stalin said that Railways can't remain stripped of all necessary enterprises which always served the Railway. We do not want new ones, but old ones built by Russians should not be entirely eliminated. Depot, factories, forests allotment. We do not propose to extend installations. Cannot have no auxiliary enterprises.

Soong: Stalin said you would give list.

Molotov: O.K. will submit today.

Soong: Understanding of Chiang was without subsidiary undertakings and branch lines. This is also clear from Yalta agreement. I think you don't intend to use enterprises for other uses than for railway.

Molotov: Yes, exclusively for railway.

Soong: I will wire Chiang.

Molotov: Coal formerly was not sufficient. Therefore we suggested that Chinese government ensures supply of coal. Coal mines which we had formerly may have branch lines. Use of the branches is to be reserved.

Soong: Let us see it.

Molotov: We must have detailed agreement. Doubtful whether we can make list at of all enterprises in one or two days.

Soong: I understand.

Molotov: Therefore, we cannot accept this drafting.

Soong: We will consider.

Molotov: You say safeguard of security ensured by China. I should agree to what Stalin suggested yesterday.

Soong: I have specific instructions form Chiang. We don't want foreign armed men.

Molotov: Railway must be able to work.

Soong: We can assure safety. We are anxious ourselves.

Molotov: We want to be assured.

Soong: We attach greatest importance. Sovereignty in Manchuria would be doubtful thing if armed foreigners were there. to us it is a matter of principle. To you it is a matter of safety. We assure it.

Molotov: We will think it over.

Not clear about transportation of troops. Troops must be transported.

Soong: There is open sea.

Molotov: Is it possible to send troops to relieve troops?

Soong: In my talk of 2 July, it was understood there would be no movement of troops except in war.

Molotov: If we agree that Port Arthur is for joint use we must be able to transport certain contingents of troops.

We can agree that they will not land nowhere in Manchuria.

Soong: Stalin agreed to joint use on 2 July.

Molotov: Yes, but there will be Soviet forces in Port Arthur. We cannot send always by air or sea.

Soong: Read minutes of 2 July.

Molotov: Stalin did not have this in mind. We return to this next time.

Soong: I am in great difficulty. I have faithfully reported to Chiang who expects accuracy on my part. Stalin said we will have few troops in Port Arthur so he had Port Arthur in mind.

Molotov: We will return to this.

Re profits: should be half and half.

Soong: I think your proposal is fair. I accept.

Molotov: Item 6 very important. Should settle so as not to have cause of disputes. Propose our draft re administration of railway. Article 3 of our draft: 7 members = 4+3.

Soong: If ownership is 50-50 why should board of directors be 4 and 3.

Molotov: Yalta spoke of preeminent point of Soviet Union. We intended joint ownership you conceded us on this point. In 30 years you will get railway.

Soong: We made concession 50-50. On this point real difficulty. In 1924 there were 5+5 directors.

Molotov: There were conflicts all the time. You accepted Yalta agreement.

Soong: Preeminent in regard to other powers, not to China. You must be more fair to us.

Molotov: Even 1924 provided for majority of Soviet. Urge you to accept.

Soong: Cannot accept.

Molotov: We shall not regard the matter as settled if you don't accept our view.

Soong: I gave you telegram of Chiang yesterday where it is said administration should be Chinese. Yalta is not sacred. On Outer Mongolia it said quite a different thing. We made a sacrifice.

Molotov: We had unpleasant experiences. We renounced many rights of Czarist Government in Manchuria but we must ensure good operation of railway. Hope Soong will defend our view before Chiang.

Soong: Our draft has no redemption clause as in old agreement why to give you outlet until you have your own ports.

Molotov: We appreciate it. We must put in your draft that no foreign capital can be invested. No redemption in order not to cut off Port Arthur and Dairen.

Soong: Now I wish to say that this is extraordinary measure to operate jointly such a railway on one's territory. Poland corridor led to war with Germany. But we try with you noble experiment. We propose to do what was never done in international relations. Therefore we must be fair.

Otherwise there will be trouble. Our proposal is fair, taking into consideration that railway runs through China, that Russian lease has elapsed. I cannot recommend to Chiang, because his instructions are clear, he will turn down.

Molotov: On this point we cannot accept other proposals, that's why we stated it so clearly in Yalta agreement.

(He reads Yalta agreement).

We violated this by accepting joint ownership. We cannot go beyond this.

Soong: I will report to Chiang. I cannot share Molotov's view but will report. Yalta provides full sovereignty. But if commonly owned railway is dominated by foreigners there is no sovereignty.

Molotov: That's only an economic matter.

Soong: Sometimes difficult to distinguish between economics and political matter. Ask Molotov to report to Stalin also.

Molotov: Other points to be considered by our representatives. 30 years minimum Stalin said.

Soong: I wired already to Chiang.

V. Dairen

Molotov: Chinese draft not so detailed as Soviet draft. Let us take Soviet draft.

Article 1: Joint use of Port Arthur and Dairen. Is it acceptable?

Soong: Dairen will be commercial port, internationalized. How can it be so it is in a military zone? That does not make it a free port.

Molotov: There will be Chinese administration, except for Port Arthur and Dairen.

Soong: But you will have troops.

Molotov: In certain places only.

Soong: Dairen cannot be administered by Soviet military forces.

Molotov: No, we said so in our draft.

Soong: Why should we use Dairen as naval base since we have Port Arthur.

Molotov: There is only on 'bay' reserved. It was so formerly.

Soong: We want Dairen to be a great commercial base without naval base. We look to be only commercial (asks for Yalta formula).

Molotov: Will send you today. Chinese sailors would also be in favour for technical reasons. It does not impede trade.

Article 7 of our draft is not in yours about municipal council.

Soong: Your article makes Dairen a Soviet port. You talk about full sovereignty of China but you propose chief port to be Soviet port.

According to telegram of Chiang, Dairen should be under Chinese administration. No military matters are involved. Sovereignty of China would be respected by giving it to China.

Molotov: Yalta agreement reads: "preeminent interests of Soviet, etc." We departed already from Yalta by renouncing the lease of Port Arthur.

Soong: Explains why he cannot accept. Must ask for new instructions.

VI. Port Arthur

Molotov: Reads Soviet article 3.

Soong: We drafted according to instructions of Chiang. No omissions if we take his point of view.

Molotov: We dropped lease to meet Chiang.

Soong: If it was a lease what would be the difference [ILLEGIBLE].

Molotov: Then we would be free to do what we like without negotiating with China.

Soong: Why should Port Arthur be administered by Soviet?

Molotov: It's a military port.

Soong: It seems to me there is no difference between lease and now. Chinese navy could also use Port Arthur under Czarist lease. Under Japan we could also use it. Glad to clarify my 'mind' about Soviet views. Will telegraph.

Molotov: What would you like to have.

Soong: Administration of Port Arthur and Dairen should be Chinese. You want it to be Soviet. It's a great deal of difference.

Molotov: How can it be otherwise in military port?

Soong: Dairen also?

Molotov: No, there is a municipality half and half.

Soong: I must ask for instructions. But time is pressing. You will leave when?

Molotov: 13th morning by plane. Can ensure maximum technical speed for telegrams. Zone civil administration is Chinese outside the ports. Key positions to be filled with agreement of Soviets. Re internal security to be safeguarded by Soviets.

Soong: As to zone Chiang distinguished Port Arthur and Dalny when he talked to Petrov. Must reserve. Any other points?

Molotov: No.

Petrov: In my conversation with Chiang we did not specify questions of zones.

Soong: I will report.

Source: Hoover Institution Archives, folder 6-9.

Contributed by David Wolff.

PARAPHRASE OF NAVY CABLE JULY 10, 1945, FROM MOSCOW

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~ AND PERSONAL FROM HARRIMAN FOR THE
PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

This morning Soong showed me the detailed notes of his talk with Stalin and Molotov last night. Substantial progress was made. Agreement appears to have been reached over Outer Mongolia. After the war the Generalissimo agrees that China will recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia, providing a plebiscite is held which favors independence. This agreement is not to be announced until after the war is over.

The above is subject to full agreement of all other questions including Soviet Union support of the National Government in unifying China.

Soong is satisfied with the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance in the form proposed by Stalin.

As to the boundaries between Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang there is a difference of opinion. This is to be left for a boundary commission to determine. Stalin, though he would not admit Soviet assistance to the insurgents in Sinkiang, agreed that it would be the Soviet Government's obligation not to support these rebel forces. Soong agreed to Stalin's suggestion that greater political recognition be given by the Chinese to the various Sinkiang racial groups.

While he would not admit giving moral and material support to the communists, Stalin categorically stated he would support only the National Government in China and that all the military forces of China must come under the control of the Government. Soong outlined the conditions the National Government was ready to grant the communists and Stalin made no adverse comment. Soong is inclined to believe that if an agreement is reached with the Soviet Union it will open the way for an understanding between the communist party and the National Government.

Chiang's counter proposals regarding the ports and railroads in Manchuria were advanced by Soong. In the discussion Stalin made only a few concessions from his previous demands. The term of agreements was reduced from 40 to 30 years. The railroads involved should be only the main lines and not

subsidiary lines. Title of the railroads might be joint Soviet and Chinese. The industries referred to in the Soviet proposal should be only the main lines and not subsidiary lines. Title of the railroads might be joint Soviet and Chinese. The industries referred to in the Soviet proposal should be only those directly connected with the operation of the railroads. Soong insisted that the railway guards should be Chinese, maintaining that the guards were soldiers and therefore if Soviet this would, in fact, be the stationing of Soviet troops in Manchuria. Stalin insisted that protection of the railroad was essential and that he could not be satisfied with Chinese guards. Finally he said "We might see after two years."

The question of whether Dairen will be included in the military zone is one of the principal differences in connection with the ports. Soong wants the military zone to be limited to Port Arthur, whereas the Russians are claiming the entire Kwantung Peninsula. Under such circumstances the port of Dairen would not be a genuinely free port as it would be dominated by the Russians.

The open questions were left for discussion between Soong and Molotov at a conference which is taking place this afternoon, July 10.

RPM

Source: W.A. Harriman Papers, Library of Congress.

FROM HARRIMAN. PERSONAL AND ~~TOP SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

Stalin received Soong for another talk tonight. Soong informed me that he has come to an understanding on all matters along the general lines previously reported except for some points as to the ports and railroads.

Generalissimo Stalin agreed, after long argument, that the guards should be Chinese and that there should be no rights to move Soviet troops in Manchuria. Any forces going to Port Arthur would be moved by sea. The final point not agreed to regarding the railroads is control of the management. Stalin still insists on a majority of the directors which Soong has resisted. Soong's offer is for joint operation with equal participation in the management and the board.

Regarding the ports, Stalin still insists that the military zone under Russian control should include Dairen as well as Port Arthur, and that there should be a naval base within Dairen. Soong offers Port Arthur and the area south of Dairen as a military zone. Dairen, however, should be a free port under Chinese management with certain storage yards and docks leased to the Soviets, for their through shipments, on a commercial basis.

It was suggested by Soong to Stalin that he return to Chungking to consult the Generalissimo over the points still at issue. Stalin, however, said it was better to come to an agreement before he met with you at Berlin as he wished to decide with you the date of his entry into the war. Another meeting has therefore been arranged for tomorrow night. Soong intends to outline in detail the maximum concessions he is authorized to make along the above lines. If no agreement is reached he will return to Chungking to consult the Generalissimo and will give me to report to you the position of the negotiations -- the points remaining at large and the matters on which agreement has been reached.

Mr. Soong asks me to tell you that he feels he has gone beyond the Yalta agreement, in order to meet Stalin's demands, in agreeing to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia after the war and has fully met any reasonable interpretation of the Yalta agreement in his proposals regarding the ports and railroads. On the other hand, Stalin has offered him satisfactory conditions for the Treaty of Friendship and the civil affairs agreement during the military period in Manchuria; also assurances that he would withhold support from the Chinese Communist Party and from the insurgents in Sinkiang.

Source: W.A. Harriman Papers, Library of Congress.

Record of Meeting Between T. Soong and Stalin

11 JULY 1945, 9.00-11.30 p.m.

Soong: I had a good talk with Molotov yesterday. He was frank. I know where we stand. There were questions he wanted to ask instructions from Stalin.

Molotov: With which draft do you want to begin?

Soong: Railway.

Molotov: We have not finished with Outer Mongolia.

Soong: We can discuss any questions, as you like.

Molotov: Let's take Outer Mongolia. You have made yourself familiar with our draft?

Soong: Yes.

Molotov: You have given us your draft. I think our draft is nearer to what was stated in conversation with Stalin. Chinese draft is more vague. What corrections you consider as necessary to our draft?

Soong: Differences between our drafts:

1. ours is a universal declaration.
2. as regards Mongols' constitution we said on both occasion that we don't recognize them. The substance is that Chinese government will not object to independence. Why do you want to embarrass us by saying that we recognize what we don't.

In 1924, Soviet Russia recognized that Outer Mongolia is integral part of China. Therefore it is equally embarrassing for Soviet. So since substance is already there why do we embarrass ourselves by recognizing.

Stalin: We can talk for two years and we shall reach nothing. Then you did not recognize, now you recognize.

Soong: We are ready to recognize.

Stalin: Reads Chinese draft— against it? against what? plebiscite?

Soong: Independence.

Stalin: Say it.

Soong: Yes.

Stalin: As regards frontiers. They should be left out. Say present frontiers. Status quo.

Soong: There is dispute about status quo.

Molotov: Question of frontiers?

Soong: If we say "Chinese Government will recognize independence."

Stalin: That will be better. Suggests will recognize. . . within her present frontiers.

Molotov: At the beginning say: no reference to Constitution— but leave rest of Soviet draft about will of Mongols for independence.

Soong: But if plebiscite the will be expressed.

Molotov: Plebiscite comes later. Why does Chinese government make statement now: because of will.

Soong: If will expressed, why should we have plebiscite.

Molotov: To check up will.

Stalin: Say if plebiscite confirms the will in favour of independence.

Soong: "Confirm the desire for independence" in our draft.

Stalin: He does not want introductory sentence?

Soong: Rather not.

Stalin: Without introduction not clear why a plebiscite is to be held.

Not motivated or give another motive: Chinese government had connections with Outer Mongolia for past 24 years and the latter enjoys in actual fact a state of national independence.

Soong: Make draft:

.

Stalin: Add: present frontier.

Soong: Don't know the frontier.

Stalin: Don't talk about frontiers.

Soong: O.K.

Stalin: In our letter we will respect independence and territorial integrity so that you don't think that we will annex (he laughs).

Soong: You don't need to, you are on such good terms.

Stalin: Term of withdrawal is offensive to us. Nowhere you ask to liberate and to withdraw within term. If France had raised similar point before Great Britain and America I don't know what would have happened— it is insulting. You better ask us how long I will remain and I'll reply two to three weeks.

Soong: I will ask you this question after capitulation.

Stalin: Two to three weeks. What circumstances can keep us longer: if Chinese requests us or Americans request, to wait, take prisoners. If China and America do not ask us to stay longer than three weeks, we start withdrawing within three weeks with exception of garrison in Port Arthur.

Soong: How long to finish withdrawal?

Stalin: Depends on capacity of railway and number of troops. We think Japan will give big battles in Manchuria. That's why we accumulate so many troops. Not more than two months.

Soong: Can you say three months?

Stalin: I don't think we need, unless unexpected things: Japs destroy lines, Kuangtong army will not obey orders. Like General Schoen(?) [sic] did not obey. Needed two weeks to defeat him. If many mines in the sea. Two months maximum for withdrawal of last man. Some will leave by sea, others by rail. We will be in a hurry ourselves. Our people are making war since four years. Americans wish us to have many troops. They don't want to land in China — they'll use all for landing in Japan. They don't foresee landing in China but in Japan.

Re you 2 (b) "direct" what you want?

Soong: Assist the high command.

Stalin: In France and Poland it was under allied command.

Molotov: "Assist in establishing co-operation."

Soong: O.K.

Molotov: Rest follows Czech agreement.

Stalin: Have you noticed: no term in Czech treaty?

Molotov: Re Chinese Eastern Railway take article by article. We have preamble in our draft. Do you accept without mention of ownership?

Soong: Yes.

Molotov: Art. 1 based on joint ownership (reads). . .

Art. 2 inalienable to anyone else

Art. 3 - joint administration

(Molotov gives me Russian draft, article 4,5,6,7).

Art. .?. - add "trunk line"

Art. 12 - add "without compensation."

Soong: On question of movement of troops I asked Stalin on July 2nd., and he said there will be no movement.

Stalin: We will have garrison in Port Arthur. Impossible to do without. Send munitions, weapons, relieve garrisons. I had in mind movement of additional troops, but minimum transport from Vladivostok. Only few troops, e.g. finish war with Japan. Troops have to be withdrawn.

Soong: Yes, but I asked for peace time.

Stalin: After capitulation of Japan there will be peace. We will have to move our troops.

Soong: I exclude period immediately after war. On 2 July, I asked question and I reported to my chief. I asked: do you intend to use railway for transportation of troops (reads minutes).

Stalin: This is transit not transfer movement.

Soong: Can you send by sea?

Stalin: Yes, it will depend how it will be more convenient.

Soong: May be more convenient to move by railway but our troops have great fear of foreign troops.

Stalin: When they remain, but not when in transit.

Soong: Even in transit.

Stalin: What shall we do with Port Arthur. We can soften but cannot exclude.

Soong: We have settled several points I wanted settle before your departure.

Stalin: We can make special agreement so as to limit. Say that in agreement. In a limited order according to the order stated in the agreement without, however, troops being disembarked in Chinese territory, with the exception of the zone of Port Arthur.

Soong: On this point and number of other points I have to ask for instructions.

Stalin: Put in an exchange of notes.

Molotov: Not publish it.

Soong: Why not by sea, it's the same thing, one will see them.

Stalin: Two, three divisions once a year. Nothing to be afraid of.

Soong: I believe Stalin. Have fullest respect but must think of our people. Chiang made concession on Outer Mongolia which I did not dare believe he would.

Stalin: Outer Mongolia was independent.

Soong: People think otherwise. You don't know our people's mentality.

Stalin: Say: war material.

Soong: O.K. accept this change: war material.

Stalin: May we send troops for first time to Port Arthur.

Soong: Yes, on one occasion.

Stalin: Say not more than 1-2 divisions in each case.

Soong: No.

Stalin: If we send in civilian.

Soong: Stalin is open, does not want subterfuge.

Stalin: This will be respect for the rights of China.

Soong: You don't need it. Port Arthur is naval base, you can go by sea.

Molotov: Use of railway must be possible.

Stalin: Let us keep war material and agree on limited number of troops, one division in each case by agreement between the two.

Soong: You want exclude all causes of trouble and friction. Therefore you wanted settle Outer Mongolia question once for all. I respect that. Easy for you to move by sea.

Stalin: O.K. War materials.

Soong: Railway guards: we want guard ourselves. We will give entire protection. We do not want any armed foreigners on Chinese soil except in Port Arthur.

Stalin: No artillery, no tanks, that are not troops.

Soong: After 1924 Chinese Eastern Railway had no Russian guards. No trouble.

Molotov: Lot of trouble.

Soong: You can be assured of our capacity to guard railway.

Stalin: Japanese will have many agents to blow up bridges.

Soong: We will so flatten Japan they will have no army.

Stalin: Germans have 100.000 underground.

Soong: Our people can take care of that.

Stalin: How to formulate. By special agreement with Soviet government?

Soong: In consultation with.

Stalin: Why not agreement?

Soong: It is clear the Chinese government will take measures.

Molotov: In consultation. Chinese government responsible for safety.

Soong: Yes.

Re directorship we propose 5 + 5.

Molotov: The board will not be able to carry on. They may be divided.

Soong: The whole thing is based on good will and understanding.

Stalin: Then chairman must have casting vote.

Soong: Who is to be chairman?

Molotov: In our draft we have Soviet chairman.

Soong: Telegram of Chiang says "all administration must be Chinese".

Stalin: This is not right.

Soong: These are my instructions: Chinese chairman and Chinese manager.

Molotov: Impossible.

Soong: When are you leaving?

Stalin: Can stay another day. Finish to-morrow or day after in day time.

Molotov: There is dinner on the evening of the 13th.

Stalin: We are leaving on the 14th.

Soong: I have suggestion. You go to Berlin. Certain things I must ask for instructions. Leave here Vice-Minister Hoo. I fly to Chungking with Petrov. Will talk Chiang personally, and will be back when Stalin returns from Berlin. On this point must talk to Chiang.

Stalin: Hardly possible. In Berlin question about Far East will be raised whether we move against Japan or not. I'll be unable to give reply before signature of treaty. There are other troops involved. We must settle before we leave for Berlin.

Soong: Today 11th. If I cable tonight, I'll get reply on 13.

Stalin: Let us wait one day more. I'll leave on 15th, will be one day late.

Molotov: List of auxiliary enterprises.

Soong: It is long. Suggest what Stalin proposed branch lines and subsidiary undertakings excluded with exception of these undertakings built during Russian administration and exclusively serving railway. We can have a commission. Naturally everything that railway needs.

Molotov: Acceptable.

Soong: Dairen. New draft. Not much difference. Dairen is the principal sea port of Manchuria. Therefore Chiang wants Chinese administration but accepts Soviet experts.

Stalin: About Port Arthur?

Soong: Chiang wants Port Arthur under Chinese administration. What Stalin said on central command is reasonable. I will recommend to Chiang to draw a line but not put Dairen in the zone. I will be bold enough to recommend to Chiang.

Nominate Chinese Vice-commandant to be appointed with your agreement.

Molotov: According to Yalta agreement, Soviet has preeminent interest in Dairen.

Soong: Our interpretation is different. Safeguard transit but not control of Dairen.

Stalin: Manager to be Russian as for Chinese Eastern Railway. We should not like to depart from Yalta.

Molotov: Chiang did not object to the basis.

Soong: We employ Soviet technicians and not other foreigners.

Molotov: Our demands are minima [sic] - protection of minimum interests.

Soong: Preeminent does not mean you'll run it. Military base I understand you'll have your command, but not for civilian port and administration.

Stalin: We need Dairen and Port Arthur for 30 years in case Japan restores its forces. We could strike at her from there. Japan will raise again like Germany. If you narrow down what can we do in the zone. Port without hinterland. We can slightly reduce the zone.

Soong: Free port must have free access, not go through zone.

Stalin: Port of Port Arthur must have hinterland and be supplemented by civilian port.

Molotov: Our demands are already modest. It will be the only harbour in warm water in Far East.

Soong: We have given you Port Arthur.

Stalin: It is a small territory. We must have shops.

Soong: This is an immense territory.

Stalin: No.

Soong: We would be foolish not to disarm fully Japan.

Stalin: Germany was also disarmed. Even if destroy all war industry, light industry must be maintained. They can be switched into war industry. Present generation is hostile to Japan. Government change, they will forget about sufferings and will make concessions.

Soong: You don't believe you can't disarm Germany?

Stalin: No, I said that in a speech. Twenty, thirty years, Germany will get back to her feet. Now less possibility but in forty years she may get on her feet again if someone helps Germany.

Soong: We did everything to meet Stalin views for Port Arthur.

Stalin: Not enough. Bottle neck can be cut off.

Soong: Must ask for instructions.

Source: Hoover Institution Archive, folder 6-9.

Contributed by David Wolff.

Memcon A. Harriman - T. Soong

TOP SECRET

Moscow

Conversation

July 12, 1945

Present: W.A. Harriman, American Ambassador.

Dr. T. V. Soong, President of the Executive Yuan and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China.

Subject: Far Eastern Conversations with Generalissimo Stalin.

Dr. Soong last night told me that in his argument last night with Stalin the latter had stated that there was great danger from the recovery of Japan just as there was from Germany, that neither Churchill nor President Roosevelt had thought there was danger of the military recovery of Germany but the he, Stalin, had convinced them that there was and an agreement had been reached to use stern measures. He mentioned particularly the necessity of taking German prisoners of war out of Germany to work in Russia. Stalin said he was not sure that the United States would appreciate the importance of making Japan militarily impotent.

In the last several talks I have had with Soong he has asked me directly for my personal opinion and advice regarding the conduct of his negotiations. In the early discussions I urged him to be more realistic in the arrangements regarding the ports and the railroads and that he would have to make further concessions than he had been authorized to propose. In the last two talks I expressed the personal opinion that he should not make further concessions since he had now met any reasonable interpretation of the Yalta Agreement. I emphasized particularly the importance of refusing to allow Russians as guards for the railroad and the use of the port of Dairen as a naval base and its inclusion in the military area. Dairen could not in fact be a free port if it was included in a Soviet military zone.

I also told Soong that I saw no reason why he should give in to Stalin in his insistence on a majority of the Board of Directors of the railroad, thus giving the Soviets complete control. Joint operation, which meant equality of authority to both sides, was all that the Yalta Agreement called for and Soviet special interest might be protected by agreement to the effect that the Chinese guaranteed that Russia's through traffic would be handled freely over the railroad.

I agreed with his position that the port of Dairen should be under Chinese management but suggested that he offer certain docks and storage areas to the Soviets on a commercial lease to be used by them for their through traffic. I had previously expressed the view that if the Russians were to have a naval base in Port Arthur they must have the right to control a military zone beginning just south of Dairen.

All of my talks with Soong have been alone. He has been unreservedly frank in discussing his problems, has translated verbatim his telegrams from the Generalissimo and has shown me English translations of the notes of his conversations with Stalin. He has shown considerable interest in my description of my different experiences and those of others in negotiating with Stalin and has been somewhat re-assured that the heat that was being put on him was not unique. I pointed out the need for reaching as specific understandings as possible and my belief that he could get more concessions on his present visit than on any subsequent occasion. On the other hand I said he should not give in to unreasonable demands going beyond the Yalta Agreement.

I expressed the opinion that President Truman would not go beyond the Yalta Agreement in urging the Generalissimo to accept. On the other hand it would be far better from both the President's standpoint and in the starting off of good relations between Chungking and the Kremlin to have the agreement reached on a bilateral basis. Therefore, if he wished to make the concessions to Stalin in return for other assurances on Stalin's part I urged him to do so. This related, however, to the recognition of Outer Mongolia's independence. I have constantly told Soong that the United States wanted to be sure that there was nothing agreed to which would give special privileges to Russia in Manchuria, resulting in a blackout. In other words, we wanted to be satisfied that all nations could have normal commercial relations with Manchuria in the same way as in other parts of China.

WAH/rpm/hnw

Source: W.A. Harriman Papers, Library of Congress.

Record of Meeting Between T. Soong and Stalin

12 July 1945, 12.00 - 12.45 a.m.

Soong: Last night when I returned I received a long telegram from Chiang. Of course it was not reply to my telegram of yesterday. But contained several points. Afraid hardly satisfactory to Stalin.

I. Railways. Chiang's idea, Chairman should be Chinese. No casting vote. Only courtesy to China. Chinese chairmanship.

Manager. Russian Manager for Chinese Eastern Railway, Chinese Assistant.

South Manchurian Railway: Chinese Manager, Soviet Assistant Manager.

Chiang agrees to 30 years.

Generally agrees along lines agreed upon by us.

II. Dairen. Free port under Chinese administration with Soviet technical experts. Certain warehouses and storages on long lease to Soviets as commercial lease for thirty years. That will give Soviet control over its efficiency.

III. Port Arthur. During period of alliance used jointly by Chinese and soviet as to military control. China would "entrust it" to Soviet so as to avoid term lease.

Civil administration should be Chinese. For joint use by China and Soviet Union Chiang proposes establish Sino-Soviet military commission to arrange for joint use. This is only presentation, frankly. Area of Port Arthur does not include Dairen or railway running to Dairen to make Dairen entire free port with free access to land.

Civilian administrators: there was a sentence in Soviet draft: men appointed only on agreement of soviet command. Because sovereignty of China is concerned Chiang finds difficult to agree.

Since Dairen-Port Arthur railway for 30 years Chiang proposes alliance also 30 years.

I came today as we have agreed on a number of points:

- 1) Outer Mongolia
- 2) Treaty of alliance
- 3) Chinese representative with Soviet army
- 4) Views of Stalin on Chiang problems (sin-kiang, internal problems: communist, no question. Stalin wants China's absolute sovereignty in Manchuria)
- 5) Railways: only question of management left
- 6) Dairen: question of administration
- 7) Port Arthur: question of area

These questions I telegraphed early this morning. But at the same time I received this one, so Chiang views cannot be very much different. I therefore want make suggestion. Best way to make quick trip home with Ambassador Petrov. Two days flying. Want present all facts to Chiang and have one or two personal talks to present entire picture. Realize Stalin anxious have settlement before Berlin but when he arrives in Berlin I'll be in Chungking - with help of Petrov can communicate easily...

Molotov: This is not convenient.

Stalin: Good.

Soong: Could appoint someone to narrow down controversial points.

Stalin: Accept thirty years for treaty, rest not acceptable. What can people with less authority settle.

Soong: Not controversial matter but points already settled.

Stalin: You are anxious avoid impression of break in negotiation.

Soong: Yes.

Stalin: It is possible.

Soong: Ask Vice-Minister and Ambassador Fu to remain.

Molotov: We will also appoint.

Stalin: When do you leave?

Soong: As soon as possible since you want reply as soon as possible.

Molotov: How about a communique.

Soong: Yes.

Stalin: On general lines.

Molotov: When will you come back?

Soong: Before you return to Berlin.

(Lossovski shows map)

Stalin: Miao dow li dow (?) [sic] islands to be neutralized. They belong to neutral zone.

Molotov: Make protocol - suggests draft.

.(Pavlov translates)

Soong: Leave morning 14th. How long do you remain in Berlin?

Stalin: Not later than end of July. 8 - 11 days usually. We will let you know when we come back to Moscow.

Stalin: Don't publish anything in press - our press will remain silent.

We know SUNFO communicates everything to representative of YENAN contents of your telegrams. Very bad.

Soong: I can assure my people will be silent. I will speak only to Chiang.

Stalin: Nothing should leak out from Chinese government.

Soong: We will see to that.

Stalin: Our press will be silent.

Soong: Special effort that everybody remains silent including our press.

Stalin: What will contain communique?

Molotov: Conversations, improvement of relations, negotiations will

continue, mutual understanding and friendship.

Soong: Is it O.K. if Chinese press says that V. Hoo and Liu remain.

Stalin: Yes, if it is convenient for you.

Soong: We have general understanding of what each press has to do.

Molotov: Still something remains to do.

Soong: Sorry, difficult to express in telegrams.

Stalin: Suggest a formula: the negotiations in view of the departure of Stalin and Molotov have to be postponed.

Soong: Fine. Could Petrov go with me?

Stalin: Yes.

Soong: Thanks for absolute frankness. Leave with impression Stalin is most sincere in desiring to be in friendly relations with National Government for which he and Chiang are very grateful.

Stalin: I also thank you for your sincerity and for sentiments you just expressed. Our people in Russia do not want break up China as formerly between Russia and China. Want China prospering and powerful State. Not all Chinese believe in what I say. Time will come when they see facts and will believe.

Soong: I believe.

Source: Hoover Institution Archives, folder 6-9.

Contributed by David Wolff.

PARAPHRASE OF NAVY CABLE JULY 13, 1945, FROM MOSCOW

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~ AND PERSONAL FROM HARRIMAN TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Last night Soong saw Stalin and Molotov again and outlined the maximum concessions he was authorized to make along the lines of my message sent the evening of July 11.

With reference to the management of the railroads he proposed equal numbers of directors with the Chinese to have the Chairman without administrative authority as a courtesy to China; the manager of the South Manchurian to be Chinese and the assistant manager Russian; the manager of the Chinese Eastern to be Russian and the assistant manager Chinese. He proposed that the port of Dairen should be a free port under Chinese management, but offered the Soviets docks and storage areas under commercial lease for their through traffic. He explained that for obvious reasons he could not agree to the port of Dairen or the connecting railroad being in a Soviet military zone or being used as a Soviet naval base. Soong offered Port Arthur as a naval base for joint use but under Soviet control. There does not appear to be any difference regarding Port Arthur but Stalin told Soong that his proposals regarding the port of Dairen and the railroads were unsatisfactory. Stalin did not offer any further concessions in his demands for the control of the railroads and for the inclusion of Dairen in the military zone substantially under Soviet control.

Soong then said that he felt he should return to Chungking to consult with Chiang, but would be prepared to come to Moscow again at any time Stalin wished. The meeting parted, according to Soong, in a friendly atmosphere and he expressed satisfaction with the frankness of discussion and the confidence that he had gained in the friendly attitude of the Soviet Government towards his own government.

According to Soong he did not press Stalin further on any points as he was anxious to leave the subject open in order to obtain your views. He hopes you will be able to get Stalin to accept the Chinese position at the forthcoming conference or that you will be able to work out a compromise which Chiang can accept. He did not, however, say this to Stalin.

Source: W.A. Harriman Papers, Library of Congress.

Memorandum of Conversation between W.A. Harriman and Stalin

Conversation

Moscow, August 8, 1945.

TOP SECRET

Present: W. A. Harriman, American Ambassador
George F. Kennan, Minister Counselor

Generalissimus Stalin
V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs
Mr. Pavlov, Soviet Interpreter

Subject: Russian-Chinese Agreement.

The Ambassador began the conversation by stating that the President had asked him to come to see the Generalissimus and to discuss a certain matter relating to the Yalta Agreement. The President was anxious that it should be made clear to the American public, in connection with the agreements which the Russians and Chinese were now negotiating concerning the use of ports and railroads of Manchuria, that there would be no departure either by the Russians or the Chinese from the open-door policy in that area. He pointed out that the Generalissimus had repeatedly expressed his support of the open-door policy in previous conversations and voiced the President's hope that the Generalissimus would consent to put this in writing, to be published at the same time as the Chinese-Russian agreements.

The Generalissimus replied, "This shall be done".

The Ambassador then handed Generalissimus Stalin the text, in Russian translation, of the proposed communication from the Soviet and Chinese Governments to the United States Government. The Generalissimus looked it over and said that it would be satisfactory except for the last sentence of the first paragraph. He pointed out that in the Crimea agreement there had been a reference to Russia's preeminent position. That meant a preferential position in the administration of the port. They consider that there should be in Dairen a municipal administration headed by a Chinese-Soviet council of five members each, the chairman of which should be a Chinese, but that the manager of the port should be a Russian, who would be subordinate to the municipal administration. That was how they interpreted the term "preeminent". It did not apply to trade. He did not think it ran counter to the open-door policy. It was only a question of the relations between Russians and Chinese in the administration of the city and port.

The Ambassador said that he had a message from the President on this subject. The President had every intention of supporting the Yalta agreement. As the Generalissimus was aware, the President had talked to Soong in Washington, and Hurley had talked with Generalissimo Chiang. The President felt that Soong's proposals met the Yalta agreement and hoped that the Generalissimus would not press Soong further for concessions. The Ambassador believed that what President Roosevelt had had in mind when he spoke of Russia's preeminent position was full protection of Russian transit traffic across Manchuria to the warm water ports. The President's thinking had not gone beyond this.

The Generalissimus stated that they too did not go beyond that. He felt that they had been generous enough with the Chinese. Both the railroad and the port had been built by Russians with Russian funds. Nevertheless they had now agreed to its joint use and possession. In tsarist days there had been Russian railroad guards. They had now renounced this privilege, although they had strong doubts as to the ability of the Chinese to guard the railroad effectively. In the old days there had been no Chinese in the administration of the railroad. Now they were meeting the Chinese half way in this respect. But he had believed the Chinese regarded the Russians as unwelcome and undesirable guests - that they wanted the Russians to be put into a position where they could not operate.

The Ambassador said that it had long been American policy to acknowledge the full sovereignty of China in her own territory and to allow China to work out her own destiny and to support herself economically. Neither President Roosevelt nor President Truman had wanted to see a step backwards in this respect. He hoped the matter would be worked out which would give the Chinese sovereignty and control.

The Generalissimus said they were in favor of this. They had no objection to Chinese sovereignty and control. After all, they were returning Manchuria to the Chinese.

The Ambassador asked why they wanted to insist on taking charge of operations in the port as long as long as they had guarantees about their traffic.

The Generalissimus said that someone had to be master there. The Russians had built the port. The place had to be kept in order.

The Ambassador pointed out that Soong had been prepared to give the Russians a commercial lease on docks, warehouses, etc. in the port area, but that this would not affect the administration of the port.

The Generalissimus said that he couldn't make out exactly what Soong had suggested. Soong had talked a lot and wasted a lot of time making notes but they had not understood exactly what he was proposing. They had asked him to put his proposals in writing but he had not yet done so.

Mr. Molotov said that they had just received part of what Soong had promised to send.

The Generalissimus said that they had put their own proposals to Soong in writing, both in Russian and English. From Soong they had only words.

The Ambassador replied that he was in the same position, and that he had no information on these matters except from cables he had received and what Soong had told him. The President hoped, however, that no final agreement would be concluded with Soong except in consultation with us. He recalled that at Stalin's request President Roosevelt had agreed to take the initiative in this matter.

The Generalissimus replied that the Russians had nothing to hide.

The Ambassador said that President Truman had accepted Soong's general proposals. If the Russians and the Chinese went beyond them, he would like to be informed.

The Generalissimus said he had no objection to President Truman's intervening in this matter, but he felt that the President should listen to the Russians as well and not only to the Chinese.

The Ambassador recalled that the President had intervened only in pursuance to a request made by Stalin himself and had exerted his influence on Soong. He asked whether he might understand that when the Generalissimus learned the exact nature of Soong's proposals he would let us know how they struck him. In the case of Port Arthur, the President felt it to be in our mutual defense interests of the Soviet Union and China for the Russians to have the use as a Naval base. But Dairen, he felt, should be a free port outside the military zone, with the reservation that Soviet transit traffic should be fully protected.

The Generalissimus replied that Dairen could not be outside the military zone. A different regime from Port Arthur might be established there; but the place had to be protected. The Japanese would have agents and saboteurs there; the Chinese could not cope with this problem. According to all the old treaties and maps, Dairen was par to the military zone. Yet now attempts were being made to exclude it. Why, he asked, did the Chinese regard them as fools? After all, Dairen was near Port Arthur.

The Ambassador said the Generalissimus would recall that President Roosevelt did not agree to the lease to the Russians of the port of Dairen. He thought it should be a free port and not part of the military zone.

The Generalissimus said nothing had been said to the effect that it should not be included in the military zone. They intended to have no Naval vessels there, no coastal defenses, etc. but they could not permit Japanese agents to wander about in the rear of their troops.

The Ambassador said that President Truman's interpretation was that he had outlined.

The Generalissimus said the Chinese had agreed that the whole peninsula should be a military zone.

The Ambassador said he understood the Chinese were proposing that Dairen be excluded.

The Generalissimus said, "That's what they say now".

The Ambassador pointed out that the Russians had originally suggested that there be a joint lease for the two ports which had not been agreed to. We interpreted it differently. They might have coastal defenses around the city, in any way they and the Chinese might like. But the port could not be military.

The Generalissimus reiterated that there would be no Naval ships there but that they would need a security zone around the port. It was wrong to think they would be free from danger but they would set up a different regime there than in Port Arthur. How, he asked, could the

Chinese operate the port unless there were a master? Therefore there would have to be a Russian Captain of the Port.

The Ambassador asked whether the municipality would be excluded from the military zone under their proposals.

The Generalissimus explained that there would be a district with a non-military regime, but that matters of security would be decided by the military authorities. This would not affect freedom of trade.

Mr. Molotov said that the Chinese had agreed to everything but one point: namely, who was to be the captain of the port, a Chinese or a Russian. This question was one of internal security, of police security. In the zone to be set up as a hinterland, Chinese administration would likewise control, but security would be a matter for the Russians. As regards Dairen, the question was who would be the chief of the port.

The Ambassador said the President hoped that the port would be under Chinese jurisdiction with certain areas set aside for Soviet transit traffic.

The Generalissimus said that the municipal administration would be Chinese just as it would be in the interior zone north of Port Arthur.

The Ambassador reiterated the President's hope that the open-door policy would be observed.

The Generalissimus said that it would be, but that it was impossible that the Russians should not play a role there. This would be counter to the Crimea Agreement.

The Ambassador said perhaps when the Chinese had submitted written proposals it would be easier for us to come to a meeting of the minds on this matter.

The Generalissimus replied, "Perhaps it will".

The Ambassador asked whether he might tell the President that the Generalissimus would keep the President informed of Soong's proposals and his reactions.

The Generalissimus said he would not only keep the President informed but he would be glad to give the Ambassador full information.

The Ambassador said that he would be glad to see the proposals and would of course report them at once to the President. Perhaps meanwhile the Generalissimus would give further thought to this matter.

The Generalissimus, pointing to our proposed text, said it was all very well but that there could be no assurance of non-preferential treatment, that after all they had preeminent interests.

The Generalissimus then produced a map showing the Kwantung Peninsula, pointed out that in tsarist times there had been not only a Russian military zone embracing the whole peninsula but also beyond it a neutral zone in which neither side could station forces. He pointed out that the Russians were now renouncing the neutral zone and using a

slightly smaller territory for military zone. Dairen, he insisted, should be run in cooperation between the Chinese and the Russians.

The Ambassador asked whether it would be necessary for people to have military permits to pass through the port and over the railroad.

The Generalissimus said no.

The Ambassador said we had envisaged that the town and railroad would be excluded from the military zone.

The Generalissimus said that as long as there were no hostilities in the vicinity no troops would be stationed there. He said that the Russians were taking a long view of this matter. They wanted these ports for only 30 years during which time they hoped to develop their own ports on the Pacific. At the present time, the Japanese might be defeated; but he could not tell what the situation would be ten years hence. The Japanese were stubborn, tenacious people. Russia had to guard her own security. She could therefore not be excluded from the administration of Dairen.

The Ambassador asked whether, under the arrangements envisaged by the Russians, freight and passengers of all friendly countries would be able to move freely through the port.

The Generalissimus replied, "Undoubtedly."

The Ambassador said that then the question was who should run the port.

The Generalissimus repeated that the Russians wanted a control organ consisting of five members, of whom the chairman would be a Chinese, but that the chief of the port, to be subordinated to the control organ, should be a Russian.

In conclusion the Generalissimus asked the Ambassador to tell the President that they were doing everything in their power to strengthen the sovereignty of China. They would consider it dishonorable to do otherwise. Furthermore they would guarantee full freedom of trade. No obstacles would be placed in its path. The principle of the open-door would rule. All this he could assure us, as far as the Russians were concerned. As for the Chinese, they did not know. That was not matter of theirs. But they would do everything in their power to see that the open-door policy was followed by their own authorities.

The Ambassador asked whether this applied to the railroad as well.

The Generalissimus replied yes, their use would also be free.

GFK/aj

Source: W.A. Harriman Papers, Library of Congress.

Memorandum of Conversation between W.A. Harriman and Stalin

Conversation.

Moscow, August 8, 1945.

Top Secret

Present: W.A. Harriman, American Ambassador
George F. Kennan, Minister Counselor

Generalissimus Stalin
V.M. Molotov, People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Pavlov, Soviet Interpreter

Subject: Far Eastern War and General Situation

The Ambassador began the conversation by expressing his gratification at the fact that we were once again allies. He then asked the Generalissimus what news he had of Soviet military action in the East.

The Generalissimus replied that Soviet troops has crossed the frontier both in the east and the west and had not met very strong resistance on either frontier. Soviet aircraft had bombed Changchun and Harbin by darkness. Soviet forces in the east had attacked in the neighborhood of Gradekovo, where the railroad from Vladivostok crosses the frontier. Another column was striking south from the Soviet border toward Hailan. A third column was moving east through the mountain pass from Chahan in the vicinity of Solunshan. The cavalry force was moving from south of Ulanbator across the Gobi desert to the Mukden region. Thus far only advanced troops had crossed the frontier but at the moment of our conversation the main forces were beginning to follow them. The Japs appeared to be taken unawares. The Soviet forces in the region between Khabarovsk and Blagoveshchensk were not attacking yet, the idea being to wait until the attacks of the center of Manchuria had caused the Japanese to weaken their defenses on that sector, at which time these forces would also attack. There had also been no attempt to attack on the Sakhalin border, but this would be done later. The immediate objectives were Harbin and Changchun.

The Ambassador remarked that the Generalissimus had told him a year ago that he thought things would go fairly fast once Russia entered the war.

The Generalissimus said that if things went fast now it would not be due only to Russia's entry. Things were going much better in general than he had anticipated. They had not known what successes our Navy would have in the Pacific. Who would have thought, he asked, that things would have progressed so far by this time?

The Ambassador asked what he thought of the effects of the news of the atomic bomb would have on the Japanese.

The Generalissimus replied that he thought the Japanese were at present looking for a pretext to replace the present government with one which would be qualified to undertake a surrender. The atomic bomb might give them this pretext.

The Ambassador observed that it was a good thing we had invented this and not the Germans. For long, he said, no one had dared think it would be a success. It was only a few days before the President had told Stalin about it in Berlin that we had learned definitely that it would work successfully.

The Generalissimus replied that Soviet scientists said that it was a very difficult problem to work out.

The Ambassador said that if the Allies could keep it and apply it for peaceful purposes it would be a great thing.

The Generalissimus agreed and said that would mean the end of war and aggressors. But the secret would have to be well kept.

The Ambassador said that it could have great importance for peaceful purposes.

The Generalissimus replied, "unquestionably". He added that Soviet scientists had also tried to do it but had not succeeded. They had found one laboratory in Germany where the Germans had evidently been working on the same problem but the Russians could not find that they had come to any results. If they had found it, Hitler would never have surrendered. England, too, had gotten nowhere with these researches although they had excellent physicists.

The Ambassador explained that the English had pooled their knowledge with us since 1941. But it had taken enormous installations to conduct the experiments and to achieve final results.

The Generalissimus remarked that this had been very expensive.

The Ambassador agreed and said that it had cost over two billion dollars. Churchill deserved much of the credit for encouraging the development.

Stalin said that Churchill was a great innovator, persistent and courageous. He too had pushed the development of the tank at one time.

The Ambassador remarked that he had seen Churchill in London. Churchill had said he had lived a lifetime in one week. He was now full of vigor and god cheer, busily preparing to take up his role as leader of the opposition. He had said he missed only one thing, being out of office. He had been accustomed, upon waking up in the morning, to press buttons and give directions which would set important matters in motion. He could not get used to not being able to do this.

Stalin commented that Churchill could not be afraid of Attlee.

The Ambassador replied that Churchill was not afraid of anyone.

GFK/aj

Source: W.A. Harriman Papers, Library of Congress.

Record of Meeting Between T. Soong and Stalin

10 August, 1945 9.00 - 11.30 p.m.

Stalin: The Japanese want to capitulate.

Soong: Thanks to you.

Stalin: Thanks to all. They want to keep their emperor.

Soong: Do you like him?

Stalin: Now we must wait. Now it is conditional and we want unconditional.

They want their emperor.

Soong: Face saving.

Stalin: Perhaps yes. They got what they deserved. Tojo remains.

Soong: Good many of them will make hara-kiri.

Stalin: It was in the past.

Soong: Expects Tojo to commit it.

Stalin: Tojo will not. He catches butterflies.

Soong: We can leave him at that.

Stalin: You're too easy going. Are we going to sign the treaties?

Soong: We are anxious to sign them before Japanese capitulate. Easier to present to our people.

Stalin: We cannot accept excluding Dairen from military zone. Nothing in nature of military arrangements now necessary. But in 15 years we cannot sign treaty when time comes. We must sign treaty to foresee what may happen.

Cannot exclude Dairen from military zone.

Ready to establish zone inside Dairen and from 2 or 3 kilometers outside which will not be under military control in peace time. As regards

railroad cannot be excluded from zone.

Traffic will be free, no inspection, nor obstacles.

This question must be decided otherwise nothing will come out.

As to two railways administration can be combined in one railway and then we can accept your status: Parity, Chinese Chairman, Manager Russian. If we settle these questions things will move forward. Re port installations, lease of land but not of installation. Installation should be joint property like railroad. Security: certain requirements of military command to be taken into account. Re islands, not to be armed without mutual agreement. We can drop. Not pressing. The declaration connected with treaty of friendship we have certain amendments. Re Mongolia ready to leave out "and in future". Re frontiers Chinese map is not well founded. Existing frontiers should be recognized. If these questions are cleared up, things will proceed forward quickly. I suggest following procedure: take Chinese drafts and go point by point.

Soong: Please.

Stalin: Molotov will take care. If there are big important questions I can come. I am very busy.

Molotov: We've got to reach agreement.

Soong: Anxious to agree before surrender. After we will have more difficulties with our people. Eight years of war. People will say why do you make such concessions.

Stalin: People will understand and will like and alliance with USSR.

Soong: Yes, but we have made many concessions, Outer Mongolia, etc.

Stalin: Outer Mongolia was lost any way - declared war on Japan.

Soong: Almost one half of China.

Stalin: It is a desert.

Soong: Does not look so on map.

Stalin: Smallest piece of land of Kwantung is twenty times more valuable.

Soong: Schoolchildren look at map and see size of Outer Mongolia.

Wang: May I be allowed to make a plea to Stalin re Dairen. When I departed from Chungking to Moscow General Chiang wanted me to state this case to Stalin. Port of Dairen is similar in nature to port of Kowloon. We have been contemplating that after war we will get back Kowloon, perhaps Hong Kong. Therefore we have been so anxious preserve administrative power of Dairen. If not it will be difficult if not impossible to get back Kowloon and Hong Kong.

Stalin: British consider Hong Kong as theirs. Dairen in 30 years, will be Chinese.

Wang: Kowloon also leased to Britain. Important to South China as Dairen for Manchuria. Chiang asks Stalin to give sympathetic consideration to this. We are struggling for emancipation of China.

Stalin: I do not want China to renounce Dairen. What am I called upon to do to satisfy you?

Wang: Let Dairen to be under Chinese administration, we will use soviet experts. If you accept this we can easier get back Kowloon.

Stalin: We cannot exclude Dairen from military zone. In case of war we would have to interfere. Chinese will want us to interfere. War may come in 10, 15, 20 years. Right to interfere should be reserved to Russia in case of war. We shall have no troops, no warships, no coastal artillery the port: Russian. His assistant, Chinese. Let us state in treaty that Russians will have no troops in Dairen and that in case of war Russia will defend Dairen.

Wang: In time of war Dairen will be subject to military control?

Stalin: Yes, as it is in military zone.

Wang: In time of peace, administration should be entirely Chinese?

Stalin: With exception of Chief of port.

Wang: We don't consider any municipal council. Foreign representation on Council. In Kowloon, Shanghai, same question will arise. Russian representatives will give Russian character.

Stalin: All right. Will give thought to this.

Wang: Have strict instructions on this.

Stalin: We will return to this later. After consulting Molotov we can agree that administration, like for zone, will be entirely Chinese.

Soong: Next question railroad. We want to have Chinese manager of South Manchurian Railway, assistant will be Soviet. Chinese Eastern Railway manager, Soviet, assistant Chinese.

Stalin: Cannot accept. The two railways should have two Russian managers. Otherwise confusion. You do not lose anything by agreeing.

Soong: In some countries many railways have different managers.

Stalin: If private railways. Here it is a state property.

Soong: Ask Stalin to be fair and have two managers as we suggest.

Stalin: Difficult. Conflicts may arise. Source of friction. If Russian unsatisfactory we appoint another one. He will be under control. Chairman is Chinese. Do you think we shall not take into account Chinese interests?

Wang: We want entire parity: two boards of directors with two managers. Chairman Chinese, then manager Soviet.

Molotov: This could create administrative difficulties.

Lossovski: Japanese have now one railway.

Wang: Before Mukden incident there were two railways until Chinese Eastern Railway sold to Japan. I made personnel suggestion without having consulted my colleagues.

Stalin: We prefer Russian manager for both railways and Chinese chairman.

Wang: If basis is absolute equality easier to convince our people.

Stalin: Railroad was built by Russians. Inequality is with regard to us.

Wang: People have different opinions.

Stalin: Question of subsidiary undertakings and branches serving railroad, built by C.E.R. and South Manchurian Railway. They should be left to railroads. But if locomotive shops for instance were built by South Manchurian Railway, are they excluded?

Soong: Enterprises built by Russians and directly serving railway.

Stalin: Only those branches and enterprises built by Russians on Chinese Eastern Railway and serving railways. We do not claim branches not built by Russians.

Soong: Even for Chinese Eastern Railway the branches were not included.

Stalin: They serve railway. It's in the interest of Chinese that they form part of railway as it is partly Chinese and will revert to China in thirty years.

Soong: We agreed in undertakings built in Russian time, we did not agree on branches.

Stalin: Short branches - serve only railway not those built by Russians for other purposes but what serves railroad.

Soong: Only for Chinese Eastern Railway and not for South Manchurian Railway.

Stalin: Yes, we do not insist for South Manchurian as regards branches not built by Russians.

Molotov: More explicitly state responsibility of China to supply coal and fuel, and that lines and profits be equally divided.

Soong: We already agreed to that.

Stalin: We insist very much that manager Russian for both railroads.

Molotov: Rest easy to agree.

Stalin: Re declaration as part of treaty of friendship, paragraph 1 - in accordance with spirit, etc., Soviet Government agree to render to China any moral support . . . to go entirely to National Government as the

Central Government, change after which the Soviet Government is convinced will realize national unity and democratization of China.

(He reads the two concluding lines).

Wang: We can make modification, but your formula is not suitable. We will think of a formula agreeable to us both.

Stalin: Paragraph 3: we suggest different language. As for the recent development in Sin-kiang the Soviet Government confirms that it has not had and, as stated in article 5 of the Treaty of Alliance and Friendship, has not the intention of interfering in the internal affairs of China. In paragraph 2, delete "solemnly" in Chinese text - it is not in English text.

Soong: Suggests add "and will prevent" etc.

Stalin: Not necessary. One cannot repeat all the time that one is honest. I could also think out innumerable declarations and assurances.

Wang: We can accept your formula without additions. Our government would like to have co-operation in case of necessity if there are troubles.

Stalin: This is a matter for China. Sin-kiang is Chinese. You can do what you like there, like we in our territory.

Wang: Re paragraph 1. If we have no better formula to replace yours let us drop our last line and your formula as well.

Stalin: You do not wish to democratize China?

Soong: For same reasons as you said we do not want to be obtrusive.

Stalin: If you continue to beat communists are we expected to support Chinese government? We do not interfere, but hard for us to support morally when you fight communists.

Wang: It seems internal matter is made subject of international agreement.

Molotov: Suggest: "To China which thrives to complete national unity and further democratization".

Soong: Prefer leave it as it is.

Stalin: Why are you against "democratization".

Soong: Deeds matter, not words.

Stalin: Say democratization in deeds! O.K. You see how many concessions we make. Chinese communists will curse us.

Soong: We do not want civil war.

Stalin: You wanted recently.

Soong: No, no. We are not so silly to start trouble. It's the communists who said so. They don't want us to be in good relations, to sign treaty with USSR.

Stalin: If it were true it would be sad and unintelligible.

Wang: They don't want you to support us.

Stalin: Re withdrawal I did not state that within 3 months. I said that 3 months as a maximum would be sufficient for completion of withdrawal.

Soong: I accept.

Stalin: Is that an agreement?

Soong: Agreed minutes to be signed

(Stalin laughs)

Soong: Stalin said if Chiang writes a letter I will write reply. If he prefers letter, it can be letter.

Stalin: Please. If Chiang asks me I shall reply. Since you ask me I'll reply. The 'minutes' is correct. I accept it.

Wang: What about the frontiers of Outer Mongolia?

Stalin: Leave the existing ones.

Wang: You want to avoid frictions?

Stalin: Yes.

Wang: Frontiers of Outer Mongolia have been chief cause of friction. We don't want any advantage, therefore we brought an atlas used in all colleges in China. It is regarded as authoritative. We are asked to recognize independence of Outer Mongolia. We must tell our people what

territory we are to recognize. We must have fairly general settlement. We do not want deceive or draw undue advantage. Frontiers in this map correspond with Soviet maps we have.

Stalin: Frontiers existing for 26 years is established without any disputes with China. Our topographers went there and drew on map a line which separated Chinese and Mongolian guards. That's west and south. Re east there were disputes with Japanese. Then there was an agreement concluded. If we re-examine, it will take time, certain pieces will be taken, others given.

Your Russian map is not valid.

Molotov: It was presented by Tojo after Kalkhim (?) government.

Stalin: There were no military topographers.

Molotov: Leave existing frontiers.

Soong: We do not know your map.

Stalin: You have your guards. There are signs, marks on frontiers. No disputes have ever taken place.

Wang: There were disputes last year between Sin-kiang and Outer Mongolia.

Stalin: Not about frontiers. It was about (Ospan) Khazak leader who crossed the frontier. Mongols did not surrender him. Dispute was not about frontier.

Wang: This is a difficult matter for us. We want to remove all causes of friction. I have not consulted my colleagues. Suggest to add in our declaration that recognition will take place after Chinese and Mongol authorities agree on frontiers.

Lossovski: There are 4.400 kilometers of boundary.

Wang: Of course not accurate, but demarcate on map.

Stalin: We cannot accept that. It is denial of independence. What was agreed would be postponed for a long time. You withdraw your agreement.

Soong: We don't withdraw, we want clarity.

Stalin: Frontiers exist which you never challenged. If you look for pretext to withdraw what you have accepted better state it frankly.

Soong: No pretext. We agreed. We want to know where the line is.

Stalin: Frontier has not been challenged by you or Mongols.

Soong: We always considered Outer Mongolia as Chinese and there was no need to challenge.

Stalin: But there are Chinese guards on frontier on side of Sin-kiang.

Wang: None of us is competent on question of boundary. We brought atlas because it is considered as authoritative and used everywhere in China. If Stalin objects to my words we might postpone conclusion of our negotiations until some competent man can go to Chungking to try reach agreement on frontiers with our topographers.

Molotov: The Mongols should participate.

Stalin: Mongols would riot if their frontier is to be changed. Mongols dream to unite with Inner Mongolia. Better not to raise the question, if in addition you tell that their frontier will be cut down.

Wang: We do not want to cut, but we must know the line.

Stalin: To prevent Mongols to have dreams, recognition should be given and if they want Inner Mongolia, threaten them with war. Russia will by no means help them to extend their frontier. They can't do alone and we'll keep quiet. It's now five o'clock in Far East and our troops will continue movement.

Soong: Any resistance?

Stalin: Hailar, Manchuli. Now less. Few surrender. Less means of war and less troops than we. We are already crossing Hingan. They have not got many forces. Prisoners tell us they are going to defend Moukden, Changchun, Korea.

Soong: Your troops entered Korea?

Stalin: No, they reached the frontier.

Wang: How many divisions you think the Japanese have.

Stalin: 20-22 Japanese divisions + 35 to 40 Manchu brigades.

Soong: Manchus fought?

Stalin: First day, now surrendering. No first class weapons with Japanese.

Wang: Any Japanese aircrafts?

Stalin: Few.

Wang: If they don't surrender how long will they collapse?

Stalin: One week. Poorly armed, no fighting spirit. Seem to be afraid of Russians. Few tanks. Seems they have transported weapons to South-Shanghai.

Soong: About railway - why can't you accept Chinese manager on South Manchurian railway.

Stalin: There will be frictions between Russian and Chinese managers.

Soong: Why? There are assistant managers.

Molotov: South Manchurian Railway only to connect with Port Arthur and Dairen.

Wang: Manager will be subject to board.

Stalin: Why don't you agree?

Wang: Principle of equality. We want to train our men to leading posts.

Stalin: If you accept for Chinese Eastern Railway a Russian manager as not against principles of equality why can't you accept for South Manchurian Railway?

Soong: Fair that you have one manager, and we one manager.

Stalin: Afraid connection will not work smoothly and we have troops in Port Arthur. Frankly speaking, we are afraid at that.

Wang: South Manchurian Railway has many branches with which Chinese manager can help remove friction.

Stalin: Assistant manager will be Chinese. He can undertake connections. We are still not in agreement. I thought we could finish.

Soong: We made proposals.

Stalin: Afraid no regular communication can be maintained with Port Arthur. We can punish Russian manager, not the Chinese.

Soong: We are as anxious that connection be safeguarded. We will punish our manager too. We are anxious to work with Soviet Russia. You can count on it.

Stalin: I believe Soong but it will not be you who will run South Manchurian Railway.

Soong: When we enter into these agreements we intend to co-operate with you. Whoever runs the railway must follow our policy. Foolish for us not to do utmost to meet your needs.

Stalin: Opposed to military commission in Port Arthur. Settlements can be done between governments. Let us take point by point with Molotov tomorrow.

Soong: Military commission - only to work out joint use does not hurt your interests. We entrust you the defence of Port Arthur. It is to explain to our people.

Stalin: An agreement should be reached between governments. We shall not conceal our plans from Chinese.

Soong: This Commission will really not interfere with defence of Port Arthur.

Stalin: What functions?

Soong: Joint use, merely a word.

Stalin: Who is subordinated to commission, not clear.

Soong: We can make it clear. This is largely presentation, article 4 says defence entrusted to Soviet Government.

Wang: Chinese use of Port Arthur should not be solely under Soviet authority, but under joint authority. Soviet side alone will decide how to use port.

Stalin: That can be done by agreement of two governments.

Wang: We don't know how often questions will arise.

Stalin: If there are Chinese vessels, Chinese will command but they will have to obey orders of Russian command. Joint command is impossible like for fronts. French troops were subordinated to Chief allied commander.

Wang: Yes, in time of war.

Stalin: Same in peace time.

Soong: We agreed to that article 4.

Stalin: We have different plan than Czars for defence.

Soong: Meet to-morrow with Molotov.

Molotov: 2 p.m.

Fu: With whom is General Hsiung to meet?

Stalin: With Antonov, Chief of General Staff.

Source: Hoover Institution Archives, folders 6-9.

Contributed by David Wolff.

PARAPHRASE OF NAVY CABLE AUGUST 11, 1945, TO WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

FROM HARRIMAN, ~~TOP SECRET~~ AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

This morning Soong told me of his negotiations last night with Stalin.

Stalin insists that Dairen be within the Soviet military zone but agrees that military authority should not be exercised in time of peace over the city of Dairen including the port and connecting railways. The Soviets would assume control in time of war. This seemed acceptable to Soong. Stalin now agrees that the administration of the city of Dairen including the port should be Chinese. The Chief of the Port, however, should be Soviet reporting to the Chinese Mayor. Soong is prepared to accept this also. Stalin, however, proposed [sic] that the port facilities should be jointly owned. Soong will not agree to this but will propose that certain wharves and storage facilities should be leased to the Soviets at nominal terms. He hopes that this compromise will be accepted by Stalin.

Soong proposed, as to Outer Mongolia, that the Chinese recognize its independence after a mixed Commission had agreed upon the boundaries. Stalin rejected this and insisted that China accept "the existing frontiers". As these are vague and undefined Soong does not feel this is possible. However, he will propose that China will recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia after the plebiscite and that then a Chinese-Mongolian Commission should define the "existing boundaries". He believes Stalin will accept this counter proposal. It is interesting to note that in connection with the discussion on Outer Mongolia Stalin threatened Soong that if China did not agree the "Inner Mongolian Brothers" would join Outer Mongolia in forming a Greater Mongolian Republic. Stalin evidently feels that he is in position to speak for the Mongolian peoples.

With reference to the railroads, Stalin agreed to Soong's proposal that there be a board of directors of ten men with equal membership, with one of the Chinese as Chairman. However, he insisted that there be one Soviet Manager for both railroads with a Chinese Assistant Manager. No agreement was reached but in the last analysis I believe Soong will give in on this point if all other questions are settled.

With reference to Port Arthur, Stalin last night refused to agree to a Chinese-Soviet Commission. Soong believes, however, that he can come to some satisfactory solution which would save China's face since he recognizes that Port Arthur and the military zone must be under control of the Soviets.

A long argument took place regarding the wording of the proposed Soviet agreement to support the Chinese National Government and to withhold moral, material and military aid from dissident elements within China. Compromise language, however, was agreed upon which is not quite as clear as Soong would wish but, as it is after all a question of good faith, he feels he should accept this language.

The conversation ended with a threat by Stalin advising Soong that he had better come to an agreement quickly or "the communists will get into Manchuria".

Soong is having further negotiations with the Soviets today.

The principal stumbling blocks appear to be Stalin's demand for joint ownership of the port facilities of Dairen and for one Soviet manager for both railroads. The former Soong will not give in to whereas I believe he will concede the latter.

The opinion was expressed by Soong that our intervention in connection with Dairen had assisted him materially in obtaining concessions from Stalin's original demands.

My opinion is that our interests would be adversely affected if Soong agreed to give the Soviets joint ownership of the port facilities of Dairen, and the Yalta Agreement certainly does not envisage this. I feel that the issue over the managership of one of the two railroads is not of sufficient importance to allow the negotiations to break down.

If I could be informed urgently of your views on these developments it would be helpful.

Source: W.A. Harriman Papers, Library of Congress.

PARAPHRASE OF EMBASSY CABLE TO DEPARTMENT #2883, AUGUST 13, 1945

FROM HARRIMAN PERSONAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

SECRET

Yesterday Stalin invited General Eisenhower, General Deane and myself to stand with him, Marshal Zhukov and other high Soviet Government and military officials on Lenin's tomb to review the Physical Culture Parade. It appears that this is the first time any foreigners have been invited to review a parade in this fashion.

Some tens of thousands of young men and women from all the Soviet Republics made up the parade and was followed by colorful exhibitions of physical culture exercises and folk dances. Each exhibition ended with an expression of devotion to Stalin. One's principal reaction was the obvious enjoyment and good spirits of the participants, the size of and organization and training required for the spectacle. The performance lasted nearly five hours. Everyone in the official group stood throughout the entire performance. This included Stalin and the elderly President Kalinin.

Everyone was much interested in obtaining from General Eisenhower and myself our reactions which we gave along the lines of the above. It was interesting to note that Molotov among others explained to both General Eisenhower and myself separately the importance of the performance and the training as promoting a military spirit. The limited number of spectators allowed in the Red Square applauded enthusiastically Eisenhower's appearance and Stalin and the other officials showed great cordiality to him.

Source: W.A. Harriman Papers, Library of Congress.

Record of Meeting Between T. Soong and Stalin

13 August 1945, 12.00 a.m. to 1.30 a.m.

Soong: I sent a message to Chiang after our last meeting. Glad to tell you he has accepted Stalin's desires.

Stalin: Which?

Soong: Chiang wanted agree on boundaries first, but Stalin said it would take too much time. So Chiang accepts existing boundaries. That question is therefore excluded from questions to be settled.

(gives our draft).

Molotov: What purpose of reservation about ratification. All treaties are signed at the same time.

Soong: Is that agreeable?

Stalin: Yes.

Soong: Railroads.

Southern part of Manchuria is where most of industries are. Therefore wants manager to be Chinese for South Manchurian Railway. Stalin said that for military reasons wants both to be Soviet. How if we make condition that in case of war South Manchurian Railway manager will be Soviet.

Stalin: We have to maintain reliable communication with Port Arthur also in peace time. Cannot accept.

Soong: Make Chairman of board of directors really effective.

Chairman Chinese - 6 Chinese and 5 Russian?

Lossovski: That's new proposal.

Soong: If we drop manager can you agree to add 1 Chinese in Board. We want to make appear to people really equals.

Stalin: Two roads.

Soong: May be one.

Molotov: This will not work. Manager will be paralyzed.

Soong: Board is policy forming, manager is operational. If difficulty in policy it goes to two governments.

Stalin: Where is it said?

Soong: No, but as a practical fact.

Stalin: Equal number with Chinese chairman having casting vote.

Soong: Agreeable.

Stalin: Auditors commission. 3 each side - Russian chairman with casting vote. One or two railways?

Soong: One railway.

Stalin: Inspection Committee. Simultaneous meeting with the administration or not can be settled to-morrow with Molotov.

Soong: Another question. Goods in transit and luggage shall not pay any customs duties. We accept that for goods, we cannot for passengers' luggage.

Molotov: O.K.

Soong: These goods will have to pass customs inspection.

Molotov: We have following suggestion: "goods sent in transit in sealed cars shall not be subject to inspection".

Soong: We accepted that for military things but in every country goods are inspected.

Stalin: Accept, say military goods exempted.

Soong: O.K. Port installation in Dairen you want joint ownership. We want Chinese ownership, but we will give you facilities on lease without charge.

Molotov: We have a proposal. Accept Chinese wording re facilities but must have agreed minutes.

(gives draft).

Soong: Second paragraph may be agreement but not in writing - a gentleman's agreement.

Stalin: Will it be reported to Chinese government?

Soong: Yes.

Stalin: We do not deceive our allies. We consider that as a crime.

Soong: We shall consider it as a crime.

Stalin: Good.

Soong: Dairen we said harbour master will be appointed by mayor from Soviet citizen in consultation with manager. Soviet proposal is reversed. We would like to have it appointed by mayor, because harbour facilities are part of port - no difference as it will be Soviet citizen.

Stalin: Who will issue instructions?

Molotov: 1927 book says all installations and facilities in Dairen belong to South Manchurian Railway. Administration of port was vested in special department of South Manchurian Railway. Natural that harbour master should be subordinated to railway.

Soong: Master appointed from Soviet citizen after consultation.

Stalin: Not question of appointment. He must be in touch with and subordinated to Railway.

Wang: Harbour master appointed by mayor after consultations and work under mayor and railway.

Stalin: Cannot have two heads.

Wang: Harbour master must also have something to do with mayor.

Stalin: Why? Port will have its own life. City its own life. Port is continuation of railroad. Otherwise may be congestion of goods. Mayor in charge of city's affairs not of port. Port is periphery of railroad.

Stalin: Harbour master to be appointed by Railway in consultation with mayor.

Wang: With concurrence of mayor.

Stalin: O.K. by agreement with mayor.

Soong: Only question left. Port Arthur. Chiang wanted Chinese/Soviet Commission - Soviet Chairman with additional vote.

(Molotov shows draft)

Soong: Suggest 2 + 2 with Soviet Chairman having casting vote.

Stalin: Latter part of our draft should be put somewhere also in article 5. Beginning article 3, want 3 Russians and 2 Chinese, and Russian chairman with one vote.

Molotov: Do you accept that Port Arthur should be outside the military zone?

Soong: Would not like to exclude it.

Molotov: New draft:

civilian administration in Port Arthur.

Soong: Why not take our text which was agreed and add "in city of Port Arthur the chief officer of the civilian administration is appointed in agreement with the Sino-Soviet military commission".

Stalin: Commission has nothing to do there. It has no administrative functions.

Wang: That would be better; corresponds to principle of joint use.

Stalin: Take Kronstadt; nothing can be done without consent of military authorities.

Military authorities should be master.

Soong: O.K. In agreement with the Soviet military command appointed "by Chinese government"?

Stalin: And dismissed by agreement.

Soong: Say city of Port Arthur.

Stalin: Yes, in the city.

Soong: Stalin agreed that deputy master be Chinese.

Stalin: Certainly.

Soong (Exchange of notes - changes made)

Molotov: Finance agreement. Same as for Czechs except that we paid for Czechs in Russia which you don't have.

Wang: This is according to Czech treaty - when we came we had no idea we have [. . . . copy cut off]

Molotov: It will be a short time.

Stalin: Give currency to troops they will buy. Wherever we went, Poland, Czechoslovakia, we were given money.

Soong: Fighting for eight years. Lost richest parts. Our own army has not enough food, Americans pay everything. They give us lend-lease aid we don't give anything.

Stalin: We must buy. Russian money is not accepted. Are there American troops regular infantry?

Soong: Yes.

Stalin: Where?

Soong: Around Kunming.

Molotov: Otherwise army will take what it needs.

Stalin: We do not want to take without paying. You print your currency. Give us some.

Soong: Manchuria - Japanese currency.

Stalin: In satellite countries like Romania, we came with our own military leis which we printed ourselves. We announced rate of exchange between our leis and theirs, not to their advantage, and with that money we bought. We can't do that with ally.

Soong: Americans will land. They want some money from us but they pay us in dollars.

Stalin: You have no regular troops.

Soong: Yes we have.

Molotov: Which towns did they free in China?

Soong: Many officers attached to Chinese army.

Stalin: This is not same thing. I speak of 100 - 500,000.

Soong: I ask Stalin: be generous to poor country.

Stalin: We have been fighting five years - hard to get food supply. We got food supply the first days from Americans. If you don't help with money, we'll have to take food on receipt that Chinese government will compensate.

Molotov: You can give us Chinese currency to oust Japan currency. We have captured Labei, Solun, Heviamao beyond Hinggan. It will go quickly.

Soong: When will you get to Moukden.

Stalin: I don't know, they are beginning to resist. Don't know how long. We'll take Moukden in ten days.

Wang: What size of Soviet army in Manchuria at end of war.

Stalin: 800,000 - 1,000,000. Little less than one million. We want to encircle Japanese troops and take them prisoners if God help.

Soong: Hope you will take and force them to work.

Stalin: We will make them build Manchurian cities. They know how to work.

Soong: That looks fine.

Molotov: We could use Chinese currency. With your currency temporary military. Cannot use Soviet currency.

Soong: Will you give us some alternatives.

Stalin: We will think it over - don't know prices. Will reply to-morrow.

Soong: We have terrible inflation.

Stalin: We too . . . unpleasant.

Soong: Yours is much better - 1.500 before war.

Stalin: We will give you to-morrow.

Source: Hoover Institution Archives folders 6-9.

Contributed by David Wolff.



Cable to Harriman Concerning the Stalin-Soong Talks

WHITE

AGWAR, Washington

HOUSE-335

Re M-25354

19 August 1945

Hos __ Amb __ G-2 __

10/2012Z

AJS

19/1852Z

Timochko

~~TOP SECRET~~

7547

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

TO MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW. PERSONAL and [ILLEGIBLE] for AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

Your M-25354. Message from Generalissimo is as follows:

"Dated 16 August. I have received your message with the 'General Order No. 1'. Principally I have no objections against the contents of the order keeping in view that the Liaotung Peninsula is a composite part of Manchuria. However, I suggest to introduce the following corrections into the 'General Order No. 1':

1. To include in the region of surrender of Japanese armed forces to Soviet troops all the Kuril islands which, in accordance with the decisions of the three Powers in the Crimea, have to come into possession of the Soviet Union.

2. To include in the region of surrender of the Japanese armed forces to Soviet troops the northern part of the island Hokkaido which adjoins in the North to the La Perouse Strait which is between Karafuto and Hokkaido. The demarcation line between the northern and southern half of the Hokkaido Island should be on the line leading from the city of Kushiro on the eastern coast of the island to the city Rumoe on the western coast of the island including the named cities into the northern half of the island.

This latter proposal has a special meaning for the Russian public opinion. As it is known, the Japanese in 1919-1921 held under occupation of their troops the whole Soviet Far East. The Russian public opinion would be seriously offended if the Russian troops would not have an occupation region in some part of the Japanese proper territory.

I greatly wish that my modest suggestions as stated above would not meet any objections."

Source: W.A. Harriman Papers, Library of Congress.

Notes on Stalin's Statement from a Meeting with a Bulgarian Delegation⁷⁷

Moscow, Op.g.30, 1945

I could see from your project that you are very frightened. I can read disturbance in your voice and now you are frightened and puzzled. Nobody wanted from you the changes in the composition of the government. You have postponed the elections and with this you ended the problem. We have agreed to your postponing the elections, as it is not an important request, but as far as important changes are concerned, we shall not agree. If the British and the Americans are not pleased with something, they should appeal to the Allied Control Commission (ACC). There they will be informed that the ACC could not make decisions on such problems and will direct them to our government. We do not agree to concessions of any kind and nothing could be done without us. For more than two years the Americans have pledged to establish control over the freed countries. They proposed control especially of the Greek elections with the obvious intent to say later that the elections, carried out by the government of Vulgaris, have been free. We, however, rejected this pledge, for it will be a negative precedent for Bulgaria and Romania. We have stated: "Even though we consider the Greek government a semi-fascist one, we are against the control, because it would mean foreign intervention in the affairs of a sovereign country. As far as the concern on the Romanian government and the appeal of the King for changes of the government, we said that we support Groza government and sent them to hell. If you go this way – changing the composition of the government every time you are told to – where would you get?! You should withstand your right to solve the problem – what kind of government to have – by yourself. From this point of view the Declaration of the National Committee of the Fatherland Front for postponing the elections was not right nor well considered. It was made too domestically. It was better to say that the elections had to be postponed because of the claims of the opposition, rather than saying that you were doing this under pressure from abroad. You should have presented the argument that without opposition any kind of democratic government would be impossible.

And you shouldn't be afraid that the opposition could still be displeased by your concessions; that is what the opposition is for – to be unhappy. It is impossible to please the opposition in everything. Ask yourself whether in Britain the Conservative Party opposition was pleased when it received no more than one third of the votes in the elections? You have missed one important point in the Declaration – the restoration of the religious freedoms by the Fatherland Front. Generally speaking, the Declaration is organized too domestically – too many curses towards Petkov.⁷⁸ In a society where there are antagonistic classes an opposition should definitely exist. As Germans say, you can't please both the employers and the employees at one and the same time. Only a society without antagonistic classes, like ours, can manage without opposition. And even then, sometimes we need to form self-opposition in the form of self-criticism. Some time ago, when the problem was to provide

⁷⁷ The Bulgarian communist leaders Dimitrov and Kolarov and the Secretaries of the CC Traicho Kostov and Valko Chervenkov are present at the meeting. Kostov probably took the notes of Stalin's statement

⁷⁸ Nikola Petkov – leader of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU). Minister in the first government of the Fatherland Front (September 9, 1944 – July 31, 1945), later leader of the United Anti-communist opposition. Arrested on June 7, 1947, sentenced to death and executed on September 23, 1947.

concession to Urkwart, Lenin (who, himself was against the concession) had to form an opposition to get rid of British pressure. He was saying: "I, myself, do agree but the Buharin opposition is against." Your society is still a society with classes and it needs opposition. It would be better the opposition to be legalized so that it could be controlled, and to make it loyal, rather than to force it work underground. You have interests in having an opposition. If you work well you would be able to hold in your hands the Petkov opposition and to get use of it in various occasions. It is even better for you to have an opposition of 50-60 figures; you have to be proud in front of Bevin that you have an opposition. The opposition in your country should be like a rod; it will make you never ease off and will urge you to work.

In some parts of your project you confess that sometimes the opposition is right. Certain dissatisfaction among the masses could sometimes be seen better by the opposition rather than by those who are in power. Look at how Churchill was misled in his expectations of the elections. Are you absolutely sure that the people are following you? And then, why did you get frightened by the opposition?! Don't forget that in your country the development of the Soviet system may develop differently – through the Parliament. This way is slower but it will lead you to the same goal. Lenin didn't exclude the parliamentary way to the Soviet power.

You'd better leave the agrarian reform to the Parliament. In your country it shouldn't be against the *pomeshchiks* (the large landowners) but against the kulaks. The kulaks are connected to the rest of the peasant mass in many ways. When we were sweeping off the kulaks as a class the peasants in many places were crying. Why now, right before the elections, you should turn the kulaks, their relatives and friends against yourself. You begin a struggle and want to fulfil ten objectives at a time. Define one, two, three objectives that could be achieved more easily. Let the Parliament carry out the agrarian reform. It will be more authoritative and stable in the field.

The existence of a Unified Agrarian Party is unthinkable. The agrarian parties everywhere split into fractions. You could advise both of your agrarian fractions to unite. If this doesn't happen you should not regret too much. In the future it will be much better to have two mutually hostile agrarian fractions. The same could be said about the Social Democrats.

From people's point of view your election law is democratic. On the other hand, from the point of view of the formal democracy – it is not that democratic. You could allow the existence of some other parties outside the Fatherland Front. You may perform the elections in the middle of October. You should direct your agitation mainly against those who want to intervene in the internal affairs of Bulgaria. For elimination of the monarchy institutions you should summon the Great National Assembly. The oath of loyalty to the Monarch, required by the Constitution when the deputies accept their duty in the new Parliament, could be postponed with the explanation that a bill for elimination of the monarchy has been introduced.

The declaration of Stainov⁷⁹ regarding the question of postponing the elections was a provocative declaration.

We haven't given up the idea of forming up an alliance between USSR and Bulgaria. First of all, however, we would like to form an alliance with Romania. An alliance with

⁷⁹ Prof. Petko Stainov – Minister of Foreign Affairs (September 9, 1944 – March 31, 1946).

Romania would mean that we have the right to keep troops there when we need them there. In this way our troops will actually come to your frontiers and thus the direct contacts with Bulgaria will be easier. Everything is settled with you, but we have to hurry with the Romanians. After the elections you could complete an alliance treaty with Yugoslavia and after that consider merging with it. But before this it would be better if you reach a reparation agreement between yourselves. You could think of an alliance with Romania as well. You could form such a union before the alliance with Yugoslavia, for some might say that you are following pan-Slavic objectives.

You could hardly change any territorial boundaries without a war. They should be changed in some way. From Turkey we want naval bases on the Dardanelles. They are against this. The problem will be solved at the Conference. If it isn't solved, we will raise the question for an outlet on the Mediterranean.

You should always take into consideration the position of Britain and USA. You should have normal relations with them. I'm really serious. You should not proclaim an eternal friendship with the USSR. You should work on it, but when the official policy of Bulgaria is formulated, you should emphasize on friendship relations and cooperation with Britain and America. You shouldn't leave the initiative to Petkov on that question. You personally, not Petkov, should say out loud that you want to maintain normal relations with Britain and America. It is a mistake to neglect the relations with the American representatives. It is necessary to send to them a group of reliable people.

For the time being the Labor Party is following Eden's foreign policy and is always asking him what to do. The only question on which they showed a different point of view, different from Churchill's and Eden's, was the question of the West frontiers of Poland; Churchill and Eden were objecting to this from the morning to the evening. And they did so, only because they were afraid that they were completely going to lose Poland. All of Churchill's advisors stayed with Attlee. Even the interpreters did not change their mind. Bevin reminds me of Noske, he is the same butcher – rough, self-conceited, with no culture. And as far as Attlee is concerned – he has no particular qualities. They are great fools; they got the power in a great country and they don't know what to do with it. They are empirically oriented and inevitably they will confront the Conservatives on the various practical problems. At the same time they have no plan of their own for their foreign policy.

Regarding the Greek problems, the boycott of the elections, the Greek communists intend to do, is a two-sided weapon. The boycott would be worthwhile if a national strike to overthrow the government is announced.

You should not rush to establish diplomatic relations with the Albanians. This could do them harm, for they are still very weak.

France doesn't have its own policy. At present the Americans make efforts to attract it on their side – perhaps with the question of Indo-China.

Preparation for restoring the postal relations between Bulgaria and the USSR are in progress.

Maybe the best thing to do is to reduce the number of Soviet troops in Bulgaria, but since you think it will be inconvenient to do it before the elections, maybe we will share their costs – in cash and provisions – half in half.

Source: CDA, f. 146B, op. 4, ae. 639, l. 20-28.

Contributed by Jordan Baev and translated by Nedialka Douptcheva.



**Jakub Berman's Handwritten Notes of a
Conversation with Stalin or a Letter to Stalin:
a Report on the Situation in Poland and Request for Advice and Help,
1945 September (first half)**

The situation in Poland within the last two weeks has been marked by numerous symptoms of rising political tension and growing pressures of reactionary forces under the influence of external and internal factors of a new configuration of political forces.

This situation is potent with serious dangers and calls for a fast breakthrough. That is why we are writing to you this letter with a request for advice and assistance.

1. There are signs of dissatisfaction among the working class, which already finds expression not only in strikes lasting an hour or a few hours (particularly in Lodz, the coal mining region, Zawiercie, on the railroads), counted already in scores, but even in the form of a general strike, as e.g. a 3-day strike of 7 thousand textile workers in Pabianice.

These strikes are being eliminated with the assistance of PPR with a very irregular assistance of PPS, which occasionally doesn't oppose them or even is in favor of them. Against the background of dissatisfaction one can notice an increase of PPS influences, which is drawing the votes of the most backward workers (concerns Lodz).

2. Among the peasants the action of Mikołajczyk's PSL enjoys popularity in the counties of the Kraków, Rzeszów, Poznań and the Pomeranian voivodships. There is a danger of capturing a number of Bańczyk's SL organizations in the Warsaw, Kielce and Lublin voivodships. One can notice attempts at breaking off contingent quotas and provoking anti-workers feelings, particularly against the PPR. Aversion and sometimes hostility toward the Red Army can also be noticed.

3. Among the intelligentsia one can notice a growing opposition toward the government, particularly among teachers and professors of universities (election of collaborationists to the Polish Academy of Science) and shifting part of the office-holders towards Mikołajczyk, with a simultaneous differentiation among the intelligentsia (positive resolutions of the Writers Union).

4. The Catholic clergy, particularly after the arrival of Cardinal Hlond with instructions from the Vatican, is displaying feverish organizational and propaganda activities (14 weeklies, 200,000 pilgrims in Częstochowa) directed against the government, using a decree on civil marriages as a pretext.

5. The terrorist action due to repression of the military and security forces, as well as exiting from the forests of numerous units (approximately ...), has slowed down, but it still lasts (particularly in the Białystok area) and brings about scores of killings every week (mostly PPR members and UB [security] forces). Also a pogrom-anti-Semitic action, despite that it has not reached such scope as in Kraków, still lasts.

6. Political diversion, which is causing hesitations in many SL circles, not excluding its supreme body (Bańczyk, Drzewiecki, Litwin), as well as in the PPS (particularly in Katowice, Kraków and Gdańsk), social diversion, which is the source of many difficulties on the railroads and in some factories, in cooperatives - all of this is intended to isolate the PPR, and at this moment is causing a slowdown in increasing PPR ranks or even a small exiting from some cells.

7. What are the sources for the activities of the reaction in Poland?

a) concentration of previously dispersed, due to the crisis, reactionary forces around Mikołajczyk, who is becoming a center for concentration of a new bloc of the Witos forces, WRN, Sanatsia, National Democrats and the clergy into a conglomerate of Christian-nationalist forces with large internal contradictions, but bounded by their anti-Soviet, anti-PPR and anti-democratic, Anglo-Saxon orientation.

b) an intensified activity of the Anglo-American provocateurs, with a weak activity of our counter-intelligence.

c) major food supply difficulties in cities, commodity shortages in the countryside, transportation difficulties with coal supply, a wild speculation, corruption of some state, industrial and commercial apparatus - besides unquestionable successes in the growth of production, labor productivity and a tendency of declining prices.

d) a decline in popularity of the Red Army [Cz.A.?] due to the demoralization of the behind the lines units spread all over Poland and units crossing over Poland, lack of security, particularly in the western territories, with numerous bands of marauders or Vlasov men, raging over those territories and hurting particularly the peasants and repatriates. Persisting inaction in this area lays the blame mainly for the PPR and weakens its authority among the masses.

e) weaknesses of state and party propaganda, which has not been able to reach to the broadest masses of peasants.

8. What kind of remedial measures is the party undertaking independently and through the government?

a) a counter-offensive against the terrorist gangs, political diversionists and destructionists of the democratic front, against speculators and grafters (new decrees against criminals threatening the state and favoring fascism, court proceedings and death sentences, a purge of the state apparatus, a decree on the duty to work and prosecuting speculators). An intensified press and propaganda campaign. Limitation of clergy privileges in public schools.

b) an increase in real wages for workers (elimination of insurance premiums and a tax reduction), rye bread instead of dark one (see the enclosed resolutions of the CKZZ - Trade Union Council). A purge and improvement of trade union councils, with a simultaneous increase of production and labor productivity. Nationalization of large industries (plants employing over 50 workers).

c) a better supply of industrial products for the peasants. Preferential treatment for the peasants in contingents and building material. Further expansion of agricultural reform through assigning the land to the peasants in the West. Establishing state properties in the West.

d) strengthening of workers unity through closer cooperation of the electoral bloc of the PPR and PPS in their daily work.

