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ABSTRACT

Political Change and Political Reform in an Authoritarian Regime:
The Case of Mexico

While Mexico's recent political history in many ways contrasts sharply with the abrupt processes of regime change that other Latin American nations underwent in the 1960s and 1970s, contemporary Mexico shares with other countries in Latin America and Latin Europe its current experiment in political change. In 1977 the López Portillo government embarked on a major effort to reform the rules of the electoral process and expand the competitive boundaries of the political system. The 1977 political reform was designed to increase the number of officially-registered political parties competing in the electoral process, liberalize the rules and conditions governing elections at the federal level, and expand opposition parties' representation in the federal Chamber of Deputies. The López Portillo liberalization measure recognized the growing problems which faced the Mexican political system: a generally perceived erosion of the regime's political legitimacy resulting from widespread public disapproval of the government's handling of the 1968 student strike and changing popular evaluations of government policy performance; the emergence of a number of opposition political parties and groups that remained unincorporated by the existing electoral process and party system; and elite concern regarding the deteriorating organizational viability and mobilizational capability of the government-affiliated Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) as a result of declining electoral competition. In contrast to earlier reform measures that sought to maintain a limited degree of competition in the electoral process by subsidizing existing, coopted political organizations, the López Portillo political reform has admitted new political actors to the electoral arena. The final consequences of this reform are far from clear, but the measure opens the possibility for long-term change and transformation in the Mexican authoritarian regime.

Three sets of questions underlie this analysis of political transition in an authoritarian regime. First, what were the origins of the López Portillo political reform? What factors, forces, and motives accounted for this regime-sponsored effort at political liberalization? How did factors such as the regime's sociopolitical bases and its institutional structure affect the initiation and direction of the transition process? Second, what were the characteristics of the reform process itself? How was the 1977 political reform related to the structure and dynamics of Mexico's governing "revolutionary coalition?" Who were the relevant sociopolitical actors within the authoritarian regime, and how did they influence the characteristics of the reform process? What conditions surrounded the implementation of the 1977 political reform, and how have they affected the accomplishment of the reform's stated goals? Third, what are the consequences of this liberalization process? Even though the reform process has so far been much less open-ended than

other cases of transition from authoritarian rule in Latin America and Latin Europe, to what extent do regime-sponsored political reforms and liberalization efforts such as that initiated by the López Portillo administration create broader pressures for--and possibilities of--regime transformation? What specific political conditions and elite choices are necessary to promote change resulting in the adoption of more democratic procedures and institutions? What theoretically generalizable insights does the Mexican case contribute to an examination of the broader question of regime-sponsored liberalization and/or democratization? These are among the questions and problems which this essay will examine.

POLITICAL CHANGE AND POLITICAL REFORM IN AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME: THE CASE OF MEXICO

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Introduction

Recent events in Latin America, southern Europe, and elsewhere have focused scholars' and policymakers' attention on regime transformation as a major issue in the study of political change. During the 1960s and early 1970s institutional military coups ended civilian democratic regimes and initiated prolonged periods of military authoritarian rule in several South American countries. These developments and the policies subsequently adopted by these regimes prompted widespread debate regarding the relationship between economic and political change in countries such as these. This debate questioned the positive relationship between industrial growth and economic change and the emergence of political democracy that had been hypothesized in earlier theories of modernization, and it resulted in a new concern with the origins and consequences of "bureaucratic-authoritarian" regimes. Then, beginning in the late 1970s, several of these same regimes showed increasing signs of political liberalization and/or movement toward more democratic political practices and procedures. These events, and comparable developments in several southern European countries, have once again brought the question of regime change to the forefront of scholarly and policy concerns. The origins, characteristics, and outcomes of transitions from authoritarian rule raise a number of important theoretical and conceptual questions.

In many ways Mexico's recent political history contrasts sharply with the abrupt processes of regime change that other Latin American countries underwent in the 1960s and 1970s. Mexico has experienced basic political stability and institutional continuity since the formation of its governing single party in 1929. The last major armed rebellion against the civilian government occurred in that same year, and there has not been a significant challenge to the "official" party's presidential candidate since 1952. The early consolidation of centralized political power and political stability contributed significantly to the country's post-1940 industrialization and rapid economic growth. The "Mexican economic miracle" came under increasing criticism in the 1970s as the rate of economic growth slowed considerably and problems such as severe income and regional inequalities, massive unemployment and underemployment, inflation, and growing foreign indebtedness assumed critical dimensions. Urban and rural guerrilla movements appeared in the early 1970s, and both foreign and domestic observers frequently concluded that Mexico was in crisis. But continued national political stability and the size, industrial capacity, and relative diversity of the economy still set Mexico apart from other developing countries in Latin America and elsewhere.

