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NATIONAL (AND FACTIONAL) ADAPTATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
OPTIONS FOR THE 1980s

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ABSTRACT

National (and Factional) Adaptation in Central America: Options for the 1980s

This paper seeks to apply a theory of political adaptation to the internal and external conflicts presently swirling in and around the states of Central America. It does so on the grounds that conventional wisdom is unlikely to unravel the vast changes occurring in the region and that, accordingly, analysts must proceed from an explicit theoretical perspective if they hope to probe beneath the day-to-day course of events.

The theory, developed elsewhere by the author in The Study of Political Adaptation (1981), posits four types of political adaptation (acquiscent, intransigent, promotive, and preservative) as stemming from the balance of internal and external demands to which any nation-state is endlessly subjected. To account for the fragmentation that has marked the politics of El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala in recent years, the theory is extended to apply to factions as well as nations as the central unit of adaptation.

Sixty-one aspects of the internal and external environments of Central American actors are identified as subject to change and manipulation today. These are then collapsed into nine major variable clusters, seven pertaining to the internal scene and two involving developments abroad. The interaction of each cluster with each of the others is estimated, as are the differences in the dynamics of the nine clusters with respect to each of the four types of adaptation. A number of policy outcomes are then anticipated (Table 4), depending on which forms of national and factional adaptation are at work in the various Central American states.

NATIONAL (AND FACTIONAL) ADAPTATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
OPTIONS FOR THE 1980s

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To assess Central America today is, inescapably, to engage in a theoretical enterprise. Both conclusions about what is likely to occur in the region and recommendations about what ought to be done in any or all of its countries are bound to be an admixture of several general theories to which one, knowingly or otherwise, subscribes. This is not because a dearth of information necessitates speculation, but rather because so much is changing and so little is remaining constant that only resort to theory can enable us to trace the course of events from one point in time to the next.

Stated differently, the pace, scope, and scale of change within and among the states of Central America highlights their discontinuities and obscures their trend lines, thus requiring the observer to impose order on what seems like sheer chaos. An archbishop is assassinated, a ^{deb}vest is poor, a junta is formed, a party is fragmented, a ~~depress~~ ^{depress} is issued, a secret document is captured, a commodity price collapses, a public rally fizzles--endless events such as these compel politicians and analysts alike to fall back on their underlying conceptions of the dynamics of conflict, the reversibility of polarization, the vulnerability of revolutionary situations to self-fulfilling prophecies, the limits of moderation and the role of brute force, the fragility of coalitions, the fluidity of popular support, the flexibility of left-wing organizations, the consequences of land reform, and the susceptibility of underlying social, economic, and political institutions and processes to manipulation by leaders at home and interested parties abroad. Indeed, if they were not so pervaded with tragedy and suffering as well as so potentially capable of escalating into a global crisis, the present circumstances of Central America could be viewed as an extraordinary opportunity for re-examining our fundamental theories as to what holds societies together and what rends them apart.

To recognize that one is juggling several theories as one assesses the Central American scene is not, however, to simplify greatly the task of comprehending its dynamics. For each of the countries of the Isthmus has its own history and traditions, and these are sufficiently differentiated to render regionwide generalizations hazardous.¹ Furthermore, notwithstanding the fact that all five of the countries are small, even miniscule, in comparison to most of the world's states, their present upheavals are not less complex for their lack of size. Small scale does not mean simplicity. Nor does it signify the presence of fewer variables or a narrower range across which they vary. If anything, in fact, smallness may add to the complexity of change processes because the repercussions of each variable may be greater by virtue of the smaller scale within which the changes in its value occur.²

Yet, to repeat, we have no choice but to resort to our theoretical impulses as we seek to evaluate the likely and desirable course of events in Central America. Despite the differences and complexity that mark the region, the breakdown of its established continuities means that our evaluations can only be as sound as the theoretical underpinnings on which they rest, theoretical underpinnings that are informed by knowledge of particular individuals, groups, and traditions in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, but that derive mainly from our general understanding of political dynamics.

But what kind of theory is most relevant to present-day circumstances in Central America? There is no single answer to this question. Much depends on how the problems we seek to clarify are posed. If the dilemma concerns the prospects for democratic institutions evolving in the region, then models of the origin and breakdown of authoritarian regimes can usefully be employed.³ If the problem involves the prospects for stability and continuity in the region, irrespective of whether it is founded on democratic institutions, we might turn to two types of models: on the one hand, to foreign policy models that allow for the roles the United States, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other interested nations might play in Central America;⁴ and, on the other hand, to political economy models that allow for the way in which the countries of Central America are locked into patterns of production and trade.⁵ If our concern is with the possibility of reversing the processes of polarization, it might prove helpful to examine and adapt Coser's model of the dynamics of conflict.⁶

A Theoretical Perspective

Valuable as such models are, they all suffer from at least one of two defects: either they are static and fail to allow for the dynamics of change, or they focus on internal or external phenomena and fail to allow for how the world's mounting interdependence is intensifying the interaction between domestic and foreign affairs. Models of political development and the decline of authoritarian regimes do build in propositions that anticipate change, but they also hold the international environment constant and thus can only account for changes induced and sustained internally. Much of the same can be said of conflict models. Foreign policy and political economy frameworks, on the other hand, do focus on the interaction of internal and external variables, but (leaving aside Marxist models) they tend to posit a cross-national design and ignore the transformations that occur through time. Furthermore, all of the foregoing approaches concentrate on the nation-state and largely dismiss as peripheral the many different types of transnational actors that have emerged as the world becomes increasingly interdependent.

These deficiencies in available theory are especially consequential when one focuses on the countries of Central America, several of which have extensive histories as client states and all of which have long been influenced by major transnational actors as well as the omnipresent superpower to the north. Consider, for example, this excerpt from a 1927 State Department memorandum by Under Secretary of State Robert Olds:

Our ministers accredited to the five little republics, stretching from the Mexican border to Panama...have been advisers whose advice has been accepted virtually as law in the capitals where they respectively reside.... We do control the destinies of Central America and we do so for the simple reason that the national interest absolutely dictates such a course.... Until now Central America has always understood that governments which we recognize and support stay in power, while those we do not recognize and support fail.⁷

Plainly, any theory of political development in Central America is bound to be conspicuously wanting if it does not allow for the operation of such an important external variable as that so vividly depicted by Olds. Nor is the necessity of building in the U.S. factor any less because U.S. influence in the region has diminished since 1977. The potential for diverse U.S. responses has not lessened and (given geography and the relative power balance) probably never will. Hence "it is no exaggeration to say [in 1981] that not a single political movement or initiative is launched in these republics that does not take into account the likely reaction of the United States."⁸ If actors in the region cannot ignore external variables, certainly those of us who theorize about it can do no differently.

