



NOTICIAS

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U.S. Policy and the Peace Process in Colombia

As the United States accelerated plans to boost military and economic aid to Colombia, the Latin American Program's *Project on Comparative Peace Processes* held a major day-long conference on September 28, 1999, to assess U.S. policy and the status of the peace dialogue between Colombian insurgents and the government of President Andrés Pastrana.



From left to right: Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman, Phillip Chicola, and Rep. William Delahunt.

Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman, chair of the House International Relations Committee, stated that what happens in Colombia is important to virtually every community in the United States, given Colombia's central role in cocaine and heroin production and trafficking. He criticized the Clinton administration for its failure to provide enough helicopters to Colombia's anti-drug police to fight "narco-guerrillas," and expressed skepticism that rebels of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) had a sincere interest in negotiating peace. He called for increased training of the Colombian military, to improve professionalism and respect for human rights.

Rep. William Delahunt (D-MA), also of the International Relations Committee, cautioned that peace in Colombia will take substantial time and a sustained commitment by the United States, and emphasized the need for patience as well as that the conflict had longstanding social roots. He advocated a multi-faceted approach to peace, including aid to restore the economy, support for civil society, crop substitution for peasant farmers and infrastructure development. He said that increased military aid for the army should be predicated on continued improvements in human rights, and called for the military to aggressively engage paramilitary groups that commit the bulk of abuses.

Phillip Chicola, director of Andean affairs at the State Department, emphasized U.S. interest in a strong, united, and democratic Colombia, capable of reducing the scope of the drug trade and seeking an end to the armed conflict. He expressed strong support for the Pastrana government and *Plan Colombia*, a multi-faceted strategy to address counter-narcotics, economic recovery, peace, and social development issues. Chicola saw the peace process as an important opportunity; he acknowledged the impact of Colombia's conflict on neighboring countries, but argued that it was smaller than some have alleged. Caryn Hollis, principal director for inter-American affairs at the Defense Department, argued that U.S. interests in Colombia went beyond drug trafficking, and emphasized that, contrary to heated rhetoric from the region, the United

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States had no intentions of intervening in the Colombian conflict. She argued that the armed forces required U.S. support, and that the United States would “help them help themselves” to combat drug trafficking and insurgent violence. She said that structural changes in the military justice system constituted a major achievement, and emphasized human rights training as a key component of professionalization.

Colombian scholars and representatives of civil society took issue with many of the perspectives offered by U.S. policymakers. *Alfredo Rangel*, former security adviser in the government of President César Gaviria, said that the armed forces faced a dual task: to convince the guerrillas that military victory was impossible, and to take punitive action against paramilitary groups that also undermined the state’s legitimacy and its monopoly on force. Despite tensions between the military and the civilian political leadership, Rangel said, the armed forces had respected civilian authority in the peace process. *Alejo Vargas*, vice-rector of the National University, argued that the longstanding, structural roots of the insurgency were to be found in development models that had excluded important groups from the benefits of growth. The extent of drug cultivation in the country, he said, reflected the lack of support for peasant farmers and the failure to undertake a serious agrarian reform in the last half-century. *Mauricio Romero* of the Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales of the National University described the role of powerful regional elites and groups linked to narcotrafficking in the origins and development of paramilitarism. A “functional alliance” emerged, he said, between these groups and the armed forces, which had as a common enemy the guerrillas as well as political activists of the left.

Meanwhile, *Ana Teresa Bernal*, a member of the government-sponsored National Peace Council, described the growing influence of civil society in the peace process. What began in 1993 as a protest of the Gaviria government’s “integral war” had blossomed into a peace movement capable of mobilizing millions of Colombians. The signing of a peace accord was only part of a wider effort to overcome the causes of violent polarization and construct alternative forms of conflict resolution, she said. Former foreign minister and National Conciliation Council member *Augusto Ramírez Ocampo* argued for changing the “correlation of forces” in the broadest sense, not only militarily but in terms of extending state services and support

throughout the country. He challenged the notion that the way to end the war was by attacking narcotrafficking, thereby depriving armed actors of economic resources. Rather, he argued, negotiating peace was a prerequisite for a stable anti-drug policy, but only if accompanied by a concerted plan of alternative development.

Jan Egeland, former deputy foreign minister of Norway and an advisor to the Pastrana government on the peace process, underscored factors in the peace process that were unique to Colombia: 1) the level of financial resources available to “conflict entrepreneurs”; 2) the high level of criminal violence relative to political violence; 3) the limited involvement of the international community; and 4) the exceptional political courage of President Pastrana. Egeland emphasized that, while the will to make peace must come from within Colombia, a peace process was too difficult without the active, long-term support of the international community. *Hans Blumenthal* of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation’s Bogotá office said that Colombian peace diplomacy had focused almost exclusively on the United States. It was necessary to engage the European Union politically and not just in search of economic resources, he said.

In closing, Colombian ambassador to the United States *Luis Alberto Moreno* described civil society as central to the prospects for peace. He said that while many had criticized unilateral gestures by the Pastrana government in the peace talks, support for the peace process remained high. He said *Plan Colombia* made the central point that Colombia’s problems went beyond drugs, and that weakening narcotrafficking was not just a military issue, but part of a comprehensive strategy to create alternative development opportunities, revive the economy, and strengthen the capacity of the state.



From left to right:
Michael Van Dusen,
Deputy Director,
Woodrow Wilson Center,
and *Caryn Hollis*.





Latin American Military Views of Democracy

In a December 6, 1999, seminar on “Bridging the Conceptual Gap: Latin American Military Views of Democracy, Planning, and Policy” Public Policy Scholar *J. Samuel Fitch* explored characteristic views of democracy and the policy process that contribute to military disillusionment with current Latin American democracies.

The first “conceptual gap” between civilians and members of the armed forces involves the definition of democracy itself. For reformist or populist militaries, governments in a democracy should serve the people, and in particular, the interests of the poor majority. This substantive or outcome-based definition contrasts with the procedural definition embraced by political scientists, emphasizing free elections, open debate, and the rule of law.