Strengthening of the left wing of peasant leaders in the SL in a fight against Mikołajczyk. Strengthening of the workers-peasants unity against the reactionaries and the unity of the coalition of democratic parties (PPR, PPS, SL, SD, SP).

9. An indispensable condition of the effectiveness of the above mentioned measures is the elimination of very harmful political influence of marauding and hooliganism from the part of particularly demoralized behind the lines units, which despite Marshall Rokossowski's efforts are still occurring on a mass scale.

The announcement of Generalissimus Stalin's order, show trials and punishment of the guilty ones will undoubtedly put an end to this and will have a very positive impact on the whole situation, so much recently aggravated.

10. To achieve a breakthrough in the situation we are mobilizing all forces at the party's disposal and for this purpose we will hold a CC PPR plenary meeting on September 21.

Outlining to you the situation and our efforts, we ask you for assistance and advice.

Source: AAA, Jakub Berman Collection, 325/33, pp. 22-26.

Translated by Jan Chowaniec.

**Memorandum of a Conversation
between W.A. Harriman and Stalin**

TOP SECRET

Gagri, October 24, 1945.

Conversation

Present: Generalissimus I. V. Stalin
 Mr. Paylov, Soviet Interpreter

W. A. Harriman, American Ambassador
Edward Page, First Secretary of Embassy

Subject: 1. The Japanese Situation.
 2. The Procedural Question.

After a preliminary exchange of remarks on the Caucasian coast and Generalissimus Stalin's health, the Ambassador presented to him the President's message with Russian translation, stating that the President was anxious to obtain his reaction thereto. The President wished to know what was on the Generalissimus's mind and he had therefore instructed the Ambassador personally to discuss the message with him.

The Generalissimus read the message carefully, looked up, and stated "the Japanese question is not touched upon here". The Ambassador stated that he was not surprised that he should bring up this question. He explained that the Japanese question was being discussed at the present time between the State and War departments and General MacArthur and the President hoped to have some concrete proposals ready by October 30 when the meeting of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission would convene. The Ambassador continued that he would be entirely frank providing the Generalissimus would allow him to discuss the matter informally and would accept his remarks as unofficial. If so, he could explain the thinking of the President and his advisors on this question as far as it had gone. Stalin said that he would be grateful for any information, which he, of course, would keep secret. The Ambassador stated that from the beginning the President had not wished any misunderstandings to arise between the Soviet Union and the United States over Japan. As the Generalissimus knew, on instructions from his Government the Ambassador had written Mr. Molotov on August 21 proposing the formation and convocation of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission. He had explained that this body would deal with the political approach to all aspects of the Japanese situation, and also the establishment of control machinery to carry out the surrender terms. This proposal had been made ten to eleven days before General MacArthur had landed in Japan and forced the Japanese to sign the surrender. The Chinese were the first to accept the proposal to establish an advisory commission. The Soviet Government had accepted on September 5. However, the British had not accepted the proposal until the latter part of September. They had misunderstood it - thinking that the meetings would continue in Washington. When Mr. Byrnes saw Mr. Bevin in London he had informed him that if the other participants desired the meetings to be transferred to Tokyo the United States Government would agree. Furthermore, the British desired India to be included among the

participants. The Ambassador stated that he did not know why the British took so long in making up their mind - perhaps they desired to consult the dominions - perhaps it was because of the formation of the new Government.

The Ambassador continued that Mr. Byrnes was ready to discuss all aspects of this matter with a Soviet representative to the meeting in Washington on a bilateral basis if Generalissimus Stalin would send his representative there. These discussions would include the character of the control machinery and Mr. Byrnes would make every effort to come to agreement.

The Ambassador stated that he was unable to give Stalin the details of the proposal which the President would approve after he had consulted his advisors but he could give the Generalissimus a general idea of the thinking in Washington on this matter. From what the Ambassador knew he did not believe that this proposal would prove to be very different from what Molotov had recently written him. He was not authorized to say this - but from what he had learned from the State and War Departments it seemed to him that the President's proposal would be much the same as that suggested by Mr. Molotov. The first phase was, of course, the surrender of Japan and the disarming of the Japanese armed forces on the four main Japanese islands. This was being handled by United States forces. This phase of the surrender had about terminated or would in a few weeks. It was thought more advisable to disarm the Japanese with one army than with several since many risks were involved. Following the surrender and disarmament of the Japanese armies it was contemplated to invite the Russian, Chinese and British to send a certain number of troops to join in the second phase of the control of Japan - the occupational period. The Ambassador stated that he could not give the Generalissimus the exact number of foreign troops his Government had in mind as he did not yet know how many it had been determined should be kept on the Japanese islands. Furthermore, he could not define the exact relationship between these foreign troops and General MacArthur - that was another subject under discussion at the present time. In general however, there should not be separate zones of occupation and they should carry out the orders of the United States Commander.

The Ambassador continued that there was another conception under consideration in Washington; namely, that the commanding generals of the foreign troops should act with MacArthur as a military council. They would be furnished full information on all matters pertaining to Japan and there would be full discussion on all questions. Every attempt would be made to reach agreement on these questions, with the understanding that if no agreement were reached the last word would rest with MacArthur.

The Advisory Commission which would shortly meet in Washington would move to Tokyo and deal with all political and economic questions regarding Japan. There was also another idea, namely, to combine the two functions, i.e., military and political into one political council. This matter was at present under consideration but was subject to discussion and final decision. In general the basic conception was to set up machinery through which Japanese political, economic and other questions might be fully discussed by the Allies in order that decisions might be reached. However, as the situation was so complex, it was considered that in the last analysis the final authority of General MacArthur must be the ruling one if the agreement were not reached. The Ambassador hoped that this would not be the case.

Generalissimus Stalin said that he was very grateful to receive this information from the Ambassador. He realized that by bringing up the question of the control machinery for Japan he was placing the Ambassador in an embarrassing position. The Ambassador replied that he did not believe there was anything that he and the Generalissimus could not discuss frankly.

The Generalissimus continued that he had been forced to raise this question as it was linked up with the Truman message. He wished to make a few remarks on the substance of the question of the control machinery for Japan. The proper term to use was "Control Commission" and not "Control Council", which existed only in Germany where there was no government. There was a government in Japan and it was therefore more proper to speak of the control machinery as a Control Commission. Analogy could be found in Hungary and Rumania where there was a Control Commission and where the final word rested with the Soviet commander. In Rumania there were no troops other than Soviet and the final word rested with the Chairman of the Control Commission though not in the same measure as stated by Ambassador Harriman in respect to Japan. It went without saying that the United States representative, General MacArthur, should be the permanent Chairman of the Control Commission and should have the final voice. However, if there were other troops on the Japanese islands, as there were in Germany, the effect would be to restrict the rights of General MacArthur. This was not desirable. In order to preserve the freedom of action of MacArthur it, perhaps, might not be advisable to send other troops to Japan. This was more logical.

The Generalissimus then turned to President Truman's message and inquired "what does Mr. Byrnes' compromise amount to? Can you explain the substance of the proposal not accepted by Mr. Molotov?"

The Ambassador stated that Mr. Molotov had never rejected Mr. Byrnes' proposal. He had said that he had to consult his Government in person. At the September 11th meeting of the Foreign Ministers' Council, Mr. Molotov had agreed that it would be proper to invite France and China - and also the United States, when Finland was discussed - to remain in the room during the discussions of all the peace treaties. Only those agreed upon at the Potsdam Conference could vote on matters regarding these treaties. The other representatives could only participate in the meetings and make comments. However, after sixteen meetings Mr. Molotov said that this procedure was a mistake and that the Foreign Ministers should return to the restricted procedure under the 4-3-2 formula. Mr. Byrnes had replied that it would be impossible to humiliate the French and China by throwing them out after they had been invited to participate in sixteen meetings, unless some agreement were reached as to when they should be invited back. Mr. Bevin had agreed to this. Mr. Byrnes had freely admitted that if Mr. Molotov had taken this position on the first day the meetings could have been thus limited. However, the Potsdam Agreement contained authorization to invite the other nations to participate in the peace discussions. Mr. Byrnes was now trying to find a dignified way to solve the present impasse. He had suggested that after the peace treaties had been drafted by the smaller groups in accordance with the Potsdam Decision, a peace conference be held which would be made up of the most interested parties. The Chinese and French had tentatively agreed to this proposal if it were agreed to by all. Mr. Molotov, however, had requested Mr. Byrnes to return to the restricted procedure

and to leave the peace conference for the future. Mr. Byrnes did not believe this fair to the French and Chinese and had thus suggested agreement on calling of the peace conference as a compromise. After this conference, only those present at the conference who had been at war with each satellite would conclude the peace. The Ambassador concluded that he was a devil's advocate since he thought Mr. Byrnes' proposal was a very wise one.

Generalissimus Stalin again read the paragraph of the President's message to the effect that in an effort to find a solution acceptable to all Mr. Byrnes had stated that he would accept a narrowing of the draft procedure provided it was agreed to that the council would call a peace conference of the principally interested states. The Generalissimus remarked that there was no reference in this paragraph to those countries that had declared war and whether such countries should be invited to the conference. He remarked that many countries had declared war in order to obtain a seat in the security organization.

The Ambassador stated that Mr. Byrnes had proposed three classes of countries to participate in the peace conferences, namely: (1) the five permanent members of the security council since these nations were primarily interested in the preservation of peace; (2) the European members of the United Nations; and (3) those non-European nations which had supplied substantial armed forces against the Axis. These included Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, India and Brazil - the only South American country. Brazil had sent two divisions to Italy.

Generalissimus Stalin reading from his records of the London meetings, stated that he had understood the proposal as follows: the Council would prepare drafts of the peace treaties under the 4-3-2 formula to draft the peace treaties. The Council would then call a peace conference made up of the five permanent members of the security organization, all the European United Nations and all the non-European nations which had supplied substantial military contingents. This conference would meet in London and as a basis for its deliberations it would accept the reports of the deputies. After full hearing and discussion final approval of the peace treaties would be made by the states which had waged war with the enemy states. The Ambassador stated that the Generalissimus's understanding of the proposals was correct. However, it should be added that the deputies would draft the treaties under the 4-3-2 formula.

The Generalissimus remarked that if one general conference were to be called he wondered whether Italy, for example, could contribute anything in the discussions on the Finnish treaty. He questioned the advisability of one general conference and developed the theory of a series of conferences, on Bulgaria, Finland, and Rumania for example. He could not see what Brazil could contribute to a conference on Finland and stated that it appeared to him that it would be more feasible to convoke a group of conferences.

The Ambassador stated that the President and Mr. Byrnes agreed that only those states who actually waged war against an individual enemy should have the final say as to the peace and should sign the treaties. They believed however that there was in fact only one European war and all those directly involved in it should be asked to review the work of the Foreign Ministers and present their ideas. However, the final voice

should remain with those who had been engaged in war with actual fighting forces with each enemy. HE wished to point out that Italy was not one of the United Nations, was an enemy state, and therefore would not be involved in the conference. He continued that it was Mr. Byrnes' idea that all the European countries at war with the Axis should have the right to be heard in such a conference. Although Belgium and Holland, for example, had not been technically at war with Italy they were vitally interested in the peace. There had to be some period when all the European countries had the right to voice their views in connection with the peace treaties. This included China, a permanent member of the Security Council.

The Generalissimus stated that he could accept at the conference those countries who had actually fought but there were other countries who had declared war and who had not sent one soldier to the front. What did they have to do with the peace? President Truman had said that the conference should be made up of those principally interested states. Mr. Byrnes' proposal appeared to broaden this formula. What had Puerto Rico to do with Rumania? It had not sent one soldier abroad. Greece and Yugoslavia had fought against the Italians. The Chinese had not. The fact that the Chinese were a member of the Security Council did not enter the picture. The Security Council had entirely different functions. The peace treaties should be settled now. The Security Council has a future role. It was not called upon to deal with these matters. Justifying Chinese participation in the peace conference on the ground that it was a member of the Security Council was not appropriate. Furthermore, India was not a state. It was a colony. If the British granted India certain rights, dominion status for example, he would favor its participation in the peace conference. However, it was not likely that such rights would be granted.

The Generalissimus continued that he must give the matter more thought. He believed however that a basis for compromise could be found along the following lines:

(1) Call a meeting of the Foreign Ministers to work out the peace treaties on the 4-3-2 formula.

(2) After the peace treaties had been drawn up, call a peace conference of not only those who had signed the armistice but those who had sent contingents to Europe and had waged war - not those who had technically declared war.

(The Ambassador inquired whether this included those who had fought against any one of the Axis. The Generalissimus replied in the affirmative).

(3) Following the conference, not only the big three but also such countries that had actually waged war should conclude the peace.

The Ambassador stated that it was the President's idea to convoke one conference to which the five draft peace treaties should be submitted rather than separate conferences with all the complications involved. The Generalissimus stated that he clearly understood this. However, he thought that it might be preferable for example as far as Bulgaria was concerned, to invite the Greeks and the Yugoslavs to attend during the discussions of the Bulgarian treaty. When the Hungarian treaty was under discussion it might be better to invite not only the Big Three but the Czechs and the Yugoslavs. With respect to Italy - who should be invited?

The Brazilians? Yes. They had sent two divisions. All countries which had fought against the Italians, not platonically by declaring war but with actual troops, should be invited. The Ambassador had mentioned Belgium. He could understand the participation of the Belgians in the German peace but not their participation in the Italian and Russian peace. They had not sent one soldier to Italy or Rumania.

The Ambassador stated that with respect to Italy a number of countries, including all the dominions and India had been involved. They had all sent troops. The Generalissimus stated that he had no objection to the participation in the Italian peace conference of all those who had actually fought the Italians.

The Ambassador stated that the president's view was that this had been one war. Various countries had participated at different times on different fronts. All the satellite countries had assisted Germany in the war. Furthermore, the armistices with the satellites had been signed on behalf of the United Nations. In addition, the Generalissimus would recall that at Potsdam it had been agreed that the draft peace treaties would be submitted to the United Nations. Therefore all the nations who had participated in the war with substantial forces on any front should be given the opportunity to express their views even though they may not have had troops in one particular theatre. The President felt that unless these countries were consulted ill will would be created unnecessarily throughout the world. These countries were entitled to a voice in the peace. This was a procedure contemplated at Potsdam and one wise to follow out. If attempts were made to restrict the conference the Big Three would only be doing themselves harm in the eyes of the world. Take Norway, for example. The Norwegians had placed their ships in a common pool. They were used wherever needed. Supplies had gone to Italy in them and quite possibly to the air forces which had carried on operations in the Balkans. The Generalissimus abruptly stated that such countries could express their views to the press. The Ambassador stated that the question was quite different. These countries should be asked in a dignified way to come to the peace conference as sovereign states.

The Generalissimus inquired whether Puerto Rico should be asked to such a conference. The Ambassador replied that he would have to correct the Generalissimus. Puerto Rico was United States territory. The Generalissimus corrected himself and said he meant Costa Rica. The Ambassador replied that Mr. Byrnes had suggested that only those who had actually waged war should be invited. Insofar as the South American countries were concerned only Brazil was included on the Secretary's list. The Generalissimus stated he had no objections to Brazil but remarked that Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Haiti had declared war on Rumania. The Ambassador again stated that under Byrnes' formula these countries would not be invited to participate in the peace conference.

The Ambassador continued that according to his understanding the main difference between the Generalissimus's and the President's proposals was that the President wished to submit all the drafts of the peace treaties to one conference and to hear the views of the conferees. The President did not wish to try to decide who had been involved in the war against whom. It had been one war and there should be one conference to which all the peace treaties should be submitted. It would be inadvisable to try to divide up the conference into different groups. The President did not feel that it was possible to segregate one satellite from another.

More good will would be created in the world by convoking a general conference. This was in line with the spirit of the United Nations. If that spirit could be agreed to, the Ambassador did not believe that it would be difficult to agree upon a list of nations to be invited. The President was quite prepared to exclude those South American countries which had not been actually involved in the war.

The Generalissimus stated that whenever the Big Three were engaged in making decisions the entire world wondered whether such decisions would be fair. There was always an important moral factor involved. He considered that it would be unfair to place on a par those countries which had waged war and which had been occupied by the Germans, with other countries which had not fought and which had not been occupied. Furthermore, there were countries which had helped the Germans and others which had merely technically declared war. Take Chile, for example: it had helped the Germans and the Japanese. What had Chile to do with Italy or Germany and why should they be invited to attend such a conference. The Ambassador again stated the President agreed that South American countries should not be invited save Brazil. The Generalissimus remarked that Chile was one of the United Nations. The Ambassador stated that notwithstanding this fact it was not on Mr. Byrnes' list. The Generalissimus inquired whether this meant that not all the United Nations would be invited to the conference. The Ambassador stated that only those would be invited which had provided troops and actually waged war.

The Generalissimus stated that he would like to see a concrete list. Such a list could not be drawn up by the deputies of the Foreign Ministers. A conference should be called of the Foreign Ministers and such a list should be drawn up. Furthermore the question of control machinery for Japan should be considered. The deputies alone were not capable of handling such questions. Agreement should be reached first on the list of countries invited to the peace conference. Then agreement should be reached on Japan.

The Ambassador stated that he felt sure the President would agree that the Foreign Ministers should meet again after the question of the peace conference was settled. However, he also felt sure that the Generalissimus would agree that the deputies should continue in the meantime the work assigned to them after general agreement had been reached on the list. The Ambassador then handed the Generalissimus the list of countries, as he recalled it, which Mr. Byrnes had in mind in London. He said that he could not guarantee this list; however, it was substantially correct. The Generalissimus inquired as to the advisability of including China. The Ambassador stated that the President felt strongly that China, as a permanent member of the security organization, should be included. Italy had had interests in the Far East. The Generalissimus remarked that China had sent no forces to Europe. The Ambassador replied that it would be very unfortunate to exclude China since that country was a member of the security council and a member of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The Generalissimus interjected that China was a member of the Foreign Ministers' Council only on matters affecting it. The Ambassador again stated that it would be very unfortunate to leave China out if a general European conference were convoked. He inquired whether China was the only country not on the Generalissimus' list. The Generalissimus stated that he also wished to exclude India, Belgium and Holland. The Ambassador remarked that India had sent troops to the Middle East and to Europe and that he again wished

to refer to the principal of one indivisible war. Norway and Holland had supplied ships whenever they were needed. The Generalissimus remarked that if it was one indivisible war Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, for example, should be invited to the Far East peace discussions. The Ambassador stated that the President divided the European from the Far East war. The Generalissimus apparently accepted this interpretation.

The Generalissimus then turned to that section of Mr. Byrnes' proposal concerning the work of the proposed conference and the conclusion of peace treaties with the satellites and inquired into the exact interpretation of it. The Ambassador stated that what Mr. Byrnes wished to do was to invite the nations on the list to hear the views of these nations but not to conclude the peace. It was not necessary to be bound by the views expressed in this conference. For example, the United States was not at war with Finland. It might wish to have the right to express certain views on Finnish peace. However, it would not sign this peace. Referring to the final stage of concluding the peace treaties the Generalissimus stated that Mr. Byrnes' draft was apparently drawn up in haste. The term "those at war" should be more closely defined. Did this mean those who had actually fought, those who had signed the armistices, or those who had merely declared war. The Ambassador stated that he knew what Mr. Byrnes had in mind. Take Bulgaria for example. He thought it right that the USSR, the U.S.A., Great Britain, the Dominions, White Russia, the Ukraine, Yugoslavia and Greece should conclude the peace with Bulgaria. The Generalissimus brought up the case of Italy. Although India had sent contingents these were rightly British forces. India was not an independent state. The Ambassador remarked that this question had been thrashed out at San Francisco Conference in connection with the Ukraine and White Russia. The Generalissimus stated that he was not pressing for the inclusion of the Ukraine and White Russia in the present conference. The Ambassador stated that India was a British problem. He was not prepared to discuss it. He knew that the British were trying to give India dominion status and he would like to point out that the Indians had actually fought. The Generalissimus stated that he would welcome seeing dominion status accorded India. However, this would not come soon. The Ambassador stated that his Government wished to give India as much prestige as possible. For this reason we would welcome India in the peace conference. The Generalissimus remarked, that if India were invited India should also be included. However, we believed that if India were invited to the conference the world at large would not think it a wise move. With respect to India's participation in the world organization this was a future problem. The world organization would last a long time. The peace treaties should be drawn up immediately. It was a bad analogy to compare the peace conference under discussion with the United Nations Organization. No one had suggested that Turkey or the Argentine be invited to the present conference. The peace conference and the United Nations were two entirely different things. The Ambassador again referred to India and stated that not only had that country sent substantial troops to the Middle East but had fought well. The Generalissimus again repeated that these were British troops. India was not allowed to have its own troops. It did not have its own government or foreign minister. He said that if India were not invited this would expedite the accordance of dominion status. If India were not invited it could be said that the British and Americans wished to invite India but that Stalin had frustrated these plans. In this case, he would make it clear why he had opposed the inclusion of India. This would give him a pretext to say something publicly about India. The Ambassador stated that he knew that

the President wished to invite India in order to give that country more prestige. It was a matter of opinion whether the extension of such an invitation would encourage the development of dominion status.

The Ambassador stated that he would like to discuss a little further the Japanese question. However, since he had already taken up three hours of the Generalissimus's time he would like to know whether the Generalissimus wished to continue the conversation or postpone the consideration of this subject until the following day. The Generalissimus replied that he would prefer to discuss the Japanese problem tomorrow and suggested a meeting at 7:00 P.M.

EP/aj

Source: W.A. Harriman Papers, Library of Congress.

**Memorandum of a Conversation between
W.A. Harriman and Stalin**

TOP SECRET

Gagri, October 25, 1945.

Time: 7:00 p.m.

Conversation

Present: Generalissimus I. V. Stalin
 Mr. Pavlov, Soviet Interpreter

W. A. Harriman, American Ambassador
Edward Page, First Secretary of Embassy

Subject: The Japanese Situation

After preliminary remarks on railroad construction in the Caucasus, the Ambassador stated that as the Generalissimus had originally raised the Japanese question he now wished to clarify certain aspects of this matter. The President was hopeful that the Generalissimus would send a representative to Washington to participate on the Far Eastern Advisory Council at which time the question of the control machinery for Japan would be discussed. If desirable, bilateral conversations could be carried on before the general meeting.

The Generalissimus stated that it would be "very difficult" for him to send a representative to Washington. The Soviet Government had been given no responsibilities in Japan and it would be difficult for it to figure as an "annex" without having shared responsibility for policies in Japan or without having had any influence on such policies.

The Ambassador stated that it was the thought of the President to thrash out all such matters in the Advisory Council by those powers principally concerned. Some method must be found to do this. The President understood that the Soviet Union had accepted on September 5th the invitation to attend the conference. He had hoped that this meeting would have taken place some time ago and it would have, had it not been for delays caused by the British. The Generalissimus stated that Mr. Molotov had informed Mr. Byrnes that the situation in Japan had since changed and that it was now time to organize a control commission. The British apparently were of similar mind. The Soviet Government did not believe that the Advisory Commission was a satisfactory means in any respect to consider the question of control machinery for Japan.

The Ambassador explained that one of the terms of reference of the Advisory Commission was to consider the control machinery for Japan. The President hoped that the Generalissimus would agree that the meeting in Washington was the proper place to discuss these matters. If the Generalissimus did not agree the President would wish to know what other way he wished to deal with this matter.

The Generalissimus stated that this subject could not properly be handled by the Advisory Commission. The question of the control

machinery for Japan could only be decided by the governments themselves - no one else was qualified to discuss this matter. The Ambassador inquired whether the Generalissimus desired to discuss this matter bilaterally on a government level. The Generalissimus replied that there was no other way to handle the question. The Advisory Commission was not the appropriate or proper place for such discussions. They should be on a government level. The Ambassador inquired whether these discussions should be on a bilateral basis. The Generalissimus replied that there were three, in fact four, governments involved. However, the main discord appeared to be between the United States and Soviet Governments. Therefore they should take the initiative in reaching agreement. The Ambassador stated that he did not know that there had been any actual disagreement. The Generalissimus maintained that there was and added that if two nations failed to agree that proved that disagreement existed. The Ambassador stated that as far as he could judge there was only disagreement on the method of carrying on discussions. Mr. Molotov desired to discuss Japanese control at the Foreign Ministers Council. Mr. Byrnes was not briefed for such discussions. The United States Government had suggested the Advisory Commission. The Soviet Government now replied in the negative. This was not disagreement in substance but in procedure. The substance of Japanese control had not as yet been discussed. The Ambassador stated that he regretted that he was unable to offer a concrete proposal -he had furnished the Generalissimus however with the general thinking of the United States authorities on this question. When it came to concrete proposals there might develop disagreement on various points. However, at the present time he did not believe that the points of view of the two countries were very far apart.

The Generalissimus stated that this was quite possible. He continued that in suggesting the Advisory Commission the Americans were going along the same road as followed prior to the victory over Germany when the European Advisory Council was set up, which in turn established the German control machinery. Therefore it was probable that the Americans could not understand why the Russians did not agree to join in the Advisory Commission for Japan, having once joined in an Advisory Commission for Germany. The Ambassador stated that this was of course not clear, especially so after the Soviets had signified their agreement on September 5th. The Generalissimus stated that Germany had not been defeated when the plans were drawn up for the establishment of the EAC. The situation was now entirely different. Japan had been defeated and the Soviet Union was waiting for the establishment of a control commission. This should be done quickly.

The Ambassador inquired as to what brought about the change in the Soviet point of view since September 5th. The Generalissimus stated that more than a month had passed since September 5th, during which time no reply had been made to the Soviet Government on this question. The British had objected to the United States proposal. The Soviets last month had also objected but had received no reply to Molotov's letter to Secretary Byrnes. It appeared to the Soviet Government that the British and Americans were inclined to drag out this question. Mr. Byrnes refused to discuss it in London. Furthermore the Soviet Government felt that it could not bear responsibility for MacArthur's actions in Japan since it had never been informed or consulted on Japanese matters. It had decided to recall its representative, General Derevianko because he was not receiving any information on policies or developments in Japan. The Soviet Government had its self-respect as a sovereign state. No decisions

made by MacArthur were being transmitted to it. In point of fact the Soviet Union had become an American satellite in the Pacific. This was a role it could not accept. It was not being treated as an Ally. The Soviet Union would not be a satellite of the United States in the Far East or elsewhere. These were the reasons Mr. Molotov had raised the question of control machinery in London.

The Ambassador stated that there must be a complete misunderstanding. It had never been the intention of the President to disregard the views of the Soviet Union. He wished fully to consult with the Russians on all matters of mutual interest and Japan was certainly one of these matters. This question must be straightened out.

The Generalissimus replied that the President may not have had such thoughts in his mind but he was speaking of what had actually happened. Soviet views [sic] on Japan were completely disregarded. The Soviet Union was not informed of measures adopted there. Is this the way to treat an ally? If this regime were to continue the Soviet Union would leave Japan for it could not be responsible for actions it only learned of through the press. Did MacArthur represent the Soviet Union? No. It would be more honest if the Soviet Union were to quit Japan than to remain there as a "piece of furniture".

The Ambassador stated that in the early days, that is at the time of the capitulation of Japan, he had received thousands of words to and from MacArthur on directives issued to him and what he was doing in regard to Japan. These messages had been transmitted to the Red Army General Staff by the Military Mission. Since MacArthur had established himself in Japan, arrangements had been made for the Soviet General to have radio communications with Marshal Vassilevsky and MacArthur had furnished Derevianko full information for transmission to Vassilevsky. Then messages to the Embassy ceased and the Ambassador had assumed that the Soviet representative was obtaining all information and transmitting it to Vassilevsky. To this the Generalissimus replied that the Soviet Government knew nothing whatever as to what was going on in Japan. Its representative received now word, for example, on the new Japanese Government and the changes therein. It had not been informed of the reasons for making these changes. This was only one example, there were many more.

The Ambassador stated that this was all news to him and that he would report this matter to his Government. The Generalissimus stated that he could not understand why the Japanese press and radio were permitted to denounce the Soviet Union. The Soviets were Allies. He also could not understand why the higher Japanese commanders were allowed to remain at liberty and were not isolated. Was Japan a conquered country or not? Did any censorship exist there?

The Ambassador explained that MacArthur had issued a directive to the effect that no criticism in the press or on the radio should be leveled against the Allies. He had no information on the attacks mentioned by the Generalissimus. The Generalissimus stated that he did not doubt that such a directive had been issued but nonetheless the Japanese press had vilified the Soviet Union with impunity. The Soviet representative in Japan had twice approached MacArthur on this question. The press attacks had stopped and then recommenced in a truly fascist manner. The Soviet Government would never permit such a thing to go on in

its zones of occupation. If any newspaper in Rumania, for example, should attack the United States its editors would be immediately punished. Such questions however could only be handled through a control commission. The Generalissimus continued that in view of the present facts the situation in Japan was deteriorating from day to day. This was why Molotov had raised the question of a control commission in London. The Ambassador inquired as to the nature of the Japanese press attacks. The Generalissimus stated that he did not remember the facts but that Mr. Molotov could advise the Ambassador in the premises. The Ambassador then inquired why the Generalissimus considered the situation in Japan to be deteriorating. It was his (the Ambassador's) impression that satisfactory progress was being made. The Generalissimus stated that he was speaking of the Soviet position. The Soviet representative was merely a "piece of extra furniture" with the regime established by MacArthur. This was a very embarrassing position.

The Ambassador said that he would like to make a general statement regarding the Japanese surrender. The capitulation of Japan was quite unique in history. It was the general conception that MacArthur would proceed to Japan as Supreme Commander on behalf of all the Allies, force the Japanese to lay down their arms and obliterate their military power. He would take no permanent future commitments during the surrender period except for the destruction of the Japanese military machine. It was thought that this first surrender period would last about two months so that by November 1st this phase of the occupation of Japan would be over. With that in mind his Government had proposed on August 21 that an advisory council be established and meet promptly in Washington in order that Japanese political, economic and other policies could be discussed and the Allies could consult. Every effort would be made to reach agreement on policy. In the meantime each Ally had a military representative in Japan. The Ambassador assumed that these representatives were informed of developments. He also assumed that if there had been objection to any action protest would have been made. So far as he was aware no protest had been registered. Now the advisory commission meeting had been postponed for various reasons of which the Generalissimus was aware. However, he knew that he could say that there was never any intention on the part of the President not to consult fully with the Soviet Union on Japan especially after this first phase of the surrender period had terminated.

The Generalissimus remarked that recently the banks had been closed in Japan and their assets had been confiscated. What objections could be made after such a definite action had been taken? The Ambassador stated that the Soviet Union would be furnished with full information on all these subjects. These were matters which would be discussed at the advisory council. He continued that the Generalissimus would find that MacArthur had done only what was necessary to carry out the surrender terms and to protect the interests of the Allies. For this reason the President hoped that the Generalissimus would send a representative to Washington to discuss these matters.

The Generalissimus repeated that the establishment of the advisory council was an incorrect solution. If he sent representatives to Washington he feared that they would interfere with the work of the commission; they would become a nuisance and there would be a further deterioration in Soviet-American relations. Would it not be better for the Soviet Union to step aside and let the Americans act as they wished in

Japan? The Soviet Union would not interfere. For a long time the isolationists had been in power in the United States. He had never favored a policy of isolation, but perhaps now the Soviet Union should adopt such a policy. Perhaps in fact there was nothing wrong with it.

The Ambassador stated that he could only report to the President. He had informed the Generalissimus how the President wished to concert policy on Japan - this included full consultation with the Soviet Union and the other Allies. He had also explained that full consultation had perhaps been difficult during the first initial period of the surrender. After all, a period of two months was not a long time in the history of the two countries. The Generalissimus had spoken of Rumania and Bulgaria. During a similar period the Americans and the British had been upset as to the treatment accorded their representatives so that the Generalissimus' emotions were the American emotions during that period. The Generalissimus replied that the situation in the Balkans was entirely different. The Americans were accorded the same treatment the Soviets were extended in Italy. Then the situation changed. In addition there were no American or British troops in the Balkans. The Soviets had troops on Japanese territory. After Potsdam the treatment accorded to the American and British representatives in Bulgaria and Rumania was changed for the better. However no change was made in Italy with respect to the Soviet representatives. In addition, the Russians had maintained 20 to 40 divisions on the Manchurian frontier for the last ten years and recently up to 70 divisions had been in operation against Japan. The Soviet Union had made its contribution in the Japanese war. No one could say they had done nothing. Furthermore it had been ready to help the United States by landing troops on the Japanese islands. This offer had been rejected. (*) The Soviet Union had never done anything against the Allies in Bulgaria and Rumania which had not been done to the Soviet representatives in Italy.

The Ambassador stated that this was a matter of opinion. In any even the United States Government intended to treat the Russians honorably in Japan. If the Generalissimus thought that the situation had worked out otherwise he deeply regretted it. He had no information regarding the treatment of Soviet representatives in Japan. He could not speak of this matter. However, he wished to say a few words about the situation in Bulgaria and Rumania. According to his reports the American representatives there were in no way given as favorable treatment as that accorded to the Soviet representatives in Italy. However, he did not wish to argue this point. It was past history. He only wished to point out that these questions looked differently in Washington than in Moscow. Nonetheless they were ones which should be talked over as Allies and friends until agreement were reached.

The Ambassador recapitulated. He stated that according to his understanding the Generalissimus had suggested that the question of a control commission for Japan should be the subject of discussions between the two Governments and that the Soviet Government would not send a representative to Washington. The Generalissimus stated that this was correct. The advisory commission would not be able to decide anything. Such decisions must be reached on a government level. The Ambassador stated that he would return to Moscow in the morning where he had good communication facilities and that he would report fully to his Government.

(*) Interpreter's note:

When Stalin made this remark it was quite obvious from the tone of his voice and from the expression on his face that he was still very irked at our refusal to permit Soviet troops to land at Hokkaido [sic].

The Ambassador inquired whether there would be any useful purpose in discussing the London procedural question any further. He remarked that the Generalissimus had stated that the Japanese question should be settled first. The Generalissimus replied that the two questions should be settled simultaneously since they were linked together. The Ambassador inquired as to what he should report with respect to the Generalissimus' views on the procedural question. The Generalissimus replied that he had explained his point of view in yesterday's meeting. The Ambassador stated that as he understood it agreement should first be reached upon what nations should be invited to the proposed peace conference. The Generalissimus replied that it would be advisable to agree on this matter. The Ambassador inquired whether he was right in assuming that the Generalissimus was ready to have submitted to this conference the four peace treaties drawn up in accordance with the Potsdam 4-3-2 formula. The Generalissimus replied in the affirmative. He stated that he did not object to a general conference. However, first of all the rights of the members of this conference should be defined as against the rights of the signatories of the armistice terms. The Ambassador inquired as to what rights the Generalissimus had in mind. Who, for example should conclude the peace treaties? The Generalissimus replied that those who signed the surrender terms should be the nations to sign the peace treaties. The Ambassador inquired whether countries like Yugoslavia and Greece, insofar as Bulgaria was concerned, should have any rights in the final stage, that is in the actual conclusion of the peace, or only rights of expressing their views at the general conference. The Generalissimus replied that there was no objection on his part to such countries signing the peace. However, the nature of the peace treaties should be defined by the armistice makers.

The Ambassador inquired as to the Generalissimus' reaction to the list he had left with him last night. (The Generalissimus went out of the room to get the list). He then stated that he objected to the inclusion of China, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Norway and India. The rest had taken part in the war against Italy and he would accept them. The Ambassador stated that he knew the President felt that Belgium and Holland had been vitally affected by the war and should be brought into these discussions. The Ambassador and the Generalissimus thereupon went over the list. The Generalissimus stated that in addition to the Big Three, France, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Canada, Brazil and Ethiopia should participate in the peace conference. He objected to the participation of Norway, Holland, Belgium, Poland, India, China and Luxembourg. He did not "require" the participation of the Ukraine or White Russia.

The Ambassador reiterated the President's concept that this was one war against the Axis. Such countries like Norway, Holland and Belgium had been overrun by the Nazis. They were vitally interested in the peace. Norway and Holland had continued to fight with their navies and merchant shipping. The Generalissimus remarked that if these countries should be included all of the sixteen republics should also participate. They had fought and suffered. They had more independence than India. The

Ambassador inquired whether the sixteen republics could be placed in the same category as the sovereign independent countries of Belgium, Holland and Norway. The Generalissimus maintained that they were the same as India.

The Ambassador stated that he would immediately report in full to his Government as soon as he had returned to Moscow. He was very grateful for the amount of time the Generalissimus had given him and he wished to thank him most sincerely for the Generalissimus' hospitality and enjoyable time he had had during his visit to Gagri.

The Generalissimus concluded that he had not only received Mr. Harriman as the Ambassador of America but also as a friend. It would always be so.

EP/sj

Source: W.A. Harriman Papers, Library of Congress.

Gomulka's Memorandum of a Conversation with Stalin

1. The political situation in Poland

third quarter of 1945⁸⁰

On the PPS [Polish Socialist Party]. You are wrong if you think that Morawski⁸¹ is just naive. He is clever, and follows the orders of others who teach him and give him orders. There are smarter people in the PPS than he. Morawski does not want to oppose them and fulfills their orders. Before he obeyed Bierut, and now he is obeying others. They, that is, the PPS, will leave you anyway.

On the PSL [Polish Peasants' Party]. He [Stalin] is in possession of absolutely sure information that everything that the English ambassador does in Warsaw has been agreed upon with Mikolajczyk. Mikolajczyk is very careful, and although they are in possession of sufficient evidence of what he says to the English ambassador, that evidence is not good enough to compromise him in the eyes of the world. To the suggestion that there are political differences within the PSL, he declared that it is a fact that everybody listens to Mikolajczyk.

On the PPR [Polish Workers' Party]. You keep conducting defensive policy. You behave as if you were sitting in the dock. This is all caused by the fear that the bloc will break apart. Belonging to the bloc does not exclude party agitation. Your agitation is wrong. Your people are not ideologically armed. You need to have a clear program, written in striking terms, so that everybody will know what you want and what you are thinking about your coalition partners. You should clearly state your stance towards other parties. When talking about Mikolajczyk, you should talk about the Warsaw uprising and that his policy is aimed at bringing back the big landowners and foreign capitalists. About the PPS you need to say that it is a party that has certain good points, but you also need to point out their shortcomings. You have to call the antagonistic elements by name. You don't need to worry so much about the bloc disintegrating. If you are strong they are going to come to you. They wanted to isolate the French party the same way and now they cannot not consider them. Thorez⁸² gave nothing to the nation, and you gave a lot. It is ridiculous that you are afraid of accusations that you are against independence. It is bad that on this issue you moved to defensive positions, that you are trying to explain yourselves. You are the ones who built independence. If there were no PPR, there would be no independence. You created the army, built the state structures, the financial system, the economy, the state. Mikolajczyk was abroad at the time, and Morawski was lagging behind somewhere on your tail. Instead of telling them all that, you are saying only that you support independence. The PPR turned the USSR into an ally of Poland. The arguments are right there at your feet and you don't know how to make use of them. Take the example of a manager of a factory who cried all the time that he couldn't get any materials. And Stalin for two days walked around the factory and found everything that was needed. A membership of 200,000 is a force which can overturn a whole country if it is well organized, well managed and controlled, and if it

⁸⁰ Words "third quarter of 1945" added in Gomulka's hand on the original.

⁸¹ Edward Osóbka-Morawski, premier of TRJN (Temporary Government of National Unity).

⁸² Maurice Thorez, General Secretary of the Communist Party of France.

has instructions as to what to say and how to say it. Do not be so worried about the bloc, leave the inter-party diplomacy to Bierut, and fight for concrete issues: the question of independence, cooperatives, nationalization and state trade.

The issue of the premier. Morawski is not playing a positive role, he is only slowing things down at present. The paralysis of the authorities is a dangerous thing. Lange⁸³ will definitely be better. Morawski is a chicken compared to him. Lange was probably closely connected to Roosevelt and belonged to the circle of his trustworthy professor-informants who come to a country and give a good estimate of the situation within a short time. Presently Lange, together with the whole Roosevelt entourage, fell out of grace. This is how the fact that he took Polish citizenship can be explained. Will he, as a socialist, not listen to the PPS? Ask Wasilewska's opinion. She knows him well and has a good hunch about people. (Don't push Wasilewska away. She may still come back to Poland). He [Stalin] did not exclude the possibility that the PPR might take over the [office of the] premier. If your influence is equal to that of the PPS, why can they have a premier and not you? He agreed, however, that if the PPR were to take the office of the premier there would be a great outcry about the single-party system and about sovietization. He took the stance that it was needed and absolutely necessary to change the premier before the election. Morawski could be toppled over the question of cooperatives.

The issue of the election. Why do you think that the election should be postponed as much as possible? It will not be better, but worse. The economic situation will not be better, people will drift back from England, they (the opponents) will organize better and they may even bring you down. Because they know that, the PPS is suggesting that the election be in a year. The election should take place in the spring of 1946. Your Congress should start the election campaign. The fact that the PPS is not responding to your suggestion of creating a bloc should be treated as a refusal. You should address them in writing in an [official] document and say that if you receive no concrete reply you will consider it a refusal. He [Stalin] was not against the [idea of the] bloc but he expressed doubts as to the possibility of forming it and suggested entering the election alone. He said that with good agitation and a proper attitude the party may win a considerable number of votes. You have to stop being diffident.

The issue of the Party Congress. It is necessary to clearly break with the past of the KPP, and state that the PPR is a new party formed in the heat of the battle against the German invaders. The KPP was lead by Pilsudski's spies, who forced upon the party an unpopular policy, which isolated the party from the nation. He [Stalin] said he could show documents to prove it. [Those were] the testimony of Sosnowski⁸⁴, a close associate of Dzierzynski and a testimony of Dabal.⁸⁵ Do not invite any foreign parties to the Congress. If somebody were to come from WKP (b), there would be a completely unnecessary ovation.

⁸³ Oskar Lange, a well-known economist, active in the PPS and PZPR, was a professor at the University of Chicago during the war.

⁸⁴ Jan Sosnowski, active in SDKPiL, lived in the USSR after 1917. He died in the purges of 1937-38.

⁸⁵ Tomasz Dbal, one of the leaders of the KPP, died in the purges in 1938.

The congress should be a starting point for an offensive [election] campaign of the party. The knot of the question of independence can be untied beginning with the Congress.

Relations between the Soviet Union and the Anglo-Saxons. Do not believe in divergences between the English and the Americans. They are closely connected to each other. Their intelligence conducts lively operations against us in all countries. In Poland, in the Balkans, and in China, everywhere their agents spread the information that the war with us will break out any day now. I am completely assured that there will be no war, it is rubbish. They are not capable of waging war against us. Their armies have been disarmed by agitation for peace and will not raise their weapons against us. Not atomic bombs, but armies decide about the war. The goals of the intelligence activities are the following. First of all, they are trying to intimidate us and force us to yield in contentious issues concerning Japan, the Balkans, and the reparations. Secondly, [they want] to push us away from our allies -- Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. I asked them directly when they were starting the war against us. And they said "What are you saying? What are you saying?" [Russian: "*Shto vy? Shto vy?*"]. Whether in thirty years or so they want to have another war is another issue. This would bring them great profit, particularly in the case of America, which is beyond the oceans and couldn't care less about the effects of the war. Their policy of sparing Germany testifies to that. He who spares the aggressor wants another war. To the statement that there are rumors in America that soon there will be an agreement between America and the Soviet Union, he said "It is possible."

Intelligence Service. This part of the conversation took place because I informed him that the English keep alluding to my going to London. He declared: "I assure you that they are not inviting you for a good purpose. Do not refuse directly, but don't go." There is a group of complete rascals and ruthless murderers in the Intelligence Service, who will fulfill any order given to them. They are the ones who killed Sikorski. He [the one who gave the order for Sikorski's assassination] was Governor of Gibraltar at the time, the former head of the English Military Mission in the USSR, and a ruthless murderer. He prepared the crash of Sikorski's plane. When Stalin asked Churchill what happened to Sikorski, Churchill answered "I gave them strict orders that nothing like that was to happen again," as if you could kill the same man twice. They killed Sikorski probably because he threatened the English that [Poland will move] to the American side. They tried to kill Tito three times. Once they incited the Germans against him. Tito was with his Staff and there were about two hundred English and American officers there who left him one day before the attempted attack. The Germans performed a landing operation on Tito's Headquarters. Tito was saved by a Soviet pilot who took him away to an island. Not long ago they organized a train crash, but Tito took the train a day earlier and his car on the train was empty. In 1942 when Molotov was in London, the English invited the people accompanying Molotov for a ride on a four-engine plane. The English officers and Molotov's people all died. When the English really care about [killing] someone, they sacrifice their own people as well. When we go to England, we use our own planes, our own fuel, and have our own guards by the plane to make sure that they don't add anything to the fuel. The Soviet pilots explained Sikorski's crash [by saying] that powder must have been added to the fuel. The English usually invite you to their country to find out what your weak spots are through either drunkenness or

women. Whenever they can, they blackmail the chosen victim and try to recruit people. Unszticht⁸⁶ was also recruited this way by the czarist police.

Loans. If America wants to give, you should take, but without any conditions. You need to reject the open-door policy, since they use this policy only towards colonial countries. You can give the Americans most-privileged-nation status. You cannot reject the proposal to permit trade representatives in [the country] because you don't officially have a monopoly on foreign trade, and private capital exists in your country. You can agree to having particular projects built in your country in ports, in Warsaw, or other places, but you cannot agree to concessions. We want to take from them six billion at 2.5% for forty years; the payments would start in nine years. At first they were telling us about the open door policy as well, but they had to back out and suggested that we ask them for loans. We don't want to ask until we are sure that we are going to receive. They are already backing out, because they gave us four hundred million from lend-lease⁸⁷ on our conditions. You will have to establish some customs tariffs. It provides state income and there is no state without tariffs. You also have to guard well the frontiers on the USSR side.

Nationalization. You need to carry it out. It would be good if it were the act of a new premier. The National Council [Polish: *Krajowa Rada*] should pass it. You should not tie your hands with a clause about damages. You could for example call it a "fair compensation." Check how Mexico did it with their industry so that you will always be able to say that you follow Mexico's, not Russia's, example.

Quotas. It will be difficult for you to keep the quotas for two to three years. The best way is for the state to have reserves and force the farmers to lower their prices by interfering in the market. This is what we did in Latvia and Estonia by throwing one hundred thousand tons of crops [on the market] and lowering the price of bread five times.

Inflation. It is impossible to avoid it. You should not fall into the extreme inflation like after World War I, but you cannot economize on production credits.

Western Territories. He [Stalin] expressed surprise that Zhukov doesn't want to accept the Germans [living in Poland]. You should create such conditions for the Germans that they want to escape themselves. Keep only the ones you need. Wieslaw [Gomulka] should not take the Ministry of Western Territories, he should concentrate on the party and the election campaign. Somebody else needs to be found for that post. He [Gomulka] should not even take formal responsibility for Western Territories. You should learn from our experience and have a few vice-premiers, each watching over several Ministries. You should not be afraid . . . [line missing from copy?] . . . you have twenty people and keep shuffling them around. It is impossible that during all this time you did not educate many good people. You should not pump the people out of the party although you were right to have taken the

⁸⁶ Józef Unszticht, active in SDKPiL, lived in the USSR after 1917, died in purges in 1937-38.

⁸⁷ The Lend-Lease Act of 1941, on the basis of which the USSR received from the United States equipment and supplies worth 11 billion dollars during the war.

responsibility for the country. If the party gets stronger it will be easier to do the state work as well.

State domains⁸⁸ in the Western Territories. The idea is correct, but where are you going to get the labor force from? Because of the agricultural reforms, for a few years in Poland there will be no influx of people from the countryside to the cities. We are starting to implement a different policy in soviet communes [Russian: *sovchoz*]. We give the workers housing and some land, between half a hectare and hectare for an accessory farm. We did the same with railroad workers. We have been attacked "from the left" that we are creating a new petty bourgeoisie. This is incorrect and not Marxist. Great capital creates around it a craftsman- and petty-bourgeois-focused environment as a reserve of labor force. America, the most capitalist of countries, can be taken as an example here. America's crafts and light industry are also the most developed [in the world]. A socialist farm also has to create such an environment as a reserve of labor force. Changes are occurring in the Soviet Union in the laws governing labor. In the past, the rule was that as the most qualified, metal industry workers earned the most. We suffer the "misfortune of no unemployment," and therefore people do not want to do hard labor, such as mining, for example. Therefore we pay more to unqualified workers performing hard labor, such as miners, than we pay metal industry workers.

Transportation. The most important issue. First he [Stalin] was against moving Minc into transportation, but later agreed to it, once he found out that we had no people in transportation. He stipulated that Minc should not leave industry. He promised to look into our proposals concerning transportation, particularly the question of moving transit onto the seaside line. He sees no possibilities for us to get locomotives and train cars with their help.

Reparations. He [Stalin] stated that they are beginning to implement a new system of reparations, namely instead of bringing in machines that would start running not earlier than after a year, they are planning to start production in Germany within a few weeks. There are specialists -- engineers -- there, and a lot can be produced and reparations can be received in the form of ready products. This is even more necessary because for reasons relating to transportation, bringing in machines is very difficult. The Germans are very pleased with that. He was interested in our detailed needs and said that we can obtain a lot if we use that system.

Agricultural reform in Germany. The English and Americans are furious, but we are doing our thing. This way we are destroying the junkers, a class which is economically most combative. Forests, of which there have been too many in Germany, are also getting divided.

About the conversation between Bierut and Molotov. He [Stalin] was notified by Lebedev⁸⁹ that on the basis of his conversation with Molotov, Bierut drew a conclusion about a shift of the Soviet position towards Poland. He showed particular interest in the course of

⁸⁸ State-run farms.

⁸⁹ Viktor Lebedev. USSR Ambassador in Warsaw, 1945-52.

that conversation and concluded that there is no shift towards Poland whatsoever and that Molotov was probably in a bad mood at the time.

About the navy. Explain to me [Stalin] what happened concerning the navy. How could it have happened that you believed that we wanted to give you ships instead of machines as reparations. I explained to Bierut twice that it wasn't the case, and Bierut kept muttering something about gasoline. I had the impression that you simply did not want any communist bunkers in your country. You are ashamed of it. I scolded Bulganin for [passing on] inaccurate information that you will be getting ships at the cost of reparations. He is a clumsy and not very flexible man. The whole time Stalin thought that we will receive ships as an advance on the 15% of the one-third of the trophy German navy. [Stalin said] In Potsdam I promised to give [it] to you for free, but the 15% of the navy ships is more than I had promised. It has been taken from the enemy, after all, and Bierut got angry with me that I am not giving things away for free. Such lack of trust spoils relations. In the meantime, Stalin called Wyszynski and Kuznetsov concerning this matter. He came back after the phone conversation and declared that the matter stands worse than he thought, and that the Soviet bureaucrats really want to cheat you [Poles] and count twenty-three ships as reparations and you are agreeing to it. It is all coming from Bulganin. If you think there are no stupid generals, you are wrong. Later Stalin declared that they will have to give us those ships for free. In the meantime, another phone call came from Moscow. It became clear that the 15% mentioned in the Polish-Soviet agreement refers to the commercial fleet, not the navy, and that apparently an agreement was reached in Moscow with a Polish delegation that the twenty-three ships are to be counted in exchange for the shipwrecks which the Soviet navy will raise from the bottom of the Polish sea and take. Stalin asked that the copy of the agreement be sent to him. He agreed to it unwillingly, as if it were a *fait accompli*.

The army. Concerning officers of the Red Army taking Polish citizenship in the Polish Army -- many of them do not want to take it because they are afraid that the leadership will change. We don't want to force them. You should polonize the army all the way through. You can let go of the Red Army generals and officers whenever you want, as soon as possible. If you need a released soldier's help, they should help you, but as an instructor. If it upsets Bulganin, that means he doesn't understand anything. You keep doing your thing and don't pay attention to that. Why did you approach Bulganin and not a military attaché in Poland? When he found out about the issue involving rear-admiral Abramov⁹⁰, he pointed out that we should not put Soviet people in uncomfortable positions, that is, inviting them to certain posts [only to] release them later.

The Red Army in Poland. There are no international circumstances that would require keeping large troops of the Red Army in Poland. Only small troops guarding the transit railroad line could be left. The only question is your domestic situation. The point is that they would not kill you. The situation is similar in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. They don't want us to leave before the election, either. The number of Red Army soldiers in Poland is steadily diminishing and will continue to diminish. We will soon pull the last soldier out of

⁹⁰ Nikolai Abramov, rear-admiral, a Russian officer who for five months (August-December 1945) was Chief of Staff of the Polish navy.

Czechoslovakia under the condition that the Americans pull out as well. He [Stalin] generally spoke for localization but make no concrete promises concerning that matter. He stated that after the war, plundering instincts were awakened among the Red Army soldiers. In Berlin alone they took two hundred thousand watches. One of the reasons is that the command of the Red Army allowed the released soldiers to take some amount of spoils home. When the demobilization is over marauding will end as well.

Grain for sowing. He was embarrassed when he found out that Molotov refused to lend [Poland] fifty thousand tons of grain for sowing. He was urging us to take thirty thousand although he wasn't sure whether it could still be done. He called Rokossovskii [and told him] to give the thirty thousand tons as a loan. He confirmed that order to Molotov by phone.

Zaolzie. You have coking coal, so economically your problem is solved. Nobody but us would support your claims. We would be risking defeat if we supported your claims. Why should you or we compromise ourselves? You should solve this situation by resettling the population. You need to organize some kind of Polish-Czech conference. We can help you with it if you want us to. It is no good that all the Slavic countries unite, and only two of them are arguing.

Yugoslavia. The picture of the partisan movement in Yugoslavia was not as pretty as it seemed from afar. During the take over of Bialogród⁹¹ Tito was in Moscow. The partisans could not keep up an open battle with the Germans at all. However, Tito was much more ruthless towards the enemy than you. Of thirty-four thousand of Pavelicz's⁹² captives [POW's -- trans.] he had fourteen thousand shot. The English demanded that we influence Tito in order to postpone the election once Szubaszic⁹³ left the government. We answered that Tito's government is the only legally valid and universally recognized government of Yugoslavia and only that government can decide about the election. The English have already been silent for two weeks concerning this matter. The English were the ones who forced Szubaszic to leave the government.

Revkom.⁹⁴ Stalin was on the front line at the time. Dzierzynski dreamed of a Soviet Poland. Lenin unwillingly agreed to Revkom. We very quickly realized that creating Revkom was a mistake. In a country such as Poland, which for so many years was under foreign rule, choosing Soviet rule was a mistake. Lenin tried to explain it as prodding Poland with a bayonet just to see. But of course that is not a sufficient explanation.

⁹¹ Belgrade.

⁹² Ante Pavelic, a Croatian politician and soldier who collaborated with the Germans during World War II.

⁹³ Ivan Subasic, premier of the Yugoslavian emigration government in London in 1944. In 1945, after an agreement with Josip Broz Tito, he became a Minister Of Internal Affairs in Tito's government. He resigned from that post after several months.

⁹⁴ The Temporary Revolutionary Committee of Poland, which was to become the Polish Soviet Government in case the Red Army won in 1920. It existed for a short period of time in the summer of 1920 on the territory seized by the Red Army. Julian Marchlewski was the Chairman; other members were Feliks Dzierzynski, Feliks Kon, Edward Próchniak and Józef Unszlicht.

END NOTES

1. Letter of a Swedish sailor-communist to the Soviet Government concerning anti-Soviet agitation in Gdansk and Gdynia.
2. The delay in the invitation was caused by the unexpected arrival of Harriman at Sochi.
3. Truman removed Hopkins.
4. Freedom of the press -- Lenin treated like a German spy by the bourgeois press.
5. Associated Press and Timoshenko⁹⁵ - Stalin in Teheran and forcing the correspondent to publish a denial which was dictated to him under threat of expulsion from the Soviet Union.
6. Good-naturedly calling us "tolstoyniks" during dinner.
7. Benefits from power -- Georgian deputy who bought oxen and built two houses.

Source: Andrzej Werblan, "New Evidence on Poland in the Early Cold War," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 11 (Winter 1998), pp. 134-40 (Gomulka papers, in possession of the Gomulka family).

Translated by Anna Elliot-Zielenska.

⁹⁵ Semyon Timoshenko, a USSR marshal.

**I.V. Stalin's Conversation with W. Gomulka and G. Minc
about the Situation in Poland.⁹⁶**

Moscow

November 14, 1945
SECRET

To Comrade MOLOTOV for the Four

The conversation was not recorded (the Poles did not consider it necessary to record it), therefore, I am summarizing the essence of the conversation in the form of questions and answers.

The Poles' question. Has the attitude of the Soviet Leaders to Poland and, in particular -- to Polish communists, changed?

Comrade Stalin's answer. No, it has not changed and it could not change. We see the Poles and the Polish Communists as friends, as we used to.

Question. Should we pass a law on nationalization of big industry and banks?

Answer. After Benesh had passed such a law, the time has come when it became necessary to pass this law in Poland also.

Question. Should we allow foreign capital in Poland in the form of concessions or in any other form?

Answer. This question is a very serious one, and the Poles themselves should think about it very seriously.

Note: The Poles did not say anything to the effect that some time ago they rejected a Soviet proposal about joint ventures. I had an impression that the Poles would not mind to make concessions to foreign capital on this issue.

Question. Should we accept the proposal of the PPS about renouncing of state bread collection and introducing free market mechanism without price regimentation?

Answer. As sad as it is, sooner or later the Poles would have to accept that measure, because under any system, other than Soviet, and in the situation of the absence of war, there is no possibility to preserve the system of bread collection and fix prices for a very long time.

Question. Would I be against if the Poles accepted a loan from the Americans or the British, and would I accept it if that credit was received on the conditions which limit the freedom of its use in Poland to some degree?

⁹⁶ Copies distributed to V. Molotov, L. Beria, G. Malenkov, A. Mikoyan, A. Vyshinsky.

Answer. You can accept a loan but without any conditions that would limit Poland's freedom in using the money.

Question. Can we sign an agreement of mutual assistance with France?

Answer. Yes, you can; however, it should be in accordance with the spirit of the mutual assistance pact between Poland and the USSR.

Question. Should we elaborate on the Teshin question and can the USSR give Poland support in negotiations on Teshin with the Czechoslovaks?

Answer. I advice not to stressed this issue any more, because after Poland has received the Silezia coking coal, Poland does not have any more arguments for transferring Teshin to the Poles, and, therefore, the USSR cannot give the Poles any support on that issue. It would be desirable to remove this controversial issue from your relations with Czechoslovakia, to be satisfied with a relocation of the Teshin Poles to Poland, and to revive good relations with Czechoslovakia. The USSR can provide support for the Poles in negotiations with Czechoslovakia on the issue of relocating the Teshin Poles to Poland.

Question. Should we invite representatives of the All-Union Communist Party (b) to the Congress of PWP, which will convene in the nearest future?

Answer. It would be better not to invite them, so that our opponents would not be able to say that the PWP Congress was under the control of the All-Union Communist Party (b).

Question. Can we state at the PWP Congress that the PWP is a follower of the line and the tradition of the Polish Communist Party, which was liquidated before the war?

Answer. No, you should not do that, because the Communist Party of Poland in reality became a collection of Pilsudski's agents, although our enemies painted them as agents of the All-Union Communist Party (b). It would be desirable to state that the PWP represents a new party and that it is not connected with the line and traditions of the Polish Communist Party at the Congress of PWP.

Question. Are we correct in thinking that it would be expedient to postpone general elections in Poland for one more year?

Answer. I think that it would be advisable to hold elections no later than the spring of 1946, because it would be very difficult to postpone the elections any longer, both because of the internal and international considerations.

Question. Osobka-Morawski is not behaving properly, and if he does not change that in the nearest future, we would like to replace him even before holding the elections by Mr. Lange (current Polish Ambassador in the USA, moderate member of the PPS, who, according to the Poles, is favorably inclined toward the Communists). What can you suggest?

Answer. If you do not have any other alternatives, and if you cannot nominate Bierut in this case (the Poles consider this combination inexpedient), then you could try Lange with the objective to use him to undermine the PPS. Consult with Vanda L'vovna, who knows Lange very well.

Further discussion touched upon the issues of providing the Poles with 30 tons of seed grain from the Rokossovski reserves on a reciprocal basis, and of satisfying their request regarding the rail transportation, but you already know about it.

STALIN

Source: Vostochnaia Evropa, edited by G.P. Murashko, et al, vol. 1, pp. 301-03 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 355, l. 8-11).

Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.

**Record of I.V. Stalin's Conversation
with Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Bulgaria K. Georgiev,
Ministers P. Stainov, A. Yugov, and Envoy to the USSR D. Mikhachev
about Implementation of the Decisions of the Moscow Conference
of Three Foreign Ministers on Bulgaria.**

Moscow

January 7, 1946
TOP SECRET

From the Soviet side -- Comrades I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, and S.P. Kirsanov

From the Bulgarian side -- Chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers Mr. K. Georgiev, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. P. Stainov, Minister of the Interior Mr. A. Yugov, and Bulgarian Envoy to the USSR Mr. D. Mikhachev.

The conversation lasted one hour and a half from 10:10 p.m. to 11:40 p.m.

In the beginning of the conversation, after the exchange of greetings, Comrade Stalin asked K. Georgiev about the consequences of the drought, which occurred in Bulgaria in 1945, and about the state of livestock agriculture. K. Georgiev responded that the drought brought serious damages for agriculture in all Bulgaria, excluding Southern Dobrudgi. At the same time, he said that the abundant snow that Bulgaria is experiencing right now, gives reasons to expect good harvest in 1946. The fall sowing plan was fulfilled almost at 100% throughout the entire country. As far as livestock agriculture is concerned, the chronic crisis in this area, which has only intensified in 1945 because of the drought, in Georgiev's opinion, will last for at least 2 or 3 years. After this, Comrade Stalin turned to questions related to the implementation of the decisions of the Moscow Conference of Three Ministers on Bulgaria, which took up the rest of the time. The participants did not raise other issues during the conversation.

Comrade Stalin: "What about your opposition? We were informed that you had difficulties in the implementation of the decisions of the Moscow Conference".

In response to this question, K. Georgiev said that all Bulgarian people received the decisions of the Moscow Conference on Bulgaria with satisfaction. The government of the Patriotic Front has special reasons to be satisfied by this decision, because the positions of the Patriotic Front were fully accommodated in it.

Comrade Stalin: "Does it create any difficulties for your situation?"

K. Georgiev responds that the government does not have any grounds to complain about those decisions. The decisions were good and acceptable for both sides – for the government as well as for the opposition.

Georgiev further says that initially it seemed that there would be no people in Bulgaria, who would be against those decisions, however, in reality it was not so. The first information, which the government received about the mood among the opposition circles after the Moscow decisions were published, were that the opposition, especially the farmers' opposition, was peacefully inclined. Having received the friendly advice from the Soviet government, the Bulgarian government in separate letters invited leaders of the opposition

groups that split from the Patriotic Front – the farmers and the social-democrats – N. Petkov and K. Lulchev –to select their delegates for negotiations with the government delegates on the issue of participation of those groups' representatives in the government of the Patriotic Front. On January 5, they had meetings with representatives of both groups, one after another. During those meetings, the government delegation stated, in accordance with the decisions of the Moscow Conference, that their task is to supplement the current government with two representatives of other democratic groups, but not to reconstruct the government. K. Georgiev named the conditions presented to the opposition groups for sending their representatives to the government and commented on those conditions (see supplement # 2).⁹⁷ Petkov in his conversation with the government delegation was more peacefully inclined than the delegates from the social-democrats, among whom there was such a person as Pastuhov, who never had anything in common with the Patriotic Front. Responding to the desire of the delegates of the opposition groups, the Bulgarian government gave a written summary of their conditions for including representatives of those groups into the government with a request to respond to it in writing on the next day, on January 6. Yesterday, on January 6, the government received written responses from those groups. From a comparison of those responses, one can conclude that both of these groups acted in coordination. Their responses are almost identical. (K. Georgiev hands Comrade Stalin the response of farmers' group of N. Petkov. See attachment # 1)⁹⁸ As one can see from these responses, Georgiev continues, the opposition presents absolutely unacceptable proposals and disregards the decisions of the Moscow Conference on Bulgaria. These statements are clearly in contradiction with the decisions of the Moscow Conference.

Comrade Stalin, looking at Petkov's answer, interjects a phrase: "Formally, they recognized this agreement, but in essence they reject it. This is a common trick of the crooks."

K. Georgiev agrees with that and informs Stalin that taking into account the obvious refusal of the Bulgarian opposition to abide by the decisions of the Moscow Conference, the Bulgarian government decided in the middle of the day today to make a special announcement about the new situation on the radio. (K. Georgiev passes Comrade Stalin a text of the statement. See attachment # 2)

Comrade Stalin asks, whether the statement was already published, and having received an affirmative answer says that the Bulgarian government rushed with its publication and that it could complicate the situation. The statement itself, says Comrade Stalin, is also incorrectly written. It does not include the original texts of Petkov's and Lulchev's responses. Those responses are given in a summary form, and are summarized only approximately. The opposition could claim in such a case that the government purposefully altered their documents.

Comrade Stalin then tells the Bulgarian ministers how the decisions concerning Bulgaria were made at the Moscow Conference of Three Ministers. The British and the Americans,--he says, --raised the Bulgarian question together with the Romanian question. They demanded in regards to both states that: (1) Ministry of the Interior should be neutralized; (2) that governments of both countries should make official statements to the effect that they would guarantee freedom of speech, press, and the right of parties to present

⁹⁷ Was not published.

⁹⁸ Was not published.

separate lists for the elections; (3) to include representatives of opposition parties into the government, and to reconstruct those governments. They did not say that the Bulgarian elections were not valid. They did not speak about changing internal and foreign policies either.

We responded to them that first of all, we need to distinguish Romania from Bulgaria, because Bulgaria had already held elections. They agreed with this. Then we said that opposition should be loyal, as it is, for example, in America. We declined the British and American demand concerning the reconstruction of the Bulgarian government. They agreed with this also. In regards to Romania, we refused their request about including Maniu, Lupu, and Dino Brutianu⁹⁹ into the government. The demand for the reconstruction of the Romanian government was also refused. We stated to the British and the Americans that the Romanian government was behaving well and that there were no grounds for its reconstruction. As far as the elections are concerned, we agreed that the Romanian government would give assurances regarding freedom of convention, speech, and press. The British and the Americans wanted the Bulgarian government to give relevant assurances too. We did not agree with that. We did not agree to neutralize the Romanian Ministry of the Interior.

Therefore, the decisions on Bulgaria did not include anything related to the reconstruction of the government or holding new elections, or changing internal policy.

Today,--continues Comrade Stalin,--we received information that they already made a deal in Romania. By the way, the Romanian government did not accept just any representatives of opposition parties in the government. The National-Tsaranists, for example, proposed Mikhalaki.¹⁰⁰ They were told that this candidacy would not work. Then they proposed other candidates. The candidacy of Bebe Brutianu was also declined. They found another candidate.

It is more difficult in this respect in Bulgaria, although it would seem that it should be easier here. The decisions of the Moscow Conference on Bulgaria were more beneficial for the Bulgarian government than the decisions on Romania for the Romanian government. In reality, however, it turns out that the Bulgarian government gives more to the Bulgarian opposition than the Romanian government does. In Romania, representatives of the opposition, included in the government, do not get any portfolios. In Bulgaria, the opponents get Ministerial Posts, and they still do not want to participate in the government. That is simply obnoxious,--concludes Comrade Stalin.

Comrade Stalin and Molotov then asked the Bulgarian Ministers what did they plan to do next.

K. Georgiev makes a suggestion that maybe the agreement achieved in Bucharest would be sobering for the Bulgarian opposition, but at the same time he makes it clear that he does not believe in that, saying that the opposition gets bad advice from the outside. If it was only possible,--he said,--to stop that bad advice, or replace it with good advice. To Comrade Stalin's question--from whom does the opposition get bad advice,-- Georgiev responds--from American political representative Barnes -- and states that Barnes linked his name with the Bulgarian opposition so closely, and that he does not pay any attention to any accepted norms of behavior of diplomatic representatives.

⁹⁹ As in the original. Should be Bratianu.

¹⁰⁰ As in the original. Should be Mihkalake.

After this, the participants engaged in an active exchange. I am quoting the most important statements of the conversation.

Comrade Stalin: "Obviously, we will have to interfere. It is clear that neither Petkov nor Lulchev, no Pastuhov should be in the government."

Comrade Molotov: "Can we consider your negotiations with the opposition completed?"

K. Georgiev: "Formally, the negotiations were not interrupted, but in essence it is hopeless."

Comrade Stalin: "Everything came to a good conclusion in Romania. The opposition there turned out to be smarter. The King was happier than anyone about the agreements that were achieved. He almost cried, so happy he was. They could kick him out, and now, thank God, he is safe for the time being."

Stainov: "The acceptance of the results of the elections is our most difficult issue."

Comrade Stalin: "The elections are over. Your opposition can go to hell. It boycotted those elections. Three great powers recognized the results of the elections. Isn't it clear from the decisions of the Moscow Conference on Bulgaria?"

Stainov: "Yes. The opposition turned out to be short-sighted."

Comrade Stalin: "You cannot always be far-sighted. Churchill was much more far-sighted than your opposition, and during the Berlin Conference he assured us that he would definitely receive the majority in the Parliament. Ettlí was only hoping to increase his vote a little bit, but he did not think that his party would receive the majority in the Parliament. You cannot foresee everything, it is difficult.

The British and the Americans thought that if the elections in Bulgaria were free, then the Patriotic Front would receive the minority of the vote, but that is not the way it happened."

K. Georgiev: "They looked at us through the glasses of our opposition."

Comrade Stalin: "Now both, the British and the Americans, confirmed that the elections were legitimate."

Comrade Molotov: "There is not a single word about elections in the Moscow communiqué. Nothing is said about the freedom of the press either. The British and the Americans had signed the communiqué. Consequently, the opposition lost their support on those issues. Of course, behind the curtains, the British and the Americans will still support the opposition, but they would not be able to do it officially. You never had such a situation before."

Stainov: "Yes, it is a silent acceptance of the results of the elections."

Comrade Stalin: "When is Vyshinsky going to London? Can we send him to Bulgaria first, so that he would resolve those issues? Of course, neither Petkov nor Lulchev should be included in the government. And if the British and the Americans do not want to recognize the Bulgarian government, we could wait on this recognition. They did not recognize us for many years."

Stainov: "I think that even after Vyshinsky's visit, the opposition would not take part in the government."

Comrade Stalin: "That is not the problem. Now the argument is between the government and the opposition. If the negotiations fail, the responsibility could be shifted to the Bulgarian government. However, if Vyshinsky comes to Bulgaria, who was a member of

the Moscow Conference, a neutral person in your conflict, it will be a different case. If it fails, we take the responsibility onto ourselves. Then nobody will blame you for that.”

Stainov: “We are not afraid of responsibility.”

K. Georgiev: “We are taking our political habits into account--that is why not only we presented our conditions in the written form, but also demanded that the opposition does so too.”

Comrade Stalin: “You acted incorrectly. You should not have started with a written presentation of conditions. You should have started with oral negotiations, and step by step orally force your opponents to give up some of their positions, and only after that you could force them to present their demands in writing. And now you have tied your opponents’ hands. It will be very difficult for them to retreat. One can see that you do not have enough experience of negotiations between parties.”

K. Georgiev: “Those are blinded and dishonest people. If we have not started from a written presentation of our positions, then next day they would attribute things you did not even dream of to us.”

Comrade Stalin: “Petkov has a peasant psychology. He is afraid of paper. A peasant can do many things as long as he is not forced to sign any documents, and if he has to sign something, he tries to put all kind of conditions on it.

I believe that a positive decision on this issue would be favorable both for you and for us. However, if the opposition does not do it, the worse for them. The opposition will die. We will do fine without it. Petkov should not think that the USSR and America will go to war because of him.”

Stainov: “We need the opposition to recognize the results of the election.”

Comrade Stalin: “Do you really need Petkov’s recognition so much?

Seems that Vyshinsky would have to explain the Moscow decisions to Bulgarians”.

Comrade Molotov: “This is a position that we had already won. You understand Moscow decisions incorrectly. The results of the elections are already recognized by the Moscow Conference. The absence of any references to elections in the decisions of that Conference did not happen by chance. Do not demand from the opposition that they recognize the elections.”

Comrade Stalin: “It is an axiom, and you are trying to turn this axiom into a theorem . You have only one problem – to supplement the current government with two representatives of opposition groups. (Stalin asks Vyshinsky on the telephone, when the agreement on including representatives of the opposition into the Romanian government could be published, and gives him instructions in regards to Bulgaria: “Petkov obnoxiously demands a reconstruction of the Bulgarian government and a dissolution of the Parliament. He is a jerk. He should be shown his place as we did it with the Romanian King”). Petkov and Lulchev should be asked just one question--whether they want to select their representatives to the government, or they do not. All other questions should be removed. The Romanians had a much more difficult situation, they did not even have elections yet, and, besides, they have a King, not just the opposition. It is just a misunderstanding that you gave your Petkovs the opportunity to present any kind of conditions and declarations.”

Stainov and Mikhalchev: “And what will happen if the opposition refuses to take part in the government even after Vyshinsky’s visit?”

Comrade Stalin: “In such a case, the responsibility would lie with us, not with you. You could be accused for undermining the Moscow decisions, but they cannot accuse us,

they will not dare to. The main objective is to undermine the opposition. The decisions of the Moscow Conference on Romania and Bulgaria are already beginning to undermine the oppositions in these countries, because all it says is only that the current governments should be supplemented with two representatives of the opposition. It is very different from what the British and the Americans had promised, and not at all what the opposition leaders were hoping for. Everybody criticizes the British and the Americans in Romania already. If leaders of your opposition do not send their representatives to the government, a fight among the oppositions is inevitable.”

The conversation was recorded by KIRSANOV

Attachment: as mentioned above.

Original

Source: Vostochnaia Evropa, edited by G.P. Murashko, et al, vol. 1, pp. 355-61 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 252, l. 28-29)

Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.

Report by Walter Ulbricht on a Meeting with Stalin
on 2.6.1946 at Nine in the Evening

departed 28.1.1946
arrival 6.2.1946

Unification agreed — line correct
Socialist Party of Germany
in Bebel's time necessary workers
independent
Socialist Unity Party of Germany
May 1
Party conference
"United" ["Einige"]

Minimum program
Unity Germany
in Western zone
change name KPD in Socialist Unit. Party

Maximum program
transition question
situation entirely different
in Rus[sia] shortest road
domin[ation] of the working class
detour Lenin renegade Kautsky
in the West parl[iamentary] traditions
via democratic road
to worker power
not dictatorship
purge of the state apparatus
communalizing of the businesses
dispossession of the large landholders

Socialism

Economic questions
factory council elections
municipal elections
Mittelstahl-Werke Riesa [Steel plant Riesa]

Our demand — whether dismantling (*to end*)
until end of Febr[uary]
2nd half of March factory council elections
reservations until calculation

Economic plan too early for entire year
Material help
1946 only quarter plan

Economic guidelines agreed

Situation raw materials
30,000 t[ons] cotton for sov.[iet] troops
Coal Zwickau — briquettes
Germany cannot live without the Ruhr area
Saar area possibly as compromise
No permission given, for separation,
although French demanded already

Unity is correct

Trade union question
Majority conquered — companies

Election result in Americ.[an] zone
Paper for Western zone —
that is not designed (*as*) KPD
Weekly paper
more radio

Company — entrepreneur — dangers
Order no. 124 is not sufficient
not German law
whether referendum agreed in SU
purge
handing over [of property] very much agreed
Election law
Land reform
in Western zones referendum

Nuremberg trial has no effect on the masses
because only occupation powers
whether locally in Germany-
good example
start a trial
Mutschmann Saxony
Act against militarism —
prisoners of war
generals, only when sick, back

Communal elections

Join[t] committee decision

Right to vote at 18 years

4 parties should apply with Zhukov

not state legislatures, but central legislature

(German parliament)

Point 7 inserted —

parliament

Financial questions — bank credit balances

demand middle cl[ass] [Bürgerl.] — national [Reichs] debt 10%

accept

small savers 2-3 Bil[lion] needed

because of national debt turn to Marshal

Women — develop leaders

Youth

Farmers — needed — create leading figures —

farmers library

Nazis question — were no Nazis — majority

Campaign against SU (Schumacher)

Excursions from Western zone into Easter zone

Statements of principle (on 10.2 to Secretaries)

in Thuringia

Easter April 21 a[nd] 22 states [Landes]-unification

Saturday 27, 28, 29 unification — on May 1

Study commission

on basis meeting with party secr.[etary/ies] draft

Source: Wilhelm Pieck: Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik 1945-1953, edited by Rolf Badstübner and Wilfried Loth, pp. 68-70 (ZPA [Central Party Archive] NL 36/631, pp. 33-34, 49).

Translated by Ruud van Dijk, Dickinson College.

Answers to the Questions of Mr. E. Gilmore

March 22, 1946

Gilmore: What importance do you attach to the United Nations as a means of preserving international peace?

Stalin: I attach great importance to the United Nations, since it is a serious instrument of preserving peace and international security. The strength of this international organization consists of the fact that it is based on the principle of equal rights of states, and not on the principle of the supremacy of one over another. If the United Nations henceforward succeeds in maintaining the principle of equality, then it will doubtless play a major, positive role in the matter of guaranteeing peace and security.

Gilmore: What, in your opinion, has caused the present threat of war that many people in several countries are feeling?

Stalin: I am convinced that no nations, nor their armies, are striving for a new war - they want peace and are striving to ensure peace. That is, the "present threat of war" has been brought forth by the actions of certain political groups engaged in propaganda for a new war and, thus, sowing the seeds of discord and mistrust.

Gilmore: What must the governments of freedom-loving countries do in the present day for the preservation of peace and order throughout the world?

Stalin: It is necessary that society and the governing circles of states [engage in] counter-propaganda against the propagandists of a new war and for the preservation of peace. [This must be done] so that no speech of the propagandists of a new war remains without rebuff by society and the press, and in order to expose the instigators of a new war in a timely manner and not give them any opportunity to abuse freedom of speech against the interests of peace.

Source: I.V. Stalin, Sochineniia, vol. 16, p. 32.

Translated by Mike Thurman.

Cable from B. Smith to Secretary of State

711.61/4-546: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

Moscow, April 5, 1946 - 6 p.m.
[Received 6:38 p.m.]

1053. I had an interview with Generalissimo Stalin at 9 o'clock last night. Because I thought that the conversation might become stormy I went alone. Mr. Molotov was with Stalin.

The conference lasted a little over 2 hours, and opened on a very restrained note. The interpreter read President Truman's letter¹⁰¹ after which I stated that when I left the United States the most important question in the minds of the American people was "What does the Soviet Union want, and how far is Russia going to go?" While the United States could appreciate Soviet desires for security and participation in exploiting the world's raw materials, and consequently did not strongly criticize what seemed to be some of the Soviet objectives, the methods used by the Soviet Union caused grave apprehension, and gave the general impression in America that the Soviet Government did not mean what it said. Neither the American people nor the American Government could take seriously the possibility of aggressive action against the Soviet Union by any nation or group of nations in the world today. We felt certain that no possible combination of powers could threaten the Soviet Union without the active support of the United States, and our entire history precluded the possibility that we would ever lend support to aggressive action. If further proof were wanted, it could be found in the speed with which we were demobilizing our vast military strength.

The United States is willing and anxious to meet the Soviet Union half way because we are convinced that if our two nations understand and cooperate with each other the peace of the world is assured. Indeed, we felt that we had already gone more than half way. We appreciate and admire the strength of the Soviet Union, but at the same time we are fully conscious of our own strength.

The United States entered the United Nations organization with the full support of its people and with a complete sense of the responsibility we assumed for the peace of the world. We believe profoundly that only by the sincere observance of the principles and obligations of the United Nations Charter on the part of all members is there any hope for a stable and peaceful world. Events which have taken place in the Near East, in Asia, and later in the early sessions of the present Security Council meeting had caused doubts in the minds of the American people that the Soviet Union really intended fully to support the United Nations as an agency for insuring world peace to the extent that the United States intended to support it, although by the end of the war we had been assured that unqualified support

¹⁰¹ Text of this letter has not been found in the Department files, but it is known to have contained an invitation to Stalin to visit the United States. See the final paragraph of the present telegram; and see also Walter Bedell Smith, *Moscow Mission, 1946-1949* (London, 1950), pp. 15, 35, and 88. President Truman was himself questioned about this invitation at his news conference of May 31, 1946; see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1946* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 281-283 *passim*.

would be forthcoming from the USSR. These apprehensions had been somewhat allayed by the Generalissimo Stalin's statement to the Associated Press, but more was needed.

The President had asked me to say that both he and Secretary Byrnes had always believed that when the Generalissimo made a statement or a commitment he meant to keep it, and the American people hoped that events would confirm that belief, but it would be misinterpreting the character of the United States to assume that because we are basically peaceful and deeply interested in world security, we are either divided, weak or unwilling to face our responsibilities. If the people of the United States were ever to become convinced that we are faced with a wave of progressive aggression on the part of any powerful nation or group of nations, we would react exactly as we have in the past.

The fact is that we are faced in America, as is the USSR, with the responsibility of making important long-range decisions on our future military policy, and these decisions will depend to a large extent on what our people believe to be the policies of the Soviet Union. If each of our two nations is convinced of the other's sincerity in supporting the principles of the United Nations Charter, then these policies can be settled without difficulty in the way we most earnestly desire. On the other hand, if both nations remain apprehensive and suspicious of each other, we may both find ourselves embarked upon an expensive policy of rearmament and the maintenance of large military establishments which we wish to avoid.

Generalissimo Stalin replied at length and in great detail, and his remarks included counter-charges directed against our own actions and policies. The sequence and length of his argument made it obvious that the United States' comments had been anticipated.

He discussed the Iranian question, beginning with a history of Soviet-Iranian relations from the time of the Treaty of Versailles as known to the Department. He stated quite frankly that Qavam's predecessor¹⁰² was definitely unfriendly to Russia and that pressure had been exerted for his removal and for the appointment of a successor who was not unfriendly. He cited similar instances from British and American international relations.

He then spoke at length of the obstacles placed in the way of Soviet efforts to obtain oil concessions, particularly by Great Britain and later by the United States and commented somewhat bitterly on the fact that the delay asked by Russia in considering the Iranian question in the Security Council had been opposed by the US, saying that if such a request had been made by the US in similar circumstances the Soviet Union would willingly and gladly have conceded it. Now, however, an agreement had been reached with the Iranian Government, the Soviet Union was committed to the complete withdrawal of its troops by May 5th, and this commitment would be met. He remarked that he had made known to President Truman and to Secretary Byrnes the reasons why he felt unable to meet the previous withdrawal date, and had encountered no objection at that time.

He then discussed the general question of Soviet adherence to the United Nations Charter, which he reaffirmed, but deplored the fact that the American press and American statesmen had given an entirely incorrect idea of Russia's objectives. The USSR had no intentions of taking over the Balkan nations, nor would this be an easy matter as the Balkan nations were determined to maintain their national integrity.

He spoke very strongly about Mr. Churchill's speech in Fulton which he interpreted as an unfriendly act and an unwarranted attack on himself and the USSR which, if it had been directed against the United States, would never have been permitted in Russia. He implied

¹⁰² Ibrahim Hakimi was the predecessor of Ahmad Qavam as Prime Minister of Iran.

that this speech and many other occurrences could indicate nothing but a definite alignment of Great Britain and the United States against the USSR. With regard to the Far East, he said that twice the withdrawal of Soviet troops had been delayed at the request of the Chinese Government which later complained, remarking contemptuously: "That is just like such people."

He then said that Russia was anxious to reduce her military establishment, and, apparently under the impression that I had intended to propose some such thing, said that the Soviet Government would be very willing to discuss with the US a mutual reduction of armaments.

In reply I said that with regard to Iran there was no slightest idea on the part of the US of denying to USSR an equal opportunity with others to exploit natural resources, and we would, in fact, give moral support to such equal opportunity, but we deplored the approach to a concession under threat of armed force when it seemed entirely possible for the Soviet Union to have kept her commitment on the agreed date of withdrawal of her troops from Iran and still have obtained the oil concessions they desired. The Generalissimo said that on previous occasions when their attempt to obtain concession for Iranian oil had been blocked by Great Britain he had not noticed that the US had supported Russia's just requests. I replied that I recalled no instance where the matter had been brought officially to the attention of the US, or that we had ever been in a position to express an opinion or to give moral support to the USSR at the time.

With regard to the Soviet Union's security aspirations, I said again that the people of the US could not take seriously the idea that any combination of powers now constituted a threat to the USSR. On the contrary, we had noted the fate of Latvia, Lithuania, Esthonia, the present situation in the Balkan States and in the Near East, and we asked ourselves if this were only the beginning; that it must be said that we were beginning to believe that the Soviet idea of a friendly government and our own was very different. It seemed to us that what the USSR meant by a friendly government was a government which was under the complete control of Moscow, and not one which was capable of self-determination.

I then asked directly why the Generalissimo thought that any power or powers seemed a threat to the USSR. To this he replied: "Churchill—He tried to instigate war against Russia, and persuaded the US to join him in armed occupation of part of our territory in 1919, and lately he has been at it again."

"Russia," he said, "as the events of the past few years have proved, is not stupid, and we can recognize our friends from our potential enemies."

I replied that we ourselves must plead stupidity since it was impossible for us to imagine a threat to Russia, particularly in the direction of the Baku oil fields, or any serious attempt at aggression without the support of the United States, which would never be given to aggression.

I then asked him categorically if he really believed that the US and Great Britain were united in an alliance to thwart Russia. He replied that he did so believe. I said that this was certainly not the case; that, while the US had many ties with Britain, including common language and many common interests, we were interested primarily in world security and justice; that this interest and responsibility extended to small nations as well as large; and that while recent events had caused the US Delegation to vote with Britain, it was because we felt that justice required us to do so. On the other hand, there was no nation in the world with whom we were more interested in arriving at a basis of understanding than with Russia, as

we felt that the future of the world for a long time to come lay in the hands of our two nations.

With regard to his statement that Russia did not intend to go much further, I asked if this implied active expansion at the expense of Turkey. He stated that he had assured President Truman that the Soviet Union had no intention of attacking Turkey, nor did this intention exist. On the other hand, the Soviet Union was conscious of the danger to Russia which existed in foreign control of the Straits which Turkey, with a government unfriendly to Russia, was too weak to protect. Consequently, the Soviets demanded a base in the Dardanelles. I replied that it would seem that this was a matter which could and should be handled by the United Nations, the agency set up to provide such security, and that by so doing Soviet security might be safeguarded without aggression toward Turkey. He then said that the USSR could possibly agree that as an alternative the Security Council of the United Nations might be able to undertake this responsibility.