Nor can the need to include private actors as well as governments in the analysis of external variables be understated: "...it is no longer possible to understand inter-American relations without reference to the activities of a broad variety of interest groups...."⁹ The recent kidnapping of an American working in Colombia for the Wycliffe Bible Translators, an organization viewed by the kidnapers as "an affront to...our national sovereignty" and "a means by which the plunder of our national resources is institutionalized,"¹⁰ is a poignant symbol of the importance of private actors to the course of inter-American affairs. And two stories immediately adjacent to each other on the same page of the Los Angeles Times perhaps make the operational implications of this point even more incisively: in one, the U.S. secretary of state spoke of the possible need to ship arms to El Salvador, while in the other Los Angeles local leaders of the Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union spoke of not loading arms for shipment to El Salvador.¹¹

What is needed, in short, is a theoretical perspective that somehow combines variables derived from national, international, and transnational models. More accurately, if the problem is defined as one of comprehending the alternative routes the republics of Central America may traverse as they respond to and cope with the dynamics presently besetting them from within and without, a theory combining the several levels of analysis would surely yield more incisive results.

It would be presumptuous to suggest that what follows meets the requirements of a theory that can adequately account for constancy and change in the maelstrom of Central American politics. Time and space limitations, not to mention the limits of imagination and training, do not permit an effort to develop a theory here that encompasses all of the relevant variables at the several levels of analysis. But the ensuing formulation does offer a point of departure, since it takes into account the interaction of internal and external variables and also allows for

profound transformations in political structures and processes. It is a formulation that I call a theory of national adaptation.¹² The theory has proven helpful in exploring the dilemmas of relatively autonomous and internally coherent small states¹³ and may, with modifications, thus lend itself to the analysis of the less autonomous, strife-ridden states of Central America. At the very least, it is a formulation which enables us to probe how the various factions and parties contending for power in the region may assess and address the options open to them.

Let us first summarize the theory. In its original and most general formulation, the adaptation perspective focuses on any state, irrespective of whether it is large or small, developed or underdeveloped, united or divided, authoritarian or democratic--to mention only a few of the salient dimensions of states. As long as its sovereignty as an international actor is accepted, every state is conceived to be faced with the problem of adapting to changing circumstances if it is to persist through time and space as a cohesive social unit. The survival of the national state is not theoretically assumed, but is treated as an empirical question. Although few states are likely to be conquered militarily today, collapse from within is an ever-present possibility. Hence, while most states persist, some go under, and those that do point up the delicacy of the mechanisms through which national adaptation occurs. In identifying four types of national adaptation, in other words, I do not mean to imply that the continued existence of any historic nation-state is assured. The theory allows for a fifth alternative: maladaptation that is so severe as to amount to extinction.

National adaptation is defined as a process through which fluctuations in the essential structures of states are kept within limits acceptable to their members. The essential structures are those basic interactions patterns (e.g., the economy, polity, society) that sustain the life of national actors and that undergo fluctuation in response to changing circumstances at home and abroad. These changes are posited as demands with which a nation must cope. Because the demands are both internal and external, the nation is seen as achieving (or failing to achieve) adaptation through the basic orientations whereby the interplay between the demands from at home and abroad is handled.

Built into the theory, in other words, is an internal-external balance which is always present, but which can undergo enormous shifts, depending on the relative potency of the internal and external demands and the orientations of the nation's leaders and publics toward these relative potencies. The degree of adaptation and maladaptation at any point in time is conceived to be a function of the discrepancy between the relative strength of the key internal and external variables and the orientations toward the balance between them. If the discrepancy is great, maladaptation will ensue, with either extinction or transformation to a more appropriate set of orientations occurring thereafter. If the discrepancy is slight or nonexistent, then neither extinction nor adaptive transformation will follow.

The theory postulates the nation, like any human entity, as always pursuing one of four basic and mutually exclusive adaptive orientations if it is to maintain its essential structures and survive. It can seek

to adjust its present self to its present environment; it can try to shape its present environment to its present self; it can attempt to create a new equilibrium between its present self and its present environment; or it can accept the existing equilibrium between its present self and its present environment. In order to simplify discussion, these four alternative sets of self-environment orientations have been designated as giving rise to, respectively, the politics of acquiescent adaptation, the politics of intransigent adaptation, the politics of promotive adaptation, and the politics of preservative adaptation. Present-day Afghanistan, South Africa, Libya, and Great Britain might be cited, respectively, as illustrative of the four types.¹⁴ Table 1 delineates the four types in terms of the decisionmaking orientations inherent in each.¹⁵

TABLE 1

THE NATURE OF DECISIONMAKING IN DIFFERENT PATTERNS OF ADAPTATION

Patterns of adaptation	Demands and changes emanating from a society's external environment	Demands and changes emanating from the essential structures of a society
Acquiescent	+	-
Intransigent	-	+
Promotive	-	-
Preservative	+	+

+ Officials responsive to changes and demands, either because the changes and demands are intense or because their intensity is perceived to be increasing.

- Officials unresponsive to changes and demands either because the changes and demands are not sufficiently intense or because their intensity is perceived to be decreasing.

It is important to stress that each of the self-environment orientations is conceived to constitute a basic posture from which all policy decisions spring. All four are viewed as stable and enduring as long as the relative strength of the demands emanating from within the national actor and of those from its present environment do not change or are not perceived to have changed. If changes occur and/or are perceived as such, then the national actor is seen as either undergoing a transformation to one of the other three adaptive orientations or failing to survive. This means that the theory allows for 12 possible transformations. It must be re-emphasized, however, that the four types of adaptive orientation are conceived as deep-seated and not transitory in nature, as undergoing transformation only in response to profound social and technological change, either internally or in the international system. The theory posits an electoral or violent ouster of political leaderships as normally necessary to the initiation of any of the 12 possible transformations, and for some of them (especially the transformation from either

intransigent or acquiescent to preservative adaptation), a major societal upheaval would appear to be a prerequisite.¹⁶

The Adaptation of Small States:
Modifying the Theory

The original formulation of the adaptation model is pervaded with the implicit assumption that the external environment of small states is predominant, locking them into situations from which transformation is unlikely and thus giving rise either to the politics of acquiescent adaptation if their internal demands are perceived as relatively minimal or to the politics of preservative adaptation if the internal demands are viewed as sufficiently great to offset those from abroad. This assumption now appears untenable. The changing structure of world politics has facilitated, perhaps even encouraged, the emergence of some small states who have managed to lessen substantially their orientations toward their external environments or to raise substantially their orientations toward the needs of their essential structures. That is, some small states have successfully moved their politics from acquiescent to preservative adaptation (e.g., Panama), from acquiescent to promotive adaptation (e.g., Cuba), from preservative to promotive adaptation (e.g., Libya), or from preservative to intransigent adaptation (e.g., Cambodia in the mid-1970s). In effect, the original formulation was founded on the faulty reasoning that equates smallness with weakness and that treats objective circumstances as determinative of external behavior. Consequently, dependency was presumed to mark small state survival, whereas now it is clear that defiance and different degrees of autonomy are also forms of survival available to them.