Yet despite these historical contrasts, contemporary Mexico shares with other countries in Latin America, southern Europe, and elsewhere its current experiment in political change. In 1977 the López Portillo government (1976-1982) embarked on a major effort to reform the rules of the electoral process and expand the competitive boundaries of the political party system. The 1977 political reform (reforma política) was designed to increase the number of officially-registered political parties competing in the electoral process, liberalize the rules and conditions governing elections at the federal level, and expand opposition parties' representation in the federal Chamber of Deputies (Cámara de Diputados). (A detailed summary of the 1977 reform law's major provisions appears in section II below.) This liberalization effort follows earlier reform measures undertaken during preceding administrations. Like the reform measures enacted in 1963 and 1972-1973, López Portillo's reforma política recognized the growing problems which faced the Mexican political system. But in contrast to these earlier reform measures that sought to maintain a limited degree of competition in the electoral process by subsidizing existing, coopted political organizations, the López Portillo reform has admitted new political actors to the electoral arena. The final consequences of this reform are far from clear, but the measure opens the possibility for long-term change and transformation in the Mexican authoritarian regime.

Political liberalization in the Mexican authoritarian regime thus involves (1) an expansion in the opportunities for political contestation and interest representation in the electoral and legislative arenas and (2) the creation of alternative mobilization channels through the legalization of previously unrecognized political parties. The liberalization process initiated by the 1977 political reform has been less abrupt than a number of other political transitions in Latin America and Latin Europe in part because Mexico represents a less severe form of authoritarian rule. As a result of its revolutionary origins and a longstanding effort to balance a diversity of interests within a governing "revolutionary coalition," the Mexican regime has historically offered a number of opportunities for interest articulation within the established political system. Yet this liberalization process is interesting from a comparative perspective precisely because it involves an authoritarian regime whose historical origins and evolution are distinctive. It is also a regime in which major actors such as political parties, the military, organized labor, and the national bourgeoisie play roles different than those typical of many other authoritarian situations. The Mexican case offers an opportunity to examine both the long-term characteristics of political change in an authoritarian regime and the specific conjunctural factors which affect the process of political liberalization. Furthermore, an analysis of the Mexican liberalization experience illuminates some of the overarching similarities, common factors, and recurring patterns that characterize transitions from authoritarian rule.

Three sets of questions underlie an analysis of this and other cases of political transition in an authoritarian regime. First, what are the origins of such initiatives for political change? What factors, forces, and motives account for Mexico's recent regime-sponsored effort at political liberalization? How do factors such as the regime's sociopolitical bases and its institutional structure affect the initiation

and direction of the transition process? Second, what are the characteristics of the reform process itself? How is the current political reform related to the structure and dynamics of Mexico's governing "revolutionary coalition?" Who are the relevant sociopolitical actors within the authoritarian regime, and how have they influenced the characteristics of the reform process? What conditions surrounded the implementation of the 1977 political reform, and how have they affected the accomplishment of the reform's stated goals? Third, what are the consequences of this liberalization process? Even though the reform process in Mexico has so far been much less open-ended than other cases of transition from authoritarian rule in Latin America and Latin Europe, to what extent do regime-sponsored political reforms and liberalization efforts such as that initiated by the López Portillo administration create broader pressures for--and possibilities of--regime transformation? What specific political conditions and elite choices are necessary to promote change resulting in the adoption of more democratic procedures and institutions? What impact is Mexico's post-1978 petroleum boom likely to have on this process? What theoretically generalizable insights does the Mexican case contribute to an examination of the broader question of regime-sponsored liberalization and/or democratization? These are among the questions and problems which this essay will examine.