A second conceptual gap concerns the nature of politics. For the military, policymaking and planning begin with more or less permanent objectives, an analysis of the threats to those interests, and means for overcoming the threats. Current democracies are viewed as corrupt and illegitimate because governments do not set out to serve the common good by referring to national interests. Political scientists, however, are skeptical of any group’s monopoly on understanding what is in the common good or national interest, and emphasize that benefits and costs of public policies are distributed unequally.

A third gap involves the policy process itself. For the military, the process is conceived as rational—linking an analysis of permanent national objectives with long-term plans and specific policies. Political scientists make no assumption of comprehensive rationality, however, underscoring competing definitions of the problem, and incomplete information about policy alternatives and the consequences of policy options. Policy is made incrementally and with a limited attention span.



International Security and the Amazon River Basin

The *Peace and Security in the Americas* (P&SA) project held a workshop at the University of Campinas, Brazil, on September 13-14, on international security and the Amazon River basin. The workshop gathered military and government officials from Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, and Peru, along with representatives from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the World Bank, and scholars of Amazonian affairs to discuss the changing international security agenda in the region and to explore possibilities for cooperative multilateral responses.

Brazilian participants emphasized the vastness and complexity of the Amazon Basin, which encompasses forty percent of South American land and includes twenty percent of the world’s fresh water and plant diversity resources. Because of the uniqueness of these resources, their management is often described as an issue of global security, although the Brazilian government has been reluctant to accept this perspective. *Wanderley Messias da Costa*, former advisor on the Amazon to President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, stated that the main challenge Brazil faces is how to integrate the undeveloped territory of Amazonia into a modern, industrializing nation, without causing undue damage to its environmental resources and human population. Integration is essential if the government is to address the region’s poverty, underdevelopment, and social violence, and to stop drug traffickers and guerrilla groups such as Colombia’s FARC who use the thick forest cover and undefined national borders to hide their operations.

According to *Galizia Tundisi* of the International Ecological Institute in São Paulo, past government policies emphasized economic goals at the expense of the environment and the needs of local peoples. Today there is pressure from the international community to place environmental concerns above the need for social and economic development. Security in Amazonia is multi-dimensional and requires a coherent national policy that coordinates economic, social, and environmental objectives. Participants in the workshop from Peru, Venezuela, and Colombia emphasized that with increasing cross-border trade, as well as other phenomena which do not respect national frontiers such as drug trafficking, forest fires, and the migration of indigenous groups, security in the





Amazon basin also requires international cooperation. *Thomaz Guedes da Costa*, formerly of the national Ministry for Strategic Affairs (SAE), cautioned that efforts at regional cooperation are limited by the lack of institutional and military capacity in the region, information on and monitoring of activities in the forest, and even basic infrastructure. The implementation of the satellite and radar System for Surveillance of Amazonia (SIVAM) will greatly increase the nation's ability to study and monitor the region. However, in Brazil and other countries, local government institutions such as the police and judiciary are extremely weak, so that even the most progressive and well-conceived policies at the national or international level are extremely difficult to implement on what is an essentially ungoverned frontier.

These points were picked up and developed by *Andrew Hurrell* of Oxford University who suggested that the growth of local level political institutions is critical in the long-term to successful development and management of Amazonia. The influence that international NGOs and multilateral institutions can have on national environmental issues is limited and generally of short-term impact. The formulation of longer-term strategies for sustainable development that balance multiple interests depends upon the opening of channels for political expression by local interests. *Robert Schneider* of the World Bank agreed, and suggested that international assistance can only be successful if it promotes and cooperates with local groups, both state and non-state, which share the mission of sustainable development.

Joseph S. Tulchin of the Latin American Program warned that the spread of drug trafficking into Amazonian territory has destroyed any remnant of Brazil's traditional perception of Amazonian security as a strictly national issue. The war against guerrilla groups in Colombia and economic troubles in Venezuela, which push more people toward potentially lucrative illegal mining, logging, and drug trafficking activities, increase the pressure on these nations to view these problems on a regional instead of national basis. Multilateralism, however, requires the ability to implement and enforce policies locally. The development of local governance and political institutions must be the region's chief priority; but Brazil must accept collaboration with the other nations in the Amazon Basin and with the U.S. to protect its own national interests.

P&SA is co-coordinated with FLACSO-Chile and generously supported by the MacArthur Foundation.

The Transfer of the Panama Canal

As the United States prepared to carry out its obligations under the 1977 Panama Canal Treaties, the Latin American Program hosted a December 8, 1999 forum on "The Transfer of the Canal and Key Issues in the U.S.-Panamanian Relationship."

Robert Pastor, professor of political science, Emory University and former National Security Council advisor for Latin America during the Carter Administration, noted that it was Woodrow Wilson's ideas of territorial nationalism and self-determination that led to the 1977 Panama Canal Treaties. Pastor described the United States' exclusive control of the Canal as generating instability and worsening U.S.-Latin American relations. Panamanians, he said, viewed U.S. control of the Canal as offensive. The political and financial costs of control were ultimately too high and it became the better alternative to allow Panama control, to promote Canal openness. The United States needed to transform its relationship with Panama from colonial presence to "cooperating neighbor," Pastor argued. Ending exclusive U.S. control and allowing Panama to operate the Canal promotes Panama's preferred relationship with the U.S., which is to assist in rather than to displace sovereignty, Pastor contended. The Canal turnover symbolizes the end of a U.S. central role and bodes well for a beginning of a redefinition of U.S. leadership and U.S.-Panamanian partnership.

Stephen Rademaker, chief counsel, House International Relations Committee, agreed with Pastor's statement that while the turnover of the operations and administration of the Canal to the Panamanians has been official policy for the last 23 years since the signing of Carter's two 1977 Panama Canal Treaties, the transition has not been gradual. Eighty percent of the properties, worth approximately \$2 to \$4 billion, were turned over only in the last three years. There exists confidence, however, that Panama will do a good job of controlling the Canal. Further, the opposition to the Treaties' implementation stems from a view that the U.S. is relinquishing something of great strategic importance and thereby creating a "vacuum," according to Rademaker. However, the U.S. has a joint responsibility with Panama regarding the defense of the Canal, as per the Permanent Neutrality Treaty. Rademaker offered assurances that the U.S. will comply with the Treaties. However, he warned that more atten-





tion should be directed to the future U.S.-Panama relationship and the Multilateral Counter-Narcotics Center issue.