By this time the atmosphere had become distinctly more cordial, and Stalin's remarks, interspersed with complimentary references to the accomplishments of the American Army and various American Generals, became very much more personal in tone. Since I felt that the position of the US had been made quite clear, and the conference had already lasted more than 2 hours, I concluded by restating our desires for a closer relationship and mutual understanding with the Government of the USSR which we considered essential for world peace. Marshal Stalin replied: "Prosper your efforts. I will help you. I am at your disposal at any time." He then re-affirmed his desire for peace and adherence to the principles of the United Nations going to some length in discussing the differences in our political ideologies, which were nevertheless not incompatible, and stated that we "should not be alarmed or apprehensive because of differences of opinion and arguments which occur in families and even between brothers because with patience and good will these differences would be reconciled." He hoped in the future that they might be reconciled before coming formally on the floor of the United Nations Conference, since that resulted in embarrassment to one side or the other.

Speaking of the President's invitation to visit the United States, he said he would like much to be able to accept. However, he said: "Age has taken its toll. My doctors tell me that I must not travel, and I am kept on a strict diet. I will write to the President, thank him, and explain the reasons why I cannot now accept."

SMITH

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States 1946, vol. VI, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, pp. 732-36.

Bierut's Telephone Conversation with Stalin
on 7 April 1946, at 6 p.m.

Stalin: I have been told that you wanted to talk with me yesterday?

Bierut: Yes, Comrade Stalin. I have sent to you [*ya pereslal na Vasheh imya*] a telegram relating to two matters very important for us.

Stalin: Please, tell me what are these matters.

Bierut: The first one - is our request to you to help us once again in overcoming our difficult food situation. We have a deficit of 300 tons of grain till the new crops. The UNRRA refuses to provide us the agreed quantities of grain. This refusal puts us in an exceptionally difficult situation. We have no choice, but to ask you for assistance.

Stalin: I understand you. How much grain would you like to receive and of what kind?

B.: We are short of 300 thousand tons. As far as the types are concerned, we will send you a specification [*zayavku*].

St.: You see, com. Bierut, I should explain to you what difficulties we have in meeting your demand. If your demand had come earlier, we would have been able to satisfy you fully. But a few days ago we made a commitment and concluded an agreement with France. French communists called on us with a request, as they have a difficult situation with supplies. The Americans and British don't want to give them, they are attempting to put pressure on them to force them to submission. The British don't have food for themselves. But they would like to undermine the present system in France. We have decided to give the French 500 thousand tons of grain to support them. That's why we have concluded an agreement with them. We are going to assist you too, but we may be having difficulties in meeting your request to that extent. We will try to give you up to 200 thousand tons. We are mainly short of wheat. Please specify for us what kind of grain you want. Perhaps when the situation clarifies itself in July we can give you more - we will add, but now we cannot commit ourselves.

B.: We are deeply grateful to you, com. Stalin for this assistance. The demand regarding specifications we are going to send right away.

St.: What to thank for? We consider it our duty to assist you. What is your other question?

B.: The second question relates to the supplies of our coal. We have calculated that we won't be able in the current year, i.e. till 1 April 1947 to supply you more than 9 million tons. But 1/3 of that quantity we would like to ship within the trade agreement, since we are unable to do without Soviet imports.

St.: Yes, Molotov told me about this. How much should you deliver till that date?

B.: According to the agreements we should deliver 12 million tons, but we won't be able to do this. Based on the norms of the present deliveries we can guarantee only 9 million tons.

St.: Well, if you cannot do more, we won't insist. But you have allegedly raised the question that we ship you products from Germany. Have you really made such demand?

B.: We presented the question of compensation for coal deliveries on the basis of an agreement from August 1945. We have in mind machinery, equipment and industrial goods from Germany - all what we can obtain at present as war reparations, because otherwise coal deliveries without the corresponding compensations would create a strenuous situation in our national economy.

St.: We will try to give it.

B.: I have one more thing, com. Stalin. We need certain types of military equipment for the army. For example, rifle and artillery bullets.

St.: Bullets?

B.: Yes, shells and rifle bullets, some parts for the air force and other military equipment, which we are short of. Couldn't you extend us credit for imports of this equipment from the USSR, since we would not be able to pay for it now.

St.: Good. We will give you credit. Send in your order for what you need. Is it all?

B.: If you can spare for me a few more minutes, I would take advantage of it to inform you about our internal questions.

St.: Please, I will be glad to.

B.: So, we have decided to hold a referendum in June. All parties have supported this decision.

St.: Except for Mikołajczyk?

St.: No, Mikołajczyk has accepted too. He just insisted on earlier elections to the parliament. He would like to hold it in early fall, we are for mid- or late fall, but not later than November. His agreement with respect to the referendum can be explained by the fact that a policy of splitting the electoral bloc would cause discontent among the lower echelons and a break-up of smaller groups. As a matter of fact, for the time being these groups are not headed by outstanding leaders, with the exception of Upper Silesia, where Mikołajczyk's policies are being opposed by one of the more distinguished activists. In any case one can say that rather wide circles of the Mikołajczyk's party are dissatisfied with the break-up of the electoral bloc.

St.: In the lower echelons?

B.: Yes, in the last days there was a meeting of the Main Council of PPS. At that meeting a decision was taken on the question of relations with the Żuławski group. Based on an agreement concluded earlier between the PPS leadership and that group - 12 members of the Żuławski group were to be elected to the Main Council. Under our pressure the PPS leadership decided to reduce that number to 6, including also Żuławski. The latter one has refused and if he stands by this refusal, it would be an important step in the direction of cleansing the leadership bodies of PPS from the influence of right-wingers.

St.: Is your connection and relationship with the PPS strengthening or deteriorating?

B.: Undoubtedly, in the recent period they have strengthened in connection with our fight with the Mikołajczyk party.

St.: Well, it's very good. Thank you for your information. I wish you a success.

Source: AAN, KC PZPR, 2724, k. 181-86.

Translated by Jan Chowaniec.

**TRANSLATION OF NOTES KEPT BY THE
HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER REGARDING
CONVERSATIONS WITH SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES
DURING THE VISIT TO MOSCOW
OF THE HUNGARIAN PRIME MINISTER**

April 9, 1945 - April 18, 1946, Inclusive

April 9, 1946.

Molotov received us at 6:30 p.m. He was with Dekanozov, Deputy Foreign Minister, Pushkin and his secretary Pavlov, Hungarians: myself, Minister Szekfu and Secretary Nizskacs as interpreter.

Upon Molotov's request I outlined to him my ideas about territorial questions connected with the preparation of peace. Hungary has territorial problems with only two countries: Czechoslovakia and Roumania. As regards Czechoslovakia, the question was not raised by us. It was forced on us as a consequence of the first Prague discussion, when they insisted on transferring from Slovakia a large amount of Hungarians to Hungary. To show our friendliness we accepted the principle of exchange of population. According to Masaryk's estimate the number of Slovaks accepting voluntary transfer to Slovakia was about 2-300.000. On the basis of present information, their number does not exceed 50-60.000, so that after the exchange of population about 600.000 Hungarians would remain in Slovakia. The Czechs plan to grant Czechoslovak citizenship to about 200.000/ either because they speak the language or because they have Slovak relatives or ancestors/. In view of the bad conditions in which the Hungarians live in Slovakia it is possible that many will take Slovakian citizenship. The balance of 400,000 would be divided as follows: about half would be distributed in Czechoslovakia and the other half transferred to Hungary. This would be too heavy a load on Hungary and we therefore ask for assistance in trying to obtain that the Hungarians remain in Czechoslovakia without being disturbed and with equal civil rights.

If, however, the Czechs should insist on the transfer of Hungarians, the territorial question becomes acute.

Molotov listened with attention. He expressed his approval on our having made an agreement on exchange of population and his hope that the Czechoslovaks will grant equal rights to Hungarians in Slovakia.

I then submitted the Transylvanian question and the two proposals which we have worked out to settle the Roumanian Border. The first proposal includes annexation to Hungary of 11.800 square Km with 967.000 inhabitants, of which 442.000 are Hungarian and 421.000 Roumanian, while 104.000 of other nationality/German and Slovak/. This would be the ethnical rearrangement of the boundary, which has the disadvantage of leaving the larger part of Hungarians in Roumania, while many Roumanians would remain on Hungarian territory. The sound public opinion is not so much worried by the territorial question as by the destiny of Hungarians which will be left on Roumanian territory. We know that Groza's policy has been friendly to the Hungarians, but we also know that his policy is sabotaged by his officials and by the reactionaries.

Molotov asked which were the main complaints on the part of Hungarians in Roumania.

I replied that the complaints are particularly of an economic character. Every effort is made to destroy Hungarians economically. This does not affect only middle class and the wealthier class, which is easier to understand, but also the small farmer and poor people, workers, small traders, etc. Not even fanatics believe in Hungary that it is possible to obtain the territory where the Szekely population lives. Our plan is therefore to have as many Roumanians on Hungarian territory as Hungarians on Roumanian territory. This is the basis of the second plan which applies to a territory of 22.000 Km². This is not more than one fifth of Transylvania. This territory includes 900.000 Roumanians so that there still would be 180.000 Hungarians in excess on Roumanian territory, i.e. 1.080.000. But generally speaking it would result in an approximate equilibrium, which is the best guarantee for the two countries treating their minorities humanly. If however this treatment could not be secured, the second plan offers the advantage of making possible an exchange of population and all Hungarians or Roumanians could be settled down on this territory of 22.000 Km². This territory also has a certain economic basis and a geographic justification. It includes forests which are important to Hungary, a considerable production of sulphur/for fertilizers/a small production of metals. The loss would not affect Roumania sensibly.

Molotov listened with attention and said that in the Armistice agreement the Allies had promised to assist Roumania in the reannexation of Transylvania or of the larger part of Transylvania.

I replied that our plan was not in contradiction to this as our maximum demand is 22.000 Km² i.e. 1/5 of the whole Transylvanian territory.

Molotov thanked me and without giving me a hint as to the Soviet intentions, the conversation was terminated.

(pp. 115 - 117)

April 11

Stalin received us at the Kremlin at 9:30 p.m. Hungarians: myself, Nagy Ferenc, Szakasits, Geroe and Szekfue. Russians: Stalin, Molotov, Dekanozov, Puskin and Grigoriev, as interpreter.

Nagy Ferenc: He thanked Stalin for liberation and for the democratic development which the country could obtain through Russian assistance. He talked about land reform, nationalization of mines, supervision of banks. He said that he thought it necessary to report on the results of one year of Hungarian democracy. Stalin interrupted him and said that Hungary is a free and independent country and therefore her Prime Minister is not obliged to make reports so that he considers Nagy's expose as the communication of a friendly country. Nagy then spoke about the fight against reaction. Stalin then spoke about the difficult economic situation of Hungary, particularly about inflation. The Prime Minister outlined the recent economic program of the Hungarian Government. He requested Stalin to send one or two Soviet economic experts to Hungary to help the Hungarian Government with their advice by examining the economic situation and finding a solution of difficulties.

Stalin asked about the behaviour of the Red Army in Hungary. The Prime Minister said that there has been some trouble in the past, as it always happens in the case of occupation, but that complaints were now reduced to a minimum. Stalin then said that the occupying troops would be soon withdrawn from Hungary and only small detachments would remain.

Then, the matter of reparations was discussed. The Prime Minister said that reparations represent a great difficulty to Hungary, under present economic conditions. The Government intends to do his best to comply with obligations, but they do not know whether this will be possible. He asked for extension of the reparation period. Stalin said he agrees and details will have to be discussed.

Nagy then mentioned Red Army claims for payment of railroad expenses. Stalin was much amused by Gero's expose. The Red Army asked for payment of 14 million dollars for work which was largely done by Hungarian workers. When Gero said that claims include repairs done on lines which are located in Austria and Czechoslovakia, Stalin burst out laughing. He told Gero not to pay.

Gero then said that the Red Army has painted Russian trophies on MAV cars, which are then leased to the Hungarian Railways at very high international rates. Stalin said that in his opinion the cars which were owned by Hungary and which are required for transportation by the Hungarian railways should be returned to the Hungarian railways.

Nagy asked for the assistance of the Soviet Union and of the Generalissimo in the question of Hungarian displaced property in the Western European territory. Stalin said that Hungary will have these assets returned, at least the gold.

Nagy then mentioned peace preparation. He said that we have no claims towards Yugoslavia. He then mentioned Czechoslovakia on the same lines as outlined by me to Molotov on April 9. Stalin said it would be necessary for the two countries to make an agreement including an exchange of population. Nagy then said that there are many more Hungarians in Slovakia then vice versa. Stalin said this is not the substance of the problem. the Soviets have transferred 1 million Poles and obtained only 100,000 Ukrainians and in spite of this the Soviets have realized the exchange of population. However, not all Governments are able to take such courageous measures.

Then I commented on the subject in the same manner as in the case of Molotov.

Stalin replied that the Czechs would be willing to discuss territorial questions, but they are afraid of the Slovaks. Stalin said that in his opinion the obtaining of equal rights for Hungarians in Slovakia is absolutely justified.

Nagy then spoke about the Transylvanian question and that the Foreign Minister had certain plans on this subject. Puskin interrupted and said that the Foreign Minister has maps. Thereupon I showed the maps to Stalin who rose from his seat and looked at the map with great interest. I outlined my plans as already done to Molotov. During the whole time, Stalin listened attentively and looked several times at the map. He asked twice whether any exchange of population was involved in the plan, whereupon I said that it was not included in the plan but that it was possible under the plan. Stalin joked and said that if the Soviets accept the plan, the King of Roumania will abdicate. Nagy said that Roumania would then at least become a Republic like Hungary. Stalin then asked Molotov about the terms of the Roumanian Armistice Agreement. Molotov told him that the Allies will support the Roumanian claims for all or at least the greater part of Transylvania. Stalin thought a while and then said that he would think the matter and that we will meet again.

The interview lasted two hours.

The whole conversation had the character of a friendly talk under the influence of Stalin's personality, which though giving the impression of his historic individuality, also showed his human and encouraging side. The delegation was at first somewhat embarrassed, because at the beginning Stalin looked rather stern. But then we saw that his severity was due more to the interest he was taking in the matter and to concentration of his attention. He showed sparks of the Stalin humor and this encouraged the members of the delegation, who felt that it stood in front of the greatest son of a great country and of the perhaps greatest popular personality of history whose monumentality did not however lack a certain community of spirit with us.

(pp. 118 - 120)

April 12

At 6:30 a two hours interview at the Foreign Office with Dekanozov and Grigorjev, the latter acting as interpreter.

The first question raised by me was the problem of war prisoners. I asked for permission of correspondence to be granted to PWs. D. agreed and said that details should be discussed. I suggested that correspondence should be made possible on cards printed in Russian (difficulties are mainly due to the fact that the Russians have not a sufficient number of censors speaking Hungarian). In addition of securing by this method news to the families, it would also give us an idea of how many prisoners there still are. I asked D. to authorize Szekfue to discuss details with the Soviet Foreign Office.

D. agreed to my request. I also asked for authorization to have the Soviet Foreign Office forward the 200 letters sent by PW family members to the Hungarian Legation in Moscow. D. Agreed. I also asked him to make it possible for PWs, who have special political merits to return home exceptionally. D. Agreed to this also.

I then mentioned the 1 million Rubel loan to be given to our Legation. Puskin had told me in Budapest that the matter would be arranged as soon as the Legation was established. Up to now only 100,000 rubels were received. This causes difficulties. D. told me he knew about the matter. His financial advisers told him that it was necessary first to make an agreement. He advised me to discuss the matter with Mr. Csucusulin at the Vnyestorg bank. I also told him that the National Bank had transferred money and that the Legation had not received any notice. D. said he did not know this matter.

I then outlined our peace plans. The matter is not only important but also very urgent, due to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on April 25. In this situation it was my aim to try and find out what the Soviet intentions are in respect to South Eastern Europe. I do not want the Soviets to inform me of their views as I suppose that this is not possible. My intention is to ascertain whether our plans are not in opposition to Soviet political interests. My policy was from the beginning friendly to the Soviets and I do not want to make plans which would be contrary to Soviet political interests. D. agreed to what I said and I then spoke about Czechoslovakia and told him how glad and thankful we were that Stalin had approved of our contention as regards equal rights to Hungarians in Slovakia. Stalin's assistance in this matter is of great value to us and fills us with hope. I then outlined the Roumanian program in the same manner as to Molotov. I understand — I said — that Soviet Union is friendly both to Roumania and to Hungary and does not wish to affect the interests of either of these countries. Therefore I do not insist on having a decided support. But I would like to know if the smaller plan is not in contrast with Soviet plans.

D. said he understands our difficulties and also personally my difficulties in trying to satisfy the demands of my party. What claims will be made at the Peace conference is a matter to be decided by the Hungarian Government, particularly by Nagy Ferenc, as Prime Minister and leader of the majority party. In his opinion, the Prime Minister should discuss the matter with Groza, attempting to reach an agreement with him.

I then asked D. whether the Soviet Union would give active support for such an agreement to be reached.

D. then said they cannot do it for political reasons. This is the task of the two Prime Ministers.

I then said that if the Soviets do not participate intensively in such agreement to be reached, I do not see any possibility of concluding an agreement. I had suggested an exchange of views with Groza to Puskin in writing, but have received no answer. Anyhow it is too late now, as we have only two weeks before the beginning of the Peace Conference.

D. agreed that the time was too short.

I added that in any case I did not see any possibility to reach an agreement. If Groza renounces one square kilometer of territory before elections, he would cause himself great damage politically. The Hungarian Government would be accused of having lost a possibility of obtaining a much better result, if it had not yielded in the discussions with Groza. Responsibility is so large that neither of the two Governments can undertake it. Already in the case of the Czechoslovak negotiations we agreed with Clementis that regardless of the goodwill of both of us in the cardinal questions, the political problems involved are such that they can be solved only by an international decision.

I told D. that my idea was to submit to the Peace Conference our maximum demand, as Groza will evidently also submit his maximum demand of the whole Transylvanian territories. Both Tatarescu and Groza have declared publicly that they consider the present boundaries as definitive. In my opinion Groza would suffer no harm if we submit the maximum proposal. If we submitted a proposition which would be accepted immediately by the Allies, it might mean a defeat for Groza, but if we come with a proposition and in this connection Groza obtains a certain success this position is even better. If we see that the maximum demand does not meet the understanding of the Allies, we have still the smaller plan as a reserve.

D. only said that the Roumanian Armistice Agreement applies to the annexation to Roumania of Transylvania or of a large part of Transylvania. I then said that our maximum demand did not represent more than one fifth of Transylvania. D. did not make any comment to this.

In the long and lively interview I was unable to ascertain the Soviet opinion on the matter. D. then asked whether the Hungarian Delegation at the Peace Conference was already appointed. I told him that there was a plan under which the delegation would be composed of the Foreign Minister, the representatives of the parties and the experts but that this plan had not yet been finally discussed.

(pp. 121 - 123)

THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA*

SECRET

AMERICAN LEGATION
Budapest, Hungary, April 23, 1946.

Dear Jimmie:

Supplementing my letter of yesterday, I now enclose translation of Notes by the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Dr. Gyongyosi, of a conversation on April 15, 1946 at Moscow between members of the Hungarian Delegation and Foreign Minister Molotov.

I also enclose translation of excerpts from the toast delivered by Stalin at a dinner for the Hungarian Delegation on April 16, 1946.

I enclose two extra copies of these two papers and would ask you to be so kind as to turn them over to Mr. Reber for the Department's files. I sent him duplicate copies of my letter of April 22, 1946 to you before I knew he would be with you in Paris, as I gather from today's radio bulletin.

With best regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld
American Minister

Enclosures: (2) (In triplicate)

1. Translation of Notes by Hungarian Foreign Minister dated April 15, 1946.
2. Translation of excerpts from toast delivered by Stalin on April 16, 1946.

The Honorable
James C. Dunn,
American Deputy to the
Council of Foreign Ministers,
Paris, France.

*Box 100, RG-43, N.A.

(p. 124)

**TRANSLATION OF NOTES KEPT BY THE
HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER REGARDING
CONVERSATIONS WITH SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES
DURING THE VISIT TO MOSCOW OF THE
HUNGARIAN PRIME MINISTER**

April 15, 1946.

April 15.

Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Molotov, Pushkin, Kemeny Secretary of Legation, Grigorjev Secr. of Legation

Molotov replying to the questions raised in Moscow by the Hungarian delegation, first spoke about the Czechoslovak and Roumanian problems. In his opinion these questions should be settled by negotiations directly with the countries concerned. In connection with Roumania he emphasized the fact that it would not be advisable to submit the question to the Peace Conference, without having it first discussed with Roumania.

Gyongyosi said — after the Prime Minister stated that Hungary agrees with Molotov's suggestion and will attempt to realize it — that the plan involves difficulties. He indicated that both CSR and Roumania will have elections soon and their governments would have difficulties with public opinion if they agreed prior to elections with any proposal which might be unpopular. This circumstance also affected the Prague negotiations, as although the negotiators could have agreed on many points, they were handicapped by politics. This is indicated also by the protocol of the Prague negotiations by the sentence that any problems which cannot be solved through negotiations will be submitted internationally. Hungary has already had elections but the public opinion represented by the majority party is just as difficult to handle as in Roumania. If direct negotiations do not lead to a positive result, the Government will be accused of having made an error and that it would have been better to submit the question to the Peace Conference. Therefore, Hungary is able to negotiate the matter directly only if the Soviet Union is ready to initiate these discussions.

The Prime Minister interrupted and said that he believes it is desirable to have a mutual agreement between the two interested countries and in his opinion, if the countries do not agree, they must be made to agree.

Gyongyosi then asked in connection with Roumania which of the two countries should propose to start negotiations. Molotov said that it was only natural that the proposition should come from the country which has more interest in the matter, in this case Hungary. Gyongyosi then asked whether the Soviet Union would approve of such an initiative. Molotov gave an affirmative answer. The Prime Minister then said that all South Eastern democracies have troubles and that Hungary understands the difficult position of the Groza government and that it is in Hungary's interest to have Groza remain on his post. However, it is natural that Hungary is most interested in her own troubles. Molotov smiled in a manner which looked understanding.

Gyongyosi said that according to press news, the Roumanian delegation had already been invited to the conference and it has arrived in Paris, accompanied by a substantial documentation. Molotov said this was just a sensational report on the part of correspondents and that Hungary will be also invited and that Roumania will not be in a more favorable

situation than Roumania at the Peace Conference (*sic*). Prime Minister said he heard that the Roumanians had taken to Paris two carloads of documents. Molotov said smiling that it is not the quantity of documents which will influence decisions in Paris. Prime Minister said that at the Peace Conference they will not even read 2 kilos of documents and that if decisions could be affected by the weight of underlying documents, Hungary would have difficulties due to her shortage in transportation.

On reparations, Molotov said that the Soviet Union agrees to extend the term of 6 years to 8 years. The term for the wool and cotton processing shall also be extended until the middle of next year. He is willing to permit returning home of sick PWs and correspondence with their families will also be permitted. Details will have to be discussed separately.

As regards railroad transportation problems, these shall be discussed by the competent ministries of the two countries.

Thanking for the concessions made by the Soviet Union as regards the question of PWs, the Prime Minister said that he would like to raise a concrete question in this connection. Molotov interrupted and said that the delegation would have another opportunity to see Stalin and on this occasion they may mention any further question which has not been discussed heretofore. The Prime Minister thanked him and said that the Red Army have made prisoners many people, who were not members of fighting units and who were not even soldiers. This is not a large percentage of the Hungarian PWs, they do not exceed 10,000, but as many are farmers and they are required for cultivation in Spring, the Hungarian Government would like them to be released exceptionally.

Molotov said he had not heard of this before and he wants to obtain information but in principle is in favor of the proposed solution, which must however first be discussed.

Pushkin interrupted and said that this matter had been mentioned in Budapest, he had asked for lists but the Legation has never received these lists.

Gyongyosi said that these lists were progressively forwarded to the Legation. Molotov interrupted and said that he would do his best to obtain a favorable solution of the matter.

Then Molotov said that the communique should be worded in common and that it should contain only generalities although satisfying Hungarian and Soviet public opinion. Then, technical details regarding the communique were discussed, especially as regards inclusion of the concession on the reparation term.

The Prime Minister thanked Molotov for Hungary having been able to obtain an important success on all matters dependent on the decision of the Soviet Union.

**TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM THE TOAST
DELIVERED BY STALIN AT A DINNER FOR THE
HUNGARIAN DELEGATION ON APRIL 16,1946**

At present it seems that many medium and small countries are afraid of the Soviets. This fear is unjustified. Lenin stated that all nations, large or small, have their particular value and importance from the point of view of humanity. This principle still rules in Soviet policy. More than half of the Soviet population is non Russian, and consists of many nationalities. These nationalities enjoy complete autonomy and freedom.

The Soviets have always had sympathy for Hungary and always wanted to be on friendly terms with her. This was true even when the Hungarian regime was not democratic. Stalin then spoke about the Hungarian flags of 1849 which had been returned to Hungary by the Soviets in 1941. At that time, declarations made by Hungarians induced the Soviet to believe that Hungary was a real friend. In their simplicity the Soviet leaders did not know that this was only a fake. A few months after the flags had been returned, Hungary declared war on Russia. The fight was long and bloody. Horthy later was prepared to make an Armistice, but he had no character and energy. Szalasi continued the fight. Under such circumstances the Red Army could do nothing else than to fight too.

The Russian people have a debt towards Hungary. The Armies of the Czar helped the Austrians in 1849 to defeat the revolutionary Hungarian army. However, the Soviet Union, who executed the last Czar, Nicholas II, is not responsible for the sins of the Czarist regime.

He is now glad to know that the leaders of the Hungarian Nation are democrats and that they have come to Moscow. He emphasizes the fact that the Soviet Union always wanted friendship with Hungary, regardless of the latter's Government.

He then emptied his glass to the health of the friendly relations between Russia and Hungary.

BUDAPEST*
SECRET
Secret

April 25, 5 pm 1946
100
April 27, 4 am

From reliable source it is learned that at Foreign Affairs Committee of Assembly yesterday Gyongyosi stated Soviets had approved return of part of Transylvania to Hungary. At meeting with British MPs today Gyongyosi asked them to support this Hungarian claim. In reply they inquired what Great Britain could expect in return to which Gyongyosi could not provide satisfactory answer....

Schoenfeld

*Box 96, RG-43, N.A.

**Record of I. V. Stalin's Conversation
with the Hungarian Governmental Delegation
regarding Economic Issues and the Situation of Hungarians in Slovakia.**

Moscow

April 10, 1946

21:00

SECRET

PRESENT: V. M. Molotov, G. M. Pushkin, B. Ya. Grigoriev (USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Prime Minister Nagy Ferents, Deputy Prime Minister Sakashich Arpad, Minister of Foreign Affairs Diendeshi Janos, Minister of Transportation Gero Erno, and Hungarian Envoy Sekfu Dula.

Nagy says that on April 4 they celebrated first anniversary of Hungary's liberation from the Nazi rule. Hungary was liberated thanks to the heroic Red Army and Generalissimus Stalin. The Hungarian government understood that one year after the liberation they had to visit Generalissimus Stalin in order to express their gratitude for the liberation of Hungary, for freedom of the Hungarian political life, and for independence of the Hungarian motherland. According to Nagy, the Hungarian government must not only express its gratitude, but also report on how the Hungarians use the freedom granted to them thanks to Generalissimus Stalin's good will. Nagy asks for permission to briefly describe the situation in Hungary. He says that Hungary makes its policies by coalition, because the political parties that won the right to take part in the governing want to be equally responsible for the future of the Hungarian democracy. All the political parties accepted all the requirements of democracy. The Hungarian coalition rests on a wide political base, and that wide base gave it an opportunity to implement extensive reforms. They have implemented the land reform. The ruling elite was changed twice. The Hungarian Government has punished and continues to punish war criminals. The consolidation of the economic life is being carried out on the basis of the program of the left. The mines are being nationalized, and the big industries are being transferred under the state control. The National Bank and the largest banks of the country are also under the state control. They developed an economic plan, created the Department for Distribution of Raw Materials. The Hungarian government does everything in its capacity in order to put the liberated Hungarian people up on its feet in the economic sense. The Hungarian national policy is the most modern one, which has already been implemented in the Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia. The reaction is constantly attacking the Hungarian democracy. The government undertakes everything possible in order not to allow the reaction to organize. The economic bases of the reaction are being liquidated. The Hungarian democracy is still going to face struggle in the future, but this struggle will be successful. The invincibility of the Hungarian democracy will be ensured by reeducating the Hungarian people.

From the moment of Hungarian liberation Hungary's official foreign policy has been a pro-Russian policy. By educating people in this direction, the government strengthens democracy. This foreign policy -- one of the sincere and profound friendship with the Soviet Union -- is being incorporated into the soul of the Hungarian people. Apart from the feeling of gratitude, Hungary is obliged to pursue a realistic policy determined by its geographical and ethnic situation. The direction of this realistic policy leads toward the Soviet Union. Nagy says that precisely because of this realization he can inform Generalissimus Stalin with

a feeling of deep satisfaction that they have signed agreements on creating Soviet-Hungarian joint ventures in bauxite and petroleum production, and that they had concluded agreements on civil aviation and navigation even earlier in order to further strengthen the economic ties between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

Then Nagy says that the current leaders of the Hungarian policy were persecuted in the past, and that they seriously believe in their political principles. These leaders learned a lesson from the foreign policy, which was implemented by the reactionary Hungary. Nagy emphasizes that Hungary fully trusts the Soviet Union and Generalissimus Stalin, and that he, as Prime Minister of Hungary, made his short report on the occasion of the first anniversary of the country's liberation on the basis of this trust.

Comrade Stalin says that Prime Minister of Hungary does not have to report to him, because the Soviet government considers Hungary an independent country, and, therefore, the Soviet government considers what Mr. Prime Minister just has told us as information. Comrade Stalin thanks Nagy for the information.

Comrade Stalin asks, what is the Hungarian government doing to stabilize the Hungarian currency, and asks him whether the Soviet troops offend the Hungarian population. Comrade Stalin suggests that Nagy should speak about it openly and sincerely.

Nagy says that he would like to respond to the last question of Generalissimus first. In his words, the occupation army now does not experience any contradictions with the Hungarian population. Nagy states that he can say with a sincere joy that in the recent past there were only very rare incidents between the population and the occupation army. Often dishonest Hungarians abuse the occupation army themselves. Nagy says that the stay of a considerable number of the Red Army troops remains a serious burden for the Hungarian economy.

Comrade Stalin says that, according to Mr. Prime Minister's words, the Hungarian population cannot complain about the Red Army in moral terms.

Nagy confirms that the Hungarian population cannot complain about the Red Army in a moral sense—they only experience some economic difficulties.

Then Nagy reports that the Hungarian government undertook a number of steps to rebuild the economy. On April 7, the Hungarian government published its economic program. The Hungarian government, however, does not expect to achieve a complete improvement of the economic situation as a result of that program's implementation, but hopes to prevent further worsening of the economic life, and to create conditions for its improvement. The first government's action presupposes preparation of the state budget. Autonomous administrative units will be obligated to work under a strict budget, and will not be allowed to spend above the budget limits. This represents a beginning of big economy, which will begin with a significant decrease in the staff of the state apparatus and the Hungarian Army. This measure pursues not only economic goals but also aims at removing the remaining reactionary elements from the state and administrative apparatus. The Hungarian government anticipates serious benefits from transferring big plants working on reparation supplies under the state control. Those enterprises are financed by the state and, therefore, the control will be more effective.

Nagy says that currently in Hungary they are engaged in a serious struggle for increasing the extraction of coal and increasing the production of steel. The workload of the plants and the fulfillment of Hungary's obligations before the Soviet Union will depend on how they manage this task.

Comrade Stalin asks whether Hungary has sufficient amounts of coal.

Nagy says that Hungary is experiencing shortages of coal, and Mr. Gero adds that the daily extraction of coal in Hungary is currently 22 thousand tons.

Nagy states that Hungary makes serious efforts in the area of agricultural production. Hungary experiences serious shortages, does not have any reserves, and that determines the deterioration of the Hungarian currency.

Comrade Stalin asks what reserves do they have in mind.

Nagy responds that there are shortages of consumer goods and raw materials. Then Nagy says that the Hungarian government is hoping to stabilize the Hungarian currency under the condition if they can get a good harvest, and if the equipment, various properties, and gold, shipped by the Germans and the Salashists to the West, is returned to Hungary, and, finally, if the Hungarian government manages to improve the foreign trade balance of the country in order to provide the Hungarian industry with raw materials.

To Comrade Stalin's question about the volume of Hungarian property shipped away by the Germans and the Salashists, Nagy reports that according to the estimates of experts and specialists, that property is valued approximately at two billion American dollars. According to Nagy, this sum is getting smaller and smaller every day, because the Germans and the Austrians are squandering that property.

Comrade Stalin asks where is the Hungarian property shipped away by the Germans stored.

Nagy responds that the major part of the property is kept in the American occupation zone, and partially in the French zone.

Comrade Stalin asks who is authorized to resolve the issue of returning the Hungarian property.

Nagy reports that the American government decided to return an insignificant portion of the Hungarian property, which was taken to the West, and as far as the remaining part of the Hungarian property is concerned, they were told that the decision on that issue depended on the Great Powers.

Comrade Stalin says that the Soviet government will not be against returning that property to Hungary, and points out that not to return the Hungarian gold reserves would be against the law. Comrade Stalin says that the Soviet government will try to raise this issue at the conference of Foreign Ministers.

Nagy thanks Comrade Stalin for this statement.

Comrade Stalin says that part of Soviet troops will be gradually withdrawn from Hungary, and points out that all the troops cannot be withdrawn at the same time. Comrade Stalin states that some small number of troops will remain in Hungary and, therefore, part of the burden would be removed from the Hungarian economy. Then Comrade Stalin says that in order to improve the Hungarian economic situation, the Soviet government could prolong the Hungarian reparation payments.

Nagy expresses his deep gratitude to Comrade Stalin for this statement. Then he says that even small expenses could represent a serious burden for the Hungarian economy. Nonetheless, Hungary is trying to fulfill its obligations before the Soviet Union, and at the same time would be very grateful for any relief in these obligations.

Comrade Stalin asks if Hungary has iron ore.

Nagy informs Comrade Stalin that Hungary has a limited amount of iron ore.

To Comrade Stalin's question about the percentage of iron in the ore, Minister Gero says that the ore extracted in Hungary contains 32% of iron.

Comrade Stalin notes that it is a lot.

Nagy points to the fact that Hungary has to produce predominately industrial goods in order to fulfill its reparation obligations before the Soviet Union. In order to produce industrial goods, Hungary needs raw materials, mainly coke and iron ore. Iron ore could be supplied by the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The same relates to non-ferrous metals. The shortages of coke and metals complicates a production for reparation supplies. Nagy states that last year Hungary was considerably behind in fulfilling its reparation obligations before the Soviet Union, and thanks to the measures that they undertook, the reparation supplies for the months of the current year have already surpassed the total sum of deliveries of the last year. Nagy adds that in the sphere of the agricultural deliveries, Hungary was able to do considerably more than in deliveries of industrial products.

Then Nagy asks a permission to raise several economic questions before the Generalissimus. He says that last year the Soviet Union and Hungary concluded an agreement on exchange of goods. Cotton is the major part of deliveries from the Soviet Union. Hungary is willing to pay for it with finished textile products. The Hungarian government is asking the Soviet government to postpone the deadlines for deliveries of finished textile products by half a year.

Comrade Stalin says that he will talk to his colleagues about this question, and will try to do everything possible.

Nagy says that the Hungarian government will be very grateful for this.

Gero reports that in August of the last year they concluded an agreement on railroad communications. Under that agreement Hungary took on itself an obligation to pay for railroad repairs and for the railroad cars, including the trophy cars. In this connection, the Hungarian Minister of Transportation has recently received a bill for a big sum in American dollars from the International Department of the Transportation Ministry of the USSR.

To Comrade Stalin's question, what should Hungary pay for, Gero informs him that the bill that they received was for the rebuilding of the Hungarian, Austrian, Yugoslavian and Czechoslovak railroads, and even for one railroad that simply does not exist in the world.

Comrade Stalin asks who sent that bill.

Gero responds that the signature on the document was illegible, but the bill was received from the International Department of the Ministry of Transportation of the USSR.

Comrade Stalin asks whether they had an agreement with the Hungarian government on that issue.

Gero responds that last year temporary rules were introduced, and it was agreed that in the future we would conclude an agreement on this issue. Then Gero informed Stalin that the Hungarian industry has already rebuilt more than 10 thousand damaged and half-destroyed railroad cars and more than 600 engines.

Comrade Stalin asks if Hungary has any engine-building plants.

Gero reports that they have the plants and the repair shops.

To Comrade Stalin's question why they never spoke about it up until now, Gero explains that the bill was received on March 13, 1946.

Comrade Stalin suggests that Gero should talk with the Ministry of Transportation of the USSR on this issue and to put an end to this disorderly affair. Comrade Stalin says that

we need to discuss it and to sign an agreement. The question should be settled in such a way that Hungary would possess a sufficient number of railroad cars and engines. Comrade Stalin notes that the trophy cars do not belong to Hungary, and that all these questions should be decided and resolved here in Moscow. Comrade Stalin promises to help, so that this question could be resolved, taking into account the interests of the Hungarian economy.

Nagy thanks Comrade Stalin for his support on this issue.

Then Nagy asks for permission to describe the views of the Hungarian government regarding peaceful goals of Hungary to Generalissimus. Nagy states that the Hungarian government understands that Hungary received its independence and freedom as a gift, and first of all, as a gift from the Soviet Union. Nagy assures Comrade Stalin that Hungary is not trying to achieve any chauvinistic or revisionist goals. The Hungarian government starts from the following considerations, as far as the Peace Treaty is concerned. First of all, the Peace Treaty should serve the Great Powers' aspiration to establish a stable peace. Secondly, the conditions of the Peace Treaty should ensure opportunities for development for the Hungarian people. And thirdly, the peaceful results should assist in strengthening democracy. The decisiveness of the Hungarian government to achieve not only good peace for itself, but to gain good neighbors, is dictated by these considerations. To achieve these goals, the Hungarian government asks for support of the Soviet government and Generalissimus Stalin.

Nagy says that he can make a statement on behalf of the Hungarian government that Hungary does not have any disputes with Yugoslavia. As far as two other neighbors of Hungary--Czechoslovakia and Romania--are concerned, the Hungarian government is concerned with the situation of the Hungarian population living in the territory of those countries. In regards to Romania, there is even a question that touches upon the future of democracy. Then Nagy says that Generalissimus Stalin and Minister of Foreign Affairs Molotov obviously noticed that Czechoslovakia wanted to wipe away the national minorities with means so far unknown, and the Czechoslovak government was transferring thousands of Hungarians to Hungary without any preliminary consultations with the Hungarian government. 650 thousand Hungarians live in Czechoslovakia, and many hundreds of thousands of them live along the Hungarian border as a compact enclave immediately close to Trianon territory of Hungary.

The rest of the Hungarians live in separate villages, diminishing in number to the North into Slovakia. The Hungarian government sees two possible solutions to the issue of the fate of the Hungarian people living in Czechoslovakia. First, a Peace Treaty should obligate Czechoslovakia to guarantee the Hungarian minority conditions of equality, under which the Hungarians would be able to live and develop freely, as it was done in Yugoslavia, and in accordance with how the nationality question was resolved in the Soviet Union. However, taking into account the fact that many responsible Czechoslovak state leaders repeatedly made statements to the effect that the Czechoslovaks intended to get rid of the Hungarian minority, the Hungarian government is forced to raise the issue about two alternatives. The second possible solution would involve possible return of a part of purely Hungarian districts compactly populated by Hungarians, so that if the Czechoslovaks further aspire to get rid of ethnic minorities, they would have an opportunity to resettle those people. Nagy states that a correct implementation of either of these options would pacify the Hungarians, and create a basis for good neighborly relations between Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Comrade Stalin asks if the Hungarians want to choose the method of population exchanges. Comrade Stalin says that if you choose to exchange populations, then quantitative equality is not essential. Poland signed a treaty with Ukraine and Lithuania on population exchange. The Poles who desire to return to Poland do not have any problems in doing so, and the Lithuanians who wanted to move from Poland to Lithuania should also have assistance in doing that. There might be up to 200 thousand Poles who wish to move, and only 20 thousand Lithuanians. Comrade Stalin says that the number does not play any role. Whoever wants to return to their Motherland can return there, and whoever wants to stay -- should be able to use the freedoms and the rights.

Comrade Stalin explains that the Czechs want to satisfy all the requests of the Slovaks, who only reluctantly decided to remain in a part of Czechoslovakia. The Slovaks want to get rid of the Hungarians, and the Czechs do not interfere with that. This is unfair that the Hungarian population is not given any rights, or schools, etc. Exchange of population could be done, doing so would be analogous to the solution of this issue between Poland and Lithuania. Comrade Stalin says that it would be better for Hungary to receive the Hungarians from Czechoslovakia, otherwise they would be denationalized. Therefore, from the point of view of the nationalities policy, it is more expedient to take back those Hungarians. Comrade Stalin asks how the Hungarian government feels about such a solution, and adds that he does not know what the Czechoslovaks think about it. Comrade Stalin asks whether they practice the exchange of population.

Diendeshi informs Stalin that an agreement on this issue was achieved between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and that they did everything in order to resolve this issue to both sides' satisfaction on their part. The agreement involves exchange of population on a voluntary basis and on the principle of parity. The Slovaks entertain great hopes that between 150 and 200 thousand Slovaks would want to voluntarily move from Hungary to Slovakia. Currently, they are trying to register those Slovaks. On April 14, the propaganda campaign, undertaken by the Czechoslovak commission, will be completed, but even from the preliminary information, one could expect that no more than 50 to 60 thousand Slovaks would agree to move to Czechoslovakia. The rest of them do not want to leave Hungary, because they are more loyal to their land than to their language. These Slovaks are already assimilated to a significant degree. After the exchange of population about 600 thousand Hungarians will remain in Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovaks would like to grant Czechoslovak citizenship to 200 thousand Hungarians on the condition if those Hungarians called themselves Slovaks, and would cite the Slovak origins, even in cases where they do not know the Slovak language. The Hungarian government cannot approve of such a measure. On top of that, approximately 200 thousand more Hungarians would still remain in Czechoslovakia, and the Czechoslovaks plan to relocate them to Hungary. Those Hungarians represent ancient inhabitants of that territory, on which they initially settled and have lived for over a thousand years already. Also, it would be difficult to compensate the Hungarian population, which is subject to relocation. The density of population in Hungary is very high for an agrarian country. Hungary would be able to accept such a large number of people only if its industry develops with considerable success, or if it is able to guarantee appropriate economic opportunities for this population. The essence of the problem is in being able to guarantee civil rights for the Hungarian minority. In this case there would be no disputes between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. However, if Czechoslovakia intends to relocate the Hungarians to Hungary, in such a case it would be necessary to provide for their living

conditions, which could be only achieved by transferring part of the territory to Hungary, and by economic compensation for those people who are going to be relocated.

Sakashich, on his part, adds that each nation should aspire to increase its population. In his opinion, if 650 thousand Hungarians remain in Czechoslovakia, and if they do not enjoy any rights, and if the economic conditions for them are not be provided, then those Hungarians will become carriers of irredentism and revisionism, as it has already happen in Transylvania and in other regions alienated from Hungary. If Hungary had good economic conditions, then the Hungarian government would not even think twice about these questions and accept this population from Czechoslovakia, because the workforce is the most valuable resource.

Comrade Stalin states that it follows that the Hungarians would like to include the issue of the Hungarian national minority into the Peace Treaty.

Nagy says that the trust that Hungary feels toward the Soviet Union obligates the Hungarian government to raise this issue before the Soviet government.

Comrade Stalin notes that consequently, they were not able to resolve this issue with Czechoslovakia.

Diendeshi reports that negotiations between these two countries are going on, but the results seem questionable, because Hungary cannot agree with the Czechoslovak position on this issue, and the Czechoslovak government cannot accept the Hungarian proposals, because of the internal political difficulties.

Nagy appeals to Comrade Stalin and comrade Molotov asking that the Soviet government devote attention to this issue.

Comrade Stalin states that the desire to ensure civil rights for the Hungarian national minority is the correct position, and expresses his opinion that the Czechoslovaks would not agree to give the territory to Hungary. Comrade Stalin promises that the Soviet government would try to settle this affair. Comrade Stalin points to the fact that the Czechs are afraid of the Slovaks, and make concessions to them on all issues, including this one. Comrade Stalin repeats once again that the Soviet government will try to assist in resolving this dispute.

Nagy thanks Comrade Stalin for his statement.

Comrade Stalin notes that he cannot promise success, but that measures would be taken in order to settle this issue.

Nagy states that in regard to Romania, the problem is even more important and significant than in regard to Czechoslovakia. The Romanian and the Hungarian nations do not have ethnic ties with other peoples. To establish peace between these two nations, would be the most important factor of peace in South-Eastern Europe. We should not leave any reason for contradictions that might lead to the emergence of factions in any of these peoples. As a result of the last World War, Romania received Transylvania, and part of Banat and Partsiium, as a result of which more than 1.600 thousand Hungarians found themselves under the Romanian rule. This number later became smaller, because approximately 200 thousand Hungarians ran away from Transylvania, and then the number of the Hungarian population increased again. Therefore, there are approximately a million and a half Hungarians living currently in Transylvania. The situation is made more difficult by the fact that purely Hungarian settlements -- Sekler settlements -- are located deep in the Eastern part of Transylvania, near the territory of old Romania and far from the Hungarian borders. In all of Transylvania, there are no compact ethnic settlements, except for the Sekler ones. There is a small territory with the Hungarian minority along the Hungarian and Romanian border.

However, you cannot establish a border, even in this region, which would resolve the entire Hungarian problem. Nagy states that the Hungarian government does not want to weaken the Romanian democracy and the Groza government by raising this issue. At the same time, to completely abandon the territorial claims toward Romania would represent an unbearable burden for the Hungarian democracy. The Hungarian government puts the question of territorial rearrangement between Hungary and Romania in a direct fashion, but only to the extent to which it would not be a threat to the cause of democracy in both countries.

Comrade Stalin asks what is the essence of the question.

Nagy responds that in the opinion of the Hungarian government, part of the Transylvanian territory should be returned to Hungary, so that the territorial settlement in the Peace Treaty could calm the Hungarian people.

Comrade Stalin asks how was the question of Transylvania formulated in the armistice agreement, which was concluded with Romania.

Comrade Molotov responds that that agreement specified that all or major part of Transylvania should belong to Romania.

Comrade Stalin notes that that phrase gives some grounds for Hungary to be able to receive something, but what exactly, which part – this remains to be seen. Comrade Stalin says that this question is currently being discussed in London by Deputy Foreign Ministers. Comrade Stalin explains that in the armistice agreement, which was signed with Romania by three Great Powers, it was stipulated that all or most of Transylvania should be transferred to Romania. That phrase gives Hungary an opportunity to get a part of Transylvania. This question will be discussed. Comrade Stalin informs Nagy that comrade Molotov would go to Paris for the conference of Foreign Ministers, which would take place on April 25, and says that this question will be raised and discussed at that conference.

Nagy thanks Comrade Stalin for his response and says that this answer gives the Hungarian government hope that the conditions of the Peace Treaty will answer the concerns of the Hungarian people.

Diendeshi shows Comrade Stalin a map of Transylvania, which shows new borders in accordance with the Hungarian proposals. Diendeshi explains that under such territorial settlement 18 thousand square kilometers of the Transylvanian territory will remain in Romania and 22 thousand square kilometers would be transferred to Hungary. Also, the map specifically defines a territory of 11.800 square kilometers, on which the Hungarian population outnumbers the rest with the total number of 960 thousand people. 52 percent of them are Hungarians, 48 percent – Romanians. In the territory of 22 thousands square kilometers, which could be transferred to Hungary, the overall population is 1.550 thousand people, and 850 thousand people are Romanians. Diendeshi says that when this proposal was being developed by the Hungarian side, they were trying to divide the Transylvanian territory in such a way that there would be the same number of Romanians in Hungary, as there are Hungarians in the Romanian part of Transylvania. Such a settlement would create a balance between the national minorities. In the situation if the Hungarian and Romanian governments would not be able to resolve the issues of national minorities under the proposed territorial division, then both countries would be able to negotiate on the exchange on population, and Hungary would have an opportunity to relocate the Hungarian population to this territory, which would be transferred from the Romanian part of Transylvania. Diendeshi adds that apart from the considerations of ethnic character, they also took into account the economic issues, where the natural resources of the territory, which was marked

for transfer to Hungary, could substantially help the Hungarian economy. In particular, there are non-ferrous metals and sulfur around Nadban; besides, there are forests in this part of Partium, which are in short supply in Trianon Hungary. Diendeshi says that the Hungarian proposals are not based only on the ethnic principle, but are also directed at resolving the Romanian-Hungarian dispute over Transylvania.

Comrade Stalin expresses his opinion that the Romanians would not agree to such a territorial concession to Hungary, and notes that no government that made such a concession would be able to stay in power, and the Romanian King could resign.

Diendeshi says that the Hungarian government also takes huge responsibility upon itself, and shows courage, because it would not stay in power, if it does not present certain territorial claims to Romania. In Diendeshi's opinion, the Hungarian government would take big responsibility upon itself under such a solution of the issue, because in a situation of exchange of population, the Hungarian population would be transferred to the Hungarian part of Transylvania, and Hungary would lose the opportunity to raise the question of revision of borders forever.

Nagy points to the fact that the Hungarian government would not have any regrets if the Romanian King resigned, and says that Romania should also establish a Republic.

Comrade Stalin explains that the Soviet Union and Poland exchanged population, and Poland received more than a million of Poles, while only 400 thousands Ukrainians and Belorussians returned from Poland to the USSR, because there were no more of them in Poland. Comrade Stalin notes that this was also a courageous step, and probably there is no government in the world that would agree to such a resolution of the issue.

Diendeshi says that he would like to ask whether the Hungarian proposals regarding the return of a part of Transylvania to Hungary contradict the interests of the Soviet Union.

Nagy and also Sakashich propose that Diendeshi should not raise this issue before the Soviet government.

Then Nagy asks Comrade Stalin to inform them if the Hungarian prisoners of war, imprisoned in the Soviet Union, could engage in correspondence with their relatives.

Comrade Stalin says that there is such a possibility.

Nagy asks Comrade Stalin to allow him to begin negotiations on this issue with the Soviet authorities.

Comrade Stalin responds affirmatively.

Nagy says that Comrade Stalin inquired about the perspectives for stabilization of the Hungarian currency. In this connection, Nagy asks Comrade Stalin to tell them whether the Soviet Union could send one or two big specialists-experts to Hungary, who would be able to study the Hungarian economy and to give the Hungarian government advice for the purpose of improving the financial system.

Comrade Stalin says that he will think about it. Regarding the prisoners of war, Comrade Stalin proposes that the Hungarian government begin negotiations with the Foreign Ministry of the USSR.

Gero says that in accordance with the armistice agreement, the Romanians arrested the enemy's property, including the Hungarian property. There are significant Hungarian investments in Transylvania, in particular in the coal mines of Petroshani, located in Southern Transylvania, in the sum of approximately 30-50 American dollars.¹⁰³ Gero asks

¹⁰³ Apparently, they mean millions of dollars.

whether they could propose these investments to the Soviet Union as a part of payment of the Hungarian reparation obligations. The stock packet of coal mines is kept in Budapest. Gero explains that they extract coking coal of high quality in Petroshani.

Comrade Stalin states that the Soviet government will think about the proposal regarding the coal mines of Petroshani, and says that comrade Molotov will inform them about the answer of the Soviet government on this issue.

Before leaving, Nagy expresses his hope that he would have another opportunity to be received by Comrade Stalin.

The conversation lasted 2 hours and 15 minutes.

Recorded by GRIGORIEV

Original

Source: Vostochnaia Evropa, edited by G.P. Murashko, et al, vol. 1, pp. 443-63 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 355, l. 33-62).

Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.

**Record of the Conversation of Comrade I.V. Stalin with
Rasmussen, Denmark Minister of Foreign Affairs, and
Prince Axel, Chief of the [Danish] Trade Delegation**

Secret

6 June, 1946 9:00 PM

Present: V.M. Molotov, V.N. Pavlov (USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Axel declares that, first of all, he would like to express his condolences to Generalissimo Stalin concerning the death of M.I. Kalinin, one of the greatest Russians.

Comrade Stalin thanks him.

Comrade Stalin asks if Axel and Rasmussen were able to have a look around Moscow, and if they liked it.

Axel answers that he was able to see a little bit of Moscow, in particular various museum collections. He, Axel, is in Moscow for the first time.

Comrade Stalin says that he was in Copenhagen in 1906, and that Copenhagen is a beautiful and nice city.

Rasmussen expresses the hope that Stalin will once again be in Copenhagen sometime.

Comrade Stalin says that he would like to travel, but that his affairs do not permit him to do this.

Axel declares that he believes that Generalissimo Stalin would receive as good a welcome in Copenhagen as the Danish delegation enjoyed in Moscow.

Axel says the Danish delegation is very satisfied with the progress of the trade negotiations in Moscow.

Comrade Stalin remarks that this is quite good.

Axel says that he hopes that the trade agreements will be structured for mutual interests.

Comrade Stalin says that this is the only way that firm trade links can be forged between both countries.

Comrade Molotov says that now, after the war is over, it is possible to develop widespread trade relations, and that no one can hinder this.

Axel notes that, possibly, the volume of Danish trade with the Soviet Union appears small to [the USSR, while] for Denmark [this volume] is quite large.

Rasmussen notes that before the war the per capita trade turnover between Denmark and other countries was quite substantial. One of the difficulties [experienced by] Denmark is that it possesses no metal or coal. Nevertheless, Denmark was able to create a quite considerable machine-building industry.

Comrade Stalin notes that if there is meat, fat, and fish, there will be metal, [and] metal will come of its own.

Axel says that bacon is better than money.

Comrade Stalin remarks that bacon is gold.

Comrade Stalin asks whether Denmark maintained extensive trade ties with Germany before the war.

Rasmussen answers that before the war Denmark traded mainly with Germany and Great Britain.

Axel says that Denmark had economic ties with almost all countries. Denmark, in particular, had substantial economic interests in Siam.

Rasmussen says that trade relations between Denmark and the USSR before the war were not as extensive as they should have been.

Comrade Stalin says that now the Soviet Union can maintain parity in trade relations with Denmark [lit. "has the possibility to maintain an equivalent in trade relations with Denmark"]. Before the war there were fewer possibilities for this, but now they will increase.

Axel says that this will be good.

Rasmussen remarks that Denmark is a country with a mechanized agricultural [sector].

Comrade Stalin says that Denmark is a developed country; that it was, relative to, say, Albania, wealthy, and that it can once again become wealthy.

Comrade Stalin asks if Denmark had economic ties with Sweden.

Rasmussen answers that Denmark traded and [continues to] trade with Sweden, but not to the same degree as with larger countries, since Sweden doesn't need Danish agricultural products. But Denmark builds ships for Sweden and Norway in its shipyards.

Comrade Stalin asks if Denmark builds only civilian ships or if it also builds warships.

Axel answers that Denmark only builds merchant ships for other countries. It only builds warships for itself.

Comrade Stalin remarks that in the past Denmark had a sufficiently large war fleet.

Rasmussen says that Denmark still has a relatively large merchant fleet, but that it incurred major losses during the war.

Comrade Stalin asks if Denmark's allies returned the Danish fleet that they borrowed [lit. "used"] during the war.

Axel answers that the Allies returned Denmark's fleet, paid for its use, and compensated [Denmark] for its losses. But during the war, Axel says, Denmark succeeded in building several merchant ships. True, their construction was not finished during the German occupation, since the Danish did not want the Germans to utilize these ships.

Comrade Stalin asks if Denmark needs orders for ships from abroad.

Axel answers that Denmark needs such orders, but that it cannot accept them within the next two years.

Rasmussen says that before the war Denmark built ships for Poland and Rumania.

Comrade Stalin asks whether Denmark maintains economic ties with Poland.

Rasmussen answers that Denmark has resumed economic [relations] with Poland, from which it obtains coal. However, economic ties with Poland are still not sufficiently broad.

Comrade Stalin asks if Axel and Rasmussen are convinced that the trade negotiations in Moscow between Denmark and the Soviet Union concluded on a good note [lit. "well"] and will yield results.

Axel answers that the Danish delegation optimistically assesses the negotiations and is trying to do everything possible so that they will be successful. In truth, there were times [lit. "cases"] when the Soviet side asked for more that Denmark is in a position to provide.

Comrade Stalin says that it would be good if the negotiations conclude successfully and asks what are the hindrances to successful trade between Denmark and the Soviet Union.

Axel says that Denmark is a factory in which on one end raw material is received, and from which manufactured products, for example, bacon, come out on the other end. The success of Soviet-Danish trade depends upon the quantity of raw material that Denmark can obtain.

Comrade Stalin asks if the trade obligations that Denmark accepted from England hinder free action.

Rasmussen says that it stands to reason that all obligations limit free action.

Comrade Stalin agrees with this and asks if, however, Denmark has reserves [of raw materials].

Axel answers that Denmark has reserves, but that it is in need of raw materials.

Comrade Stalin asks exactly which raw materials does Denmark need.

Rasmussen answers that Denmark needs oil-cakes and barley more than anything.

Axel says that in the summer of the previous year Denmark was free of all trade obligations, but the Soviet Union was not prepared to renew trade with Denmark then.

Rasmussen expresses the hope that trade linkages between Denmark and the Soviet Union will develop.

Axel says that the Soviet trade organs consider that Denmark needs fewer raw materials than it requires.

Comrade Stalin says that Denmark of course, must judge for itself concerning this.

Axel says that if the Soviet side entirely will fulfill the Danish demand for raw materials, Denmark promises to hand over to the Soviet Union all excess product that can be obtained through processing these raw materials.

Comrade Stalin asks how much oil-cake Denmark needs.

Rasmussen answers that before the war Denmark imported from 600,000 to 700,000 tons of oil-cake. Now certain countries have promised to deliver oil-cakes to Denmark, and Denmark has already obtained 150,000 tons of oil-cake. However, this quantity is insufficient to raise Denmark's agricultural production to a normal level.

Axel says that during the war Denmark did not have the opportunity to import chemical fertilizer from abroad.

Comrade Stalin asks if Denmark needs apatite [a mineral].

Axel and Rasmussen answer in the affirmative.

Comrade Stalin says that the Soviet Union might be able to deliver a certain quantity of apatite. However, the Soviet Union cannot in the next two to three years deliver a considerable quantity of oil-cakes and barley to Denmark. It is necessary, says Comrade Stalin, to foresee the development of Danish-Soviet trade over an extended period, so that both sides can count upon one another.

Rasmussen answers that this viewpoint coincides with [that] of the Danish government.

Comrade Stalin asks if there are Allied military forces in Denmark.

Rasmussen answers that there is still a British force of 500 to 600 men in Denmark. But Denmark has asked the British government to leave a certain number of British military personnel to teach the Danish how to use modern weaponry and radio communications. When the instruction is finished, the British troops will depart from Denmark.

Comrade Stalin asks if the British troops are fed at England's expense.

Rasmussen answers that until November of 1945 the Danish government supplied the British forces with food, but now the English troops live at their own expense.

Rasmussen says that, unfortunately, there are still very many interned Germans from among the civilian population. He, Rasmussen, spoke about this subject with Molotov. The number of German internees reaches 200,000 people.

Comrade Stalin asks, didn't England hand over German prisoners of war to Denmark.

Rasmussen answers that England did not hand over any prisoners of war to Denmark, with the exception of certain Germans of Danish descent.

Comrade Stalin asks who is feeding these German internees in Denmark.

Rasmussen answers that the Danish government is feeding the German internees, spending from 200 to 230 million crowns per year on this.

Comrade Stalin asks if these German internees are of any sort of benefit to Denmark.

Axel and Rasmussen answer in the negative.

Comrade Stalin remarks that, therefore, the Danish government would be happy to be rid [lit. "free"] of these Germans, but, apparently, the matter is that Germany doesn't accept them. Meanwhile, around 2.5 million Germans have gone to Germany from Czechoslovakia and even more from Poland.

Rasmussen says that the Danish government would very much like to follow the example of the Czechoslovakian and Polish governments in this respect. The Danish government pays up to two-fifths of its pre-war budget for these Germans.

Comrade Stalin says that if these German internees were free in Germany, they could provide for themselves better.

Rasmussen says that, of course, it would be better if these Germans were in Germany. The Danish government has addressed the Control Council concerning this matter and, quite recently, the governments of the Soviet Union and United States as well. As regards England, the Danish government conducted negotiations with the English government in this regard. The English answered that the British zone is overcrowded with German refugees and that they cannot receive German internees from Denmark [typo - original reads "from Germany"] into their zone. A considerable portion of these German internees come from the eastern districts of Germany.

Comrade Stalin says that he thinks that the Soviet [government] could accept half of the German internees from Denmark into the Soviet zone of occupation, under the condition, of course, that the other Allies accept the other half [of the internees] into their zones [of occupation].

Axel and Rasmussen say that this would be wonderful.

Comrade Stalin says that the democratic parties of Germany are probably interested in taking these Germans to Germany.

Comrade Stalin asks whether these Germans have attempted to flee Denmark for Germany.

Rasmussen answers that the Danish government is feeding them well and, in view of the unattractive conditions in Germany, there has not been a noticeable desire among the interned Germans to flee for Germany.

Comrade Stalin asks how long will the Danish government feed these Germans.

Rasmussen answers probably for as long as the Danish government doesn't suffer a financial collapse.

Comrade Stalin says that, possibly, in the future Germany will have to compensate the Danish government for the upkeep of these Germans.

Rasmussen says that he doesn't know if Germany will be able to do this.

Comrade Stalin says that there can be no doubt of this. Germany will get on its feet. The Germans are a capable and labor-loving people. During the war they invested all of their energy into war. But if they were to put one-tenth of the energy that they expended on the war into the restoration of the economy, then Germany will be quickly rehabilitated.

Comrade Stalin says that, of course, the upkeep of the interned Germans is a heavy burden on Denmark. Poland and Czechoslovakia, says Comrade Stalin, put the Germans in such a condition that, because of their hunger, [they] were ready to flee these countries in all directions.

Rasmussen says that, since Comrade Stalin has paid so much attention to the question of the Germans interned in Denmark, he, Rasmussen, will permit himself to mention other German refugees in areas situated south of the Danish border, outside of Denmark. Nevertheless, the presence of these German refugees arriving there from the eastern districts of Germany is a danger to Denmark. He, Rasmussen, is speaking of South Schleswig. The number of German refugees presently reaches 350,000, that is as many as the native [Danish] population. The Danish government has discussed the matter of removing these German refugees from South Schleswig with the British government over an extended period, but it has produced no results .

Comrade Stalin remarks that therefore this a matter concerning German territory.

Axel says that this territory has belonged to Germany since 1864.

Comrade Stalin says that it is now as if Denmark is making claims on this territory.

Rasmussen declares that after the Versailles Treaty there was a plebiscite in the northern portion of Schleswig, as a result of which North Schleswig was transferred to Denmark. But in the southern portion of Schleswig there is a Danish minority, and for this reason Denmark is interested in this part of Germany.

Comrade Stalin says that is it too bad that there is no government in Germany. If there was a government there, then it would be possible to settle this matter.

Axel and Rasmussen thank Comrade Stalin for receiving them.

Comrade Stalin thanks Axel and Rasmussen for the conversation, which was for him, Comrade Stalin, beneficial.

Recorded by V. Pavlov (signature).

Source: AVPRF, f. 06, op. 8, p. 33, d. 519, l. 19-27.

Translated by Michael Thurman.

**Report of the Labour Party on its
Goodwill Mission to the USSR**

Private & Confidential.

International Sub-Committee
of the National Executive
Committee.

GOODWILL MISSION TO THE U.S.S.R.

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We left London on Sunday, the 28th July, breaking our journey in Berlin where we were met by representatives of the British Military Government and a representative of the Russian Foreign Office. We left Berlin the next day for Moscow where we were received by representatives of the Russian Foreign Office, the Moscow Soviet, and the British Embassy: we also faced a barrage of newsreel cameras and press photographers.

On the journey from the airport to the Hotel, in cars provided by our hosts, three of our number had their introduction to Moscow. We were later invited to the Foreign Office to meet Mr. Dekanozov, the Third Minister of Foreign Affairs, who, during the absence of Mr. Molotov and Mr. Vishinsky in Paris, was in charge at the Foreign Office.

Mr. Dezanozov, in welcoming the delegation on behalf of his Government, indicated that they had been anticipating our visit for some time. They were very happy to meet us and were anxious to place such facilities at our disposal as would make our visit as interesting and as useful as possible, for they were deeply conscious of the vital importance of maintaining friendship and goodwill between our two peoples. We responded in appropriate forms and stressed the strong desire of the British Labour Movement and, indeed, of the British people, for a real and abiding friendship with the Russian people. The Government of both countries were charged with the great responsibility of pressing forward schemes of Socialist Reconstruction with all possible speed. Neither country could afford to see that work impeded as it might well be if there was international distrust and the fear lurking in the minds of men that there would again be international insecurity. In our view, a real understanding between our two peoples could be a decisive factor in preserving the peace of the world. Our desire was to further that understanding and to that end we desired to meet the leaders of Russian thought, political, industrial and intellectual. We therefore expressed a wish to see the President of the U.S.S.R., Mr. Shvernik, to whom we desired to pay our respects, Generalissimo Stalin, Leader of the Russian people, members of the Politburo, and the Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, Mr. Iuznitzov. We also asked if we could examine the progress made in the development of the educational services, as we were deeply interested in the general cultural level of the Russian people. We suggested that we should like to see a collective farm and some factories in order that we should observe the progress of transformation from a war to a peace economy and get some first-hand

knowledge of factory conditions and welfare provisions. We hoped, the time permitted, that visits to Leningrad and Stalingrad could be included in our itinerary. There were also places of interest such as the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, the Museum of the Revolution, which we would like to see.

We emphasised that as far as the delegation was concerned, meeting with the leaders to whom we had referred and with others who the [ILLEGIBLE] important.

Mr. Dekanozov, in reply, said they had been expecting the delegation for some time and he thought it was appropriate that we should arrive at the time of the opening of the Peace Conference. He had taken a note of our requests and would report them to the Government and he believed that steps would be taken to meet the wishes of the delegation. In association with his colleagues he had prepared a preliminary plan, which included talks with Trade Union leaders, the Chairman of the Moscow Soviet and visits to Union Leningrad and Stalingrad. In addition, he had anticipated that the delegates would like to meet representatives of the Party. He was pleased to see that in broad outline his views and ours coincided. His colleagues and he himself felt the same sense of responsibility as we had affirmed and he thought that those concerned would be pleased to meet the delegation. He expressed the view that our stay in the Soviet Union was all too short and he pressed us strongly to extend the period of the visit. We said that, unfortunately, that was not possible in view of other important duties. Mr. Dekanozov accepted our reply with regret but said that if we later found we could stay longer they would make arrangements to make the additional time interesting and useful. He concluded by referring to the great tasks of domestic reconstruction and the building of world peace in which our two peoples were engaged. During our stay they would give us all the assistance we desired and he felt that the success of the mission was assured.

On the following day we received an invitation to meet Mr. Popov, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and Chairman of the Moscow Soviet. In company with the Vice-Chairman, he received the delegation in the City Chambers. We expressed our pleasure at the opportunity of visiting Moscow and for the courtesy already extended to us. After indicating that we would prefer to talk to him as Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, we explained who the members of the delegation were, the sections of the movement they represented, and the status and position of the delegation. We emphasised that we were a Labour Party delegation and that our visit to Russia arose from the universal desire of the British people for friendship and understanding with the peoples of the U.S.S.R. In Britain, the Labour Party had won the General Election with a tremendous majority and the Government was not only charged with the task of transforming a war economy into a peace economy but to a Socialist economy. The unprecedented destruction caused by the war and the widespread shortage of materials and man-power had brought about a situation where the maximum energies of all would have to be utilised in the tasks of reconstruction if the goal was to be reached in a reasonable time. This, in the view of the delegation, was the position, not only in Britain but in the U.S.S.R. Both were therefore concerned in building an economy which served the interests of the people and not those of a privileged few. Our two movements had also great responsibilities in this building of peace and its preservation, essential prerequisites to industrial and social progress. There might, from time

to time, be differences on our approach to the problems which arose, but if there was a real understanding between our two peoples, such differences would fall into their proper perspectives.

Mr. Popov said that it was the earnest desire of the people of Russia for complete friendship with the people of Britain. He was not, however, in a position to dispute the political questions we had raised. We pressed certain of the points we had already raised but it was clear that at that time he was not able to discuss them. In those circumstances we proceeded to discuss the work of the Moscow Soviet and the problems of the city. During an interesting and useful discussion, there was an interchange of experience between Mr. Popov, his Vice-Chairman, and members of the delegation.

On the following morning we met Mr. Shvernik in his suite in the Kremlin. After a preliminary conversation we gave an outline of the development of the British Labour Movement, the election of its Government, the significance of that event and the achievements during its first year of office. We also drew attention to the importance of by-election and local government elections since the General election. Mr. Shvernik evinced great interest in the progress made in Great Britain and raised a number of points with us. He then talked of the problems which were facing the U.S.S.R. in the domestic field and the steps they were taking to overcome them. He outlined the structure of Government in the Soviet Union which, in his view, had been fully tested by a powerful and ruthless enemy in the course of the war - it had stood the test. Large areas of the country had been devastated and this had left them with a terrific problem of reconstruction both in the provision of homes and in industry. Although they had started to make provision for the homeless before the end of the war, a small proportion of the people still lived in dugouts. Special difficulties also existed in the industrial towns and cities which were partly in the process of rehabilitation and partly of reconstruction. The solution of the tremendous problems with which they were confronted necessitated the immediate concentration of a large part of their natural resources upon capital development. He believed that the war had done more than anything else to prove the wisdom of their system of collective farming. He felt that under any other system they would have been in great danger of losing the war through a shortage of food especially after the loss of so much agricultural machinery. In the war years food production had been carried on by women and young boys and girls who were imbued with the will to win through. They were hoping, and indeed it was their intention as the result of their first post-war five year plan to bring the mechanisation of the industry to its pre-war level. In relation to the current food situation, he said that if the weather remained reasonably good the harvest should help them to relieve the food situation throughout the country. In the course of the subsequent conversation on the questions which had been raised there was agreement that any interruption in the work of internal rebuilding due to international uncertainties would be inimical to the people's interest; we jointly could ensure that there was no such interruption.

The time with Mr. Shvernik passed so quickly that we found we were much overdue for a luncheon to which we had been invited by the Chairman of the Moscow Soviet. This function was extremely interesting, for in addition to enabling us to meet Mr. Popov again, we met a number of Ministers and Leaders in the political, educational, and industrial fields and engaged in informal discussions of many subjects of mutual interest.

From the Minister of Education for the R.S.F.S.R. we received an invitation to a conference on education. This conference, over which the Minister presided, had been specially convened in order that we might have an opportunity of obtaining information about educational organisation, method and practice in the Soviet Union. During the conference there was an interesting exchange of ideas and experience. We gathered that the basis of the educational structure in the Soviet Union was the general school, catering for children between the ages of seven and ten years. There were Secondary Schools organised in seven class groups up to the age of fifteen and a form of Higher School with groups of ten classes catering [sic] for children and adolescents up to the age of eighteen. There were fees in the Secondary Schools and the Higher Schools but we gathered that these could be so graded that no hardship was entailed.

Though the general provision in the towns and cities covered seven school years or classes, in the rural areas this was limited to four or five and the majority of the children left school at twelve for work on the countryside. Some provision was, however, made for special educational institutes for the use of those who work on the farms, particularly those between the ages of twelve and seventeen. We were also informed that there is an expanding development in the field of technical education and that this is having a wide appeal particularly to those employed in the factories. Technical education was not narrowly conceived, for attention was [ILLEGIBLE] given to cultural subjects and social science.

In the Russian Federation of Soviet States, we learned that there were approximately 116,000 schools, of which roughly 85,000 were Elementary Schools, 25,000 Secondary and over 6,000 Higher Schools. In the year 1945-46, the number of pupils was given as 14½ millions and for 1946-47 the figure is expected to reach 16 millions. Over 2½ million children entered the first classes of elementary schools during the year. The provision of teachers is a real problem in Russia, as it is in our country. Serious attention was being given to this question by the Minister and his colleagues and we were informed that there were already 61 teachers' institutes with 16,000 students attached to the Pedagogical institutes and colleges; there were, in addition, 46 unattached institutes with 13,000 students. He is inevitable under conditions arising from or accentuated by the war, there is also improvisation on the teaching side and it would appear that this must continue for some little time.

The Minister is responsible for all institutes, the training of teachers, publication of school books and all subjects in the school programme. We were impressed by many of the books we saw but for our purposes we felt that our method of dealing with the curriculum was more suitable and advantageous.

We later met the Minister for Higher Education throughout the U.S.S.R. with certain of his colleagues. We were privileged to hear in some detail of the developments in this sector of the educational field. Despite losses sustained in the war, we were informed that they now have 35 classical Universities, 143 higher technical schools or colleges, 133 higher agricultural schools and 520 pedagogical schools mainly concerned with the training of teachers. They have also a number of institutes for additional and specialist education.

At our request, arrangements were made for us to meet the Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. We were received by Mr. Kuznitsov and a number of his colleagues - men and women. We made it clear that we were not in Russia as the official representatives of the British Trade Unions; that was the prerogative of the Trade Union Congress. We were, however, keenly interested in the development and work of the Russian Trade Unions. We dealt with many questions raised with us about the political and industrial position in Britain, including the structure of the Labour Party and its relationship with the T.U.C. Interest was displayed in our references to the General Election and the subsequent achievements of the Labour Government. Mr. Kuznitsov and his colleagues gave us an outline of trade union structure, the way in which the unions work and the [ILLEGIBLE] with which they deal.

They referred to the wage structure in industry basic or minimum wages were fixed by the Soviets. The trade unions had, however, their part to play in the consideration of incentive payments and matters related thereto. Safety and welfare arrangements were also their concern as was the provision of cultural and recreational facilities. They also took pride in the work they had done in connection with the provision of hospitals, convalescent homes, holiday centres and other places of culture and rest. We had some discussion on earnings in various branches of industry but we had not the time then or later to get the detailed information on earnings and prices to make a reasonable assessment of the standard of living.

The following day we were the guests of Mr. Kuznitsov and other trade union colleagues at a luncheon where we met other representatives of Russian social activity. We feel that these two gatherings arranged by the Central Council of the Trade Unions were an extremely valuable contribution to the success of our mission.

The members of the delegation had all looked forward with more than ordinary interest to the meeting with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., Mr. Stalin. We had no doubts, after our talk with Mr. Dekanazov, that a meeting with Mr. Stalin would be arranged but we had no knowledge of the date or time. It was at 9 o'clock on the evening of the 7th August when we entered the Generalissimo's room at the Kremlin, and met the leader of the Russian people. We were met by a man simply dressed, smaller and somewhat older looking than we had expected, but whose merry smile and twinkling eyes welcomed us before he had uttered a word. There was nothing formal about the meeting; we sat at a table with the interpreter at the end, Mr. Stalin, Harold Laski and Mr. Dekanazov on one side, Morgan Phillips, Harold Clay and Alice Bacon on the other, and we talked in an easy conversational manner for 2¼ hours upon the tasks which confronted the people of our two countries.

Our Party Secretary expressed our deep sense of pleasure at meeting Mr. Stalin and then in a succinct statement explained the purpose of our mission, the changes which had taken place in the political shape of Britain as the result of the General Election, the achievements of the Government since the election and stressed the desire of the Labour Movement in Great Britain and the whole of the British people for real and enduring friendship with the people of Russia. After a general discussion, in which many points were raised, Mr. Stalin said that he was gratified to know that two great countries were travelling in the Socialist direction. In Russia they were travelling to Socialism in the

Russian way, which he believed was shorter but more difficult, whereas in Britain we were going in what appeared to be the more roundabout British way - to which there was an aside that 'we had a habit of getting there'. He felt that in both countries we could reach the Socialist objective. As Marxists and Leninists the Russians did not think that theirs was the only road to Socialism. They recognized that though they believed that theirs was the shortest, even if the most difficult, way, and that it may be accompanied by bloodshed; by the British method, the change may be less violent but the process was much longer.

He was glad to receive the assurance of the delegation of the desire of the British people for the maintenance of friendship with his people but he felt that it would be amazing if there was not friendship between the two peoples, and particularly so now that we have both the same aim, the achievement of Socialism. The fact that the British people had these feelings of goodwill towards the Russian people was well known but it was not so well known that those feelings were reciprocated by the Russian people. At this point he reminded us of the assistance given by the Russian people to the British miners during the 1926 dispute and we, in turn, referred to those acts of friendship displayed by the British Labour Movement over a long period of years, to the victims at Leningrad in 1905 and in various other ways since that time.

Mr. Stalin felt that the Labour Government had adopted the right line in dealing with the public ownership of the basic industries first, but said he would like to know what were the dangers of reaction from the political enemies of the Labour Movement and from the industrialists who were dispossessed as the result of the action by the Government. That, he felt, was a contingency against which we should have to be on our guard and he referred to a return to power of people whom it had been contended would never again be in a position of power and authority in the State. From their experience in Russia they knew that if basic industries and commerce rested in the hands of the State, the State could direct its policy to reduce prices and raise real wages. In those fields in which commerce was not directly under the State, policy could be influenced by State action and this would be to the workers' advantage. In the development of industrialization, particularly in the early stages, they in the Soviet Union had experienced great difficulty. They had a peasant population much greater and in many ways different from that in Britain. To win them over to an understanding of Socialist objectives was a difficult task; much care and thought had to be given to the many problems which arose. Problems of a different order arose so far as the industrial workers were concerned but these were overcome. For a time, a considerable proportion of the women were not active industrially. As that situation changed, it had a great effect upon their economy and today the role occupied by women was vitally important in the building of socialism. He thought that so far as domestic reconstruction was concerned, there was, and would continue to be, the fullest understanding between the two countries, and he felt that in international affairs, we could get the same degree of understanding. Russia would welcome the opportunity of the fullest co-operation between our two peoples. At this point, he indicated that a delegation from the Supreme Soviet would visit England in response to a British invitation, and with an ingratiating smile, he expressed the hope that when they came, Mr. Bevin would not "scold them too much". And in just the same spirit of light raillery Mr. Clay responded, "I know of no problem to which you and Mr. Bevin would not find a solution".

Mr. Stalin then dealt at some length with the industrial policy which they were pursuing in the U.S.S.R. and their determination to use the normal profits or surplus from industry and commerce for the extension and improvement of industry and, secondly, to raise the standard of life by (a) a reduction in prices which improved real wages and (b) raising money wages where considered desirable. The extent to which they succeeded in their first objective would make easier the attainment of the second. They had already achieved in some fields a substantial reduction in prices and an increase in production but there was still a long way to go. They were, however, moving with all possible speed. Things could, of course, be speeded up if the armed forces of the State could be reduced, but care must be taken to ensure that there was no further danger of aggression. In this connection suitable mutual treaties of defense would help to reduce the Forces and thus allow of the allocation of more manpower to production, thereby increasing the amount of goods available for improving the welfare of the Russian people.

[ILLEGIBLE]

The level of culture was one of their deep concerns and this was having their urgent attention. They had also a large peasant population whose approach to socialism and its implications was different to that of the industrial workers. This problem had to be faced and the facts of achievement rather than the theoretical approach was more important in their case. These two questions presented difficulties for them of a character which we had not to face. We had not a substantial peasant problem but we had a highly organised working-class and a higher level of culture. We had, of course, other problems and difficulties; for example, our business men were wealthier, much more clever and experienced than the Russian business men. He nevertheless felt that we had the opportunity in Britain of a more peaceful approach to Socialist construction than they had in Russia. He expressed the hope that the confidence pronounced by the delegation in the future political prospects of our movement would be justified by the events. At an earlier stage, Mr. Stalin had said, in reply to a question, that he was surprised at the result of the General Election. He had not thought that such a result was possible at that time. On both sides many questions were raised and answers given but the delegation got the impression that there was still a fear in Russian minds about the possible strength of reaction in Britain.

Facilities were made available for visits to Leningrad and Stalingrad. We met the Soviet authorities in both cities, discussing with them a variety of problems and exchanging experiences. We were also entertained to dinner by the leaders of the Soviets in both these places, when we had the pleasure of meeting representative people whom we might not otherwise have met. These functions were pleasant and friendly affairs and we also found them of value because of the opportunities they provided for informal discussions on a variety of questions.

Leningrad we found to be a beautiful city with magnificent buildings and a refreshing air of spaciousness about it. Squares, parks and other open places were pleasing to the eye. We also saw the advantages which the people of Leningrad enjoy from its rivers, not on the side of utility only but because they add substantially to the attractiveness of the city. We saw the evidence of the destruction which had occurred during the long siege and we were impressed by the way in which the people were dealing

with this problem. We discussed with leaders of the city their plans, not only for the repair of the damage, but for the extension and development of the city. The tribulation which the people had undergone during the 900 days siege had not damped their spirits. They were determined that the city of tomorrow would be finer than that of 1939.

In Stalingrad we came upon what had recently been a battle-ground and we saw what had once been a city built after the Revolution reduced to rubble and ruin. The damage was appalling but what struck us most was the spirit and determination of the people. Some factories are back in production and others are well advanced in rebuilding and extension. Schools, hospitals and other social buildings have been rebuilt and are in use. Housing is having attention but this is a terrific job and there will have to be improvised arrangements for some considerable time. When we talked with leaders of the city and others about the task ahead and asked how long they thought it would take to build the city, they replied 'about 15 years', and they said that with a full realisation of the gigantic task before them. We doubted whether they could do the job in the time stated. Whether they can realise their objective is not really the point now. What is important is that they believe they can and there is the will and the spirit to realise it. We thought that the spirit displayed by those we met was of the same quality as that displayed by the Russian General who was in command during the great battle for the city and who talked with us about many of the events in that epic struggle.

Wherever we went we noted that the tasks of rebuilding the economic and social life of the country, special emphasis was laid upon the production of capital goods, the re-equipment of the basic industries where tractors, commercial vehicles and turbines, etc., could be turned out with increasing rapidity. There was a large concentration on these things now in order to ensure a much wider range of consumer goods in greater quantities a little later.

A fair amount of house building is going on but there is a terrific housing problem to face. We were informed that last year there were approximately 25,000,000 people homeless and that some 2,000,000 lived in dugouts in the ground through the rigours of the Russian winter. Confronted with problems of that magnitude, we could understand the feverish production drive and the adoption of incentives of various kinds which would not find favour in Britain.

We visited factories and the Metro, museums and art galleries. We were able to see the various rooms and halls in the Kremlin, including the chamber where the supreme Soviet meets. We saw modern Concert Halls and enjoyed a high standard of musical entertainment. At the match between the Russian Dynamo team and the Yugo Slavs in the Dynamo stadium, one of our number had his introduction to Association Football.

We were given a private showing of the special film 'The Vow', which is a film featuring Stalin. It is a good medium of propaganda for the Russian Communist Party, but as history it would not stand the test. Events were displayed in such a way that the needs of the Party were met though without too great a regard for accuracy.

During our stay we learned that the Communist Party had a membership of approximately 6,000,000 but some concern was expressed in the Party about the type of people being recruited. A warning was issued to local

parties to exercise care about those who were accepted into the Party. A special drive was being organized amongst scientists and academicians to bring them into the ranks of the Party.

We met many people during our stay in Moscow, including members of delegations from other countries with whom we had interesting conversations. We also met a number of foreign press correspondents who all indicated the extreme difficulty, even the impossibility, of carrying out their work owing to the rigidity of the censorship. This view has been supported by a British journalist since our return. Our information was that the censorship had virtually passed from the control of the Foreign Office to the control of the Party. In those circumstances, we were told that it was not possible to get stories out of the country that were not acceptable to the Russian Communist Party.

In contradistinction to this, we found that there was a development of criticism internally and that this was not discouraged. We found many examples of criticism and the objective examination of problems. This, however, appeared to relate solely to methods and matters of detail and not to broad questions of policy.

We visited the offices of 'British Ally' and met the people who produced it. They appeared to be doing a good job of work on a paper which has a circulation of 50,000 at two roubles a copy. There was also a form of black market circulation at about 30 rubles per copy. An interesting sidelight on this was the story we heard that whenever Mr. Ernest Bevin made a speech which did not appear to be fully reported in the Russian papers, the price of the 'British Ally' in the black market rose to 60 roubles.

Every courtesy was extended to the delegation, and having regard to our limited stay, we saw all that we had asked to see and met everyone we expressed a desire to meet. We were lavishly entertained and both the informal and more formal discussions were carried on in the most friendly manner possible. From all quarters we received assurances of the desire of the Russian people for friendship with the people of Britain. We did not regard it as part of our duty, particularly as the Paris Conference had opened, to discuss international questions. Nor did we discuss the relationship of the two parties except in so far as it had a bearing upon the development and maintenance of friendship between the peoples of the two nations. We should be foolish to assume that difficulties and differences do not exist or that all misunderstanding has been dispelled. We do, however, believe that as a goodwill mission our visit was well worth while. The publicity given to the delegation together with the response from the people we met justifies our saying that the mission was a successful one.

We could not conclude this report without expressing our appreciation to the British Ambassador for his courtesy and consideration towards us and to the members of the British Embassy for their kindness and assistance in a variety of ways. We are indebted to them.

Alice Bacon
Harold Clay
Harold Laski
Morgan Phillips

[Note: this document is dated "7 AUG '46 LABOUR PARTY ARCHIVES (copyright Labour Party)" in a handwritten note]

Source: Labour Party Archives.

Contributed by Jonathan Haslam.

**Bierut's Notes of a Conversation with Stalin
on the Situation in the Polish Socialist Party (PPS)
and Preparations for Parliamentary Elections in Poland
28(?) August 1946**

Bolesław Bierut's notes on his conversation with Stalin

The conversation began with questions on the last session of the Supreme Council of the PPS. "Have they got rid of Matuszewski? Thus, have they settled matters with the left", ("Svoloczi") and further: "Morawski turned out to be a bastard worse than the others. How was Cyrankiewicz behaving? Quite a company got together. It's Szwalbe who did it all. Cyrankiewicz had been posing for a leftist as long as he did not reveal the composition of real leftists, and then he took off together with them to a fight".

He listened with great interest the details from the session of the Supreme Council. He was clearly depressed by my description of statements of the Matuszewski-Świątkowski group, the lack of a team-work and boldness of their criticism, a weak effect of speeches, and a character of their attack was not clear enough politically and not consistent enough.

"You should have helped them in preparing a clear political declaration". I responded that we had done it, but he didn't receive it with conviction. Later he remarked: "It would not hurt if they had expelled from the party the whole group - it would create a basis for forming an opposition to their party". "And perhaps it would be advisable to set up a third party? After all, in your case - still in the czarist period there had always been splits within the socialist party, there was a party - if I am not mistaken - that was called the PPS Left?".