I. The Origins of Mexico's Contemporary Political Reform

The Mexican authoritarian regime is at once mass-based and elite-dominated. The governing "revolutionary coalition" is a heterogeneous grouping of sociopolitical actors and competing interests which, despite a considerable degree of internal competition and frequent conflict over policy issues, has over a relatively long period of time been linked by an overarching consensus on broad norms for political action and the general goals of economic development. The contemporary political system is in large part the result of Mexico's 1910-1917 social revolution, and its principal mass bases consist of organized labor and peasant movements. These popular organizations are subject to important controls, and the characterization of the Mexican system as an authoritarian regime places particular emphasis on the state's active intervention to regulate and limit sociopolitical pluralism, mass political mobilization, and socio-economic and political demand articulation. The inclusion of the organized labor and peasant movements as sectors within the "official" Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) --and the formal exclusion of organized business interests from the party --is a symbolic (if not always real) commitment to their representation in an elite-dominated regime. This mass social base constitutes an important source of political legitimacy and accounts for major characteristics of internal regime bargaining.[1]

The composition of the ruling political elite reflects the heterogeneity of Mexico's "revolutionary coalition." While there is considerable internal competition and rivalry within this elite, its overall commitment to established political norms and procedures and the limited availability of mass actors for competitive mobilization have been important sources of long-term national political stability. The PRI provides an important institutional forum for elite competition. The party serves as a mechanism for elite selection, and it represents the regime's

commitment to the political representation of a broad array of actors and interests. The Mexican regime is thus a reasonably well institutionalized and broad-based authoritarian system. Relatively greater opportunities for the exercise of liberal political rights and limited political competition make the regime more open than many other forms of authoritarian rule in Latin America. Yet political power is firmly concentrated in the federal executive, and the president is the principal focus of the national decisionmaking process.[2]

Political change in the Mexican system has generally occurred in response to a combination of specific events or crises and the more general consequences of socioeconomic modernization. Particular events or crises may effect political change through their impact on actors within the governing coalition or on popular perceptions of regime legitimacy. Such crises have arisen as the result of internal elite conflict, shifts in major sociopolitical actors' constituencies, and occasionally as a result of international events. They may be the product of unfulfilled economic or political expectations or the impact of regime policies on specific groups or sectors. More general processes of socioeconomic modernization may affect the regime's broader social bases and produce political conflicts as a result of an increase in sociopolitical mobilization. In adapting to specific crises and overall change, the governing political elite's guiding principle has been the maintenance of a limited degree of sociopolitical pluralism and an internal equilibrium among existing socioeconomic interests and political groups. This frequently involves a delicate, complicated effort by the political elite to balance often conflictive interests and actors so as to preserve internal stability and institutional continuity.

In the specific case of Mexico's contemporary process of political liberalization, the regime-sponsored reform initiative was a response to three closely related problems and issues: a generally perceived erosion of the established regime's political legitimacy following the violent repression of the 1968 student strike and the rise during the late 1960s and 1970s of widespread public concern regarding government policy performance; the emergence of a number of opposition political parties that remained outside the officially-recognized party system; and the declining mobilizational capacity of the PRI as indicated by increasing voter abstention. The Echeverría administration (1970-1976) responded to these problems with negotiation, selective repression, leadership cooptation, and limited electoral reform. But severe economic problems and sociopolitical turmoil at the end of the Echeverría presidency convinced important segments of the governing political elite that more extensive political change was necessary. The 1977 political reform was a more comprehensive effort to respond to these specific issues and the more general sociopolitical challenges facing the Mexican authoritarian regime.

During the early 1970s liberal factions within Mexico's governing "revolutionary coalition" became increasingly convinced that the established regime suffered from a significant erosion of its political legitimacy. The 1968 student strike and the subsequent "Tlatelolco massacre"--in which police and army troops killed or wounded many protesting students--are generally considered to have been watershed events in this regard.[3] The impact of the 1968 crisis on subsequent political

developments was in part due to the nature of political legitimacy in the Mexican authoritarian regime. The 1910-1917 revolution produced a new conception of the Mexican state: as a representative of all groups and classes, the modern state was given responsibility for the moderation and conciliation of conflicting interests. State mediation of mass participation and active state intervention in diverse aspects of social life were justified on the supposition that the postrevolutionary regime was committed to the enactment of widespread socioeconomic and political reforms.[4] In a regime whose origin and consolidation were products of revolutionary transformation rather than the result of a broadly inclusive democratic electoral process, popular perceptions of regime legitimacy were closely tied to overall evaluations of government performance and the fulfillment of a pragmatic, nonideological revolutionary program.[5] Despite specific political conflicts in which the state relied on selective repression to silence political opponents and suppress labor and peasant movements that threatened elite control and/or the position of "official" mass organizations, until the late 1960s the established regime received widespread support as the focus of the revolution's promises of social equity and political democracy. During the 1940s this legitimacy was symbolized by the idea of "national unity,"[6] and the governing coalition's position was substantially reinforced by the rapid economic growth which Mexico experienced from the mid-1940s through the early 1970s.