A number of factors can be cited as sources of the various adaptive transformations experienced by some small states. The breakdown of the bipolar world and the resulting greater tolerance of great powers for the autonomy of small states, the advent of ever greater numbers of small states and the cohesive consequences of the intense nationalism through which many of them came into existence, the relatively lessened importance of military-security issues and the relatively greater importance of socioeconomic and scientific issues, the growing number of transnational actors from whom small states can procure assistance, and the dynamism of modern technology and the greater interdependence it has fostered are among the more obvious reasons why the adaptive options open to small states have multiplied.

Although it is the totality of such factors that comprises the world to which all nations must adapt, one of these changes seems especially salient as a source of the dynamics whereby small states have been able to evolve new adaptive orientations. The shift from a world in which military issues and strategy are predominant to one in which economic conflicts and tactics are paramount--what might be viewed as a shift from foul- to fair-weather politics--has appeared to have had profound consequences for the way in which small states define their self-environment relationships. When the context of world politics is cast predominantly in terms of military security, with the threat of armed intervention ever present and the demand for adherence to alliance commitments serving as a constant pressure, the officials of small states are likely

to perceive their external environments as a series of forces to be deflected, dodged, or otherwise warded off. With the greater prevalence of economic concerns, however, the external environment emerges not as a wellspring of threats, but as a vast reservoir of desired possessions. Instead of being viewed as an ominous source of challenges to be thwarted, the environment comes to be seen as an endless resource from which to procure. To begin to redefine the external environment as a site from which demands emanate to one in which resources are available is, in terms of adaptive orientations, to begin to undergo a transformation from acquiescent to the other three types of adaptation or from preservative to promotive or intransigent adaptation. Such a redefinition of the external environment would appear to be underway among many small states, mainly those in the Third World but also on the part of some in the industrial world. For them, the superpowers and other large states are decreasingly seen as armed camps and are increasingly viewed as marketplaces where goods and expertise can be acquired. And, equipped for the first time with this conception of the outside world as offering procurement opportunities, small states are in the position of considering alternative strategies for coping with their external environments.

There is a curious paradox here. While large states and superpowers, still needing to be attentive to problems of military strategy and for the first time experiencing a substantial degree of dependence on foreign resources, are moving in the direction of preservative adaptation in which a balance is sought between external and internal demands, small states are increasingly able to tip the balance in favor of their internal needs. More accurately, in the case of those small states whose internal structures are basically coherent and not racked by dissension, the external environment is emerging as a place where it is possible to strive for the formation of new arrangements and processes that can yield previously unobtainable benefits. In effect, the small states may be the only ones capable of evolving and sustaining the orientations that underlie promotive adaptation.

Such an interpretation seems especially logical for those small states which are richly endowed with a resource needed in the industrial world. The oil-rich states of the Arab world, once so dependent on the West and so acquiescent in their adaptive orientations, have clearly benefitted from the shift from foul- to fair-weather politics and been able to evolve perceptions of the world as a vast marketplace in which their oil products can serve as an effective currency with which to promote new arrangements abroad and new dimensions of their essential structures at home. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that only those small states possessing resources in short supply in the West are capable of redefining their relationship to their external environments. The sight of superpowers becoming increasingly vulnerable and linked to changes abroad, supplemented by the example of small states such as Cuba defying their larger neighbors, would seem to have encouraged other, less richly endowed small states to reconsider their self-environment relationships. In some instances (such as Panama), the reconsideration has been hastened by vigorous demands for greater national autonomy on the part of domestic groups, while in other instances (such as Bahrain), the effort to initiate adaptive transformations has its root in the calculations of top-level elites. But, whatever the source, a process of emulation would

appear to be sweeping the world of small states, encouraging all of them to be much more ready to re-examine whether their dependency form of survival is necessary and to explore strategies for moving toward greater autonomy.

It is here, of course, that the theory has relevance for the states of Central America. All of them are being swept by change, and three of them have clearly entered a period of adaptive transformation. After a long history of acquiescent adaptation in which successive leaderships were oriented to give greater priority to the policies of the United States than to internal demands, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua are now undergoing the domestic upheaval that precedes the emergence of new self-environment orientations. Which set of orientations will actually emerge as predominant in these three countries is, obviously, the paramount policy question presently confronting all of the actors, domestic and foreign, caught up in the Central American maelstrom.

The Adaptation of Central American States:
Further Modifications

As it has been developed thus far, however, the theory of national adaptation provides only a point of departure for examining the current Central American scene. Its application to small states yielded a number of useful hypotheses founded on the assumption of coherent and strife-free internal structures,¹⁷ but such a condition certainly does not obtain today in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. All three are presently racked by factional conflict among groups and parties scattered across the left, center, and right ranges of the political spectrum. And, unfortunately, the theory has not yet been elaborated in such a way as to allow for the derivation of hypotheses about likely internal strategies and external policies while states are undergoing adaptive transformations. For such transformations arise when the self-environment orientations of different factions have moved from peaceful competition to mortal combat, with the result that the internal strategies and external policies pursued during such periods may be more in the nature of short-term accommodations to the immediate requirements and crises of combat than they are derivatives of deep-seated, long-term adaptive orientations. Thus some argue, for example, that the tolerance of moderate political parties in Nicaragua on the part of the Sandinista government is a tactical retreat from their underlying self-environment orientation, a window-dressing designed to sustain the flow of outside aid from the United States and Venezuela until such time as an effective switch over to Cuban, Soviet, and other Communist sources can be pulled off.

Through a five-step process of analysis, however, it is possible to redesign the adaptation model as a conceptual tool that can be fruitfully applied to the current circumstances of Central America: first, the model's focus on nation-states is scaled down in such a way that the faction, be it an opposition group or a fragile government, is treated as the adapting entity; second, those aspects of the current scene in Central America that we, as detached observers, consider central to the course of events in the region are identified and the extent to which each variable can be manipulated by a faction or a regime is assessed;

third, the interaction among the variables is analyzed; fourth, the degree of manipulability of each variable is then reassessed from the perspective of the four adaptive orientations; and, finally, the fundamental adaptive orientations of the various factions presently struggling for predominance in the several countries are determined through a careful review of their activities and pronouncements. As a newcomer to the study of Central America, the present writer can contribute only to the first four of these steps, but hopefully what follows in this regard will enable specialists on the region to implement the fifth step and thereby develop insights into the options and maneuvers that the competing factions might pursue as the dynamics of change unfold throughout the Isthmus.