I responded that at this stage there are - in my opinion - no appropriate conditions for this and I doubt if it would be advisable. He didn't attempt to dispute, but strolling around the room he was thinking for a while and then asked: "I don't understand why did they expel Matuszewski, with what specifically were they charging his group?". I explained that the only reason of their fight with the left was its criticism of the party leadership for drawing into the party's leadership the WRN-elements and loosening its cooperation with the PPR. He then asked if the left had come up with a thesis of uniting the two parties. I responded that merely the question of closer cooperation between the two parties constitutes sufficient reason for the present leadership core of PPS to treat distrustfully those members, who put forward this question. Just for this reason they are charging Matuszewski that he is an agent of PPR in their party and decided to get rid of him, as well as Skowroński and Żaruk. With respect to the others they hope to be able to terrorize them or turn them away from their critical attitude. He asked once again if there is someone in the left group who is clearly putting forward the question of unification of the two parties and said: "I told you that their attitude toward you is hostile. Morawski is a fool, who willingly went along with such "rogues" as Szwalbe and Cyrankiewicz, it fitted to his own attitude. Indeed - it's a pity for Poland that it has such a premier, it deserves a better one. Szwalbe - a slyer ("khitretz"), he did it all. You have to take care of this left group, deal with its political education, help it to get stronger".

Then we moved on to other topics, which I have described as shown in the enclosed theses (see the enclosure).

He was listening without interruption to my arguments against the postponement of the elections. He admitted: "Of course - it has its drawbacks". When I came up to the question of the bloc of 6 (6 parties) on terms giving Mikołajczyk a superiority of 5 percent in relation to other worker parties - he protested: "I was advising this before the referendum, keeping in mind as a condition, that Mikołajczyk would go to the referendum together with the parties of the governmental bloc, but he did not agree. He went separately and after the referendum he was appealing to the outside world. This changes the situation. In my tomorrow's conversation I will speak against this concession. Now one can speak at most about equal share with other worker parties: 25 or 30 percent, whatever, but the PPR and PPS must receive the same. No, there is no ground to allot him a bigger share - particularly after his behavior".

I explained that we are considering this concept from the point of view of a maximal limit of our concessions not so much to Mikołajczyk, but rather toward the PPS, which is driving at any price to conclude with us an electoral understanding and avoid a fight. Calculations that I have made are designed to get an idea of how the relationship of power would look like in the Sejm with such a concept. He was looking with attention at the figures. He drew attention to the fact that in projections one should always take into account a worse result rather than a better one. "PPS members will betray you at the first opportunity - one cannot count on them! They, like Mikołajczyk, are also under the influence of the British. They will try to bind together with him".

When I came next to describing our concept of elections in the bloc of 4, he reacted with great animation on the proposal of competitive lists toward the PSL outside of the bloc. He emphasized several times the rightness of this concept and all remaining points of this chapter (see chapter III enclosed). He didn't pay much attention to the details of my calculations, concentrating clearly on the essential elements of the scheme. "Unquestionably - he said - the bloc of 4 is a better idea. But are you sure that the PPS will not let you down? How were they behaving in their talks with you on this subject?". I told him about a resolution of the Supreme Council on this matter, emphasizing that, after all, they must be bound by this toward their own activists. He agreed that it should be binding on them. He mentioned that the concept of the bloc of 6 should be torn up ("rostorgnut").

In our further conversation he praised the idea of a written agreement with the PPS on mutual cooperation. I translated to him point by point the whole passage of the Wieslaw's draft from the chapter of "A uniform front" till the end. Generally he nodded with approval, but at the end he said that there was a lack of political emphasis in this agreement. He began formulating some ideas (see an attempt recorded by me), but was called away to the telephone in the neighboring room, where he spoke with someone for about 10 minutes. Later on he didn't return to this matter. He asked if we had already worked out an electoral law. Is it already binding?

Ha was amazed by the audacity of the British note to us, demanding that we present them a draft of that electoral law before its passage. When I told him that we have not yet responded to it - he said: "It's better not to respond at all. Take the position that a response to this kind of note would be insulting to your dignity". He added: "and this kind of note is being sent by the Labor Party? What was the reaction of your PPS members?". I responded that they had treated it rather indifferently.

When I said that Morawski at the Supreme Council had put forward a slogan of a "million member party" - he said: "It is understandable that they are considering outdistancing you as their most important objective. You should counteract it by working out a clear political program and hold a discussion with them around it. At the initial stage of the revolution we bolsheviks had 200 thousand members, while the Social Democrats had a million and a half, and what happened? They had dispersed and now nobody even mentions them. The same will happen with your PPS members. In social struggle an ideological program is of great significance and they are a party without ideology, running for positions and willingness to lead. They have always been like this. It's difficult for them to reconcile with the fact that today they have to fight with you for parity. Indeed, there has never been a situation where communists would have been stronger than the socialists".

Then he asked if anyone from the Politburo writes on theoretical topics and if we have the right journal for such theoretical discussions. I told him about the conditions under which people of our Politburo are working, about their overloading with practical matters of the state and organizational life, about total impossibility of devoting even casually some time for deeper studies of this or that question. I mentioned that on the program questions the secretary general of the party, com. Wieslaw, is speaking most often, and in occasional circumstances all other Politburo members do it. I mentioned about the "Trybuna Wolności" ("Tribune of Liberty"), Żółkiewski and "Kuznica". He was interested in biographical details and national origin of comrades from the Politburo. In answering this question I drew his attention to great losses in people that the party had suffered in the pre-war period and expressed an opinion that among the radical and progressive Polish intelligentsia interest in social issues had most often been rather abstract and not connected with practical political struggle.

Source: A. Werblan, "Tajemne karty z dziejów powojennej PPS," Dziś. Przegląd Społeczny, vol. 3 (1992), no. 12, pp. 52-58.

Translated by Jan Chowaniec.

**Answers to the Questions Posed by A. Werth,
Moscow Correspondent for the *Sunday Times***

Sept. 17, 1946

Werth: Do you believe in a real threat of a “new war,” about which many irresponsible conversations are presently conducted throughout the world? What steps must be taken to prevent the war if such a threat exists?

Stalin: I do not believe in a real threat of a “new war.”

It is mostly military-political spies and their few adherents among the civil officials who are making noise about a “new war.” They need this uproar, if only in order to: a) intimidate naive politicians from among their contractors with the specter of war and thus help their governments extract greater concessions from the contractors and b) paralyze the demobilization of troops and thus prevent the rapid rise of unemployment in their countries.

One must differentiate sharply between the sensation concerning a “new war,” which is being spread now, and the real danger of a “new war,” which doesn’t exist at present.

Werth: Do you believe that Great Britain and the United States of America are consciously engaging in “capitalist encirclement” of the Soviet Union?

Stalin: I do not believe that the governing circles of Great Britain and the United States of America could accomplish “capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union” even if they wanted something which, however, I cannot confirm.

Werth: To use the words of Wallace in his last speech, can England, Western Europe, and the United States believe that Soviet policy in Germany will not be turned into an instrument for aspirations directed against Western Europe?

Stalin: I consider it unthinkable for the Soviet Union to use Germany against Western Europe and the United States of America. I consider it unthinkable not only because the Soviet Union is linked with Great Britain, France, and the United States by a mutual aid agreement against German aggression - the decisions of the Potsdam conference of the three great powers - but also because a policy of using Germany against the Western Europe and the United States of America would mean a departure by the soviet Union from its fundamental national interests.

In short, the policy of the Soviet Union concerning the German question is geared towards the demilitarization and democratization of Germany. I think that the demilitarization and democratization of Germany is one of the most important guarantees of establishing a stable and long-lasting peace.

Werth: What is your opinion of accusations that the policy of the communist parties of Western Europe are “dictated by Moscow”?

Stalin: I consider this accusation absurd and copied from the bankrupted arsenal of Hitler and Goebbels.

Werth: Do you believe in the possibility of friendly and long-lasting cooperation between the Soviet Union and the western democracies, in spite of ideological disagreements, and in “friendly competition” between the two systems, about which Wallace spoke?

Stalin: I absolutely believe [in this].

Werth: While the Labour Party delegation was where, you, from what I understand, expressed confidence in the possibility of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain. What would aid in the establishment of these relations, which the broad masses of the English people fervently desire?

Stalin: I am really confident in the possibility of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain. The establishment of such relations would greatly assist in strengthening political, trade, and cultural ties between these countries.

Werth: Do you consider that a rapid withdrawal of all American troops from China is necessary for peace in the future?

Stalin: Yes, I do consider [this to be true].

Werth: Do you consider that the monopoly possession of the atomic bomb by the United States is one of the chief threats to world peace?

Stalin: I do not consider the atomic bomb to be such a serious power as certain political figures, who are inclined towards it. Atomic bombs are set aside for frightening those who have weak nerves, but [atomic bombs] cannot decide the fates of war, because an atomic bomb is entirely insufficient for this. Of course, the monopoly possession of the secret of the atomic bomb creates a threat, but there are at least two means [to be used] against this: 1) the monopoly possession of the atomic bomb cannot continue for long, and 2) the utilization of the atomic bomb will be forbidden.

Werth: Do you suppose that, with the further progress [lit. “movement”] of the Soviet Union towards communism, the possibilities for peaceful cooperation with the outside world will diminish, so far as regards the Soviet Union?

Stalin: I am convinced [lit. “do not doubt”] that the possibilities of peaceful cooperation will not diminish, but might even increase.

“Communism in one country” is entirely possible, especially in such a country as the Soviet Union.

Source: I.V. Stalin, Sochineniia, vol. 16, pp. 37-39.

Translated by Michael Thurman.

**Answers to the Questions of Mr. H. Bailey,
President of the American Agency "United Press"**

October 26, 1946

Bailey: Do you agree with the opinion of the Secretary of State Burns, expressed in a radio announcement last Friday, concerning the intensified tensions between the USSR and the United States?

Stalin: No.

Bailey: If such an increased tension exists, could you not point out the reasons for it, as well as the primary means for eliminating it?

Stalin: The question is irrelevant, because of the [lit. "falls away" in connection with the] answer to the previous question.

Bailey: Do you consider that the present negotiations will result in the conclusion of peace agreements that will establish cordial relations between peoples - the former allies in the war against fascism - and eliminate the danger of a war being unleashed by the former countries of the Axis?

Stalin: I hope so.

Bailey: In the opposite case, what are the hindrances to establishing cordial relations among the [countries] that were allies in the great war?

Stalin: The question is irrelevant, because of the [lit. "falls away" in connection with the] answer to the previous question.

Bailey: How does the Russia feel about the decision of Yugoslavia not to sign a peace agreement with Italy?

Stalin: Yugoslavia is justified in being dissatisfied.

Bailey: At present, what, in your opinion, is the most serious threat to world peace?

Stalin: The instigators of a new war, most of all Churchill and like-thinking persons in the USA.

Bailey: If such a threat arises, what steps must be taken to by the peoples of the world to evade a new war?

Stalin: It is necessary to expose and restrain the instigators of a new war.

Bailey: Is the United Nations a guarantee of the integrity of small countries?

Stalin: As yet it is difficult to say.

Bailey: Do you believe that the four zones of occupation in Germany must be unified in the near future as regards economic administration for the purpose of restoring Germany as a peaceful economic unit, and thus ease the four powers' burden of occupation?

Stalin: It is necessary to restore not only the economic, but also the political unity of Germany.

Bailey: Do you believe that it is possible at present to create a kind of central administration run by the Germans themselves, but under Allied control, which will make it possible for the Council of Foreign Ministers to work a peace agreement for Germany?

Stalin: Yes, I consider it [possible].

Bailey: Are you convinced that, judging from the elections that took place this summer and fall in various zones, that Germany is developing along democratic lines, which give hope for its future as a peaceful nation?

Stalin: As of yet, I am not convinced of this.

Bailey: Do you consider that, as it was proposed in certain circles, the level of industry permitted for Germany must be raised above the level agreed upon so that Germany can be more prosperous [lit. "better provided for"]?

Stalin: Yes, I consider that [it must be raised].

Bailey: What must be done beyond the existing program of the four powers to prevent Germany from again becoming a military threat to the world?

Stalin: We must really root out fascism in Germany and thoroughly democratize it.

Bailey: Is it desirable to permit the German people to restore their industry and trade so that they can be self-sufficient?

Stalin: Yes, it is desirable.

Bailey: In your opinion, are the decisions of the Potsdam conference being adhered to? If no, what is required to make the Potsdam declaration an effective instrument?

Stalin: It is not always adhered to, especially in the matter of democratizing Germany.

Bailey: Do you consider that the right of veto was abused during the negotiations between the four ministries of foreign affairs and at meeting of the Council of the Iu.N.O. [UN?]

Stalin: No, I consider this [to be true].

Bailey: How far, in the opinion of the Kremlin, must the allied powers go in the matter of investigating and bringing to trial minor war criminals in Germany? Is it considered that the Nurnburg decisions created a sufficiently strong basis for such actions?

Stalin: The further it goes, the better.

Bailey: Does Russia consider the western borders of Poland to be permanent?

Stalin: Yes.

Bailey: How does the USSR view the presence of British troops in Greece? Does it consider that must deliver more weapons to the present government of Greece.

Stalin: [I consider it] as unnecessary.

Bailey: How large are the Russian military contingents in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Austria, and for how long, in your opinion, must these contingents be maintained in the interest of guaranteeing peace?

Stalin: In the West, that is, in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, the Soviet Union has 60 divisions altogether (including infantry and armored divisions). Most of them are not fully manned. There are no Soviet troops in Yugoslavia. In two months, when this October's decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet concerning the final stage of demobilization will be implemented, 40 divisions will remain in these countries.

Bailey: How does the USSR government regard the presence of American warships in the Mediterranean Sea?

Stalin: Indifferently.

Bailey: What are the prospects at present for a trade agreement between Russia and Norway?

Stalin: As yet it is difficult to say.

Bailey: Is it possible for Finland to again become a self-sufficient nation after reparations are paid, and does [Stalin] have any sort of opinion concerning the reexamination of the reparations program to hasten the revival of Finland?

Stalin: The question is posed incorrectly. Finland was and remains a fully self-sufficient nation.

Bailey: What will the trade agreements with Sweden and other countries mean for the reconstruction of the USSR? What foreign aid do you consider desirable for the accomplishment of this great task?

Stalin: The agreement with Sweden is a contribution to the economic cooperation of nations.

Bailey: Is Russia still interested in receiving loans from the United States?

Stalin: It is interested.

Bailey: Does Russia already have its own atomic bomb or some similar sort of weapon?

Stalin: No.

Bailey: What is your opinion of the atomic bomb and similar weapons as an instrument of war?

Stalin: I have already given my evaluation of the atomic bomb in a well-known reply to Mr. Werth.

Bailey: How, in your opinion, might we best control atomic energy? Must this control be created on a worldwide basis, and to what degree must a power sacrifice its sovereignty in the interest of establishing effective control?

Stalin: Strict international control is necessary.

Bailey: How much time is required to restore the devastated districts of Western Russia?

Stalin: Six to seven years, if not more.

Bailey: Will Russia permit functioning trade airlines over the territory of the Soviet Union? Does Russia intend to expand its own airline on other continents on a mutual basis?

Stalin: Under certain conditions this is possible [lit. "not excluded"].

Bailey: How does your government view the occupation of Japan? Do you consider it successful in its present form [lit. "existing basis"]?

Stalin: There is success, but greater successes could have been accomplished.

Source: I.V. Stalin, Sochineniia, vol. 16, pp. 40-43.

Translated by Michael Thurman.

**Osóbka Morawski's Notes of a Conversation with Stalin in Sochi
Held by PPR and PPS Delegations on 24 November 1946**

November 24, 1946

I am reconstructing a trip to Moscow and the situation of calling on Generalissimus Stalin for an arbitration in a dispute between the PPR and PPS. An attempt to reconstruct the conversation with Stalin from November 1946.

The trip took place on the PPS initiative to entrust to Stalin the role of an arbiter between the PPS and PPR regarding an **Agreement**. From the PPR side there were: Gomulka, Berman and Zambrowski, from the PPS: Szwalbe, Cyrankiewicz and myself.

On the first day we arrived in Moscow and spent the night. On the second day we flew to the Caucasus, to Sochi, where Stalin was vacationing. We flew not by our plane, but by a proven one, as we had been told. In Sochi it's very beautiful, and while in Moscow the temperature was over twenty degrees below zero, in Sochi at the same time it was several degrees plus. We settled in a mountain villa, right over the sea. It seems to me that com. Wiesław was making contacts in some way before our visit to Stalin. Towards the evening at 8 p.m. of the Moscow time Stalin received us in his villa in the mountains. We were driving up the hill along the serpentines for about half an hour.

Cyrankiewicz began with his report. He did it very aptly. Then Wiesław took the floor. His report was a collection of assaults at the PPS, otherwise using trifle and not serious arguments. He charged us with: 1) a pro-western orientation, 2) pro-PSL sympathies, 3) liquidation of leftist elements in the party and introduction of WRN-elements, etc.

After Wiesław I took the floor, refuting point by point those charges. And since some of the Wiesław's arguments had been weak and unproven, it seems to me that the impression had eventually been totally different than intended. Berman and Szwalbe didn't speak. Zambrowski come up in Wiesław's support, trying to lay down more or less the same theses, inventing just new arguments. Cyrankiewicz (and partly me) presented the so-called Matuszewski's "memorial" problem and the case of Skowroński. This crushed our adversaries totally. Stalin did not get involved in the merits of our dispute at all and was interested merely in our demands toward the PPR (percentages). He said he didn't want to be an arbiter, but could advise us in a friendly manner. With the exception of a "key" in the military, which he didn't share, not to make the military party-oriented - he shared our other demands. He advised not to give to the PSL and others, running outside of the bloc, more than 25 percent. He defended the SL and on his advise we have decided to add them 2 more point to 27. He gave a low rating to the SD, suggested even lower than our estimate (8 percent); he said it was not a party of the future and after the elections it should rather disappear. After that evening the PPR members were easier to talk to. The second day we spent at the porch, working out conditions of an agreement. There were controversies, but it

wasn't difficult to close the gaps. The essence of the agreement came down to: 1) PPR members have finally recognized the principle of our parity; 2) we have come to an agreement for the post-election period, besides of what the PPS is to gain currently.

Before the elections: vice minister of Foreign Affairs and the same position in the Ministry of State Security. Regarding the first position we agreed right away on the person (Leszczycki), regarding the second one - no. After the elections the PPS is about to receive additionally: the Ministry of Public Administration, assuming after a certain period the Ministry of the Recovered Territories is to be eliminated; the Ministry of Shipping and Foreign Trade and the Supreme Chamber of State Control. The PPR is to receive the Ministry of Education, the SL - Ministry of Agriculture and the Speaker of the Sejm (PPS will have the I deputy speaker). Among the negative points of the agreement are constraints on my independence in allocating subsidies from the Council of Ministers (as politics is being made through money). We have agreed that we will decide collectively about subventions.

On the second evening we were received by Generalissimus Stalin in a second wonderful villa, built in stone overlooking the sea. Mountains, the sea and forest - what a wonderful setting: Stalin received us very warmly, he was joking about a "cock-fighting" between the PPS and PPR, was telling about differences among the big powers over Germany. Stalin is of the opinion that Germany should be a single entity, that they cannot be replaced as a production force and that it would not be good to leave America alone in this area. He called Szwalbe a "Talleyrand of the PPS". He didn't agree with the PPR that Daszyński should not be glorified. He gave Shevchenko as an example that the Ukrainians are using him now. He said jokingly: "I am for Daszyński". All in all we considered ourselves winners all along. But Stalin kissed Wiesław. For a return trip Stalin gave us tangerines and was very friendly. He promised to come to Poland after the elections.

We were flying back to Warsaw with adventures. At Rostov we were tanking fuel, but right beyond Rostov we had to make a turn towards Moscow because of bad weather. The following day we couldn't fly by our own plane because it turned out, after checking, that it had only ... 12 defects. So, we took the Soviet plane. But the weather was poor. The pilot wanted to turn back, but we didn't agree. Neither Warsaw, nor Poznań, Bydgoszcz, Wrocław, Szczecin or Kraków would receive us. Finally we flew to Lodz and there we landed safely.

Source: A. Werblan, "Tajemne karty z dziejów powojennej PPS," Dziś. Przegląd Społeczny, vol. 3 (1992), no 12, pp. 70-71.

Translated by Jan Chowanec.

Interview With Elliot Roosevelt

December 21, 1946

Roosevelt: Do you consider it possible that a democracy like the United States can live peacefully side-by-side with a communist form of government such as exists in the Soviet Union, and that neither side will make an attempt to interfere with the internal political affairs of the other?

Stalin: Yes, of course. This is not only possible. This is reasonable and entirely feasible. During the tensest times of the war the differences in the forms of government did not hinder the two countries in allying and defeating our enemies. Preserving these relations is possible to an even greater extent during peacetime.

Roosevelt: Do you consider that the success of the United Nations depends on the agreement of the Soviet Union, England, and the United States concerning essential matters?

Stalin: Yes, I think so. In many respects the fate of the United Nations as an organization depends on these three nations achieving harmonious relations.

Roosevelt: Do you consider, Generalissimo, that reaching a broad economic agreement on mutual exchange of manufactured goods and raw materials between our two countries is an important step towards general peace?

Stalin: Yes, I suppose that this would be an important step towards general peace. Of course, I agree with this. The expansion of international trade in many respects favors the development of good relations between our two countries.

Roosevelt: Does the Soviet Union support the rapid creation by the United Nations Security Council of an international police force that would, with the participation of all of the United Nations, quickly appear wherever military endeavors threaten peace?

Stalin: Of course.

Roosevelt: If you consider that the United Nations must control the atomic bomb, then mustn't this be done by way of inspection, the establishment of control over all research institutes and industrial enterprises manufacturing all manner of weapons, as well as [control over] the peaceful utilization and development of atomic energy?

Here Elliot Roosevelt notes in parentheses: (Stalin quickly posed the question, "In general?" I said, "Yes, but in particular does Russia agree with such a plan?").

Stalin: Of course. On the basis of the principle of equality, no exclusions must be made for Russia. Russia must be subject to the same rule of inspection and control as any other country.

At this point, Roosevelt notes in parentheses: (There was no wavering in his answer. And he didn't even mention the matter of reserving the right of veto).

Roosevelt: Do you consider it beneficial to call a new conference of the Big Three for discussion of the international problems presently threatening the general peace?

Stalin: I consider that there must be not one conference, but several. If several conferences are convened, they would serve a highly useful purpose.

Here Roosevelt notes in parentheses: (At this moment my wife asked if he thought that such conferences would contribute to establishing tighter relations at lower levels between the representatives of the countries involved. She also asked if this was accomplished as a result of the wartime conferences. Stalin answered, smiling at her, "There is no doubt about it. The wartime conferences and the results achieved considerably aided the establishment of cooperation at lower levels").

Roosevelt: Sir, I know that you study many political and social problems of other countries. Therefore, I would like to ask if you consider that the elections taking place in the United States in November are evidence of the people's departure from belief in the policy of Roosevelt [in the direction of] the isolationist policies of his opponents?

Stalin: I am not such a great authority on the internal life of the people of the United States, but it seems to me that the elections prove that the present government is wasting the moral and political capital created by the deceased president, and, therefore, it made the victory of the Republicans easier.

At this point, Roosevelt notes in parentheses: (The Generalissimo responded to my last question with great emphasis).

Roosevelt: To what do you attribute the weakening of friendly ties between our two countries since the death of Roosevelt?

Stalin: I consider that if this question relates to the ties between the Russian and American peoples, then there has been no worsening. As regards relations between the two governments, a misunderstanding has arisen. A certain worsening [of relations] took place, and then [the alarmists] made a lot of noise and began to cry out that in the future relations would become even worse. But I do not see anything horrifying in the sense that it harms peace or [threatens] armed conflict. No great power, even if its government strives towards it, can send out a large army to fight against another allied power, another great power, since in the present day no one can wage war without their own people, and the people don't want to fight. The nations [of the world] are tired of war. Moreover, no purposes have been propounded that could justify a new war. No one would know what they were fighting for, and thus I don't see anything terrifying in the fact that certain representatives of the United States government speak about a worsening of relations between us. In light of these considerations, I think that a threat of a new war is unrealistic.

Roosevelt: Do you support a broad exchange of cultural and scientific information between our two countries? Do you support an exchange of students, artists, scholars, and professors?

Stalin: Of course.

Roosevelt: Must the United States and the Soviet Union work out a general, long-term policy concerning for the peoples of the Far East?

Stalin: I consider that this would be beneficial if it were possible. In any case, our government is prepared to conduct a common policy with the United States concerning matters in the Far East.

Roosevelt: If an agreement was reached between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning a system of loans or credits, would such an agreement be of benefit to the United States economy over the long term?

Stalin: A system of such credits, doubtless, is of mutual benefit to both the United States and the Soviet Union.

At this point, Roosevelt notes in parentheses: (Thereupon I posed a question that would elicit obvious dissatisfaction in many European countries).

Roosevelt: Does the fact that no program of de-Nazification was conducted in the American and English occupation zones of Germany give the Soviet Union serious cause for unease?

Stalin: No, this is not a reason for serious unease, but, of course, it is unpleasant to the Soviet Union that this part of our common program was not carried out.

Source: I.V. Stalin, Sochineniia, vol. 16, pp. 45-48.

Translated by Michael Thurman.

**Soviet and Yugoslav Records of the
Tito-Stalin Conversation of 27-28 May 1946**

A. The Soviet Record:

Record of Conversation of
Generalissimus I.V. Stalin with Marshal Tito

27 May 1946 at 23:00 hours¹

Secret

Present:

from the USSR side - [USSR Foreign Minister] V.M. Molotov, USSR Ambassador to Yugoslavia A.I. Lavrent'ev;

from the Yugoslav side - Minister of Internal Affairs, A. Rankovich; Head of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General K. Popovich; Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Serbia, Neshkovich; Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Slovenia, Kidrich; Yugoslav Ambassador to USSR, V. Popovich.²

At the start of the meeting com. Stalin asked Tito whether, in the instance of Trieste being granted the status of a free city, this would involve just the city itself or the city suburbs, ³ and which status would be better - along the lines of Memel [Klaipeda, Lithuania] or those of Danzig [Gdansk, Poland].⁴ Tito replied that the suburbs of the city are inhabited by Slovenians. Only the city itself would be acceptable. Though he would like to continue to argue for including Trieste in Yugoslavia. Further, Tito, in the name of the Yugoslav government, expressed gratitude to com. Molotov for the support that the Soviet delegation showed in the discussion of the question of the Italian-Yugoslav border at the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Paris.⁵

Com. Molotov gave a report on the differences in status between Memel and Danzig, pointing out that the status along the lines of Memel is more acceptable.

Com. Stalin asked Tito about the industrial and agricultural situation in Yugoslavia.

Tito replied that all land had been sown the intermediate crop was awaited, and that industry was working well.

After which, com. Stalin invited Tito to present the group of questions which the Yugoslav delegation wished to discuss this evening.

Tito put forth the following questions: economic cooperation between USSR and Yugoslavia, military cooperation,⁶ and Yugoslav-Albanian relations.

Regarding the question of economic cooperation, Tito said that Yugoslavia did not want to turn to the United States for credit. If America were to agree to provide loans, then this would be tied to demands for political concessions from Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia does not have the means for further industrial development. The Yugoslav government would like

to receive assistance from the Soviet Union, in particular, through the establishment of mixed Soviet-Yugoslav associations. Yugoslavia has a fair amount of mineral and ore deposits, but it is in no position to organize production, since it does not possess the necessary machinery. In particular, Yugoslavia has oil deposits, but no drilling machines.

Com. Stalin said: "We will help."

Regarding com. Stalin's questions, whether Yugoslavia was producing aluminum, copper and lead, Tito answered in the affirmative, noting that Yugoslavia had many bauxite and ore deposits for the production of these metals.

Com. Stalin noted that the Ministry of Foreign Trade had informed Yugoslavia of its readiness to participate in talks regarding the establishment of mixed associations, but no final answer had been received from Yugoslavia. As a result, the impression was created that Yugoslavia was not interested in forming such associations.⁷

Tito objected, stating that on the contrary, he had spoken several times with ambassador Sadchikov⁸ about the Yugoslav government's desire to create mixed Soviet-Yugoslav associations.

Regarding com. Stalin's note whether it will not be necessary to allow other powers into the Yugoslav economy following the formation of mixed Soviet-Yugoslav associations, Tito answered that the Yugoslav government had no intention of allowing the capital of other powers into its economy.

Subsequently, com. Stalin summarized, saying that in this way the Soviet-Yugoslav economic cooperation was being conceptualized on the basis of forming mixed associations.

Tito affirmed this, stating that he was intent on presenting the following day his proposals, in written form, on this subject.⁹

With respect to the question of military cooperation, Tito said that the Yugoslav government would like to receive shipments from the Soviet Union to supply the military needs of Yugoslavia, not in the form of mutual trade receipts, but in the form of loans. Yugoslavia has a small military industry which could produce grenade launchers and mines. In a number of places there were cadres. But there were no corresponding arms, since the Germans carried them away. The Yugoslav government would like to receive some machinery from Germany as reparations for the reconstruction of certain military factories. But Yugoslavia cannot by itself provide for all of its military needs, and in this regard, the Yugoslav government is hoping for assistance from the Soviet Union.

Com. Stalin said that Yugoslavia ought to have certain military factories, for example, aviation [factories], for Yugoslavia may produce aluminum given the presence of rich bauxite deposits. In addition, it was necessary to have artillery munitions factories.

Tito noted that [artillery] gun barrels may be cast in the Soviet Union and then further assembly may be done in Yugoslavia.

Touching upon the question of Yugoslavia's water borders, com. Stalin said that, for the purpose of safeguarding them, it was important to have a good naval fleet. You need to have torpedo boats, patrol boats, and armored boats. Although the Soviet Union is weak in this regard, we will nevertheless, in the words of com. Stalin, help you.¹⁰ Regarding Albania, com. Stalin pointed out that the internal political situation in Albania was unclear. There were reports that something was happening there between the Communist Party Politburo and Enver Hoxha. There had been a report that Kochi Dzedzej¹¹ wants to come to Moscow in order to discuss certain questions prior to the party congress.¹² Enver Hoxha has also expressed desire to come to Moscow together with Dzedzej.

Com. Stalin asked Tito whether he knows anything about the situation in the Communist Party of Albania.

Tito, appearing unacquainted with these questions, replied that Hoxha's visit to Belgrade was being proposed for the near future. That is why he, Tito, believes that the reply to the Albanians should note that Dzodzej's and Hoxha's proposed visit to Moscow will be examined following Hoxha's visit to Belgrade.

Com. Molotov noted that we were trying to hold back the Albanians' efforts to come to Moscow, but the Albanians were determined in this.

Com. Stalin noted that the Albanians' visit to Moscow might bring an unfavorable reaction from England and America, and this would further exacerbate the foreign policy situation of Albania.

Further, com. Stalin asked Tito whether Enver Hoxha agreed with including Albania in the Federation of Yugoslavia.

Tito replied in the affirmative.

Com. Stalin said that, at the present time it would be difficult for Yugoslavia to resolve two such questions as the inclusion of Albania into Yugoslavia and the question of Trieste.

Tito agreed with this.

As a result, continued com. Stalin, it would be wise to first examine the question of friendship and mutual assistance between Albania and Yugoslavia.

Tito said that, above all, this treaty must provide for the defense of the territorial integrity and national independence of Albania.

Com. Stalin said that it is important to find a formula for this treaty and to bring Albania and Yugoslavia closer together.¹³

Com. Stalin touched on the question of including Bulgaria in the Federation.

Tito said that nothing would come of the Federation.

Com. Stalin retorted: "This must be done."

Tito declared that nothing would come of the federation, because the matter involved two different regimes. In addition, Bulgaria is strongly influenced by other parties, while in Yugoslavia the entire government, [though] with the presence of other parties, is essentially in the hands of the Communist Party.

Com. Stalin noted that one need not fear this. During the initial stages things could be limited to a pact of friendship and mutual assistance, though indeed, more needs to be done.

Tito agreed with this.

Com. Molotov noted that at the present time difficulties may arise from the fact that a peace treaty had not yet been signed with Bulgaria. Bulgaria was perceived as a former enemy.¹⁴

Com. Stalin pointed out that this should not be of significant importance.¹⁵ For example, the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship with Poland before Poland was even recognized by other countries.¹⁶

Further, com. Stalin summarized the meeting, saying that what the Yugoslav government is looking for in economic questions and in military matters can be arranged. A commission must be established to examine these questions.

Tito informed com. Stalin of Yugoslavia's relations with Hungary, notifying of Rakosi's¹⁷ visit to Belgrade. Tito declared that the Yugoslav government had decided not to raise the question of Yugoslavia's territorial demands against Hungary (demands on the

Ban'skii triangle ["Baiskii triangle," the region along the Hungarian-Yugoslav border centered on the city of Baia.])¹⁸ in the Council of Ministers.¹⁹ Tito expressed his satisfaction with Yugoslavia's signing of an agreement with Hungary on reparation payments.

Com. Stalin noted that if Hungary wanted peaceful relations with Yugoslavia, then Yugoslavia had to support these endeavors, bearing in mind that Yugoslavia's primary difficulties were in its relations with Greece and Italy.

Recorded by Lavrent'ev.

Source: Leonid Gibianskii, "The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War: Archival Documents on Stalin's Meetings with Communist Leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 1946-48," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 10 (March 1998), pp. 112-34 ("Poslednyi vizit I. Broza Tito k I.V. Stalinu," Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1993, no. 2, pp. 16-35; APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 397, ll. 107-110).

Translated by Daniel Rozas.

B. The Yugoslav Record

In the Kremlin

27.V.46*, 23:00 hours.

[*Recorded by B. Neshkovich.]

[Translator's note: the brackets used in the text are from the Russian translation of the Serbo-Croatian document. Any brackets and notes by the English translator will hereafter be denoted by "trans."]

[Present:] Stalin, Molotov, Lavrent'ev, Tito, Marko,²⁰ Koča,²¹ Vlado,²² Kidrich, Neshkovich.

Stalin: "Beautiful people, strong people."

[Stalin:] "A hardy nation."

Molotov: agreed.²³

Stalin: Asks how was our trip.

Tito [says] it went well...

Stalin (chuckling, ironically): "How is my 'friend' [Russian word used in text] Shubashich?"

Tito (similarly) [says], he is in Zagreb, in the coop.²⁴ And also Grol.²⁵

Stalin (similarly): "And how is my 'friend' [Russian word used in text] Grol?"

Tito (similarly): "He's in Belgrade"...

[Tito:] "We always had measures to suppress them. The parties exist only formally, though in fact they don't exist. In reality, only the Communist party exists."²⁶

Stalin chuckled pleasantly at this.

Stalin: "What kind of crop will you have?"

Tito: "An especially good one. The land has been well sown. In the passive regions²⁷ it will be good. The assistance of UNRRA²⁸ will not be needed. There will be lots of fruit."

Stalin: "Have you sown everything?"

Tito: "Everything has been sown."

Stalin: "What is your plan? What would you like to raise [for discussion]?"

Tito: puts forth economic and military questions.

Stalin during the whole time: "We'll help!"

* [Stalin] "How are Kardelj and Djilas?"²⁹ [* Here a line was moved from below where it is denoted by * __*.]

T[ito]: "Well. We couldn't all come, and so only half of the government is here."

S[talin]: "The English and Americans don't want to give you Trieste!" (chuckling).

T[ito]: thanked for the support, [said] that the people send their greetings to Stalin and Molotov, [speaks] of the great political significance [of Soviet support].

Molotov: "But you still do not have Trieste..."

T[ito]: nevertheless, [Soviet support] is of great pol[itical] importance...³⁰

* During the time that Tito [...]*

27.V.46**

23:00 h.

[** Recorded by K. Popovich.]

...1) S[talin]: "On our part we made a proposal to your comrades, responsible for economic questions, whether you would agree to the establishment of joint enterprises. We will hold nothing against you if you decline. Poland, for example, declined on the grounds that the Americans may, in their turn, raise questions of establishing joint enterprises."

T[ito]: "No, such is not my opinion nor the opinion of other leaders - [on the contrary, we think] it is necessary."

2) S[talin]: "...I agree to the establishment of these enterprises as you see fit...".
(M[olotov]: "In those fields that are more beneficial both for you and for us...")

S[talin]: expressed interest in where our oil and bauxite deposits are located. "You have very good bauxite." T[ito] explained where the deposits were, as well as the locations Bora, Trepcha and Rasha³¹ - and that we have good coal, but not coke for house ovens.

3) M[olotov said that] one of the Italian economic arguments for receiving Rasha is the fact that without it Italy would only be able to meet 20% of its demand.

4) The army.

S[talin]: "This is right, that in the event of war, because of the difficulty of supply, that [there ought to be] as much military industry in the country as is possible. It would be good to develop the aviation industry, given the rich bauxite deposits, and, as for artillery, the forging ought to be done within the country."

S[talin]: "For coastal defense, you need to build formations of fast, light, and mobile ships, for Italy will be left with a sufficiently strong Navy (about two squadrons)."

T[ito]: "... In Boka Kotorska³² ships of 30,000 tons can be stationed."

S[talin]: "These days they build ships of 60,000 tons. Currently we are having great difficulties in naval fleet construction, but we must assist you. I agree to assist you with equipment for munitions and light firearms factories. We will also assist you with cadres, who will help to organize officer improvement schools, which would in 1-2 years be turned into an Academy (on the level of the Frunze [Academy])."

Shipments for the Y[ugoslav] A[rmy] will be made outside the framework of trade agreements - that is, free and on credit.

It is very important that you have a naval fleet. We will assist you in the construction of shipyards and bases and corresponding naval cadres.

We will assist you with the extraction of oil.

Together with munitions factories, it is important to reestablish arsenals, with which we will also assist you. It is necessary to examine the possibility of constructing aviation-engine factories."

5) Albania*.

[Further, two lines are crossed out:] S[talin]: "What do you think of [doing] with Albania?"

T[ito]: "Sign...". T[ito] [with regard to the naval fleet]: "We must know whether our border will be along Albania or the coast."

S[talin]: "What exactly are you proposing?"

T[ito]: "To sign one good treaty to help Albania - a treaty to defend independence, this will help both in the given situation and with regard to the naval threat."

S[talin]: "This is a new formulation, but it ought to be examined and worked out. You worked out a good treaty with Czechia and found a new formulation: not only against Germany and its allies during the war, but also against its future allies.³³ But one needs to think about it more and find an appropriate formulation.

Right now is not the time for a federation (not with Bulgaria either). Most important now is the question of Trieste, and this must be decided first. But if you want a treaty right now, both are possible (Trieste and Albania) at the same time" (at this he chuckled).

T[ito]: "Three times we put off Enver Hoxha's visit to B[el]g[ra]de, since we were planning on a meeting with you. Generally speaking, we are ready to sign an agreement with Albania assuring [its-trans.] "sovereignty." ***.

[***Here text has been inserted from below, marked by ***** __ *****.]S[talin]: "Do you know Enver? What kind of person is he?**** [**** Further text is crossed out: "They were trying to visit us, but they do not want to send Enver by himself - they want Kochi Dzodzej to accompany him." This phrase is printed in a slightly altered form further below.] Is he a communist? Are there any internal problems of their own - what is your information on this?"

T[ito]: "I did not see Enver Hoxha [sic-trans.], he is a young man, but in the course of the war he became popular...

***** We will work out an agreement and foster circumstances for greater closeness."

S[talin] agreed.*****

T[ito]: "...and in general, the government consists of young people. As far as we know, there aren't any kind of special problems."³⁴

S[talin]: "They were trying to come here, but they do not want to send Enver alone, but Kochi Dzodzej wants to come with him - as some kind of restraint. What do you know of this?"

T[ito]: "We are not aware [of this] nor of the presence of some kind of disagreements."

S[talin]: "We are constantly putting off their visit. What do you think, should we receive them? We think that there is no need."

T[ito]: "Yes, we can take care of everything with them."

S[talin]: "Right now it would be inconvenient for us and for them. Better if we help them through you."³⁵

S[talin]: after this, expressed the opinion that something is amiss in the Alb[anian] Politburo.

Marko: "Comrades in the Politburo do not see Env[er] Hoxha as a sufficiently solid party member, and thus they always insist on him being accompanied by Kochi Dzodzej as the most senior party member in the Politburo. At the April plenum they discussed the question of the party line, especially with regard to Yugoslavia and the S[oviet] Union, and ascertained certain mistakes, and excluded Seifulla Maleshov³⁶ from the Politburo as a bearer of these mistakes. Since then, the leadership has been more consistent."

T[ito]: "We can resolve this question with them."

S[talin]: "Good."

6) Bulgaria.

S[talin]: "Are you currently in favor of a federation with Bulgaria?"

T[ito]: "No. Now is not the time. For they have not yet definitively resolved many things: the army, the bourg[eois] parties, the monarchy and the Bulg[arian] position on signing a peace treaty."

S[talin]: "Correct, but they must be offered help."

7) Hungary.

T[ito]: "We have no territ[orial] demands. Since the int[ernal] polit[ical] situation has been corrected there, we have dropped our territ[orial] demands in accordance with your advice."³⁷

S[talin]: "Right. If you have good relations with your nor[thern] neighbor, then Greece will also look at you differently... And does Greece raise any demands with regard to Yugoslavia?"

T[ito]: "There were provocations against us, but not in recent times."

S[talin]: "The Eng[lish] maintain an army there in order to prop up the reactionary forces, and yes, possibly for other reasons as well."

T[ito]: (laughs): "We have demands against them: Aegean Maced[onia] and Salonikki."

M[olotov]: "Yes, Salonikki is an old Slavic city. You need access to the Aegean sea."

S[talin]: "Damn it* [*Russian words used in document.] Many comrades have gone to Bulg[aria], but things are not moving, not developing as they should. The com[munists] have influence, but they do not hold corresponding positions in the state apparatus. We should have told them to remove Stainov.³⁸ Currently we have there the Sec[retary] of the Min[istry] of For[eign] Affairs."^{**} [^{**}Russian word used in document.]

T[ito]: "I later explained to Rakosi that we demanded Petchui³⁹ because of strat[egic] reasons and in order to help the Hung[arian] communists, since the reactionary forces were beginning to raise their heads."

S[talin]: "And did they really believe you?.."⁴⁰

S[talin]: "And what further plans have you for tonight?"

T[ito]: "We don't have [a plan]."

S[talin] (laughing): "Leadership, but without a state* [*Russian word used in document.] plan!" (laughing).

Vlado: "We accommodated ourselves to meet with you."

S[talin]: "Then we can have a snack."^{**} [^{**}Russian word used in text and alongside in brackets an explanation in Serbo-Croatian is given: "to eat something".]

M[olotov]: "If you are inviting us, then with great pleasure."

At the villa^{***}

[^{***} Russian words used in text with explanations in Serbo-Croatian alongside in brackets.]

S[talin]. Regarding Togliatti⁴¹: theoretician, journalist, can write a good article, a good comrade, but to gather people and "guide" them - this he cannot do; he has difficult circumstances there.

Torres [Thorez] and Duclos: good comrades.⁴²

Jose (Diaz)⁴³ was good, intelligent. Passionaria⁴⁴ is not the same, she cannot gather and lead; at this difficult time she is in no condition to govern. In Rumania there are good young comrades.

In Germany F. is a good leader, Pieck - "the father"^{****} [^{****}Russian word used in document.], is gathering people and resolving various questions...⁴⁵ Germans are nothing without orders.

The International - there's nothing to say.⁴⁶

Referenda - "but it's nonsense"^{****}⁴⁷

[^{****} Russian words used in quotes in the document.]

Warlike people are trying to draw in the Greeks.⁴⁸

"Do you want another war, to have your backs beaten again, to have Slavs lose another ten million? - If you do not want this, then the Slavs must unite in a single front with the Sov[iet] Union."

The idea of revenge in Italy.

Realism and idealism of Benes:⁴⁹ realist, when shown strength, but would be an idealist if he felt he was in possession of strength (this is an answer to Tito's remark: Benes is an English person, though a realist).

"Fierlinger⁵⁰ will go with the communists."

Relations between Czechia and Poland: Entertaining as a pre-election maneuver; fact is, they did not undertake any dip[lomatic] steps.⁵¹

Yugoslavia is a democracy* [^{*}further crossed out: "new"] of a special type (non-Soviet type), different from all others.

"We are Serbs, Molotov and I ... we are two Serbs..."^{**} [^{**}Phrase composed of Russian words.]

"Slovenian"^{***} [^{***}Russian word used in text.] mercenary intelligentsia."⁵²

Eucalyptus.⁵³

"Tito must take care of himself, that nothing would happen to him ... for I will not live long ... laws of physiology..., but you will remain for Europe..."⁵⁴

Churchill told him about Tito..., that he is "a good man." - St[alin]: "I don't know him, but if you say so, that means he must be good. I will try to meet him."⁵⁵

Let Djido come, so I could rest under his care... "I will cure my migraine under his care."⁵⁶

"Bevin - an English Noske"⁵⁷

Vlado inquired about Marko, and after Marko, about Vlado...

"Beria - Marko - who will subvert whom?"⁵⁸

END NOTES

1 According to the register of persons received by Stalin, the meeting lasted from 23:00 hours, 27 May 1946, to 00:30 hours, 28 May 1946. Note by Yu.G. Murin, Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), Fond (f.) 45, Opis' (op.) 1, Delo (d.) 416, List (l.) 95 ob.

2 I. V. Stalin (Djugashvili; 1879 (1878)-1953 - chairman of the USSR Soviet of Ministers, member of the Politburo, secretary (essentially general secretary) of the Central Committee [CC] of the All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik) (TsK VKP(b)); Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980) - chairman of the Council of Ministers of Yugoslavia, general secretary of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY); V.M.Molotov (Skriabin: 1890-1986) - vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers, USSR Minister of Foreign of Affairs, member of TsK VKP(b) Politburo; A.I. Lavrent'ev (1904-1984); Aleksandr Rankovich (1909-1983) - Politburo member, secretary of CC CPY, in charge of organizational and cadre affairs; Kocha Popovic (b.1908); Blagoe Neshkovich (b. 1907), also CC secretary of the C[ommunist] P[arty] of Serbia; Boris Kidrich (1912-1953), at the 7 May 1946 meeting of the CC CPY Politburo was appointed to the post of Chairman of the Economic Council and Minister of Industry and Trade (AJ-CK SKJ.III 19) in place of Hebrang (see introduction), the official appointment took place in June after returning from Moscow; Vladimir Popovic (1914-1972).

Only the more important Yugoslav activists who had arrived in Moscow were present at the meeting with Stalin. In addition to those noted above, the delegation accompanying Tito in his visit to USSR included the assistant Chief of the General Staff Rade Khamovich, Chief of Staff of the Air Force Zdenko Ulepich, directors of the departments of the Navy and of Military Industry in the Ministry of People's Defense of Yugoslavia, Srechko Manola and Miyalko Todorovich, commander of the People's Defense Corps of Yugoslavia (state security force) Jovo Vukotich, member of the Union Planning Commission Zvonko Morich, author Radovan Zogovic, in charge of cultural policy affairs and CC CPY agit[ation]-prop[aganda]. See Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), f. 144, op. 6, p. 8, d. 2, ll. 169-170; Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita (Josip Broz Tito Archives, Belgrade), F. Kabinet Marsala Jugoslavije [hereafter AJBT-KMJ], I-1/7, L.1.)

3 The majority of the Trieste population was Italian, while the adjoining region [oblast'] was settled primarily by Slovenians and Croatians. Yugoslavia, with the USSR's support, claimed this entire territory, which had been included as a part of Italy following World War I. The Yugoslav proposal was to grant Trieste the status of a separate federal unit, within the parameters of the Federated Yugoslav state, while granting the port of Trieste the jurisdiction of a free port. The Western powers came out against transferring Trieste and its adjoining regions to Yugoslavia. Western diplomats were discussing possible compromises by granting Trieste and its adjoining regions the special status of a "free city." Later, by the end of June 1946, such a proposal was made by France.

4 Under the Versailles treaty of 1919, Danzig (Gdansk) and an adjoining region, up until that time under claim by Poland from Germany, were given a special status under the protection of the League of Nations. Danzig had the status of a demilitarized free city with its own laws and government organs, while control of its foreign relations and its water and rail transport lines was held by Poland, to whose customs system it also belonged. Memel (Klaipeda) and its adjoining region, until 1919 having also belonged to Germany but now claimed by the new Lithuanian state, was at first put under the control of the Entente, and then transferred to Lithuanian authority under the conditions of the special convention of 1924. It stipulated significant autonomy for Memel in its internal affairs, laws and executive organs, but which nevertheless had to operate under the parameters of the Lithuanian constitution.

5 The Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) of the USSR, USA, Great Britain, France and China was created by the decision of the Potsdam conference in preparation for a peace

treaty with Germany and its former European allies. At the CFM meeting in Paris during 25 April - 16 May 1946, where, among other things, the peace treaty with Italy was being drafted for later examination by the Paris peace conference, a central point of discussion became the establishment of a new Italian-Yugoslav border, in connection with the problem of Trieste and its adjoining territory. The Soviet delegation under Molotov's leadership actively supported Yugoslav territorial claims.

6 During the meeting with Lavrent'ev on 18 April 1946, Tito announced his intention to visit Moscow to discuss economic cooperation, and also noted that such cooperation "must also include the sphere of military industry." (See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 31.) Yugoslavia, having received from the USSR during 1944-46 large-scale shipments of weapons, ammunition, military equipment, and military machinery (including equipment for 32 infantry divisions, several aviation divisions, tank and artillery brigades), had made similar requests previously. Since the summer of 1945, Yugoslavia had been sending requests to the Soviet government for captured factories, workshops, and materials for the production of ammunition, mainly from Soviet occupation zones in Germany and Austria. The Soviet side tried to fulfill these incoming requests in part. (Ibid., d. 10, ll. 18-19; *ibid.*, f. 144, op. 5, p. 5, d. 2, ll. 44, 46, 49-50; *ibid.*, op. 7, p. 12, d. 1, l. 43.) However, Tito, who had proposed even in January 1946 to send a military delegation to Moscow for the purpose of agreeing on a general plan for the training and equipping of a 350-400,000 men-strong Yugoslav army, tried to get the USSR to render broader assistance in the construction of the Yugoslav military industry, possibly through mixed Soviet-Yugoslav enterprises. (Ibid., f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 10, ll. 19-20.) On April 9, during an expanded meeting of the CC CPY Politburo, the members of the military delegation which was to go to USSR for negotiations were mentioned: K. Popovic, Z. Uleplic, S. Manola, M. Todorovic (Arhiv Jugoslavije (Archives of Yugoslavia, Belgrade), F. SKJ, CK SKJ [hereafter AJ-CK SKJ] III/16), that is, the same people who later accompanied Tito to Moscow.

7 Stalin was referring to the situation as of mid-April 1946 (see introduction). However, following this, the trade delegation led by the Minister of Foreign Trade Petrovic, which visited Moscow during the first half of May, was assigned the task, in addition to preparing an agreement for mutual shipments of goods, of also holding negotiations to draft agreements on economic cooperation, including the establishment of joint enterprises. Thus, these questions were discussed by the delegation during its negotiations with the Soviet partners prior to Tito's arrival. (See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 12, l. 5; *ibid.*, d. 15, ll. 38, 90.) On the question of joint enterprises, there were disagreements, which had emerged already during late April, when separate negotiations commenced in Belgrade on the first of these, an aviation enterprise: the Yugoslav delegates considered the Soviet version of the agreement on this enterprise unacceptable to Yugoslavia. The examination of this question was transferred over to the Moscow talks on the general problems of organizing future enterprises. Both sides expressed mutual dissatisfaction with each other's position with regard to the negotiations on the aviation enterprise. (See *ibid.*, d. 10, ll. 6-7; d. 15, ll. 89-90; Arhiva Saveznog sekretarijata za inostrane poslove SFRJ (Archives of the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of the SFRY [Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia], Belgrade), Politicka arhiva (hereafter ASSIP-PA), 1948 god. F-I, Pov. 1535; V. Dedijer, *Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita* [New Materials for Josip Broz Tito's Biography], T. 3 (Belgrade, 1984), pp. 244-245.)

8 I.V. Sadchikov (b. 1906), USSR ambassador to Yugoslavia from March 1945 to February 1946. He was replaced by Lavrent'ev.

9 On the following day Tito proposed that in order to make comments the Yugoslav delegation should take the draft of the agreement put together by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade. (See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 119.) As a result, on 8 June 1946, concurrently with the inter-government agreement on mutual shipment of goods for 1946 (Historical-Foreign Economic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties of the Russian Federation, f. Treaty-Legal Department, op. 11876, d. 55, ll. 14-16), Mikoian and Petrovic signed an agreement on economic cooperation. This agreement provided for the creation of eight Soviet-Yugoslav joint-stock enterprises in Yugoslavia: extraction and refinement of crude oil, extraction of bauxite and production of aluminum, extraction and production of lead, exploration and extraction of coal, ferrous metal production, civilian aviation, the Danube shipping company, and the Soviet-Yugoslav bank. It also provided for further examination of the proposed lumber and paper-cellulose enterprise. The agreement contained the overall equal-term scheme for enterprise organization, while the actual establishment of each of these was to be formulated by separate concrete agreements. (See *ibid.*, ll. 17-19.) In addition to the establishment of enterprises, the agreement provided for Soviet technical assistance to Yugoslavia in areas of electrical, food, textile, chemical, and metal forging industries, as well as the production of building materials and in agriculture (*ibid.*, l. 17). Like other documents signed during this visit, the agreement on economic cooperation was not published. The joint communique issued in connection with the visit stated only that "decisions were made concerning close economic cooperation between both friendly countries." Pravda, 12 June 1946.

But the carrying out of the agreement met with difficulties. By February 1947, an agreement had been reached only with regard to the establishment of two enterprises: civilian aviation and the Danube shipping company. As for the others, the main stumbling block was tied to the production of Yugoslav mineral resources: Yugoslavia insisted that the value of mineral deposits be counted as part of their share of the investment, while the Soviet side maintained that the overall value of mineral deposits could not be counted as investment. (See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 16, ll. 75, 109-110.) This was discussed by the CC CPY Politburo in late September 1946, where frustration with the Soviet position was voiced, with some members, as Lavrent'ev later found out, going so far as to compare this to the "capitalist countries'" mining of Yugoslav mineral resources before the war. (See AJ-CK SJK. III/21; AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 16, ll. 75-76.) And when in early 1947 the Yugoslav government sought decisive action from Molotov and even Stalin himself for the swift establishment of the planned enterprises on the basis of Yugoslav proposals, Stalin, during a 19 April 1947 meeting with Kardelj, announced that there must be no further establishment of enterprises and proposed instead to assist Yugoslav industrialization through Soviet shipments of complex machinery and materials, access to blueprints and technical documentation, and the dispatch of specialists on terms of credit. (See ASSIP-PA, 1947 god, F-IV, Str. Pov. 125, 1234, 1238; AJBT-KMJ, I-3-6/639, ll. 2-3; *ibid.*, I-3-6/646, ll. 9-11.) Yugoslavia agreed, and the corresponding agreement was signed in Moscow on 25 July 1947.

10 The outcome of the visit was announced in a joint communique: "The government of USSR agreed to equip the Yugoslav Army with weapons, ammunition, etc. on conditions of long-term credit, as well as to assist in the reestablishment of the Yugoslavian military

industry." (Pravda, 12 June 1946.) However, no concrete agreement had been signed at this point. It was to be worked out in special negotiations. Even during Tito's visit, the Yugoslav General Staff forwarded requests, on the basis of which the Soviet General Staff determined the type and quantity of materiel to be shipped to Yugoslavia, and a portion of the shipments began to arrive even before the forthcoming agreement. (See AVP RF, f. 144, op. 6, p. 8, d. 3, ll. 132-134; *ibid.*, op. 7, p. 12, d. 1, l. 23.; ASSIP-PA, 1945/1946 god., F-IV, Str. Pov. 968; *ibid.*, 1947 god., F-IV, Str. Pov. 1881.)

11 Enver Hoxha (1908-1985) - first secretary of the CC CPA [Com. Party of Albania], chairman of the Council of Ministers of Albania. Kochi Džodžej - organizational secretary of CC CPA, vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Internal Affairs, the number-two man in the Albanian government at the time. In 1948 he lost in the power struggle against Hoxha, was stripped of all posts, arrested, and executed in 1949.

12 In February 1946 the CC CPA Plenum resolved to call the First CPA Congress on 25 May 1946. However, the Congress was not called until November 1948.

13 The memorandum "On Yugoslav-Albanian Relations," put together by the director of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Balkan sector, A.A. Lavrishchev, in preparation for Tito's visit to Moscow, labelled the completion of the Yugoslav-Albanian Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance "useful and important," and contained only the recommendation to avoid mentioning Italy in the treaty, adopting instead the wording from the Yugoslav-Polish treaty signed in March 1946, which could be used against Italy if it tried to "renew aggression." (The Yugoslav-Polish Treaty provided for mutual military and other assistance using all available means, if one of the countries "is drawn, as a result of invasion, into military operations against either Germany, a country which had been allied with Germany during the last war, or any other country which had directly or by any other means allied with Germany or its allies in such an aggression.") As for the "discussion of incorporating Albania into the Yugoslav Federation," the memorandum recommended to put this off, "in order not to exacerbate the international positions of Yugoslavia and Albania." It further specified that it be put off until peace treaties were signed with Italy and Austria, and Albania was included into the UN. "By the same reasoning" it advised to refrain from signing a secret military agreement between Yugoslavia and Albania, and to "simplify the border situation without signing a special agreement, so as not to attract British and American attention to this matter." (See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 10, l. 3.)

In his meeting with Tito, Stalin stayed close to this strategy. However, it is unclear whether his arguments to put off federation for the time being were an actual expression of the Soviet policy or simply a tactical ploy, intended to shield the real Soviet efforts to prevent Albania's unification with Yugoslavia altogether, which later became one of the reasons for the 1948 conflict. As a result of the 1946 Moscow talks, the question of direct Albanian unification with Yugoslavia was for the time being removed from the agenda. In addition, the Soviet side, having given Tito the "okay" for the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance and the Agreement on Close Economic Cooperation with Albania, informed the Albanian government that it had come out in favor of these agreements and of further "Albanian orientation toward closer relations with Yugoslavia." This had an influence on the Albanian position and in particular on Hoxha, who arrived in Belgrade in late June 1946, where he consulted with Lavrent'ev before signing the corresponding Yugoslav-Albanian documents in early July. (*Ibid.*, d. 15, ll. 167-168; *ibid.*, d. 16, l. 1.)

14 Already since late 1944, the leadership of the communist parties of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, having come to power, began talks on uniting both countries into a federation. The talks were sanctioned, if not even initiated, by Stalin himself, who at the time was in favor of expediting the creation of such a body. Apparently, he had intended this as a means to significantly strengthen the "people's democracy" in Bulgaria: first, with the help of the more stable communist regime in Yugoslavia, and second, reckoning that by uniting with Yugoslavia—a member of the anti-Hitler coalition—Bulgaria would successfully shed its status as a vanquished nation and consequently escape U.S. and British prerogatives stemming from their participation in the establishment of allied control. In early 1945, however, the Western allies, exercising these prerogatives, vetoed the establishment of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation. And when Stalin in turn decided to have Yugoslavia and Bulgaria for now sign only a Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, the veto was extended to this as well. The matter had to be put off to follow the signing of a peace treaty with Bulgaria. See L. Ya. Gibianskii, "U nachala konflikta: balkanskii uzel" ["The Beginning of Conflict: the Balkan Knot"], *Rabochii klass i sovremennyi mir* 2 (1990), pp. 172-173.

In early 1946, although the peace treaty was still far off, the Bulgarian side began to pose the question to the Soviet and Yugoslav governments of resuming the Bulgarian-Yugoslav talks on federating, broken off a year ago. This was done mainly in January 1946, during the Moscow visit of the Bulgarian prime-minister and the ministers of foreign and internal affairs. In his reply Molotov pointed out the importance of holding off on federation and the Treaty of Alliance until a more opportune moment. (ASSIP-PA, 1945/1946 god., F-1, Str. Pov. 433, 434.) Nevertheless, in April the Bulgarian envoy in Belgrade posed the same question to Tito and Lavrent'ev. Tito, like Molotov, told the Bulgarian envoy that such steps, if taken prior to signing a peace treaty with Bulgaria, would cause harm. Nevertheless, in relating this to Lavrent'ev, the Yugoslav leader stated "in a significantly decided tone that he cannot currently support the idea of establishing a federation with Bulgaria," as the latter continued to remain a formal monarchy, and in particular because the communist party influence in Bulgaria was "incomparably weaker" than in Yugoslavia. However, certain that Bulgaria would once again raise this question, Tito asked the Soviet ambassador to ascertain Moscow's position on signing the Yugoslav-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship. (See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, ll. 39-41, 47-48.) And in the discussion with Lavrent'ev a week before his visit to the USSR, speaking on the agenda for the Moscow talks, he pointed out the importance of examining Yugoslav relations not only with Albania, but with Bulgaria as well. (Ibid., l. 100.)

The Yugoslav position coincided with the Soviets', as reflected in the MFA USSR report by Lavrishchev, "On Relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria." The report was completed on 27 May 1946, the day of Tito's arrival in Moscow and his reception by Stalin. Its accompanying suggestions for talks with the Yugoslav leader stated that although "the establishment of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation would correspond to the interests of both countries," it would be a mistake to undertake its creation, as well as to conclude the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, prior to signing a peace treaty with Bulgaria and resolving "difficult internal-political questions" within both countries. (Ibid., d. 10, ll. 13-17.)

15 It is unclear why, contrary to the previous Soviet position expressed in Lavrishchev's report and in Molotov's statements during the meeting, Stalin suddenly announced that the Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty could be concluded prior to signing the peace treaty with

Bulgaria. However, at the meeting with Stalin a few days later, which, along with Tito and accompanying Yugoslav officials, also included the Bulgarian leaders Georgii Dimitrov, Vasil Kolarov and Traicho Kostov, it was decided that the Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty would be signed after concluding the peace treaty with Bulgaria. In addition, it was provided that the matter would involve the closest cooperation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. See N. Ganchovskii, *Dnrite na Dimitrov kakvito gi vidyakh i zapisyakh* (Sofia: 1975), vol. 1, p. 220.)

16 The reference is to the regime that appeared in Poland in July 1944 with the arrival of Soviet forces, and which was established by the Soviet Union and Polish communists relying on its military presence. On 21 April 1945, when the treaty between USSR and this regime was concluded, the Western allies continued to recognize the Polish government in exile.

17 Matyas Rakosi (1892-1971) - General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, deputy prime-minister.

18 The question of Yugoslav territorial claims on Hungary was raised by the Yugoslav representatives to the Soviet government already towards the end of the war. In particular, Hebrang, assigned by Tito to visit Moscow in January 1945 (see introduction), put forth to Stalin claims to the region of the city of Pecs and the "Bais triangle." Stalin at the time replied that such a question could be put before the allied powers only in the event that the Yugoslav population in these regions started to "clamor" for unification with Yugoslavia. The question of possibly posing Yugoslav territorial demands to Hungary and relocating Hungarians from Yugoslavia was discussed in April-May 1946 by Yugoslav and Soviet representatives of various ranks. In late April 1946, Tito also discussed the matter with Rakosi, who had come to Belgrade. The Yugoslav leader expressed readiness not to put the territorial demands on Hungary before the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Paris Peace Conference, but with the condition that the Yugoslav minorities in Hungary be granted ethnic rights and Yugoslav economic interests be ensured in border regions. Rakosi agreed. (See AVP RF, f. 06, op. 7, p.53, d. 872, l. 16; *ibid.*, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 12, l. 6; *ibid.*, d. 13, ll. 19, 22-23; *ibid.*, d. 15, ll. 39, 64-65.)

19 Reference is to the Council of Foreign Ministers (see note #5).

20 Pseudonym of Aleksandr Rankovic.

21 Koca Popovic.

22 Vladimir Popovic.

23 According to Dedijer's account given in his book, Stalin said this when Tito began to introduce to him members of the Yugoslav delegation, and Molotov nodded his head in agreement with Stalin's words. See Vladimir Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito: Prilozi za biografiju* [*Josip Broz Tito: Materials for a Biography*] (Belgrade, 1953), p. 448.

24 Ivan Subasic (1892-1955) - June 1944-March 1945 prime-minister of the Yugoslav monarchy's government in exile, signed an agreement with the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia with Tito at its head and took the post of foreign minister within the national coalition government formed by Tito in March 1945. Resigned in fall 1945, stating that his agreement with Tito had not been fulfilled by the ruling regime. Afterwards lived in Zagreb under surveillance by state security organs.

25 Milan Grol (1876-1952) - during the war, member of the monarchy's government in exile, in March 1945 took the post of vice-premier in Tito's united government. Resigned in August 1945, accusing the ruling regime of being in the hands of the CPY and thus in violation of the Tito-Subasic agreement, and became one of the leaders of the legal opposition formed in fall 1945. Following the first elections to the *skupscina* (parliament) in November 1945,

when the opposition was defeated and was practically destroyed, Grol retired from politics and devoted himself to the theater.

26 Following the 1945 elections, the opposition parties were in effect liquidated, while the parties comprising the People's Front, run entirely by the CPY, began to take on an increasingly fictitious and deceptive character.

27 Regions that do not export foodstuffs, particularly bread, and are even unable to support themselves.

28 The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency.

29 Eduard Kardelj (1910-1979) - member of the Politburo, Secretary of CC CPY, vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers, chairman of the Oversight Commission of Yugoslavia; Milovan Djilas (b. 1911) - member of the Politburo, Secretary of CC CPY, minister without portfolio.

30 Reference made to Molotov's support at the CFM meeting in Paris, 25 April - 16 May 1946 (see note #5).

31 Known deposits of non-ferrous metals.

32 The gulf on Yugoslavia's Adriatic coast.

33 Such a formulation was not contained in the Yugoslav-Czechoslovak, but in the 1946 Yugoslav-Polish agreement on friendship and mutual assistance (note 13). The agreement of friendship, mutual assistance and cooperation in peacetime, signed by Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia on 9 May 1946 made no mention of former German wartime allies. It stated that the signing parties would render each other military and other assistance using all available means, if one of them "is brought into conflict with Germany, the latter having repeated its aggressive policies, or with any other country which had aligned itself with Germany for the purpose of aggressive action."

34 Tito was obviously being sly, as evidenced by the following reply from Rankovic, who referred to both the CC CPA Plenum which had expelled Maleshov from the government (see introduction), and the clear criticism by a number of Albanian Politburo members toward first Party secretary and head of government Hoxha.

35 The Soviet Union's assistance to Albania, in particular military assistance using Yugoslavia as a go-between, was undertaken immediately following the war. When in summer 1945, during the first Moscow visit by the Albanian government delegation, the question of arming and equipping the Albanian army was being discussed, the USSR government enacted a resolution to send shipments of arms and other military materiel to Albania "via the government of Yugoslavia," that is, within the context of shipments to Yugoslavia. (See "New documents on the Great Fatherland War," *Kommunist* [The Communist] 7 (1975), p. 52.) On the eve of Tito's visit to Moscow in May 1946, Kardelj expressed to Lavrent'ev the opinion that USSR trade operations in Albania must be carried out by mixed Soviet-Yugoslav enterprises, once these were established. See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 108.

36 Seifulla Maleshov (b. 1900) - member of the CC CPA Politburo in charge of economic policy; expelled from the Politburo by the CC CPA Plenum in February 1946.

37 See note 19.

38 Petko Stainov (1890-1972) - Bulgarian foreign minister 1944-1946, activist in the union "Zveno"-a party belonging to the Fatherland Front controlled by the Communist party. In early June 1946, during a meeting with Dimitrov, Kolarov and Kostov (see note 15), Stalin announced that "you must show your teeth to the rightist Zvenists" and that another

prominent member of "Zveno," Damyan Velchev, must be removed from the post of Minister of War. (See Tsentralen d'rzhaven arkhiv - Sofiia (Central State Archives - Sofia), former Tsentralen partien arkhiv [hereafter TsDA-TsPA] under TsK on BCP, f. 1, op. 5, A.e. 3, l. 134.) Stalin's orders were carried out in both cases.

39 See note 19. Pechui-Serbian name for the city of Pecs in Hungary.

40 Judging by handwritten notes made by Tito upon his return from Moscow, during the visit the Soviet side had discussed, along with the aforementioned topics, the question of Austria and Yugoslav-Austrian relations, as well as Yugoslav relations with other Slavic countries. (See AJBT-KMJ. I-1/7, ll. 51-52.)

41 Palmiro Togliatti (1893-1964) - general secretary of the Italian Communist party.

42 Maurice Thorez (1900-1964) - general secretary of the French communist party; Jacques Duclos (1896-1975) - member of the Politburo, secretary of CC F[rench]CP, second in rank at the time. Dedijer's description of the meeting with Stalin on 27 May 1946 states that "the leader" had mentioned a "great deficiency" in Thorez. "Even a dog that doesn't bite, said Stalin, shows its teeth when he wants to scare someone, but Thorez can't do even that..." Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito, p. 451.

43 Jose Diaz (1895-1942) - general secretary of the Spanish Communist party, died in the US.

44 Pseudonym of Dolores Ibarruri (1895-1990), who became the general secretary of the Spanish Communist party following J. Diaz's death.

45 Wilhelm Pieck (1876-1960) - leader of the German communist party, became one of the two chairmen of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) following the April 1946 merger of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and the Social-Democratic party into the SED in the zone of Soviet occupation. It is unclear who the writers referred to by "F." Dedijer's account of the evening dinner mentions that Stalin, in characterizing the leaders of foreign Communist parties, expressed his opinion, alongside those already mentioned, regarding the chairman of the Czechoslovak communist party Klement Gottwald and the general secretary of the Communist Party of Great Britain Harry Pollit. See Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito, p. 451.

46 The phrase obviously referred to the impossibility of reestablishing the Comintern. Apparently Stalin told the Yugoslav delegation the same thing he had said ten days earlier in his meeting with Dedijer, Kolarov and Kostov, of which an unidentified record has been preserved, written most likely by Kostov. According to this account, Stalin told the Bulgarian delegation: "We will never reestablish the old style of the [Communist] International. It was created with the example provided by Marx, who expected that revolution would take place concurrently in all countries. However, this does not correspond to our current ideology." In additional remarks, Stalin criticized the Comintern, stating that its directives had tied the hands of the Communist party, which "we untied" "when we dissolved the Comintern." (See TsDA-TsPA under CC on BCP, f. 1, op. 5, A.e. 3, l. 138.) In reality, Comintern directives were issued by Stalin himself. And even following the announced dissolution of the Comintern in 1943, Stalin by no means had given up on administering via directives to the leadership of Communist parties-only the organizational forms and the concrete mechanism of such administration were changed. Thus, in speaking of the impossibility of reestablishing the "old style of [the Communist] International," he spoke only within that context. At the same time he discussed with the Yugoslav and Bulgarian guests his plan to set up a new organizational structure for the international communist movement: an informational bureau

which would unite a number of communist parties. According to the Yugoslav delegation members' accounts reported by Dedijer, the question of establishing the information bureau was raised by Stalin during a conversation with Tito, and later during the joint meeting with the Yugoslav and Bulgarian delegations, when he emphasized that the new organ must maintain an informational character and its decisions would not be binding on a communist party which disagreed with the decision. (See Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito, pp. 453, 471.) That the question was put forth in this manner is supported by the handwritten notes Tito made a few days after returning from Moscow. (See AJBT-KMJ, I-3-s/11, ll. 1-2.) Most likely these remarks, including the statement that there "can be no talk" of reestablishing the Comintern, were a tactical move intended to help his interlocutors "swallow" his idea to create the Informbiuro (Cominform) as some kind of entirely different "democratic" organ of which they had no reason to be wary.

47 Possibly the reference is to the Greek referendum to be held on 1 September 1946 to decide whether to continue the monarchy, which was a focus of intense political struggle.

48 Greece was at the time the arena of a sharp and intensifying confrontation which in the second half of 1946 began to erupt into an armed struggle between the partisan forces and the Greek government, with the former having been created under the leadership of the Greek Communist party and receiving assistance from Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria, and the latter relying on military support from Great Britain and, later, the USA.

49 Eduard Benes (1884-1948) - president of Czechoslovakia. Attempted in the years immediately following the war to navigate between the USSR and the West, but was forced into resignation following the de facto coup carried out in February 1948 by communists relying on Soviet political support.

50 Zdenek Fierlinger (1891-1976) - one of the officials in the Czechoslovak Social-Democratic party, head of the Czechoslovak government in 1945-1946, actively supported the communist party, including during the coup in February 1948.

51 Reference is made to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry announcement delivered on 24 April 1946 to the ambassadors of USSR, USA, Great Britain and France, which officially put forth territorial claims on Poland for the so-called border region of Teshinskaya Silesia. The Czechoslovak-Polish dispute regarding Teshin continued for some time following the end of World War II and reached its peak around late April-May 1946, on the eve of the first post-war parliamentary elections in Czechoslovakia, held on May 26, a day before Stalin's meeting with Tito. From the record of conversation published herein, it follows that Stalin regarded the Czechoslovak announcement entirely as a pre-election maneuver. The question of Teshin was obviously raised by the Yugoslav guests, for even on May 7, in his discussion with Lavrent'ev, Tito inquired as to Moscow's opinion of the Czechoslovak demarche and informed him that the Polish ambassador to Belgrade had addressed him, Tito, with a request to influence the Czechoslovak government to renounce these claims. AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 77.

52 According to Dedijer's account, Stalin had spoken about the Slovenian intelligentsia with Kidric, himself a Slovenian, using a play on words-"podlaja [sycophantic] intelligentsia" and "podlinnaya [genuine] intelligentsia." See Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito, p. 452.

53 Dedijer's book mentions that Stalin advised the Yugoslavs to plant eucalyptus, as this is the best tree for ship-building, and related how many years ago he had read in a book that this tree grows well in South America. So having received the seeds, he undertook to plant them in the Crimea where it took root very successfully and grew very quickly. Stalin

promised to send eucalyptus seedlings to Yugoslavia. See Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito, pp. 452-453.

54 In Dedijer's account of the 27 May 1946 meeting these words are tied to an episode where, following a lengthy period during which the guests had sat at the dinner table, Stalin stood, walked over to the record player in the corner, and began to play record after record—all Russian folk songs. While listening to one of the records, he started to sing along and dance. Molotov and others present met this with exclamations of how robust Stalin was, from which followed Stalin's response about the laws of physiology, which dictated that he would not live long. Stalin added that Tito must take care of himself in order to be there for Europe. And further, according to this account, Stalin looked at Molotov and noted: "Viacheslav Mikhailovich will remain here...." He then proposed to Tito to drink to "bruderschaft" [brotherhood] (and then to all the other Yugoslav guests); they clinked glasses, embraced, and then "the leader" with the exclamation "I still have strength left!" grabbed the Yugoslav leader by the armpits and lifted him three times. (See Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito, p. 452.)

However, the Yugoslav political and cultural activist Josip Vidmar later maintained that, upon returning from accompanying Tito to Moscow, Kidric told of a different scene at the evening dinner at Kuntsevo: it was he, Kidric, who grabbed and lifted Stalin, and that the latter laughed and spoke compliments. See J. Vidmar, *Obrazi* (Ljubljana, 1980), p. 396.

55 Prime-minister of Great Britain Winston Churchill (1874-1965), having met Tito in August 1944 in Italy, said this to Stalin during his visit to Moscow in October 1944. In actuality, Stalin by this point had already met Tito in person, when the latter secretly visited Moscow in late September.

56 Djido-Djilas' pseudonym. Stalin knew from Tito that Djilas suffered from headaches.

57 Ernest Bevin (1881-1951) - one of the leaders of the Labor party and a trade-unionist in Great Britain, foreign minister during the early years following World War Two. Gustav Noske (1868-1946) - German Social-Democratic activist, member of government following the November 1918 revolution in Germany, became famous as one of the organizers of the suppression of revolutionary action taken by the radical wing of the German labor movement.

58 L.P. Beria (1899-1953) - member of CC VKP(b) Politburo, vice-chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Dedijer's account states that Stalin joked about Beria and Rankovic, both in charge of security organs in their respective countries—who will subvert whom? According to this account, also present among the Soviet participants at the evening dinner at Kuntsevo, aside from Stalin and Molotov, were A. A. Zhdanov, Beria and N.A. Bulganin. See Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito, p. 451.

Source: Leonid Gibianskii, "The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War: Archival Documents on Stalin's Meetings with Communist Leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 1946-48," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, no. 10 (March 1998), pp. 112-34 ([Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita](#). Fond Kabinet Marsala Jugoslavije. I-1/7. L. 6-11.)

Document obtained and translated into Russian by L. Gibianskii.

Translated into English by Daniel Rozas.

**Report to Washington on Montgomery's
Conversation with Stalin**

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorized recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICES TO WASHINGTON

No: 518

17th January 1947

D. 5.25.p.m.17th January 1947

Repeated to Moscow No. 265

Paris No: 120 Saving

X:X:X:

IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is summary of interview between Generalissimo Stalin and Field Marshal Montgomery.

After visiting the chief Russian Military Academies and meeting the chief Russian Marshals during the first days of his visit (when nothing of political interest transpired) the C.I.G.S. was received by Stalin in private audience on January 10th. The interview lasted about an hour.

2. Field Marshal Montgomery opened the discussion by referring to the comradeship in arms which had grown up between the British and American armies and commanders during the war, and he stressed this association had naturally continued into the post-war period. He felt that this fact should be put to better use and that the fighting men of each nation might help the politicians who were wrestling with the difficult problems of the post-war period, by maintaining and developing their respective armies and thus help to eliminate suspicion and mistrust, Stalin expressed himself in agreement.

3. The C.I.G.S. went on to say that for this reason he had come to Russia to establish friendly contacts with the Red Army; he had been much gratified by his reception and the friendliness he had experienced led him to hope that with Stalin's encouragement the relations between the British Army and the Red Army might be further improved. He

had invited the Soviet Marshals to pay a visit to England next spring and the next step would, he thought, be an exchange of Officers between the respective military schools. Such a scheme would have to develop gradually but a start should be made soon, even if it was only a question of one or two Officers to be exchanged. Stalin said he was interested in this scheme, but considered that the time had not yet come for an interchange of Officers since such action might be misunderstood in political circles and he might be blackguarded in the world press for being a war-monger.

4. The conversation then turned to the close relations between the United States' and British Forces. Stalin said he realised how closely linked the two armies were in the matter of exchange of information, and he also understood there was a definite plan for standardisation of weapons and equipment; he did not see how this could be the case unless there was definite military alliance or agreement with the United States. He assumed there was such an alliance or agreement. He asked Field Marshal Montgomery if he would care to say anything about that. He added that he did not in the least object to such an alliance provided it was not directed against the Soviet Union.

5. The C.I.G.S. in reply explained how the "standardisation" of weapons had grown up during the war, and emphasised that this had not been based on any rigid plan nor could there be any question of it being connected with any sinister designs on the part of the United States or of His Majesty's Government. He added that after the end of the war His Majesty's Government had begun to consider adopting certain types of American weapons and making them in British factories. He said he would be glad to study the adoption of similar arrangements between the British and Soviet armies. Field Marshal Montgomery then assured Stalin, speaking as head of the British Army, that there existed no military alliance or agreement or comprehensive plan for the standardisation of weapons and equipment between Great Britain and the U.S.A. Stalin assured the Field Marshal that he accepted this statement.

6. Stalin told the C.I.G.S. in this connexion that he had no objection to an Anglo-American Military alliance, provided that it was not directed against Russia. He added that he himself had alliances with France and other countries. In the case of France he had consulted Mr. Churchill and had only gone ahead with the alliance when Mr. Churchill said he agreed. For his part he would have no objection to a British

alliance with France or any other country provided (a) it was not directed against Russia and (b) that he was consulted first as he had consulted His Majesty's Government.

7. The C.I.G.S. then asked Stalin in connexion with what Stalin had previously said about military alliances, whether he thought there should be a military alliance between Britain and Russia. Stalin replied "that is what I would like and I think it is essential". The C.I.G.S. referred to the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance of 1942 and said he was under the impression that it was still in force. Stalin gave the following explanation of his views on that treaty. The Treaty was in two parts. Part One provided for mutual co-operation and combined action in the war against Germany; the war against Germany was now over and therefore Part One of the Treaty had ceased to apply. Part Two provided for mutual assistance and non-aggression for a period of 20 years after the end of the German war or until some world organisation or League of Nations had been formed and was in working order. The U.N.O. had been formed and was now in working order and therefore Part Two was in theory "suspended in the air". Although however the whole Treaty was theoretically in suspense, it had been provided that it remained operative until an agreement to that effect had been signed. Since no such agreement had been signed the situation was not clear. When the C.I.G.S. asked Stalin if he would wish him to inform the Prime Minister that Stalin would like a new Treaty and a Military Alliance with Britain, he replied that he would welcome a military alliance and considered it was very necessary, but did not wish to charge the C.I.G.S. with any official commission for His Majesty's Government on this subject. He had no objection, however, to the Field Marshal quoting his views.

8. The C.I.G.S. then explained to Stalin the reasons for the continued existence of the Combined Chiefs-of-Staff Organisation. He referred to the manner in which it had grown up during the war and explained that there were a great number of problems still to be handled which required Anglo-American collaboration; these problems were of an administrative order and connected with the aftermath of war and no operational subjects were under discussion: no doubt when these problems had been disposed of the respective Governments would review the necessity for the continued existence of the Combined Chiefs-of-Staff Organisation.

9. Field Marshal Montgomery dined in the Kremlin as the guest of Stalin the same evening. No important political or military subjects

were discussed. Stalin said in conversation that he was delighted that General Marshall had become Secretary of State as soldiers of experience made very good politicians.

[This telegram has also been distributed to members of the Cabinet.]

Source: Public Record Office.

Meeting Friday, 1.31.1947, in Moscow, 9-12 in the Evening

Stalin, Marshal, Suslov, Semenov, Volkov —
Pieck, Grotewohl, Ulbricht, Fechner, Oelsner

Greeting: We greet you most cordially and are happy to see you in such good health. We wish that it will remain that way for several decades.

We thank for the help the Soviet government gives the German people—at the same time a great support for the work of our party—especially in the Soviet occupation zone.

We also thank for the invitation, which gives us the opportunity to state the problems that face us and to hear your advice on them.

We have provided you with some materials worked out in joined meetings and about which there is agreement on our side.

Comrade Gr[otewohl] will make the report.

Report O. Gr[otewohl] with the help of 3 resolutions

Interruptions

- 1) Question — how government reality —
whether not state governments [Landesregierungen] — our argument against that is weak — need stronger argument —
- 2) How strong still are the Nazist forces — in the West — can they be split — separate honest patriotic elements — perhaps combine in one party, belonging to the block.
- 3) Whether at plebiscite on G[ermany's] unity not even larger majority than 30 mil[lion] out of 50 mil[lion].
- 4) Contradictions in the SPD — the masses like that? — because voted for SPD.
- 5) Whether left elements in the SPD — with them unified front committees — committees against reaction in the West
- 6) Whether Schumacher in favor of municipalization or nationalization — nationalization is correct — socialization [Vergesellschaftung] — socialization [Sozialisierung] — mess.
- 7) Eastern border is another question — here decision of the allies
Yalta — Berlin
other borders no decision —
change nothing there —

raise Eastern border means raising other borders too —
means war

- 8) KPD in the West burdened with the old program of the KPD
fear of dictatorship — revolution
therefore new program of the SED for the nearest [nächstliegende] period
- 9) not necessary for the SED to hunt for members — important
is their influence
- 10) Admission of the SPD in Sov. occupation zone
whether SED is afraid of the SPD
one should defeat them politically
- 11) All German meeting of the parties — yes —
when it produces something
- 12) Organ of the zone only when no realization central administration

Explanations at the end —

Position of the SED for unity G is correct —
Engl., Am., Fr. are for federalism, because this means weakening of G.
Weak G should have no influence on the world market, no foreign trade, therefore
also no central government, no central administration.

Concept SU runs counter —
G a[nd] Japan should [have] access to the world market, because this way prices lower a[nd]
goods better —
is gain for humanity.

Undivided mastery of America means high prices, poor products.

Hum.[an] progress requires that G. again rise a[nd] [has] access to the world market. 70
mil[lion] Germans cannot be stricken from world history.

Americans live under the illusion, that alone [can] manage world market.

70 mil[lion] Germans cannot permanently live at the pauper stage, as beggars.

Raw materials are needed, as import — but also needed for selling (export). Germans can
provide good and cheap products.

Subjugation a[nd] choking feeds thoughts of revenge, that means new war.

We are comrades, aren't we, it hurts us, that Germ. work[ers] suffer, the Germ. proletariat should live better again.

Americans speak of econ. unification, but are against unif[orm] government — without pol. unity means, however, econ. unification — unification of the occupiers.

The quicker unity G a[nd] Germ. government, the more we alleviate the rise for this reason against federalism — it is tied to higher burdens.

Germ. government will come about with difficulty in the case of Americ. resistance — therefore German central administration as transitory situation.

The others would like to divide G into 4 parts — because only through agreement — because not voted upon — something comes about — [a] central administration can only be created this way too — will be somewhat easier.

But correct — as M. [has] said in Paris — that central government controlled by the allies must sign peace treaty — not by state governments.

M: Peace treaty a[nd] creation of the government will drag on —

We work from the Potsdam decisions. But question of the central administration [to be] put more broadly. St[alin] demanded unif[ied] central administration — not materialized, therefore only 5 administrations, but these have not been created. For all areas there must be created administration, with the exception of military a[nd] state security.

Unif[orm] central administration for all of G until the creation of the government, immediately platform as stage for government.

Stalin: Engl. and Americ. are afraid of the rise of G — fear competition on the internat. markets — Americ. wants world market under its control — wants monopoly prices — When America reaches goal — this way prevent unemployment in America. Everything that accelerates rise, foreign trade G. America rejects.

SU wants opposite — when reparations hinder rise, they can be postponed.

Prisoners of war should be evaluated
improve pol. schooling — CC apparatus is overburdened.

Source: Wilhelm Pieck: Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik, edited by Rolf Badstübner and Wilfried Loth, pp. 111-114 (ZPA [Central Party Archive] NL 36/694, pp. 3-7, 25-26).

Translated by Ruud van Dijk, Dickinson College.

**Record of the Meeting between J.V. Stalin and the SED Delegation with Participation
from V.M. Molotov, W. Pieck, O. Grotewohl, W. Ulbricht,
M. Fechner, F. Oelßner, M.A. Suslov, and V.S. Semenov,
January 31 1947, 21-24h.**

General Course of the Conversation:

- a) Com. Pieck greeted Comrade Stalin extremely warmly and expressed to him his gratitude for the great help for the working population of Germany.
- b) Presentation of Com. Grotewohl on the situation in Germany and the tasks of the SED. He read almost word by word the 3 documents I sent yesterday.
- c) Interruptions and remarks in the course of the presentation (during the translation) on the part of Comrade Stalin and some remarks by Com. Molotov.
- d) Speech by Comrade Stalin with an assessment of the situation in Germany, our diplomatic position regarding the German question in connection with the upcoming Moscow foreign ministers meeting, and several tasks of the SED.
- e) Individual questions of the SED leadership and the answers to them.

II. The essential substance of the presentation

During the Patriotic War you, Comrade Stalin, have said: "The Hitlers come and go, but the German people, the German state remains." Your words have evoked great hope among the German people.

The situation in Germany is serious at the moment, and there exist questions, in particular in regard to the Moscow foreign ministers conference, where we would like to get your counsel.