In reality, the transition has been seamless, according to *Rogelio Novey*, independent consultant, former alternate executive director for Panama and Venezuela, Inter-American Development Bank, and former chief of staff, Deputy Secretary General of the Organization of American States. Panama is realizing an increasing rate of economic and social growth. A large diversity of investments and enterprises are compensating for the loss of defense dollars from the U.S. In addition, three successive elections since the 1989 invasion and reasonable stability and legitimacy in government institutions, with the exception of the judiciary, have translated into social stability. With regard to environmental concerns, Novey pointed out that recently established environmental laws are being implemented with financial assistance from the Japanese government and multilateral organizations.

The fear some have in the U.S. of Chinese control of the Canal, a response to significant Chinese corporate investment, is unfounded and reflects anachronistic anxiety about China, not about Panama, the panel agreed. Finally, it was agreed that the Moscoso administration is currently developing a national security strategy.

The Pinochet Case and International Law

The effort by Spanish judge Baltazar Garzón to extradite Chilean General Augusto Pinochet to stand trial for human rights abuses virtually collapsed in mid-January, when the British government deemed Pinochet too ill to stand trial. Nonetheless, according to Chilean human rights lawyer *José Zalaquett*, the effort to extradite Pinochet to stand trial in Spain for human rights abuses committed in Chile marks an important reaffirmation of international law: the case has upheld the principle of universal jurisdiction for human rights crimes such as torture, and underscores that diplomatic immunity does not shield former heads of state from criminal prosecution.

At a January 14, 2000 seminar sponsored by the Latin American Program, Zalaquett, a law professor at the Uni-

versity of Chile and former member of Chile's Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, traced the evolution of the repression by Chile's military regime, as well as the efforts of a civilian government to grapple with the legacy of the past. A truth commission appointed in 1990 documented 2,000 political executions and 1,200 disappearances, most of which were carried out between the years of 1973 and 1977 and masterminded by the Chilean secret police. Of the disappeared, only the remains of about 200 people had been identified. The military's 1978 self-amnesty, as well as other constitutional provisions enshrining Pinochet's power, limited the ability of civilians to bring the military to justice following the democratic transition of 1990. But Chile's truth commission was able to reveal the truth about a denied past, Zalaquett argued. The official acknowledgment of abuses by civilian president Patricio Aylwin was an important act in the moral reconstruction of Chilean society.

PIC

Cynthia J. Arnson and José Zalaquett

Zalaquett criticized the outgoing government of President Eduardo Frei for giving Pinochet an official mission when he traveled to London in 1998, thereby appearing to embrace the impunity he had long enjoyed and turning his problems with international law and justice into the problems of the democratic government. Further, Zalaquett said that the Chilean foreign service had underestimated the risk of Pinochet's travel abroad, given that much was known about Judge Garzón's efforts to bring the general to justice under international treaties, including the Torture Convention which Chile ratified in 1988. Finally, according to Zalaquett, the Chilean government committed





a technical error in not informing Great Britain of Pinochet's official capacity when he traveled there for medical treatment in 1998.

Zalaquett said that Pinochet's arrest while in Britain had initially polarized Chile, re-igniting old passions between supporters and opponents of the dictatorship. Ultimately, however, the effect in Chile has been salutary. A new generation of judges, appointed during the last ten years of democratic rule, has pursued investigations of human rights cases, some on the grounds that disappearances constitute an ongoing crime not subject to the 1978 amnesty. Politicians on the right have sought to distance themselves from Pinochet. And members of the military are "seeking to enter into the modern world," participating in a government-initiated dialogue that could yield new information on victims of disappearance and provide the first acknowledgment by the armed forces' of their role in abusive practices. Zalaquett speculated that, if returned to Chile, Pinochet would face a move to strip him of his position as Senator-for-life, even if he never lands behind bars.

Working Group Meeting on Inter-American Security

On October 11, the Latin American Program hosted the second meeting of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Working Group on Inter-American Security. The Working Group consists of active and former policy makers, analysts, and scholars of inter-American relations from across the hemisphere. The topic of the second meeting was strategic planning, which is complicated across Latin America (as in the United States) by the crisis management nature of bureaucratic decision-making, the lack of commitment to strategic planning at the executive level of government, and the inability of institutions—outside of the armed forces—to form and implement strategic policies. Most security policy in the region is in response to crises, without which there is little political motivation for the consideration of strategic issues or for innovative or long-term thinking.

Arturo Sarukhan, deputy chief of policy planning at the Mexican Foreign Ministry, suggested that existing multi-lateral initiatives such as NAFTA and the FTAA Summitry process, should be utilized more effectively as platforms for the definition and promotion of cooperative international policies. These policies are challenged by the fact that security threats and strategic planning differ among countries and sub-regions. Threats including transnational crime, economic crises, or illegal migration affect nations differently, and responses are shaped according to national or local institutional capacities and perceptions. The lack of dialogue and cooperation among partner nations leads to ineffective and costly operations such as the fifteen-year-old U.S. campaign against drug trafficking. Sarukhan emphasized that the fundamental challenge to strategic planning in the region is the lack of definition in the responsibilities and capacities of national institutions. In many national cases it is unclear what agency or department handles what type of threat, and cooperation among agencies—police, military, judiciary, etc.—is scarce.

The complexity of post Cold War threats was also a theme raised by *Thomaz Guedes da Costa*, formerly with the Brazilian Ministry for Strategic Affairs (SAE). He said that while pressures of economic globalization have forced many industries, corporations, and even government agencies to think and act strategically, and to pressure the government for more far-sighted policies, he urged caution in building cooperative security policies, because of the risk that such cooperation could generate uni-dimensional responses to complex threats—such as narcotrafficking—especially when the United States is a powerful player. The concepts of security and collective security should be carefully defined in order to avoid outdated, militarized approaches to today's multi-dimensional threats.