To look within the nation-state and treat the various factions in the several countries as adaptive entities presents some analytic problems, but none of these are insurmountable. From this scaled-down perspective, any faction's self-environment orientations are examined in such a way that its constituent elements and resources constitute the "self" (i.e., the source of internal demands) while the rest of the society and the world beyond the state's formal boundaries comprise the "environment" (i.e., the source of external demands). The faction's preferred balance between these demands may undergo short-term accommodations in response to the exigencies of the ongoing struggle for control, but their conceptions of which demands need to be accommodated and which can be resisted, thwarted, manipulated, or otherwise managed are likely to stem from their underlying orientations toward themselves in relation to their environment. Thus can an analysis of the competing factions facilitate estimates of how each faction is likely to assess the options open to it during the period of transformation.

Furthermore, the device of scaling down the adaptation model to the subnational level enables us to frame expectations as to the policies and strategies the various factions are likely to follow in the event they emerge as winners of their country's power struggle. Of course, to compete for power is not the same as wielding power. As the faction becomes the government and its responsibilities become society-wide in scope, its definition of the self may be enlarged enough to alter the adaptive orientations with which it came to power. Promotive or intransigent orientations, for example, may give way to the preservative kind as new internal and external "realities" are encountered for the first time. On the other hand, it seems highly improbable that the self-environment orientations of a victorious faction would undergo immediate change. At the very least, the adaptive orientations it articulated during the struggle for power are likely to be a forerunner of how the faction's leaders initially define the "realities"--what can and cannot be manipulated at home and abroad--when they become the government. Surely, for instance, the early months of a new regime previously committed to promotive self-environment orientations will be marked by different responses to the United States than will one that brought preservative orientations into office. In sort, scaling the adaptation model down to the factional level allows us to look beyond the present chaos and polarization in the region if we assume that eventually stable (if not consensual) regimes will emerge in each of the troubled countries, thereby enabling them to pass out of the transformation phase into a new era of predominant self-environment orientations fashioned by the faction that takes over the reigns of government.¹⁸

Another advantage of analyzing Central American factions and parties as adaptive entities is that it frees us from the conceptual blinders inherent in the tendency to classify factions on the left-right political spectrum. The distinctions between left, center, and right do describe important ideological and policy differences, and they also identify crucial socioeconomic and class differences in the support bases of factions. But such differences do not enable us to anticipate the readiness of a faction to contest or accommodate to new developments at home and fresh challenges from abroad. By examining factions in the context of the relative significance they attach to internal and external demands, however, we are in a position to estimate the range within which they are likely to tailor their ideological commitments to the economic, political, and military "realities" with which they have to contend. To classify the Sandinistas as a left-wing regime, for example, is to provide clues as to its policies toward land reform, banks, and other burning issues; but such a classification does not facilitate an answer to the question of what the Sandinistas will do when faced with the possibility of a cut-off of U.S. aid to Nicaragua. Yet, such questions can be meaningfully handled by interpreting the empirical indicators of the Sandinistas' adaptive orientations. Whatever the dictates of their ideology and whatever their location on the left side of the political spectrum, they will respond differently to U.S. challenges if they are transiently, promotively, or preservatively oriented.

There is, to be sure, an overlap between the left-center-right political model and the adaptation scheme. Other things being equal, in the nature of their ideological commitments and socioeconomic support bases, left-wing factions are likely to maintain promotive orientations and those on the right are likely to be intransigently oriented, while those located in the democratic center will probably adhere to preservative orientations. But other things are not equal in Central America. Local economies are too impoverished and the need for external assistance is too great to allow us simply to overlay the left-right spectrum onto the adaptation types. The two models should be seen, rather, as supplementary, with a faction's political ideology perhaps underlying its initial predispositions in any situation, but with these then being filtered through its self-environment orientations.

Controls Over and Interactions Among the Relevant Variables

Let us turn now to the next steps in applying the adaptation model to Central America, those of enumerating the relevant variables and assessing their manipulability. On the basis of a careful survey of journalistic accounts of events in the region since 1977 (a year when the Isthmus was characterized as quiescent, even "simple and controlled"¹⁹), 61 recurrent features of its several situations emerge as relevant to future outcomes and thus as variables that may or may not be subject to manipulation by the factions and regimes who wield power in the various countries. These are listed in the left-hand column of Table 2. Although far from exhaustive, this listing makes clear the extraordinary complexity and delicacy of the transformations now underway in Central America. Each of the 61 variables can reasonably be said to be interactive with most or all of the others, so that a change in the value of

TABLE 2 (continued)

23. Ability of a faction to create publicity calling attention to its claims.	x		x
24. The extent and pace of polarization among a country's factions.	x		x
25. Degree of consensus among a country's factions.		x	x
26. The extent of support for and coherence within and among right-wing factions.	x		x
27. The extent of support for and coherence within and among center factions.	x		x
28. The extent of support for and coherence within and among left-wing factions.	x		x
29. The extent of support for and coherence within and among military elites.	x		x
30. The extent to which the political regime controls the military.	x		x
31. The extent of support for and coherence within and among religious elites.	x		x
32. The degree of activity on the part of religious elites.	x		x
33. The extent of support for and coherence within and among business elites.	x		x
34. The readiness of business elites to increase productivity.	x		x
35. The readiness of a faction or regime to resort to violence (assassinations, kidnappings, death squads, harassment).		x	x
36. The readiness of a faction or regime to prevent or curb increasing violence.	x		x
37. The readiness of a faction or regime to resort to censorship.	x		x
38. The readiness of a faction or regime to correct corruption.	x		x
39. The readiness of a faction or regime to curb or facilitate shipment of arms to neighboring countries.	x		x
40. The readiness of a faction or regime to press land reforms, institute press reforms, nationalize banks, etc.	x		x
41. A faction's ties to west European countries.		x	x
42. A faction's ties to the U.S. State Department, members and committees of Congress, the Defense Department, etc.		x	x

TABLE 2 (continued)