1. Peace treaty or -statute

The SED champions the conclusion of a peace treaty, because a peace treaty

a) creates the opportunity to establish a democratic, central German government that should ensure the fulfillment of the peace treaty and the development of Germany as a peaceful and democratic state,

b) obligates all parties to take on responsibility for the peace treaty, which would limit the demagoguery of the CDU and SPD.

The SED opposes Murphy's plan (American adviser), for the allies unilaterally to announce a peace statute instead of a peace treaty. Because this would promote the development of chauvinism, hamper democratization, and give some German parties the chance to dodge the responsibility for the fulfillment of the conditions for peace.

2. Is it necessary to carry out a plebiscite on peace?

From the American side we have heard of the consideration that it would be necessary to conduct a plebiscite on the peace treaty in Germany. The SED opposes a plebiscite because it would, with an eye on the Eastern borders, evoke a strong chauvinist campaign and demagoguery, hamper the democratization of Germany, and complicate its foreign policy situation.

3. Who from the German side signs the peace treaty?

The SED promotes that the peace treaty will be signed by a central German government.

4. The position of the German parties on the question of the unified state.

In practice, the SPD defends federalism.

So does the CDU.

The LDP argues in favor of German unity.

The SED is the only party promoting a unified German state with a democratic administration.

5. Is it necessary to carry out a plebiscite on the question of a unified state?

The SED promotes carrying out such a plebiscite. It believes that a plebiscite would lead to a weakening of the reactionary forces and would open up the possibility of the development of a broad democratic movement in which the SED would act as the most active defender of the national unity of the German people.

We count with a success in such a plebiscite and would win at least 30 million votes out of 50 million for the unified state.

The allies will be against the plebiscite.

Interruption [by Stalin—B&B] “and against the central German government, against democratization, and against the rise of Germany. To prevent its competition, they strive to prevent Germany from rising. That is their policy.”

6. On the central administration for all of Germany.

We believe it is sensible that, in continuation of the development of the decisions of the Berlin conference, there are created not “some important central German administrative departments,” but a central German administration. (And I, [Suslov] add: these administrative departments have not been created either).

The five central German administrations envisioned in the Berlin decisions (for finance, transportation, post and telecommunications, foreign trade and industry) have to operate as sections of a central German administration and need to be complemented by a section for economic planning and sections for foreign trade and agriculture.

That would be the first stage of the creation of a central German government.

In the Soviet zone there is no such coordinating administrative organ yet. In the Anglo-American zones such organs do exist.

Would it not lead to the solidification of the disintegration of Germany in case one created such zonal organs? No, provided the creation of a central government does not delay itself.

Interruption [by Stalin] “We will head that way in case the partners do not agree to the creation of a central government or a central administration for Germany.”

7. How should a German central government be established?

The SED promotes that a German central government will be established out of representatives from all parties, and inclusion of the unions, so that none of the parties evades responsibility. The SED opposes federalism and the creation of the central government out of representatives of the federal states [Bundesländer] and the zonal administrations.

Interruption [by Stalin] “Your position for a unified Germany, against federalism, is correct.

What arguments do you use in your agitation against federalism? [”] Because he did not receive a satisfying answer to his question, [Stalin] remarked: “Federalism in Germany today is a means with which the reactionary classes seek to preserve their privileges and save themselves from socialism.”

After he had listened to the arguments of the comrades substantiating the creation of a central government out of representatives of all parties and anti-fascist organizations instead of representatives from the federal states, Com. [Molotov—B&B] remarked:

“The federal organs did not originate on the basis of a vote of the entire people. But this is about the creation of an all-German government. Besides, the federal organs are not democratic but essentially the creation of the occupying powers.”

8. *About the zonal agreement between the English and Americans.*

The SED is against the zonal agreement between the English and Americans because it believes the agreement aims to win markets for English and American capital and to cause the sell-out of Germany and the enslavement of the German people.

Interruption [by Stalin—B&B] “The merging of the zones, about which the Americans and English make such noise, is a unification by the occupying powers, but not by the German people. What does the German people have to do with that?”

About the political situation in the country.

What prerequisites for democratization have been created?

They differ completely in the individual zones.

The struggle for the liquidation of fascism proceeds in entirely different ways in the individual zones.

Interruption [by Stalin—B&B] “What strength have the fascist forces in West Germany? Their possible share of the vote in a plebiscite?”

· One should distinguish the active reactionaries, those who have sold out to the Nazis, from the patriotic elements among the Nazis. One should fight against the reactionary elements of the former Nazis. The patriotic, honorable elements one should detach from them. [”]

In the Soviet zone the corporations [Konzerne], the big banks and fascist economic firms have been liquidated, just like the estates of the large landowners were confiscated.

In the Western zones, on the other hand, one tries to prevent the liquidation of the corporations. The large banks continue to exist, the large landowners, the pillar of the militarists, remain untouched.

The fight against the nazist and militarist ideology has been developed in entirely different ways in the individual zones.

9. *The balance of power [Kräfteverhältnis] between the political parties.*

In comparison to 1932, the balance of votes between the workers parties and the bourgeois parties has shifted about 10% in favor of the workers parties.

	1932	1946
Socialist votes	36.7	46.6
Bourgeois votes	63.3	53.4

The votes of the 49.7 Mil. voters (who voted in the state elections of October 20, 1946 in the Soviet zone, in the elections in Berlin on October 20, 1946, in the British and French zone on October 13, and on November 24 and December 1, 1945 in the American zone) divide as follows among the political parties (in thousands of votes):

workers parties

bourgeois parties

SED	5071	LDP	5400
KPD	3059	CDU	17634
SPD	14681	Center	1138
Union of Mutual Farmers Assistance other groups	283 36	NLP other groups	1405 965
tog[ether]	23131	tog.	26543

The organizational strength of the parties according to data available to us is as follows:

SED	1663 th[ousand]
SPD (incl. Berlin)	663 „
KPD	273 „
CDU (only Soviet zone)	180 „
American zone about	400 „
English zone about	300 „
French zone about together	150 „ 1030 „ th
LPD (only Soviet zone)	150 „

The comrades furthermore give a characteristic of the individual parties CDU, LDP, and SPD.

In the characterization of the SPD the presenter points out the contradictions in the party:

- a) unified state — federalization, separatism — United States of Europe,
- b) nationalization — socialization — participation of the workers through stocks,
- c) unity of the working class — deepening of the division, recognition of Marxism — revisionism.

From these contradictions develop ever deeper differences of opinion in the SPD, which are still magnified by tense personal relationships. This opens the perspective on a clear break in social democracy and on gaining [die Gewinnung] a large part of the social democratic workers.

Interruption [by Stalin, B&B] “Perhaps one votes for social democracy also because of these contradictions? T[hat] i[s], the population likes it?”

The most dangerous in the West would be if the social democrats went the way of a coalition with the bourgeois parties. Our main task is the secure the democratic development of Germany and to prevent a coalition policy as in the time of Weimar. Therefore, the main issue is the fight for the unity of the working class, for the creation of unity of action in activities, in the factories, in the unions, etc.

10. *The situation in the SED*

The unification of both parties has endured [hat sich bewährt]. The party is developing steadily. Since unification it has grown by one hundred thousand members and now counts 1663 th[ousand] members. An exception to this positive development is Berlin.

Our task consists of making real socialists out of these 1.6 mil[lion] people. For that we still lack experienced cadres. The party worker cadres from the former social democrats and the former communists have not yet merged.

130 political schools have been founded at the district level for the training of cadres, and in Berlin the central party academy.

The KPD in the Western zone has 273,000 members at its disposal and during the elections at the end of 1945 has received 3,058,000 votes. In comparison with the situation before 1933 such a membership means a considerable growth. Back then the KPD in all of Germany had 350,000 members.

The occupying powers create every kind of difficulty for the KPD.

The KPD wages a consistent struggle for the unified front.

Many organizations react negatively to union work in the large districts and do not fight sectism sufficiently.

Interruption [by Stalin, B&B] "Are there important left leaders in the social democratic party in the Western zones?"

The Schumacher people do not allow it that left elements work actively inside the social democratic party.

Interruption [by Stalin, B&B] "Should one promote the creation of a left social democratic party in the Western zones or does Schumacher not give these leftists the light of day?"

We used to believe that we should carry out the merger of the SPD and KPD into a Socialist Unity Party of Germany in the West. This has not succeeded. After a certain period of clarification work we would think it useful to found the SED in the Western zones, in case the occupation powers admitted the SED.

Interruption [by Stalin, B&B] "It would be very good to have the Socialist Unity Party in the West. Over there you are only represented by the KPD. The population reads the platform of the KPD in which the democratic proletariat constantly destroys something. That deters many parts of the workers. For socialists and communists it would be better if the Socialist Unity Party existed over there. That would make it easier for many elements of the working population to join socialism. You should not walk behind the masses."

A voice [from among those present, B&B]: One must have the correct political line (example: the Bolshevik party between April and October 1917).

We believe that our demand to admit the SED in the Western zone raises the problem of the admission of the SPD [in the text mistakenly SED, B&B] in the Soviet zone. Our position is that there is no need to admit the SPD in the Soviet zone.

Interruption [by Stalin, B&B] "One should admit them."

"What is there to fear? And criticism one should allow, within certain limits."

"One does not need to fear that."

"Make counter propaganda."

"With the help of a ban by the occupying power one achieves nothing."

"When you cannot hold your own against Schumacher without the occupying power, you are weak."

It would be difficult for the party to work under the circumstances of the dismantlings, the serious question of the reparations, and the difficult economic situation.
Interruption [by Stalin, B&B] "Yes, that would be difficult for the party."

III. Remarks by Comrade V.M. [Molotov]

The question of a peace treaty with Germany is a difficult problem and, so it appears, it is being delayed. As a result, the creation of a central government is also being delayed.

Therefore, it is useful to raise, on the basis of the decisions of Potsdam, the question of the creation of departments, and indeed not only the five envisioned in the Potsdam decisions (although these too have not been created), but also other departments except for military matters and security, and not to delay this until the creation of the central government.

Together with the creation of the departments one should strive to achieve the creation of a central coalition organ.

Probably the partners will be against this. But already at the conference in March one should put this on the agenda.

That would be a stage on the road to the creation of a German central administration. Some opportunities for that exist, for there are the Potsdam decisions.

IV. [Talk Stalin, B&B]

England and America fear the rise of Germany as a competitor on the international market extraordinarily. From that it follows that they would like to keep the international market under their control in order to secure monopoly prices for their goods.

They are of the opinion that one should not allow Germany, since it has now been defeated, to get up [again] and enter the world market. They work from these considerations.

Therefore, the allies reject everything that can accelerate the development of Germany.

In the place of a uniform [einheitliches] Germany — federalism and separatism, for that means weakness. A weak Germany, however, will have no access to the world market.

In order that Germany remains weak, it cannot be allowed to have a central government.

Our concept opposes this. Humanity has an interest in it that both Germany and Japan have access to the world market. Then prices for goods will be low and humanity, first of all the workers, will benefit.

The undivided mastery of the American monopolies would mean high prices and poor products. And that is not in humanity's interest.

Germany must get on its feet and go out onto the international markets.

One cannot strike Germany, with its 70 million population, from history.

One should realize that Germany will be weak and its population poor, if one does not allow it to enter the world market.

The rise of Germany is also necessary because it will be the basis for various adventurers and revanchist tendencies in case it does not get on its feet and enter the world arena. Besides we as Marxists and communists feel for the German proletariat because it suffers so. We wish the German proletariat lived better.

Economic unity is not possible without a uniform government, without the complete unification. Just an economic unification, that would only be a unification of the occupying powers.

The earlier a central government is created, the faster Germany will be reconstituted. The slogan of the unification of Germany must be in your hands.

In case we do not achieve the creation of a central government before long, the unification in the Soviet zone (that would be the less favorable case) must proceed.

The partners really want to have 4 Germanies, but hide this in every way.

Our line is the following: there must be created a central government, and it can sign the peace treaty.

Further claims to dismantlings we do not have. The army is being reduced. Fewer need to be supplied with food. We will not force the reparations, they can be stretched. In this way conditions are created for a better material situation of the working population.

V. Various questions and remarks.

Can one count with a small correction in regard to the Eastern borders?

I am afraid nothing will come of that.

Exchange of opinions regarding the Western part of the Usedom island.

What do you think of the possibility of convening a conference of representatives of all parties on the issue of Germany's unity?

One must test the waters, in order that your party does not remain alone. The partners will delay the conclusion of peace and blame us for the delay. Your position is correct, that the conclusion of peace leads to the necessity of the creation of a central government.

When should one begin the campaign for a plebiscite?

For that one should find a pretext.

About the prisoners of war.

We have received back 120,000. The women want further releases.

We wished the democratic education of the prisoners of war would be strengthened.

"Let Germans carry out the political work."

There are democratic elements in the camps, but they are not being used properly.

We would like the CC of the VKP(B) [United Communist Party?] concerns itself with this question.

"The CC of the VKP(B) is too much overburdened."

We request that schooled anti-fascists prisoners of war carry out the propaganda among the prisoners of war. We also request that a few hundred anti-fascists will be sent to Germany according to list.

"We will send them."

Copy.

The authors report that the document does not have a signature and may only be a working document, but that its author is Suslov.

Source: Bernd Bonwetsch and Gennadij Bordjugov, "Stalin und die SBZ: Ein Besuch der SED Führung in Moskau vom 30. Januar—7. Februar 1947," Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte Vol. 42 (1994), No. 2, pp. 279-303, record of the meeting pp. 294-301 (RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 128, d. 1091, ll. 43-54).

Translated by Ruud van Dijk, Dickinson College.

**Information from Major of the Soviet Army, Interpreter Skoda
concerning his Conversation with Gheorghiu-Dej about his Meeting with I. V. Stalin¹⁰⁴**

Moscow

February 4, 1947
SECRET

On February 4, 1947, I accompanied Dej¹⁰⁵ to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he was supposed to speak with Bucharest over the secure line.

During the trip, Dej began to tell me about his impressions from the conversation that he had with Stalin.

Dej believes that the conversation did not have a consistent character. He takes the blame on himself, saying that, as always, when he is in Stalin's presence, he feels disorganized and "looses his head."

Dej said that he was also depressed about the substance of the conversation.

He was concerned by the sharp wording of the question about the nationalist faction inside the Romanian Communist Party. Dej would like to know who was it, who informed Comrade Stalin about that. He even asked me, whether I knew, who did that. I responded negatively.

Dej expressed the idea that the anti-Semitic faction does exist in the country, and that you cannot but take it into account. Still, followed Dej, it does not mean that we will implement nationalist policy in our party.

Most of all, Dej was struck by the interpretation that Molotov gave to his notes¹⁰⁶ and the fact that Comrade Stalin said: "The Hungarians and the Austrians would not have written such a thing to us." On this question, Dej told me that not only he made a mistake, but also a stupid one, because he put himself in an unpleasant situation and "angered such people as Stalin and Molotov." Continuing, Dej emphasized that he did not think that they would pay so much attention to those memos, because he submitted them just as information, not expecting those report memos to turn into semi-official documents.

In conclusion, Dej said that he was very concerned about the situation, which will develop in the country after the signing and ratification of the peace treaties. In his words, they already have information that the Maniu people are raising their head in the country, and that the possibility of a bloc between the King and the Maniu people after the ratification of the peace treaty should not be excluded. In such a case, the King could even demand resignation of the government.

Dej said that he would try to express those thoughts to one of the Soviet leaders before his return to Romania.

¹⁰⁴ Copies sent to I. Stalin, V. Molotov, A. Vyshinsky, S. Kavtaradze.

¹⁰⁵ As in the original. Should be Gheorghiu-Dej.

¹⁰⁶ He refers to Gheorghiu-Dej's memos to A. Ya. Vyshinsky, where he presented two requests. The first referred to reconsideration to cut the Romanian debt for payments for the damages caused by Romania to the Soviet Union during the war in Romanian goods, which was not satisfied by the Soviet side. The Soviet government also rejected the second Romanian request regarding "counting the expenses incurred by the Romanian government for maintenance of the Soviet troops in the period from July 1945 to January 1947 to the sum of reparations" (Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation. Fond 0125. Finding Aid 35.II.136, File 11, pp. 15-16, 18-20, 22-23).

Major Skoda.

Certified copy

Source: Vostochnaia Evropa, edited by G.P. Murashko, et al, vol. 1, pp. 569-70 (AVPRF, f. 0125, op. 35, p. 136, d. 12, l. 15-16).

Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.

Interview with Mr. Stassen

April 9, 1947

Stassen declares that he is grateful to I.V. Stalin for the reception. He, Stassen, asked about the reception so that he could express his respect for I.V. Stalin as a head of state. He, Stassen, finished an interesting trip to European countries, during which he was interested in the economic situation of various countries after the war. In his, Stassen's, opinion, the standard of living of peoples is greatly important for their prosperity. Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States were very important during the war and will be quite significant in the future. He, Stassen, realizes that the economic systems of the Soviet Union and the United States are different. The economy of the USSR is built on a planned, socialist basis, and the Communist Party leads its development. In the United States a free economy with private capital exists. He, Stassen, would be interested to know if Stalin thinks that these two economic systems can coexist in the same world and cooperate with one another after the war.

Stalin answers that they, of course can cooperate with one another. The difference between them has no real importance, because the heart of the matter is their cooperation. The economic systems of Germany and the USA are the same, yet nevertheless war arose between them. The economic systems of the USA and the USSR are different, but they did not fight with each other, and cooperated during wartime. If two different systems can cooperate during wartime, then why can't they cooperate during peacetime? Of course, it stands to reason that if there will be a desire to cooperate, then cooperation is entirely possible under different economic systems. But if there is no desire to cooperate, then even under the same economic systems states and peoples can fight.

Stassen declares that, of course, a desire to cooperate has great importance, but in the past, before the war, various declarations were made in both countries about the impossibility of cooperation. Before the war, I.V. Stalin himself made a declaration concerning this. But he, Stassen, would like to know if I.V. Stalin considers that the events of the war, the defeat of the fascist axis, i.e. Germany and Japan, changed the situation and can one now hope for cooperation between the USSR and the USA if there is the desire.

Stalin answers that in no way can he assert that two different systems cannot cooperate. The first ideas about the cooperation of two different systems were expressed by Lenin, our teacher, says I.V. Stalin. We, the Soviet people, are Lenin's pupils. We never deviate and never will deviate from the instructions of Lenin. It is possible that he, I.V. Stalin, said that one system, for example the capitalist, doesn't want to cooperate, but this relates to the realm of desire to cooperate, and not to the possibility. As regards the possibilities of cooperation, he, I.V. Stalin holds the point of view of Lenin concerning the possibility of and the desire for cooperation between two economic systems. Likewise, the people and the Communist party of the USSR have the desire to cooperate. Doubtless, such cooperation would be beneficial to both countries.

Stassen answers that this is clear. The declarations that he remembered were issued by I.V. Stalin to the XVIII Party Congress and to the 1937 Plenum. In these declarations the subject

was “capitalist encirclement” and “monopolistic and imperialistic development.” From the recent declarations of I.V. Stalin, he, Stassen, has come to the conclusion that now, after the defeat of Japan Germany, the situation has changed.

Stalin declares that in no congress or plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party did he, I.V. Stalin, speak, nor could he speak of the impossibility of cooperation of the two systems. He, I.V. Stalin, said that capitalist encirclement and the danger of an attack on the USSR existed. If one side doesn't want to cooperate, then this means that there is a threat of attack. And, in reality, Germany, not wanting to cooperate with the USSR., attacked [us]. Could the USSR have cooperated with Germany? Yes, the USSR could have cooperated with Germany, but the Germans didn't want to cooperate. On the other hand, the USSR would have cooperated with Germans the same as with any other country. As you see, this relates to the sphere of desire [for], and not to the possibility of cooperation.

One must differentiate between the possibility of cooperation and the desire to cooperate. There is always the possibility to cooperate, but there isn't always a desire to [do so]. If one side doesn't want to cooperate, then the result will be conflict and war.

Stassen says that the desire must be mutual.

Stalin answers that he must prove the fact that the Russians want to cooperate.

Stassen says that he is happy to hear this, and that he would like to touch upon the Stalin's declaration that the economic systems of the USA and Germany are the same. He must say that the economic systems of the USA and Germany were different when Germany began the war.

Stalin does not agree with this and says that the [political] regimes in the USA and Germany were different, but that there was not difference in the economic systems. The regime is a temporary, political factor.

Stassen says that much has been written to the effect that the capitalist system gives birth to the evil of monopoly and imperialism, as well as oppression of the workers. In his, Stassen's opinion, in the USA they have succeeded in preventing the development of monopolistic and imperialistic tendencies of capitalism, and, moreover, the workers in the USA enjoyed a much greater right to vote that Marx and Engels could have imagined. In this lies the difference between the economic systems of the USA and the one that existed under Hitler's Germany.

Stalin says that one shouldn't be carried away with criticism of one system by another. Each people adheres to that system which it wants and can hold to. History will show which system is better. One must respect the system that has been selected and approved by the people. It is the business of the American people whether the system in the USA is good or bad. To cooperate, it isn't necessary that nations have the same system. It is necessary to respect the system that has been approved by the people. Cooperation is only possible under this condition.

As concerns Marx and Engels, they, of course, could not foresee what would take place 40 years after their deaths.

They call the Soviet system totalitarian and dictatorial, and the Soviet people call the American system monopoly capitalism. If both side want to curse each other as monopolistic or totalitarian, then cooperation will be unsuccessful. We must proceed from the historical fact of the existence of two systems that were approved by the people. Cooperation is only possible on this basis.

As regards enthusiasm for criticism of monopoly or totalitarianism, this is propaganda. And he, I.V. Stalin, is not a propagandist, but a man of deeds. We cannot be sectarians, says I.V. Stalin. When the people want to change the system, then they will do this. When he, I.V. Stalin, met with Roosevelt and discussed military matters, he and Roosevelt did not curse each other as monopolists or totalitarians. This considerably aided him and Roosevelt in establishing cooperation and attaining victor over the enemy.

Stassen says that this type of criticism from both sides since the end of the war is one of the reasons that misunderstanding has arisen. He, Stassen, would like to know if I.V. Stalin hopes for a wider exchange of ideas, students, teachers, artists, and tourists in the future in the event that cooperation is established between the USA and the USSR.

Stalin says that this is inescapable if there is to be cooperation. The exchange of goods leads to the exchange of people.

Stassen says that in the past misunderstanding has arisen between the USA and the USSR because the Soviet side did not want to exchange ideas; this was expressed in the introduction of censorship of the communications of foreign correspondents from Moscow. For example, the refusal of permission for the New York Herald Tribune to have their own correspondent in Moscow was one of the reasons for the lack of mutual understanding between the peoples of the USSR and the USA.

Stalin answers that, in truth, the rejection of the New York Herald Tribune correspondent's visa took place. But this was a mix-up, an accidental occurrence. It was not connected with the policy of the Soviet government. He, I.V. Stalin, knows that the New York Herald Tribune is a respectable newspaper. The fact that part of [the contingent of] American correspondents have a poor disposition towards the USSR is also important.

Stassen answers that there are indeed such correspondents. The New York Herald Tribune correspondent was granted permission to be in Moscow, but only during the session of the Council of Ministers. Now the newspaper is considering the matter of dispatching a permanent correspondent to Moscow. The New York Herald Tribune is one of the leading organs of the Republicans, who are even more important now that they have obtained a majority in Congress.

Stalin says that it is all the same, since we do not see any great difference between the Republicans and the Democrats. As regards the question of correspondents, he, I.V. Stalin, remembers a [notable] instance. In Teheran, the Big Three held a press conference at which they conducted affairs in a friendly atmosphere. One American correspondent, whose last name he, I.V. Stalin, cannot remember, sent a communication that Marshal Timoshenko attended the conference, although in fact he was not there, and that he, I.V. Stalin, struck Marshal Timoshenko during dinner. This was a crude and slanderous fabrication. So what of it? Should we praise this correspondent? Churchill, Brook, Leigh [translit. Legi], and up to 30 people, who could bear witness that nothing of the sort occurred, were at this dinner, during which the participants celebrated Churchill's sixty-ninth birthday. Nevertheless, this correspondent sent his fabricated communication to the newspaper and it was published in the US press. Can you trust such a correspondent? We, says I.V. Stalin, do not consider that the USA or its policies are to blame for this. But such incidents will occur. This creates a poor disposition on the part of the Soviet people [towards the USA].

Stassen says that, of course, there are examples of irresponsible conduct by correspondents, who send incorrect dispatches. But other correspondents correct the mistakes of these former [group], and as time passes the people know which correspondents are reliable and which aren't. As a result, we see that the people understand and unite in the names of the great military powers.

Stalin answers that this is true.

Stassen says that every time a correspondent makes an intentionally and entirely incorrect declaration, his newspaper recalls him. Thus, our newspapers create for themselves a cadre of talented and credible correspondents.

Stalin says that at first these correspondents write sensational dispatches. The newspapers publish them, make money, and then dismiss these correspondents.

Stassen says that media, trade, and cultural exchange are the spheres in which the two systems must find a way to arrange their mutual relations.

Stalin says that this is true.

Stassen declares that, in his way of thinking, if there was no censorship of the correspondents' announcements, this would be a better basis than any other for cooperation between our peoples.

Stalin says that in the USSR it would be difficult to manage without censorship. Molotov tried to do this several times, but was entirely unsuccessful. Every time that the Soviet government abolished censorship, it had to reverse this decision [lit. "repent of this] and [re]introduce [censorship]. In the fall of the year before last the Soviet government abolished censorship. He, I.V. Stalin, was on vacation and the correspondents began to write that Molotov forced Stalin to go on vacation, and then they began to write that he, Stalin, will return and drive away Molotov. Thus, these correspondents imagined the Soviet government

as some sort of menagerie. Of course, the Soviet people were indignant, and censorship had to be reintroduced.

Stassen says that, as he understands now, I.V. Stalin considers that cooperation is possible if the will and desire to cooperate are present.

Stalin answers that this is entirely true.

Stassen says that electrification and mechanization are important in the matter of raising the standard of living, and utilizing atomic energy in industry is significant for all peoples, including those of the USSR and the USA. He, Stassen, considers that the business of creating a system of inspection, control, and announcing uses of atomic energy outside the law for military purposes are important for all peoples of the world. Does I.V. Stalin consider that there are prospects for working out an agreement in the future concerning the control and regulation of producing atomic energy and concerning its peaceful utilization?

Stalin answers that he hopes for this. There are major disagreements between the USSR and the USA on this question, but in the end, as he, I.V. Stalin, hopes, both sides will understand each other. In his, I.V. Stalin's, opinion, there will be institutions of international control and inspection, and this will be quite significant. The utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes will bring forth a great turning point in production processes. As regards utilization of atomic energy for military purposes, this, in all probability, will be forbidden. This requires the desire and conscience of the nations.

Stassen says that this is one of the most important problems. If it is solved, atomic energy will be come the greatest boon for the peoples of the entire world, but if it is not [solved], it will be the greatest curse.

Stalin says that, as he thinks, they will succeed in instituting international inspection and control. The matter comes to this.

Stassen thanks I.V. Stalin for the conversation.

Stalin answers that he is at Stassen's disposal, that Russian hold their guests in high esteem.

The rest of the conversation deals with the economic situation of Europe and the United States.

The text ends with the following end note: "This text of I.V. Stalin's conversation with Mr. Stassen was handed to Mr. Stassen in Moscow. Moreover, the text of Mr. Stassen's pronouncements was approved by Stassen, and the text of Stalin's pronouncements was approved by Stalin. Nevertheless, a number of arbitrary changes and inaccuracies were permitted in the text's publication in the American press."

Source: I.V. Stalin, Sochinenija, vol. 16, pp. 57-67.

Translated by Michael Thurman.

**Record of I.V. Stalin's Conversation
with the Czechoslovak Government Delegation
on the Issue of Their Position Regarding the Marshall Plan
and the Prospects for Economic Cooperation with the USSR**

Moscow

July 9, 1947
SECRET

Present: Comrade I.V. Stalin, Comrade V. M. Molotov, Prime Minister of Czechoslovak Republic Gottwald, Minister of Foreign Affairs Masaryk, Minister of Justice Drtina, General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic Gendrih and Czechoslovak Ambassador Gorak.

Comrade Stalin asks Gottwald, what questions do you have to us?

Gottwald responds that they would like to discuss three main questions:

1. about participation at the Paris Conference on July 12, 1947,
2. about the Czechoslovak Republic's treaty with France,
3. about trade negotiations between the Czechoslovak delegation and the USSR

Ministry of Foreign Trade.

Comrade Stalin asks Gottwald, which question they would like to begin with.

Gottwald responds that they would prefer to begin with the first question.

Comrade Stalin says that approximately two or three days after comrade V. M. Molotov returned from Paris, the Yugoslavs asked us, what should they do--whether to take part in the conference on July 12 in Paris, or not. They expressed their opinion that they were thinking about refusing to participate in that conference. Later on Romania and Bulgaria addressed us with the same question. Initially, we thought that we should recommend them to go to that conference and then to ruin it. We were convinced, on the basis of the materials that we received from our ambassadors, that under the cover of credit assistance to Europe they were organizing something like a Western bloc against the Soviet Union. Then we made a firm decision and announced our opinion to everybody that we are against participation in this conference on July 12, 1947.

We were surprised that you decided to participate in that conference. For us -- this issue is the issue of friendship between the Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Republic. Objectively, you are helping--whether you want it or not--but you are helping to isolate the Soviet Union. Look what is happening. All the countries, which have friendly relations with us, are not going to participate in that conference, while Czechoslovakia, which also enjoys friendly relations with us, will. Therefore, they will decide that the friendship between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Soviet Union is not all that solid, if it was so easy to put Czechoslovakia on the side of isolating the Soviet Union, against the Soviet Union. This would be seen as a victory over the Soviet Union. Our people and we will not understand this. You need to rescind your decision, you need to refuse to participate in this conference, and the sooner you do it -- the better.

Masaryk asks Comrade Stalin to take into account that the Czechoslovak government was aware of the dependence of the Czechoslovak industry on the West. Representatives of the industries believed it was expedient to participate in the conference, so that they would

not miss an opportunity to get credits. At the same time, the Polish delegation arrived in Prague and told us that they decided to participate in the conference in Paris. As a result, the decision of the Czechoslovak government to participate in the conference in Paris on July 12, 1947 was taken unanimously by all political parties.

Then Masaryk continued that he was not going to deny the responsibility that he was also in favor of participating in the conference. However, he was asking to take into account that by making this decision, neither him, nor the government of the Czechoslovak Republic wanted to do anything bad against the Soviet Union. In conclusion, Masaryk asks Comrade Stalin and comrade Molotov to help to make their situation easier.

Comrade Molotov notes to Masaryk that even the fact of your participation in the conference by itself would be against the Soviet Union.

Masaryk responds that he, the government, all the parties, and the entire Czechoslovak people do not want to do, and will not do, anything against the Soviet Union.

Comrade Stalin says that we never doubted and do not doubt your friendship toward us, but objectively it looks different in reality.

Drtina says that he, on his behalf, and on behalf of all members of the party, to which he belongs, states that if our decision is against the Soviet Union, then my party does not want to, and will not do it. My party will not do anything, which would give any reason to interpret our actions, as being against the Soviet Union. At the same time, Drtina is asking to take into account that the Czechoslovak Republic is different from other Slavic countries, except the USSR, in that its export and import depends on Western countries up to 60 percent.

Comrade Stalin notes that Czechoslovakia has a passive trade balance with the West, and Czechoslovakia has to export their currency to the West.

Drtina says that he has in mind the volume of import and export, and that the people of the Czechoslovak Republics believe that if we do not participate in that conference, then we would not get the credits, and, therefore, we would lower the living standards of our population, because the trade between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Soviet Union has sharply decreased in 1947. Drtina finishes his comments with the request to help them get out of the existing situation, to increase trade with Czechoslovakia.

Comrade Stalin says that we need some goods, which we can get from Czechoslovakia, for example, pipes for petroleum industry, rails for narrow railroad cars, and so on, and we can help Czechoslovakia, i.e. we could sign a trade treaty, which would be beneficial for both sides.

Gottwald says that Czechoslovakia exports a lot of consumer and textile goods to the West, and the Soviet Union, so far, has not been buying them.

Comrade Stalin says, why, we will.

Gottwald asks Comrade Stalin and comrade Molotov to write it down in the communiqué, so that the others would see, what the Soviet Union is willing to give them as a result of this visit of the Czechoslovak delegation.

Masaryk and Drtina ask Comrade Stalin and comrade Molotov to help them to formulate their refusal to participate in the conference in Paris.

Comrade Stalin says that they need to see how the Bulgarians formulated their refusal, to consult among themselves, and to draft needed formulations of the reasons for the refusal.

On the second issue, regarding the treaty with France, Comrade Stalin says that according to Benesh's statement, it seems that we, the Soviet Union, are against the treaty of friendship and mutual assistance between Czechoslovakia and France. It is incorrect. We want Czechoslovakia to sign the treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with France, but we also want that this treaty would not be worse than the one with the Soviet Union, with Yugoslavia, with Poland. This is what we want. Regarding immediate assistance in case of aggression, Comrade Stalin says that Czechoslovakia would need immediate assistance, because it is a small country.

Comrade Stalin then says that it is unclear to him, why the German satellites -- such as Austria, Hungary and others -- could be better as aggressors than Germany itself. History teaches us that it is not necessary that Germany should become an aggressor itself, it could do it with the help of its satellites. Consequently, the Soviet Union wants only one thing -- that the agreement between the Czechoslovak Republic and France should not be weaker than the agreements that the Czechoslovak Republic has with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia Union, and Poland.

Masaryk says that when French ambassador Dejan came to visit him, regarding the issue of the treaty of friendship and mutual assistance between the Czechoslovak Republic and France, Dejan directly told him that Czechoslovakia asks from France more than it is written in the treaty between the Soviet Union and France.

Comrade Stalin confirms that indeed, the treaty between the Soviet Union and France does not presuppose immediate assistance of the sides in case of aggression -- because of an omission on our part, but we are planning to correct this treaty in this part. Simultaneously, we need to keep in mind that our treaty with Britain presupposes immediate assistance of the sides in case of aggression.

Gottwald says that he has several smaller questions, and that he will write to Comrade Stalin about them.

Comrade Stalin agrees.

In conclusion of the conversation, Comrade Stalin reminds Gottwald and all members of the Czechoslovak delegation that it is necessary to refuse to participate in the conference in Paris today, i.e. July 10, 1947.

Masaryk says that they will discuss this question tomorrow, and only by the evening they would be able to send their opinion to the government.

Comrade Stalin says that they would need to do it immediately.

The delegation thanks Comrade Stalin and comrade Molotov for the reception and for the needed advice, and promises to do everything as they agreed to do.

Recorded by BODROV.

Original

Source: Vostochnaia Evropa, edited by G.P. Murashko, et al, vol. 1, pp. 672-75 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 393, l. 101-05).

Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.

MINUTES
OF A VISIT TO GENERALISSIMO J.V. STALIN
ON 9 JULY 1947¹⁰⁷

Present: Generalissimo J. V. Stalin
Minister of Foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov
Prime Minister KI. Gottwald, Ministers J. Masaryk, P. Drtina
Ambassadors: Heidrich, Horák,
Chargé d'affaires: Bodrov

By way of introduction, *Prime Minister Gottwald* said that the Czechoslovak Government delegation had three questions in mind about which they wished to speak with Generalissimo Stalin and Minister Molotov.

These are

- 1) attendance at the Paris Conference
- 2) the Franco - Czechoslovak treaty
- 3) economic and trade negotiations.

1. Czechoslovakia's participation at the Paris Conference

Prime Minister *Gottwald* stated that we had, it is true, answered the invitation to Paris positively, but with numerous serious reservations which give us the possibility of a free decision. The Government of the ČSR was resolved to withdraw its delegate immediately if this should turn out to be necessary. But now a new situation has arisen as a result of the fact that we are the only one of the Slav states and the only one of all the East European states which has accepted the invitation to Paris. Therefore, the Government of the ČSR would like to know the attitude of the USSR.

Generalissimo Stalin said:

After Molotov's return from Paris, the Government of the USSR received news of Yugoslavia's attitude. Then Tatarescu made an enquiry. Initially, the Soviet Government did not answer and concluded that it would be correcter to go to the Conference and then, if it should turn out necessary, to leave the Conference. However, after the reports from the Ambassadors of the USSR had arrived, a different opinion had formed: The credits which are referred to in the Marshall Plan are very uncertain and it turned out that "using the pretext of credits the Great Powers are attempting to form a Western bloc and isolate the Soviet Union" (Generalissimo Stalin said this verbatim).

Generalissimo Stalin continued: "France herself has no programme for a revival of her economy, she is in a difficult financial situation, and Great Britain is also in dire financial straits and is struggling with difficulties of an economic nature, and in spite of this both Great

¹⁰⁷ Throughout the translation, quotation marks have been set exactly as in the Czech original, so as to reflect a certain irregularity in their use by the Czech author. Thus, no attempt has been made to differentiate between simple quotations and quotations within quotations, and frequently the ends of quotations are unmarked.

Powers are trying to put together a programme for the economic revival of Europe. But the main creditor is the USA, because neither France nor England has a kopeck. For these reasons, the Paris plans did not appear serious to the Government of the USSR, and now the Government of the USSR has become convinced on the basis of factual reasons that it is in fact a question of isolating the USSR.

Therefore the Government of the USSR sent telegrams to Tatarescu, Yugoslavia, and the Poles: the Poles wavered initially, but then they decided not to accept the invitation. That is why the Government of the USSR was surprised by our decision to accept the invitation.

Generalissimo Stalin continued: "For us, this matter is a "question of friendship." You would not have any direct advantages from attendance at the Conference. Surely you do not want "kulbanv je kreditv" (i.e. credits which would endanger our economic and political sovereignty). "The terms of credit will certainly be bad, said Generalissimo Stalin and added:

"We consider this matter to be a fundamental question on which our friendship with the USSR depends. If you go to Paris, you will show that you want to cooperate in an action aimed at isolating the Soviet Union. All the Slav states refused, even Albania was not afraid to refuse, and that is why we believe that you should withdraw your decision."

Minister Masaryk points out that in our country at the time of the decision on attending the Paris Conference the situation was determined by the general knowledge that with respect to raw materials we are 60-80% dependent on the West. The managers of state enterprises keep saying to Minister Masaryk that it is necessary to go to Paris in order not to miss the opportunity of obtaining some credits.

When the Polish Government delegation arrived in Prague last week, Minister Masaryk spontaneously and unofficially asked some of the members how the Polish Government would decide about Poland's attendance at the Paris Conference. The Polish guests generally replied that Poland will go to Paris and that she will be represented by at least her Ambassador. Minister Masaryk requests that the impression should not arise from this remark that we perhaps wanted to hide behind our Polish friends. As far as Czechoslovakia's possible attendance at the Paris Conference is concerned, Minister Masaryk told the Polish guests that, if we were to accept the Franco-British invitation to attend the Paris Conference, we would do this with many reservations, namely in such a manner that we can leave the Conference at any time we should ascertain that this is not welcome to the Soviet Government or that our industry's hopes prove to be positive.

In conclusion, Minister Masaryk emphasized that all political parties are agreed that Czechoslovakia may not undertake anything which would be against the interests of the Soviet Union. The delegation will promptly notify Prague that the Soviet Government considers acceptance of the Anglo-French invitation to be an act directed against it, and Minister Masaryk does not doubt in the least that the Czechoslovak Government will act accordingly without delay. But Minister Masaryk here requests that the Soviet Government help us in our delicate situation. We do not have any great illusions, perhaps the matter could be fixed in such a manner that one would go to the Conference on one day and leave it on the next.

Then *Generalissimo Stalin* returned to our participation in Paris and said: "Participation at the Conference puts you in a false light. It is "a break in the front," it would be a success for the Western Great Powers. Switzerland and Sweden are still wavering. Your acceptance would certainly also affect their decision."

“We know,” Generalissimo Stalin continued, “that you are our friends, there is nobody in the Government of the USSR who would doubt the friendship of the ČSR for the Soviet Union. But through your participation in Paris, you would indeed prove that you had allowed yourselves to be misused as a tool against the USSR. Neither the Soviet Union nor the Government would put up with this. (“ne perevarill by”).

Minister Drtina will not repeat the reasons for our course of action in the matter of the Paris Conference which Minister Masaryk has already explained. However, he stresses that also the party to which he belongs would not participate in anything in the field of foreign policy which would appear as an act directed against the Soviet Union. He greatly welcomes this opportunity to emphasize this here. He wants it to be known that Minister Drtina’s party will also consistently pursue such a policy as is necessary to prevent such deals. But Minister Dr. Drtina asks that Generalissimo Stalin and Minister Molotov consider one point: The economic situation of the ČSR is different from that of the other Slav states, except, of course, the Soviet Union, i. e. the living standard of the ČSR is dependent above all on foreign trade; and here, unfortunately, the situation is such that 60-80 % of our trade depend on the West.

Generalissimo Stalin remarks that our trading balance with the West has been passive.

Minister Dr. Drtina says that this is possible, but that the turnover of our trade with the West is large.

Generalissimo Stalin remarks that our exports to the West are not great enough to cover our imports if we have to pay in foreign currency.

Prime Minister Gottwald said that we have to pay in foreign currency and that we only have a little.

Generalissimo Stalin laughed and said: “We know that you have foreign currency” and, turning to Minister Molotov, he said with a smile: “They were telling themselves that they could obtain credits and therefore they did not want to miss this chance.”

Minister Dr. Drtina asks Generalissimo Stalin to look at the situation in our country taking into account the fear which our population has, that namely the detachment from the West should not result in general impoverishment. That would not only have serious economic consequences, but also political ones. Our foreign trade with the Soviet Union, which attained a considerable level last year by comparison with the pre-War level, took a downward turn this year. Minister Drtina expresses the hope that the negotiations which are currently beginning in Moscow will improve this state of affairs.

As far as our attendance at the Paris Conference is concerned, the Government will certainly prepare itself in accordance with what we have determined here, Minister Dr. Drtina remarks and adds what Minister Masaryk already said, that the Government has decided unanimously about our attendance in Paris.

In conclusion, *Minister Masaryk* asks that the Soviet Government facilitate our way out of the situation.

Minister Masaryk asks Generalissimo Stalin to forgive him for speaking openly and says that in our present situation we need a kind of consolation prize, a gesture of the Soviet side.

Generalissimo Stalin then passed on to the economic situation and said: “Your situation is better than that of France and England. You could draft a programme for the

economic recovery of France and England. The USSR is prepared to help you in your economic affairs. I will just quote some points:

- 1) We need “obsadnvice trubky” drilling pipes for oil fields. It would be a matter of a supply for 3-4 years.
- 2) We also need pipes for petroleum pipelines.
- 3) Tracks for narrow-gauge railways for the forestry industry.
- 4) Wagons.
- 5) Electric motors (smallish ones).

In this connection, *Prime Minister Gottwald* remarked: “We export light industry products, glass, china, footwear, textiles, etc. to the West. But the USSR has not purchased such products up to now.”

Generalissimo Stalin: “We can buy these products as well. Generalissimo Stalin added: “Our harvest is good this year. The size of our country leads to the fact that only now can we see the situation clearly. The agricultural plan has been fulfilled, indeed exceeded. We can help our friends: Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Poland, and also you.

In reply to Generalissimo Stalin’s question how the harvest would be in our country, *Prime Minister Gottwald* declared that it will turn out worse than last year and that it will be necessary to procure at least 300,000 tonnes of wheat.

Whereupon Generalissimo Stalin replied that the USSR could give us 200,000 tonnes of wheat, also barley and oats. He added that the USSR would buy clover seed from us. Prime Minister Gottwald said that we could also supply hops and sugar. Minister Masaryk said jokingly that our beer is better than the Soviet one. Generalissimo Stalin remarked that good beer is brewed only in Estonia.

Prime Minister Gottwald returned to our attendance in Paris and asked Generalissimo Stalin and Minister Molotov to make our way out of the difficult situation easier.

Generalissimo Stalin said: “I can show you the reason given by the Bulgarian Government for refusing to attend. The Romanians refused without giving a reason.

The Poles replied that they would accept American credits, but that they would like to negotiate with the USA directly, without intermediaries.”

“Then, as far as you are concerned,” Generalissimo Stalin said, “you could announce to Paris as follows: In the recent past it has become evident that the acceptance of the invitation could be interpreted as a blow” (stroke) “against the USSR, in particular since none of the Slav or other East European states accepted the invitation.” Generalissimo Stalin added: “I believe that the sooner you do that, the better.”

2. The Franco - Czechoslovak Treaty

Generalissimo Stalin said: “I read President Beneš’s note about the treaty in question. I gained the impression that President Beneš is of the opinion that the USSR for some reason does not wish for your treaty with France. Precisely the opposite is the truth. We want your treaty with France, but we want that that this treaty should not be worse than your treaties with the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Poland.”

We know your draft, we also know the French one and found that the French draft is worse in two essential points than your treaties with the states mentioned above.

1. France does not guarantee you immediate, automatic help. And yet for the ČSR precisely the obligation of immediate help is indispensable. This is not so important for the USSR; in the event of an invasion we can withdraw for hundreds of kilometres and then begin with the offensive, but for you a mere 30 km mean dangerously much in view of the small size of your territory. In your treaties with the USSR, Yugoslavia, Poland, there is a clause about immediate help; why should your treaty with France be worse?

2. The French draft limits France's help just to the case that you should be invaded by Germany. But it does not guarantee you any help for the case that you should be invaded by any ally, satellite of Germany. It is possible though that the Hungarians or Austria would invade you, but in this case, France would not be obliged to come to your help. Bear in mind that France once before has failed to adhere to her obligations to you as an ally.

The Government of the USSR does not intend to advise you not to conclude any treaty with France, but it does advise you not to make a worse treaty than those with Yugoslavia and Poland.

Generalissimo Stalin continued: "In our treaty with England (the treaty is for twenty years, i.e. until 1962), there is a clause that England is obliged to help us immediately, and not only against Germany, but also against satellites. On the other hand, our treaty with France contains the clause about immediate help, but there is no clause about any help against the satellites."

Generalissimo Stalin added: "We failed to include this in the French treaty (eto my prozevali"). This happened because the treaty with France was not so important for us. As a matter of fact, with the treaty, we wanted to enhance France."

Minister Masaryk: points out that only one day before the flight to Moscow, the French Ambassador to Prague said to him that Czechoslovakia was asking France to give more than the USSR had granted. Ambassador Dejean proposed agreeing by an exchange of letters that if France were to broaden her obligations towards the USSR in the future, the mutual Franco-Czechoslovak obligations would automatically be broadened.

Generalissimo Stalin and Minister Molotov stated: The initiative came from England that the Soviet-British treaty of friendship should be extended to fifty years. The Soviet Government is prepared to do this, but demands that some articles, which weaken the treaty, be improved. Bevin did not raise any objections to this during his visit to Moscow, but when the negotiations began, it became clear that the British proposals actually worsen the treaty considerably. The new British draft actually aims at removing from the treaty the clause about immediate help, and also about help against Germany's satellites. However, the Government of the USSR decidedly insists on the treaty's remaining unaltered in this point and, moreover, demands the addition of the following clause to the treaty:

"Both parties shall not participate in coalitions directed against one of the parties to the treaty, but they shall also not participate "in actions or measures aimed directly or indirectly" against one of the treaty parties." The British Government does not agree with this clause. For these reasons, the negotiations are not being continued for the moment.

Prime Minister Gottwald asked whether Generalissimo Stalin is of the opinion that the signing of the French treaty on our part might somehow have an effect, for example, on the British-Soviet negotiations. Generalissimo Stalin said: "If you were to sign the treaty, it would certainly have a negative effect on these negotiations" -

3. *Economic affairs*

In conclusion, *Prime Minister Gottwald* spoke about economic questions.

1. In Moscow there is a delegation of our railway experts at present. In accordance with last year's negotiations, we assumed that the so-called "booty railway material" (wagons) is our property, but we found that the USSR considers these things to be her property.

Prime Minister Gottwald requested that the Government in the USSR should help us in this respect. Generalissimo Stalin said that it would be necessary for our delegation to speak to the Minister of Railways and give him a detailed list of the Czechoslovak requests.

2. The *Prime Minister* informed Generalissimo Stalin about Hungarian matters. He emphasized that the Hungarians have been sabotaging the transfer agreement and are sabotaging it now, claiming that the agreement had been made by Gyöngyösi. Generalissimo Stalin said that there is now a better Government in Hungary, but *Prime Minister Gottwald* answered that this Government is also sabotaging the transfer agreement. He added that he has only mentioned this for Generalissimo Stalin's information.

3. *Prime Minister Gottwald* further mentioned our interned persons and the families of Svoboda's troops. Generalissimo Stalin said that it is necessary to draw attention to these matters by a note.

The visit ended at 24.30 hours

Source: "Stalin, Czechoslovakia, and the Marshall Plan: New Documentation from Czechoslovak Archives," *Bohemia. Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur der böhmischen Länder*, vol. 32 (1991), no. 1, pp. 133-44.

**I.V. Stalin's Notes regarding
E. Benes's Memorandum on Czechoslovakian Foreign Policy¹⁰⁸**

Moscow

July 11, 1947
SECRET

We could see from the President's memo that the President saw the position of the Soviet Union regarding the mutual assistance treaty between Czechoslovakia and France, as a negative position. I do not agree with such an interpretation of the Soviet position, and I believe it is necessary to state that the Soviet Union is in favor of signing the treaty on mutual assistance between Czechoslovakia and France. Such a treaty would be favorable for Czechoslovakia, and what is favorable for Czechoslovakia, should be considered favorable for the Soviet Union as well.

At the same time, the Soviet government believes that the treaty between Czechoslovakia and France could not be worse or weaker than the treaty that has already been signed by Czechoslovakia with the USSR, Poland and Yugoslavia. The main points of those treaties are, first of all, mutual support against an aggression from Germany and its allies, and, secondly, immediate assistance against an aggression being prepared and aggression already begun. The French are excluding both of these points, and thus they are trying to weaken those positions of Czechoslovakia, which have been already gained in the treaties with a whole number of states. The Soviet government believes that the Czechoslovak government should not agree to this weakening of the Czechoslovak position, and should demand a treaty, which would not be worse than the treaties with the USSR, Yugoslavia and Poland from France. It is not clear why do the French exclude the formula about the allies of Germany in the case of aggression. Is it not true that the German allies would represent the same threat for Czechoslovakia as Germany itself would? It is not clear either why do the French exclude the point of automatic assistance in case of aggression on a part of Germany and its allies. Russia could overlook the point of automatic assistance, because it has a large territory, and in the worst case it could temporarily retreat by one or two hundred kilometers while waiting for assistance on the part of its allies. However, Czechoslovakia, as a small country, cannot overlook the point of immediate automatic assistance, because it would be sufficient for the enemy to descent from the border mountains by 40 kilometers, and Czechoslovakia would have to be on the edge of defeat. The French have already left Czechoslovakia in trouble in terms of providing immediate assistance before. We cannot allow Czechoslovakia to forget this lesson.

In addition, we have to keep in mind that if the Czechoslovak government agrees to weaken its position in the treaty with France, then the Czechoslovak allies -- the USSR, Yugoslavia and Poland -- could find themselves in an unfavorable situation in comparison to France. In such a case, we should not exclude the possibility that they could look at the French precedent.

¹⁰⁸ Copies sent to I. Stalin, V. Molotov, L. Beria, A. Zhdanov, G. Malenkov, A. Mikoyan, N. Voznesensky. The document bears a note: "USSR Attaché in Prague Comrade Bodrov was instructed to hand this document to Benes." Memorandum of President of the Czechoslovak Republic E. Benes was received via Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia Mr. K. Gottwald.

Copy

Source: Vostochnaia Evropa, edited by G.P. Murashko, et al, vol. 1, pp. 676-77 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 393, l. 107-08).

Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.

**Record of the Meeting of Comrade I.V. Stalin with
the Secretary of the CC French Communist Party Thorez**

Moscow, 18 November 1947.

Present: Molotov, Suslov.

[Thorez began the conversation with expression of respect and gratitude to com. Stalin on behalf of all members of French communist party and the CC FCP]

Com. Stalin asks jocularly if Thorez is thanking him for the fact that in Warsaw [at the meeting of the Cominform in September 1947] the French communists were berated.[rugali].

Thorez responds that the Communist Party of France is all too grateful for having been told about its shortcomings...

Thorez said that the estimate of the situation presented at the conference of nine communist parties is being brilliantly corroborated in France. In particular, the interference of the Americans in the country is increasing, economic difficulties are aggravating, class struggle is growing more acute. The French Communist Party, according to the instructions of the conference of the nine, is waging struggle in defense of the country's independence and is fighting alone against the entire coalition of reactionary forces. At the last municipal elections the French communist party managed to preserve and even partially increase the number of its voters. At the present moment de Gaulle has managed to rally around himself all most extreme reactionary forces of France. It was achieved to the detriment of the socialists and particularly the MRP [Mouvement Republicaine Populaire], who have lost a large number of votes at the elections...

[Thorez asks Stalin's opinion about French political groupings that regard themselves as a third force between the communists and the supporters of de Gaulle]

Stalin says that in France there will be probably further consolidation and polarization of forces. Of course, the communists will gain in strength, but the DeGaullists will also gain in strength. All who would like to position themselves between war and peace will lose their prestige. Today there is a question of choice between peace and war. One should make a choice between supporters of peace and advocates of war. There can be no vacillation.

[Thorez and Stalin discussed the situation inside the French socialist party. Stalin supported and even reinforced Thorez's negative assessment of the socialists]

Com. Stalin says that it seems to him that the socialists in France, as well as the Labourists in England are creating for themselves a left wing in their parties. Most prominent leaders of the left wing are the agents of the Right. Such leaders as [Leon] Blum and others in France, as [Ernest] Bevin and others in England understand that serious opposition from below will grow in their parties. To prevent the migration of these elements to the communists, leftist leadership is being created for them. The leftists are engaged in demagoguery to satisfy the opposition from below, the rightists at the same time keep in their

hands the party leadership and steer it in their direction. In such perfidious and crooked way they cheat people in order to keep the opposition elements within their party and not to let them come over to the communists. Of course, there are some good and sincere people in the opposition, but they do not lead the opposition.

[Thorez stressed that the CC FCP decided, in the spirit of the conference of the nine parties, to organize at factories and plants alliances in defense of independence of France, using to this purpose the CGT (Confederation General de Travail). According to Thorez, the FCP succeeded at the last conference of the CGT in winning a majority against the Marshall Plan and American imperialism.]

Com. Stalin says that the struggle against the Marshall Plan should not be put up too crudely. The Socialists will say that the communists are against accepting loans from Americans. The answer should be: no, not against. Communists are for loans, but on such conditions that will not harm the national sovereignty. Communists are against the enslaving conditions that impinge upon independence of France. This is how the Communists should formulate the issue...

Com. Stalin points out that the socialists are selling their nation [rodinu] down the river.

... Thorez says that, in connection with the conference of the nine communist parties, he would like to touch on one issue that pertains more to the past than to the future. The FCP admitted justified criticism of its shortcomings and, in particular, the criticism that it could not quickly and decisively unmask the plans of American imperialism. However, at the last congress the FCP did draw attention to the menacing character of American imperialism. The French Communist Party expanded self-criticism and is seeking to correct its shortcomings. However, representatives of some fraternal communist parties sometimes subjected the FCP to unfair criticism. For instance, in particular the Yugoslav comrades reproached the French Communist Party that it had joined the resistance struggle all too late and could not ensure the people's power at the moment of France's liberation. Thorez says that, in his opinion, this criticism is not justified. In order to gain a chance to correctly inform the party masses of France and not to disorient them, Thorez would like to know the opinion of com. Stalin on this issue. Thorez says that the French Communist Party was the first party who had engaged in struggle even as early as 1939, defending its country against the German invasion. During the occupation of France the Communist Party led the armed struggle against the Germans. Even such a renowned enemy of the Communist Party as de Gaulle does not dispute the fact that at the end of the occupation the Communist Party was the only force who organized armed resistance to the Germans. The fact that the French Communist Party failed to seize power during the liberation of the country in August 1944 is explained by a whole number of reasons of an international nature. The French Communist Party at that time directed its efforts to advocate the speediest opening of the second front, intensification of the war and bringing closer a victory over Germany. The French Communist Party was in the rearguard of American and British armed forces.

Com. Stalin says that it would be completely different story had the Red Army been positioned in France.

Thorez says that at that time de Gaulle whose prestige was still unchallenged, wanted to provoke the Communist Party to start an armed uprising. Yet, the Communist Party of

France did not walk into this [trap] (*ne poshla na eto*). It did not want to see itself weakened and isolated. The Party managed to unmask before the people a true face of de Gaulle, this rabid reactionary and fascist. Thorez says that, of course, the French Communist Party committed errors, but its general line in that period was, in his opinion, correct.

Com. Stalin says that the French communists could not seize power at that time. Even had they seized it, they would have lost it then, because of the presence of Anglo-American troops in the country.

...Com. Stalin says that the Yugoslav comrades work very well, but they owe much to the fact that their country was liberated by the Red Army. Had Churchill been late by one year with opening of the second front in Northern France, the Red Army would have come to France. Com. Stalin says that we [in Moscow] toyed with an idea of reaching Paris (*dobratsia do Parizha*).

Thorez says that when the Anglo-Americans landed in France, they did not so much to defeat Germany, but mostly to occupy strongholds in Western Europe.

Com. Stalin says that, of course, the Anglo-Americans could not afford such a scandal, so that the Red Army would liberate Paris while they would sit on the shores of Africa.

Thorez says that he can assure com. Stalin that the French people would have enthusiastically received the Red Army.

Com. Stalin observes that then it would have been quite a different picture...

Com. Stalin remarks that the French Communist Party has never approached the VKP(b) with request of assistance and jocularly adds that they are perhaps afraid of assistance. Com. Stalin says that the VKP (b) has material capabilities to come to assistance, whenever it is necessary.

Thorez responds that the French Communist Party is in good financial situation and possesses of large funds. Even before the war it had 20 million franks. Today this sum has grown considerably.

[Then Stalin inquires if the French communists has stockpiles of arms. Do they consider it necessary to have them.]

Thorez responds that the CC of the French Communist Party authorized two comrades, one from the Politburo, another from the CC, to deal specifically with this issue. Those selected [for the task] are Lequeur, who was secretary of the Communist Party organization of Paris during the occupation, and Tillon, the organizer of the guerrilla movement in France. They conduct work among old guerrillas, create organizations of paramilitary nature. French Communist Party managed to conceal a whole number of depots with armaments and ammunition.

Com. Stalin says that one must have armaments and organization if one does not want to become disarmed before the enemy. Communists can be attacked and then they should fight back. There can be all kinds of situations. Com. Stalin says that we [the Soviets] have arms and we can give it, if it becomes necessary.

Com. Stalin asks if one could establish permanent communication with the French Communist Party, for instance, by radio. Com. Suslov says that some radio communication

with the French Communist Party exists. The French [communists] have a radio operator trained in Moscow.

Thorez remarks that the French communists have several radio stations.

... Com Stalin asks if [Jaques] Duclos is a good assistant to Thorez. Com. Stalin says that the speech of Duclos in the Chamber [of the National Assembly] with a declaration that the working class will not be provoked into armed insurrection was not a good one. One should keep in mind that the enemy will not spare the weak and the unarmed.

Thorez responds that Duclos is a very good worker and works a lot, but sometimes he takes liberty of speaking in the Chamber without sufficient preliminary preparation. Therefore there are instances when he gets provoked and speaks not what he planned. Nevertheless Duclos is a good and intelligence communist.

Com. Molotov asks if there are vacillations inside the CC French Communist Party in connection to the decisions of the conference of the nine communist parties.

Thorez responds that there were such vacillations in the CC FCP. In particular Andre Marti adopted a wrong stance. This does not surprise he, Thorez, for Andre Marti, even though he is a brave fighter, imbued with revolutionary spirit, and gives much credence to formal logic. He does not grasp at once all kinds of sharp turns and complex situations. This time he even spoke at the CC with a separate report about the conference of the nine parties and declared that, in his opinion, the enemy number one is de Gaulle. Thorez says that he explained to Marti that the enemy number one is American imperialism that has its agents in France such as de Gaulle, the MRP and the socialists. The issue about erroneous stand of Marti was discussed at the Politburo. Marti was not happy with this. But on the next morning he spoke to a meeting of the communist organization in Paris and gave a very good and correct speech about the conference of the nine. Thorez says that Marti is a disciplined comrade. However, he is a bit hot-headed and one should have maximum patience in dealing with him.

Thorez says that Marcel Cachin is a remarkable figure of the Communist Party, although he is already 80 year old. He is a very energetic and active communist, but he somehow came to believe that if he is a member in the commission of foreign affairs at the National Assembly, he can then almost guide the entire foreign policy. Marcel Cachin is one of the greatest friends of the USSR. For him what the Russians say is the law.

Com. Stalin says if some relapses for the past (*retsidivi proshlogo*) can be observed with Cachin [In 1939-40 Cachin refused to support the new Comintern line unconditionally in support of the Nazi-Soviet pact].

Thorez says that there are no relapses can be observed in his case.

Com. Stalin says that in the French Communist Party there is comrade Montmoussot who is too much intimidating the French bourgeoisie with strikes. He declared, for instance, a general strike. Nobody went on strike, but he declared it.

Thorez says that Montmoussot is a close friend of Frachon, a man loyal to the party.

Thorez says that there are good cadres growing from out of the ranks of the young comrades. The best among them is Fajon. As early as 1940 he spoke at the National Assembly with a wonderful speech in the spirit of Liebknecht. He is presently busy with the issues of education and ideological work. Raymond Guillot, former Comsomol secretary, is also a good comrade. At the moment he works as secretary of the communist organization of the Parisian district. He is young in age, but a very gifted and experienced communist."

Source: Mikhail Narinskii, "Torez, 1944-1947. Noviiie materiali," Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, no. 1, January-February 1996, pp. 26-30 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 392, p. 83-106).

Translated by Vladislav Zubok.

**Report of Milovan Djilas about a
Secret Soviet-Bulgarian-Yugoslav Meeting
10 February 1948(1)**

Kardelj and Vacaric arrived in Moscow on Sunday, February 8, and until Tuesday, February 10, nobody gave them any news. On Tuesday before noon Baranov² phoned to say that Kardelj and the others should stay put, because in the evening, at nine o'clock we would be invited to the Kremlin. Lesakov told us that the Bulgarians arrived on Monday, but stressed that these were "the top guys" from Bulgaria-Dimitrov, Kolarov and Trajco Kostov.

Indeed, we were invited to the Kremlin at nine o'clock in the evening. We arrived punctually, but since the Bulgarians were late, we sat for 10-15 minutes in Stalin's reception room, and when they joined us, we walked in [to Stalin's office].

So, the meeting took place on Tuesday, February 10, at 9:15 Moscow time, and it lasted about three hours. When we entered [the room], Soviet representatives were already there. Those present at the meeting were: Stalin (at the head of the table), Molotov, Malenkov, Zhdanov, Suslov and Zorin (to the right side from Stalin along the table), and Dimitrov, Kolarov, Kostov, Kardelj, Djilas, Vacaric (to the left side from Stalin along the table).

Molotov spoke first. At first, he stressed that this was already a matter of serious disagreement between them [the Soviets] and Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. These disagreements were inadmissible both from the party and the state point of view. As examples of the serious discord he gave three: firstly, the conclusion of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian Treaty of Union-lack of coordination between the USSR, on one hand, and Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, on the other hand; secondly, the declaration of Dimitrov about a Federation of East European and Balkan countries, including Greece - lack of coordination between the USSR, on one side, and Bulgaria, on the other; thirdly, the introduction of a Yugoslav division into Southern Albania (Korcha)³ - lack of coordination between the USSR, on one hand, and Yugoslavia, on the other. As to the first point, he stresses that the Soviet government informed the Yugoslav and Bulgarian governments-and they agreed to this-that one should not conclude a treaty with Bulgaria until the expiration of limitations imposed by the Peace Treaty [with Bulgaria in 1946]. However, the Yugoslav and Bulgarian governments concluded the treaty, and the Soviet government learned about it from the newspapers. With regard to the second point he stresses that comrade Dimitrov grew too fond of press conferences. Meanwhile, if Dimitrov and Tito make announcements for the press, the whole world believes that such is also the view of the Soviet Union.⁴

At this moment, Stalin cut in to remind [us] that the Poles who were in Moscow in those days, spoke against [the Federation]. That means that the Soviet representatives first asked them what they thought of Dimitrov's declaration. And they said that they agreed, but when Stalin told them that the Soviet Union was against it, they also said that they were against, but they had previously believed that this was a position and request of Moscow.⁵ Stalin adds that the subsequent clarification by Dimitrov (he probably had in mind the announcement of the Bulgarian telegraph agency) explained nothing. Stalin quotes from this announcement that says how Austria-Hungary had thwarted a customs union between Bulgaria and Serbia, and adds that it means-the Germans had worked against a customs

union, and now we do (i.e. the Soviet Union).⁶ Stalin adds that Dimitrov diverts attention from domestic issues to foreign affairs-Federation, etc.⁷

Then Molotov passes to a third point of disagreement and stresses from the very beginning that they [in Moscow] accidentally learned about the entry of the Yugoslav troops into Albania. The Albanians told the Russians that they thought that the entry of the Yugoslav troops had been coordinated with the Soviet Union, and meanwhile it was not so. At that moment Molotov began citing some sort of dispatches, and Stalin told him to read them aloud. He asks Stalin which message he should read. Stalin leans [over] and points out [one]. Molotov reads a message from [Soviet ambassador in Yugoslavia] Lavrent'ev about his meeting with Tito. From this reading, it becomes clear that the message is an answer to the question of the Soviet government if there is a decision about the entry of Yugoslav troops into Albania, and it says that such a decision-coordinated with Hoxha-really exists, that the motive comes from the notification about a probable attack against Albania; then the message points out that Tito said that he does not agree with Moscow that in case of an entry of Yugoslav troops into Albania, the Anglo-Americans would intervene beyond a campaign in the press. Tito, according to the message, said that, if it came to anything serious, Yugoslavia and the USSR would sort it out [raskhlebitv kashu] together, however, after the Soviet demarche about this issue he would not send a division [to Albania]. At the end, Molotov points out that Tito did not inform them about his disagreement with Moscow. He stresses that disagreements are inadmissible both from the party and state viewpoint and that disagreements should be taken out [for discussion], and not concealed, and that it is necessary to inform and consult. One must be cautious with regard to press conferences.⁸

Following Molotov, Dimitrov spoke. He, as well as the other Bulgarians and Kardelj (he was the only one among the Yugoslavs who spoke), did not give his reasons coherently, because Stalin kept interrupting him. He said that what Yugoslavia and Bulgaria publicized at Bled was not a treaty, but only a statement that a future treaty had been agreed upon. Soviet representatives affirm that they learned about this affair from newspapers, etc.⁹ Dimitrov stresses that Bulgaria's economic difficulties are so serious that it cannot develop without cooperation with other countries. It is true that he got carried away at a press conference.¹⁰ Stalin interrupts and tells him that he wanted to shine with a new word, and that is wrong, and it is a mistake because such a Federation is not feasible.¹¹ Dimitrov says that he did not target the USSR by his assertion that Austria-Hungary had blocked a Bulgarian-Serb customs union. He stresses, at last, that there are essentially no disagreements between the foreign policies of Bulgaria and the Soviet Union.

Stalin interrupts and asserts that there are substantial differences and there is a practice of the Leninists-to recognize differences and mistakes and to liquidate them. Dimitrov says that they make mistakes because they are only learning foreign policy, but Stalin replies to this that he [Dimitrov] is a senior political figure who had been engaged in politics for forty years, and in his case it is not mistakes, but a different perception [than the USSR's] (he [Stalin] said it two or three times during the meeting, addressing Dimitrov).¹² As to the repeated emphasis by Dimitrov on the fact that Bulgaria must get closer with other countries for economic reasons, Stalin says that he agrees if one speaks of a customs union between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, but if one speaks of Romania (later, as I recall, he also mentioned Hungary), then he is against it. In general, when he spoke about such ties of Bulgaria with which the Soviet Union disagreed, most often [he] cited Romania as an example. It happens as a result of a clause about the customs union in the Bulgarian-

Romanian treaty and because, I believe, that the joint Bulgarian-Romanian communique calls for coordination of plans between Romania and Bulgaria. These issues were raised at the meeting and often referred to by Soviet representatives. They have in mind a forthcoming conclusion of the treaties between Bulgaria and Hungary, and [Bulgaria and] other countries. Thus, Soviet criticism of Romanian-Bulgarian relations touches on future Bulgarian-Hungarian relations, and, obviously, on the relations of Yugoslavia with Hungary and Romania.

Then Kolarov began to speak. He says about this part from the Bulgarian announcement regarding a customs union between Serbia and Bulgaria, where nobody meant to hint at the USSR, and as to the customs union between Romania and Bulgaria, the Romanians are also all for it. Besides, the Romanian-Bulgarian treaty had been earlier sent to the Soviet government and it already made only one amendment so that an article [on the joint defense] against any aggressor would be replaced by an article against Germany or a power that could be in alliance with it, and there were no comments on the Bulgarian-Romanian customs union. Then a brief exchange between Stalin and Molotov occurs. Molotov confirms what Kolarov says. Stalin stresses again that he is against the Bulgarian-Romanian customs union, although Bulgarians have a reason to think otherwise, on the basis of dispatches. He stresses that he did not know that there was an article about a customs union in the Romanian-Bulgarian treaty that had been previously sent to the Soviet government. Dimitrov says that that it was the very cause why in his statement he went further than necessary.¹³

Stalin says to him that he [Dimitrov] wanted to surprise the whole world and adds that it looked like the secretary of the Comintern was explaining tediously and meticulously what should be done and how. [Stalin] says that this gives food to American reactionaries [reaktziia]. He then speaks about the significance of the American elections and [says] that one should be careful to do nothing to give the reactionaries arguments that could facilitate their victory. In his opinion, we should not give the reaction anything to snatch at [nikakoi zatsepki]. The current American government still contains itself, but money bags [denezhniie meshki] and sharks can come to power. The reactionaries in American, when they hear such statements, say that in Eastern Europe there is not only a bloc in the making, but [the countries] are merging into common states. He tells Dimitrov and the others that they are overdoing it [perebarshchivaiut], like the Young Communists and then like women take everything to the streets. Then he makes a linkage to the issue of Albania. The three world powers—the USSR, England, and America guaranteed Albania's independence by a special agreement. Albania is our weakest spot, because other states are either members of the United Nations, or recognized, etc., but Albania is not [recognized]. If Yugoslav troops entered Albania, the reactionaries in England and America would be able to use it and step forward as defenders of Albanian independence. Instead of sending troops we should work intensely to build up the Albanian army, we should teach the Albanians, and then, if they are attacked, let the Albanian Skupcina [parliament] appeal to Yugoslavia for help. He makes an example of China, where nobody¹⁴ can reproach the USSR,¹⁵ but the Chinese are fighting well and advancing; he then adds that the Albanians are not worse than the Chinese and they must be taught. Then he adds that we should sign a protocol about joint consultations.¹⁶ He says that the Bulgarians and the Yugoslavs do not report anything [to the Soviets], and they [the Soviets] have to find out everything on the street, usually ending up faced with a fait accompli.

Kostov then begins to complain how hard it is to be a small and undeveloped country. He would like to raise some economic issues. Stalin cuts him short and says that there are competent ministries to do it, and this is the discussion of the differences.

Kardelj starts to speak.¹⁷ On the first point [of disagreements] he says that it was not a treaty that was published, but only a communiqué about the discussion leading to a treaty; he adds that we [Yugoslavs and Bulgarians] were too hasty. This triggers an exchange similar to that when Dimitrov made the same point. [Andrei] Zhdanov intervenes and says that they [in the Soviet Union] learned about this matter from the newspapers. On Albania he says that not informing them on that was a serious error. Stalin cuts in and says that we [in Yugoslavia] oversimplify this matter, but it is a complicated matter.¹⁸ Kardelj then mentioned the constant Greek provocations, the weakness of the Albanian army, and that we are linked to Albania economically and that we underwrite [soderzhim] its army. Two or three times Stalin interrupted. For instance, regarding a Greek invasion of Albania, he said that it was possible. Then he asked if the situation was really such that one should not have any faith in the Albanian army, and added that the Albanians must be taught and their army must be built up. Molotov says that they have no information about any kind of attack on Albania and wondered that we withhold our information from them. Then, reacting to Kardelj's explanation that the anti-Albanian campaign in Greece is worsening, Stalin demanded [to know] if we believe in the victory of the Greek guerrillas. Kardelj responds that we do. Stalin says that recently he and the rest of his collaborators have had grave doubts about it. He says that one should assist Greece [i.e. guerrillas] if there are hopes of winning, and if not, then we should rethink and terminate the guerrilla movement. The Anglo-Americans will spare no effort to keep Greece [in their sphere],¹⁹ and the only serious obstacle [zakavika] for them is the fact that we assist the guerrillas. Molotov adds that we are constantly and justifiably blamed for assistance to the guerrillas. Stalin says that if there are no conditions for victory, one must not be afraid to admit it. It is not for the first time in history that although there are no conditions now, they will appear later.²⁰ Then Kolarov speaks and tells that the American, British and French embassies appealed to them [Bulgarians] with a warning not to recognize the government of Markos.²¹ Kolarov says that the American ambassador is courteous, but the British ambassador is arrogant. Stalin cuts in and says that it means that the American is a great scoundrel and they [ambassadors of the US and UK] always trade roles. Stalin also said that we should not link the future of our state with a victory of the guerrillas in Greece. On Dimitrov's comment that a victory of the Monarchists-Fascists would seriously aggravate the situation in the Balkans, Stalin says that it is not proven.

Then Dimitrov and Kolarov spoke about other matters that did not relate to the agenda of the meeting. Among other things, Molotov cited a paragraph from the Yugoslav-Bulgarian treaty which read that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria would act in the spirit of the United Nations and would support all initiatives directed at the preservation of peace and against all hotbeds of aggression. Molotov cites from the treaty to reject Dimitrov's attempts at a linkage between the struggle against "hotbeds of aggression" with the actions of the United Nations. Stalin adds that it would mean a preventive war which is a Komsomol [i.e. juvenile] stunt, a loud phrase, material for the enemy. Stalin then tells a story, hinting at the Komsomol behavior, that there was a seaman in Leningrad after the revolution who condemned and threatened the whole world by radio.²² Molotov then spoke about oats that Albania asked the USSR for, and that Tito had told Lavrent'ev that Yugoslavia would give

oats, and after that the Yugoslavs are instructing the Albanians to buy oats in Argentina.²³ Stalin said half-jokingly that the Yugoslavs are afraid of having Russians in Albania and because of this are in a hurry to send their troops.²⁴ He also said that the Bulgarians and Yugoslavs think that the USSR stands against a unification of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, but it does not want to admit it. Molotov raised some kind of a point from the Bulgarian-Romanian communiqué about the coordination of plans and mentioned that it would have been essentially a merger of these states. Stalin is categorical that this is inconceivable and that Dimitrov would soon see for himself that it is nonsense, and instead of cooperation it would bring about a quarrel between the Romanians and Bulgarians. Therefore mutual relations should be limited to trade agreements.

Then Stalin laid out a Soviet view that in Eastern Europe one should create three federations-Polish-Czechoslovak, Romanian-Hungarian and Yugoslav-Bulgarian-Albanian.²⁵ Bulgaria and Yugoslavia [he said] may unite tomorrow if they wish, there are no constraints on this, since Bulgaria today is a sovereign state. Kardelj says that we were not in a hurry to unify with Bulgaria and Albania, in view of international and domestic moments, but Stalin reacts to it by saying that it should not come too late, and that the conditions for that are ripe. At first, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria must unite, and then let Albania join them. This should be agreed upon through People's Skupcina [parliaments], by the will of the peoples. Stalin thinks that one should begin with political unification and then it would be difficult [for the West] to attack Albania. As to a Bulgarian-Yugoslav unification, Stalin repeatedly stressed that this question has ripened, and one even began a discussion about the name of [a united] state.

Then Kardelj returned to the issue about what after all one should do in Albania, but [Stalin's] answer boiled down to what Stalin said earlier, i.e., the Albanian army ought to be taught, and that Albania should ask for assistance in case of aggression. As to oats, Kardelj says that it is possible that the enemy interfered to spoil Yugoslav-Soviet relations (Molotov kept silent).²⁶ Then Kardelj says that he does not see any big differences between Yugoslavia and the USSR in foreign policy. Stalin interrupts him and says that it is incorrect, that there are differences and that to hide them would mean opportunism. We should not be afraid to recognize differences. Stalin stresses that even they, Lenin's pupils, many times disagreed with him. They would have a quarrel on some issue, then talk it over, work out a position and move on. He believes that we should put the question more boldly about the guerrillas in Greece. Then he mentions the case of China again, but now he raises another aspect. In particular, that they [the Politburo] invited the Chinese comrades and considered that there were no conditions for successful uprising in China and that some kind of "modus vivendi" [with the Guomintang] had to be found. The Chinese comrades, according to Stalin, in words agreed with the Soviet comrades, but in practice kept accumulating forces. The Russians twice gave them assistance in weapons. And it turned out that the Chinese, not the Soviet comrades, were right, as Stalin says. But he does not believe that the case of the Greek guerrillas falls into the same category. On China he says that they [the Soviets] do not have their people there, except in Port Arthur [Lushunkov] which is a neutral zone according to the treaty with the Chinese government. He spoke about the tactics of the Chinese who avoided attacking cities until they had accumulated sufficient strength.²⁷

Kardelj speaks again and says it was a mistake that we [the Yugoslavs] failed to inform them. Stalin interrupts him and says that it was not a mistake, it was a system [a policy] and that we do not inform them on anything.

Then Stalin and Molotov propose a protocol on mutual coordination of foreign affairs. Kardelj agrees with that. Stalin proposes that we inquire of them [the Soviets] on all questions of interest to us, and that they would also inform us about everything.²⁸

Then Dimitrov diverted the conversation to economic and other issues. When Dimitrov says there are important economic issues, Stalin cut him short by remarking that he would speak about it with a joint Yugoslav-Bulgarian government. During subsequent discussion Stalin raised a question about how the Albanians would react to such a union, and Kardelj and Djilas explained to him that the Albanians would accept it well, because it would be in their national interests, considering that eight hundred thousand Albanians reside in Yugoslavia.²⁹ Stalin also said with regard to Albania that one on our side [u nas odin] has already committed suicide,³⁰ and that we want to overthrow Hoxha and that it should not be done hastily and crudely-"the boot on the throat"-but gradually and indirectly. Stalin says again that at first Yugoslavia and Bulgaria ought to unite, and then Albania should join them. And Albania must declare itself about its desire to join. Then Kostov raised the question that the [Bulgarian-Soviet] treaty about technical assistance, also about patents, licensing and authors' rights, is not favorable for the Bulgarians (he failed to mention if this treaty has already been signed). Molotov said that this matter will need consideration, and Stalin said that Kostov should submit a note [to Molotov].

Then we discussed the answer of the Sovinformburo to the slander of the Americans regarding [their] publication of the documents on Soviet-German relations.³¹ Kardelj gave a positive assessment to the answer published in Pravda and Dimitrov says that the Western powers wanted to unite with Germany against the USSR. Stalin replies that he had nothing to hide [on vse vynosit otkrito], and the Western powers did not speak openly, in particular that Europe without Russia means against Russia. Molotov remarks during the conversation that the Bulgarians do not put enough camouflage on the number of their troops and that it exceeds the clauses [about limits] in the Peace Treaty, and the Bulgarians may be criticized for it. Dimitrov said to this that, on the contrary, the number is even below the limit stipulated by the Peace Treaty. Molotov was satisfied with that [answer] and did not mention it again.³² Dimitrov raised the issue about the conclusion of a treaty on mutual assistance between the USSR and Bulgaria. He stressed that it would be of great significance for Bulgaria. Stalin agreed with this, but added that among the Quisling countries³³ [the USSR] would first conclude treaties with neighbors: with Romania-this treaty is almost ready, with Hungary and Finland.

Then Stalin underlines that we (i.e. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria) must build up our economy, culture, army, and that a federation is an abstraction.

Suddenly Stalin asked about "our friend Pijade,"³⁴ Kardelj told him that he is working on our legislation.

Kardelj asked [the Soviets] about their opinion what answer should be given to the Italian government who asked the Yugoslav government to support Italian claims to govern their former colonies. Stalin said that these demands must be supported and asked Molotov how [the Soviet side] responded. Molotov says that they still have to respond and that he believes they should wait. Stalin told them that there is no point in waiting and the answer should be sent immediately. He said that former Italian colonies should be put under Italian governance [trusteeship] and remarked that kings, when they could not agree over the booty, used to give [disputed] land to a weakest feudal so they could snatch it from him later at

some opportune moment, and that feudal lords invited a foreigner to rule them so they could easily overthrow him when they become fed up with him.

On this note the conversation ended.

I would remind [napominaiu] that the criticism of Dimitrov by Stalin, although rough in form, was expressed in friendly tones. This report was composed on the basis of notes taken at the meeting and from memory.

END NOTES

1 [Translator's Note: In *Conversations with Stalin* (1962) Milovan Djilas recounted this meeting in great detail. He mentioned that he had submitted a written report of that meeting to the Yugoslav Central Committee, but that he could not get access to it when he wrote the book. As the comparison of the document with the book reveals, Djilas' memory retained with remarkable precision some pivotal moments of the conversation.-V.Z.]

2 Baranov, Leonid Semenovich-assistant director of the CC VKP(b) [Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Department of Foreign Policy.

3 The statement concerns the Yugoslav intention of deploying a division, which never took place.

4 In the Bulgarian records, particularly Kolarov's account, this is presented in the following manner:

"It seems to us that com. Georgii Dimitrov has taken a fancy to press conferences and interviews, thus giving opportunity to be prompted with questions which ought not be discussed in the first place. This is misguided and undesirable. During the course of the interview a plan was set forth which goes too far without any attempt to consult with whomever it may concern. A question was put forth of creating a federation or a confederation, a customs union that would include both Poland and Greece. Com. Georgii Dimitrov speaks of all these things without being granted authority by anyone concerned. This is misguided in principle and is tactically harmful. This eases the burden of the creators of the Western bloc." And further: "We must take the position in such a way that all would know-both enemies and friends-that this is our point of view. We consider this absolutely wrong and unacceptable in the future." This is contained in slightly abbreviated form in the Soviet record as well.

5 According to Bulgarian and Soviet records this was spoken by Molotov, not Stalin. Kolarov's account puts it in the following manner: "When we spoke with the Polish comrades, they said: We thought that this was Moscow's opinion. Everyone thinks that if Dimitrov or Tito speaks of a number of countries, it originates from the USSR. In essence, the Polish comrades said that they are against Georgii Dimitrov's idea and consider it misguided."

6 According to the Bulgarian and Soviet records, this was also spoken by Molotov, while Stalin supplemented this with separate remarks.

7 Before these statements by Stalin, the Bulgarian records, particularly Kolarov's account, show the following remarks by Molotov:

"[Czechoslovak President Eduard] Benes' newspaper immediately hastened to write that 'Dimitrov puts out communist plans, and now the Czech communists must answer.' On the

other hand, this position of Georgii Dimitrov contradicts the declaration of the nine communist parties." The same is corroborated by the Soviet record.

8 According to Bulgarian and Soviet records, this statement by Molotov sounded more categorical. Kolarov's account records the following words: "In the future, com. Georgii Dimitrov must rid himself and us of the risks of such statements."

9 [Translator's Note: This intervention is presented dramatically in Djilas's book. "'Yes, but you didn't consult with us!' Stalin shouted. 'We learn about your doings in the newspapers! You chatter like women from the housetops whatever occurs to you, and then the newspapermen grab hold of it.'" (p. 175)-V.Z.]

10 The Bulgarian and Soviet records note somewhat stronger self-criticism by Dimitrov. Kolarov recorded his words: "This was harmful and fundamentally misguided. This was self-indulgence. Such statements will not be repeated in the future."

11 According to Bulgarian records, in particular Kolarov's, Stalin said: "We wanted to say another word. The Poles and Czechs are laughing at your federation. Ask them-do they want it?" The same is corroborated by the Soviet record.

12 According to the Bulgarian records, in particular Kolarov's account, Stalin said to Dimitrov: "You are a politician and must think not only of your own intentions, but also of the consequences of your statements." Later, returning once more to this question, the Soviet leader said to Dimitrov: "You are an old politician. What possible mistakes could one speak of? You may have another goal in mind, but you yourself will not admit it. You must not give interviews so often." According to the Soviet record, Stalin, noting that Dimitrov has apparently another goal that must be revealed, added that these are not little children sitting here, and Dimitrov is not a "pre-schooler."

[Translator's Note: This part of the conversation is dramatized in Djilas' book in the following dialogue:

"Stalin, decidedly and firmly: 'There are serious differences, Why hide it? It was Lenin's practice always to recognize errors and to remove them as quickly as possible.'

Dimitrov, placatingly, almost submissively: 'True, we erred. But through errors we are learning our way in foreign politics.'

Stalin, harshly and tauntingly: 'Learning! You have been in politics fifty years-and now you are correcting errors! Your trouble is not errors, but a stand different from ours.'"

Then Djilas writes that Dimitrov's ears "were red, and big red blotches cropped up on his face covering his spots of eczema. His sparse hair straggled and hung in lifeless strands over his wrinkled neck. I felt sorry for him...The Lion of the Leipzig Trials...looked dejected and dispirited." (pp. 176-177)-V.Z.]

13 The entire conversation recorded by Djilas about the draft of a Bulgarian-Romanian treaty sent to the Soviet government, which in turn expressed no objections over the article on the customs union, is absent from the Soviet and Bulgarian records. Kolarov's account contains only the following phrase: "Kolarov points out that the treaty with Romania had been harmonized with Moscow."

14 [Translator's note: "nobody" here means the United States and Great Britain, not the Communist Party of China. This phrase reveals Stalin's emphasis on realpolitik as a method to prevent "imperialists" consolidation and intervention into Balkan affairs.-V.Z.]

15 The Bulgarian records contain the following words expressed by Stalin over this matter: "You see the kind of war that is raging in China. We don't have a single one of our soldiers there."

16 According to Bulgarian records, the question of signing a protocol on mutual consultation arose in connection with Dimitrov's statement on 10 February concerning Moscow: "We also receive little information from here." Stalin responded: "You have the right to demand from us to keep you informed. Let us then put together a protocol on obligatory consultation between us on all important international questions." This is similarly recorded in the Soviet record.

17 [Translator's note: According to Djilas, "he was red and, what was a sign of agitation with him, he drew his head down between his shoulders and made pauses in his sentences where they did not belong." (p. 179)-V.Z.]

18 [Translator's note: The exchange on the failure to inform the USSR on sending Yugoslav troops to Albania was more serious and emotional, according to Djilas' book: "'Stalin shouted, "This could lead to serious international complications..." Kardelj explained that all that had not yet been final and added that he did not remember a single foreign problem but that the Yugoslav Government did not consult with the Soviets..."It's not so!" Stalin cried. "You don't consult at all. That is not your mistake, but your policy-yes, your policy!" Cut off, Kardelj fell silent and did not press his view." (pp.179-180)-V.Z.]