Two practitioners in the U.S., *Theodore Piccone* of the U.S. Department of State's Office of Policy Planning and *Arturo Valenzuela*, special assistant to President Clinton and senior director for inter-American affairs at the National Security Council, stated that the Summitry process related to the FTAA 2005 project has been useful in stimulating consideration of key strategic issues at top levels across the Americas. The fact that education was the chief topic at the last presidential Summit meeting in Santiago in 1998 demonstrates the usefulness of the process in identifying and promoting key areas for long-term concerted action. Valenzuela emphasized that Summitry is important as a






motivation for policy planning. Within most governments, including that of the United States, policy is formulated according to short-term or immediate deadlines and demands, which such meetings create. Without regular summitry meetings and other collective initiatives, this sort of planning would only take place in response to crises, in which asymmetries of power and interest would be more pronounced, to the detriment of cooperative relations.

Ernest R. May of Harvard University agreed, citing NATO as an organization that thrives due to a structure of regular and frequent meetings at various governmental levels in which each member nation must participate. May emphasized, however, that attempting to build collaboration in the Americas would be a greater challenge than it had been in Europe, due to dramatic structural differences and disparities in capacity among the institutions of various nations.

The weakness of regional institutions and the frequent lack of clear institutional responsibility for security and strategic planning pose major challenges in both a domestic and international context. Participants noted that even if consensus and policy are successfully formulated at the top level, the implementation of those policies at the local level, where institutions are often incapable of carrying out the duties called for by national policies, can be extremely problematic.

These challenges notwithstanding, there are many reasonably successful cases of international cooperation on security and strategic planning in Latin America, particularly at the sub-regional level. Sarukhan emphasized that NAFTA has deepened the Mexican-U.S. relationship at many levels, including the development of regular meetings between the two nations' policy planning staffs. MERCOSUR also has generated increasing mutual confidence and coordination on security matters among traditional rivals of the Southern Cone.

The Working Group on Inter-American Security meets periodically to discuss issues in U.S. relations with Latin America and the region's role in world affairs. The Working Group is supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation.



Venezuela's National Security Agenda and Regional Relations

On May 17-18, the *Peace and Security in the Americas* project conducted the workshop "Venezuela's National Security Agenda and Regional Relations," with the objective of examining what impact, if any, the new Chávez government has had on national security policy and how Venezuela's security interests overlap with those of the region. Participants included military and government officials from Venezuela and the United States, representatives of the Venezuelan private sector, members of the P&SA team, and scholars of regional security from across the Americas. The debate revealed that important elements of Venezuela's national security agenda, such as the mission of its armed forces and their role within Venezuela's future democratic system, are not clearly defined. The workshop was conducted in Caracas, in cooperation with our local host the Center for National Development Studies (CENDES) of the Central University of Venezuela.

Venezuelan Defense Minister *General Raúl Salazar* stressed that forces of globalization and the end of the Cold War present Venezuela with a new range of security threats. What were once considered external issues now are inseparable from domestic security, he said. Despite the peace accords, trade pacts, and cooperative initiatives that have proliferated across the region, widespread poverty and social inequality threaten the stability of the entire hemisphere.

Salazar noted that although the end of the Cold War and the spread of democracy across Latin America have changed the nature of regional security, many traditional threats to Venezuelan security still remain. Along with the need for poverty reduction, problems at the borders—primarily with Colombia and in the Amazon region with Brazil—continue unresolved [for more on the Amazon, from a Brazilian perspective, see pp. 3-4]. The Amazon territory in particular is a problem due to increasing extra-regional involvement, including the evangelizing of indigenous tribes and the pilfering of the region's rich mineral and biological resources. This border must be better controlled and the region developed to protect Venezuela's national sovereignty. In order to address non-traditional





threats that have both external and internal sources—drug trafficking and increasing crime—the various branches of the armed forces should be consolidated. According to Salazar, in the past the civilian government has acted irresponsibly and the military has had to act alone to define its mission and to protect the rights of Venezuela's citizens. Today, the armed forces have changed their perspective and are working in close cooperation with the government to support the national agenda for development and to protect and promote the democratic system.

The potential role of the armed forces within the new government was a provocative issue. *Raúl Benítez Manaut* of Mexico's UNAM argued that in Venezuela, as in Mexico, the militarization of security issues such as crime, drug trafficking, or poverty avoids confronting the real problem, which is the incapacity of government institutions to fulfill their responsibilities. Over time, militarization tends to erode the security of citizens and weaken democratic institutions. However, institution-building and democratic reforms take time, which means that in the short term the military often appears to be the only tool available for addressing these threats. *Carlos Romero* of the Universidad Central de Venezuela argued that the strategic thinking of the Venezuelan military has not kept pace with the rapid modernization of the country's society and politics. The armed forces have not yet redefined their mission to address changing threats, and are hampered in this process by their isolation from the modernizing forces of civil society. Romero stressed that the Chávez government is not a military government. However, he fears that under Chávez, if the armed forces are given expanded powers without a clearer definition of their objectives and mission, there is a danger of the military becoming more closed to the rest of Venezuelan society, more corporatist, and perhaps totalitarian in their thinking. An essential step to modernizing the military and to closing the gap between it and the government and civil society would be to revise the archaic system for the education and training of its officers.

In the same vein, *Heinz Sonntag* of the CENDES in Caracas, stated that the national security debate must be made more open to civilian groups, elected legislators, and non-governmental organizations to ensure its legitimacy and to promote the modernization of the nation's armed forces within the democratic system.