43. A faction's ties to private groups in the United States (church, media, etc.).	x		x
44. A faction's ties to the Soviet Union, Cuba, and/or other Communist actors.	x		x
45. A faction's ties to Venezuela, Mexico, and other non-Communist acotrs.	x		x
46. A faction's readiness to cut all ties to the United States or to make compromises in order to obtain assistance.	x		x
47. Availability of an international black market in arms.	x		x
48. Availability of international private credit.	x		x
49. Readiness of the U.S. to insist on human rights, land reform, free elections, etc.	x	x	
50. Readiness of the U.S. to provide economic, military, and/or diplomatic aid.	x		x
51. Readiness of the U.S. to make military commitments in Central America.	x		x
52. Readiness of the U.S. to send military advisers.	x		x
53. Readiness of the U.S. to reverse its policies.	x		x
54. Readiness of the U.S. to bring pressures on others to support its policies in the region.	x		x
55. Readiness and ability of factions and other regimes in Central America to provide assistance, channel arms, etc.	x		x
56. Readiness and ability of Cuba and other Communist countries to provide arms, economic assistance, etc.	x		x
57. Readiness of Communist countries to back off under U.S. pressure.		x	x
58. Readiness of Socialist International to support counterparts in Central America.	x		x
59. Readiness of Christian Democratic parties outside Central America to support their Central American counterparts.	x		x
60. Readiness of a faction or regime to tamper with evidence relative to controversial developments.	x		x
61. Availability and accuracy of evidence in regard to arms supplies from abroad.	x		x

*Other things being equal.

any of them seems bound to result in the alteration of some of the others. Such, of course, is the nature of adaptive transformations. They render constants into variables and slow-changing variables into short-term fluctuations. And their rippling effects make it easier for actors to precipitate change but harder to control its outcome.

Since many of the listed variables involve actions, policies, and resources external to Central America, Table 2 also makes clear the high degree to which the interdependence of domestic and foreign affairs marks the politics of the region. That is, many of the interactions among the variables span national boundaries, with the result that decisions taken abroad can have repercussions within a faction, regime, or country, and vice versa. As will be seen, it is with respect to these internal-external interactions that the adaptation model is especially clarifying.

The right-hand columns of Table 2 employ a simple coding scheme to assess the extent to which the listed variables appear (to a detached observer) subject to control by the leaders of a faction or regime seeking to advance their goals and by external actors pursuing foreign policies toward the region. A book-length manuscript would be needed to explain each of the assessments, but certain patterns which they form are worthy of comment here. First, it seems clear that the factions and regimes in Central America are, other things being equal, much more capable of manipulating developments within their countries than are any external actors who might seek to exercise control in the region. Second, other things being equal, there remain severe limits on the extent to which the factions or regimes can effect desired changes within their countries, particularly in the short run. The values of many of the variables do change in the short term, but this is because of dynamics at work in the polity, economy, and society, and not because leaderships are able to get the compliance on which control is founded. Third, to the extent that any of the variables are manipulable, and again assuming that other things are equal, the external actors are no better able to manipulate the intraregional variables than are faction or regime actors able to impact on the extraregional variables.

Some of the limits of control from abroad and at home are amplified in the ensuing, more specific analysis, but these three general patterns highlight an important overall reminder for those who ponder appropriate policies to be pursued by the United States and/or its favored factions or regimes in the region. Namely, that in periods of profound and rapid transformation, the limits to policy effectiveness are much less than they might otherwise appear, that the options open to either external or internal actors are not very great and involve incremental and marginal impacts, and that the few viable options are more likely to involve controlling the pace of change than they are the fact of it.²⁰

In order to facilitate the next steps in the analysis, the 61 variables listed in Table 2 have been reduced to nine broad clusters. Although the variables are highly interactive, each has been assigned only to one cluster so as to highlight some of the more important interactions among them through an examination of how the mutually exclusive clusters impact on each other. The nine clusters and a crucial range across which each can vary are set forth in the rows of Table 3, while their listing in the columns permits a crude assessment in the cells as to

TABLE 3: ESTIMATED INTERACTION AMONG MAJOR VARIABLE CLUSTERS CURRENTLY (1981) OPERATIVE IN CENTRAL AMERICA

variable clusters	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX
I. SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURES (1 - 18*) (rigid ↔ flexible)	///	1 +	2 -	3 -	4 +,-	5 +	6 ?	7 ?	8 +,-
II. POPULAR SUPPORT (19 - 22*) (decline ↔ growth)	9 +	///	10 -	11 -	12 +,-	13 +	14 ?	15 +	16 +,-
III. POLARIZATION PROCESSES among a country's factions (24 - 25*) (lessens ↔ heightens)	17 -	18 -	///	19 +	20 +	21 +,-	22 +	23 -	24 +,-
IV. ELITE COHERENCE within factions (26 - 34*) (fragmented ↔ unified)	25 -	26 +,-	27 +	///	28 +	29 +,-	30 +	31 +	32 +,-
V. readiness to resort to DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (35 - 36, 39*) (low ↔ high)	33 -	34 -	35 +	36 +,-	///	37 ?	38 +	39 +,-	40 ?
VI. readiness to resort to new, REDISTRIBUTIVE DOMESTIC POLICIES (38, 40*) (reluctant ↔ eager)	41 +	42 +	43 +	44 +	45 ?	///	46 +	47 +,-	48 ?
VII. readiness to resort to new FOREIGN POLICIES (41 ↔ 46*) (maintain old relationships — establish new contacts)	49 ?	50 ?	51 +	52 +,-	53 ?	54 +	///	55 +	56 +,-
VIII. capacity to PROCURE economic, financial, and/or military AID abroad (47 - 59*) (limited ↔ considerable)	57 ?	58 +	59 ?	60 +	61 +,-	62 +,-	63 +	///	64 +,-
IX. readiness to provide accurate EVIDENCE in regard to the course of events (23, 37, 60 - 61*) (minimum ↔ maximum)	65 ?	66 +,-	67 +,-	68 +,-	69 ?	70 ?	71 +,-	72 +,-	///

+ as the value of the row variable moves from left to right across its indicated (in parentheses) range, similar movement is likely with respect to the column variable.

- as the value of the row variable increases or decreases across its indicated range, contrary movement is likely with respect to the column variable.

+,- the interaction between the row and column variables can go in either direction, depending on the identity of the adapting faction.

? unclear as to how the row and column variables may be linked or, indeed, whether there is meaningful and systematic connection between them.

* These are the variables (as numbered in Table 2) encompassed by the clusters.

whether, other things being equal, each cluster is directly or inversely linked to the other eight.

Perhaps the most interesting, or at least the most currently salient, relationship depicted in Table 3 is to be found in Cells #39, 47, 61, and 62. These involve the interaction between a faction or regime's capacity to generate support abroad and its inclination to hold firm or alter the domestic policies it pursues. Other things being equal, the foreign supplier seeks to impact on the faction's domestic policies by offering or withholding economic, military, or political support, but the faction, being deeply committed to its own political and philosophical foundations, is reluctant to accede fully to the external demands if they are viewed as too risky or noxious. Thus, other things being equal, a delicate balance evolves as the internal and external actors assess each other and juggle their assessments with the other demands made upon them. This is what is occurring to the junta in Nicaragua as it faces the prospect of losing U.S. aid if it applies, or permits the supplying of, arms to El Salvador's rebel factions. And it is also the current experience of the El Salvadorean junta as it seeks to balance the need for U.S. support with U.S. demands that land reform and other liberal policies be aggressively advanced by the junta.