19 [Translator's Note: In Djilas's book Stalin says: "No, they have no prospect of success at all. What do you think, that Great Britain and the United States-the United States, the most powerful state in the world -will permit you to break their line of communication in the Mediterranean Sea! Nonsense. And we have no navy. The uprising in Greece must be stopped, and as quickly as possible." (p. 182) -V.Z.]

20 As noted in the Bulgarian records, in particular in Kolarov's account, Stalin cautioned the Yugoslav side against careless involvement in Albania, where the USA and England might strike back, claiming to be defenders of Albanian independence. With this in mind, Stalin put this question to Kardelj: "If the Greek partisans are defeated, will you go to war?" Kardelj replied in the negative. To which Stalin said: "I am arguing on the basis of an analysis of the current forces of the partisans and their enemies. Recently I have started to doubt the prospects of a partisan victory. If you are not convinced that the partisans will win, the partisan movement ought to be wrapped up. The Americans and the English are very interested in the Mediterranean sea. They want to have a base in Greece and will spare no means to preserve a government that listens to them. This is an important international question. If the partisan movement is wrapped up, then they will have no reason to attack you. It's not so easy to start a war now. If you are convinced that the partisans have a chance of victory, then that's a different matter. But I somewhat doubt it."

The Bulgarian records note the following remark by Kostov: "We believe that a defeat of the partisan movement in Greece would create a very difficult situation for other Balkan countries." To this Stalin replied:

"Of course the partisans must be supported. But if the prospects for the partisan movement are falling, it is better to postpone the fight until better times. That which is lacking in relative forces cannot be supplemented with moans and exclamations. What is needed is a thoughtful reckoning of forces. If this shows that at the present time the matter is moving nowhere, one must not be afraid to admit it. There have been other instances when partisan movements were terminated given an unfavorable situation. If it's impossible today, it will be possible tomorrow. You are afraid to state the question clearly. You are under the impression of a "moral obligation." If you cannot lift the weight which you have hoisted upon yourselves, you must admit it. You must not be afraid of some kind of a "categorical

imperative" of moral obligation. We do not have such categorical imperatives. The entire question rests in the balance of forces. We go into battle not when the enemy wants us to, but when it's in our interests."

Further discussion of the Greek question, following these observations by Stalin, is recorded in the Bulgarian records:

"Kardelj: Over the next several months the chances of the partisans will become clear.

Stalin: In that case, fine, you can wait. Perhaps you are right. I also doubted the abilities of the Chinese and advised them to come to a temporary agreement with Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-Shek]. They formally agreed with us, but in practice continued on their own course—that is, mobilizing the forces of the Chinese people. After this, they openly raised the question: we will continue to fight; the people support us. We said: fine, what do you need? It turned out that the conditions were very favorable to them. They turned out to be right, we turned out to be wrong. Maybe we will turn out to be wrong here as well. But we want you to act with certainty. Kolarov: Will America allow a partisan victory?

Stalin: They won't be asked. If there are enough forces for victory, and if there are persons capable of employing the force of the people, then the fight must be continued. But one must not think that if things are not successful in Greece, then everything is lost."

The Soviet record overall corroborates this course of discussion, but sets it down in significantly condensed form, without a number of details. In particular, it does not record Kostov's remark found in Bulgarian records on the difficult consequences the defeat of the Greek partisans would bring to other Balkan countries (in the Djilas report this remark is attributed to Dimitrov), and Kardelj's negative reply to Stalin's question whether Yugoslavia would go to war in the event of a Greek partisan defeat. In addition, the Soviet record corroborates Kardelj's optimistic assessment, noted by Djilas, of the prospects of a partisan victory in Greece, though at the same time noting his qualification that this is possible only in the absence of direct US assistance to the Greek government, apparently meaning intervention by the American military.

21 The reference is to the creation of a Provisional Democratic Government of Greece, declared by the decision of the leadership of the Communist Party of Greece in late December 1947. This government would be headed by the commander of the partisan forces, member of the Communist Party Politburo, Markos Vafiadis, known at the time as "general Markos." The Bulgarian records note that at the 10 February 1948 meeting Stalin said on this subject: "The bordering countries must be the last to recognize the Markos government. Let others, who are further away, recognize it first." This statement by Stalin—that Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania must refrain from recognizing the Greek revolutionary government, and allow other "people's democracies," not bordering Greece and not accused of interfering in its internal affairs, to recognize it—is absent from the Soviet record. However, it does contain a statement by Kardelj (not present in the Bulgarian records) declaring that it would be better for Albania or Bulgaria to recognize Markos, and not Yugoslavia, for the latter is a member of the UN.

22 [Translator's Note: This "seaman" must be Fedor Raskolnikov, a famous Bolshevik and agitator of the Baltic fleet, later a Soviet emissary to ignite the Muslim revolution in Asia. He defected in 1937 from Bulgaria, where he was ambassador and wrote a letter to Stalin denouncing his regime and the purges of Bolsheviks in the USSR.-V.Z.]

23 On 13 December 1947, Lavrent'ev, on orders from Moscow, informed Tito of the Albanian government's request for a shipment of 5 thousand tons of oats from the USSR, and

inquired whether Yugoslavia had any objections to this. Two days later, Tito replied to the ambassador that the shipments from the USSR are not needed: Albania will receive the oats from Yugoslavia. However, the oats promised by Yugoslav never arrived in Albania. Even after the meeting in Moscow, during the second half of February 1948, Lavrent'ev, in his discussion with Kardelj, attempted to find out why this occurred. Kardelj explained this through a misunderstanding and lack of cooperation between the corresponding government bodies in Yugoslavia. AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 32, p. 128, d. 8, ll. 3, 8, 96, 102-103, 114-115.

24 The Bulgarian records note this statement by Stalin in the following manner: "The Yugoslavs, apparently, are afraid that we will take Albania away from them. You must take Albania, but wisely." The Soviet record notes this statement by Stalin in more detail. It notes his words that "the Yugoslavs, apparently, are afraid that we will take Albania from them, and that's why they want to deploy their forces there sooner. They believe that we are tearing away from them their union both with Bulgaria and with Albania, and want to present us with a fait accompli."

25 The Bulgarian records present this thought by Stalin in the following manner: "Only three federations are possible and naturally inherent: 1) Yugoslavia and Bulgaria; 2) Romania and Hungary and 3) Poland and Czechoslovakia. These are the possible and realistic federations. A confederation among ourselves is something far-fetched." Somewhat further along in the Bulgarian records are the following words by Stalin: "You must not delay with uniting three countries-Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania." The Soviet record does not include the idea of three federations, and only mentions that Stalin remarked on the natural rapprochement between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, and Poland and Czechoslovakia, while calling the idea of a single federation of all countries "nonsense." According to the Soviet record, Stalin used the term "federation" only in connection with the Bulgarian-Yugoslav union, though also noting that first Bulgaria and Yugoslavia could be united, and then Albania could also be included. Neither the Soviet nor Bulgarian records contain any mention of a conversation, found in the Djilas report, regarding the name of the united Yugoslav-Bulgarian country.

26 Kardelj's reply on possible enemy interference in the shipment of oats is not mentioned either in the Soviet or Bulgarian records. The Soviet record mentions only Kardelj's words that the question of oats is unclear to him.

27 Ed. Note: For the Bulgarian version of this Greek-Chinese comparison, see footnote above.

28 The Bulgarian and Soviet records do not contain such a dialogue between Stalin and Kardelj. According to the Bulgarian records, such a dialogue took place between Stalin and Dimitrov.

29 According to the Bulgarian records, this was stated not by Kardelj and Djilas, but by Stalin himself.

30 [Translator's Note: This is a reference to Nico Spiru, a member of the Albanian leadership with links to Belgrade, who committed suicide in November 1947.-V.Z.]

31 [Translator's Note: Early in 1948 the US Department of State published the documents on the Nazi-Soviet talks and agreements in 1939-41, seized in Germany at the end of the Second World War.-V.Z.]

32 According to the Soviet record, Dimitrov said nothing of the kind, and, indeed, said that the Bulgarian government would take measures to cover more carefully their forces and weapons.

33 [Translator's Note: In other words, the countries that collaborated with Nazi Germany during the Second World War.-V.Z.]

34 [Translator's Note: A member of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party. On Stalin's remarks about Pijade to Djilas, see *Conversations with Stalin*, p. 154.-V.Z.]

Source: Leonid Gibianskii, "The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War: Archival Documents on Stalin's Meetings with Communist Leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 1946-48," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 10 (March 1998), pp. 112-34 (Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita, Fond Kabinet Marshala Jugoslavije I-3-b-651, ll.33-40).

Translated by Vladislav Zubok.

**Bolesław Bierut's Notes to a Conversation with Josef Stalin
on approximately 15 August 1948**

I. 1) with the recommendation of the Politburo in full composition with the exception of Wieslaw.

2) Within the last two months there have taken place in the party important events, of which we were partly informing Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov and com. Zhdanov¹⁰⁹. The essence of these events comes down to revealing a rightist-nationalistic deviation in the party. The seriousness of this deviation is defined by:

1) it's headed by secretary general of the party, for whom within the last 4 years we have created great popularity and authority in the party.

2) it coincides with a crisis in the Yugoslav communist party, it gains international attention; this to a degree constrains our party in the sense that until now we have been avoiding an open fight against this deviation.

An important positive factor is that Wieslaw's attempts to transmit his false views and doubts to the party have been met with a deserved and decisive rebuttal not only from the party leadership, but also from the broad party active, so that a small group in the party headed by Wieslaw has been isolated and apparently attempts to proceed to the tactics of disguised fractional activities.

A complicating factor is that the party is on the eve of uniting with the PPS, as a result of which half a million members will pour into the party, the majority of which has been brought up in the spirit of opportunistic and nationalistic tendencies, which, of course, makes the rightist-nationalistic danger in the party more real.

3) A short outline of our party's crisis:

a) Already a year ago during the first meeting of the 9 parties and creation of the Information Bureau com. Wieslaw had revealed himself and under his pressure the whole Polish delegation, serious vacillations with regard to communist internationalism. He had sort of wanted to fence off Poland from the consequences of struggle against imperialism; he was just frightened not to have A Comintern rebuilt [the last 11 words in the original deleted - A.K.]. The delegation had been unable to assimilate fully an appraisal of the international and political situation presented in com. Zhdanov's report and take into consideration the tasks resulting from this assessment for all communist parties. However, all comrades from the leadership of our party, with the exception of Wieslaw, understood very fast the falsehood of their position at the first meeting of the Information Bureau and made self-criticism. Com. Wieslaw is still evading such self-criticism and remains silent.

¹⁰⁹ In the preserved materials of the CC PPR there has been found no correspondence, which would confirm contacts with the VKP(b) leadership relating to the crisis in the PPR leadership.

b) To the first letter of the CC VKP(b) to the CC of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia com. Wieslaw had reacted with unfounded mistrust even before a discussion of this letter at the Politburo meeting, questioning the righteousness of assessment of the behavior of the Yugoslav communist party leadership, as presented in the letter. True - all Politburo members have received with amazement such deep political crisis in the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party, since previously they had appraised with excessive optimism the ideological position of the YCP, and in particular with regard to the principle of revolutionary internationalism and toward the Soviet Union. However, nobody of us had doubts in the correctness of facts, which had been considered by the CC VKP(b), and verified by signatures of comrades Molotov and Stalin.

Com. Wieslaw's doubts on the Yugoslav question have forced the Politburo not to include the secretary general of the party to a delegation to the Information Bureau to discuss the Yugoslav question, while he himself has received with satisfaction the fact of his exclusion.

c) For the June plenary meeting of the CC PPR, called in to discuss ideological foundations of unifying the two parties, com. Wieslaw had been preparing a report till the last minute and in contradiction with the usually accepted method of discussing it earlier at a Politburo meeting, com. Wieslaw, allegedly for lack of time - came up with the report directly to the CC. It turned out that com. Wieslaw had consciously calculated that the Politburo would not accept the content of his report, but that his personal reputation and influence would ensure acceptance of his report by the expanded CC plenum, in which over 100 people participated¹¹⁰.

In com. Wieslaw's report there were many openly anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist theses. Dealing with the problem which of the traditions of the Polish revolutionary workers movement should be an ideological record for strengthening the foundations of a new Marxist-Leninist united party, com. Wieslaw thought that the most important of those achievements had been a struggle for independence of the Polish state in the period of tsarist oppression. Detaching the struggle for independence from the specific international situation and from the specific stages of development of revolutionary struggle of the working class - com. Wieslaw came up with an isolated negative assessment of the SDKPiL and KPP position and with a positive assessment of the PPS position on this question. PPS had revealed more political realism in the struggle for Poland's independence than the SDKPiL, which had suffered of Luxemburgism, and than the KPP, which had suffered of sectarianism - this is the basic thesis of com. Wieslaw. Distorting the Leninist thesis on the right of nations to self-determination up to separation, com. Wieslaw argues that in Poland's conditions this slogan had always come down to the struggle for Poland's independence - in contradiction to clear and comprehensive pronouncement of Lenin on this question. The whole report of com. Wieslaw had been severed from the specific struggle of the two basic streams in revolutionary struggle of the Polish proletariat, which had been conducted in the course of sixty years and has in fact taken position of justifying an opportunistic and bourgeois-nationalistic trend in the PPS.

¹¹⁰ According to the list of attendance 153 persons participated in the meeting.

Contrary to com. Wieslaw's calculations the CC plenum not only didn't approve his report, but all speaking comrades, with the exception of one¹¹¹, took a critical position. This report has done a tremendous harm to the party, whose ideological coherence has not been questioned up to now and had a decisive influence on the whole political life of the country.

The Politburo attempted to convince com. Wieslaw of falsity of his position only after the plenary meeting. None of the Politburo members spoke at the plenum¹¹², trying to avoid an inadmissible situation in the party leadership, which com. Wieslaw had created by his behavior. But com. Wieslaw didn't want to admit his mistakes. In response to a resolution of the Politburo, which gave justifiable [the word deleted in the original - A.K.] and principal criticism of all false statements in com. Wieslaw's report at the CC plenum - com. Wieslaw in a written document still deepened his glaringly nationalistic deviation from the general line [2 last words deleted in the original - A.K.] of the foundations of Marxism-Leninism. Having heard sharp criticism of this document at the Politburo meeting he refused to discuss it and stated he was ready to resign from his position of secretary general of the party. But the following day he said he has no objections to the Politburo resolution criticizing his report and withdraws his written statement. Due to his health condition he demanded a leave, as a result of which the Politburo has decided to convene a CC plenary meeting for the purpose of eliminating the ideological consequences of the June plenum, without Wieslaw's participation, whom we indeed recognized as seriously ill.

At the July plenum we have eliminated anti-Marxist guiding principles, relating to questions raised in Wieslaw's report not through criticism of that report, but through an analysis of questions raised in the report from the point of view of Marxist-Leninist theory, applying the method of self-criticism in a broader sense and not connecting it directly to com. Wieslaw. Decisions of this plenum have been received by the whole party with great enthusiasm.

d) Under our pressure com. Wieslaw sent greetings to the CC plenum stating that he fully agrees with the Politburo decisions. This fact allowed us to hope that com. Wieslaw, after a rest, would be able to enter on a road of sincere self-criticism of his mistakes.

However, com. Wieslaw, unfortunately, has deepened his mistakes by new facts. In talks with comrades he has taken a negative position towards the resolution of the Information Bureau on the Yugoslav question, particularly on collectivization. He was of the opinion that the resolution of the Information Bureau had been a consequence of pressure by the VKP(b) on the people's democracies, in which the question of transition of the village on a socialist road should be carried out at a slower rate through a fully voluntary development of cooperative forms of agricultural production.

¹¹¹ Reference is probably made to O. Dłuski.

¹¹² Not correct. R. Zambrowski did participate, though in fact he limited himself to discussing organizational matters, without taking position towards W. Gomulka's report.

e) In connection with com. Wieslaw's leave coming to an end, the Politburo has decided to send to him a delegation composed of three comrades¹¹³ to clarify his attitude toward his mistakes through self-criticism. Com. Wieslaw received this proposal with amazement, referring to his formal statement, that he is in solidarity with the Politburo's resolutions.

The Politburo is recognizing this as wriggling out of the bolshevik duty of a communist from a sincere self-criticism of one's mistakes.

Taking into consideration the above circumstances, the Politburo at its meeting held yesterday¹¹⁴, conducted a critical analysis of com. Wieslaw's behavior in the whole period when he had been holding the function of secretary general of the party and concluded that in the past, before Poland's liberation by the Red Army [superimposed on the deleted "Red" - A.K.] com. Wieslaw had revealed serious deviations of a rightist-nationalistic type, when he had succumbed to the pressure by rightist elements in the party and almost on the eve of the country's liberation thought it possible to liquidate the KRN through its unification with the reactionary Council of National Unity.

A form of liquidation of the rightist deviation in the party:

1) An open fight within the party with the rightist-nationalistic views regardless of the person.

2) A more decisive and comprehensive self-criticism and a fight with any hesitations of an ideological type. The Politburo considers itself guilty for permitting such hesitancy with particular comrades and with com. Wieslaw, approaching them often in a conciliatory manner or being even under their influence.

3) Organizational conclusions.

4) The necessity of change in the position of President [RP]¹¹⁵.

5) Asks for advice¹¹⁶.

II. A request to receive the Politburo¹¹⁷.

¹¹³ Translator's note: at this point reference is made to footnote No. 29, which in this segment is not available. That footnote most likely gives the composition of that delegation.

¹¹⁴ Reference is made to the previous footnote, No. 29, which is available only in the Polish original edition of the book.

¹¹⁵ Such change didn't occur.

¹¹⁶ In the Polish archives there are no documents regarding that meeting of B. Bierut with Stalin. Judging from the proceedings of the CC PPR on August 31- September 3, 1948 and from its resolutions one can assume that the theses and draft decisions proposed by Bierut had been met with Stalin's approval.

¹¹⁷ Talks is probably here of a visit of the CC PPR Politburo's delegation. No data about such visit.

III. The agenda of the conference¹¹⁸.

Original, the manuscript in Russian.

Source: AAN, KC PZPR, 2727, k.113-20.

Translated by Jan Chowaniec.

Contributed by Krzysztof Persak.

¹¹⁸ It hasn't been established about what kind of conference the reference is made here.

Result of the 4-hour Meeting on 12.18.1948
[Wilhelm Pieck, Walter Ulbricht, Otto Grotewohl, Fred Oelsner, Stalin]

Affair Gniffke — how possible — parity
what lessons — Pol. bureau

Situation of the KPD

sever connection (*with SED*) —
Tasks in consequence of split G[ermany]
because of sep. Western state other —
also because of split of the work[ers] movement other tasks —
Struggle for democracy
Help to KPD
Literature — 5
Paper — print shop — money
Nutrition
monthl. 180,000 W[estern]M[arks]
Subsidies Paper [Ztg.] 80-100,000
Instructors
in sm[all] secr[etariat] 1 man Dahlem
especially for the West
Party app[aratus]
Radio
send simple people into SPD
Fight too open — mask
discuss only with Reimann

whether companies from East to West
Econ. penal law
DWK [German Economic Commission] Oct.
Economic questions
Law against speculation
Law excl[usive] buying right of the state
in companies a[nd] stocks
Law not cult[ivated] land will be retracted
Law regarding agricultural workers situation
Contradictions between
Work[ers?] - Day [Arb.- Tag]
Agricultural work[ers] a[nd] large farmers [Großbauern]
Law mach. stations buy through the state
from VdgB [Association for Mutual Farmers' Help]
No dispossession, still too early
in SU 1925/27
Preliminary stage to collectivization
no people's democracy yet

do not move against groups of owners
only against individuals, when these sabotage [noun]
regulate through economic means
raw materials, fuel
Treaty instead of control
not direct interventions, but zig-zag —
opportunist policy
toward socialism — Why
Situation not equal
to VD [People's Democracies]
not uniform state yet
do not stand before power
Unity Peace
Lowering of prices Wage increases
Improve nutrition

Struggle too openly
cautious policy necessary
(Comparison Teutons)
Undermine LPD
Not boast of Plan, differentiate
How to gather the people around the party
Wholesale trade — question of the prices —
central state trade offices [staatl. Handelszentralen] correct
Delivery system elastic
Favor small farmers
little by little help from Moscow
Nationalize Machine stations
turn into pol. centers — as SU 1926/27
Purge agric. cooperat[ions]
Raw materials not through I.-H. [Industry - Trade] chamber
DWK
Treaties
Economic plan
Groceries
24,000 t fat raise by 20g [,] 600g month
Foodstuffs (grain, barley, peeled barely)
Raw materials — rolled products [Walzfabrikat], steel, sulfur
Nitrogen for fertilizer
Hungary sm[all] farmers

Prov[isional] German government
— when in the West gov[ernment] in Feb/March
leading people
German People's Chamber [Deutsche Volkskammer] chooses government
furthermore by People's Council [Volksrat], possibly people's congress

Elections not before spring 1950

People's Police

10,000 border

10,000 readiness } in barracks
furthermore 65,000
who have to be turned into officers
Academy in SU
Criminal police
pol. a[nd] mil. training

Prisoners of war

Party questions

Reorganization of the leadership

elect by party conference — upon recommendation PV [Parteivorstand]

Polbureau 7 a[nd] 2 candidates

sm[all] secr[etariat] 5 for routine work

Proposals control

Central secr[etariat] continues to exist — because according to statute

Party congress should decide

State pres[idium] [Landesvorst.]

sm[all] sekr[etariat]

Party control commission will be elected by PV

subordinate to it

have confirmed

Core [engeres] sekr[etariat] of the LV [State presidiums]

2 chairm.

P[rime] M[inister]

Unions

Internal } 7

Org.

Prop.

Questions regarding the candidates among the membership
in SU Dec. 1919 8th Party Congress

Principal decision at the party congress

Party of the New Type

(*security measures for admission*)

requires consolidation — guarantee

not jeopardized by influx

of those not sufficiently trained

Masses

event[ually] confirm only at party conference

Time — workers 1 year
farmers 2 years

intellectuals

2 recommendations

2 years

Influx into the party
warding off

preliminary stage

Candidate as something inferior

Quantity Quality

1 800, 000

Term

Source: Wilhelm Pieck: Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik 1945-1953, edited by Rolf Badstübner and Wilfried Loth, pp. 259-263 (ZPA [Central Party Archive] NL 36/695, pp. 42-47).

Translated by Ruud van Dijk, Dickinson College.

**Stenographic Record of a Speech by Comrade J. V. Stalin
at a Special Session of the Politburo, March 14, 1948**

In the February session of the Politburo, Comrade Molotov gave us a detailed report on the present international situation. In general, I agree with the conclusions he drew but I still have some objections concerning the estimated causes of the present world crisis. I already stated sometime ago that the world is divided into two camps: in the one camp are peoples possessing financial capital and exploiting the majority of the population on earth and in the other are peoples in the colonies and dependent countries being oppressed and exploited. Quite naturally, a developed capitalist country like America becomes the champion of the former camp while the Soviet Union arising from the principal theories of Marx and Lenin, becomes the leader of the latter. Since the purpose of the two camps is quite opposite, sooner or later, there will be conflict between them.

Now, exactly, this moment has come and, therefore, it is in vain to look for a way of reconciliation between the two hostile camps for the simple reason that their respective points of view are absolutely irreconcilable. If one of the camps does not capitulate to the other, armed conflict between them, sooner or later, will be absolutely inevitable. The innumerable conferences taking place in recent years indicated clearly to us that we cannot come to an agreement with the camp opposing us just as water and fire are unable to come to terms.

The present situation of a hostile yet peaceful world may still last for a long time but there will come a time when conflict, I repeat, will be inevitable. What then should we do, Comrades. The answer to this question is absolutely clear. We should, without respite, increase the power of our country militarily as well as economically and to be ready for any surprises. At the same time, we should energetically support the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed peoples of the dependent and colonial countries against the imperialism of America, England, and France. Now quite obviously, such a struggle is the only way for their liberation from oppression and exploitation, there being no other way out for them. Many colonial and dependent countries have already entered the path of national liberation movement which will bring about a world crisis of capitalism. But the victory of the working class in developed countries and the liberation of oppressed peoples from the yoke of imperialism are impossible without the instruction and consolidation of a common revolutionary front. There is already such a front although we are not satisfied with the results attained thus far and should exert all our efforts for its further development. In particular, we should give our special attention to Spain and South American countries.

With no exception, all the Governments of Central and South America only hold on by the bayonets of the several tens of thousands of their faithful soldiers and everyone of the Governments is like a real house of cards. They only need a strong wind to blow at them and they will be swept away and will vanish without a trace. In all these countries, we should have such power that when the time requires we could, with the assistance of the exploited masses, overthrow all those operatic dictators, help them to take power into their hands, and deprive the United States of necessary raw materials. This is quite a possible task for us, there is nothing utopian in it if we notice that in Central and South American countries, 70% of the population (in some cases even more) are downtrodden and exploited poor people with bitter hatred towards their oppressors. They only wait, we repeat, for the possibility we should give them if occasion demands. At present, it is necessary to intensify our propaganda there, and to completely organize all our forces.

The United States of America counts on the latter countries as her reliable strongholds and this is somewhat correct so far as the Governments of the South American Republics are concerned. As regards the working masses, we know reliably that they are only waiting for the possibility to start the relentless opposition against their oppressors. In Bogota, capital of Colombia, a conference of Pan-American countries will take place next month, and I absolutely believe that it cannot come to any positive result. The Ninth International Conference of American States met in Bogota from 30 March through 2 May 1948. The Charter of the Organization of the American States was signed during the Bogota conference on 30 April 1948. There is already so much contradiction among them, so much dissimilarity of interests and purposes, that the only similarity among them is their appetite. Under pleasing, flattering phrases will be hidden deep mutual distrust and the desire to take as much as possible and to give as little as possible. All will be concluded in magnificent phrases of mutual solidarity and common interests, while in a really dangerous moment, there will be such discord among them that they will become a liability and not an asset for the United States.

We should pay special attention to Brazil which possesses such an inexhaustible reserve of raw materials that the United States has good reason to count on her natural reservoir. The Communist party there is subject to strong persecution but this is only of service to it. In a struggle with the enemy, it receives a baptism of fire and can free itself from the opportunists, the weak-minded, and those who are simply dissatisfied with any regime. We want people who are able to sacrifice absolutely everything for the communist idea and when Brazilian communists will consist of only several hundred such persons, she can face the future cheerfully.

After Brazil, we should pay special attention to Venezuela. In that country, huge oil reserves are completely exploited by North American capitalists and, in case of war, the first thing we should do is prevent American industry from using Venezuelan oil. Since we already elaborated a detailed plan for this, I consider it unnecessary to repeat it to you now.

Regarding the Panama Canal, I suppose it should be quite indifferent to us since, in a future war, surface water fleets will lose all their significance and we have no reason to have any special interest in it. In case of its destruction, it will require a long time to restore it and this will only delay the economic development of the world after the war.

In Europe, we should be particularly interested in Spain. According to all the information we have, Franco's regime there will soon come to an end. Naturally, we could accelerate its fall, but I considered, and still consider that for the present time, this is premature. Comrade Zhdanov also discussed the reasons why it is disadvantageous for us now to undertake in that country any transformation and I agree with him entirely. We should limit ourselves now to fortifying our position and propaganda.

In Italy and France our position is so strong that we need not fear any election or any change of government. The United States government feared that the Italian Communist Party would win national elections scheduled for 18 April 1948 but the Communist-Socialist bloc received only 30% of the vote. Stalin's comments here seem to confirm the Italian government's belief at the time that the Soviets had decided not to interfere in the elections. In time of necessity, the majority of the population of the country will be with us, notwithstanding all the contriving in selling themselves to the American capitalist bourgeoisie.

We are not afraid of England or the small European countries. They follow America out of necessity, and yield to her through fear cast to them by adroit propaganda. We have already spoken enough of that. We have already worked out our active plans and it now rests for us to follow them.

The most important of our trump cards is, and should always be, Asia. Millions of masses enslaved in the current century are already awakened and regardless of how scheming the colonial imperialists may be, they cannot deny them the desire to become free and to live an independent life. All colonial empires have already come to an end, their complete collapse is only a question of the near future. We have already exerted great efforts to accelerate the emancipation of Asiatic peoples, although I think henceforth we should increase tenfold our work in this direction. The example of China's liberation movement is enlightening to us and becomes for us a model of future work. In spite of the tremendous aid rendered by America to Kuomintang China, the whole of China is trembling under the powerful blow of the victorious communist army. Chinese reactionaries have suffered defeat after defeat. Awakened by the prospect of a new life, the Chinese people without any charity are dealing a blow to the oppressors who sell themselves to foreign capital. The People's Army successively liberates new towns and new regions. Through suffering and struggle, they are creating a new, anti-imperialistic, democratic China. Our part is to use every possible means to help our Chinese comrades until they can definitely save themselves from all their enemies, be friendly with the Soviet Union, and begin a new, happy life.

The next stage for us should be India. Now, she gained freedom from England, but such freedom appears to be only a myth. Here is millions of working masses who cannot and do not wish to live in the old way. They understand that the real meaning of the running intrigues of the imperialists is to stir up with new sauce in order to extend their domination in Asia. The anti-imperialist struggle is taking in a wider range of people. We will help them to win and to enjoy equal rights in the family of free peoples.

In general, in the whole of Asia, we firmly and unbendingly conduct our plan worked out last year and I can boldly say that it has had very great success. But, the successes sometimes have their shady sides. They give birth sometimes to dangers which if given certain developments may cause the whole thing to unravel. There are those who are too proud of the success. There is a danger that someone from our comrades dazzled by the success forgets entirely about himself and boasts in such songs as "the world is now at our knees" and "we can do whatever we like." No, Comrades, with success already gained we should work even more energetically and harder, for in general, perfection in this world does not exist.

Together with our work in the world we should not forget the work inside the Soviet Union. The restoration of the people's economy is going forward without stopping although there still are some defects in some places. Our duty is to remove them in the shortest period, nor to stop in front of any obstacles or any personalities with their past merits. We should, from the root, tear out those with obsolete spirit and those who hinder our going ahead.

The development of our heavy and light industries is progressing with continuous success. We have reason to believe that our last Five-Year Plan will virtually be finished in four years.

As always, we should pay special attention to the development of the Soviet Army and Navy. Their present condition in comparison with the American and English Armies, about which we have absolutely correct information, I can definitely say that only in one

respect are we inferior, that of surface water fleet, whilst in all other respects, we are far superior. In spite of all the intrigues of America and in spite of the colossal budget she has undertaken for the Army and Navy, they cannot catch up with us. On the contrary, as time goes on, the greater increase will be in our favor in relation to the Anglo-American armed forces. We do not wish for war, but we are not afraid of it.

From now on, we will do all that is possible so as to prevent mankind from a new catastrophe, but if the imperialists want that, it cannot be helped and it will be the worst for them.

I cannot be silent about the indeed pitiful role played by the "United Nations" organization. Even the dead Geneva "League of Nations" acted with greater dignity and independence. The present "United Nations" is none other than a gathering of marionettes, who obey, by raising up hands, the command of their master--American imperialism. Often they act against their own national or economic interests, just to please the almighty egg [*ugodit vsesilnoi yaitso*], and, therefore, we have nothing to do with such company.

Take, for example, the Marshall Plan. From the economic viewpoint, it is no more than an even worse version of the war-time plan of "export or unemployment" already put forward in the United States. It is an attempt to transfer to other countries the catastrophe which threatens the American economy. Wall Street monopolists hope to attain this aim by selling to countries in the European continent what is not needed in their economic restoration. They export there not machine equipment and important industrial raw materials but finished goods. These imported finished products threaten to suffocate the important branches of the industries of Western countries and to doom the working class to chronic unemployment. Thus, no wonder that many European countries from the very beginning refused to take part in the Marshall Plan. Governments of these countries realized the serious danger to the independence and sovereignty of their nation with the so-called "American aid." In spite of the efforts the imperialists made to deceive the people and to break their resistance, the opposition against the insidious, scheming Wall Street grows irrepressibly. The working class cannot reconcile themselves with selling their fatherland to American imperialism. They rejected the Marshall Plan to enslave their country. We should defeat this plan and do so in the interest of the workers of the world.

There is a great difference between the Soviet Union in comparison with a group of countries who hold out greedy hands to American. We do not need anyone's help, as we only hope for our own strength. We attain eminent success because we have a correct leading line of the party and we are able to organize the masses in carrying out this line. Look at other countries. How many can be found with the ruling party having a correct line and carrying it out? Actually, there are no such parties now in the world, for all of them live without prospect, confused by chaotic crises and being unable to find out the means to get out from the quagmire. Only our party knows how to manage the situation and push ahead toward success. It has been a hundred years since Marxism has come on the stage. In this period, tens and hundreds of bourgeois governments attempted to destroy Marxism. And what of it? Bourgeois governments passed away while Marxism remains. And, comrades, we are obliged to work and struggle under the banners of Marx, Engels, and Lenin for our success. From this follows the conclusion: Be faithful, to the end, to the great banners of Marx, Lenin, and Engels. Be faithful, to the end, to the cause of the brotherly, united proletarians in all countries.

(Stormy applause and Greetings to Comrade Stalin.)

Source: Brian Murray, "Stalin, the Cold War, and the Division of China: A Multi-Archival Mystery, Cold War International History Project Working Paper, no. 12, pp. 18-22 (ROC-MFA 105.11/61.15).

**Stalin's Meeting with Kim Il Sung,
Moscow, 5 March 1949**

5 March 1949. Notes of the conversation between Stalin and a governmental delegation from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea headed by Kim Il Sung. The meeting began at 8:00 p.m. Present were A.Ia. Vyshinsky, T.F. Shtykov, Kim I.M. (Translator). On the Korean side: Pak Hon-yong, Hong Myong-hui, Chong Chun-taek, Chang Shi-u, Paek Nam Un, Kim Chong-ju, the Korean ambassador to the USSR Chu Yong-ha, Mun Il (Translator).

Stalin asks the members of the delegation how their trip was, was it difficult on the journey?

Kim Il Sung thanks the Soviet Government for its attention to them and says that they arrived safely.

Stalin asks how they travelled—by railroad or by air.

Kim Il Sung answers that they came by railroad.

Stalin asks whether they became ill on the way.

Kim Il Sung answers that they were healthy.

Stalin suggests that they proceed to business and asks what will be the questions.

Kim Il Sung says that after the liberation of Korea by Soviet troops, the Soviet Government and the Soviet Army rendered aid to Korea in the matter of economic development, in the matter of the development of Korea along the democratic path, and that the Korean government understands that without further economic and cultural aid from the Soviet Union it will be difficult for the DPRK to restore and develop its national economy and culture. The assistance of the Soviet Union is required for the further development of the Korean economy and culture.

Stalin asks what kind of aid.

Kim Il Sung answers—economic and cultural.

Stalin asks what precisely is needed.

Kim Il Sung says that they have confirmed a two year plan for the restoration and development of the national economy. They need economic assistance to fulfill this plan and to strengthen the foundation of the economy. They need machines, equipment and spare parts for industry, communications, transport and also for other branches of the national economy. They also need technical assistance: sending Soviet specialists to Korea, drafting plans for the construction of new objects (factories and plants), conducting geological exploratory work.

Stalin asks what kind of objects?

Kim answers, e.g., irrigation structures [at] Anju, the construction of which they have now moved toward, but they do not have enough specialists, and also the restoration and completion of the Seisin metallurgical plant, repair of the Sufun hydroelectric plant and others.

Stalin asks if there is iron ore in Korea.

Kim answers that there is very much iron ore in Korea.

Stalin says that it is possible to render this assistance, and it is also possible to provide specialists.

Kim indicates that until now trade between the two countries has been conducted successfully, but in the future, for the fulfillment of the two year plan, they need to import from the Soviet Union equipment, steam engines, electric locomotives, spare parts and equipment for the textile industry. But exports from Korea will not cover the imports, therefore they need credit from the Soviet government.

Stalin says "Fine" and asks in what amount they need credit.

Kim answers from 40 to 50 million American dollars.

Stalin—fine, what else?

Kim Il Sung answers that for convenient transport and for strengthening the economic ties between our countries it is necessary to build a railroad from Aoji to Kraskino.

Stalin asks where this is and how many kilometers is the distance of this railroad.

Shtykov reports that this railroad should be built from the station at Kraskino (Soviet territory) to the station at Aoji (Korean territory) for a total distance of 58 km, of which 10 km is on the territory of Korea and 48 km is on the territory of the USSR.

Stalin says that we will think about it and asks if there are some more questions.

Kim Il Sung indicates the necessity of establishing air communications between Korea and USSR and says that they do not yet have their own transport planes and no pilots, but an air link is needed.

Stalin asks aren't there Russian planes in Korea.

Kim answers that after the withdrawal of Soviet troops Soviet aviation units and planes were not left in Korea. He indicates that they now have begun the preparation of their own pilots.

Stalin asks if they have their own planes.

Shtykov reports that they have their own training aviation regiment and they have training and military planes, but they do not have transport planes.

Stalin asks how many planes they have.

Shtykov answers that they have 48 military and 19 training planes.

Stalin indicates that we now have fewer planes in a regiment, that we have lowered the number of planes in a regiment and asks what other questions they have.

Kim Il Sung indicates the necessity of cultural ties with the USSR. It is hoped, for example, that Soviet teachers could be sent to Korea for work in Korean institutions of higher education, that Korean students could be sent to the Soviet Union for study, that Korean specialists could be sent to the USSR for practical work in production technology, that teaching programs and literature for institutions of higher education and technical schools could be sent to Korea and that there be exchanges of cultural and artistic figures.

Stalin asks if there is an agreement with the Soviet Union on these questions.

Kim indicates that earlier there was such an agreement. Now, after the formation of the government, there is no such agreement.

Stalin indicates that it is possible to do this, but [sending] specialists and students will be difficult, since they do not know the language.

Kim Il Sung says that instruction in Russian language has been organized in all schools and institutions of higher education in Korea. It is necessary to send teachers to Korea from the Soviet Union.

Stalin says that it will be difficult for them because of not knowing the Korean language.

Kim Il Sung indicates that there is not a sufficient number of qualified teachers in Korea, that Soviet teachers are already working in Korea and that they have translators, through whom it is possible to conduct pedagogical work.

Stalin answers that it is possible to send teachers.

Kim says that it is necessary to conclude an agreement on all the above-indicated questions, specifically about economic cooperation and the broadening of trade, a trade agreement, an agreement about technical assistance from the Soviet Union and about cultural ties.

Stalin asks if Kim has thought about credit or a loan.

Kim answers that he has thought about it and that they want to receive credit.

Stalin answers that it is possible to do that and asks for what period they wish to receive credit.

Kim answers that if credit will be given in the amount of 50 million dollars, then it will be paid back from 1951 until 1954.

Stalin asks when will credit be paid.

Kim answers that [it will be paid] beginning with 1951 to 1954.

Stalin asks how they want to receive credit, at one time or in installments over the course of 1949, 1950, 1951.

Kim answers that they wish to receive credit in 1949. If this is not possible for some reason, then in the course of 1949 and the first half of 1950.

Stalin indicates that we cannot do this. You need machines, but machines must be ordered and manufactured. This requires time.

Kim indicates that they need automobiles, steam engines, equipment for the textile industry, and oil, and that it is hoped that they would receive this during this year.

Stalin answers that in one year it is not possible to do this and asks in what currency they wish to receive credit.

Kim answers in American dollars.

Stalin answers that we do not now calculate in dollars but we calculate in rubles and indicated that soon one dollar will equal 5 rubles. Stalin proposed to present equipment and machines in credit in the course of three years in equal portions and indicated that during these three years they will not pay credit, but in the course of the following three years they must produce payment, also in equal portions. For example: credit is given in 1949, 1950, 1951, and perhaps 1952, and payment of credit will begin from the fourth year in equal portions. In such a way, credit will be given out over 6 years. We render assistance to the countries of the peoples' democracies according to these principles. We take the following percentages for the credit received: 2% yearly, if the state has recovered [from the war], and 1% if the state has still not recovered. Moreover, close trade in goods between the countries will be continued without credit. This order will be established by agreement. Stalin asked if they have any people who can begin work on drafting these agreements.

Kim answers that they have such people.

Stalin indicates that we can give credit in the sum of 200 million rubles, i.e. 40 million dollars. We would give more, but now we are not able.

Kim says that they agree.

Stalin asks if they have any automobiles.

Kim answers that they do not have their own cars, they would like to acquire them in the Soviet Union.

Stalin says that it is possible to provide cars. It is possible also to provide planes.

Shtykov says that the Korean Government wants to receive not only planes, but also to have a joint share aviation society and to build a railroad.

Stalin answers that it is possible to do this. As concerns the construction of the railroad, we will review this question, but there is not a sufficient work force in the Soviet Union for the construction of a railroad, and asks if they have a work force among Koreans.

Kim answers that they do have a work force among Koreans.

Kim says that in the south of Korea there are still American troops and that intrigues against North Korea by the reactionaries are increasing, that they have infantry troops but sea defense almost does not exist. The help of the Soviet Union is needed in this.

Stalin asks how many American troops are in South Korea.

Kim answers that there are up to 20,000 men.

Shtykov—approximately 15-20 thousand men.

Stalin asks if there is a national Korean army in the south.

Kim answers that there is, the number is around 60,000 men.

Stalin asks if this number includes only regular army or also police.

Kim answers that it includes only regular army.

Stalin (joking) asks, and you are afraid of them?

Kim—No, we are not afraid, but we would like to have naval units.

Stalin asks which army is stronger—north or south.

Pak Hon-yong answers that the northern army is stronger.

Stalin asks if there are dry docks in Korea left by the Japanese, for example, in Seisin or in other places of Korea.

Kim answers that there are none.

Shtykov reports that there are dry docks, but only small ones.

Stalin says that it is possible to render assistance in this, and that Korea needs to have military planes.

Stalin asks are they penetrating into the South Korean army, do they have their own people there?

Pak Hon-yong answers that they are penetrating, but so far they are not revealing themselves there.

Stalin says that this is correct, that it is not necessary to reveal themselves now and indicates that the southerners also, apparently, are sending their people into the army of the north and that they need [to exercise] caution.

Stalin asks what has happened along the 38th parallel. Is it true that several points have fallen to the southerners and have been seized, and then these points were taken back?

Kim answers that they are taking into account that the southerners can send their own people into the [North Korean] army, and that they are taking the necessary measures. Kim reported that there was a clash with the southerners in Kangwon province at the 38th parallel. Their police were not sufficiently armed at that time. When regular units approached, the southerners retreated.

Stalin asks—did they drive away the southerners or did they leave themselves.

Kim answers that as a result of the battle they drove away the southerners, threw them across the border of the country.

Stalin asks if they have a military school.

Kim answers that they do.

Stalin asks if there is a pilot school.

Shtykov reports that they have a training-military aviation regiment.

Stalin remembers that the last time two came to Moscow, and asks, appealing to Pak Hon-yong, if he was the second.

Pak Hon-yong confirms this.

Stalin says that Kim and Pak have both filled out and that it is difficult to recognize them now.

Kim says that they have a military school, but no military academy and that among the officer corps of the Korean army there is no one who has completed a military academy. He asks permission to send Korean officers to the Military Academy of the USSR for training.

Stalin asks wasn't there such permission.

Kim answers that there was not.

Stalin says that it is possible to permit it.

Kim says that they do not have any more questions.

Chong Chun-taek asks if it will be possible to send Soviet specialists to Korea and Korean specialists for practical training in production technology to the USSR.

Stalin answers that they have already spoken on that question. Soviet specialists may be sent to Korea and Korean specialists may be received in the USSR.

Stalin asks where the Koreans get cotton.

Kim answers that they want to receive cotton from the Soviet Union. Last year they received already 3,000 tons.

Stalin says, joking, that we ourselves want to receive cotton from Korea.

Stalin asks if they have trade relations with other countries: with Japan, China, Philippines.

Kim answers that they have such relations with China, but China is at war and therefore they cannot conduct regular trade [with China].

Stalin asks—and what about with other countries?

Kim answers that they have not traded with other countries. They conduct trade with Hong Kong, but unofficially and on a case by case basis.

Stalin asks aren't there trading societies among them of their own traders.

Kim Il Sung answers that such a society exists. This society conducts trade in the main with Hong Kong, with the city of Dalny²³ and with China.

Stalin says that it is necessary to have such a society, there is nothing wrong with it. The national bourgeoisie exists; among the bourgeoisie there are, apparently, also good people, it is necessary to help them. Let them trade and deliver goods, there is nothing bad in this. I do not have questions.

Stalin, turning to Vyshinsky, asks if he has questions.

Vyshinsky answers that he doesn't have any.

Hong Myong-hui thanks Comrade Stalin for the reception.

Stalin in his turn thanks the delegation for coming and for the conversation. The conversation lasted for an hour and 15 minutes. Shtykov and translator Kim I.M. took notes.

Source: Kathryn Weathersby, "To Attack, or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1-9 (AVPRF, f. 059a, op. 5a, d. 3, p. 11, l. 10-20).

Translation by Kathryn Weathersby.

**Record of I. V. Stalin's Conversation with E. Hoxha
concerning Albanian-Yugoslavian Relations and
the Foreign and Domestic Policy of Albania**

Moscow

March 23, 1949
22 hours, 00 minutes
SECRET

Present from the Soviet side: A. Ya. Vyshinsky, USSR Envoy to Albania D. S. Chuvakhin, and V. I. Erofeev (interpreter).

Form the Albanian side: Chairman of the State Planning Commission of Albania Spiro Koleka and Albanian Envoy to the USSR M. Prifti.

After the exchange of mutual greetings, Comrade Stalin asks if the Albanian delegation had a good trip.

Hoxha responds that the Albanian delegation had a very good trip.

Hoxha says that first of all, he was instructed to express the deepest feelings of love and gratitude on behalf of the party and the Albanians for everything, which has been done and is being done for Albania, to Comrade Stalin.

Comrade Stalin thanks him. Comrade Stalin asks if everything that was promised has been delivered to Albania.

Hoxha responds affirmatively.

Comrade Stalin says that it is good that the Soviet people took the Italian battleship and brought it back.¹¹⁹ The ship was brought back intact. The cruiser, however, was steered by the Italians. They damaged it in the Black Sea before they released it to the Soviet Union. Comrade Stalin notes that the Italians acted as bad guys in this situation.

Hoxha says that this is what always happens with the Italians.

Comrade Stalin asks what questions does Hoxha have.

Hoxha responds that first of all, he would like to describe the situation, which developed in the country and in the party, and then turn to the presentation of several requests of economic order; and also he would like to tell Comrade Stalin about the Albanian army and its needs. Beside that, he would like to raise several questions, on which the Albanian comrades would like to get explanations from Comrade Stalin. In conclusion, Hoxha would like to give a brief description of the situation on the Albanian borders.

Comrade Stalin notes that Hoxha is not constrained by anything and may raise any questions he wants.

Hoxha says that the letters of the Bolshevik party, which were sent to the Central Committee of the Yugoslavian Communist Party, and the resolution of the Informbureau saved Albania from an imminent catastrophe.

Comrade Stalin asked, what would that catastrophe manifest itself.

¹¹⁹ Stalin refers to battleship "Julio Cesare" (Julius Caesar), received by the Soviet Union as part of the reparation payments from Italy. In the USSR it was renamed "Novorossiisk." It exploded in Yeisk Bay (Near Sevastopol) on October 29, 1955.

Hoxha responds that the Yugoslav nationalists pursued certain goals directed against the Soviet Union, against the democratic and anti-imperialist camp, and against Albania itself.

Comrade Stalin adds: "And against the Muslims".

Hoxha agrees with that. Hoxha states that the Yugoslav nationalists, belonging to the Tito's group, conducted their subversive activity in Albania beginning from the moment of the country's liberation. The Albanian communists could not but see that the economic and other relations between Albania and Yugoslavia were developing poorly. However, the revolutionary alertness of the Albanian party turned out to be insufficiently sharp. The biggest responsibility for this lies with him, Envar Hoxha. The fact that the Albanians, already during the War, used to believe in friendly relations with the Yugoslavs, also played a certain role. All these factors taken together led to the situation, where the Albanian leaders did not notice that, as the folk saying goes, the fish rotted from its head. The Yugoslav trotskists were engaged in all kinds of intrigues inside the Albanian party, trying to lead it to a split. In their subversive activity, they relied on support of their proponents Kochi Dzodze, Pandi Kristo and others.¹²⁰

Comrade Stalin asks whether the named people are Slavs.

Hoxha responds affirmatively, pointing out that Kochi Dzodze is a native of Macedonia, and Pandi Kristo is from Korchi.¹²¹

Comrade Stalin asks, what religion do those people belong to.

Hoxha responds that they are Orthodox.

Hoxha states that the letters of the CC VKP(b) exposed the hostile position of the Yugoslav trotskists. If they had not received those letters, then honest Albanian Communists would have to return to the mountains sooner or later, in order to start new struggle once again. Analyzing its work, the Albanian party came to a conclusion that everything mentioned in the letters of the CC VKP(b) really was entirely relevant, with the exception of the fact that the Albanian Communists never lost their feeling of love and loyalty to the Soviet people, the Bolshevik party, and Comrade Stalin.

Comrade Stalin says that not all issues were covered in those letters, because we did not know everything at that time. It was only later that we learned, for example, that when the Yugoslavs wanted to send their division to Albania, they had a completely different goal from that, which they stated, not the goal to defend Albania from the Greek aggression, but to overthrow the regime, which existed in Albania. We learned about it later. Comrade Stalin says that not only the Albanians were not alert enough, but we did not understand everything either.

Hoxha says that the Albanians had close ties with the Yugoslavs, and they should have been able to figure their behavior our first. Hoxha adds that when he found out about the Yugoslavs' intention to send their division to Albania, he thought that the Yugoslavs had coordinated this issue with the Soviet government.

Comrade Stalin responds that the Yugoslavs were preparing to send that division in secret from us, but it is quite possible that to the Albanians they made it sound like that was

¹²⁰ For more detail see: Volume I, Document no. 302, 305.

¹²¹ In E. Hoxha's book With Stalin. Memoirs (Tirana, 1984) only Christo Temelko, mentioned below, is identified as a Macedonian, i. e. a Slav. In the Soviet version of the record of conversation all Orthodox Albanians are identified as Slavs.

done with the USSR consent. We learned about the Yugoslavs' intentions only accidentally from Hoxha information. When we criticized the Yugoslavs, they apologized, and said that it was a mistake.

Comrade Stalin asks what percentage of non-Albanians are there in the national population of Albania.

Hoxha responds that there are the Greeks and the Jews in Albania, but few of them. Besides, there are 5 to 6 thousand Macedonians in Albania. They live on the Southern border of Albania.

Comrade Stalin asks if there are many Albanians in Yugoslavia.

Hoxha responds that approximately 1 million Albanians live in Yugoslavia.

Comrade Stalin asks, what religion do those Albanians belong to.

Hoxha responds that those are primarily Muslims, and partially Catholics from the Northern regions of Albania.

Comrade Stalin asks if there are many Orthodox Christians in Albania, and also individuals of other denominations than Islam.

Hoxha responds that there are 30 to 35% Orthodox Christians in Albania, and 10 to 15 % Catholics. Catholics live mainly in the Northern part of the country, Orthodox Christians -- in the central regions, and partly in the Southern regions, and the Muslims-- mostly in the South.

Comrade Stalin asks, what language do the Orthodox and the Catholics speak in Albania.

Hoxha responds that all of them speak Albanian.

Hoxha states that after the letters of the Bolshevik party and the resolution of the Informbureau, the Albanian Communists undertook decisive measures against the Yugoslavian nationalism, both within the party, and in the economic life. It was difficult to immediately undertake a full analysis of this situation in the party and in the country. It could be explained by the fact that one of the main proponents of the Yugoslav trotskists Kochi Dzedze staged a strong resistance and concealed many things from the party. Considerable time was needed in order to establish what substantial work for sabotage of the economy, and what subversive activities inside the party were undertaken by the Yugoslav trotskists and their stooges in Albania. The country came to the party Congress already having some realization about the activities of the Yugoslav trotskists in Albania, and their subversive actions inside the party. Many serious mistakes were made in the party, but the intra-party democracy almost did not exist. The organizational structure of the party, which was fully copied from the Yugoslav model, was faulty. The party lived under the complete control of the security organs. Laws and instructions on economic issues in the country were not implemented. The reaction to the treason of the Toto clique was very strong in Albania. The struggle against the Yugoslav trotskists and their supporters got out of the party boundaries, and all the people were united in this struggle around the party. Hoxha notes that the feelings of the Albanian people to the Yugoslav people did not suffer from all of this. The party took care of that.

The party Congress showed that in the struggle with the Yugoslav trotskists, the party cured itself, and became even stronger. Congress also showed that the party, even though it is a young party, possessed great power and energy for the struggle for the correct line. Sharp criticism of the activities of the pro-Yugoslav elements unfolded in front of all the Albanian people. The mistakes made by the party were admitted, and the ways to correct

those mistakes were determined. The party did not use repressive measures on a large scale, and acted in this respect very carefully, starting from the assumption that many comrades, who took the false way, believed that the line, which was suggested by the Yugoslavs, was correct. Therefore, the comrades, who admitted and criticized their mistakes, were given an opportunity to correct them. Only Kochi Dzodze, Pandi Kristo and three other people were arrested. Kristo Temelko¹²², one of the people who was mostly responsible for the implementation of the harmful Yugoslav line, and who repeatedly expressed his hostile attitude to the Soviet Union and the Soviet comrades working in Albania, was not arrested. Kristo Temelko presented all the facts related to his activity at the session, and sharply criticized his own behavior. His self-criticism was considered sufficiently honest and objective.

Comrade Stalin asks what position did Kristo Temelko have.

Hoxha responds that he was a General and had a position of the political leader of the army.

Comrade Stalin asks, where is Kristo Temelko now, and what is he doing.

Hoxha responds that he is now in Tirana, and that he was barred from his responsibilities, and currently is not doing anything.

Comrade Stalin asks, who is Kristo Temelko by nationality.

Hoxha responds that Kristo Temelko is a Slav. Hoxha adds that some time ago, the Albanian government asked the Soviet government to allow Kristo Temelko to come to Moscow to study in the Lenin's Military Academy.

Comrade Stalin asks, whether the Albanians received a response to that request.

Hoxha responds that initially the answer was positive, but then the issue was postponed.

Comrade Stalin asks if the Albanians want to get rid of Christo Temelko by sending him to Moscow.

Hoxha responds that they would like to send Kristo Temelko to the USSR to study, and hope that he would be able to rehabilitate himself.

Comrade Stalin asks, if the party trusts Kristo Temelko in the political sense.

Hoxha responds that the party continues to hope that Kristo Temelko would be able to improve, but he cannot give him its complete political trust now.

Comrade Stalin notes that the Albanians currently do not need Kristo Temelko.

Hoxha responds affirmatively.

Comrade Stalin states that the Albanians do not need Kristo Temelko, but we do not need him either. Comrade Stalin asks, whether the Albanians want to send Kristo Temelko to the USSR from the considerations of their own security.

Hoxha responds that Kristo Temelko always wanted to apply to study at the Military Academy of the USSR.

Comrade Stalin states that if the Albanian comrades want, we will accept Kristo Temelko in the USSR.

Hoxha says that after the Congress, they took certain measures for cleaning the party. A number of comrades, who compromised themselves by their connections with the Yugoslav trotskists, were removed from the leadership positions in the party and in the army.

¹²² Christo Temelko was one of the closest supporters of E. Hoxha in the years of the national liberation struggle, member of the organizational Congress to found the CPA, who later joined the first CC CPA.

They undertook measures designed to improve the intra-party democracy, renounced all decrees and instructions made under the Yugoslavian influence. They elected the Central Committee at the Congress, which was supplemented by young loyal comrades. Apart from that, they took measures in regard to the Ministry of the Interior, which permitted exaggerations and incorrect actions, and committed many dirty deeds. Fresh forces were added to that Ministry. Currently they are holding elections to the primary party organizations in the cities and in the entire country, and also to the regional party committees. As a result of these elections, time-tested and loyal comrades are coming to the leadership of local party organizations in the cities. Soviet comrades working in Albania provided very significant assistance in correcting the mistakes committed in the country's economy.

Hoxha notes that the events that had transpired, had certain negative influence on the situation inside the party. In a number of party organizations, one can observe the weakening of the discipline. Anarchic inclinations emerged among the weak elements. Moreover, at the present moment, when the class struggle became intense, the opportunistic moods of some party members became more pronounced. Hoxha says that in the period when the party was engaged in the work for fighting the Yugoslav nationalism and its proponents inside the party, it somewhat retreated on the issue fighting against the village bourgeois elements. That retreat was made with the goal not to complicate the situation in the party. However, that led to the situation that as a result of village bourgeoisie actions, government could not get the sufficient amount of bread and corn in the village. The country faces serious economic difficulties. Another cause of those difficulties was that when the Yugoslavs were preparing the attempt against Albania, they did not give Albania anything in 8 months. The Albanian market plunged into an economic chaos. Peasants stopped selling their goods on the market, which sharply increased the prices. Only the assistance from the Soviet Union gave them an opportunity to start working to improve the present situation. Hoxha states that in spite of all these difficulties, the Albanian people give their full trust to their state leadership. The Albanian people suffered a lot, they experienced many troubles and they are not afraid of difficulties.

Comrade Stalin notes that it seems that the Albanians are creating collective farms.

Hoxha responds that they decided at the Congress to start creating collective farms, but not to rush with this.

Comrade Stalin says that Albanian comrades should not rush with creating collective farms. Albania is a backward country, it is also a mountain country. Even in the Soviet Union, there are no collective farms in the mountain regions. Therefore, they should not create collective farms yet in Albania. If the peasants do not have fertilizers, life stock, and technology, the state can come to their assistance. For this, it is necessary that the state has its own tractor and technology stations, so that if the peasants would want to get assistance in form of machines, then the state will be able to plough up the peasants' land with the help of those machines, and during the harvest they would help the peasants to thresh the bread. In return for this assistance, the state can take some payment in products from the peasants. How the peasants divide the bread and the corn between themselves -- this is not the state's business. The state will receive the payment in products. The state should have its own economy with tractors, threshing machines, and other machines in order to provide assistance to the peasants, if they ask for this assistance. This is not like collective farms, but at the same time, it gives peasants an opportunity to examine the technology and to realize its

importance. We called it machine-rental stations some time ago. Peasants could rent machines, which they had to return back to the state. You should do the same in Albania. As far as the distribution of harvest is concern, then those peasants, who have more land will get more, and those peasants who have less land will get less. It is not a struggle against the village bourgeoisie, but it will teach the less affluent peasants to work together.

Comrade Stalin asks if Albania has national commercial bourgeoisie.

Hoxha responds that Albania has national trade bourgeoisie, but it does not have factories or shops, or houses. Everything was expropriated¹²³.

Comrade Stalin says that this is not good. National bourgeoisie could help to produce some goods and engage in some sort of trade, while the state is getting stronger, especially if there are elements, who value freedom and independence of Albania among that national trade bourgeoisie. Such patriotic elements among the bourgeoisie should be used, not rejected. Comrade Stalin says that he can give an example from the practice of Northern China. There are some elements among the Chinese bourgeoisie, among petty and midsize factory owners and midsize trade bourgeoisie, who support the Communists. We recommended to the Chinese Communists not to reject those elements. That national patriotic part of the bourgeoisie believes that only Communists can protect the independence and freedom of China, and that all other parties are bankrupt. Therefore, they established contacts with the Communists. That part of the national bourgeoisie distanced itself from Chiang Kai-shek, because they saw that Chiang Kai-shek's party was not capable of standing up for a united and independent China, because they realized that only Communists would continue their fight for such a China. And the bourgeoisie is genuinely helping the Communists. As is well known, China is divided into two parts -- the Northern and Southern China. Some trade societies in the North of China supply Southern goods, including even American goods, to the Chinese Communists. To the question, why they are doing it, and why they are sacrificing their money, they responded that they did not see anybody, who would be able to stand up for the Chinese independence against Japan and America, except for the Communists.

Lenin had always believed that if a revolution had an anti-imperialist character, a character of defending the independence of a county, which was threatened, then Communists can have some cooperation with the national bourgeoisie. Such cooperation is permitted at a certain stage in the first period. The Albanian comrades should remember this Lenin's recommendation.

In the countries of people's democracy, the national bourgeoisie has embarrassed itself by its connections with the German and Italian occupants. Therefore, when the Russian troops entered those countries, the bourgeoisie retreated with the Germans. In the Albanian territory, there were no Yugoslav or Soviet troops. Therefore, some elements of the national bourgeoisie stayed in the country--if the Albanians comrades did not kill all of them. We should not push away that bourgeoisie, which stands up for the national independence of the country, and which can help us. The same refers to some elements among the intelligentsia, which do not agree with the Communists, but see that only Communists can defend the independence of their country. We should not push them away either.

¹²³ The private sector in the industry and commerce was practically abolished by the series of decrees issued by the Interim Democratic Government in January 1945.

The Russian Bolsheviks did not follow that policy. Nobody occupied Russia at the moment of revolution and nobody threatened it, if you do not take the war with Germany into account. The Russian revolution, therefore, did not have an anti-imperialist character, its focus was inside the country. Therefore, there is a difference between what was happening in Russia, and what is happening now in China, Korea or other countries. Because Russia did not experience an immediate external threat, the Russian national bourgeoisie was an irreconcilable enemy of the revolution. The struggle with the bourgeoisie dragged on for several years. The Russian bourgeoisie was not patriotic. It appealed to the French and the British for help, appealed for an intervention. The Albanian comrades should not copy what happened in Russia or in other countries in their policy. They should take local features into account.

If there are petty capitalists, who open small enterprises, shops or craft shops in Albania, you should give them licenses, levy taxes, but give them an opportunity to engage in trade and industrial activity, as long as the Albanian economy is not completely improved. When that happens, we would have a different situation, and then we will raise the question of the bourgeoisie once again.

Comrade Stalin asks how many people have arrived as members of the Albanian delegation.

Hoxha responds that the Albanian delegation contains 8 members.

Comrade Stalin asks him to list the members of the delegation specifying their positions.

Hoxha responds that the Albanian governmental delegation includes him, Chairman of the State Planning Commission Spiro Koleka, Deputy of the Chairman of the State Planning Commission Kocho Teodosy, Deputy Minister of Trade Vasil Katy, Deputy Minister of Industry Djafer Spahiu, Deputy Minister of Public Works Shinazi Drogoty, Deputy Head of General Staff Colonel Nedjip Vinchani. Also, Albanian Trade representative in Moscow Teohar Fundo is included in the delegation. Hoxha adds that the Albanian government nominated Kocho Teodosy as their representative to the Council of Economic Cooperation.

Comrade Stalin asks, who is the commander of the Albanian Army.

Hoxha responds that he himself is the commander.

Comrade Stalin says that the Soviet people, as Bolsheviks, have the following principle of building the leading organs of the state: if the Muslims prevail in the country, then the majority of government members should also be Muslim. You cannot violate people's religion. People will not understand, why the state is not led by the Muslims, while the majority of the country's population is Muslim. These are elementary things, but they did not understand that in Yugoslavia. It does not mean that only Muslims should be in the government. We should select capable people from among the national minorities in order to keep the unity of the people intact. Participation in the government of the representatives of ethnic and religious minorities will ensure the stability of the government.

Comrade Stalin says that he would like to ask whether the Albanians have received the uniforms for the army from the USSR, about which the Head of the Albanian General Staff asked them some time ago.

Hoxha responds that so far, they did not receive any uniforms, but that as he has heard, they are on the way.

Comrade Stalin says that it was decided to send the uniforms.

Hoxha asks for a permission to turn to the economic issues, and says that they have developed a two-year plan of reconstructing the economy of the country. This plan presupposes, first of all, a creation of new industrial enterprises for production and for re-casting of textiles, cotton, sugar, lumber and other goods for the needs of Albania itself. Secondly, the plan puts emphasis on expanding the geological works and increasing the extraction of natural resources. They plan to build a petroleum pipeline Patos -- Valona¹²⁴, and an oil-refining plant with capacity of 150 thousand tons a year. The plan presupposes development and search of natural resources, such as cooper, chrome, and bitumen. According to the plan, they will build an electric power station to provide the textile complex with energy. In regard to the transportation, the plan includes improving the automobile transportation, and the continuation of building of the railroad Durazzo -- Elbasan. As far as the agriculture is concerned, according to the plan, they plan to increase the area of irrigated land by using new agricultural technologies. The plan does not presuppose increasing the production of agricultural machines, because the country has enough tractors, which it has received from the Soviet Union.

Comrade Stalin asks what railroad they plan to build.

Hoxha responds that they are building the railroad Durazzo -- Elbasan in Albania. Last year they finished the first part of that railroad Durazzo -- Beijing, 37 kilometers long. The two-year plan includes finishing the strip from Beijing to Elbasan, which is 30 kilometers long.

Comrade Stalin asks whether the Albanians received rails from the USSR.

Hoxha responds that the Albanians have received rails, railroad cars and other materials and equipment. Hoxha says that the two-year plan presupposes expanding the network of schools, and increasing the number of hospital beds. To implement the plan, Albania counts on the assistance from the Soviet Union in machines and equipment. On the other hand, Albania concluded trade treaties with the countries of people's democracy, and received credits from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Currently, the Albanian delegation is engaged in negotiations with Romania, after which it will go to Bulgaria.

Comrade Stalin responds that we will provide assistance as much as we can. Comrade Stalin also notes jokingly that we hope that the Albanians themselves will work too.

Hoxha says that the Albanians will put all their efforts in order to fulfill the plan. Hoxha states that Albania would like to ask for Soviet specialists, in particular to help in building the textile and sugar complexes.

Comrade Stalin responds that we will send our people, but that Albania should grow its own cadres. Our people will work in Albania temporarily, and then they will return to the Soviet Union. Albania should have permanent national cadres. This is most important.

Hoxha says that the Albanian government will do everything to follow this way. Hoxha states that the Albanian government asks Comrade Stalin to send a geological group to Albania, and also a group to analyze energy resources of Albania.

Comrade Stalin responds that this can be done. Comrade Stalin asks if Albania has coal.

¹²⁴ Here and below in the text, they use the Italian names of the Albanian cities: Valona instead of Vlora (or Vlera), Durazzo, instead of Durres, Skutari, instead of Skodra.

Hoxha responds that there is very little coal in Albania, small resources of coal could be found in the areas of Tirana and Korchi. Besides that, the Italians discovered a layer of coal in the very South of Albania.

Comrade Stalin asks, whether the railroads use coal or petroleum.

Hoxha responds that the railroads work on coal, but the coal in Albania is not of a good quality. Hoxha says that the organization of the leadership of the state security organs poses a serious problem for Albania now. In this connection, the Albanian government asks for a permission to send 20 officers for special courses to the USSR. After those officers finish the courses, the Albanian government would like to send 20 more officers. If that is impossible, then the Albanian government would ask to send several Soviet instructors to Albania, who could organize such courses in Albania itself.

Comrade Stalin responds that the officers, who would come to the Soviet Union for the special courses, would have to learn Russian first, and then go on to study their specialty. Therefore, it would be more effective if we send our instructors to Albania.

Hoxha says that Albania also needs two instructors for the Ministry of the Interior: one instructor for the police and another for criminal investigation.

Comrade Stalin says that we could send such instructors.

Hoxha asks, if the Albanian government can get written materials from the USSR on work and organization of the police organs.

Comrade Stalin responds that the Albanian government can get such materials.

Hoxha says that he would like to touch on one other very important for Albania issue. The problem is that the Albanian codes were developed on the basis of the Yugoslavian code. Therefore, the Yugoslavs have an opportunity to decode all the Albanian telegrams. The Albanian government asks to send a Soviet instructor, who would be able to help the Ministry of the Interior to work out a new code.

Comrade Stalin asks, whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs need such an instructor. Comrade Stalin asks, whether the Albanian Foreign Ministry uses a code.

Hoxha responds that the Albanian Foreign Ministry does use a code, but that that code is kept in the Ministry of the Interior. Hoxha says that the Albanian government asks to send them two radio direction finders with the necessary equipment, and the technicians. Hoxha adds that the Albanian organs of state security have established that there were several secret radio transmitters somewhere in Albania, one of which, in particular, was located somewhere in the region of Skutarty .

Comrade Stalin responds that radio direction finders could be sent. Comrade Stalin points out that comrade Vyshinsky will be in charge of preparing responses for the Albanian government delegation, and that he would consider all the requests. Hoxha can inform comrade Vyshinsky about all the issues that interest the Albanian government. Comrade Stalin repeats that we will help Albania.

Hoxha says that he would like to touch upon the Yugoslavian issue. The economic and political relations between Albania and Yugoslavia are broken.

Comrade Stalin asks, who broke those relations.

Hoxha responds that the relations were broken by Albania. Hoxha says that the Yugoslavs are engaged in extensive propaganda campaign against Albania, both from the territory of Yugoslavia itself and inside Albania, and they methodically create their agent network there. Moreover, the Yugoslavs carry out intensive propaganda along the northern borders of Albania, trying to induce the Albanian citizens to escape from Albania to

Yugoslavia. That propaganda had certain successes, and a significant number of peasants escaped from Northern Albania to Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs are trying to take the leadership of the gangs, acting in the mountain regions of Albania, in their own hands. The Yugoslav leaders are trying to unite and organize the reactionary elements inside Albania, so that they could use them in order to overthrow the regime existing in Albania now. Recently, they exposed a gang, which was led by the Yugoslavian mission, and on March 21 the bandits stood before the Albanian court.

Comrade Stalin asks if the Albanian ambassador was still in Yugoslavia, and if the diplomatic relations were preserved.

Hoxha responds affirmatively.

Hoxha says that the Albanians are not sitting with their hands crossed. They are developing their activity directed against the Yugoslavian trotskists, and support contacts with the Albanian minority living in Yugoslavia. On top of that, the Albanians organized the Yugoslav immigration, although they are very cautious about the Yugoslavs, because some of them are often Rankovich's people.

Comrade Stalin notes that Rankovich throws in his agents.

Hoxha says that in his opinion, the Tito clique will be wiped out as a result of the political struggle, which will grow into an armed guerilla movement.

Comrade Stalin says that he would not exclude that possibility.

Hoxha, turning to the Greek issue, says that the Albanian comrades would like to know Comrade Stalin's opinion on the issue of whether Albania feels an immediate threat from Greece, taking into account the constant provocations of the monarchy-fascist troops and all kinds of conversations about the division of Albania. The morale of the monarchy-fascist army in Greece is very low, in spite of the constant American assistance to the Greek Army. At the same time, the morale of the democratic army is very high. The Greek democratic army is currently well armed and equipped. Hoxha says that nonetheless, some moments in the Greek comrades' behavior create some doubts. In particular, he, Hoxha, believes that the Greek democratic army is separated from the people, because the monarchy-fascists evacuate the population from the regions, which were threatened by the democratic army, and the democratic army, in its turn, evacuates the population from the regions occupied by it to Albania.

Comrade Stalin explains that this is happening in the areas of combat.

Hoxha agrees with it.

Hoxha says that he thinks that the form of the leadership organization in the Greek government and in the democratic army is somewhat strange. From his conversation with Zahariadis and the Greek comrades, Hoxha had an impression that they are hiding the leading role of the party somewhat. There are no political commissars in the army. Zahariadis is still not the leader of the government, due to his modesty, which is not clear to Hoxha. Hoxha believes that this is all caused by the mistakes of the Markos time, and that on the issue of the political commissars you can see the reflection of former mistakes of the EAM and ELAS.

Comrade Stalin says that the Greek comrades do not emphasize the role of the Communist party, because they appealed to the democratic masses, and they want to show that all the people are fighting the war. This is the correct way. As far as the political commissars are concerned, the Soviet Army does not have them any more either. The

political commissars are not necessary, when the leadership of the party is in the hands of Communists themselves.

Comrade Stalin points out that all the conversations about the division of Albania are designed in order to scare the Albanians. As we know, the independence of Albania is guaranteed by the declaration of three powers -- America, Britain and the USSR. Of course, they can violate the declaration, but it is not all that easy. As far as the Tsaldaris Greeks are concerned, they are too weak on their feet in order to seriously talk about a division of Albania. If the Albanians behave properly—if they do not criticize imperialists too much, do not tease them, but behave modestly--nobody would touch Albania. Both, America and Britain, do not want Albania to belong to Italy, because that would strengthen Italy; they do not want Albania to belong to Greece, because it would strengthen Greece; they do not want Albania to belong to Yugoslavia either. More than that, America does not want Albania to belong to Britain. That is why they all stand for the preservation of the Albanian independence.

The conversation lasted 2 hours and 10 minutes.

Recorded by V. YEROFEEV

Certified Copy

Source: Vostochnaia Evropa, edited by G.P. Murashko, et al, vol. 2, pp. 44-57 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 249, l. 55-74).

Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.

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IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

My telegram No. 599. Interview with Stalin.

The Generalissimo received me last night at 10 p.m. (Moscow Time) in the Kremlin. I was accompanied by Mr. Harrison, with Mr. Hayward as interpreter. On the Russian side Vyshinsky was in attendance, with Pavlov as interpreter. Following is a verbatim record of conversation.

Sir. D. Kelly: "I am very glad to have this early opportunity of meeting you, Generalissimo Stalin, as I am aware how busy you are as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. I wish to pay my respects and not to discuss any specific issues, but would like to take the opportunity to tell you of the main lines of my general instructions.

I start from two fundamental points. First is the statement which you, Generalissimo, have made several times, that it is possible for our two countries with their respective systems, to exist side by side; that there is room in the world for both to exist without injuring each other's essential interests. It is quite clear that to achieve this there must be better understanding on each side of the other's interests and point of view, and it is my hope that I may be given all possible assistance at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to enable me to pass on to my Government the Soviet point of view. If I may give in return similar explanations of my Government's point of view, this exchange should really aid in the improvement of relations.

The second basic point is that Mr. Bevin has said over and over again that there is no possibility of aggression from our side; that we have no thought of endangering the Soviet Union. Mr. Bevin in this is, without doubt, speaking for the British Government and the British people as a whole; whenever suspicions arise about this, they can only be due to misunderstandings and it will always be my first duty to discuss them and try to find a way out. Besides these general assurances, our two countries have some very important common interests. One is the great reconstruction work in which we are both engaged. I know of the devastation created by the Germans in Russia and of the immense effort of reconstruction which is now bearing fruit in an improved standard of living. In our country we have had a million houses destroyed by bombing and we have financial and economic problems as well which we are making a great and united effort to overcome. We both can afford material help to each other. I am therefore very anxious to promote more trade relations

and, although contact is normally between the Board of Trade in London and the Trade Commissars in the Soviet Union, I shall always be glad to assist at any time when difficulties arise on which I can be of use.

Secondly, both our countries have suffered from two great wars with Germany and we are united in our determination never to allow Germany to attack either of us again. We deeply hope that the relief in the situation created by the Paris Conference will lead to further discussions and a final solution".

Stalin: "That is true. Unquestionably our two countries can co-exist, and develop without injuring each other's interests. Suspicions existing at the present time are somewhat preventing our relations from improving and being placed on a friendly footing. On this point the Ambassador is right. Suspicions on our part became stronger after the signing of the North Atlantic Pact. I hope it will prove to be purposeless. (His translator said "meaningless"). We have no intention of attacking anyone and it is not easy to provoke us. Therefore I am not frightened by the pact. In the long run our two countries will understand each other. As to the two points in common, I think in this respect also the Ambassador is right. These two points also induce us to understand each other. The Ambassador can count on my rendering him all possible assistance in improving relations between our two countries."

Sir D. Kelly: "If I might comment on the Generalissimo's remarks about the North Atlantic Pact, I would explain that we regard it as a stabilising factor designed to reassure the peoples in the Western countries. It is difficult to understand why it should cause suspicion when the Soviet Union has such close relations and alliances with neighboring countries. We raise no objection to them. The pact is indeed looser than the Soviet Union's relations with her neighbours. We regard the Pact as a stabilising factor as you regard your pacts with neighbouring countries".

Stalin: "All the same we Russians would not be prepared to conclude such a pact against Great Britain".

Sir D. Kelly: "It is not a pact against you any more than your alliances are directed against us".

Stalin: "Ours are all directed exclusively against Germany".

Sir D. Kelly: "I am afraid we do not see eye to eye on this question".

Stalin: "No. (After a pause). Why are there American forces in England? Are they too a stabilising factor?"

Sir D. Kelly: "We know the United States of America and do not believe they could be drawn into a war except in self-defence. It would not be possible to draw the American people into a war of aggression".

At this point Stalin took out his pipe sat back in his chair and asked me a number of personal questions: Whether this was my first visit to Moscow; whether I could speak Russian, etc. After a few moments exchange of conversation he asked whether there was any way in which he could be of service to me.

Sir D. Kelly: "May I amplify about exchanges of views. I have been sorry to see that so many of my predecessor's visits to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were concerned with personal matters affecting the Embassy. Mr. Bevin had spoken to Mr. Vyshinsky in Paris of the value of diplomatic preparation for conferences and I shall be very happy to have more general conversations from time to time on wider subjects so as to be able to keep Mr. Bevin informed of the point of view of the Soviet Government. As it is, conversations at the Ministry are apt to be confined to personal questions, such as relations of members of the staff with Russian ladies".

Stalin: (Laughing) "Such questions arise from boredom".

On this note the interview closed, having lasted exactly 25 minutes.

Stalin appeared to be in good health and shewed [sic] that he had been following the conversations closely by replying to my opening remarks without having taken notes and without a single glance at Vyshinsky. His manner was affable throughout and interview ended on a laugh.

As far as is known, this is the first interview of this kind that Stalin has accorded to a foreign Ambassador for several years.

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Source: Public Record Office.

Contributed by Jonathan Haslam.

**Record of I. V. Stalin's Conversation with V. Chervenkov,
P. Damyanov, and A. Yugov on the Issues
of Bulgaria's Internal Political Life¹²⁵**

Moscow

July 29, 1949
SECRET

Present: Comrades Malenkov, Bulganin, Vyshinsky.

Comrade Stalin asks about the situation in Bulgaria, and if their trip was difficult.

Chervenkov responds that it was somewhat bumpy. He asks for permission to present some questions, mainly from the party and state leadership. He informs Comrade Stalin that so far they elected the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and three Deputy Chairmen, all of them – members of the Politburo. They did not make any other changes, because they believed that it was inexpedient at this moment, and that it would be better to make necessary changes after the elections in November¹²⁶. He asks for advice, whether they did the right thing, or if it would be better to make changes now. At the same time, he says that Chervenkov, Yugov and Terpeshev were appointed Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers. They appointed three Deputies, mainly because of the large volume of work in the Council of Ministers, and because of Kolarov's illness, as a result of which he will not be able to begin his work in the next two months. Generally, he will not be able to work full time; so he will need a lot of assistance. He adds that Kolarov believes it expedient to make necessary changes after the elections. Kolarov also believes that he should keep the position of Foreign Minister for himself.

Comrade Stalin explains that such combination of two positions is incorrect, and that Kolarov is wrong in this case. Under such a combination of positions, a number of inconveniences emerge for the government, because the Prime Minister takes upon himself the responsibility for all current work of the Foreign Ministry, whereas the Prime Minister should be the super arbiter. He should have an opportunity to correct the Ministers. When you combine the positions, you cannot do that. Therefore, it would be better to separate the positions of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

As far as the question raised by Chervenkov, whether they should wait for the elections or not, in order to make the necessary changes in the composition of the government, it is better not to wait for them. It is better to relieve Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers from their other positions right now. In their capacity as Deputy Chairman they will monitor Ministries, but will not be Ministers themselves.

Chervenkov asks whether it would be expedient to divide the Ministry of the Interior into two Ministries – the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of State Security.

Comrade Stalin asks what are the functions of the Ministry of the Interior in Bulgaria.

¹²⁵ The letter has an attachment—a cover note saying the following: “To Comrade A. N. Poskrebyshev. Here are two copies of I. V. Stalin's conversation with Chervenkov, Yugov, and Damyanov recorded by myself. I am keeping one copy of the text. Record of the conversation was typed in three copies. A. Vyshinsky. August 3, 1949.” There is also a handwritten note on the document: “Recorded by A. Vyshinsky. Typ[ed] in three copies; 2 for Comrade Poscreb[yshev], 1 to the files.”

¹²⁶ He refers to the elections to the First People's Congress, which took place on December 18, 1949.

Chervenkov gives an explanation, from which it follows that the Ministry of the Interior in Bulgaria is in charge of militia, defense of the borders, and fire emergency measures.

Comrade Stalin asks who is in charge of registration of marriages, births, and deaths.

Yugov explains that the Bulgarian Ministry of the Interior does not deal with those issues.

Comrade Stalin points to the fact that Bulgaria is a small state, and it is not necessary to divide the Ministry of the Interior into the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of State Security. You should not copy the USSR, --says Comrade Stalin, --there is no need to do that, especially because the USSR is a very big state.

Yugov draws attention to the fact that the militia in Bulgaria carries out combat tasks in its struggle against the gangsterism.

He asks whether it would be convenient in these conditions to subdivide the Ministry of the Interior into two Ministries.

Comrade Stalin reaffirms that it is inconvenient and there is no need to do that.

Yugov, returning to the issue of combining the positions of Prime Minister with the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs, says that Kolarov and some other comrades are concerned that it would be difficult to find an appropriate candidate for the position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Comrade Stalin says that they can find people, they only need to search. There are many growing young people, they should be promoted, and they should be more assertive in promoting them.

Chervenkov says that it was decided to promote new people, especially for the leadership positions in connection with Kostov's affair.

Comrade Stalin. This is correct. We need to promote them. We should not rely on old specialists, especially in the trade area; they are people of the old cast. We should promote new people, not the old specialists, who are spoiled by the bad habits of the old society.

Comrade Stalin draws attention to the fact that Kostov surrounded himself exactly with such people, who should be replaced with new young cadres.

Chervenkov says that some of the ministers were shown to be involved in the Kostov case, and that they see the need to replace a number of ministers.

Comrade Stalin reminds them that this is the way it was in the Soviet Union. Lenin was a great man, but even in his time we overlooked similar facts. We always praised the Main Political Department (GPU), but only Dzerzhinsky was an impeccable honest person in it. There were a lot of foreign agents, who were sent from the abroad, who quite possible did not want to harm us, but had to, because they were recruited by the foreign intelligence services.

Comrade Stalin points to Yugoslavia, where there are many American and British agents, from whom it is constantly required that they supply information and services. Whether they want to do harm or not – does not matter, there are certain requirements, and they should fulfill those requirements. It is the law. There is nothing exceptional in it. There is nothing surprising in what is done in this respect in Bulgaria.

Comrade Stalin names some of the most vicious trotskists, German and British agents in the USSR – Sheinman, Yagoda, Kolmanovich and others, and adds that it is not by accident that the old wolves are sitting there in Britain and the United States. Nothing

exceptional happened in Bulgaria in this respect. It was the same in our country. Kostov's case will help to clean your country from these agents, and in general--from hostile elements.

Chervenkoy says that Kostov admitted his plans to tear Bulgaria away from the friendship with the USSR.

Comrade Stalin, addressing the Bulgarians, says that Kostov is a foreign agent, he turned your own people in to the enemy. He is afraid to tell all the truth now, but if you force him to talk, he will tell you many things.

Chervenkoy returns to the issue of the reconstruction of the government, and says that Kolarov desires to postpone it until the elections.

Comrade Stalin asks whether the Bulgarians know that Kolarov in the past was in the right wing, he was considered an opportunist. In his time, he created a lot of problems for Lenin. He gravitates to the right and he calls it "carefulness." Subsequently, Kolarov improved. Undoubtedly, he is a Marxist and a reasonable person; Kolarov undoubtedly is our man, but recurrences may happen.

As far as the changes in the government are concerned, we should not delay them.

Comrade Malenkoy asks whether there are any obstacles to the appointment of new ministers before the elections.

Chervenkoy and Yugov explain that there are no such obstacles.

Comrade Stalin says that we should not wait, it is not the right way.

Chervenkoy asks whether we have to have the General Secretary of the party.

Comrade Stalin responds that they do not have to have the General Secretary.

Chervenkoy informs Comrade Stalin that the Politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party recently consisted of nine members and three candidates. Now the Politburo has seven members and three candidates. The Central Committee believes that the Politburo should not be expanded.

Comrade Stalin recommends to expand the Politburo in order to involve more new people in the work. Let them learn. You could promote people to the Politburo not only from the Politburo candidates, but from other people, who have grown, and who deserve it.

Chervenkoy informs Comrade Stalin that right now they have two Secretaries of the Central Committee and that they proposed to elect a third Secretary. They thought about Pilovsky's¹²⁷ candidacy, but then it turned out to be necessary to get some additional information about him, and the solution of this issue was temporary postponed. They believe that the third Secretary should be one of the Politburo members.

Comrade Stalin agrees that it is better to have three Secretaries, and who that would be, of course, they would know better.

Comrade Stalin responds to the repeated Chervenkoy's comment that Kolarov wants to combine the positions of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and says that they should recommend that he gives up the idea.

Chervenkoy explains that Terpeshev and Yugov of the new Deputy Chairmen will work in the Council of Ministers and he, Chervenkoy, will work simultaneously as a Secretary of the Central Committee, and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Chervenkoy lists names of other members of the Politburo and explains what positions they have in the government.

¹²⁷ As in the original. Should be: Pelovsky.

Chervenkov says that they cannot find a place for an organizational bureau in the system of the party leadership.

Comrade Stalin explains that in our country the organizational bureau monitors the practical work of local party organizations and mass public organizations. When the organization bureau does its inspections, they hear reports of instructors of the Central Committee, after which they make an appropriate resolution. It works very well.

Chervenkov asks whether the Bulgarians can study the work of the apparatus of the Central Committee, and send a group of comrades of about seven people to Moscow.

Comrade Stalin says that of course, they can. Let them come and study our work.

Chervenkov points to difficulties with specialists in the area of internal trade and agriculture. They would like the USSR to help them with their advisers.

Comrade Stalin says that they can help.

Chervenkov, touching on their relations with Yugoslavia, emphasizes that trade between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria has almost disappeared.

Comrade Stalin asks, who does not want to trade--the Yugoslavs or both sides.

Chervenkov responds that both sides do not want to. He adds that the trade agreement is not working. The fact that the transit of all the goods goes through Yugoslavia and that the Yugoslavs create all kinds of obstacles to it negatively affects the development of Bulgarian foreign trade.

Comrade Stalin says that of course, the Yugoslavs will create problems.

Chervenkov touches on the question of building a bridge over the Danube. It would give them an opportunity to get rid of their dependence on Yugoslavia. They would like to build a bridge in the next two years.

Comrade Stalin asks if there is a ferry across the Danube.

Chervenkov responds that there is a ferry in Rushuk¹²⁸. But they would like to build a permanent bridge in the narrowest spot of the Danube. Soviet specialists recommend to build a bridge near Rushuk. The Bulgarians believe that because of the economic and strategic considerations, the bridge should be built in the narrowest place, and that the Romanians also agree with this, because that would involve Romania as well. Then Chervenkov gives detailed explanations, using the map, where exactly they plan to build the bridge.

Comrade Stalin says that we have built a bridge over Danube for the Yugoslavs, and that we should also build such a bridge for the Bulgarians.

Chervenkov says that the Greek comrades asked them for assistance in food products and weapons.

Comrade Stalin asks, where do the weapons, appropriated for the Greeks, go? Do they lose them, or give them up to the enemy?

Yugov and Damyanov confirm that the Greeks are asking for weapons, and that they plan to build underground hangars in the mountains.