Participants from across Latin America suggested that international cooperation on security issues can strengthen internal democratic institutions and help to clarify the mission of the armed forces. *Luis Bitencourt* of the University of Brasilia urged policy makers to undertake small initiatives toward greater international coordination, in particular by engaging in confidence-building measures such as sharing information and increasing operational interaction among specific branches of their armed forces. *Alberto Cisneros* of CENDES argued that regional integration brings problems as well as benefits, and requires an active, open democratic system for its management. *Allison Major* of the United States Office of National Drug Control Policy described bilateral progress in combating narcotrafficking, but cautioned that further regional cooperation is essential. *Joseph S. Tulchin*, co-director of the Peace and Security in the Americas project, added that what appear to be small, sub-regionally specific measures of cooperation—an inter-Caribbean accord on small arms control, or the coordination among Andean nations of their penal codes and processes of extradition—can be the building blocks for a much wider cooperative system twenty years in the future.

A detailed report on the Caracas meeting is available upon request.

Combating Crime and Violence in the Americas

The growing sense of insecurity among the peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean is directly related to the recent but sustained increase in violent crime throughout the region. Ordinary citizens are aware of violence in the streets. In addition, high levels of media coverage influences and reinforces the public's sense of insecurity, contributing to demands on governments to increase security. Although this subjective feeling of insecurity is based on objective factors—high crime rates in the region—it sometimes appears independently of any objective conditions of criminality and can be linked to socioeconomic variables such as unemployment.





Together with the Political Science Institute of the University of Chile, the Latin American Program organized a seminar in Santiago, Chile on May 6 and 7, 1999 to examine "Citizen Security and Democratic Consolidation in the Americas." Participants represented various countries in the Americas and several disciplines within the social sciences—law, economics, sociology, political science and anthropology—allowing for a comparative, interdisciplinary approach to the subject.

The seminar provided an opportunity to examine the premises behind current initiatives to reduce crime throughout the world as well as to share and discuss distinct local experiences in the Americas. Participants were asked to consider the effects of increased crime in the region on democratic consolidation and economic reform with special sensitivity to the legacy of authoritarian regimes within institutions of internal security and the judiciary. Debate was enriched by the participation of an audience including academics, government officials, representatives from international organizations, and members of the Chilean security forces. Sessions dealt with policies in the region which have enjoyed some success in preventing violence, with new police management practices, and with the development of procedures to hold law enforcement institutions accountable to the public. Shared experiences helped facilitate the process of identifying collective solutions to the problem.

Presentations were made by *Joseph S. Tulchin*, director, Wilson Center Latin American Program; *Andrew Morrison*, specialist in social development, Social Development Division, Inter-American Development Bank, (Co-authors: *Mayra Buvinic*, Inter-American Development Bank and *Michael Shifter*, Inter-American Dialogue); *Hugo Frühling*, professor and research coordinator, Political Science Institute, University of Chile; *Enrique Zuleta*, professor of law, University of Buenos Aires and president, Sofres-Ibope; *Mauricio Duce*, professor of law, Diego Portales University, Santiago, and visiting researcher, International Legal Studies Program, Stanford University (Co-author: *Rogelio Pérez Perdomo*, Institute for Advanced Studies in Administration—IESA, Caracas); *Paul Chevigny*, professor of law, New York University Law School; *Carlos Basombrío*, deputy director, Institute for Legal Defense, Lima; *Catalina Smulovitz*, professor of political science, University Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires; *Adriana Loche*, researcher, Center for the Study of Violence, University

of São Paulo; *Laura Chinchilla*, advisor, Regional Project for Justice, United Nations Development Program, San José; *Anthony P. Maingot*, professor of sociology and anthropology, Florida International University.

A number of recommendations were formulated in the course of the debate: conceptualize a citizen security doctrine that is democratic in nature; define comprehensive, long-term public policies; provide for citizen participation; increase police professionalism; plan according to local needs; reform the judiciary; conduct more focused research on the problem.

Democratic governments within the Americas face the challenge of designing and implementing citizen security policies that strengthen social participation. In states where democracy and the rule of law prevail, the primary concern is no longer the threat of internal conflict or authoritarianism, but rather the need to create a culture of citizenship. Latin America's democracies must find ways to deal with social violence without resorting to repressive and authoritarian mechanisms that result in a passive and non-participatory civilian population dependent upon the state—a hierarchical power structure.

Legitimacy is not required of authoritarian governments; however, democratic governments must maintain a minimum level of public support. Is it possible that the demand for security is one of the issues that gives dynamism to Latin American democracies? What is the relationship between common crime, large-scale criminal activities, and democracy in post-authoritarian times or when nations are experiencing periods of internal conflict? What role does impunity play in the gross violation of human rights that took place in the region over the past decades? To what extent does more severe repression elicit support from the civilian population while simultaneously encouraging a return to an authoritarian society? The points discussed above should guide policies to advance citizen security and the consolidation of democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean.





Assessing Chávez at 100 Days

On June 8, the Latin American Program hosted the seminar “Democracy in Venezuela: Chávez’s First 100 Days.” Participants included *Moisés Naím*, editor of the journal *Foreign Policy* and a former minister of public works in Venezuela; *Bernardo Álvarez*, Venezuelan congressman and member of Chávez’s political party; and *Janet Kelly*, dean of the Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración (IESA) in Caracas. The meeting was the first of the Latin American Program’s Washington Policy Forum, a series of monthly discussions of critical issues facing the hemisphere.

During his first 100 days, Chávez’s intentions to dissolve the Venezuelan Congress and the Supreme Court, to create a new constitution, and to expand the role of the military, caused alarm throughout the Americas. However, panelists at the workshop agreed that since taking office Chávez had acted cautiously and pragmatically, as the novelty of leadership gave way to the challenge of addressing Venezuela’s severe economic and political problems.

Congressman Álvarez agreed with Janet Kelly that the formation of a Constituent Assembly to rewrite the constitution had cast the country into a period of profound political uncertainty. Predicting the direction of this process, however, was judged impossible given the lack of

modern precedent in Venezuela. Even Chávez did not know what to expect, panelists suggested, and some predicted that his control over the process would likely diminish with time. Chávez’s behavior indicated that, although he reached the presidency through an aggressive style of politics, he was learning that patience, tactical silence, and an ability to compromise were increasingly important if his policies were to be implemented.