However, the Tlatelolco episode severely challenged public perceptions of the established regime and its revolutionary credentials. The 1968 crisis demonstrated that the rapidly growing urban middle class could not be easily incorporated in the existing political system by traditional means. The protest movement called for regime democratization and the creation of new participatory opportunities, and it constituted a significant political threat to the regime due to its effort to link a radical middle class leadership with opposition elements in the organized labor movement and among urban marginals. The government's response was a violent attack on the sons and daughters of the urban middle class, the political elite's most politically articulate constituency. The subsequent mass public protest represented a widespread rejection of the government's action as a violation of accepted political behavior and governing practices. Moreover, although the Tlatelolco crisis did not in itself directly challenge the underlying political-economic pact between the state and the private sector, the events of 1968 did seriously undermine the "myth of the Mexican Revolution" and the assumptions of the progressive achievement of socioeconomic and political justice associated with Mexico's post-1940 development model.[7]

The 1968 crisis was of major significance in changing public perceptions of regime legitimacy, but two qualifications to this point are necessary. First, the legitimacy issue was of most direct concern to members of the middle class; their perceptions of legitimate governing practices and norms of regime conduct were at stake. This in itself was politically important, since the urban middle class had been the primary beneficiary of post-1940 economic development and much of the intelligentsia's criticism of the established regime dates from the 1968 crisis. However, the legitimacy issue per se was probably of less direct importance to the organized labor and peasant movements. Since the late 1940s

the regime's labor and peasant support had been based predominantly on a complex system of control over these mass organizations, and members' evaluations of the established regime were relatively less important than their leaders' support for government policies. It is significant in this regard that organizations such as the PRI-affiliated Confederación de Trabajadores de México (CTM, Mexican Workers' Confederation) publicly expressed support for the government during the 1968 student strike and after the Tlatelolco massacre. Moreover, "official" mass organizations such as the CTM offered the regime a critical basis of political support by not joining in the popular mobilization against the government.[8]

Second, to the extent to which labor and peasant expectations were at issue in changing perceptions of regime legitimacy, they were part of a more general shift in public evaluations of the government's success in satisfying the historical goals and aspirations of the Mexican Revolution: socioeconomic equity, justice, opportunities for political participation, and so forth. Much of the established regime's earlier mass support had been based on satisfactory public evaluations of government policies such as agrarian reform, national industrialization and economic growth, and the expansion of primary and secondary education systems. But by the late 1960s the shortcomings and contradictions of Mexico's post-1940 development model had become particularly apparent. The events of 1968 focused public attention on these issues, and Mexico's socioeconomic problems had become especially urgent by 1976-1977. Urban workers faced widespread unemployment and underemployment, continuing inflationary pressures which eroded real wages, and limited access to public services. There was increasing relative inequality in rural areas, stagnating agricultural production and a growing need for imports of basic foodstuffs, a high rate of rural-urban migration, and a rise in the incidence of land invasions and rural violence. By the late 1960s and early 1970s the issue of regime performance had also become of increasing concern to the urban middle class as its continued rapid growth resulted in the declining ability of the national educational system to meet its needs. University and technical/vocational training institute graduates encountered increasing difficulties in finding appropriate employment.[9] Many of these problems were not new to Mexico, and in some cases they took on significant dimensions only after the crisis in public confidence which surfaced in 1968. But a generalized awareness in elite circles that these problems had reached new levels of intensity and constituted a significant potential threat to the established socioeconomic and political order was a major impetus in the formulation of the 1977 political reform initiative. National political dialogue in Mexico at the time centered on the word "crisis."[10] The 1977 reform measure was in part an attempt to create a political opening that would defuse accumulating sociopolitical tension.