Another set of crucial dynamics that will determine the outcome of the transformations unfolding in Central America are those represented by Cells #15 and 58 in Table 3. Involved here are the complex ways in which the amount of tangible and intangible support a faction can procure abroad is linked to the extent of the support it has, or appears to have, at home. "Popular support"--as journalists summarily describe the strikes that paralyze, the rallies that fizzle, the funeral processions that lengthen, the kidnappings that persist, and the many other types of events that may reflect the shifting tides of public sentiment--appears to be endlessly volatile, as if waiting to coalesce around a victor who can bring both progress and stability. Under these conditions a faction needs to demonstrate underlying viability if potential friends abroad are to maximize their moral and material support. Ideological affinity is not enough to insure unqualified backing. Counterparts abroad cannot long afford to endorse a loser and will quickly back away from concrete commitments if the momentum seems to shift and popular support seems to slip. Thus, other things being equal, factions have to be careful that their claims of public support are essentially accurate, lest they be embarrassed by discrepancies between their claimed support and the realities of the way it is expressed. This happened recently in El Salvador when spokespersons for the left-wing insurgents announced a forthcoming military drive to oust the Duarte regime. The drive failed as the anticipated public support did not materialize, an outcome that led the insurgents' friends abroad to modify their previously unqualified support by calling for a negotiated settlement of the conflict.

The distinction between assertions about the political climate and the realities of that climate call attention to still another important set of interactions identified in Table 3. These are represented by the cells comprising both the ninth row and the ninth column, and they testify to the large (but subtle) role played by information and evidence--be it scarce or plentiful, accurate or distorted--in Central America today.

Any fluid and volatile situation, where each increment of domestic or foreign support seems capable of tipping the balance in a new direction, is bound to highlight the importance of images, of indicators of growing strength, for those who are party to the situation and hope to turn it to their advantage. The extent to which images and evidence are presently being contested in El Salvador and Nicaragua is thus a measure of the uncertainty and explosiveness of those situations. In trying to maximize public support, for example, all parties to the conflict in El Salvador are seeking to create an image of momentum that reflects growing unity among their previously divided factions, that is bringing in outside aid which will further insure success, that is daily adding to the ranks of supporters, and that, all told, is sweeping them unerringly toward their goals.

Whether it involves the pace of land reform or the flow of goods from abroad, in other words, the image can often be as important as the reality in the current Central American scene. And, under these circumstances, the nature and solidity of the evidence for claims and counter-claims can, other things being equal, be as much an issue as the conflicts to which the evidence pertains. Thus, to cite but a few recent examples from the conflict in El Salvador, did major controversies with widespread repercussions arise over such questions as the authenticity of captured rebel documents depicting the flow of aid from the Communist world, the validity of an ID card indicating the presence of U.S. combat soldiers; the identity of those who fired first at Archbishop Romero's funeral, the origins of the wood in the hull of a boat used to smuggle arms into the country, and the affiliations of the killers of four Catholic missionaries.

Or consider the large degree to which information and evidence bears on the underlying political values to which a faction may or may not be committed. Consider, for example, the important consequences that flow from where the Duarte regime is located on the political spectrum in El Salvador. The U.S. government contends that it is backing a centrist regime, whereas a former U.S. ambassador to that country, Murat W. Williams, argues that the regime is "neither centrist, nor Christian, nor democratic, nor reform-minded."²¹ Which characterization does one accept, and what evidence on the matter does one find credible? The elusiveness of the answer to this question serves to demonstrate the considerable extent to which the faction that creates the most effective images and offers the most persuasive evidence--and which can sustain the reputation for these qualities--has a distinct advantage in the struggle for power in the region. The capacity to provide "proof" has, in effect, become a crucial ingredient of national and factional power in Central America.

The ceteris paribus phrase that peppers the previous paragraphs points up the analytic limits of the relationships identified in Table 3. Other things, of course, are never equal. The table depicts variables and not constants. The outcomes of the interactions among the variables are thus bound to differ as their values differ from one country to the next or change within a country from one situation to the next.

One obvious way in which other things are never equal concerns the policies of foreign countries toward specific factions and the Isthmus

in general. These may have been essentially constant in earlier eras, but as change sweeps Central America and brings its affairs high onto the agendas of foreign powers the constancy of its external environment has come apart. The United States has vacillated between pressing human rights and supporting authoritarian regimes. Cuba, Mexico, and Venezuela have been actively concerned about the course of events throughout the Isthmus. The Soviet Union and several of its allies have been cited as suppliers of military and economic aid to the region. The support of Social Democratic parties in Europe and elsewhere has been sought by the left in El Salvador, while President Duarte, the head of its junta, has directed similar efforts toward fellow Christian Democrats abroad. In short, the relevant external environment of Central America has enlarged in recent years and, accordingly, so have the options open to its factions and regimes increased in number. Stated differently (and in the terms in which the external variables have been clustered together in Table 3), the capacity of each faction or regime to procure aid abroad has been altered and is now subject to much more variability than ever before.

This is not to imply that generating external support has become easier for any of the factions and regimes in Central America. To be more salient on the global agenda and thereby have more options is no guarantee of an increased capacity to bargain for or otherwise procure more aid abroad. The countries remain small and poor, and their ability to drive hard bargains continues to be constrained by the "realities" of their geographic location and their historic patterns of production and trade. Furthermore, even if they were somehow prepared to set aside their growing reluctance to use internal structures and policies as bargaining chips to attract would-be foreign powers, their capacity to procure aid abroad is limited by the obvious fact that the readiness of each of the foreign countries to respond to requests for aid is affected by a host of other considerations, from its own domestic pressures to its other external commitments, that have no relevance to Central America and that have a higher priority than providing support to factions in the region. Many current examples could be cited. Mexico's close ties to Cuba precede (and condition) its links to El Salvador. Several governments in Western Europe, especially those where socialists hold or share power, put plans for deploying nuclear missiles in Europe ahead of temptations to side with counterparts in Central America.²² In the United States, the Reagan administration does not want the situation in El Salvador to divert attention from or otherwise undermine its efforts to mobilize support for its new economic program.²³

The capacity to procure support abroad, in other words, can never be treated as given by any faction or regime in Central America. It varies not only in terms of the faction or regime's success in managing its internal affairs and otherwise remaining attractive to would-be outside supporters (i.e., in terms of the interactive phenomena represented by all of the cells in the next-to-last row and column of Table 3), but it is also a capacity that is as variable as the foreign policies of the countries with which the faction has established or might establish links (phenomena not depicted in Table 3).