According to the panelists, Chávez also was learning to appreciate the power of external constraints on his policy options. His administration had benefited from an unexpected rise in the international price of oil. Nevertheless, like all of Latin America, the health of Venezuela’s economy depends upon foreign investment. Participants noted that Chávez had as a result come to show caution in his economic policy. He had backed away from some of his earlier caustic statements, which some in Venezuela considered inflammatory, and had resisted his previous intentions to revamp PDVSA, the powerful state oil company. His visit to Washington and to New York also signaled his awareness of the need to mollify foreign investors. Chávez faced another potential external complication with respect to the cross-border spillover of the Colombian conflict. His attempts to volunteer his government as a mediator were viewed by some as clumsy—worsening what has always been a problematic bilateral relationship. According to the participants, Chávez was learning through the process of governing, and was increasingly exhibiting the tactics and style of a politician instead of a military strongman.



From left to right: Janet Kelly, Bernardo Álvarez, and Moisés Naím.





Paths to Power: The Strategies of Intermediate States in the International System

As part of its exploration of Latin America's role in world affairs and the foreign policies of Latin American nations, the Latin American Program hosted a seminar on May 13 that examined comparatively the strategic policies of Brazil, Canada, India, and Mexico. *Ricardo Sennes* of the University of São Paulo presented the Brazilian case study. *Andrew Cooper* of Waterloo University gave the Canadian case study. *Srini Sitaraman* of the University of Illinois presented the Indian case study, and *Guadalupe González* of the University of California, San Diego gave the Mexican case study.

Andrew Hurrell of Nuffield College, Oxford University discussed the problematic definition of "intermediate states," yet argued for the usefulness of the category in describing nations that, due to their size and resources, have a range of options in the international arena. The four presentations covered a variety of strategic policies, including India's development and exhibition of nuclear capacity, and Mexico's membership in NAFTA, which altered radically its relations with the United States and its position internationally. The Canadian case provided an example of institutional activism in the United Nations and other multilateral fora, by which the country has established itself as an important partner in international initiatives. Brazil has experimented with different strategies, including the nuclear option and a push for sub-regional dominance, and is struggling to define its role as a major state with characteristics of both the First and Third Worlds. Taken together, the presentations emphasized the centrality of domestic political factors and exigencies, and the effects of globalization and democratization in determining these nations' foreign policy options.

Working Paper No. 244, which includes the four revised and updated papers, as well as Andrew Hurrell's commentary, is available upon request from the Latin American Program.

JUNIOR SCHOLARS

The Latin American Program is pleased to welcome the 1999-2000 grantees in the Junior Scholars Training Program. The Program, in its fifth and final year, is designed to provide an advanced public policy research opportunity to outstanding young researchers or policymakers from Latin America and the Caribbean.

The new grantees, their research topics, and host universities are as follows:

Gonzalo Alcalde, FORO Nacional/Internacional, Lima, Peru: *"International Cooperation for Social Development Objectives,"* David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard University;

María Mercedes DiVirgilio, Instituto Gino Germani, Universidad de Buenos Aires: *"Processes of Gentrification in Argentine and U.S. Cities,"* University of Texas at Austin;

Carlos Mendoza, Centro de Investigaciones Económicas Nacionales, Guatemala: *"Beyond the Peace Accords: Democracy in a Multicultural Society,"* Queens University, Toronto, Canada.

Junior Scholars attended a week-long orientation program in Washington in January, becoming familiar with the public policy process in the United States and the research facilities of the Library of Congress. After spending five months at their respective universities, Junior Scholars return to Washington in June 2000 to present the results of their research.





The Peace Process and Insurgency in Colombia

Two distinguished Colombians, one a former government official and the other an academic, discussed prospects for the peace process and the nature of the insurgency at a March 22, 1999, seminar at the Wilson Center. Public Policy Scholar *Daniel García-Peña*, former director of the office of the Alto Comisionado para la Paz, said that numerous setbacks since the January 1999 opening of formal talks between the Colombian government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) had generated pessimism in both Bogotá and Washington, but nonetheless had infused the peace process with greater realism. The absence of FARC leader Manuel Marulanda at an initial meeting, the guerrillas' insistence on the dismantling of paramilitary groups, and the murder of three U.S. indigenous rights activists opened the FARC to widespread criticism, García-Peña said, dashing inflated expectations about what the peace process could be expected to yield in the short term.

He described paramilitary groups as among the most sensitive and complex issues to be addressed in the peace talks. He said that the Colombian state bore a high degree of responsibility for the phenomenon; recently it had been ambiguous in its handling of the paramilitaries, taking little action to combat and dismantle groups despite an official commitment to do so. At the same time, he argued, the Colombian state had lost control over the paramilitaries, whose independence has grown over the last several years.

García-Peña said that escalating the war, given the failure of the peace process to yield early results, was counterproductive, and that earlier attempts to seek a military solution had not only failed but had widened the conflict. U.S. engagement in support of the peace process and human rights had had a positive effect, he said, but risked being undermined by the insistence on the drug war and on militarization. Rather than reflecting different aspects of a coherent policy toward Colombia, he argued, U.S. policy objectives were incompatible and contradictory. He urged the United States to re-engage more actively in the peace process, and put pressure on the Colombian military and elite to break links to paramilitary groups and improve respect for human rights.

Colombian academic and journalist *Alfredo Molano* addressed the question as to whether Colombian guerrillas had a political agenda or were better understood as a criminal enterprise. Molano described the FARC as political actors, despite what he said was a serious lack of political formation of guerrilla rank-and-file and mid-level commanders. The brutality and inertia of the war left little time for ideological discussion or reflection, he said, and the break-up of the communist world had left many in the guerrilla movement skeptical of the importance of ideology. The FARC's political agenda, he said, has evolved over time, starting with a series of demands for agrarian reform, roads, and health centers in rural areas, and eventually revolving around the restructuring of the state, including the armed forces and judicial system.