To Comrade Stalin's question, they respond that the monarch-fascists took up several places along the Bulgarian-Greek border.

Damyanov adds that the guerillas systematically violate the Bulgarian border.

Comrade Stalin says that the guerillas are isolated from the population, and that it is very difficult to wage a guerilla war without the support of the population. You cannot wage

¹²⁸ Modern name--Ruse.

a guerilla war in isolation from the population. As far as the underground facilities are concerned, it is nonsense.

Comrade Stalin notes that the guerillas would like to increase their numbers from the immigration, but there are many spies among the immigration.

Yugov confirms that the guerillas do actually count on increasing their numbers from among the immigrants, and that there are approximately 900 Greek immigrants in Bulgaria, who, however, do not want to fight, and the Yugoslavs are not helping the guerillas either.

Comrade Stalin says that the Yugoslavs have never been helping the Greek people's movement.

Comrade Stalin reminds the Bulgarians that they organized a storage with food products and weapons for Greece in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs did not show it to anybody, even to Zahariadis. Later, when they were able to see that storage, it turned out that every good thing was taken away from that warehouse.

Comrade Stalin suggests that they should invite Zahariadis and one representative each from the Albanians and Bulgarians, and discuss this issue.

Chervenkov says that the Turks began to stir recently, and they demand permission to move to Turkey. This campaign is inspired from the abroad.

Chervenkov points to the fact that the overwhelming majority of the Turks are good tobacco growers, and that it is impossible to let them leave Bulgaria.

Comrade Stalin emphasizes that nonetheless, these Turks should be expelled, notwithstanding the tobacco. We expelled such public from our border areas.

Yugov points to the difficulties that would arise, because the places, where the Turks live now in Bulgaria, would be empty and they would have to be settled anew. They are thinking about expelling the Turks from Bulgaria in the fall¹²⁹.

Comrade Stalin asks whether Turkey would accept them.

Yugov responds that that is, of course, doubtful.

Comrade Stalin proposes that they should ask the Turkish government, how it would look at this issue, and meanwhile they should postpone the expulsion until the fall.

Yugov says that it would be expedient to begin expelling the Turks from the 25-kilometer border area.

Comrade Stalin confirms the correctness of this proposal--because you cannot keep spies along the border.

Comrade Stalin asks, if there is excess of population in Bulgaria.

Yugov confirms that there is excess of people, who do not have any land. And again, he emphasizes that the relocation of the Turks would weaken the tobacco growing.

Comrade Stalin points to the fact that there are tobacco growers in Bulgaria even without the Turks, and that they should get rid of the Turks. Comrade Stalin asks, how the Turks behaved in the Central areas of Bulgaria.

Yugov responds that they are not behaving too well, but they are not doing anything exceptional. He responds to Comrade Stalin's question that there are several Turks in the

¹²⁹ The Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party decided to relocate the Turks on August 18, 1949. The resolution emphasized that all Turks who desired it, had an opportunity to leave Bulgaria. In the case if Turkey does not accept them by the end of the year, they will be relocated to the northern part of the country. The migrants were allowed to take their property with them, with the exception of the agricultural equipment and livestock. A special commission was created at the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to carry out the relocation campaign.

Bulgarian Great People's Congress. He also emphasizes that the Turkish youth, especially in the region of Shumen, is reforming itself in the democratic direction.

Comrade Stalin inquires whether the Turks received any land after the revolution.

Yugov responds affirmatively.

Comrade Stalin says that the Turks should go to Turkey, they will get quite a lesson there, and they will feel the difference.

Comrade Stalin asks if there are marriages between the Turks and the locals in Bulgaria.

Yugov responds that there are very few of them. He says that pomaki still live in Bulgaria--there are 150 thousands of them, they also live in the border areas. They will have to be relocated to the central parts of Bulgaria.

Comrade Stalin asks, what is the direction of the development of the Bulgarian economy, and what should be the course of this development.

Yugov responds that Bulgaria has a five-year plan, which was drafted under comrade Dimitrov. The main direction is to develop the textile, leather, flour grinding, and metal production industries; the industry of small agricultural machine building (ploughs, pumps for irrigation, and other equipment). There are railroad repair shops, but they are not building railroad engines.

Comrade Stalin points to the need to expand the repair shops and that Bulgaria cannot do without railroad engines.

Yugov continues to speak about the plan of construction. It is suggested to build a plant to produce cast-iron, two chemical plants, and to expand the nitrogen fertilizer production.

Comrade Stalin asks whether our people have arrived, and how are they helping.

Yugov confirms that they are helping very well. He points to all kinds of deficiencies in planning. For example, they planned to build new plants, power stations, and it turned out that the existing plants are not fully utilized, and the existing power stations cannot work, because of the shortages of wire to transmit electricity.

To Comrade Stalin's question, Yugov says that there are many mountain rivers in Bulgaria. They are building six big dams and hydroelectric power stations, which will give a large amount of power to the country. They are expanding the production of tins, which is lagging behind, because of the shortages of white tin-plates--as a result, they have a lot of vegetables, but the people cannot use them. They are also expanding the woodcutting industry.

To Comrade Stalin's question, Yugov responds that they have coal in Bulgaria, but its exploration is not organized yet.

Comrade Stalin points to the fact that they can produce gasoline from the coal.

Yugov responds that they are building such plants in Burgas. It will be a large plant. It will have to satisfy the needs of the entire country. Yugov points to the fact that the Bulgarians need advisors-planners, and specialists in construction and exploitation of power stations.

Comrade Stalin says that they should send several people to the USSR to study electric power construction.

Yugov informs Stalin that they are sending 30 people to study in the USSR. Yugov also informs Comrade Stalin that presently they are building a railroad line Sophia-Burgas.

Comrade Stalin asks, whether the Bulgarians have received the motorboats from the USSR.

Yugov responds that the motorboats will arrive in Bulgaria by August 8.

Comrade Stalin asks, if they have sufficient arsenals for repair of weaponry, in particular for the artillery. He points out that it would be necessary to station the arsenals in the North.

Yugov responds that they have the arsenals, but that they are somewhat weak.

Comrade Stalin asks, if the Turks bother them on the border.

Yugov responds negatively, and adds that the Turks are undertaking a press campaign against Yugoslavia.

Comrade Stalin notes that they are doing it specifically for the United States.

Comrade Stalin asks, if the Bulgarians have intelligence in Turkey.

Damyanov responds that the Bulgarians do not have a military attaché in Turkey, after the Bulgarians expelled the Turkish attaché. They do not have intelligence in Yugoslavia either, although the work along the lines of state security was done very well.

Comrade Stalin asks, if there are Turkish troops stationed to the North of Constantinople, and if they are any good.

Chervenkov responds that there are troops there, according to their information. He cannot say anything about the quality of those troops.

Comrade Stalin reminds him that during the war Churchill complained that the Turks did not use radio.

Comrade Stalin asks, why Kostov wanted to separate Bulgaria from the USSR.

Chervenkov says that he cited his desire to ensure the Bulgarian independence.

Comrade Malenkov says that Kostov used this to cover up.

Chervenkov confirms this, and makes a suggestion that Kostov wanted to conceal his genuine intentions.

Chervenkov says that Bulgaria is in a difficult situation now, and addresses the Soviet interlocutors with a request to help the Central Committee.

Comrade Stalin responds that we will help, but the Bulgarians should act faster. They should remove the wrong people and to replace them with new appropriate people.

Comrade Stalin emphasizes that Kostov was connected with the representatives of the foreign capital. They should be removed in the first place, because you cannot keep such people in the government. Kolarov, who wants to postpone the replacement of those unsuitable people, wants to look more constitutional, more democratic, but nobody will believe him anyway.

Comrade Stalin promises to help by sending some people, who will be useful for Bulgaria.

Yugov informs Stalin that they are thinking of introducing a financial reform.

Comrade Stalin asks if the exchange rate of lev¹³⁰ is weak.

Yugov responds that the exchange rate is not bad, but that there are some absurdities, which suggests the need to introduce a financial reform in Bulgaria.

Comrade Stalin says that we can help in this. He names comrade Zlobin, who helped the Yugoslavs and the Romanians, and the Hungarians. He will help the Bulgarians as well¹³¹.

¹³⁰ As in the original. Should be: leva.

Comrade Stalin asks, if the Bulgarians have the printing presses to print money. Yugov says that they do not have the printing presses and that before September 9, 1944, Austria and Germany printed the money for Bulgaria.

Comrade Stalin says that they should acquire their own printing presses. It is not difficult, and we will help in this.

Comrade Stalin adds that this is where the struggle for independence should manifest itself, but not in criticizing the Soviet government. In this connection, he says that the Yugoslav clique of scoundrels dares to say that the Soviet Union exploited Yugoslavia. These bastards scream about independence. Let us see how far they will go with this independence. These are dishonest people; they do not have anything Slavic in them. In 1946 the USSR gave Yugoslavia 50 thousand tons of bread free of charge, and now they are slandering that the USSR exploited them. These are unscrupulous people.

Yugov informs Stalin that Bulgaria had a bad harvest this year. They are 200 thousand tons short on all grains. They would have to borrow 100 thousand tones of bread¹³². He cites the bad soils in Dobrudja.

Comrade Stalin said that they could successfully grow corn and cotton in Dobrudja.

Damyanov responds that that is correct, but there is very little water there, and no rivers.

Comrade Stalin points out that they could put powerful pumps, and take the water from the Danube. Comrade Stalin asks, how much arable land is there in Dobrudja.

Damyanov and Yugov say that there is about 700 thousand hectares.

Comrade Stalin notes that precisely in this region of Dobrudja (he points to a region laying next to the Romanian border on the map), cotton should grow well.

Chervenkov, Yugov and Damyanov agree with this.

The conversation ends on this point. The conversation lasted approximately two hours.

Original

Source: Vostochnaia Evropa, vol. 2, edited by G.P. Murashko, et al, pp. 192-202 (APRE, f. 45, op. 1, d. 254, l. 7-21.)

Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.

¹³¹ On February 21, 1952, it was decided to send the Zlobin Commission "to provide assistance to our Bulgarian friends on financial issues." The commission consisted of I. D. Zlobin (head), I. I. Makarov, V. I. Alexandrov, V. I. Moskvina, A. E. Grigoriev, N. Ya. Vorobiev (RTSHIDNI, Fond 82, Finding aid 2, File 1134, pp. 79-80).

¹³² In August 1949, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria V. Kolarov appealed to Comrade I. V. Stalin with a request to "release 200,000 tons of wheat on the basis of reciprocity for the needs of the population and the army, to be returned in kind from the harvests of the next four years." The Bulgarian side was hoping that if the issue was favorably resolved, deliveries of grain could start already in September, and that Bulgaria would have received the first 100,000 tons before the end of 1949. On August 18, 1949 USSR Ambassador to Sofia Bodrov sent Kolarov's letter to Moscow (AP RF, Fond 45, Finding aid 1, file 254, pp. 22-27). On September 2, 1949 they signed an agreement in Moscow, under which the Soviet government would provide wheat to the Bulgarian government on the loan basis. By the agreement, the Soviet side assumed responsibility for providing 160,000 tons of wheat altogether; 100,000 tons—from September to December 1949, and 60,000 tons from January to May 1950. The Bulgarian side promised to return the loan in the next four years from the Harvest of 1950-1953. (*Soviet-Bulgarian Relations and Contacts. Documents and Materials. Volume II, September 1944-December 1958. Moscow, 1981, p. 318*).

The Mao-Stalin Meetings

December 1949-February 1950

On 1 October 1949, Chairman Mao announced at the "Gate of Heavenly Peace" to the whole world that the People's Republic of China was established. The next day, 2 October, the Soviet Union formally recognized the People's Republic and expressed the willingness to establish diplomatic relations with it. Other people's democratic countries quickly followed the example of the Soviet Union to recognize and formed diplomatic relations with the new China.

On 16 October, Roschin, the Soviet ambassador to the People's Republic,¹³³ presented his credentials to Chairman Mao at Zhongnanhai. Premier Zhou Enlai and other top Party and state leaders attended the ceremony. With no experience in handling such activities, we took the suggestion of the Soviet comrades to host a banquet following the ceremony. The Soviets ordered roast ducks from the famous Quanjude Roast Duck Restaurant. However, when the ducks were delivered to Zhongnanhai, they were already cold and not crispy at all, making everyone disappointed. Thereafter we never held a banquet after an ambassadorial credentials reception ceremony.

Early in October, the Party Politburo decided that it was time for Chairman Mao to visit the Soviet Union. He was to attend the celebration activities for Stalin's seventieth birthday, to exchange opinions with the Soviet leaders on all important issues concerning the interests of the two Parties and nations, to discuss and solve several unsettled issues between the two countries, and, most important of all, to negotiate and sign a new treaty of alliance that would replace the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945 and lay the foundation for a new relationship.

We began to prepare for Chairman Mao's trip immediately. The Central Committee requested that all Party and government branches compile documentary materials for Chairman Mao's visit, a process which Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou personally directed and supervised. The Central Committee also assigned its administrative office to select and prepare gifts for Stalin.

Jiang Qing, Chairman Mao's wife, demonstrated an extraordinary interest in the last matter, and repeatedly made suggestions. She proposed to the Chairman that we should present to Stalin with items with Chinese characters, and, therefore, it was better to choose only agricultural products and articles of handicraft art. On the list prepared by her were cabbage, green onion, and white carrot from Shandong province, porcelain products from Jindezhen, dragon well tea from Zhejiang province, black tea from Qimen in Anhui province, bamboo shoot from Jiangxi province, lacquers from Fujian province, and textile products and silk embroideries from Hangzhou. Jiang Qing's mind on what should be selected as gifts changed constantly, and those she assigned to check and accept the gifts were extremely nitpicking. Consequently, the gifts did not catch the deadline for Chairman Mao's trip. They were transported to Moscow later in several groups.

Why was Jiang Qing so active in this matter? During her visit to the Soviet Union in summer 1949, Stalin praised her and treated her politely. She thus became insufferably arrogant, feeling herself to be an expert on Sino-Soviet relations. Therefore she made a

¹³³ Roschin was also the Soviet Union's ambassador to the Nationalist government.

suggestion here and drop another idea there, behaving as if she were the "chief of staff" in the preparations for Chairman Mao's visit to the Soviet Union.

Chairman Mao left Beijing by train on 6 December. Among those accompanying him were Chen Boda, who was then his political secretary (we called him Professor Chen), Ye Zilong, director of the Chairman's confidential office, Wang Dongxing, deputy head of the Chairman's body guards, and myself. I.V. Kovalev, the general Soviet advisor to China, Ambassador Roshchin, and Fedorenko, a councilor at the Soviet embassy and Chinese language interpreter, also accompanied us to travel to the Soviet Union.

When Chairman Mao's train passed by Tianjin, it was reported that an obsolete hand grenade was found on the railroad bed. Luo Ruiqing, minister of public security, particularly took off the train to investigate the matter. These were the early days of the Republic, and the remnants of the Nationalists were far from being eliminated. It was thus necessary to take security affairs more serious than usual, making the duty of safety personnel extremely arduous.

When the train arrived in Shenyang, Gao Gang boarded the train and accompanied us all way to Manzhouli, the city on the Chinese-Soviet border. He then said farewell to the Chairman and left the train.

Our first stop in the territory of the Soviet Union was **Auteberg**. **Lafurejev**, deputy foreign minister of the Soviet Union, traveled specifically from Moscow to meet Chairman Mao at the train station. He chaired a brief welcome ceremony at the platform. Chairman Mao reviewed the guards of honor. The temperature that day was well below freezing point, and everywhere was covered by ice and snow, with the cold wind chilling one to the bone. Chairman Mao had to return to the train quickly. On our way to Moscow, we were greeted at every main stop by leading local officials.

When we arrived at Novosibirsk, the Soviet foreign ministry telephoned us to inquire if Chairman Mao was in good health. The Soviets particularly asked if the Chairman had any special requests or needs, so that they would satisfy them, making sure that the Chairman would travel comfortably and healthily.

When we arrived at **Sverderovskiy**, the Chairman got off the train and took a walk at the platform. In a few minutes, however, he felt dizzy, began sweating, and could not stand steadily. I hurried to him to support him with my arms, and we quickly returned to the train. After several hours he was fine again, but he would not take a walk when the train stopped. At Yaroslavsky, Wang Jiexiang, who recently had been appointed as new China's first ambassador to the Soviet Union, boarded the train and accompanied us to Moscow.

At noon on 16 December, our train arrived at Moscow's North Station (the Yaroslavsky Station) exactly at the time when the station's big bell was making the twelfth knock—an elaborate arrangement by our Soviet hosts. Due to the cold weather, the welcome ceremony at the station was made very short, but it was warm and formal.

Molotov, vice chairman of the council of ministers, and Bulganin, a marshal of the Red Army, embarked the train to greet Chairman Mao. They explained that the Soviets had prepared a grand welcome ceremony at the station for us, but because the weather was too cold, they decided to make it simplified. There would be the guards of honor of the three services at the station, but Chairman Mao needed only to receive them briefly by walking in front of them. It was not necessary for Chairman Mao to make a speech at the station. If he had prepared one, he could let the Soviet media publish it.

The Chairman agreed. In the written statement, he first expressed China's gratitude to "the brotherly friendship of the Soviet government and the Soviet people." He then emphasized that "the important tasks currently facing us are how to consolidate the front of world peace headed by the Soviet Union, how to struggle against the war monsters, how to enhance the diplomatic relations between the two great countries of China and the Soviet Union, and how to develop the friendship between the Chinese people and Soviet people." He pointed out that "because of the victory of the Chinese revolution and the establishment of the People's Republic of China, because of the common efforts by new democratic countries and the peace-loving people in the world, because of the common wish on the part of, as well as the intimate cooperation between, the two great countries of China and the Soviet Union, and, in particular, because of Marshal Stalin's correct international policy, it is certain that these tasks will not only be completely fulfilled but also will lead to positive results."

After the welcome ceremony, Chairman Mao was arranged by the Soviets to stay at Stalin's second residence at **Jiemeihe [??]**, where Stalin lived during the Second World War. It had a huge underground section which Stalin had used as his wartime headquarters. The Chairman, Ye Zilong and I stayed on the first floor. Chen Boda and Wang Dongxin stayed on the second floor.

The same evening, at six o'clock, Stalin met with Chairman Mao in the small conference room in his quarters of the Kremlin. We arrived at the Kremlin a few minutes earlier. Exactly at six o'clock, the door of the conference room was opened. Stalin and all members of the Soviet Party politburo, including Molotov, Malinkov, Beria, and Bulganin, and Foreign Minister Vyshinsky, stood at the door to greet Chairman Mao. This was exceptional for Stalin, as he almost never greeted a guest outside his office. It is apparent that by giving Chairman Mao this special treatment Stalin meant to show his respect to the Chinese people and their great leader. That evening, I was the only interpreter. This arrangement was again special, by which the Soviets meant to demonstrate their complete trust of, as well as high respect to, the Chinese comrades.

Stalin held Chairman Mao's hands tightly, looking at him and saying: "You are very young, and you look well and healthy. Great! Great!" He then introduced his colleagues to Chairman Mao one by one. We all stood in the hall and greeted each other.

Stalin continued to praise Chairman Mao: "Great! You are truly great! You have made great contributions to the Chinese people, you are their great son. I wish you the best. You have won a great victory. I wish you advance continuously." These moving words made the atmosphere very warm.

Chairman Mao said at this moment: "I am a person who was excluded and purged for a long time. I did not know where to express my opinions..."

Before the Chairman could finish, however, Stalin interrupted him: "The winner should not be tried. We should not blame the winner. This is a general rule." These words prevented Chairman Mao from speaking out what had been accumulated at the bottom of his heart.

We entered the conference room while talking to each other. Stalin took the seat at the center. All the Soviet leaders sat on his right side. Chairman Mao, I and other Chinese comrades sat on his left side.

Then the formal meeting began. Stalin asked with concern about the Chairman's health, expressing the hope that he should take good care of it. Stalin said: "The complete

victory of the Chinese revolution is on sight. The Chinese people will be thoroughly liberated. The Communist Party is invincible. The victory of the Chinese revolution will change the balance of power in the whole world by significantly increasing the weight of the international revolution. Economic recovery and reconstruction is the primary task you are facing now, but you have the most precious and most abundant resource, that is, manpower. This is the most reliable guarantor for you to achieve the final victory and to advance continuously. It is undoubted that you will win the final victory. But it is also undoubted that the enemy is unwilling to accept his defeat. However, there is nothing the enemy can do to stop you today. We congratulate you for your victory wholeheartedly, hoping that you will achieve more and greater victories in the future.”

The conversation between the two leaders touched upon a wide variety of topics, ranging from military situation to economic recovery and reconstruction, from grain harvest to land reform, from domestic mass mobilization to analysis of international situation. From the beginning, I had a feeling that Stalin was trying to probe Chairman Mao’s intentions. The conversation lasted for more than two hours. On the Soviet side, Stalin was the only speaker. The other Soviet leaders sat and listened.

Stalin repeatedly asked: “It is not easy for you to come here. What should we do for you? What suggestions do you have for us?”

Chairman Mao replied: “I come here first of all to attend the celebrations for your 70th birthday. I also hope to travel around the Soviet Union, from the north to the south, and from the east to the west.”

Stalin said: “You come from afar, and should not return home with your hands empty. Is it necessary for us to work out something?”

When Liu Shaoqi met Stalin in July, he already made it clear that Chairman Mao hoped to visit the Soviet Union to sign a new treaty. Why was Stalin reluctant to make the issue straightforward now? I guess this was probably because he did not want to behave as if he was imposing his will on others. He had made some bad suggestions and committed some mistakes to the Chinese revolution in the past. Maybe he felt the need to act more cautiously this time.

Chairman Mao's response was subtle: “I think that we need to work out something which should not only look nice but also taste delicious.”

This metaphor was a philosophical statement expressed with a sense of humor. If I translated it directly into Russian, the Soviet comrades would not be able to understand it. Therefore, I added some explanations while translating it: “‘Look nice’ means that it should be good in format—we should be able to show it to anyone in the world, and ‘taste delicious’ means that it should be substantive in contents, reliable and sound.”

But it was still difficult for the Soviets to catch what Chairman Mao really meant. While the others seemed stunned, Beria could not control himself and laughed.

It was difficult to tell whether or not Stalin had understood Chairman Mao's humor of Eastern style. But he remained calm and continued to probe the Chairman's intentions.

Chairman Mao was still reluctant to give Stalin a direct response. The Soviets, in his view, were more experienced, and therefore they should take the initiative to make clear in which ways they would help us. Failing to do so meant lack of sincerity on their part. At one point, Chairman Mao told Stalin that he wanted to ask Premier Zhou Enlai to come to Moscow to join the discussion. Stalin looked surprised, asking Chairman Mao: “If we cannot decide on what we are going to do, why should we ask Zhou Enlai to come here? What is he

supposed to do?" It was apparent that Stalin was continuing his probe, but Chairman Mao did not respond to the question.

Neither Stalin nor Chairman Mao had correctly commanded the other's intention and mood, and, as a result, some misunderstandings emerged between them. For Chairman Mao, the abolition of the old Sino-Soviet treaty was crucial for negating the diplomatic legacy of the old China, as well as important for constructing the new China's diplomatic framework. Accordingly, he believed it necessary for Zhou Enlai, who was new China's premier and foreign minister, to come to Moscow to accomplish this task. Stalin did not quite understand Chairman Mao's logic. He probably believed that any treaty or pact between the Soviet Union and China should be signed by himself on the Soviet side and Chairman Mao on the China side. Only by doing so, in Stalin's view, would the signing ceremony, which was conducted between two persons of equally noble status, be dignified. Stalin simply did not understand why the Chairman was unwilling to represent China's 500 million people to sign such a treaty. A psychological barrier had thus emerged between Chairman Mao and Stalin. The first meeting between Mao and Stalin ended in a mood that was potentially tense.

On 18 December, Chairman Mao dispatched a telegram to Liu Shaoqi in Beijing, which summarized his first meeting with Stalin. The Chairman asked the Politburo in Beijing to discuss and provide its opinions on two issues: whether or not Zhou Enlai should come to Moscow, and whether or not a new treaty should be signed. The reply came on 21 December. In a telegram jointly signed by Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De and Zhou Enlai, the CCP Politburo provided its advice: "The Politburo met today. The consensus is that if the Soviet side is not prepared to sign agreements on loans, aviation, and commercial affairs, and is only willing to issue a statement on the [Soviet] military presence in Lüshun and on the general political situation, it seems unnecessary for Comrade [Zhou] Enlai to travel to Moscow. The Politburo authorizes you to consider this question and make due decision."

21 December 1949 was Stalin's seventieth birthday. A celebration rally attended by high-ranking Soviet officials was held at Moscow's **Grand Theater**. Stalin and the representatives from fraternal parties were taking seats at the podium. Chairman Mao sat next to Stalin and the Hungarian leader Matthias Rakosi. I was sitting by the Chairman to interpret for him.

Chairman Mao's congratulatory speech was read by Fedorenko at the rally. In the speech, the Chairman highly praised Stalin's contributions to the international communist movement, arousing enormous echoes. During the rally, Stalin frequently turned to Chairman Mao to talk to him. However, no matter how Stalin, as well as Rokosi, tried to please him, Chairman Mao did not smile at all. He said only a few words, as if he were thinking all the time.

The rally was followed by a banquet and a cultural show. Stalin and Chairman Mao sat next to each other in the same box, which was reserved for the Czar in the old days. After the end of the show, the audience all turned to the box, cheering "Stalin-Mao Zedong! Mao Zedong-Stalin!" Chairman Mao waved to greet the audience. This time he hailed: "Long Live Stalin! The glory belongs to Stalin!" The whole theater was echoed with the thunderous cheering and applause, which lasted for several long minutes.

After the birthday celebration, the Party delegations from European countries returned home. We remained in Moscow.

After their first meeting, a gap had existed between Stalin and Chairman Mao. The two great men considered the problems facing them in different ways, following their own ways of thinking.

After a few days, Stalin felt worried. He sent Molotov and Roshchin to talk to the Chairman, hoping to clarify what he was thinking about and what he wished to achieve. Stalin also personally called Chairman, Mao, asking him what ideas he had in mind, what the two sides needed to do as the next step, and if he had any new considerations. Stalin even called me one time, trying to learn what the Chairman was thinking about. But what could I say? Indeed, it was even difficult for me to figure out what the Chairman was really thinking about.

Kovalev and Fedorenko were the two Russians who accompanied us to travel to Moscow. From time to time, they came to visit Chairman, Mao. On one occasion, when they were chatting with us, the Chairman suddenly got angry with Kovalev: "You invited me to come to Moscow, and I have nothing to do here. Why am I here? Am I here only to eat, shit, and sleep everyday?"

When I saw the two Russians leave the Chairman's quarters, I found Kovalev look strange. I returned to the Chairman's room. He was really in a high mood. He told me in smile: "I have taught Kovalev a lesson. I think he will report to Stalin what happened here today. He will let Stalin know how disappointed we are."

But I know that Kovalev and Fedorenko seldom had the opportunity to meet Stalin. In July 1949 Kovalev saw Stalin once when he was accompanying the Chinese delegation headed by Liu Shaoqi. When Stalin asked him questions, he was so nervous, standing stiffly, as if he were a primary school pupil. How dared he and Fedorenko to report to Stalin that the Chairman had lost temper and blamed the Soviets?

I explained to the Chairman: "I do not think that Kovalev can see Stalin. Even if he can, I doubt if he has the guts to report to Stalin that you have scolded him. He cannot do this, and dare not to do this. Otherwise, he will be criticized and punished. What he is going to do is something we need to wait and see."

Later we learned that Kovalev sent a long report to Stalin to criticize China. In the report, Kovalev said that the majority of the Chinese Communist Party leaders had been "pro-America" and "anti-Soviet." This was report full of nonsense. After receiving it, however, for whatever reason, Stalin decided to hand it over to us. Stalin explained: "The report was written by Kovalev himself. We never instructed him to do so. You must know that Kovalev is not a political figure, he is only a technician. It is improper that he tries to involve in politics." Then, in another meeting between Stalin and Chairman Mao, the two leaders were discussing the dispatch of Soviet experts to China. Chairman Mao mentioned if Kovalev would again be sent to China. Stalin replied: "Kovalev is not an expert and knows little about economic reconstruction. We will send experts with more experience to China."

Late in December, Molotov came to see Chairman Mao. The Chairman gave Molotov a long and extensive lecture about the history of the Chinese revolution and the CCP's inner-Party struggles. Molotov, obviously with the intention of probing the Chairman's plans, listened calmly, showing no interest in the Chairman's endless story. Occasionally nodding his head, he made no comments and asked no question. He did not understand, nor seemed willing to guess, why the Chairman told him these stories. His only concern, most probably, was how to fulfill the task Stalin assigned to him.

The New Year's Day of 1950 was approaching. Chairman Mao had been in Moscow for almost two weeks, and he disappeared from Soviet media after attending Stalin's birthday party. At this moment, a **British news agency** made the rumor that Stalin had placed Chairman Mao under house arrest. This made the Soviets embarrassed. In any case, Chairman Mao's visit to the Soviet Union was the first direct formal meeting between the top Party and state leaders of the new China and the Soviet Union. It was natural that this important diplomatic event attracted the attention of the international media. Now, for almost two weeks, Moscow had released no report about the progress of the visit, how could the Western media fail to guess what really happened?

When the Soviets inquired us about how to deal with the rumor, Wang Jiaxiang, who had long had the reputation of being a "wiseman," suggested Chairman Mao might openly announce his plans to visit the Soviet Union by answering questions from the TASS correspondents. This would not only break up the rumor, but also would promote the Chairman's mission. Chairman Mao accepted Wang's suggestion. On 2 January 1950, Chairman Mao's interview with TASS correspondents was published in Soviet and Chinese newspapers. He stated: "The length of my sojourn in the Soviet Union will be partly determined by how long it will take to solve the various questions concerning the interests of the People's Republic of China." He particularly emphasized: "Among these questions, the problems of first importance are the ones concerning the existing Sino-Soviet treaty of Friendship and Alliance, the Soviet Union's loan to the People's Republic of China, and trade and trade agreements between the two countries, and other issues." The Chairman thus made public that the central purpose of his visit was to sign a new Sino-Soviet treaty.

The publication of the Chairman's interview with TASS correspondents caused tremendous repercussions in the world. All the rumors were gone, and the political atmosphere around the visit was completely refreshed.

Stalin's attitude began to change at this moment. At 8 o'clock on the evening of 2 January 1950, Molotov and Mikoyan came to Chairman Mao's quarters, inquiring the Chairman's opinions about signing a new Sino-Soviet treaty. I interpreted for them.

The Chairman made three proposals. "The first option is to sign a new Sino-Soviet treaty, which will allow the Sino-Soviet relations to be formalized on its basis." He explained: "If this option is adopted, the workers, peasants, intellectuals, and national capitalists will all be encouraged, and the right-wing of the national bourgeoisie will be isolated." "As a result," Chairman Mao emphasized, "we will have more political capital to deal with the imperialist countries, as well as to examine the treaties signed between the old China and the imperialist countries."

Molotov and Mikoyan listened carefully. Chairman Mao continued: "The second option is to have the news agencies of our two countries issue a brief communiqué, announcing that we have exchanged opinions about the old Sino-Soviet treaty." Chairman Mao then introduced the last option in his mind: "We may sign a joint statement to summarize the principles underlying the relations between our two countries, and that is all." The Chairman Mao made it clear that if the first option was adopted, Zhou Enlai should come to Moscow; but if either the second or the third option was adopted, it was not necessary for Zhou Enlai to come.

The Soviet leaders apparently had already considered the whole matter, for Molotov immediately said: "We believe that the first option is the best one. We are ready to welcome Comrade Zhou Enlai here in Moscow."

Chairman Mao was excited. But he wanted to make sure that Molotov meant what he said, and he asked: "Do you mean that we should sign a new treaty to replace the old treaty?"

Molotov replied: "Yes."

Chairman Mao then told Molotov and Mikoyan that he would immediately telegraph Beijing to inform Zhou Enlai to travel to Moscow. He began to calculate how much time Zhou would need to get to Moscow: "My telegram will reach Beijing on 3 January. Zhou Enlai will need five days to prepare for the trip. Then he will leave Beijing on the 9th. It will take him eleven days to travel to Moscow by train, and he will be arriving in Moscow on 19 January. From 20 January to the end of the month we will need about ten days to negotiate and sign the treaty and other agreements. Zhou and I will leave for China together early in February.

The conversation then turned to discussing Chairman Mao's sightseeing plans in Moscow and in other cities. It was decided that in Moscow, Chairman Mao would visit Lenin's mausoleum, and that he would travel to Leningrad. Molotov and Mikoyan also made some suggestions about the places Chairman Mao might want to see.

After Molotov and Mikoyan had left, Chairman Mao cabled Beijing at 11 o'clock in the evening, reporting to the Party's Central Committee the result of the meeting: "The work here has achieved a major breakthrough in the past two days. Comrade Stalin has agreed that Comrade Zhou Enlai should come to Moscow, and that a new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, as well as agreements on loans, trade, and aviation, should be signed." I could clearly sense the Chairman's excitement while dictating this cable.

The next day, Stalin again called Chairman Mao to confirm the plans for Zhou Enlai to travel to Moscow. He particularly discussed with the Chairman about his intentions and opinions.

On 10 January, Zhou Enlai led a Governmental Delegation of the People's Republic of China to leave Beijing for Moscow. This was a delegation with a strong lineup. In addition to those who had already been in the Soviet Union, the members of the delegation included Li Fuchun, Vice Chairman of the Northeast People's Government, Ye Jizhuang, Minister of Foreign Trade, Lü Dong, Deputy Head of the Northeast Industry Department, Zhang Huadong, Deputy Head of the Northeast Trade Department in the Northeast, Wu Xiuquan, Director of the Soviet and East European Section under the Foreign Ministry, Lai Yali, Deputy Director of the Administrative Office of the Foreign Ministry, Ouyang Qing, Party Secretary of the Dalian City, Chai Shufan, Head of the Planning Division of the Ministry of Industry, Chen Mingbi, Director of the Northeast Electricity Bureau, Chang Yanqing, a division head of the Northeast Foreign Trade Department, Shen Hong, a division head of the Central Financial and Economic Planning Bureau, Su Dongguan, a confidential secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Wang Xun, Deputy Manager of the Anshan Steel Company, Niu Chunrong, Deputy Director of the Northeast Machinery Bureau, Luo Weihe, Head of the Planning Division of the Northeast Coal Mining Bureau, and He Jian, a security staff.

When Chairman Mao learned that Premier Zhou had set up 10 January as the date to leave Beijing for Moscow, he also prepared to go sightseeing outside of Moscow. On 14 January, the Chairman, accompanied by Wang Jiexiang, Chen Boda and me, left Moscow by

train to the North. The next day, we arrived at Leningrad, and received a grand welcome ceremony at the train station by the local leaders.

Our local hosts originally planned to let Chairman Mao take a rest at **the Simoerni** after the ceremony. But the Chairman was eager to see the ocean. Following his will, our Soviet hosts drove us directly from the train station to the Finland Gulf of the Baltic. The sea and the land were all covered by ice, and it was impossible to tell where the sea and where the land were. Our car traveled on the ice for more than one hour. **Fort Kronstadt**, where the workers began uprising during the October Revolution, fell into our vision in distance. Chairman Mao took off the car and walked back and forth on the ice. He looked into the distance and commented excitedly: "Isn't this **Qianli bingfeng**?"

The Soviet comrades introduced that we were standing on the one to one-and-half meter thick ice, under which was the Baltic Sea.

Chairman Mao said: "I wish to walk from Haishenwei (Vladivostok) on the western coast of the Pacific to the Baltic on the eastern coast of the Atlantic, and then from the Black Sea in the south to the Arctic Circle in the north. By then I can say that I have reached the four corners of the Soviet Union on foot."

Everyone on site was inspired, jubilating and applauding. The Soviets seemed deeply moved by Chairman Mao's lofty aspiration and breadth of vision.

Chairman Mao stayed at the **Smorni Palace** in Leningrad. This is the office building in which Zhdanov had worked. Accompanied by Kuznetsov, chairman of the City Soviet, and **Lianov**, the city's Party secretary, the Chairman and us visited the Kirov Machine Building Factory. This was an important stronghold of the Bolsheviks during the October Revolution, to which workers of the factory had made enormous contribution. At the factory's cultural club, a group of teenagers greeted Chairman Mao. The scene was warm and rejoicing; the Chairman was in such a high spirit and he smiled all the time. This was indeed a pretty and pleasant moment for us all. When in Moscow, we seldom had outdoor activities except for occasionally taking a walk in the garden, which our days there awkwardly tense and tasteless.

The Chairman and us then visited the Art Museum located at the Winter Palace. We saw the Czar's bedroom, office, sitting room, parlor, and private library. But our Soviet hosts told with regret us that there was a China section in the museum, which we would have been able to visit if it had not closed for renovation. Chairman Mao turned to me and commented: "This is because they do not want us to see it. They will feel embarrassed because the Czarist Russia had stolen too many things from China."

In the suburb, Chairman Mao visited Leningrad's defense works left by the Second World War. A Red Army colonel was our guide and was supposed to explain to the Chairman how the battles were fought during the war. But his boring depiction made the magnificent yet extremely cruel fightings in this heroic city dry as dust. Indeed, he was not telling a story, he was reciting something word by word. After a while he stopped and asked Chairman if he wanted him to continue. Chairman Mao said: "That is enough." The Chairman then turned around and whispered to me: "Why should we waste our time to listen to those meaningless things."

While in Leningrad, Chairman Mao also visited the battleship **Arfuler**, which was famous for shelling the Winter Palace during the October Revolution. He also watched a ballet played by **Lebiyeva** at the Kirov Theater. We left Leningrad on 16 January and returned to Moscow the next day, still staying at Stalin's villa at **Jiemeihe**.

The second day after Chairman Mao returned to Moscow, Premier Zhou called him from **New Sibersk**. They talked for a while, but because the connection was too poor, the Chairman could not hear clearly from the Premier. They decided to continue the conversation when the Premier arrived at **Sverdrosky** in **Ular**. This time the two leaders talked on phone for over one hour. The Chairman introduced to the Premier his activities and plans in the Soviet Union, and discussed with the Premier the contents of the treaty that the Premier would negotiate and sign. The Premier thus had a pretty good idea about the situation, which would allow him to begin his work immediately after arriving in Moscow.

Wang Jiaxiang particularly traveled to Yarovslovsky, about 200 kilometers from Moscow, to meet Premier Zhou and his party. They arrived at Moscow on 20 January. There was a welcome ceremony for the Premier at the train station, but its scale was smaller than the one for the Chairman. Premier Zhou made a speech at the station. He emphasized: "Following the instructions of Chairman Mao Zedong of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, I come to Moscow to participate in the discussions about how to consolidate the relations between China and the Soviet Union."

The Soviets arranged the Premier and his party to stay at a place far away from the Chairman's. As soon as he settled down, the Premier came to see the Chairman to discuss how to proceed with the negotiations with the Soviets. After one day, Premier decided to move to a room on the second floor of the Chairman's residence, so that it would be more convenient for the two leaders to have discussion.

The next evening, that of 21 January, Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou were invited by the Soviets to attend a rally commemorating the 26th anniversaries of Lenin's death. At the banquet hosted by Stalin following the rally, Beria, Malinkov and Molotov were extremely active.

Beria asked Chairman Mao: "Everyone of us hopes to visit China. Will you invite us and let us go? When will our wish come true?"

Chairman Mao said: "We welcome you."

Beria continued to push the Chairman: "Please do not make me guess for too long."

Malinkov chipped in at this point: "If you do not oppose, we will register to you one by one, and we will line up to go to China."

Viewing his colleagues so happy and relaxed, Molotov proposed that Prime Minister **Grotiwu** of Democratic Germany should also be invited to join the line-up.

Stalin rebutted Molotov: "No, a German cannot travel without his wife accompanying him. If **Grotiu** is invited, his wife should also be invited. Imagine how inconvenient it would be for us men if a woman were among us on such an occasion."

Khrushchev also attended the banquet and sat at the far side of the table. But from the beginning to the end he was absorbed in eating, without raising his head to say a single word. No one knew what he was thinking about.

On 22 January, the third day after Premier Zhou arrived in Moscow, the Chairman and the Premier had a formal meeting with Stalin. On our side Li Fuchun and Wang Jiaxiang attended the meeting, and on the Soviet side Vyshinsky was present.

Chairman Mao first spoke at the meeting. He briefly summarized why it was necessary to formalize the cooperative relationship between China and the Soviet Union by signing a new treaty. He stated that the treaty should be designed for more intimate political,

military, economic, cultural and diplomatic cooperations between the two countries, so that they would make common efforts to prevent the reemergence of Japanese imperialism, as well as the aggressions by Japan and those countries colluded with Japan.

Stalin expressed his full agreement to Chairman Mao's statement. He emphasized that it was necessary to make clear what should be worked out. He mentioned that they should include the treaty of alliance, and agreements on the China Changchun Road, the status of Lüda, bilateral trade, Soviet loan to China, and cooperation on civil aviation, etc.

Chairman Mao proposed that the problems concerning China Changchun Road, Lüshun and Dalian should not be dealt with separately, but should be settled in one pact.

Stalin said: "The Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance and friendship should be a new treaty, and we may put the Yalta agreements aside. There are two ways to solve the Lüshun question. The first is to set up a deadline by which the Soviet Union will return it to China, and the Soviet Red Army will evacuate from it after the signing of the peace treaty with Japan. The second is that the Red Army will leave Lüshun now, but the format of the previous treaty will not be changed at this moment." Chairman Mao believed that the first way was better. Stalin also believed that China should take care of the Dalian question by herself.

On the question of the China Changchun Road, we had already decided that we would not ask for abolishing the Sino-Soviet joint ownership over it at this moment, but would only request shortening the length of the joint ownership, changing the capital share from 50 to 50 between China and the Soviet Union to 51 for China and 49 for the Soviet Union, and appointing a Chinese to be the director of the railroad authorities. The Soviets agreed to shortening the length of the joint ownership, but insisted that the current capital share (50 to 50) be maintained and that the Chinese and the Soviets should assume the railroad authorities' directorship and deputy directorship in turn.

When the discussion touched upon the trade issue, Chairman Mao stated that the export and import list we had prepared was only a preliminary one, thus we would only be in a position to make some general decisions on trade issues.

At this moment, Stalin brought about the question of forbidding the residents of a third country to enter and to live in China's Northeast and Xinjiang province. This caused an awkward silence at the meeting until Premier Zhou responded: "There are many ethnic Korean residents living in the Northeast, should they be counted as residents of a third country? I even don't need to mention the residents from the friendly Mongolia, should they be forbidden to enter and live in China?" Stalin was stunned and remained speechless for a while. He then explained that he intended not to allow those from such imperialist countries as the United States, Britain and France to conduct activities in the Northeast. But still we Chinese were not happy, because Stalin virtually had interfered with China's internal affairs on this issue.

I must mention here that this was not the only occasion on which Stalin demonstrated an intention of interfering with China's internal affairs. On the issue of China inviting Soviet experts to work in China, Stalin made some harsh terms, which not only violated the principles of Sino-Soviet friendship but also reflect a sense of inequality on his part. According to these terms, the Soviet experts would get very high compensation by working in China (even many Soviet experts acknowledged this later). Further, when they committed crimes in China, they would not be tried by the Chinese court by Chinese law, but would be dealt with by the Soviet side. On this issue, Stalin had behaved in the same way as did the

Western imperialists, reflecting his big-power chauvinism. In actuality, by doing so he meant to please the Russians in the Soviet Union (he himself was from Georgia), so that they would believe that he was indeed serving the interests of the Russian people. This was why many, including Russians, believed that Stalin's bid Russian chauvinism was even stronger than that of the Russians. Lenin once criticized Stalin on this issue, which, in retrospect, seemed quite to the point.

At the end of the meeting, the two sides decided that more specific discussions would be held between Zhou Enlai and Mikoyan and Vyshinsky.

Beginning on the next day, 23 January, discussions on more specific issues continued between Zhou Enlai, Wang Jiaxiang and Li Fuchun representing China, and Mikoyan, Vyshinsky, Gromyko and Roshchin representing the Soviet Union. Chairman Mao and Stalin would occasionally attend the meeting.

The main part of these meetings was devoted to working out the specifics of a new "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance." Premier Zhou pointed out at the beginning of the discussion that in order to make sense of a treaty of friendship and alliance, it must include terms about mutual assistance. In other words, the Premier emphasized, these terms must become an integral part of the treaty. The Soviet comrades showed great interest in Premier Zhou's argument and particularly report it to Stalin. It thus became the basis of the discussion around the new Sino-Soviet treaty.

The first draft of the treaty's text was prepared by the Soviets, which they claimed to have reflected Premier Zhou's basic ideas. However, when they presented the draft to us, Premier Zhou commented disappointedly: "No, you have not included many of my points, especially the one concerning the mutual assistance aspect of the treaty. This draft needs to be reworked." After discussing with Wang Jiaxiang and Chen Boda, Premier Zhou reported the problem to Chairman Mao. The Chairman instructed the Premier to prepare a new draft by himself.

Premier Zhou spent more than two days and worked out a new Chinese draft for the treaty. It particularly emphasized that "both Contracting Parties undertake jointly to adopt all necessary measures for the purpose of preventing the resumption of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other state that may collaborate with Japan directly or indirectly in acts of aggression." It also established that "both Contracting Parties, in the interests of consolidating peace and universal security, will consult with each other with regard to all important international problems affecting the common interests of China and the Soviet Union." In order to demonstrate to the whole world that the new Sino-Soviet treaty was not designed to threaten anyone, Premier Zhou added a paragraph, pointing out that both China and the Soviet Union were "imbued with the desire to consolidate lasting peace and universal security in the Far East and throughout the world in conformity with the aims and principles of the United Nations." I translated this draft into Russian and turned it to the Soviets. They seemed quite satisfied with this draft, without asking for making any substantive changes to it. Indeed, they were surprised that we the Chinese were able to produce such a sound draft for the treaty. The final version of the treaty was virtually based on this draft.

Following the agreement reached between Chairman Mao and Stalin at the 22 January meeting, the two sides also worked out "The Agreement on the Chinese Changchun Railroad, Port Arthur [Lüshun], and Daren [Dalian]." On the Chinese Changchun Railroad,

the agreement established that “the Soviet government transfer without compensation to the government of the PRC all its rights to joint administration of the Chinese Changchun Railroad with all the property belonging to the Railroad. The transfer shall be effected immediately after the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, but not later than the end of 1952.” Concerning Soviet naval base in Lüshun, the agreement set up that “the Soviet troops be withdrawn from the jointly utilized naval base Port Arthur, and that the installations in this area be handed over to the government of the PRC, immediately on the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, but no later than the end of 1952.” The Soviets, however, insisted on inserting to the agreement the clause that “the government of the PRC will compensate the Soviet Union for expenses it has incurred in restoring and constructing installations [in Lüshun] since 1945.” Further, the Soviets insisted that both the Chinese Changchun Railroad the Lüshun naval base, until the conclusion of a peace with Japan or the end of 1952, would continue to be placed under joint Sino-Soviet administration

The meetings also worked out the concrete condition on which the Soviet Union would provide China with a loan of 300 million U.S. dollars. The Soviets were willing to give a loan of larger sum. However, Chairman Mao believed that we should borrow only what we really needed and what we would be in a position to return. Therefore the loan was set at 300 million dollars and not more than that. The two sides agreed that the Soviet Union would provide the loan to China at an annual interest of one percent, and that China would return it in a ten-year period from 31 December 1954 to 31 December 1963.

The independent status of the Mongolian People’s Republic was another issue the meetings had discussed. In August 1945, the Nationalist Government and the Soviet Union exchanged formal notes to recognize outer Mongolia’s independence. During his visit to Moscow in summer 1949, Liu Shaoqi made it clear to the Soviets that following the principle of national self determination, we would recognize outer Mongolia as an independent country. At one meeting Chairman Mao and Stalin both attended, Premier Zhou stated: “Concerning the independent status of the Mongolian People’s Republic, China plans to issue a statement.”

Stalin was immediately alarmed. Seemed surprised, he said: “Isn’t it true that the problem of Mongolia has already been solved? If there does not exist a Mongolia problem, what statement can be issued about it? Further, the Mongolian comrades are not here today, how can we discuss the Mongolia problem? Who gave us the right to discuss other people’s fate?”

Premier Zhou explained patiently: “That is not what I mean. It is absolutely necessary for our government to issue a statement. When the establishment of the People’s Republic of China was proclaimed, we announced that we would not recognize any international pact or treaty accredited by the old China. Mongolia’s independence was handled by the Guomindang. The democratic figures in our country asked us: If you are not to recognize any international pact and treaty accredited by the Guomindang, what is your attitude toward the independence of Mongolia. We must make our attitude toward this issue clear.”

Stalin, greatly relieved, said: “We may both issue a statement. Maybe it is more proper for China first to issue a statement and the government of the Soviet Union will then issue a statement to support it. The Mongolian government may also issue a statement to make known of its position on this issue.”

Through the meetings between Premier Zhou and Mikoyan and Vyshinsky, the two sides decided to include the following paragraph in the joint Sino-Soviet communiqué that

was to be issued when the new Sino-Soviet treaty was signed: “Both Governments affirm that the independent status of the Mongolian People’s Republic is fully guaranteed as a result of the plebiscite of 1945 and the establishment with it of diplomatic relations by the People’s Republic of China.”

A question that was discussed but not solved during the meetings was how to treat Soviet residents living in China (the majority were in the Northeast and Xinjiang). The main problem at issue was their citizenship and conditions on which they would remain in China. Some of them did not want the citizenship of the Soviet Union, but they were unwilling to get Chinese citizenship either. As a result, they became stateless, which China would not allow. Many of them did want to get Soviet citizenship, but the Soviet side was only willing to give citizenship to the young people but not the old. Many of the old people fled from Russia during and after the revolution, the Soviets thus took a skeptical attitude toward them. This problem would not be solved until after Stalin’s death (maybe in 1955).

Sometimes Stalin was very friendly. At one meeting, for example, Stalin took the initiative to mention that during Sheng Shicai’s reign period in Xinjiang, the Soviets helped the progressive elements there to establish armed forces and train cadres, so that they would be able to confront the Guomindang’s influence. As a result, the Soviets constructed a huge arsenal, which stored large quantity of military equipment and ammunition. Stalin said that the Soviet side had decided to transfer them all to the Chinese side, and he hoped that China would make specific arrangement to receive them. Chairman Mao immediately asked Premier Zhou to take care of this matter.

I remember that originally the two sides decided to make the new Sino-Soviet treaty effective for 20 years. However, for whatever reason, it later became 30 years. When translating the contents of the treaty for Chairman Mao, I called his attention to it. Chairman Mao said: “Originally it was set to run for 20 years, but was changed to 30 years later, and I don’t know when it was changed.” It seemed that Chairman Mao was unconcerned about the duration of the treaty.

Premier Zhou was extremely busy during these days. He needed to attend the negotiations for the new Sino-Soviet treaty and other pacts at the Kremlin; at the same time, it was his duty to direct the work of Li Fuchun’s group, who stayed at the Soviet Hotel and were conducting negotiations with the Soviets on more specific issues. At this moment, Sun Weishi, Premier Zhou’s adopted daughter, passed by Moscow on her way returning China after a series of drama performances in Europe (she was an actress). She came to see the Premier. I proposed keep her in Moscow to help interpret for the Premier in his daily life. The Premier agreed and Sun Weishi moved into the third floor of the **Jiemei** residence.

Although Chairman Mao and Stalin met for several times after Premier Zhou arrived in Moscow, the hidden gap between them still existed. I felt that Chairman Mao hoped to have a profound exchange of opinions with Stalin, but he never got an opportunity.

During one meeting, Stalin invited Chairman Mao, Premier Zhou and Wang Jiaxiang to another room. It seemed that he wanted to have a deeper conversation.

Chairman Mao brought the conversation to the past. He again mentioned that in the early 1930s the Party leaders who carried out a mistaken policyline had purge him and excluded him from the leadership. Stalin listened carefully.

Suddenly, Chairman Mao pointed to Wang Jiaxiang and said: “It was they who purged me. He was one of them, one of those who committed mistakes during the Jiangxi

Soviet period.” Both Wang Jiaxiang and Premier Zhou were made very nervous by the Chairman’s accusation.

Stalin echoed Chairman Mao: “Ah, Ambassador Wang, I don’t know that you had been such a terrible person. After all, you was one of those who had committed serious mistakes.”

Chairman Mao continued: “But he has corrected his mistakes. He now is our Party’s competent cadre.”

At this moment, however, Stalin suddenly changed the topic and the conversation was led to another direction. Chairman Mao continued to talk to Stalin, but I could feel the beating of his disappointing heart. The Chairman had been hoping to have a thorough discussion with Stalin about how he had been wrongly criticized in the CCP’s inner-Party struggle, so that the mistakes committed by the Comintern and the Soviet Party to the Chinese revolution, especially in the early and mid-1930s, would be finally settled. Stalin, however, seemed not interested in this, and was more willing to focus the discussion on the treaty and pacts that China and the Soviet Union were to sign. Probably he simply did not want to be reminded that the Comintern and the Soviet Party, he himself in particular, had committed mistakes toward the Chinese revolution. Probably he believed that he had already apologized to the Chinese comrades during Liu Shaoqi’s visit to Moscow, and it was unnecessary for him to repeat the apology. Whatever the reason was, a psychological gap had emerged between Chairman Mao and Stalin.

Stalin certainly could feel the gap. He called Chairman Mao the next day. I was then accompanying Premier Zhou at a meeting in the Kremlin, and it was Sun Weishi who received the phone call. Realizing that the caller was Stalin, Sun was frightened, saying “I can’t understand his words, I can’t understand his words,” and dropped the phone. Stalin then summoned me from the meeting room to his office, asking me to interpret for him and Chairman Mao. I could vividly feel the potential tension between the two leaders during this brief phone conversation.

Stalin : “How are you recently? Your life and your health?”

Chairman Mao: “All right.”

Stalin : “What are you considering? Do you have other wishes and requests? What else do we need to do?”

Chairman Mao: “Zhou Enlai is not here, he is having a meeting at the Kremlin.”

Stalin: “I am asking your opinion. I want to know if you have other opinions or considerations.”

Chairman Mao: “No, I have no other opinions. Zhou Enlai has the right to discuss everything.”

Stalin hanged up the phone. This was the last time he called Chairman Mao.

It was U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s 12 January 1950 speech at the National Press Club that triggered the most serious strife between Chairman Mao and Stalin. In this lengthy speech, Acheson created a series of rumors: “The Soviet Union is detaching the northern provinces of China from China and is attaching them to the Soviet Union. This process is complete in outer Mongolia. It also is nearly complete in Manchuria, and I am sure that in inner Mongolia and in Sinkiang [Xinjiang] there are very happy reports from Soviet agents to Moscow. That is what is going on. It is the detachment of these whole areas, vast areas--populated by Chinese--the detachment of these areas from China and their attachment

to the Soviet Union....The fact that the Soviet Union is taking the four northern provinces of China is the single most significant, most important fact, in the relations any foreign power with Asia."

On 17 January, the second day we returned from the trip to Leningrad, Molotov and Vyshinsky came to see Chairman Mao. The Chairman introduced to them China's different principles in establishing diplomatic relations with capitalist and socialist countries, emphasizing that China would not hurriedly pursue diplomatic relations with capitalist countries. Molotov said that he believed China had adopted the correct strategy, which made it impossible for imperialist countries to look down upon the new China.

Then Molotov handed a copy of Acheson's speech to Chairman Mao. He proposed that China, Mongolia, and the Soviet Union should each issue an official statement to rebut the shameless rumors Acheson had spread. The Chairman agreed immediately, without further clarifying what the Soviets meant by using the word "official."

On 21 January, the Soviet Union and Mongolia, in the name of their foreign ministers, issued the statement respectively. In his statement representing the Soviet government, Vyshinsky pointed out that "China now has its own people's government, which knows how to safeguard its national interest, its territory, and its people. The relationship between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union is established on the solid foundation of friendship and the mutual respect for each other's independence and territorial integrity." Countering Acheson's allegation about Soviet occupation of China's four northern regions (including Mongolia), the statement particularly emphasized that "outer Mongolia has existed as an independent country--the Mongolian People's Republic--for over three decades," and that "the Mongolian People's Republic and the People's Republic of China have established formal diplomatic relations."

Chairman Mao took this matter very seriously. After meeting Molotov, he personally drafted a statement, using stern language to criticize Acheson's speech. Early on the morning of 19 January, he cabled Liu Shaoqi, instructing him to issue the statement immediately in the name of Hu Qiaomu, director of the General Information Bureau of the Central People's Government. During the war years, it was a common practice for our Party to use the name of a journalist or an information officer to state the Party's attitude toward a particular issue, which had achieved very good effect.

But the Soviet leaders were not happy with our handling of this matter. One day late in January, Stalin invited Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou to meet him at the Kremlin. It was emphasized that on the Soviet side only Stalin and Molotov would be attending the meeting, and it was hoped that no one else on the Chinese side, except for Chairman Mao, Premier Zhou, and Shi Zhe (who would be the interpreter), would be present.

When we arrived at the meeting room, it was true that only Stalin and Molotov were there. Stalin spoke first: "We invited you to come here today to exchange opinions with you in a small circle. Comrade Molotov has something to say. Let us first listen to him."

Molotov said: "Last time we reached an agreement that we would each issue a formal statement to rebut the nonsense Acheson made in his speech. We also agreed that the statement should be issued in the name of the government. I want to know if the Chinese government has issued this statement?"

Chairman Mao replied: "Yes, we have issued the statement. It was issued in Hu Qiaomu's name."

Stalin asked: "Who is Hu Qiaomu?"

Chairman Mao replied: "He is director of the general information bureau. He issued the statement in that capacity too."

Stalin commented: "According to international custom, a journalist may express his opinions, or give a speech, or make comments on any problem, but none of this is to be regarded as representing the official stand and point of view. Therefore, if a statement is issued in a journalist's own name, he may say whatever he wants, and it counts for nothing."

Molotov followed: "What we have agreed is that China will issue a formal and official statement. In other words, it should be a statement with representation and authority. However, the general information bureau is not an authoritative agency. It cannot represent the government. The speech made by the director of the general information bureau does not necessarily represent the viewpoints of the government. The Chinese side has failed to act in accordance with what we agreed upon, which is a violation to our agreement. As a result, China's statement fails to get the effect as we have expected. We do not know how our Chinese comrades having been considering. But if we have reached an agreement, we must observe it. To observe what we have promised is an important part of our cooperative relationship. These are some of our considerations. We present them to the Chinese comrades to hear your response and explanation."

Stalin continued to make comments: "This matter has confused our steps. If we each act our own way, our strength will be reduced. I believe that we must keep the promise we have made, cooperate with each other, and coordinate our steps. This will make us more powerful. The coming days are still long, and we will have many opportunities to cooperate with each other. We may take this matter as a lesson and learn from it, so that our cooperation will be enhanced in the future. This is what we need and can do now. This is not a big matter. But because we have failed to act in accordance with the original arrangement, our steps become confused, leaving space for the enemy to maneuver."

It was apparent that Molotov said everything to reflect Stalin's intentions. This meeting produced no positive effect at all.

Stalin and Molotov angered Chairman Mao, who not say a single word throughout the meeting. Premier Zhou tried to make some explanations. But in the tense atmosphere that had already existed, there was really very little he could do.

The meeting was short. After it ended, we, together with Stalin, left the Kremlin to Stalin's villa. Stalin particularly arranged Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou to sit in the back seats of his car, and he himself and I took the added seats. A deep silence ascended, making everyone's heart beating hard.

In order to relax the atmosphere, I began to chat with Stalin, asking him: "Do you remember that you said that you would visit the quarters of our delegation?"

Stalin immediately replied: "Yes, I remember. I still want to come for a visit."

Before he could finish, Chairman Mao asked me: "What are you telling him? Are you inviting him to visit us? Don't do that."

I immediately acknowledged that I had already invited him.

The Chairman ordered: "Take it back. We are not going to invite him."

As if he had understood what we were talking about, Stalin asked me: "What did he say?"

I replied: "That is something between us."

A loud silence again ascended, in which everyone sit for the next thirty minutes.

When we arrived at the villa, there were only four of us, leaving Molotov's car far behind. After about half an hour, Malenkov, Bulganin, Beria, Kagannovich, Vyshinsky, and Roschin also arrived. Then a banquet began. But the atmosphere was somewhat cold, with no sense of pleasure. Chairman Mao was still silent, not talking to anyone. Malenkov and the others did not know what the purpose of the banquet was, let alone understand why Chairman Mao was so unhappy. But they dared not to ask. In order to break up the silence, Stalin left his seat to put on the gramophone, so that everyone would listen to music. Then he invited everyone to dance. All the Soviets left their seats and began dancing. But we Chinese were sitting there and watching until our Soviet hosts pulled Premier Zhou and me to join them. Several Soviet leaders tried to invite Chairman Mao to join the dancing, but the Chairman rejected them all. Everyone felt under the weather, the banquet and the dancing ended in low spirits. We returned to our quarters well after midnight.

Premier Zhou was a compromising element that evening. He ate, drank, joined the dancing, even sang songs and made jokes. But he never let any of his movement go beyond the boundary allowed by Chairman Mao's mood, while at the same time he never let anyone feel that he exactly followed the Chairman's steps. His behavior certainly fit his position as China's Premier and Foreign Minister, and he would neither lose his principles and self-respect nor damage his own image. He truly did everything possible to create an environment that was more relaxed, harmonious and friendly. That evening, his effort succeeded in reducing the tension between Chairman Mao and Stalin, but it was far short of bridging the gaps between the two leaders. If the Premier had not been that evening, the atmosphere would have been much heavier and more tense. On such an occasion, Premier Zhou proved himself to be a master at diplomacy.

How do I feel about Stalin's attitude toward Chairman Mao and the Chinese comrades? To be fair, Stalin's attitude to us was warm and sincere. He often emphasized that both the Russians and the Chinese were Eastern nations. In a period as long as over a century, China had been humiliated by foreign powers and oppressed by the imperialists. China was a great country, with considerable influence in the world. The Chinese people had long and superior civilization, and were thus intelligent and wise. The Chinese party was a mature party, which had raised large numbers of experienced cadres.

In several of Stalin's meetings with Chairman Mao and other Chinese leaders, I was the only interpreter, which was against the Soviet Union's usual practice that the interpreter must be a Russian. By doing this, Stalin showed his trust of us.

Stalin looked down upon the leaders of many countries in the world. But his attitude toward Chairman Mao was different, demonstrating real respect. From 1949 to his death in 1953, Stalin would personally handle all matters, big and small alike, between China and the Soviet Union, and between the Chinese and Soviet Parties, and would not allow anyone else to interfere with them. He did this not only because he wanted to demonstrate the importance he attached on China, but also because he was afraid that any mistakes committed by other people would damage the Soviet Union's relations with China.

For a Chinese leader visiting the Soviet union, be he Mao Zedong , Liu Shaoqi, or Zhou Enlai, the people at the Kremlin would regard him as Stalin's guest, and would never dare to neglect him. This was particularly true when Chairman Mao was in Moscow. The Soviets demonstrated the same respect they showed for Stalin and they would always say:

“Mao Zedong is Stalin’s personal guest.” But I felt that Chairman Mao was not really convinced by all of this.

During Chairman Mao's stay in Moscow, Stalin did talk with him about Kim Il-sung's plan to liberate the whole of Korea. Stalin told Chairman Mao that Kim had come to him with the ideas [of the plan] and he asked Kim if there existed any condition unfavorable to his plan, such as whether the Americans would intervene. He found that Kim was in a high mood. "He will only listen to the voice for his ideas, not the voice against his ideas; he was really young and brave," commented Stalin. Then Stalin asked Chairman Mao's opinions about Kim's plan, especially if he thought the Americans would intervene. Chairman Mao did not answer immediately. After a while, he said: "The Americans might not come in because this is Korea's internal affairs, but the Korean comrades need to take America's intervention into account." In fact, Chairman Mao held reservations about Kim Il-sung's plan. Chairman Mao had anticipated that Kim Il-sung would attack the South no matter what happened.

After a series of meetings, Premier Zhou and the Soviet leaders had finalized the text of the new Sino-Soviet treaty. In the morning of 14 February, the Soviets invited the Chinese delegation to the Kremlin to attend the treaty's signing ceremony. In a room next to Stalin's office, Chairman Mao, Premier Zhou, and I, and Stalin, Malenkov, Beria, and Vyshinsky, gathered. The other members of the Chinese delegation were in another room.

Stalin asked Premier Zhou and Vyshinsky: "Have you reached an agreement about today's procedures? Have all the people who should attend today's ceremony arrived?"

Vyshinsky replied: "We need to wait for a while."

Stalin asked: "I conveyed to you a letter from our diplomats a few days ago, asking you to study it first, prepare an answer and then we will discuss it. Have you read the letter? What is your opinion?"

Vyshinsky replied: "I have read it. But I hope to get your opinion first and then draft the answer."

Stalin walked to a small room while at the same time talking to Vyshinsky: "I have read the letter, nor have thought about it. How can you get my opinion? I convey the letter to you because I want you to provide your opinion."

Vyshinsky made a wry face behind Stalin, muttering to my ears: "Actually I have not read the report, how can I give him my opinion about it."

I smiled: "So you lied to him."

Vyshinsky said: "This is a small trick, otherwise how will I respond to his question?"

After a while, the signing ceremony began. The attendants on the Chinese side were Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Li Fuchun, Chen Boda, Wang Jiaxiang, Shai Fuding, and I. and those on the Soviet side were Stalin, Molotov, Voloshilov, Malenkov, Gromyko, and Roschin. Zhou Enlai and Vyshinsky represented the two governments to sign on the new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, Friendship and Mutual Assistance.

At the ceremony, Stalin and Chairman Mao stood in the center. Stalin was shorter than Chairman Mao. When the correspondents took pictures and made film for them, I noticed that Stalin intentionally made a short step forward, so that in the picture and film he would look as tall as Chairman Mao, probably even taller. Scores of cameras were aiming at us, the warmth produced by their flash lights made everyone sweating. Even Stalin had to adjust his gesture from time to time.

Suddenly Stalin said to me: "You failed to fulfill the translation task, causing the delay of printing the trade pact. Otherwise, we would sign the it today together with the main treaty. How wonderful it would be."

Chairman Mao immediately asked me what Stalin talked to me, and Stalin also asked me to translate his words to the Chairman. I translated them truthfully.

Chairman Mao muttered: "So, flaws and mistakes always belong to the Chinese."

Stalin was very sensitive, his instinction told him that the Chairman was talking about him, so he asked me: "What did he say?"

"Nothing," I replied. "It was just about some private matters between us."

Stalin did not press for the answer.

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Source: Manuscript supplied and translated by Chen Jian. Draft translation: please do not quote without permission of the translator.

Conversation between Stalin and Mao, Moscow, 16 December 1949

[Classification level blacked out:
"NOT SECRET" Stamped]

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN COMRADE I.V. STALIN AND CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA MAO ZEDONG on 16 December 1949

After an exchange of greetings and a discussion of general topics, the following conversation took place.

Comrade Mao Zedong: The most important question at the present time is the question of establishing peace. China needs a period of 3-5 years of peace, which would be used to bring the economy back to pre-war levels and to stabilize the country in general. Decisions on the most important questions in China hinge on the prospects for a peaceful future. With this in mind the CC CPC [Central Committee of the Communist Party of China] entrusted me to ascertain from you, comr[ade]. Stalin, in what way and for how long will international peace be preserved.

Comrade Stalin: In China a war for peace, as it were, is taking place. The question of peace greatly preoccupies the Soviet Union as well, though we have already had peace for the past four years. With regards to China, there is no immediate threat at the present time: Japan has yet to stand up on its feet and is thus not ready for war; America, though it screams war, is actually afraid of war more than anything; Europe is afraid of war; in essence, there is no one to fight with China, not unless Kim Il Sung decides to invade China?

Peace will depend on our efforts. If we continue to be friendly, peace can last not only 5-10 years, but 20-25 years and perhaps even longer.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Since Liu Shaoqi's return to China, CC CPC has been discussing the treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance between China and the USSR.

Comrade Stalin: This question we can discuss and decide. We must ascertain whether to declare the continuation of the current 1945 treaty of alliance and friendship between the USSR and China, to announce impending changes in the future, or to make these changes right now.

As you know, this treaty was concluded between the USSR and China as a result of the Yalta Agreement, which provided for the main points of the treaty (the question of the Kurile Islands, South Sakhalin, Port Arthur, etc.). That is, the given treaty was concluded, so to speak, with the consent of America and England. Keeping in mind this circumstance, we, within our inner circle, have decided not to modify any of the points of this treaty for now, since a change in even one point could give America and England the legal grounds to raise questions about modifying also the treaty's provisions concerning the Kurile Islands, South Sakhalin, etc. This is why we searched to find a way to modify the current treaty in effect while formally maintaining its provisions, in this case by formally maintaining the Soviet Union's right to station its troops at Port Arthur while, at the request of the Chinese government, actually withdrawing the Soviet Armed forces currently stationed there. Such an operation could be carried out upon China's request.

One could do the same with KChZhD [Chinese Changchun Railroad, which traverses Manchuria], that is, to effectively modify the corresponding points of the agreement while formally maintaining its provisions, upon China's request.

If, on the other hand, the Chinese comrades are not satisfied with this strategy, they can present their own proposals.

Comrade Mao Zedong: The present situation with regard to KChZhD and Port Arthur corresponds well with Chinese interests, as the Chinese forces are inadequate to effectively fight against imperialist aggression. In addition, KChZhD is a training school for the preparation of Chinese cadres in railroad and industry.

Comrade Stalin: The withdrawal of troops does not mean that Soviet Union refuses to assist China, if such assistance is needed. The fact is that we, as communists, are not altogether comfortable with stationing our forces on foreign soil, especially on the soil of a friendly nation. Given this situation anyone could say that if Soviet forces can be stationed on Chinese territory, then why could not the British, for example, station their forces in Hong Kong, or the Americans in Tokyo?

We would gain much in the arena of international relations if, with mutual agreement, the Soviet forces were to be withdrawn from Port Arthur. In addition, the withdrawal of Soviet forces would provide a serious boost to Chinese communists in their relations with the national bourgeoisie. Everyone would see that the communists have managed to achieve what [Nationalist Chinese leader] Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] could not. The Chinese communists must take the national bourgeoisie into consideration.

The treaty ensures the USSR's right to station its troops in Port Arthur. But the USSR is not obligated to exercise this right and can withdraw its troops upon Chinese request. However, if this is unsuitable, the troops in Port Arthur can remain there for 2, 5, or 10 years, whatever suits China best. Let them not misunderstand that we want to run away from China. We can stay there for 20 years even.

Comrade Mao Zedong: In discussing the treaty in China we had not taken into account the American and English positions regarding the Yalta agreement. We must act in a way that is best for the common cause. This question merits further consideration. However, it is already becoming clear that the treaty should not be modified at the present time, nor should one rush to withdraw troops from Port Arthur.

Should not Zhou Enlai visit Moscow in order to decide the treaty question?

Comrade Stalin: No, this question you must decide for yourselves. Zhou may be needed in regard to other matters.

Comrade Mao Zedong: We would like to decide on the question of Soviet credit to China, that is to draw up a credit agreement for 300.000.000 dollars between the governments of the USSR and China.

Comrade Stalin: This can be done. If you would like to formalize this agreement now, we can.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Yes, exactly now, as this would resonate well in China. At the same time it is necessary to resolve the question of trade, especially between the USSR and Xinjiang [Sinkiang], though at present we cannot present a specific trade operations plan for this region.

Comrade Stalin: We must know right now what kind of equipment China will need, especially now, since we do not have equipment in reserve and the request for industrial goods must be submitted ahead of time.

Comrade Mao Zedong: We are having difficulties in putting together a request for equipment, as the industrial picture is as yet unclear.

Comrade Stalin: It is desirable to expedite the preparation of this request, as requests for equipment are submitted to our industry at least a year in advance.

Comrade Mao Zedong: We would very much like to receive assistance from the USSR in creating air transportation routes.

Comrade Stalin: We are ready to render such assistance. Air routes can be established over Xinjiang and the MPR [Mongolian People's Republic]. We have specialists. We will give you assistance.

Comrade Mao Zedong: We would also like to receive your assistance in creating a naval force.

Comrade Stalin: Cadres for Chinese navy could be prepared at Port Arthur. You give us people, and we will give you ships. Trained cadres of the Chinese navy could then return to China on these ships.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Guomindang [Kuomintang] supporters have built a naval and air base on the island of Formosa [Taiwan]. Our lack of naval forces and aviation makes the occupation of the island by the People's Liberation Army [PLA] more difficult. With regard to this, some of our generals have been voicing opinions that we should request assistance from the Soviet Union, which could send volunteer pilots or secret military detachments to speed up the conquest of Formosa.

Comrade Stalin: Assistance has not been ruled out, though one ought to consider the form of such assistance. What is most important here is not to give Americans a pretext to intervene. With regard to headquarters staff and instructors we can give them to you anytime. The rest we will have to think about.

Do you have any assault landing units?

Comrade Mao Zedong: We have one former Guomindang assault landing regiment unit which came over to join our side.

Comrade Stalin: One could select a company of landing forces, train them in propaganda, send them over to Formosa, and through them organize an uprising on the isle.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Our troops have approached the borders of Burma and Indo-China. As a result, the Americans and the British are alarmed, not knowing whether we will cross the border or whether our troops will halt their movement.

Comrade Stalin: One could create a rumor that you are preparing to cross the border and in this way frighten the imperialists a bit.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Several countries, especially Britain, are actively campaigning to recognize the People's Republic of China. However, we believe that we should not rush to be recognized. We must first bring about order to the country, strengthen our position, and then we can talk to foreign imperialists.

Comrade Stalin: That is a good policy. In addition, there is no need for you to create conflicts with the British and the Americans. If, for example, there will be a need to put pressure on the British, this can be done by resorting to a conflict between the Guangdong province and Hong Kong. And to resolve this conflict, Mao Zedong could come forward as the mediator. The main point is not to rush and to avoid conflicts.

Are there foreign banks operating in Shanghai?

Comrade Mao Zedong: Yes.

Comrade Stalin: And whom are they serving?

Comrade Mao Zedong: The Chinese national bourgeoisie and foreign enterprises which so far we have not touched. As for the foreigners' spheres of influence, the British predominate in investments in the economic and commercial sectors, while the Americans lead in the sector of cultural-educational organizations.

Comrade Stalin: What is the situation regarding Japanese enterprises?

Comrade Mao Zedong: They have been nationalized.

Comrade Stalin: In whose hands is the customs agency?

Comrade Mao Zedong: In the hands of the government.

Comrade Stalin: It is important to focus attention on the customs agency as it is usually a good source of government revenue.

Comrade Mao Zedong: In the military and political sectors we have already achieved complete success; as for cultural and economic sectors, we have as yet not freed ourselves from foreign influence there.

Comrade Stalin: Do you have inspectors and agents overseeing foreign enterprises, banks, etc.?

Comrade Mao Zedong: Yes, we have. We are carrying out such work in the study and oversight of foreign enterprises (the Kailan [?] mines, electric power plants and aqueducts in Shanghai, etc.).

Comrade Stalin: One should have government inspectors who must operate legally. The foreigners should also be taxed at higher levels than the Chinese.

Who owns the enterprises mining wolfram [tungsten], molybdenum, and petroleum?

Comrade Mao Zedong: The government.

Comrade Stalin: It is important to increase the mining of minerals and especially of petroleum. You could build an oil pipeline from western Lanzhou to Chengdu [?], and then transport fuel by ship.

Comrade Mao Zedong: So far we have not decided which districts of China we should strive to develop first - the coastal areas or those inland, since we were unsure of the prospects for peace.

Comrade Stalin: Petroleum, coal, and metal are always needed, regardless of whether there be war or not.

Comrade Stalin: Can rubber-bearing trees be grown in southern China?

Comrade Mao Zedong: So far it has not been possible.

Comrade Stalin: Is there a meteorological service in China?

Comrade Mao Zedong: No, it has not been established yet.

Comrade Stalin: It should be established.

Comrade Stalin: We would like to receive from you a list of your works which could be translated into Russian.

Comrade Mao Zedong: I am currently reviewing my works which were published in various local publishing houses and which contain a mass of errors and misrepresentations. I plan to complete this review by spring of 1950. However, I would like to receive help from Soviet comrades: first of all, to work on the texts with Russian translators and, secondly, to receive help in editing the Chinese original.

Comrade Stalin: This can be done. However, do you need your works edited?

Comrade Mao Zedong: Yes, and I ask you to select a comrade suitable for such a task, say, for example, someone from CC VKP/b/ [All-Union Communist Party of bolsheviks].

Comrade Stalin: It can be arranged, if indeed there is such a need.

Also present at the meeting: comrs. Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, Vyshinskii, [Soviet translator N.T.] Fedorenko and [Chinese translator] Shi Zhe /Karskii/.

Recorded by comr. Fedorenko.
[signature illegible 31/XII]

Source: "Stalin's Conversations with Chinese Leaders," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 4-29 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, ll. 9-17).

Translated by Danny Rozas.

Conversation between Stalin and Mao, Moscow, 22 January 1950

RECORD OF CONVERSATION
BETWEEN COMRADE I.V. STALIN AND CHAIRMAN
OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S
GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
MAO ZEDONG

22 January 1950

After an exchange of greetings and a short discussion of general topics, the following conversation took place.

Stalin: There are two groups of questions which must be discussed: the first group of questions concerns the existing agreements between the USSR and China; the second group of questions concerns the current events in Manchuria, Xinjiang, etc.

I think that it would be better to begin not with the current events, but rather with a discussion of the existing agreements. We believe that these agreements need to be changed, though earlier we had thought that they could be left intact. The existing agreements, including the treaty, should be changed because war against Japan figures at the very heart of the treaty. Since the war is over and Japan has been crushed, the situation has been altered, and now the treaty has become an anachronism.

I ask to hear your opinion regarding the treaty of friendship and alliance.

Mao Zedong: So far we have not worked out a concrete draft of the treaty, only a few outlines.

Stalin: We can exchange opinions, and then prepare an appropriate draft.

Mao Zedong: Judging from the current situation, we believe that we should strengthen our existing friendship using the help of treaties and agreements. This would resonate well both in China and in the international arena. Everything that guarantees the future prosperity of our countries must be stated in the treaty of alliance and friendship, including the necessity of avoiding a repetition of Japanese aggression. So long as we show interest in the prosperity of our countries, one cannot rule out the possibility that the imperialist countries will attempt to hinder us.

Stalin: True. Japan still has cadres remaining, and it will certainly lift itself up again, especially if Americans continue their current policy.

Mao Zedong: Two points that I made earlier are cardinal in changing our future treaty from the existing one. Previously, the Guomindang spoke of friendship in words only. Now the situation has changed, with all the conditions for real friendship and cooperation in place.

In addition, whereas before there was talk of cooperation in the war against Japan, now attention must turn to preventing Japanese aggression. The new treaty must include the questions of political, economic, cultural and military cooperation. Of most importance will be the question of economic cooperation.

Stalin: Is it necessary to keep the provision, stated in article 3 of the current Treaty of friendship: "...This article shall remain in force up until that time when, by request of both High Participants in the Treaty, the United Nations is given the responsibility of preventing any future aggression on the part of Japan"?

Mao Zedong: I don't believe it is necessary to keep this provision.

Stalin: We also believe that it is unnecessary. What provisions do we need to specify in the new treaty?

Mao Zedong: We believe that the new treaty should include a paragraph on consultation regarding international concerns. The addition of this paragraph would strengthen our position, since among the Chinese national bourgeoisie there are objections to the policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union on questions of international concern.

Stalin: Good. When signing a treaty of friendship and cooperation, the inclusion of such a paragraph goes without saying.

Mao Zedong: That's right.

Stalin: To whom shall we entrust the preparation of the draft? I believe that we should entrust it to [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei] Vyshinskii and [Chinese Foreign Minister] Zhou Enlai.

Mao Zedong: Agreed.

Stalin: Let us move over to the agreement on KChZhD. What proposals do you have on this question?

Mao Zedong: Perhaps we should accept as the guiding principle the idea of making practical changes concerning the KChZhD and the Port Arthur agreements, while legally continuing them in their present state?

Stalin: That is, you agree to declare the legal continuation of the current agreement, while, in effect, allowing appropriate changes to take place.

Mao Zedong: We must act so as to take into account the interests of both sides, China and the Soviet Union.

Stalin: True. We believe that the agreement concerning Port Arthur is not equitable.

Mao Zedong: But changing this agreement goes against the decisions of the Yalta Conference?!

Stalin: True, it does—and to hell with it! Once we have taken up the position that the treaties must be changed, we must go all the way. It is true that for us this entails certain inconveniences, and we will have to struggle against the Americans. But we are already reconciled to that.

Mao Zedong: This question worries us only because it may have undesirable consequences for the USSR.

Stalin: As you know, we made the current agreement during the war with Japan. We did not know that Jiang Jieshi would be toppled. We acted under the premise that the presence of our troops in Port Arthur would be in the interests of Soviet Union and democracy in China.

Mao Zedong: The matter is clear.

Stalin: In that case, would you deem the following scenario acceptable: declare that the agreement on Port Arthur shall remain in force until a peace treaty with Japan is signed, after which the Russian troops would be withdrawn from Port Arthur. Or perhaps one could propose another scenario: declare that the current agreement shall remain in place, while in effect withdrawing troops from Port Arthur. We will accept whichever of these scenarios is more suitable. We agree with both scenarios.

Mao Zedong: This question should be thought through. We agree with the opinion of Comrade Stalin and believe that the agreement on Port Arthur must remain in force until a peace treaty is signed with Japan, after which the treaty shall become invalid and the Soviet

soldiers will leave. However, we would like for Port Arthur to be a place for military collaboration, where we could train our military naval forces.

Stalin: The question of Dalny [Dairen; Dalian]. We have no intention of securing any Soviet rights in Dalny.

Mao Zedong: Will Dalny remain a free port?

Stalin: Since we are giving up our rights there, China must decide on its own the question of Dalny: will it remain a free port or not. During his time Roosevelt insisted that Dairen remain a free port.

Mao Zedong: So the preservation of the free port would be in the interests of America and Britain?

Stalin: Of course. It's a house with open gates.

Mao Zedong: We believe that Port Arthur could serve as a base for our military collaboration, while Dalny could serve as a base for Sino-Soviet economic collaboration. In Dalny there is a whole array of enterprises that we are in no position to exploit without Soviet assistance. We should develop a closer economic collaboration there.

Stalin: In other words, the agreement on Port Arthur will remain in force until a peace treaty is signed with Japan. After the signing of the peace treaty the existing agreement shall become invalid and the Russians shall withdraw their troops. Did I sum up your thoughts correctly?

Mao Zedong: Yes, basically so, and it is exactly this which we would like to set forth in the new treaty.

Stalin: Let us continue the discussion of the KChZhD question. Tell us, as an honest communist, what doubts do you have here?

Mao Zedong: The principal point is that the new treaty should note that joint exploitation and administration will continue in the future. However, in the case of administration, China should take the lead role here. Furthermore, it is necessary to examine the question of shortening the duration of the agreement and to determine the amount of investment by each side.

Molotov: The conditions governing the cooperation and joint administration of an enterprise by two interested countries usually provide for equal participation by both sides, as well as for alternation in the appointment of replacements for management positions. In the old agreement the administration of the railroad belonged to the Soviets; however, in the future we think it necessary to alternate in the creation of management functions. Let's say that such an alternation could take place every two-three years.

Zhou Enlai: Our comrades believe that the existing management of KChZhD and the office of the director ought to be abolished and a railroad administration commission be set up in their place; and that the offices of the commission chairman and of the director should be replaced by Chinese cadres. However, given comrade Molotov's proposals, this question requires more thought.

Stalin: If we are talking about joint administration, then it is important that the replacements for the managing position be alternated. That would be more logical. As for the duration of the agreement, we would not be against shortening it.

Zhou Enlai: Should we not change the ratio of capital investment by each side, by increasing the level of Chinese investment to 51%, instead of the current requirement for parity?

Molotov: This would go against the existing provision for parity.

Stalin: We do indeed have agreements with the Czechs and the Bulgarians which provide for parity and equal-footing for both sides. Since we already have joint administration, then we might as well have equal participation.

Mao Zedong: The question needs to be further examined, keeping in mind the interests of both sides.

Stalin: Let us discuss the credit agreement. We need to officially formalize that which has already been agreed to earlier. Do you have any observations to make?

Mao Zedong: Is the shipment of military arms considered a part of the monetary loan?

Stalin: This you can decide yourself: we can bill that towards the loan, or we can formalize it through trade agreements.

Mao Zedong: If the military shipments are billed towards the loan, then we will have little means left for industry. It appears that part of the military shipments will have to be billed towards the loan, while the other part will have to be paid with Chinese goods. Can't the period of delivery of industrial equipment and military arms be shortened from 5 to 3-4 years?

Stalin: We must examine our options. The matter rests in the requisition list for our industry. Nevertheless, we can move the date that the credit agreement goes into effect to 1 January 1950, since the shipments should begin just about now. If the agreement specified July 1949 as the time for the commencement of the loan, the international community would not be able to understand how an agreement could have been reached between the Soviet Union and China, which at the time did not even have its own government. It seems that you should hasten somewhat to present the requisition list for industrial equipment. It should be kept in mind that the sooner such a list is presented, the better for the matter at hand.

Mao Zedong: We believe that the conditions of the credit agreement are generally favorable to China. Under its terms we pay only one percent interest.

Stalin: Our credit agreements with people's democracies provide for two percent interest. We could, says comr. Stalin jokingly, increase this interest for you as well, if you would like. Of course, we acted under the premise that the Chinese economy was practically in ruin.

As is clear from the telegrams that we have received, the Chinese government intends to use its army in the reconstruction of its economy. That is very good. In our time we also made use of the army in our economic development and had very good results.

Mao Zedong: That's right. We are drawing on the experience of our Soviet comrades.

Stalin: You raised the question of China receiving a certain amount of grain for Xinjiang?

Mao Zedong: Wheat and textile.

Stalin: For this you need to come up with the necessary requests that include numbers.

Mao Zedong: Very well, we shall prepare these.

How shall we proceed with the trade agreement?

Stalin: What is your opinion? Up until now we have only had a trade agreement with Manchuria. We would like to know what sort of a situation we should look forward to in the future: will we be signing separate agreements with Xinjiang, Manchuria and other provinces, or a single agreement with the central government?

Mao Zedong: We would like to have a single, central agreement. But in time Xinjiang may have a separate agreement.

Stalin: Just Xinjiang; what about Manchuria?

Zhou Enlai: A separate agreement with Manchuria can be ruled out, since in the agreement with the central government China's obligations would in essence be fulfilled by shipments made from Manchuria.

Stalin: We would like the central government to sanction and take the responsibility for the agreements with Xinjiang or Manchuria.

Mao Zedong: The agreement with Xinjiang must be signed in the name of the central government.

Stalin: Right, since [a] provincial government might not take many things into account, whereas things are always clearer to the central government.

What other questions do you have?

Mao Zedong: At the present time the main question is economic cooperation - the reconstruction and development of the Manchurian economy.