Thus it is difficult to estimate the viability of the greater number of options abroad open to Central American factions. On the one hand,

much depends on the importance which the United States attaches to the region. While the United States' geopolitical credibility has been eroded with the erosion of its superpower status, it still commands sufficient clout to dominate the region if it chooses to do so. More accurately, although the United States may no longer be able to preserve or promote desired structures within the countries of the region, it still appears competent to prevent those countries from freely (and successfully?) pursuing the new external options that have emerged with the decline of its credibility. That is, the United States' proximity to the region, its history of sending in the marines, its longstanding availability as a prime market for Central American produce, and its capacity to proffer or withhold economic and financial assistance to friendly factions are all considerations that no faction or regime can ignore as it assesses the possibility of alternative sources of foreign support. If the United States chooses, for example, it can probably prevent Nicaragua from remaining within the western financial and trading system while developing close security ties with Cuba.

On the other hand, the United States is not without limits in the region. Its freedom of maneuver in Central America is generally constrained by the lessons it learned in Vietnam²⁴ and, more particularly, by the need to maintain productive relations with oil-rich Mexico and Venezuela, not to mention the rest of Latin America--and the need to do so serves as an important constraint on its freedom to maneuver in Central America. The diplomatic costs of a military operation or an unqualified backing of a right-wing faction, for example, would be so high that the United States is unlikely, other things being equal, to wield all of the clout available to it in the region. And such constraints, reinforced as they are periodically by warnings from Mexico and other interested nations, enhance the viability of the options open to factions toward the center and left of the political spectrum. The latter have to move carefully to explore new contacts and sources of aid abroad, but there would appear to be some room for them to act independently of, even contrary to, the demands emanating from Washington.

But even if the viability of all the emerging external options open to Central American factions and regimes were somehow to remain constant, there is another important way in which ceterus parabus obscures the dynamics of the relationships set forth in Table 3. For factions to consider pursuing a new option--by identifying the leverage it offers vis-a-vis the United States and by determining whether the necessary domestic concessions can be made in exchange for foreign support--they have to assess the importance of the self in relation to the environment. Options do not loom as options unless an actor is oriented to perceive them as such. It follows that the viability of any option is bound to be different depending on how the phenomena it encompasses are seen as a link between the self and the environment.

This line of reasoning leads us to the next step in applying the adaptation model to the current Central American scene. To reduce the extent to which other things have to be equal for us to grasp the dynamics of the nine variable clusters, each of these can usefully be assessed in the context of the four adaptive orientations. The outline of such an assessment is presented in Table 4. Here it is clear that the world

TABLE 4: THE NINE VARIABLE CLUSTERS AS THEY MIGHT BE DIFFERENTIALLY EXPERIENCED IN TERMS OF THE FOUR TYPES OF ADAPTATION

	Assuasive Adaptation	Intransigent Adaptation	Promotive Adaptation	Preservative Adaptation
I. SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURES	assumed to be beyond manipulation unless of concern to the external sources of support	a consequence of nature and/or history and thus not subject to alteration	subject to extensive alteration through long-range training programs and consistent redistributive policies	subject to some modification necessary to maintain popular support and flow of external aid
II. POPULAR SUPPORT	of concern only to the extent that external sources of support are concerned	not of concern, except as a threat to existing socio-economic structures; repressive measures taken if support for the structures wanes and opposition builds	of great concern, as popular support necessary to the development of new and desired socio-economic structures	of concern to the extent the support for existing socio-economic structures wanes, in which case a readiness to adopt domestic measures necessary the maintenance of support
III. POLARIZATION PROCESSES among factions	resisted, accepted, or furthered, depending on the posture of the external sources of support	seen as a price for maintaining existing socio-economic structures and thus accepted	seen as possibly necessary to the development of new socio-economic structures and, if so, welcomed	seen as a threat to existing socio-economic structures and thus contested
IV. ELITE COHERENCE within factions	inclusion or exclusion of individuals or groups viewed as dependent on the wishes of external sources of support	viewed as crucial to maintaining existing socio-economic structures; hence defections not acceptable and force used to prevent or offset them	viewed as crucial to developing new socio-economic structures; hence ideological purity stressed and defections acceptable	viewed pragmatically, with compromises made in order to enlarge support for socio-economic structures deemed essential
V. readiness to resort to DOMESTIC VIOLENCE	only as encouraged by external sources of support	high, if existing socio-economic structures perceived as challenged	high, if seen as necessary to overcome opposition to the development of new socio-economic structures	low, only as a last resort to protect existing socio-economic policies or structures
VI. readiness to resort to new REDISTRIBUTIVE DOMESTIC POLICIES	only if external sources of support insist	adamantly against any policies that would undermine existing socio-economic structures	anxious to initiate new policies that will lead to desired socio-economic structures	appreciate that some new policies may be necessary to meet changing conditions
VII. readiness to resort to NEW FOREIGN POLICIES	only as required by external sources of support	willing to abandon old ties abroad and establish new ones if continuance of existing socio-economic structures thereby served	prepared to establish any new ties abroad that will facilitate the development of the desired internal structures	appreciate that some new tie abroad may help protect essential structures at home especially if there can be developed without jeopardizing existing relationships
VIII. capacity to procure FOREIGN AID	ready to pursue domestic policies dictated by external sources of foreign aid	unwilling to bargain alterations in existing structures for external aid	willing to make concessions, or give the appearance of so doing, in order to get the foreign aid necessary to promoting new domestic structures	ready to bargain with any foreign sources over domestic structures in exchange for aid that will preserve essential structures
IX. readiness to provide accurate EVIDENCE	release and distortion of information guided by external sources of support	only information supportive of existing socio-economic structures seen as credible and worthy of distribution; damaging evidence withheld	willing to tamper with evidence if it will enhance the development of new socio-economic structures	credibility deemed important and thus some effort to provide reliable information

abroad is seen in a very different light when approached from different adaptive perspectives. As the seventh and eighth rows of Table 4 indicate, many more policy options are open to promotively oriented factions than to those with any of the other three self-environment orientations. A comparison across the other rows, moreover, reveals that promotive adaptation leads to a wider array of options not only because it allows for a greater readiness to strike bargains with external actors, but also because it imposes fewer domestic constraints on efforts to be innovative abroad than does any of the other adaptive orientations.

Policy Implications

A more immediate utility of the formulation summarized in Table 4 concerns the urgent policy questions of how the various factions will respond to diverse and conflicting pressures for change presently converging upon them. Will the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the Democratic Revolutionary Front in El Salvador seek to widen their support bases through negotiating with business and other center groups and accommodating the United States? Or will they avoid compromise and seek to impose authoritarian solutions on their divided countries with the help of new supporters in the Communist world? Will the regime in El Salvador continue to press for land reform and free elections? Or will it be overwhelmed by the processes of polarization, abandon its centrist policies, and succumb to pressures from groups on the right? And should a coup d'état bring the right to power in El Salvador, will its leaders resist U.S. pressures for reform and seek to impose an authoritarian solution? How will comparable groups in Guatemala make comparable choices in the event the processes of revolutionary change follow a comparable course in that country?