Changes in the level of Mexican popular support for the established regime can be measured in two ways. First, public-opinion survey data show a significant shift in public evaluations of, and faith in, government in recent years. When Almond and Verba surveyed Mexican citizens in the late 1950s regarding their attitudes toward government, 58 percent of those respondents said that the national government improved conditions in Mexico. Some 30 percent (higher than in either Germany or Italy) said that they were proud of their government and political institutions--a

higher percentage of positive responses than for all other aspects surveyed, including social legislation, Mexico's position in international affairs, the economic system, the characteristics of the people, spiritual values and religion, contributions to arts and sciences, and the physical attributes of the country. Only 43 percent did not feel free to discuss politics with others (lower than in either Germany or Italy, and only slightly higher than the United States). Respondents expressed particular pride in the Mexican Revolution and the presidency.[11] Yet in 1977 a survey of Federal District/Mexico City residents by the Mexican Institute of Public Opinion found that 67.2 percent of respondents did not participate in politics. Moreover, 89.4 percent of respondents felt that there was no freedom to participate.[12]

Second, and perhaps more significantly in the Mexican context, there has been a steady decline in voter participation in the electoral process. The historical political agenda set by the 1910-1917 revolution's promise of "Effective suffrage; no reelection" gives the electoral process special importance in the Mexican authoritarian regime. Elections play an important legitimating role as a formal validation of popular consent and as a means of periodically mobilizing public support for government activities, the party system, and newly elected public officials. The electoral process also represents a commitment to regular leadership succession, and it provides both a means of periodic elite rotation and an important opportunity for the presentation of citizen demands to future officeholders.[13] Yet between 1961 and 1976 the percentage of registered voters who abstained from voting in congressional and presidential elections rose steadily from 31.5 percent to 38.1 percent.[14] Large numbers of citizens also failed to register or invalidated their ballots. While the established regime places important restrictions on independently organized mass mobilization, this growing citizen apathy toward the electoral process was perceived as a threat to the viability of the PRI-dominated party system. One of the principal goals of the 1977 political reform was to revitalize the electoral process and reverse this trend toward increased voter apathy.

The emergence of a number of opposition political parties constituted a second major motivation for the López Portillo government's political reform. The Díaz Ordaz government's violent suppression of the 1968 student movement drove leftist political opposition underground. During the next several years this opposition's principal forms of political activity were urban and rural guerrilla actions, including bank robberies, kidnappings, and political assassinations.[15] The June 10, 1971 violent attacks by paramilitary groups on student demonstrators further fueled guerrilla actions in several parts of the country by convincing many groups that peaceful reform efforts were futile. The Echeverría administration's response combined systematic (and generally successful) efforts to repress urban and rural guerrilla groups with a more liberal government policy toward nonviolent political opposition, frequently providing political support and material and financial assistance to such opposition groups as part of a "democratic opening" (apertura democrática) policy designed to reduce this sociopolitical discontent. In this more open national political environment during the early 1970s, opposition movements among urban marginals, peasants, workers, and university students all took on new importance.

The organized political groups and parties which appeared during this period represented tendencies and forces on both the left and right. Among these were:[16]

(1) Partido Demócrata Mexicano (PDM, Mexican Democratic Party) (1971)
(2) Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST, Socialist Workers' Party) (1973)
(3) Unidad de Izquierda Comunista (UIC, Communist Left Group) (1973)
(4) Movimiento de Acción y Unidad Socialista (MAUS, Movement for Socialist Action and Unity) (1973)
(5) Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores (PMT, Mexican Workers' Party) (1974)
(6) Partido Popular Mexicano (PPM, Mexican Popular Party) (1975)
(7) Partido Socialista Revolucionario (PSR, Revolutionary Socialist Party) (1976)
(8) Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT, Revolutionary Workers' Party) (1976)

With the exception of the PDM, these were all leftist political organizations of various ideological tendencies.[17] These parties and groups--particularly those on the left--gave voice to worker, peasant, and student discontent, and the most important of them succeeded in articulating alternative positions on issues ranging from the status of political prisoners to negotiations for the sale of Mexican natural gas to the United States. These organizations joined the opposition Partido Comunista Mexicano (PCM, Mexican Communist Party) (1919), which was not officially registered by the Secretaría de Gobernación (Ministry of the Interior) and had been illegal since 1949--although it participated in the 1964 and 1976 elections. The emergence of these opposition political organizations and their efforts to form linkages with various popular movements in urban and rural areas were perhaps the most significant indications that the existing "official" mass-based organizations and political parties had grown increasingly incapable of incorporating important mass publics.