Stalin: I think that we will entrust the preparation of this question to comrs. Mikoyan, Vyshinskii, Zhou Enlai, and [CCP CC member and Vice Chairman of Finance and Economics Commission] Li Fuchun.

Any other questions?

Mao Zedong: I would like to note that the air regiment that you sent to China was very helpful. They transported 10 thousand people. Let me thank you, Comrade Stalin, for the help and ask you to allow it to stay a little longer, so it could help transport provisions to [CCP CC member and commander of the PLA's Second Field Army] Liu Bocheng's troops, currently preparing for an attack on Tibet.

Stalin: It's good that you are preparing to attack. The Tibetans need to be subdued. As for the air regiment, we shall talk this over with the military personnel and give you an answer.

The meeting took two hours.

Present at the meeting were comrs. Molotov, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Vyshinskii, Roshchin, Fedorenko and Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Li Fuchun, [PRC Ambassador to the USSR] Wang Jiaxiang, [CCP CC member] Chen Boda, and Shi Zhe /Karskii/.

Source: "Stalin's Conversations with Chinese Leaders," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 4-29 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, ll. 29-38).

Translated by Danny Rozas.

Stalin's Conference with East European Delegates, January 9-12, 1951

Record I

[After a report by representatives of the bloc about the condition of their respective armies, Stalin took the floor to elaborate on the idea of the military occupation of the whole of Europe, insisting on the necessity of preparing it very well.]

[Since the Korean War had demonstrated the military weakness of the United States, despite its use of highly advanced technology, it seemed appropriate to Stalin to take advantage of this in Europe. He developed arguments in support of the following thesis:] "No European army is in a position to seriously oppose the Soviet army and it can even be anticipated that there will be no resistance at all. The current military power of the United States is not very great. For the time being, the Soviet camp therefore enjoys a distinct superiority. But this is merely temporary, for some three or four years. Afterward, the United States will have at its disposal means for transporting reinforcements to Europe and will also be able to take advantage of its atomic superiority. Consequently, it will be necessary to make use of this brief interval to systematically prepare our armies by mobilizing all our economic, political, and human resources. During the forthcoming three or four years, all of our domestic and international policies will be subordinated to this goal. Only the total mobilization of our resources will allow us to grasp this unique opportunity to extend socialism throughout the whole of Europe."

Source: Karel Kaplan, Dans les Archives du comité central: Trente ans de secrets du bloc soviétique, pp. 165-66.

Translated by Vojtech Mastny.

Record II

[Another record of the Moscow meeting, written shortly afterward by its Romanian participant, Minister of the Armed Forces Emil Bodnaras, has been preserved in Bucharest and was published there in 1995. According to this document, Stalin urged a buildup of the eastern European armies to deter an American attack rather than to prepare them for an attack on western Europe.]

[A conference of the leaders of the so-called People's Democracies and the Soviet Union was held from 9 to 12 January 1951 in Moscow. According to the Romanian delegation's report, based on notes taken during the sessions, the conference was attended by: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Vasilevsky, Shtemenko (USSR); the First or General Secretaries of the Communist Parties and the respective Defense Ministers, as follows: Ochab, Rokossovski (Poland); Slansky, Cepicka (Czechoslovakia); Rakosi, Farkas (Hungary); Gheorghiu-Dej, Bodnaras (Romania); Cervenkov, Panchovski (Bulgaria). Also attending were the Soviet principal military attaches to four countries: Gusev (Czechoslovakia), Boiko (Hungary), Kolganov (Romania), and Yemelianov (Bulgaria). The conference opened at 21:00 hours on Tuesday, 9 January in the Kremlin.]

Comrade Stalin opened the conference with the following remarks (rendition from notebook):

The opinion arose in recent times that the United States is an invincible power and is prepared to initiate a third world war. As it turns out, however, not only is the U.S. unprepared to initiate a third world war, but is unable even to cope with a small war such as the one in Korea.

It is obvious that the U.S. needs several more years for preparation. The U.S. is bogged down in Asia and will remain pinned down there for several years.

The fact that the U.S. will be tied down in Asia for the next two or three years constitutes a very favorable circumstance for us, for the world revolutionary movement. These two-to-three years we must use skillfully.

The U.S. has atomic power; we have that too. The U.S. has a large navy; but their navy can not play the decisive role in a war. The U.S. has a modern air force, but theirs is a weak air force, weaker than ours.

Our task consists of using the two-to-three years at our disposal in order to create a modern and powerful military force. This we are capable of doing, we have all the prerequisites for this. China has created a better army than those of the People's Democracies. It is abnormal that you should have weak armies. This situation must be turned around. You in the People's Democracies must, within two to three years, create modern and powerful armies that must be combat-ready by the end of the three-year period.

...The conference proceeded to designate comrade Molotov as its chairman. There followed the reports of the Defense Ministers of the People's Democracies, concerning the current preparedness of their armed forces, in the following order: [The rapporteurs listed: Rokossovski, Cepicka, Farkas, Bodnaras, Panchevski.] The presentation of the individual reports took 20 to 30 minutes on average. The reports led to the conclusion that none of the People's Democracies could meet the requirements of a war at the present time. While their preparedness level is practically identical, the countries have not coordinated their military organization and procurement plans.

All the reports, other than our own, confined themselves to describing the armed forces' organization and manpower, with their achievements and shortcomings; and included requests to the Soviet Union to upgrade the countries' military equipment. These reports failed to express resolve to do one's best for raising the military potential; and they made no reference at all to the need for coordination between the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies in terms of military organization, training, and procurement. Our report did contain these ideas.

...During the discussion on the reports, comrade Ochab dwelt on political considerations involved in developing the Polish army; and failed to discuss our specific proposal, even though Comrade Stalin had already (during the delivery of comrade Panchevski's report) expressed his view that [quote-unquote in the original] "the Romanian comrades' proposal is correct." Comrade Rakosi then requested the floor to support our proposal fully.

The other delegates did not get to speak after that because Comrade Stalin proceeded to conclude the session.

Comrade Stalin (rendition from notebook): We must speed up assistance to the comrades from the People's Democracies. We must deliver technical blueprints to them faster. We have made that decision already and I don't understand why it is not being implemented.

We must give the People's Democracies two radars per country, of the type that we currently possess, of 200 kilometer range, so that they learn to use it and to identify approaching enemy aircraft. Later it will be necessary to give them the new radars that we are now working on, of 400 kilometer range...A six-year plan such as that of the Poles is no good. What kind of a plan is this, for six years? Who can guarantee six years for you? Two to three years, that's the way to plan, that will do.

We must organize armies in the People's Democracies that would, in case of war, field 2 million to 2.5 million men from the first alert. We must carefully plan to equip this force well, with everything it needs. What do you say, Vasilevsky? Is 2 million, 2.5 million adequate?

Comrade Vasilevsky, supported by comrade Shtemenko: No, the People's Democracies can easily provide 4 million.

Comrade Stalin: If they provide 4 million, those will be poorly equipped. Preferably 3 million, to be available on first alert, well organized and equipped. That should be adequate. 3 million.

The Romanian comrades' proposal is correct. I consider that the Romanian comrades' proposal should be accepted and that the commission envisaged in that proposal should be entrusted with the task of equipping the forces. The commission, or whatever its name will be, should provide the forces with modern combat equipment in the appropriate amounts; so that everything be ready by the end of the three-year period.

We must provide jet fighter aircraft, at least one division per country...The most difficult problem to solve is that of ammunition, as our war experience shows. None of the People's Democracies can on its own provide everything it needs for war. Consequently they must help each other. That will be the role of the committee. Some raw materials ought to be replaced with other raw materials. For example, copper can be replaced with aluminum for many military items. Aluminum will do instead of copper, will do very well. We need lots of ammunition. An artillery piece, a rifle will last 5 to 10 years. But the weapons are useless without ammunition. We need a lot of bullets, shells, bombs, mines, etc.

No single country can be expected to produce everything. The tasks must be apportioned. Not every country should produce tanks and artillery guns. Select two or three countries that can produce those things faster and better....The airmen must be reliable, carefully screened, so that they don't defect with their aircraft across the borders. Anyway the fighter jets are for defense, you need a bomber force for the offense, at least one bomber division per country in the first stage.

That committee must deal with the procurement of modern equipment. That's the kind of committee we need. I propose appointing here and now a drafting group which will present recommendations within two to three days.

In a brief discussion it was decided that all the delegates from the People's Democracies would join the drafting group under the chairmanship of comrade Vasilevsky.

...The drafting group conferred on Wednesday, 10 January and Thursday, 11 January at the General Staff of the Soviet Army...The following peacetime and wartime manpower levels were set for each of the People's Democracies:

Poland: 350,000 in peacetime, 900,000 in wartime;

Czechoslovakia: 250,000 in peacetime, 700,000 in wartime;

Hungary: 150,000 in peacetime, 350,000 in wartime;

Romania: 250,000 in peacetime, 700,000 in wartime;

Bulgaria: 140,000 in peacetime, 350,000 in wartime;

Totals: 1,140,000 in peacetime, 3,000,000 in wartime.

...During the meeting there arose a dispute with Czechoslovakia's representatives. Comrade Slansky proposed that the coordinating body be comprised of nonpermanent representatives. We, however, maintained--considering the coordinating body's important tasks and Comrade Stalin's advice on the top secret nature of the committee's work--that it must be a highly authoritative body, that its members must be permanent ones. They must be selected from among competent and highly reliable individuals; two representatives from each country, including one military representative...

Comrade Farkas requested the floor to state his disagreement with the Czech [sic] proposal and his agreement with our proposal. Comrade Rakosi in turn supported our proposal. Comrade Vasilevsky asked for a 24-hour time-out in order to work out specific suggestions.

The meeting on Thursday, 11 January, which convened at the same appointed time of 16:00 in the same place, began with Marshal Vasilevsky proposing changes in the wartime manpower levels of Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, reducing Romania's by 100,000 and raising Hungary's and Bulgaria's by 50,000 each. The proposal was accepted unanimously, so that the wartime manpower levels of these three countries are set at: Romania 600,000, Hungary 400,000, Bulgaria 400,000.

...As regards the coordinating committee, the Soviet Marshal relayed a proposal that the committee should deal with procurement only. The Romanian delegation's previously submitted proposal, regarding other aspects of the committee's activities, was cited in the Soviet considerations which were ultimately accepted unanimously. On Friday, 12 January at 16:00 hours, the protocol on cooperation among the six countries was adopted in the form approved by the drafting group.

At 22:00 hours that night the last plenary meeting was held...It proceeded to discuss the appointment of a permanent chairman of the coordinating committee. Comrade Vasilevsky nominated comrade Bulganin. Comrade Stalin and the representatives of the People's Democracies' unanimously agreed with that proposal.

Comrade Stalin took the floor to draw the conclusions (rendition from notebook): You allotted too few jet fighter airplanes to Bulgaria. You proceeded from the size of its population, instead of proceeding from strategic considerations. Bulgaria has many enemies along its borders: Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia. We must allot Bulgaria more jet fighter airplanes. I consider it necessary to allot Bulgaria two divisions, instead of the one division and one regiment that you allotted.

Let me remind you that the three years at our disposal are not for sleeping, but for arming, and arming well. Why is this necessary? This is necessary in view of the imperialists' way of thinking: they are in the habit of attacking unarmed or weakly armed countries in order to

liquidate them, but they keep away from well armed countries. This is why you need to arm during this respite, and arm well, in order that the imperialists respect you and keep away from you.

This meeting lasted a total of 16 minutes.

Source: C. Cristescu, "Ianuarie 1951: Stalin decide înarmarea Romanei," Magazin Istoric, 1995, no. 10, pp. 15-23.

Translated by Vladimir Socor.

**Record of I. V. Stalin's Conversation with E. Hoxha
about Certain Foreign and Domestic Problems of Albania**

Moscow

April 2, 1951
22 hours, 00 minutes
TOP SECRET

Present: V. M. Molotov, G. M. Malenkov, L. P. Beria, N. A. Bulganin and Chief of the Albanian General Staff Bekir Baluku.

Comrade Stalin greets Enver Hoxha and Bekir Baluku, and asks them to have a seat at the table. Then he asks them, what questions they would like to ask him.

Enver Hoxha says that the Central Committee of the Albanian Labor Party and the government of the People's Republic of Albania instructed him to ask Comrade Stalin for help and advice in resolution of a number of issues facing the party and the government.

Comrade Stalin asks to present the questions.

Enver Hoxha says that first of all, he would like to present the contingency plans that were prepared by the government for a possible enemies' attack on Albania. The first version of the contingency plan starts from the assumption that Albania is attacked from three sides, namely from the Yugoslavian, Greek and Italian ones. The second version of the contingency plan starts from the assumption that one of the above mentioned countries would attack Albania. However, the government believes that it is most likely that an attack on Albania would occur from three sides simultaneously. The third version is a contingency plan for waging a guerilla war, mainly in the mountains. Enver Hoxha says that they brought detailed military maps with them that illustrate each version of the contingency plan separately. These maps show the main directions of possible enemy attacks against Albania. Enver Hoxha says that the first version of the contingency plan assumes that the Albanian government would be able to mobilize the army of approximately 150-175 thousand men, and with reserves it would reach 218 thousand. The Albanian army is currently armed with the Soviet weapons. The Albanian government also has trophy weapons, both German and Italian. Trophy weapons are old and are kept in storage. However, some border units are armed with the trophy weapons.

Comrade Stalin asks, if they have tanks.

Enver Hoxha responds that they have very few tanks: only 25. They also have very few planes. The Albanian army has only one aviation squadron.

Enver Hoxha then says that the Albanian government has information about the concentration of the enemy forces along the Albanian borders. Subversive acts and provocations continued to happen along the border. Very recently, for example, a Yugoslavian regiment came up to the Albanian border and began to dig trenches. However, some time later that regiment left.

Comrade Stalin notes that the Yugoslavs wanted to scare them. But they should not be scared and they should not be provoked.

Enver Hoxha says that the subversive acts and provocations are also carried out from the Greek and the Italian sides. That is why the Albanian government believes that an attack on Albania would occur from three sides simultaneously.

Comrade Stalin asks, how does the Albanian government know that Yugoslavia, Greece and Italy would attack Albania.

Enver Hoxha responds that the Albanian government does not know exactly, whether these countries would attack Albania. But the Albanian government believes it is likely that Yugoslavia, Greece and Italy could attack Albania simultaneously. In this connection, the Albanian government developed the contingency plan in three versions. The Albanian government asks Comrade Stalin and the Soviet government to provide assistance in giving the Albanian government the necessary

amounts of weapons and ammunition.

Comrade Stalin says that they do want to attack, but they cannot do that. There have been and will be more provocations, but they should not be afraid. The main task is to strengthen the army and the people's economy. They should not be provoked. Comrade Stalin recommends to address Bulganin on all the military issues, and asks them what other questions do they have.

Enver Hoxha says that he would like to tell Comrade Stalin about the internal situation in the country and in the party. The internal situation in Albania is quite solid. The population supports the government and gives it substantial cooperation in the struggle for liquidation of the enemy nests. The government has wiped out the gangs. Currently, they only have some scattered gangs that are hiding in the mountains. Those gangsters and subversive elements are trying to organize subversive acts. The biggest subversive act happened next to the building of the Soviet mission.¹³⁴ The Albanian government expresses its apologies in this connection, and fully accepts the blame for not having been able to prevent that subversive act. The situation inside the party is also solid. However, the Central Committee, the Politburo and the Secretariat have made serious mistakes in their work. The leadership was sitting in their offices and did not carry out the work among masses. The criticism and self-criticism were not at the necessary level. Such situation existed not only in the Central Committee, but also in the low-level organizations. They had to purge themselves from the opportunists and enemies, who infiltrated the party. First of all, we should classify Tuk Yakov, who could not carry out his work as the Secretary of the Central Committee for Personnel and Organizational Issues, as a deep opportunist. He turned out to be a convinced opportunist, who agreed with the party in his words, while practically doing different opportunistic things.

The Central Committee condemned the opportunistic line of Yakov Tuk and removed him from the Politburo. He was also removed from the position of the Central Committee Secretary. However, taking his self-critical statement into account, the Central Committee left Tuk Yakov as its member. Former Minister of Justice Manol Konomi was removed from the Central Committee for his opportunism as well. Currently, candidate member of the Central Committee Bikit Ndou¹³⁵, who was closely connected with former Deputy Minister of the Interior Sali Armeni, who committed suicide, is under arrest. The party continues to fight the hostile elements.

Comrade Stalin asks, what assistance in that issue do they need.

Enver Hoxha says that the Central Committee of the party and the government ask Comrade Stalin for advice, what to do in the future.

Comrade Stalin says that the main task is to purge the party of the enemies and to strengthen the internal security organs.

Enver Hoxha says that the Albanian government appeals to the Soviet government with a request to send 8 additional advisers for state security. Besides, the Albanian government asks the Soviet government to provide various kinds of weapons and ammunition, and 30 cars in addition to what has been already provided.

Comrade Stalin says that Enver Hoxha should raise this issue with comrade Mikoyan.¹³⁶ Then Comrade Stalin asks, if the Albanian government has some kind of plan for the development of the people's economy – whether a five-year plan, a three-year plan, or a two-year plan.

Enver Hoxha responds that they have a two-year plan of development of the people's economy, but it ended in 1950. Currently, they prepared a five-year plan of development of the people's economy, which includes 1951. The Albanian government plans to significantly expand the industry. To increase the extraction of petroleum products, bitumen, copper and coal. The Albanian

¹³⁴ He refers to the bomb explosion near the building of the Soviet diplomatic mission.

¹³⁵ As in the original. Should be: Bekir Ndou.

¹³⁶ See Document no. 177.

government plans to have 600 collective farms by the end of 1955, which will cultivate 140 thousands hectares of land. As far as the collectivization is concerned, the Albanian government follows the instructions that were given by Comrade Stalin. We are moving forward, but very cautiously. Before 1951, we had 60 collective farms, now we organized 30 collective farms more. However, 94 percent of all sowing land remains in the hands of private owners.

Comrade Stalin notes that they should not rush with this, and asks, what do the Albanian peasants primarily sow – corn or wheat.

Enver Hoxha responds that peasants prefer to sow corn, because they eat corn bread. The government took some measures to encourage peasants, who would sow cotton, but the peasants only unwillingly leave part of their land for cotton.

Comrade Stalin says that the peasants obviously do not see any benefit from sowing cotton, they do not have any material interest in sowing it. Then Comrade Stalin asks, how do collective farmers live – whether they live better or worse than other peasants.

Enver Hoxha responds that collective farmers live better.

Comrade Stalin says that when the peasants are convinced that it is beneficial for them to be members of collective farms, then they would join the collective farms. Comrade Stalin asks, what type of collective farms do they have in Albania.

Enver Hoxha responds that they have collective farms of the mixed type, i. e. the same collective farms sow sugar beets, cotton and corn.

Comrade Stalin asks, who selects the seeds.

Enver Hoxha responds that there is a small sector in the Ministry of Agriculture that is in charge of the seeds.

Comrade Stalin asks, whether the Ministry of Agriculture of the Albanian government visited the countries of people's democracy that are undertaking collectivization.

Enver Hoxha responds that they have not.

Comrade Stalin says that they devote serious attention to the industry, but insufficient attention to agriculture. Soviet agricultural organs almost never receive any requests from Albania regarding agriculture. The Soviet government could provide seeds and assistance with collective farms specialists. You need to put the specialists to work directly in the collective farms.

Enver Hoxha says that they are asking for many things already.

Comrade Stalin says that we do not receive any requests regarding agriculture and notes that the agriculture is not being seriously developed.

Comrade Stalin asks, what they did with the seeds, which were provided in Sukhumi.

Enver Hoxha responds that those seeds were used by collective farms.

Comrade Stalin asks, what other questions do they have.

Enver Hoxha says that the Albanian government would like to expel all the Greeks--more than thousand of them--from Albania, taking its international situation into account, and to expel the monarch-fascists, who are currently contained in the concentration camps first of all. They could be relocated to the countries of people's democracy.

Comrade Stalin says,--who would need the monarch-fascists in any of the countries of the people's democracy? He cannot not speak for those countries, because their representatives are not present at that conference, you would need to consult with them.

Enver Hoxha says that he made a request to Zakhryaris¹³⁷ but he still did not do anything.

Comrade Stalin says that we would have to ask them ourselves. Then Comrade Stalin asks, what other questions do they have.

Enver Hoxha says that the Albanian government has 2556 kilograms of gold and more than 3 thousand kilograms of silver in its reserves. The Albanian government appeals to the Soviet

¹³⁷ As in the original. Should be: Zakhariadis.

government with a request to allow them to send their gold and silver for safekeeping to the state bank of the Soviet Union. The Albanian government believes that that gold and silver would then be in a more reliable place, which would benefit the interests of the people.

Comrade Stalin says that Enver Hoxha should discuss this question with comrade Mikoyan.

Enver Hoxha says that the Albanian government decided to open three institutes: agricultural, political¹³⁸, and pedagogical. Some preparatory work had been already done. In this connection, the Albanian government appeals to the Soviet government with a request to send one deputy for education, and two or three professors to each institute.

Comrade Stalin notes that these professors do not know the language, how will they teach?

Enver Hoxha says that they are currently taking all measures in order to prepare the students. Currently, Russian is being introduced in schools.

Comrade Stalin recommends to discuss this question with comrade Mikoyan.

Enver Hoxha says that the Albanian government is asking the Soviet government to give a permission to exchange the Albanian cotton (1,600 tones) for Soviet cotton of higher quality. Enver Hoxha explains that the machines of the textile factory, named after Comrade Stalin, which would be opened in December of this year, are designed to process cotton with length of 27 to 28 millimeters, whereas the length of the Albanian cotton is 24 to 25 millimeters. Soviet specialists recommended them to do this exchange.

Comrade Stalin expresses his doubts regarding the conclusions of the specialists, and recommends to discuss this issue with comrade Mikoyan. Then Comrade Stalin asks, whether they have other questions.

Enver Hoxha says that the Albanian government and the Central Committee would like to consult with Comrade Stalin regarding a possibility of concluding treaties with the countries of people's democracy on the model of the treaty, which Albania has with Bulgaria.

Comrade Stalin says that Albania already has treaties and it receives credits and conducts commercial agreements under those treaties.

Enver Hoxha says that he does not have any more questions.

This ends the conversation.

The conversation lasted 1 hour 55 minutes.

Comrade K. F. STARIKOV translated and recorded the conversation.

Original

Source: Vostochnaia Evropa, edited by G.P. Murashko, et al, vol. 2, pp. 504-09 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 249, l. 90-97).

Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.

¹³⁸ As in the original. Should be: Polytechnical.

Meetings on 4.1&7.1952

[Wilhelm Pieck, Walter Ulbricht, Otto Grotewohl, Fred Oelsner, Stalin]

1. Meeting on 4.1.1952 — 21.00 - 23.07 hours in Moscow

Police — Armament

Law [Recht] not utilized

Create people's army — without noise

Pacifist period is over

SAG [Soviet stock companies] companies — sell half

Half of the profits

payment half in Mark

„ „ Goods

Grotewohl

Do not lead through ministries alone

5 proposals — pour 25,000 t pig iron

II a[nd] III quality

seamless pipes — 14,000 t

Economy/ 2.5 Mill[ion] rolling mill

check crude sheet metal

unequal distribution

Sell Neptun

Lead 7,000 t

Copper 10,000 t

Combine Cotton 8,000 t

Building machines

Mines Kombein [?] credit 1953

Lecturers — Uni — Party schools

Army — 8 military districts

9-10 army corps — 30 divis[ions] — 300,000

Training in SU

Youth service — pre-milit[ary] education

Begin with civilian org.

Company security

FDJ has to learn how to shoot

Submarine service

Train pilots

Infantry — divisions

Equipment

Carry out trials

— M. review 7 verdicts

no pacifism

Fill yourself with fighting spirit, we will help you.

Final meeting on 4.7 — 22.05 - 23.20 hours in Moscow

St[alin]: so far all proposals rejected

Situation:

no compromises

Creation European army — not against SU, but for power in Europe

Atlantic pact — independent state in the West

Demarcation line dangerous border

1st line German (*Stasi*), behind them Soviet soldiers

We have to count with terrorist acts.

Defense:

Re-establish the liquidated Soviet headquarters

3000

Armaments have to be produced,

immediately Russian rifles with ammunition.

Military training for inf[antry], navy, air force, submarines, tanks — artillery will be donated

also division of fighter planes [Jägerdivision]

Hoffmann — 24 units [Abt.] — 58,000

Not militia, but trained army. All without noise, but steadfast

Village:

Also creation of production-cooperatives in the village,

in order to encircle large farmers.

Begin skillfully in the fall.

Create examples — privileges

seed material, machines.

Instructors available.

Do not force anybody.

Do not yell collective farms — socialism

Create facts. At the beginning the deed.

— Road to socialism — state prod[uction] is socialist.

Better pay for engineers

1 : 1.7

2-3 x more than workers

Home

11-12.000 Rbl. to university graduates [Akademiker]

pay qualified workers better than unqualified

Theses not dealt with

Party not dealt with Party conference

KPD

Economic conference

Unity, Peace treaty — continue to agitate

Source: Wilhelm Pieck: Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik 1945-1953, edited by Rolf Badstübner and Wilfried Loth, pp. 395-397 (ZPA [Central Party Archive] NL 36/696, pp. 26-28, 38).

Translated by Ruud van Dijk, Dickinson College.

**Minutes of Conversation between Com[rade] Stalin and the Leaders SED
W. Pieck, W. Ulbricht, and O. Grotewohl**

Present: Comr[ade]s. Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, Semyonov (ACC [Allied Control Commission])

7 April 1952

Com[rade]. Stalin said that the last time W. Pieck raised the question about the prospects for the development of Germany in connection with the Soviet proposals on a peace treaty and the policy of the Americans and British in Germany. Comrade Stalin considers that irrespective of any proposals that we can make on the German question the Western powers will not agree with them and will not withdraw from Germany in any case. It would be a mistake to think that a compromise might emerge or that the Americans will agree with the draft of the peace treaty. The Americans need their army in West Germany to hold Western Europe in their hands. They say that they have there their army [to defend] against us. But the real goal of this army is to control Europe. The Americans will draw West Germany into the Atlantic Pact. They will create West German troops. Adenauer is in the pocket of the Americans. All ex-fascists and generals also are there. In reality there is an independent state being formed in West Germany. And you must organize your own state. The line of demarcation between East and West Germany must be seen as a frontier and not as a simple border but a dangerous one. One must strengthen the protection of this frontier.

Source: "Stalin and the SED Leadership, 7 April 1952: 'You Must Organize Your Own State'," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 4 (Fall 1994), pp. 34-5, 48 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 303, l. 179).

Translated by Mikhail Narinsky.

Conversation between Stalin and Zhou Enlai, 20 August 1952

[Classification level blacked out:
"NOT SECRET" stamped]

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN COMRADE
I.V. STALIN AND ZHOU ENLAI
20 August 1952

Present:

On the Soviet side
comrs. Molotov, Vyshinskii,
Fedorenko.

On the Chinese side comrs.

[Vice Premier] Chen Yun, Li Fuchun,

[PRC Ambassador to the USSR] Zhang Wentian, [Deputy chief of staff] Su Yu

Translated by

comrs. Fedorenko and Shi Zhe

Zhou Enlai sends Comrade Stalin greetings from Mao Zedong and inquires about Comrade Stalin's health.

Stalin thanks Zhou Enlai and inquires about Mao Zedong's health.

Zhou Enlai announces that Mao Zedong has been feeling well during the past two years. Speaks of the enormous amount of attention being focused in China on the upcoming [October 1952] XIX Congress of VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party of bolsheviks].

Stalin notes that there has not been a convention for a long time, that in 1939 there were only 1.5 mln. party members, while now there are about 6 mln.; even though we have been holding down the influx of new party members, the party is still growing.

He asks about the delegation's trip.

Zhou Enlai expresses thanks for the attention and answers that the trip went quite well and that the delegation travelled in full comfort. In the name of Mao Zedong, [he] thanks Comrade Stalin, the party CC [Central Committee] and the Soviet government for the enormous help in both the development of the national Chinese economy and in the struggle with its enemies.

Stalin. There is no need to thank. This is our duty. Wouldn't the Chinese comrades help us if we were in the same position?

Zhou Enlai agrees that this is true, adding that though assistance should be given, gratitude, obviously, should also be expressed.

Stalin. We must also thank the Chinese people for carrying on the right struggle. China also helps us by delivering us caoutchouc [natural rubber]. Thus, we will have to thank China as well.

Zhou Enlai says that, unfortunately, China's assistance to Soviet Union is insufficient.

Stalin. You came to power too late. You were late by more than 30 years.

Zhou Enlai asks for permission to set forth the reason for the delegation's visit. Refers to the telegram from Mao Zedong which contains the Chinese government's wishes. States three main topics to be discussed. First question - the situation in Korea. Second - the internal situation within PRC over the past three years and the five year plan for economic

development. Notes that a written report is under preparation. The Chinese delegation would like to deal with this question after the report has been presented. Third - the extension of the agreement on Port Arthur.

Stalin notes that the initiative to extend the joint use of the military naval base at Port Arthur must come from China. We are guests there, and guests don't ask such questions.

Zhou Enlai agrees with Comrade Stalin and offers to exchange diplomatic notes. The Chinese government shall address the Soviet government with the necessary request.

The next question concerns the construction of the railway from Ulan-Bator to the Sino-Mongol border.

Stalin asks whether China is interested in such a railway.

Zhou Enlai notes that a railway to Xinjiang would be of greater importance. But that would be a complicated and difficult construction project. The Chinese government is intent on first building a railroad to Mongolia which could then connect to Soviet Union. The length of this railroad on Chinese territory would be approximately 350 km. This railroad is projected to be completed by June 1955. Such a railroad serves Chinese interests as it opens a means of direct rail communication with Soviet Union and eases the receipt of industrial equipment from the USSR to China and the export of Chinese goods to Soviet Union.

Stalin responds that a railway to Xinjiang is very important in the long term, and that we could help China build this railway. But this is indeed a long project. If the Chinese comrades are interested in building a railway across Mongolia, we are ready to help in its construction within Mongolian territory. This would be quicker. However, we believe that one cannot lose sight of a Xinjiang railway, since this would be a very important railway which would pass through regions rich in oil. There should be oil there. Mongolia doesn't have much of it.

Zhou Enlai notes that there are large deposits of iron ore in the Pinditsiuan region, and that it will become the center of the railroad and steel industries. Right now a plan for the construction of the Xinjiang railway is being drafted. In the course of the first five year plan a railway will be constructed from Lanzhou to Khami. In the second five-year plan a railroad will be built from Khami to the USSR border.

Stalin approves of this and reiterates the significance of a Xinjiang railway with respect to prospective oil mining.

Zhou Enlai affirms that there are oil deposits all along this route. Moves on to the agreement on hevea [rubber] trees.

Stalin indicates that the question has been pretty much decided.

Zhou Enlai agrees and shifts to the question of the five year plan for the PRC's economic development. Says that a written report on the subject is under preparation and that, as soon as the report is completed, he would like to visit Comrade Stalin and personally go over the report with him.

Stalin agrees to this.

Zhou Enlai requests assistance for work in geological exploration.

Stalin promises such assistance.

Zhou Enlai shifts to the question of construction projects for various industrial enterprises in China. Says that there are 151 such enterprises planned to be constructed. Points out that China needs the Soviet Union's help in procuring equipment. Asks that the PRC's written request be considered and that an answer be given as to whether and in what capacity the Soviet Union would render such assistance, and that time periods be specified, and also that

Soviet specialists be sent to China. Emphasizes that Soviet specialists working in China have performed a great deal of work and have been of great help to China, especially in the area of training work cadres and specialists.

Stalin. That is most important. China must have its own cadres in order to stand strong on its own feet.

Zhou Enlai informs that they would like to receive an additional 800 specialists from Soviet Union.

Stalin says that this request will be examined and that we will try to send as many as we can.

Zhou Enlai asks also for assistance with technical documentation (blueprints, etc.).

Stalin answers that this is, indeed, necessary.

Zhou Enlai asks if it will be possible to continue to educate students in the USSR and to send interns to Soviet enterprises.

Stalin expresses agreement.

Zhou Enlai touches on the question of the military five year plan. Informs that materials are under preparation and that a written report will be presented. Also wishes to receive military equipment.

Stalin asks what Zhou Enlai has in mind: shipments of weapons or equipment for military factories.

Zhou Enlai says that he meant shipments of weapons. Noting that since agreement has already been expressed with regard to weapons for 60 divisions, he would like to discuss shipments for naval forces. Asks what sort of assistance could be received in the way of airplanes.

Stalin asks whether the Chinese government is thinking of building aero-manufacturing plants.

Zhou Enlai says that this would be very difficult to do in the course of the first five year plan, particularly with regard to jet airplanes. Notes that such construction is not planned to begin until at least 5 years from now, and motor-building - in 3 years.

Stalin points to the example of Czechoslovakia and Poland, which began with assembly plants. Says that the USSR could send China motors and other airplane parts, and China could organize the assembly of these airplanes. Cadres can be trained in this way. We went through the same process. Such a process would be more beneficial for Chinese comrades as well. First you must build 1-2 factories for motor assembly. We will send motors and other airplane parts which would then be assembled in China. That's how it was done in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. This ought to be organized. Having organized assembly plants, you could then, in another 3 years, build an airplane factory. That is the easiest and the best way.

Zhou Enlai says that they are beginning to understand this and are organizing maintenance and assembly plants. He adds that if Comrade Stalin finds it necessary to hasten the process, then they will take all appropriate measures to comply.

Stalin asks whether divisions of some sort have been organized in order to receive the shipment of weapons for 60 divisions which Soviet Union sent to China.

Zhou Enlai explains that out of the 10 divisions' worth of armaments that China has received, 3 have been given over to Korea and 7 have been earmarked for Chinese detachments in Korea.

Stalin asks if he understands correctly that all of the weapons will go to the Korean front.

Zhou Enlai affirms that it will be so, assuming that the war will continue. Informs that out of the total of 60 divisions' armaments, the Chinese government is intent on sending 3 to Korea, preparing 42 divisions [of Chinese soldiers] to serve in Korea [ellipsis in original]

Stalin asks whether the Chinese have gotten used to the new weapons.

Zhou Enlai explains that they are gradually becoming proficient with the new weapons, with 3-4 months of training.

Stalin. Under these circumstances we operate in a way so as to allow soldiers to become familiar with the weapons and the overall organization of the division. This takes time - approximately 6 months. Without it one could lose the weapons. Besides, during this time we inspect the operation of various mechanisms, and only then do we send these units to the front. Of course this preparation could be carried out behind the front, in Korea, for example. Half of the divisions receiving the new weapons should remain in China.

Zhou Enlai notes that the shipment of divisions to Korea results in losses, which must be made up.

Stalin emphasizes that it is imperative to train the divisions, so as to make them stronger.

Zhou Enlai raises the question of assistance with artillery.

Stalin asks whether China can produce ammunition.

Zhou Enlai answers that they have not yet addressed this question.

Stalin notes that, all in all, it is more difficult to transport ammunition than artillery pieces.

Zhou Enlai repeats his request for assistance with artillery. Emphasizes that for every Chinese shell fired, the Americans answer with 9 shells of their own.

Stalin. That's bad. Adds that if the Americans are firing 9 shells, the Chinese should be firing 20. We smothered the Germans with artillery. We had a gun stationed every 2 meters, while the Germans had a gun every kilometer. Artillery is important stuff. The Chinese government needs to get the munitions production going. We will help you build these factories.

Zhou Enlai points out that they are reorganizing existing factories and are planning new factories.

Stalin. That is necessary. Machine tools are of utmost importance here.

Zhou Enlai says that they have machine tools, but old ones.

Stalin says that machine tools are essential in the production of ammunition for 122mm, three-inch and anti-aircraft guns. We can help in this matter. Adds that it is not necessary to build large factories. We build ammunition in different plants: one plant makes shell casings while another loads them. It's difficult to do everything in one factory.

Zhou Enlai announces that the Chinese government will act upon the advice of the Soviet government regarding its aviation industry and take all measures to further its development.

Stalin emphasizes the importance of first organizing assembly plants.

Zhou Enlai says that the Chinese government plans to build tank-producing factories: one for light tanks with an output of 1 thousand tanks per year, and another for medium tanks, to be completed in 4-5 years.

Stalin advises to start here with assembly plans as well, pointing out that during the war we converted automobile factories to produce tanks. Says that it would be good for China to have 1-2 auto assembly plants.

Zhou Enlai says that they plan to build a factory in Changchun with an output of 20 thousand cars and are organizing an assembly plant with an output of 3 thousand cars a year. Asks for assistance in the planning of yet another factory.

Stalin emphasizes that cadres must receive training in assembly and maintenance factories. This issue must be addressed.

Zhou Enlai agrees completely with this observation and notes that the Chinese government is addressing this matter. They have maintenance factories and are currently working to organize assembly plants; these plants will open next year.

Stalin inquires whether China has worker education schools in their factories. Adds that we have such a school in every factory.

Zhou Enlai admits that this is one of the weaker spots. They are taking measures to rectify the situation. There are courses given in factories. They are trying to attract students and are selecting party members to teach.

Stalin points out that we have a special ministry, the Ministry of Labor Resources. There are vocational schools. It would be good for China to establish something of the sort. Every year these schools graduate around 1 mln. young workers.

Zhou Enlai asks, what sort of institutions does Soviet Union have to train middle management cadres[?]

Stalin explains that there are special technical schools for this purpose.

Zhou Enlai says that he would like to discuss the question of radar.

Stalin promises to assist in this matter. Radio and radar are very important.

Zhou Enlai says that they were thinking of building assembly plants for this purpose.

Stalin emphasizes that subsequently they should build radar equipment manufacturing plants.

Zhou Enlai says that so far they are not capable of producing radar equipment.

Stalin promises to help.

Zhou Enlai returns to the question of specialists. Says that the Chinese government does not intend merely to ask us for help with specialists but also plans to prepare its own specialists.

Stalin approves of this, pointing out that, in time, other countries will ask China for specialists: India, Burma, Indo-China. Adds that it would be wiser for the Chinese government to send engineers and technicians to Soviet factories, where they could hone their skills.

Zhou Enlai raises the question of defraying the costs that China bears from the trade imbalance between the two countries. Says that the Chinese government would like to ask for a new loan. However, observes Zhou Enlai, we understand that this would be a burden for the Soviet Union.

Stalin points out that this is because we came to power earlier, that we were lucky. If the Chinese comrades had come to power before us, then we would have had to ask the same of them.

To this Zhou Enlai responds that Moscow is the center from which all nations derive inspiration for their struggle for liberation.

He goes on to give a short account of the situation in Korea. He points out that up until May 1951 the war in Korea was not static, but was a war of movement. Since May 1951, a front has been established, and the war has become static. Both sides are about equal in strength. The enemy is in no position to carry out an offensive. There is a certain

equilibrium. But we are not carrying out large offensives, either. Like the enemy which has reinforced its position 15-20 km. deep, so have we created our own fortified zone, and continue to dig even now. The enemy has not been able to destroy our fortifications. The front line extends for about 200 km and is completely fortified, as are the left and right flanks.

Mao Zedong has put forth three questions. First - will we be able to repulse the enemy? We are convinced that we will. Second - will we be able to hold our present positions? This year has shown that we will be able to hold and strengthen our positions. Third - will we be able to carry out an offensive, to attack the enemy? Earlier we thought that we would hardly be able to carry out an offensive for more than 7 days. Now we are sufficiently strong to launch longer offensives and have entrenched ourselves well enough to withstand bombing raids.

Stalin asks whether they are capable of widening the scope of the offensives.

Zhou Enlai explains that they can launch offensives to capture isolated positions, but a general offensive would be difficult to carry out. Since the war acquired its static nature, the American command has been intent on drawing out the negotiations and is not interested in signing a truce.

Stalin says that apparently the Americans want to keep more Chinese POWs. That would explain their refusal to return POWs. Perhaps they turned them over to Jiang Jieshi.

Zhou Enlai affirms that there are agents of Jiang Jieshi among the POWs.

Stalin observes that Americans want to decide the POW question on their own, in defiance of all international laws. Under international law the warring sides are obligated to return all POWs, except those convicted of crimes. What does Mao Zedong think regarding this matter: will he give in or will he hold his own?

Zhou Enlai briefly relates the differences that separate them and the [North] Korean comrades in this matter. America has agreed to return 83 thousand POWs, and [North] Korea was ready to accept the offer. However, they have not considered the crafty game that America is playing here - out of the 83 thousand, only 6400 are Chinese, and the rest Koreans. In truth, they are supposed to return another 13,600 Chinese volunteers, but the Americans don't want to do this, though they are quite willing to return 76 thousand Koreans. This clearly shows that they are out to provoke us, by trying to drive a wedge between China and [North] Korea.

Stalin asks how many Korean POWs are there.

Zhou Enlai answers - 96,600. Emphasizes that the question of the number of Chinese and Korean POWs supposed to be returned is a matter of principle. Informs that the Chinese government is firmly committed on having all 116 thous. POWs, including 20 thous. Chinese, returned. But if Americans were to agree on returning a few less, then we would not strongly object, if [they] promised that negotiations for the return of the other POWs will continue.

Stalin affirms that this is the right position.

Zhou Enlai informs that Mao Zedong, having analyzed the current situation regarding this matter, believes that one should stand firmly committed on the return of all POWs. The [North] Koreans believe that the continuation of the war is not advantageous because the daily losses are greater than the number of POWs whose return is being discussed. But ending the war would not be advantageous to the USA. Mao Zedong believes that the

continuation of the war is advantageous to us, since it detracts USA from preparing for a new world war.

Stalin. Mao Zedong is right. This war is getting on America's nerves. The North Koreans have lost nothing, except for casualties that they suffered during the war. Americans understand that this war is not advantageous and they will have to end it, especially after it becomes clear that our troops will remain in China. Endurance and patience is needed here. Of course, one needs to understand Korea - they have suffered many casualties. But they need to be explained that this is an important matter. They need patience and lots of endurance. The war in Korea has shown America's weakness. The armies of 24 countries cannot continue the war in Korea for long, since they have not achieved their goals and cannot count on success in this matter. Koreans need our help and support.

Asks about the bread situation in Korea. Says that we can help them.

Zhou Enlai says that Korea is having difficulties in this regard. The Chinese government knows that USSR has helped Korea. Says that they have also helped Korea and have told Kim Il Sung that this is not an obstacle, that they will give them foodstuffs and clothing and everything they ask for, but that they cannot give weapons.

Stalin says that we can give Korea additional weapons. We will begrudge nothing to Korea.

Zhou Enlai repeats that they cannot yield to the Americans during the negotiations.

Stalin observes that if the Americans back down a little, then you can accept, assuming that negotiations will continue on questions still unresolved.

Zhou Enlai agrees, adding that if the Americans don't want peace, then we must be prepared to continue the war, even if it were to take another year.

Stalin affirms that this is correct.

Zhou Enlai emphasizes the truth of Comrade Stalin's observations, namely that this war is getting on America's nerves and that the USA is not ready for the world war. Adds that China, by playing the vanguard role in this war, is helping to stave off the war for 15-20 years, assuming that they will succeed in containing the American offensive in Korea. Then the USA will not be able to unleash a third world war at all.

Stalin says that this is true, but with one stipulation: Americans are not capable of waging a large-scale war at all, especially after the Korean war. All of their strength lies in air power and the atom bomb. Britain won't fight for America. America cannot defeat little Korea. One must be firm when dealing with America. The Chinese comrades must know that if America does not lose this war, then China will never recapture Taiwan. Americans are merchants. Every American soldier is a speculator, occupied with buying and selling. Germans conquered France in 20 days. It's been already two years, and USA has still not subdued little Korea. What kind of strength is that? America's primary weapons, says Comrade Stalin jokingly, are stockings, cigarettes, and other merchandise. They want to subjugate the world, yet they cannot subdue little Korea. No, Americans don't know how to fight. After the Korean war, in particular, they have lost the capability to wage a large-scale war. They are pinning their hopes on the atom bomb and air power. But one cannot win a war with that. One needs infantry, and they don't have much infantry; the infantry they do have is weak. They are fighting with little Korea, and already people are weeping in the USA. What will happen if they start a large-scale war? Then, perhaps, everyone will weep.

Zhou Enlai states that if America makes some sort of compromises, even if they are small, then they should accept. If America does not agree to return all POWs and proposes a smaller number, then they should accept the offer, under the condition that the question of the remaining POWs will be resolved under mediation by some neutral country, like India, or the remaining POWs transferred to this neutral country until the question is resolved.

Stalin asks how many American POWs there are.

Zhou Enlai explains that the overall number of POWs in North Korean and Chinese hands is 12,000, out of which 7,400 are South Koreans.

Stalin does not exclude such a resolution to the question, as proposed by Zhou Enlai. On his part, [he] proposes that they could announce to the Americans that if they are holding back a certain percentage of Korean and Chinese POWs, then North Korea and China will hold back the same percentage of South Korean and American POWs until a final solution to the POW question is agreed upon. This needs to be tried as a way of pressuring Americans by publicizing it in the press. If America rejects this offer, then it should be declared that they apparently want to send Chinese POWs to Jiang Jieshi. If these proposals are unsuccessful, then you can resort to mediation. The main thing here is to propose a ceasefire.

Zhou Enlai declares that, indeed, an armistice agreement also involves a cease-fire. On the POW question [he] enumerates three positions. First - announce from the beginning that they will hold back the same percentage of South Korean and American POWs as the percentage of North Koreans and Chinese held back by America, and leave it at that. Second - resort to mediation by a neutral country. Third - sign an armistice agreement by putting off the POW question and resuming its discussion afterwards.

Then Zhou Enlai returned to the question of military assistance and put forth the Korean comrades' request for 10 anti-aircraft gun regiments. We told the Koreans that we don't have such capabilities, but that we would bring this up with the Soviet government.

Stalin. Kim Il Sung asked as for 5 regiments. We promised to send him these. Perhaps China will also give 5 regiments?

Zhou Enlai repeats that they do not have such capabilities and that this is new to them.

Stalin says that this question needs to be cleared up with Kim Il Sung.

As for Zhou Enlai's request to send 10 regiments, irrespective of those promised earlier, Comrade Stalin answers that it will have to be examined.

Zhou Enlai brings up the Korean comrades' request for advice on whether they should start bombing South Korea. They are not sure whether it's the right way to go.

Stalin explains that the air force belongs to the state and that Chinese volunteers should not use state planes.

Zhou Enlai informs that the Korean comrades have asked about launching a new offensive, to which the Chinese government replied that they cannot carry out a strategic offensive.

Stalin points out that when armistice negotiations are taking place, they should not be launching either strategic or tactical offensives. They shouldn't be launching any offensives.

Zhou Enlai asks, referring to Mao Zedong's question whether Kim Il Sung and [Chinese military commander] Peng Dehuai should be invited to Moscow.

Stalin. I would happily talk to them, but they are far away. Besides, we are not very comfortable with inviting them. If they were to bring up the question, then we would happily welcome them here.

Zhou Enlai informs that Peng Dehuai would very much like to come, though he is unsure of what Kim Il Sung thinks. Perhaps it would be good to speak to them about this.

Stalin agrees.

Zhou Enlai repeats that the Chinese government believes that it is wise to continue the negotiations in Panmunjom. But China is preparing for the possibility of another 2-3 years of war. Again asks for assistance with aviation, artillery, and ammunition, as China cannot deal with these matters on its own.

Stalin announces that everything we can give you, we will.

Asks how is the Korean morale. Is there confusion?

Zhou Enlai explains that, indeed, there has been much destruction in Korea, especially after the bombing of the electric power station on the Yalu river. This has had an impact on Korean morale and on their efforts to accelerate the struggle to achieve peace.

Stalin says that the American strategy is fright. But they have not frightened China. Could it be said that they have also failed to frighten Korea?

Zhou Enlai affirms that one could essentially say that.

Stalin. If that is true, then it's not too bad.

Zhou Enlai adds that Korea is wavering somewhat. They are in a slightly unsteady state. Among certain elements of the Korean leadership one can detect a state of panic, even.

Stalin reminds that he has been already informed of these feelings through Kim Il Sung's telegram to Mao Zedong.

Zhou Enlai confirms this.

Asks how should the Chinese delegation proceed further.

Stalin proposes to start work immediately. Informs that Soviet Union has assigned a commission under the chairmanship of comrade Molotov and consisting of comrs. Bulganin, Mikoyan, Vyshinskii and Kумыkin, and that the Chinese delegation can speak to Molotov about when to start work.

Zhou Enlai expresses thanks for the information and asks Comrade Stalin to name the time when he can brief Comrade Stalin on the internal situation in the PRC.

Stalin agrees to see Zhou Enlai as soon as he receives a finished version of the written report.

Transcribed by

A. Vyshinskii [signature]

N. Fedorenko [signature]

Source: "Stalin's Conversations with Chinese Leaders," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 4-29 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, ll. 54-72).

Translated by Danny Rozas.

Conversation between Stalin and Zhou Enlai, 3 September 1952

RECORD OF MEETING BETWEEN COMRADES I.V. STALIN AND ZHOU ENLAI 3 September 1952

Present:

on the Soviet side
comrs. Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin,
Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich,
Vyshinskii, and Kумыkin.
on the Chinese side
comrs. Chen Yun, Li Fuchun,
Zhang Wentian, and Su Yu
translated by
comrs. Fedorenko and Shi Zhe.

After an exchange of greetings the discussion began with the question of the five year plan of the People's Republic of China.

Stalin. We have familiarized ourselves with your five year plan for construction. You are setting the yearly growth at 20%. Is not the setting of yearly industrial growth at 20% strained, or does the 20% provide for some reserve margin?

Zhou Enlai draws attention to the fact that they do not yet have sufficient experience in such planning. The experiences of the past three years has shown that the PRC is underestimating its capabilities. The feasibility of the plan will depend on the efforts of the Chinese people and on the assistance that China is counting on receiving from the USSR.

Stalin. We draft the five year plan with a reserve margin, as it is impossible to take into account every instance. There are various reasons that may affect the plan in one direction or another. We always include the civil and military industries in the plan. The PRC five year plan does not. In addition, it is necessary to have the complete picture of all expenditures provided by the plan.

We must know how much is required from us on a paragraph by paragraph basis. It is necessary to do the calculations. The given documents do not contain such data. Hence we cannot give our final answer. We need at least two months in order to do the calculations and tell you what we can provide you.

Usually it takes us at least a year to prepare our five year plan. Then we analyze the prepared draft for another 2 months, and still we manage to let mistakes go by.

We would like you to give us some two months to study your plan, so that we could answer your questions.

How do things stand in other matters? It seems that the question of Port Arthur has been examined. In that case we need to make a decision. If there are any sort of objections then they should be discussed right now.

In addition, it seems that there are also no objections to the draft communiqué on the transfer of KChZhD.

The third question concerns hevea [rubber] trees. We would like to receive from you 15 to 20 thousand tons of caoutchouc [natural rubber] each year. You, it seems, object, citing difficulties. The fact is that we have a tremendous need for caoutchouc, since automobiles and trucks, which are also being sent to you, require large amounts of rubber. We would like to receive at least 10-15 thousand tons of caoutchouc. We have not much opportunity to buy caoutchouc, since Britain keeps it to itself. We ask you to reexamine the question of purchasing for us the necessary amount of caoutchouc.

If all these questions get resolved, then the remaining can be decided with other delegation members, as it seems that Zhou Enlai is hastening to return.

Zhou Enlai says that it's difficult for him to remain here for two months, that he would like to return to China in mid-September. [Vice chairman of the Northeast (China) People's Government] Li Fuchun can remain here.

Stalin. Fine.

There still remains the question of constructing the new Ulan-Bator-Pinditsiuan railroad. The Mongolian Premier, who was just here in Moscow, has given his approval.

In other words, four questions remain to be decided by Zhou Enlai: Port Arthur, KChZhD, caoutchouc, and the construction of the new Ulan-Bator-Pinditsiuan railroad.

Zhou Enlai referring to the hevea question, says that they will take all measures in order to provide USSR with 15-20 thousand tons a year, but they are apprehensive that the blockade and other measures directed against China by its enemies may prevent it from fulfilling this commitment in full. The delegation is apprehensive that this may be seen as a breach of its commitments to the Soviet Union.

[He] repeats that they will take all measures to fulfill this commitment, but would like to reserve the right to explain the reasons and not be held in breach of its commitments, if in extraordinary cases the shipment falls short of what was promised.

Stalin says that he understands this. We can soften the wording in the agreement, by saying that China will strive in every possible way to realize the shipments of the stated amount. But if it is unable to deliver caoutchouc in the amount stipulated, then we will have to decrease the number of trucks ordered.

Asks jokingly whether President Ho Chi Minh might not be able to help in this matter.

Zhou Enlai notes that China has many options in this regard (mostly through contraband).

[He] returns to the question of the construction of the new railroad. Notes that here are no objections.

Stalin notes that they can make public announcements on Port Arthur and KChZhD, but not on hevea, and only make announcements on the Ulan-Bator-Pinditsiuan railroad once it has been completed.

Zhou Enlai expresses agreement with this and returns to the question of the five year plan. Again emphasizes that they are underestimating their capabilities. He agrees that it is difficult to perceive the five year plan as a general picture, as it does not include the military, since they are having difficulties with military planning. Overall, they are unsure whether to include the military in the general plan. As for publishing the five year plan, they were not intent on publishing the plan itself, only its general trends.

Stalin explains that our five year plans are published and that we include incognito articles dealing with military technology production, chemical and other industries. The publication of the plans is essential, if the people are to comprehend the scope of development. There must be numbers. It is not advisable to limit oneself by publishing solely its general trends. There are people who want to know and behold the entire scope of development as specified in the five year plan. That's why it is necessary to provide for military production in this plan, though without naming military enterprises and such. It will be better thus. There must be a single, unitary plan that includes both civil and military development.

As far as the USSR is concerned, we, as the provider, must also know in what capacity and what type of assistance will be required of us. There is but one source - the USSR. But we need a reckoning for both the civil and military sectors. We must know and calculate every portion of the entire sum.

Let's say that in 1953 we provide weapons for 10-15 divisions. We need to know how much steel and other materials will be needed to fulfill this order. During that same year 1953 we must supply a certain amount of equipment for the civil sector. This must also be calculated. Then both sums, the civilian and the military, must be combined to determine whether we will be able to supply the entire amount. This is how a plan must be drafted for each and every year. Perhaps our Chinese

comrades believe that all these weapons are lying around somewhere in a warehouse. No, they must be produced.

Zhou Enlai completely agrees with everything laid out by Comrade Stalin, and will ascertain how the matter of the [weapons shipments for] 60 divisions will rest. If they will be billed to credit, then that will also have to be specified.

Comr. Mao Zedong had an idea - if the war in Korea were to continue for another year or two, then would it be possible to extend the duration of shipments for 20 divisions to next year?

Stalin says that right now it's difficult to say. Perhaps it will have to be shortened, perhaps not. It needs to be calculated. The calculation will tell us. Nothing here can be determined beforehand.

Zhou Enlai turns to the question of naval-military shipments. Asks whether these need to be included in the plan or not. Roughly speaking these shipments need to be delivered over the next six years. Will the previous arrangement remain in force?

Stalin. Everything which we have agreed to - military and naval-military shipments - will remain in force. But this must be taken into account when determining the total number of shipments. We are not repealing any loans nor rescinding any agreements. In general, we find it unconscionable to run from the responsibilities that one has taken upon himself. Once an agreement has been signed, it is imperative to abide by it, and we will abide by it.

Zhou Enlai says that comr. Mao Zedong has entrusted him to present the general outline of the five year plan and to ascertain how much will have to be ordered from the Soviet Union for the civilian and military industries. They project 7,700 mln. rubles for the civilian industry, and 4,500 mln. rubles for the military. Mao Zedong asked to ascertain if this is a suitable ratio, if the military portion is not too great.

Stalin. This is a very unbalanced ratio. Even during wartime we didn't have such high military expenses.

Zhou Enlai says that the 4,500 mln. rubles earmarked for military orders are composed of the following: weapons for 60 divisions - 985 mln. rubs., military-naval shipments - 2,126 mln. rubs., aviation - 1,200 mln. rubs., and others.

Emphasizes that under normal conditions the ratio between the military and civilian sectors is not so unbalanced. The military portion is smaller.

Stalin. During wartime our military production constituted about 40-45%, but China doesn't have a real war on its hands. However, shipments for the air and naval forces are necessary. Perhaps Mao Zedong is right about the ratio of 7.7 bln. rubs. to 4.5 bln. rubs.

Zhou Enlai informs that in 1950 expenses for the military constituted 44% of the entire budget (4.2 bln. rubs.), in 1951 - 52% (8 bln. rubs.), in 1952 - 27.9% (6.6 bln. rubs.). Says that, according to the five year plan, investments in the military industry (munitions arsenals, aviation, tank production, military shipbuilding) constitute 12-13% of all industrial investments. If Comrade Stalin believes that such a ratio is acceptable, then they will use that as the basis when drafting their general requisitions list.

Stalin. Good. It is acceptable.

Zhou Enlai says that at first they projected constructing 151 industrial enterprises, but now they have dropped this number to 147, excluding military arsenals (aero-manufacturing enterprises, tank enterprises, shipbuilding enterprises). Explains that these 147 enterprises are not military, though they serve military needs.

Stalin. We usually build few new enterprises; we try to expand existing ones. It's more economical. However, China will have to build new ones, since there aren't enough existing ones. During the war we converted aero-maintenance shops into aero-manufacturing plants, and automobile factories into tank factories. We frequently resorted to inter-enterprise cooperation, producing parts in various enterprises and then assembling them. China ought to try this method. It is simpler than building special factories.

Zhou Enlai says that during the civil war years they also made use of cooperation among enterprises in the manufacture of light weapons, but now they are embarking upon the manufacture of heavy weapons, and that requires creating a base.

Shifts to the question of how to cover the cost of the trade imbalance between the Soviet Union and China. Says that there are 3 ways to cover this cost: 1) increase Chinese exports to the USSR; 2) receive payments in foreign currency - dollars, pound sterling, Hong Kong dollars, Swiss francs; 3) credit. Asks which of the three options is most acceptable.

Stalin. Perhaps it will be necessary to make use of all three.

Zhou Enlai says that they are planning to increase exports to the USSR to 13 bln. rubles. We can supply cattle, leather, fur, wool, silk, mineral resources, and foodstuffs: beans, fats, tea.

Notes that over five years they could collect up to 200 mln. American dollars, as well as 1.6 bln. British pound sterling, Hong Kong dollars, and Swiss francs.

Stalin. American dollars are preferable. British pound sterling have limited circulation. As for Hong Kong dollars, you should consult our Ministry of Finance.

The Soviet Union needs lead, wolfram [tungsten], tin, and antimony. We would like you to increase the deliveries of these.

Notes that we would also accept lemons, oranges, and pineapples which the Soviet Union buys from other countries.

Zhou Enlai says that the loan of 4 billion rubles that they would like to receive from the USSR consists of the following: 985 mln. rubles - weapons shipments for 60 divisions; 2,126 mln. rubles - military-naval shipments; 100 mln. rubles - caoutchouc; 800 mln. rubles - industrial equipment.

Stalin. We will have to give something, though the exact amount must be calculated. We cannot give four billion.

Zhou Enlai says that this amount does not include aviation. They intend to pay cash for aviation.

Stalin. The question here is not in the monetary amount, but in whether we will be able to produce this much equipment. All that will have to be determined, which will take some two months.

Zhou Enlai shifts to the question of specialists. Says that beginning with 1953, China will need new specialists in the following fields: financial and economic matters - 190 people, military - 417, medical school instructors and others - 140. In addition, they will also need specialists for the military industry, though this matter is still being studied.

Stalin. This will have to be examined: what specialists, in which fields and with what profiles. We will send some, though it's difficult to say how many.

Have you found the Soviet specialists currently working in China useful?

Zhou Enlai responds that they are very useful.

Asks whether Comrade Stalin has any remarks to make on the recently submitted report.

Stalin. The impression is a positive one. China is growing. China must become the flagship of Asia. It must in its turn supply other countries with specialists.

Zhou Enlai notes that the report contains a footnote, specifying that in the event the war ends, we would like to create an army of 3,200 thousand people, with 102 divisions.

Stalin. That's good. But that's the minimum. China must be well armed, especially with air and naval forces.

Zhou Enlai. We project on having 150 air regiments with 13,000 flight personnel.

Stalin. That's too few. You'll have to add some. You should have 200 air regiments.

Zhou Enlai. Then we will have to increase the number of flight personnel.

Stalin. That's right. You will probably have to shift to three-regiment divisions. That's more economical - less division staff.

Zhou Enlai asks whether there needs to be a certain ratio maintained between fighter jets and reciprocating engine planes.

Stalin says that reciprocating engine fighter-planes should be gradually retired and replaced by jets. Fighter jets have a speed of 800 kilometers. Pilots should be trained on reciprocating engine planes and then transferred to jet planes. Reciprocating engine planes should be completely retired

over the next two years. We will give you new fighters with speeds of 1000-1100 km/h. You must not fall behind in this matter.

Zhou Enlai raises the question of providing China with technical documentation for the manufacture of the following weapons: 122mm howitzers, 37mm guns and 67.2mm field guns.

Stalin says that the blueprints can be provided.

Zhou Enlai asks whether they should immediately begin the construction of tank factories or build automobile and tractor factories first, and then convert them to tank production.

Stalin responds that some sort of a tank manufacturing plant should be built. Such a plant could be gradually expanded. As for automobile factories, you definitely need more of them.

Zhou Enlai says that they will redraft their five year plan and will seek our advice; the redrafted materials will be submitted to comrade Molotov.

Stalin advises to fix the overall growth [rate] at 15%, and at 20% for yearly plans. Notes that that would be a plan with a reserve margin. Points out the importance of giving the workers a slogan for overfulfilling the plan. Such a plan can be overfulfilled. Says that this is exactly how we draft our plans, with a certain reserve margin, since there is a possibility of having unfavorable circumstances. You can't plan for everything.

Stalin expresses interest in the production of naval mines in the PRC.

Zhou Enlai responds that plans for a naval mine factory are being drafted.

Stalin points out the importance of defending Chinese sea ports.

Inquires about the situation in Macao.

Zhou Enlai replies that Macao continues, as before, to be in Portugal's hands.

Stalin says that this scum that has situated itself on the very entrance to China must be driven out.

Zhou Enlai says that in their relations with Southeast Asian countries they are maintaining a strategy of exerting peaceful influence without sending armed forces. He offers the example of Burma, where PRC has been trying to influence its government through peaceful means. The same in Tibet. Asks whether this is a good strategy.

Stalin. Tibet is a part of China. There must be Chinese troops deployed in Tibet. As for Burma, you should proceed carefully.

Zhou Enlai says that the Burmese government is concealing its true position with regard to China, but is actually maintaining an anti-China policy, orienting itself with America and Britain.

Stalin. It would be good if there was a pro-China government in Burma. There are quite a few scoundrels in the Burmese government, who make themselves out to be some sort of statesmen.

Zhou Enlai explains that Chinese troops were deployed in Tibet a year ago, and are now at the Indian border. The question of whether there should be Chinese troops in Tibet is moot.

Emphasizes that maintaining communication with Tibet is difficult. In order to communicate with Lhasa one needs 4-motor transport planes, equipped with oxygen tanks and de-icing devices. Could not the Soviet Union provide such planes? 2-motor planes can go 3/5 of the way, but that's as far as they'll go.

Stalin replies that Soviet Union can assist with this.

Zhou Enlai. In that case could China request 20 4-motor planes from the USSR?

Stalin replies that first we will provide 10, and then another 10.

Points out the importance of building a road to Tibet.

Zhou Enlai says that such a road is being built, but that its construction will take up all of next year and part of 1954.

Stalin notes that without a road it's difficult to maintain the necessary order in Tibet. Tibetan Lamas are selling themselves to anyone - America, Britain, India - anyone who will pay the higher price.

Zhou Enlai says that, indeed, the Lamas are hostile. This year (February, March, April) they were planning a rebellion, but the Chinese People's Government was able to suppress the rebels.

Notes that as a result of this, the Dalai Lama's brother fled abroad.

Stalin says that a road to Tibet must be built, and that it is essential to maintain Chinese troops there.

At the end of the discussion a meeting was arranged for 4 September, at 9 o'clock in the evening.

Recorded by A. Vyshinskii
[signature]
N. Fedorenko
[signature]

Source: "Stalin's Conversations with Chinese Leaders," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 4-29 (APRE, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, ll. 75-87).

Translated by Danny Rozas.

Conversation between Stalin and Zhou Enlai, 19 September 1952

[Classification level blacked-out:
"NOT SECRET" stamped]

**RECORD OF CONVERSATION
BETWEEN COMRADE STALIN
AND ZHOU ENLAI**

19 September 1952

Present: comrs. Molotov, Malenkov, Beria,
Mikoyan, Bulganin, Vyshinskii.
Li Fuchun, Zhang Wentian,
Su Yu, Shi Zhe

STALIN, opening the conversation with the Mexican proposal concerning the exchange of POWs, says that we agree with Mao Zedong, that the Mexican proposal is not acceptable, since it conforms with America's position at the negotiations in Korea. If Mexico comes forward with its proposal at the UN, the USSR delegation will reject this proposal as not conducive to the cessation of the war in Korea and will strive towards the following:

1. Immediate cessation of military activities of the involved parties on land, sea and air.
2. Return of all POWs to their native land in accordance with international standards.
3. Withdrawal of foreign armies, including the Chinese volunteer units, from Korea in the course of 2-3 months; a peaceful settlement of the Korean issue in the spirit of Korean unification, conducted by Koreans themselves under the observation of a committee with participation of the immediately concerned parties and other countries, including those which did not take part in the Korean war."

He adds that the question of which and how many countries should take part in this committee can be further discussed and decided.

Regarding the proposal of temporary withholding of 20% of POWs from each side, and the return of the remaining POWs, the Soviet delegation will not involve itself with this proposal, which will be left in Mao Zedong's hands.

ZHOU ENLAI asks, what is your opinion concerning the possibility of the Chinese government entering into a non-aggression pact with India and Burma [?] Mao Zedong thinks such a pact would be expedient.

STALIN answers that we support comrade Mao Zedong's opinion. Of course, there are and there will not be any obstacles here.

ZHOU ENLAI asks, is it possible to delay the introduction of the second position, to wait 2-3 weeks[?]

STALIN answers that this is Mao Zedong's business. If Mao Zedong wants, we can introduce in the Assembly the discussion of the second position concerning the percentage of withheld POWs.

ZHOU ENLAI introduces a question about the third position - the possibility of transferring POWs to neutral countries so that their subsequent fate can be decided separately. He says that this is talked about in the international community, and asks whether Comrade Stalin considers it possible to support this position.

STALIN answers, that we want the return of all POWs. This also concurs with the Chinese position. If an agreement cannot be reached on this basis, we cannot deliver the POWs to the UN [because the UN is a military participant in the war; he asks, in China's opinion, which country will the captives be sent to[?]

ZHOU ENLAI answers: Mao Zedong entrusted me to say, that we had in mind India.

STALIN asks who will be responsible, in this case, for the expense of maintaining POWs. It seems, every involved party?

ZHOU ENLAI answers that if the POWs are transferred to India, then after some time they will be transferred from India to China, and then the Chinese and Korean parties will pay for the maintenance of Chinese and Korean POWs.

STALIN says that this proposal can be acceptable, but we must keep in mind that the Americans will not want to deliver all the POWs, that they will keep some captives, with the intention to recruit them. This was the case with our POWs. Now we are capturing several of our POWs a day, who are being sent over by America. They are withholding POWs not because, as they say, the POWs don't want to return - America often refers to this - but so that they could use them for spying.

ZHOU ENLAI concedes that this is precisely so.

He introduces the following scenario: to cease fire and resolve the issue of POWs later. He reminds that Comrade Stalin agreed with this, if no agreement is reached regarding the percentage [of POWs] withheld.

STALIN acknowledges that this can be considered as one of possible scenarios, but America is not likely to agree to it.

ZHOU ENLAI says that perhaps America will suggest this in the Assembly.

STALIN. This would be good.

ZHOU ENLAI says that in the last discussion Comrade Stalin suggested that China take initiative in creating a continental or regional UN. He asks whether there would be any other instructions regarding this matter.

STALIN answers that he continues to hold his previous point of view. In addition he says that, besides the current UN, it is necessary to create separate organizations for Asia, Europe, etc., not in lieu of the UN, but parallel to the UN. Let America create an American organization, Europe - a European one, Asia - an Asian one, but parallel to the UN, not contrary to the UN.

ZHOU ENLAI says that China has no interest in the UN and obviously it is necessary to take initiative in creating a continental organization.

STALIN emphasizes that UN is an American organization and we should destroy it, while keeping up the appearance that we are not against the UN; we should conduct this with an appearance of respect to the UN, without saying that it should be destroyed, weakened, but in reality weaken it.

He reminds, that during the war Churchill suggested to create a continental UN, but America opposed this. We quietly observed the debate, but then Britain rejected its position and we supported the proposal regarding the creation of the UN.

ZHOU ENLAI asks whether there will be letters concerning this matter from Comrade Stalin to Mao Zedong.

STALIN explains that it will be better without a letter. He sees that Zhou Enlai is taking notes and he fully trusts him.

ZHOU ENLAI mentioned the Peace Congress in Peking, scheduled in the end of September, saying that now it will be necessary to move the Congress to the beginning of October. He adds that China is striving for the participation of Japan and India in this Congress.

STALIN asks if Pakistan will participate.

ZHOU ENLAI agrees that Pakistan should participate as well and that Pakistan representatives are invited, but the Pakistan government is not issuing them passports. As for India, a part of the Indian delegation has already arrived, and the Japanese delegation will arrive via Hong-Kong.

STALIN says further that we should aim for China to have the principal role [in the Congress], because:

1/ the initiative in assembling the Congress belongs to China;

2/ it will be better this way, because the USSR is only partly located in Asia, and China is entirely in Asia, therefore it should have the principal role.

ZHOU ENLAI asks what specific actions will be taken by our delegation.

STALIN answers: peace.

ZHOU ENLAI talks about Nehru's proposal concerning the conference of five countries - the Soviet Union, China, England, France and USA.

MOLOTOV explains that this was a proposal of the Committee of the National Congress Party.

STALIN says, that this proposal should be supported.

ZHOU ENLAI emphasizes that at such a conference India, it goes without saying, will speak [in agreement] with England, but, it would seem, that it would be advisable to utilize this proposal.

STALIN agrees with this.

ZHOU ENLAI says, that in connection with the publication of the note about Port Arthur, the position which the PRC should take with regard to Japan is completely clear. The PRC should indicate that Japan does not wish the conclusion of a peace agreement with China and the Soviet Union.

STALIN adds—and is preparing for aggression. He underscores that our position was not directed against the Japanese people.

ZHOU ENLAI raises the question of Formosa. He says that since the Japanese government has concluded an agreement with Jiang Jieshi, it thus has confirmed that it is ignoring the interests of the Chinese people. This excludes the possibility of concluding a peace agreement. So long as a peace agreement exists with Formosa, a peace agreement between the PRC and Japan is not possible.

STALIN emphasizes that the note on Port Arthur was directed against America and not against the Japanese people. America maintains a [naval] fleet around Taiwan and exploits Taiwan. He affirms the correctness of Zhou Enlai's point of view on the impossibility of a peace agreement with Jiang Jieshi, and indicates that the fact of the signing of an agreement by Japan with Jiang Jieshi only worsens its [Japan's] position.

ZHOU ENLAI asks, what will be the further development of events with regard to Germany [?]

STALIN says that it is difficult to forecast. It seems, America will not support German unification. They plundered Germany; if the West Germany and East Germany unite, then it

will not be possible to plunder Germany any longer. That is why America does not want German unification.

ZHOU ENLAI says: in his opinion, even though America is rebuilding the military forces of West Germany and Japan, hoping to use them, this weapon can turn against them.

STALIN says that it is quite possible, even though the German government will be controlled by nationalists, Hitler's followers.

ZHOU ENLAI shifts to the situation in Xinjiang. He says that the work in Xinjiang is generally going well and that agricultural reforms are being instituted there. But, there are also some leftist excesses, which manifest themselves in unlawful confiscation of domestic animals, in the domain of religion, and the reduction of interest rates and land lease. To eliminate these excesses the CC Plenum was assembled, which released [PLA commander] Wang Zhen from the office of Secretary of Xinjiang CC CPC sub-bureau, and a group of CC members was directed to take care of the excesses. In general discontent was eliminated, and cases of defection, including those to USSR territory, have been halted.

STALIN says, that the excesses resulted from the desire to obtain land and domestic animals faster, confiscating both from the rich.

ZHOU ENLAI notes that as soon as the rumors about reforms had spread, the hostile elements began to slaughter domestic animals.

STALIN notes that similar incidents took place at a certain time in our experience as well. It is necessary to hurry up with the reform. If the agricultural reform is not instituted, such looting will continue to occur.

ZHOU ENLAI explains that the agricultural reform is being instituted in crop farming regions, and redistribution and excesses connected with it [are occurring] in the animal farming regions. Since animal herders participated in the redistribution, the Chinese government has decided to improve their condition, which should improve the general condition as well.

STALIN says: of course, it is up to you.

ZHOU ENLAI says that according to the Liu Shaoqi report, two representatives from the Indonesian communist party should arrive at the XIX [Party] Congress, and he asks whether it would be timely to discuss party issues in Moscow with them.

STALIN says that it is difficult to tell yet. It depends on whether they will address the CC. He points out, that when the representatives from the Indian communist party arrived, they asked us to help in determining the party policy, and we had to do it, even though we were busy.

ZHOU ENLAI reports that the Japanese comrades should arrive as well, and it is likely they will also want to discuss party issues.

STALIN answers that older brothers cannot refuse their younger brothers in such a matter. He says that this should be discussed with Liu Shaoqi, who has substantial experience, and clarified how the Chinese comrades perceive it.

ZHOU ENLAI points out that Liu Shaoqi intends to bring with him appropriate material, in order to discuss a number of questions.

STALIN notes that if the Chinese comrades want to discuss these issues, then of course we will have no contradictions, but if they do not want it, then we will not have to discuss anything.

ZHOU ENLAI answers that the Chinese comrades will definitely want to talk.

STALIN answers that, in this case, we shall find the time.

ZHOU ENLAI says that it is possible that the comrades from Vietnam will also arrive.

STALIN notes that the Vietnamese comrades are our friends and will be our welcome guests.

ZHOU ENLAI, ending the conversation, says they would like to receive instructions concerning all these issues.

STALIN asks - instructions or suggestions?

ZHOU ENLAI answers that from Comrade Stalin's perspective perhaps this would be advice, but in their perception these would be instructions.

STALIN notes that we give only advice, convey our opinion, and the Chinese comrades may accept it or not; instructions, on the other hand, are mandatory.

ZHOU ENLAI repeats that from the Chinese perspective these are instructions, most valuable instructions. He notes that they do not accept these instructions blindly, but consider it necessary to understand and accept them deliberately.

STALIN emphasizes that we know China too little, and that is why we are cautious in giving instructions.

ZHOU ENLAI says that Comrade Stalin certainly is well familiar with the particular issues they are addressing, and asks again whether there will be any instructions.

Comrade STALIN answers that our advice is this: we should remember, that England and America will try to place their people into the apparatus of the Chinese government. It does not matter if they are American or French. They will work to undermine, try to cause decay from within, could even commit such crimes as poisonings. That is why we must be alert. He says we should keep this in mind. Here - these are all the instructions.

ZHOU ENLAI says that these are very valuable instructions. He agrees that not only Americans, English and French can commit such treacheries, but they also push the Chinese into it.

STALIN adds - their agents from the [Chinese] national bourgeoisie.

MOLOTOV, returning to the question of military credit, the payment for weapons for 60 Chinese divisions, asks whether he understood Zhou Enlai correctly the last time, that the cost of deliveries for 60 divisions is not related to the military credit, granted by the Soviet government to China from 1 February 1951, according to the agreement. The deliveries of weaponry for 60 Chinese infantry divisions will be paid in full amount according to the credit, granted in a special agreement between China and the Soviet Union.

ZHOU ENLAI answers that comrade Molotov understood him absolutely correctly, and again asserts, that the weapon supplies for 60 Chinese divisions have to be paid in full, according to the rates established for countries other than China, and not in half.

STALIN says that in this case we should sign a special agreement.

He mentions the gifts presented to Soviet representatives by the Chinese government, and notes that there have been very many gifts.

ZHOU ENLAI explains that they could not present gifts to Comrade Stalin for the 70th anniversary [of Stalin's birth]. They attended the museum of gifts, saw the gifts sent by other countries, and they feel they must make up for what they were not able to do before.

STALIN says that we also would like to present the Chinese delegation automobiles made in USSR. He says that we have automobiles "ZIS", smaller than "ZIM", but very beautiful, and we would like to present you with these "ZIMs."

Then he mentions the question concerning Song Qingling [also Soong Chingling; widow of Chinese nationalist Sun Yat-sen and then Vice Chairperson of the Central People's Government of the PRC].

ZHOU ENLAI says that he is working on getting her closer to him, that she is gradually shifting from bourgeoisie ideology to our side, that she comes out with good articles based on our ideology. She says that Song Qingling is very proud of being the winner of the International Stalin Peace Award.

The conversation started at 10:30, ended at 12:30.

Recorded by: [signature] /A. Vyshinskii/
[signature] /N. Fedorenko/

Source: "Stalin's Conversations with Chinese Leaders," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 4-29 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 343, ll. 97-103).

Translated by Danny Rozas with Kathryn Weathersby.

Interview with Stalin

18 February 1953

Last evening I had the honour of being received by Stalin. At about 4 p.m. I received a telephone call from the Foreign Office saying that the Generalissimo would receive me at 8 p.m. The number of our car and the name of the chauffeur were asked for and given. We were asked to be at the Baravitsky gate of the Kremlin at 7.45 p.m. We were told that an interpreter would be provided but that I was welcome to take someone if I wished. I decided to take my Russian-speaking Secretary, Kaul, with me.

We left the embassy soon after 7.30 p.m. Vania, who drove us, was the proudest chauffeur on earth. He was beaming with happiness, and his happiness was complete when he managed a glimpse of Stalin himself. Today, Raya, our Russian teacher, insisted on shaking hands with me—in order, she said, that she might tell her people that she had had the privilege of shaking hands with a man who had shaken hands with Stalin.

At the Baravitsky gate our identity was checked but our identity cards were not asked for. A pilot car was waiting there. Preceded by this car, we entered the spacious courtyard of the Kremlin. At every few yards there was a sentry who saluted smartly. The car came to a halt before a seemingly new building which was apparently Stalin's office. There we were greeted by an officer in uniform, presumably the Commandant of the Kremlin security police, who escorted us into an ante-chamber simply but tastefully furnished and elegantly panelled. Here Pavlov, the interpreter, joined us. He is one of the world's best interpreters and was with Stalin at many of the great wartime conferences.

At the stroke of eight, I was ushered into a room where Stalin, dressed in a Party uniform with a high-necked coat, was standing. He came forward and shook hands with me and led me to his conference table. He sat at one end of the table; and I at the other, facing him. Between us on one side of the table was Pavlov; to Stalin's right was Malik, acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and to my left, Kaul.

Stalin relaxed in his chair and said: 'Mr. Ambassador, I am at your service.' Evidently, he expected me to open the conversation. I began by expressing my gratitude to him for finding time to receive me. Stalin said that he was glad, very glad, to see me. He added that it was his duty, as Prime Minister, to receive foreign ambassadors. I remembered, however, that during the last five years he has received only three ambassadors.

I then told Stalin that Prime Minister Nehru had asked me to convey his greetings and good wishes for his health. Stalin asked me to communicate his thanks to our Prime Minister and his own greetings and good wishes to him. I said that I had received every courtesy and consideration from the Foreign Office and that I was impressed by the prevailing friendliness towards India. Stalin said that that was only natural: even shepherds in Russia were hospitable, and 'we are no worse than shepherds'. He added that the Soviet people regarded other peoples and races as equal and there was no trace of condescension in their attitude towards them. That was particularly the case towards 'the great people of India'.

Stalin then asked me what was the chief language in India. Was it Urdu or Hindi—or, as he called it, 'Hindu?' Were all the languages derived from the same stock? How did they come to have separate individual developments? In particular, what was the language spoken by the Gujaratis? I gave—I hope—appropriate answers to these questions. Towards

the end of our conversation, Stalin reverted to the subject of languages and asked whether it was true that Pakistan had been evolving a language of its own. I said that Urdu had developed as a language of the camp in India but that a number of Persian and Arabic words were now being added to it. 'In that case,' said Stalin, 'It cannot be a real national language.' This, I thought to myself, is the man who recently settled the Marrs controversy on linguistics with one stroke of the pen.

I gave Stalin a brief explanation of our foreign policy, its genesis in our national struggle and in Gandhiji's teachings, and its objectives and methods. As an illustration, I referred to our repeated efforts to find a settlement in Korea. I recalled our Prime Minister's message to Stalin soon after the Korean war had started and Stalin's reply thereto, our opposition to the crossing of the 38th parallel on the ground that it would extend the theatre of hostilities, our vote against the resolution denouncing China as an aggressor, and our recent efforts in the United Nations to remove the last hurdle to a settlement, namely the dispute over the repatriation of prisoners of war. Our resolution had been put forward of our own accord in our search for peace and we were sorry that its nature had been seriously misunderstood. I hoped that this would provoke Stalin to say something about the Korean resolution, but he remained as unforthcoming as the sphinx, saying merely, and somewhat mechanically, 'Da, Da' (Yes, yes). For aught I knew, he might never have heard of our Korean resolution at all!

Stalin was forthcoming, however, on Formosa. 'We are against the widening of hostilities,' he said. 'So is the Government of India. But in America there are certain people who are bent on widening the conflict because they want more business and greater profits. Not all Americans are like that, but many are. It is no use preaching morals to them, because they are out to accumulate profits even at the cost of blood.' I said that the reactions to recent American moves in the Far East had been adverse throughout the world, including such countries as the United Kingdom and Canada. These reactions would, I thought, have a restraining influence on American policy. 'There is no sign of it yet,' said Stalin dryly. He then went on to say: 'The peasant is a very simple man but a very wise man. When the wolf attacks him, he does not attempt to teach it morals, but tries to kill it. And the wolf knows this and behaves accordingly.' And casting my eye on the pad on which Stalin had been doodling, I found there a number of wolves in various poses.

Stalin inquired whether we had any commercial relations with Japan. I said that these relations were growing. 'Then Japan will undersell you and flood your markets with cheap goods,' said Stalin with a smile. I said that this had certainly happened in the past but we were now wiser.

He then turned his attention to the army. Apologizing for the question, he asked whether India had a sufficiently large army. I said that our army was meant essentially for defence and not for adventures abroad. 'But is your army capable of defending India?' asked Stalin. I said that we had a compact, well-trained and well-disciplined army, but that our air force and navy were still in their infancy. 'It is difficult to defend a country effectively without a powerful air force,' said Stalin.

This led him to ask about India's relations with Pakistan. I said that Kashmir continued to be a stumbling block in the establishment of friendly relations; nevertheless, India and Pakistan had a common international outlook, as was shown in such vital matters as the recognition of China and the refusal to recognize the Bao Dai regime in Viet Nam. Recently, however, there had been reports that Pakistan intended to join the Middle East

Defence Organization. We felt that this would be a very unfortunate development. Stalin made no comment but asked whether we had not considered the possibility of some kind of federation between India and Pakistan. 'That would be the ideal solution,' he said. I said that this would take time in view of the bitterness generated between Hindus and Muslims in the closing days of British rule. 'How primitive it is,' interjected Stalin, 'to create a state on the basis of religion!'

Stalin then dilated on the way in which the problem of nationalities had been solved in the Soviet Union. In the old days, he said, the Russians oppressed other nationalities and these other nationalities thereupon came to hate the Russians. He said this with so much emphasis that I thought to myself: here is the Georgian speaking—the Georgian who, as a schoolboy, started his career of political agitation by demanding that Georgian, and not Russian, should be the medium instruction in Georgian schools. The revolution, continued Stalin, marked the end of the period of Russian domination within the subcontinent. Now all nations within the Soviet Union were equal in every respect and this had led to the solidarity and strength of the country.

I thereupon referred to our Prime Minister's own conception of a secular state and his unflinching adherence to it. By upholding this conception, we had been trying to make the fifty million Muslims in India feel that they were Indians in every respect. 'Of course they are Indians,' said Stalin; 'and your policy is just the right one.'

The conversation then ended with an exchange of expressions of goodwill.

I have been trying to co-ordinate my impressions of Stalin. I recall those left by Stalin on some of the few persons to whom he has given interviews. In 1938 Joseph E. Davies, the American ambassador, in an official report to Secretary of State Hull on an interview with Stalin said: 'His demeanor is kindly, his manner almost deprecatingly simple. . . he gave me the impression of being sincerely modest.' In a letter to his daughter Ambassador Davies said: 'His brown eye is exceedingly kind and gentle. A child would like to sit on his knee.' And Winston Churchill stated in Parliament: 'Premier Stalin left upon me an impression of deep, cool wisdom and the absence of illusions . . . a man 'direct, even blunt, in speech . . . with that saving sense of humour which is of high import . . .'

I myself am impressed by three qualities in Stalin: simplicity, shrewdness and ruthlessness. Everything about him is simple— his dress, his room, his manners, his mode of speech. There is something bucolic in the way he says things; bucolic, too, are the similes he uses— they are of peasants and shepherds. This is the man whose will, more than any other factor, saved Russia for communism and communism for the world; but for him, neither Russia nor communism would have been able to resist the assault of Hitler. This is the man held not only in his own country but by millions all over the world as the 'leader and teacher of all progressive mankind'; whose portraits have taken the place of holy icons in every Russian home; and at the mention of whose name, every audience in Russia rises to its feet with prolonged applause amounting to ovation. Yet adulation has left no more mark on him than does water on a duck's back; there is not a trace of ostentation or affectation about him. When Voltaire returned to Paris after many years in exile, he was greeted by a mammoth crowd of admirers. When a friend asked him whether he was not pleased to be the people's idol, he replied, 'Yes, but an equally large crowd would have turned up if my head appeared on a scaffold.' That is a sentiment which Stalin himself would not hesitate to express.

This leads me to the second quality which impresses me: his shrewdness, which was shown as much by his silence as in his speech. He declined to be drawn into a discussion of our Korean resolution or even of the Korean problem generally. And he declined to comment on Pakistan's participation in the Middle East Defence Organization presumably because his government has not yet decided on its policy towards Pakistan. When we discussed the Far East, Stalin took the opportunity of letting off a vigorous salvo against the greed of capitalists; but on the Pakistan question he seemed more interested in the general subject of the nature of a state based on religion than in Pakistan's present policies. Perhaps he feels that he has come to the stage when he can devote his thoughts exclusively to fundamentals, leaving details to the henchmen whom he has so thoroughly trained.

If I was impressed by Stalin's shrewdness, I was also struck by his ruthlessness. Twice he spoke of the futility of preaching morals to an evil person. Gandhiji's phrase, 'a change of heart', would mean nothing to Stalin. Perhaps it was to Gandhi's pre-occupation with moral considerations that Stalin was referring when he drew the metaphor of the peasant's refusal to moralize with the wolf. I telegraphed to my government that this represented the essence of Stalin's philosophy.

Source: K.P.S. Menon. The Flying Troika. (1963) London: Oxford University Press.

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