The answers to these questions become clearer when the history, structure, and internal tensions of each of the factions are assessed in the context of Table 4. If the left-wing groups interpret the realities of their circumstances through the filter of promotive orientations, their conduct through this period of transformation will be quite different than if their circumstances loom as increasingly constraining and encourage them to evolve preservative orientations. Likewise, the question of how right-wing groups will conduct themselves can be considerably clarified by determining whether their circumstances induce them to evolve intransigent or preservative forms of adaptation.

There remains the problem of how to assess the probable evolution of each faction's adaptive orientations as the period of transformation unfolds. This is not, admittedly, an easy analytic task. Unforeseen events lie ahead, and any of these might influence which adaptive path a faction traverses. On the other hand, the problem is not as difficult as it may seem. If those who specialize in Central American affairs and have intimate knowledge of the predispositions and thinking of the various factional leaders can identify hard empirical indicators that locate the leaders in, say, two or three of the cells of the same column of Table 4, it should be possible to anticipate how any faction is likely to conduct itself in response to any challenge that the coming months may bring. This may seem like a grandiose conclusion, but it is the kind that a theoretical perspective allows. Whether or not its implications should form the basis

for policy decisions is, of course, another question. The answer depends on whether policymakers are prepared to posit self-environment orientations as the core impulse in politics to the same extent as the adaptation model does.

At the same time, it might be argued that Table 4 highlights another overall conclusion, one that is no less grandiose but surely much less satisfying: namely, the possibility that the period of transformation will not culminate in clear-cut outcomes. Such a conclusion would stress how very differently the four types of adaptation dispose their adherents toward the dynamics presently at work in Central America. These differences suggest the large extent to which the various factions and regimes may be locked into a highly structured set of perspectives toward their country, its groups and their conflicts, once they evolve their values as to the relative importance of internal and external demands. If this is so, and if the major factions of the several countries persist in clinging to various types of adaptation, it is reasonable to expect that the processes of polarization will continue apace and that the period of transformation racking the Isthmus will continue to lengthen its trail of chaos and suffering across time and space. Indeed, as long as the major factions are so differentially adaptive, it seems conceivable that none of the emergent options available to them abroad will be sufficient to inhibit the steady movement of the states of Central America toward maladaptation and eventual extinction as viable sociopolitical units.

¹Cf. Federico G. Gil, Enrique A. Baloyra, and Lars Schoultz, "The Deterioration and Breakdown of Reactionary Despotism in Central America," paper prepared for the U.S. Department of State (Washington, D.C., xerox, January 1981), pp. 3-4.

²Thus it is not surprising, for example, that even a seemingly obvious, bivariate hypothesis anticipating a link between fluctuating coffee prices and regime stability in El Salvador and Guatemala was not readily affirmed when subjected to data for a 95-year period ending in 1975. The analysts managed to tease out "the existence of a relationship" between these two variables, but their qualifications of this finding make it clear that too many other factors intervene between a shift in coffee prices and an alteration in the degree of domestic conflict to expect the former to impact directly and simultaneously on the latter. Cf., *ibid.*, pp. 17-22.

³For a valuable inquiry founded on such a model, see Federico G. Gil, Enrique A. Baloyra, and Lars Schoultz, "Democracy in Latin America: Prospects and Implications," paper prepared for the U.S. Department of State (Washington, D.C., xerox, December 1980). For a more general model, see Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

⁴General frameworks that might provide guidance here are Maurice A. East, Stephen A. Salmore, Charles F. Hermann, Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1978), and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Gerald W. Hoppole, Paul J. Rossa, Stephen J. Andriole, Foreign Policy Behavior: The Interstate Behavior Analysis Model (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980).

⁵In this connection see Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), and Albert O. Hirschman, "The Turn to Authoritarianism in Latin America and the Search for Its Economic Determinants," in David Collier (ed.), The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 61-98.

⁶Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1956), and Lewis Coser, Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1967).

⁷Cited in Richard Millett, "Central American Paralysis," Foreign Policy, 39 (Summer 1980), p. 101.

⁸Gil, Baloyra, and Schoultz, "The Deterioration and Breakdown of Reactionary Despotism in Central America," p. 5.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹⁰Los Angeles Times, February 8, 1981, p. 1.

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- ¹¹ Los Angeles Times, February 18, 1981.
- ¹² The theory is spelled out in James N. Rosenau, The Study of Political Adaptation (New York: Nichols Publishing Company, 1981).
- ¹³ See James N. Rosenau, "The Adaptation of Small States," paper presented at the Conference on Contemporary Trends and Issues in Caribbean International Affairs, Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies (May 1977), and reproduced in ibid., Chapter 6. Several paragraphs that follow have been taken from this essay. For a critical reaction to the essay, see Herb Adoo, "A Letter to Rosenau on the Three Basic Fallacies Attaching to His Theory of Adaptation of Small States," (St. Augustine, Trinidad: Institute of International Relations, xerox, August 1979).
- ¹⁴ For a full analysis of each type, see Rosenau, The Study of Political Adaptation, pp. 63-79.
- ¹⁵ Table 1 has been reproduced from ibid., p. 61.
- ¹⁶ A discussion of the 12 adaptive transformations can be found in ibid., pp. 80-87.
- ¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 113-123.
- ¹⁸ It is possible, of course, that the polarization of any of these societies will persist for so long as to render the transformation phase a permanent condition. The theory treats such an outcome as a continual process of maladaptation leading to extinction of the national system in its present structure and form. A plaintive recognition of this possibility was recently recorded by Nicaragua's Interior Minister, Tomas Borge Martínez, in relation to a failed guerrilla offensive in El Salvador: "...the guerrillas could not defeat the army and the army could not defeat the guerrillas. Things cannot continue like this. It is convenient neither for the government nor for the guerrillas, neither for the United States nor for us. No defeat and no victory seems possible...." New York Times, February 16, 1981, p. 7.
- ¹⁹ Millett, op. cit., p. 100.
- ²⁰ For a lengthy, theoretical discussion on the limits of control, see my essays entitled, "Calculated Control as a Unifying Concept in the Study of International Politics and Foreign Policy," reproduced in J. N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York: Nichols Publishing Company, rev. ed., 1980), ch. 10; and "Capabilities and Control in an Interdependent World," reproduced in J. N. Rosenau, The Study of Global Interdependence (New York: Nichols Publishing Company, 1980), ch. 3.
- ²¹ Los Angeles Times, March 11, 1981, p. 2.
- ²² New York Times, February 22, 1981.
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