Finally, there was growing concern within the political elite regarding the institutional health of the PRI. A long-term decline in the PRI's mobilization capacity and decreasing electoral competition had resulted in the deterioration of the party's internal organizational structures.[18] During the 1960s and early 1970s the traditional registered opposition parties, especially the Partido Popular Socialista (PPS, Socialist Popular Party) (1948) and the Partido Auténtico de la Revolución Mexicana (PARM, Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution) (1954), became less and less viable as independent opposition political organizations. The PARM, organized by revolutionary military veterans in partial reaction against the increasing centralization of Mexican politics, never operated as more than a factional electoral vehicle with limited regional support. It has never nominated its own presidential candidate; instead, it has regularly supported the PRI's candidate. The PPS was originally formed as a progressive alternative to the "official" governing party, but since 1958 it, too, has regularly backed the PRI's presidential nominee.[19] Disillusionment with the PRI's frequent use of fraudulent electoral tactics and the impossibility of winning national office effectively limited these parties' interest to competition in local

municipal elections. In part as a result of these developments, the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN, National Action Party) (1939) became increasingly important as a "catchall" opposition party. But during the 1976 presidential campaign, as a result of a growing abstentionist movement within the party and severe internal division among party leaders, the PAN did not field a presidential nominee and the PRI faced a presidential election without the participation of a recognized opposition candidate.[20] The PRI had also encountered considerable difficulty in adapting to changing conditions such as the erosion of its more easily mobilized rural support base and the need to represent an increasingly urban electorate. There was also growing concern regarding the effectiveness of internal PRI nominating procedures and the party's ability to field capable candidates with broad-based political experience. The Mexican political elite was well aware that the vigor of the "official" party and the health of the political system as a whole depended on the viability of the officially recognized political opposition: "Lo que resiste, apoya" ("That which opposes, supports").[21] Thus the 1977 political reform sought to revitalize the PRI by increasing the effectiveness of opposition electoral competition.

The Mexican regime has over time employed a number of different strategies and techniques to respond to political problems and changing sociopolitical conditions. Although they are discussed individually here, in practice these different methods are often employed in combination as a multifaceted regime response to political change. These strategies and techniques might be summarized as:

(1) Negotiation, repression, and electoral fraud. Although the Mexican authoritarian regime has moved forcefully to repress major mass mobilizations and challenges to the established order, it has generally been selective and (in comparison with widespread use of torture and official and paramilitary violence in other Latin American countries) relatively restrained in its use of repression against opposition political groups and specific individuals as a means of responding to perceived political threats. This situation is in large part due to the effectiveness of regime control over mass actors such as labor unions and peasant organizations by other means. For example, the use of private security forces by local landowners and rural bosses (caciques) constitutes an important means of maintaining order in the countryside. Legal provisions which facilitate the dismissal of dissident workers, in the context of a high-unemployment economy, provide employers and incumbent labor leaders with effective controls over opposition in the workplace. In addition, selective repression against regime opponents is frequently used in combination with other, more flexible methods of compromise and negotiation and policies designed to address protesting groups' demands. This continuing effort to find some accommodation with new political contenders has been a major strength of the Mexican regime. One observer has referred to this strategy as "First two carrots, then a stick."[22]

On those occasions in which the organized political opposition has emerged as a severe threat to the PRI's electoral dominance, the established regime has not hesitated to deny the opposition an electoral victory. At the national level, perhaps the most famous case of massive

electoral fraud involved Avila Camacho's (1940-1946) victory over Juan A. Almazán, the candidate of a broad-based opposition coalition, in the 1940 presidential elections. Whether or not Almazán actually won the election (as he claimed), most accounts acknowledge that his electoral support far exceeded the 5.72 percent of the vote officially credited to him.[23] Various forms of electoral fraud (stuffing ballot boxes, intimidation of voters, violence against opposition parties and their candidates, and so forth) are widespread at the state and local level, and on several occasions the PAN has been denied what appeared to be a clear electoral victory when the government invalidated the vote returns (for example, in the cities of Tijuana and Mexicali, Baja California in 1968). The PAN has succeeded in winning some important local victories in places such as Hermosillo, Sonora in 1967 and Mérida, Yucatán in 1969.[24] But in general, the PRI's government ties and its ability to shape the outcome of the electoral process have proved powerful obstacles to electoral challenges by opposition political forces.