The guerrilla tactic of kidnapping for ransom, practiced by the FARC as well as the smaller Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), was aimed at obtaining financial resources for the guerrilla movement, Molano said, but also constituted a kind of political extortion which obliged the rural and industrial elite to respond. He said that FARC involvement in narco-trafficking was also centered on the extortion of resources, via taxation of coca crops as well as inputs for cocaine production, such as gasoline and cement. While there were examples of FARC involvement in cocaine processing and trafficking, overall, he said, the FARC "taxed" drug traffickers much as they extorted cattle ranchers, landowners, and other economic actors.

Molano agreed with García-Peña that the Colombian government had done little to contain paramilitary groups. He argued that President Pastrana would not risk ordering the armed forces to attack the paramilitaries, something that could divide the armed forces or provoke their insubordination.

Mexico at the Millennium

At a November 18, 1999 Latin American Program Public Policy Forum *Pablo González Casanova*, director, Center for Interdisciplinary Research in Sciences and Humanities, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), and one of Latin America's preeminent political and social thinkers, presented his latest research using historical patterns to explain contemporary problems facing





Mexico. The process of democratization in Mexico cannot be ignored, said González Casanova, yet all parties have embraced neoliberal policies which are incapable of addressing the country's mounting problems. Mexico's ruling party, the PRI, has demonstrated an enormous capacity to adapt and coopt, taking advantage of the country's culture of discipline, while the political regime remains largely unchanged.

Throughout Mexican history, there have not been adequate links between the political system and civil society to channel negotiation among conflicting groups or to mediate competition for scarce public resources. And the current reform effort has not succeeded in replacing the old model with a new one. Mexico's left, which had been dedicated to changing the country's social system, is today solely concerned with changing the political regime. González Casanova discussed ethnic conflict in Chiapas and the protracted strike of Mexico's largest university, the UNAM, as examples of the failure of current political discourse to move toward real, participatory democracy. Mexico's leaders must not yield to increasing pressure to resolve these crises with military solutions, he cautioned.

González Casanova continued to call for a complete overhaul of macroeconomic policy in Latin America. He argued that the so-called "third way" is little different than neoliberalism, only changing the rhetoric, and constitutes an inadequate, traditional humanitarian approach to social problems. González Casanova, however, noted significant changes in the Mexican political system in the past 20 years and expressed optimism that the movement toward openness and accountability would continue.



Joseph S. Tulchin and Pablo González Casanova

Mexico Public Policy Scholars

The Latin American Program is pleased to announce the selection of six distinguished Mexicans from the worlds of public affairs and academia as Mexico Public Policy Scholars. The scholars will spend time in residence at the Wilson Center and at Yale University as part of a collaborative project organized by the two institutions with the goal of encouraging academic study of Mexico of the highest caliber and stimulating public discussion of issues vital to the interests of Mexico and the United States. The Mexico project is funded by the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. The following is a list of scholars, their projects, and dates of residence in Washington and New Haven:

April – June 2000: **José Luis Orozco**,
Senior Professor of International Politics, UNAM
Project: Mexico and the United States: The Meaning of Nationalism in Global Times

April – June 2000: **Erika Pani**,
Professor of History, Mora Institute for Research
Project: *Constructing Citizenship in the New World*

August – October 2000: **Ilan Bizberg**,
Director, Center for International Studies,
El Colegio de México
Project: *Transition and Consolidation of Democracy in Mexico: A Comparison with Brazil, Central Europe, and Russia*

January – March 2001: **Felipe Calderón Hinojosa**,
Former President, PAN
Project: *The Mexican Political Transition*

January – March 2001: **Rodolfo Stavenhagen**,
Professor of Sociology, El Colegio de México
Project: *The Dynamics of Peace and Conflict in Chiapas*

November 2000: **Gustavo Verduzco Igartúa**,
Professor of Sociology, El Colegio de México
Project: *Development and Migration from Mexico to the United States*





Exporting Development: The Washington Model and Structural Adjustment in Peru

Efraín Gonzales de Olarte, 1998-99 Wilson Center Fellow and senior researcher, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, presented his initial research findings at a colloquium on Wednesday, May 19, 1999. Gonzales addressed two questions: 1) how and why was the “Washington model” of structural adjustment created? and 2) what have been the results of the application of this model for Peru?

His central hypothesis is that the “Washington consensus,” a combination of economic, political, and institutional reforms based on the neo-liberal model, has been exported to most second, third, and fourth world countries over the last fifteen years through structural adjustment loans granted by multinational institutions. According to Gonzales, exporting the Washington model has been possible because of the financial leverage that multinational organizations have over developing countries, as well as a lack of credible alternative models of development for the nations. Gonzales outlined six features of the Washington Model: 1) it has been applied universally; 2) the model is of the center and applied to the periphery; 3) its “policies determine politics;” 4) it is an experimental model; 5) it increases risks and creates new externalities; and 6) it generates more inequalities among and within developing nations. He questioned whether a set of market incentives and incipient state regulation to promote development in countries with weak markets and weak states are sufficient to restore growth and promote equity.

Commentator *Guillermo Perry*, chief economist for Latin America and the Caribbean at the World Bank, made reference to a new set of institutional reforms, referred to as “second generation reforms,” that the World Bank is in the process of implementing. Perry noted that many of Gonzales’ criticisms were now recognized by the World Bank in the formulation of new policies and loans.

Colin J. Bradford, Jr., professor of economics and international relations, American University, and former chief economist of USAID, agreed with Gonzales’ critique, but argued that some of those policies, when applied selectively and in the right circumstances, can be very effective. Further, he questioned whether an alternative model existed, and whether Tony Blair’s “third way,” based on the

notion that the market alone is not sufficient, was viable. *John Sheahan*, professor of economics, Williams College, recognized that structural adjustment in Peru restored economic growth and stability, but at the cost of rising unemployment and a reduction in real wages—problems which may become obstacles to long-term, socially sustainable development.