(2) Leadership cooptation and elite rotation. The cooptation of opposition leaders is a continuous process in the Mexican political system. It is a mechanism through which diverse forces and groups are integrated into the governing "revolutionary coalition," and it is a strategy by which specific opposition movements can be effectively defused. The process of leadership cooptation in part accounts for the heterogeneity of the ruling coalition; this appears to be a characteristic generally shared by authoritarian regimes.[25] Moreover, the Mexican political system has a relatively high rate of turnover within the ruling elite.[26] Elite rotation reflects broader processes of socioeconomic and political change, gradually incorporating new elements into the regime. Leadership cooptation and elite rotation create a capacity for adaptation to political change in Mexico which is generally provided by the electoral process in more democratic political systems.

(3) Liberalization of the electoral process and expansion of the party system. The Mexican regime has also demonstrated considerable flexibility over time in reshaping the rules and boundaries of the political process as one means of accommodating diverse opposition groups and adapting to change. Although serving somewhat different purposes at different times, several governments have reformed legislation concerning the electoral process and the registration of political parties so as to affect the opportunities for the representation of different groups in elected positions.

In 1946 Avila Camacho became the first president to introduce a federal electoral law in the post-1929 period (the earlier law governing electoral procedures dated from 1918). Avila Camacho acted in response to the tumultuous 1940 presidential elections contested by Almazán's Partido Revolucionario de Unificación Nacional (PRUN, Revolutionary Party of National Unification) (1940) and the growing electoral appeal of the PAN (which had formed part of the Almazán coalition).[27] Although the PRUN disbanded following the 1940 elections, the PAN soon emerged as the first significant addition to the national political party scene since the formation of the "official" Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PRN, Revolutionary National Party) in 1929. The PAN presented its first candidates for the federal Chamber of Deputies in 1943; it

claimed victory in 21 districts in that year, but PAN candidates were not allowed to take office until after the passage of the new electoral law and the 1946 congressional elections.[28]

The 1946 law established various requirements governing the formation and official registration of national political parties by the Ministry of the Interior (a minimum national membership of 30,000, with at least 1,000 members in each of at least two-thirds of the states), as well as the conditions under which that registration could be cancelled. The law sought to reinforce the position of the PRM by making the formation of local and regional political parties more difficult. In addition, under the terms of the 1946 law only parties registered at least one year in advance could participate in elections. These requirements not only posed obstacles to electoral challenges such as the Almazán movement, but they also sought to channel political opposition through the electoral process.[29] The 1946 legislation was modified in 1949, 1951, and 1954 to make certain changes in its overall application (most notably in 1954, increasing the minimum national membership for party registration to 75,000, with at least 2,500 members in each of at least two-thirds of the states).[30] As a result of these raised barriers to party formation, the recognized political party system (until the formation of the PARM in 1954) was limited to a left-center-right spectrum of the Partido Popular (PP, Popular Party [1948], reorganized as the PPS in 1955), the PRI, and the PAN.[31]

The introduction of "party deputies" (diputados de partido) in 1963 constituted a major alteration in the existing electoral system and an important precedent for the 1977 political reform. In contrast to the earlier electoral laws' concern with protecting the "official" party's privileged position, the express purpose of the 1963 electoral reform (like its 1977 successor) was to revitalize a party system in which the recognized opposition parties (the PAN, PPS, and PARM) played a negligible role by guaranteeing them representation and a national political presence in the federal Chamber of Deputies.[32] Moreover, like the 1977 law, the 1963 reform was intended to defuse accumulated sociopolitical discontent; it followed the repression of teachers' and railroad workers' strikes in 1958-1959 and sought to channel the internal political opposition sparked by the Cuban Revolution into established institutional channels. The 1963 reform provided minority political parties winning more than 2.5 percent of the total national vote with a minimum number of deputies (five each, plus one for each additional 0.5 percent of the vote, up to a maximum of twenty).[33] And when in the 1964-1970 congressional elections the PPS and the PARM failed to win even the minimum 2.5 percent of the national vote to qualify for Chamber representation, the national electoral college acted "in the spirit of the law" to award them party deputies in any event. (For example, in 1970 the PPS received 1.4 percent of the total national vote and the PARM received only 0.83 percent, yet they received 10 and 5 Chamber seats, respectively.)[34] In a further attempt to resolve this problem, the Echeverría government in 1972 enacted constitutional reforms to reduce this minimum percentage to 1.5 percent. At the same time, the maximum number of "party deputies" was increased to 25 per party. A 1973 reform of the electoral law reduced the party membership requirement to 2,000 affiliates in each of at least two-thirds of the states (with a total national membership requirement of at least 65,000).[35]