Fellows and Guest Scholars

The Latin American Program bids farewell to Winter 1999 Public Policy Scholars *Chung-in Moon*, professor of political science, Yonsei University, Korea; *Steven Friedman*, director of the Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg, South Africa; and *Bolívar Lamounier*, director, Institute for Economic, Social, and Political Studies (IDESP) in São Paulo, Brazil. All three are cooperating on a comparative study on global trends in democratic governance and social policy in the 21st century.

We also bid farewell to Public Policy Scholars *Daniel García-Peña*, former director, Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, Bogotá, Colombia; *Ephim Shluger*, urban development specialist, World Bank, and adjunct professor of Urban Studies and Planning, University of Maryland at College Park; and *J. Samuel Fitch*, professor of political science, University of Colorado at Boulder. We also wish a fond farewell to Woodrow Wilson Center Fellow *Efraín Gonzales de Olarte*, who has returned to the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos in Lima, Peru.

We are pleased to welcome our 1999-2000 Fellows *Paul E. Gootenberg*, professor of history, SUNY-Stony Brook, working on “Early cocaine, 1860-1960: From Lima to Washington, miracle drug to global menace;” *Yemile Mizrahi*, researcher, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), Mexico, working on “From opposition to government: The National Action Party (PAN) in Mexico;” and *Kurt G. Weyland*, associate professor of political science, Vanderbilt University, working on “The politics of neoliberal reform in fragile democracies: Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela.”

Intern Notes

We would like to thank our Summer, Fall and Winter 1999-2000 interns, *Marcia Ferreira* from Catholic University, *Elizabeth Anne Belt* from the University of the South, *Ariel Castiglioni* from Harvard University, *Silvia Bonachea* from Georgetown University, *Adriana Quiñones* from the University of Notre Dame, and *Andrea Castagnola* from Universidad Torcuato di Tella, Buenos Aires, Argentina, for their hard work, dedication and good humor.





Books

Chiapas: El desafío de fin de siglo

Cynthia J. Arnson y Raúl Benítez Manaut, eds.
(Mexico: Miguel Angel Porrúa)
Forthcoming February 2000.

Security in the Caribbean Basin:

The Challenge of Regional Cooperation
Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph Espach, eds.
(Lynne Rienner Publishers)
Forthcoming March 2000.

Bulletins

Social Policy Project

"La Economía Política de la Reforma Institucional en Latinoamérica," julio de 1999, Nro 2.

"Lecciones Para El Caso Argentino," febrero de 1999, Nro 3.

"Lessons for the Argentine Case," August 1999, No. 4.

"Descentralización, Gasto Social y Política Social en Venezuela," noviembre de 1999, Nro 5.

Peace and Security in the Americas Project

"Formulating Defense Policy in Argentina," April 1999, No. 13.

"Brazilian Foreign Policy in the 1990s," May 1999, No. 14.

"Venezuela's National Security Agenda and Regional Relations, June 1999 No. 15.

"La Agenda Bilateral de Seguridad Entre México y Estados Unidos," noviembre de 1999, Nro. 16.

Citizen Security Project

"Seguridad Ciudadana y Consolidación Democrática en las Américas," agosto de 1999.

"Citizen Security and Democratic Consolidation in the Americas," October 1999.

Comparative Peace Processes Conference Report

"El Proceso de Paz en Guatemala: Logros y Desafíos," abril de 1999.

Working Papers

237. "Papers from the Junior Scholars Training Program 1998," by Arturo Alvarado, Sigrid Arzt, Rosana Heringer, Beulett Hunter, Julissa Mantilla, and Isaías Rojas Pérez (September 1998).

238. "The Brazilian Economic Crisis: Political and Economic Implications," by Alexandre Barros and Alkimar R. Moura (October 1999).

239. "Infectious Diseases and Social Inequality in Latin America: From Hemispheric Insecurity to Global Cooperation," by Charles L. Briggs and Paul Farmer (October 1999).

240. "Bolivia, Chile, y Perú: de la Divergencia a la Cooperación," by Antonio Aranibar (November 1999).

241. "The Popular Referendum (Consulta Popular) And the Future of the Peace Process in Guatemala," by Dinorah Azpuru, Demetrio Cojtí Cuxil, Carroll Ríos de Rodríguez, Bernardo Arévalo de León, Edelberto Torres-Rivas, and Cynthia Arnson (November 1999).

242. "Distributional Mobility in Latin America: Evidence and Implications for Public Policy," by Markos J. Mamalakis, Anders J. Danielson, David J. Hojman, and Fernando Medina (November 1999).

243. "La Consulta Popular y el Futuro del Proceso de Paz en Guatemala," (See No. 241, above, December 1999).

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UPCOMING EVENTS

- **Feb. 8** - *Fellow's Colloquium, Kurt Weyland, "The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies: Argentina, Peru, Brazil and Venezuela," Robert Kaufman, Columbia University, commentator*
- **Feb. 17&18** - *P&SA Workshop, "Mexican National Security: The Challenges of the New Century," Mexico City; Senators Norberto Corrella, Francisco Molina, and Fernando Solana, Amb. Carmen Moreno, Mexican Foreign Ministry, Peter H. Smith, University of California, San Diego*
- **Feb. 24** - *Washington Policy Forum, "U.S.-Mexico Immigration," Robert Bach, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, and Carlos Rico, Mexican Foreign Ministry*
- **Mar. 7** - *"Constructing Competition Regimes: Democracy, Markets and the Illiberal Heritage in Latin America," Jörg Faust, Universitat Mainz*
- **Apr. 28** - *"The Origins of Nations: Reading and Writing the Nation in Latin America." Papers by Tulio Halperin Donghi, UC Berkeley; Sara Castro-Klaren, Johns Hopkins; John C. Chasteen, UNC; et. al.*
- **May 4&5** - *"Mexico at the Millennium," Joint Conference with Yale University, Jesús Reyes Heróles, Mexican Ambassador to the U.S.; Gilbert Joseph, Yale University; Gustav Ranis, Yale University, et.al.*
- **May 16** - *"Security in the Amazon Basin," Co-sponsored with the Environmental Change and Security Project; H.E. Jose Sarney, Minister of the Environment, Brazil; Thomas Lovejoy, The World Bank*

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