Over time the Mexican authoritarian regime has thus relied on a combination of methods and strategies to respond to political challenges. But given the diverse political problems facing the Mexican system in the late 1960s and early 1970s, one might ask why Echeverría did not undertake a more extensive electoral and party reform. The continued overall strength of the established regime in part explains its ability to delay a broader political reform. However, several factors were of specific importance in determining the timing of a more extensive government-initiated liberalization program. First, from the incumbent political elite's perspective, too little time had passed since the events of 1968. While some response was necessary to reduce existing tension, a major reform which greatly expanded the opposition's political presence would have signalled regime weakness by establishing too direct a causal link between an attack on the established system and its response to change. Additionally, Echeverría's "democratic opening" policy--including greater press freedom, emergency wage increases and price controls on basic commodities, a more liberal policy toward the formation of independent unions not affiliated with "official" labor organizations, greater tolerance of rural land invasions, increased public investment and credit access in rural areas, the freeing of the 1968 political prisoners, an aggressive foreign policy in favor of developing countries' rights, and a more open regime policy toward the political opposition--had aroused considerable opposition among conservative groups, especially within the private sector. Concern regarding the balance of political forces within the governing coalition, and fear of increasing divisive internal tensions, may also have limited the degree of political reform possible.

Second, and again from the national political elite's perspective, the status and organizational structure of the political opposition did not lend itself to a more extensive party reform. At the time of Echeverría's reforms the government had not yet succeeded in suppressing leftist guerrilla groups, and it was not until the second half of the Echeverría administration that the bulk of opposition forces had regrouped into reasonably stable party organizations. While it was thus possible for the regime to coopt opposition leaders individually in order to respond to new political circumstances, the political opposition had not yet evolved to a point at which it could be conveniently integrated into the established party system according to the existing "rules of the game." To an important extent, then, Echeverría's support for the formation of organized opposition groups can be seen as an attempt on the part of the regime itself to structure opposition sociopolitical forces so as to make their subsequent incorporation into the established party system possible.

Finally, a broader political reform might not have been possible at this time for reasons associated with Echeverría's own political career and personality.[36] As Minister of the Interior during the Díaz Ordaz administration, Echeverría was the cabinet official directly responsible for the forcible repression of the 1968 student movement and the Tlatelolco episode. Given the very considerable reservations which a number of opposition parties expressed regarding participation in the government-sponsored political reform enacted by López Portillo, it is possible that a broad new reform initiative by Echeverría would have been tainted by

his own association with it. The reforms implemented in 1972 and 1973 sought to reinvigorate the existing political party system, but they were essentially liberal modifications of the already established party deputy system. The intended beneficiaries of those measures--the PAN, PARM, and PPS--were unlikely to boycott Echeverría's reforms, as more radical opposition parties and groups might have done. Moreover, Echeverría's emphasis on the cooptation of individual opposition leaders and direct negotiations with opposition political groups to establish boundaries for their activities fit well with his activist personality and his inclination to orchestrate all aspects of national politics. For personal reasons as well, then, Echeverría may have preferred responses which placed less emphasis on the creation of new institutional channels for opposition political groups and instead emphasized his own discretionary political power.

While the Echeverría administration did not enact a broad reform of the electoral process and the party system, his government did raise the possibility of a future political reform. The PRI's Plan Básico de Gobierno, 1976-82, published in 1975, was an effort to establish programmatic priorities for the succeeding administration.[37] It emphasized the important relationship between political liberalization and progressive socioeconomic change, and it reaffirmed the regime's commitment to political pluralism. More specifically, the document urged the adoption of a number of reform measures: an increase in the size of the federal Chamber of Deputies (to 400 members) as a means of reducing the size of electoral districts and thus improving communications and contacts between citizens and their elected representatives; expanded political party access to mass communications media; and a thorough revision and updating of voter registration lists.[38] Significantly, the Plan Básico's principal intellectual author was Lic. Jesús Reyes Heroles, a noted PRI intellectual of liberal persuasion and a government official with widespread political experience.[39] In the López Portillo administration, he was to become the powerful Minister of the Interior and the chief architect of the 1977 political reform.

II. The Political Reform Process, 1977-1979

When the López Portillo government took office in 1976, then, there were several historical precedents and specific factors which favored a broad reform of the electoral process and the political party system. But there was by no means unanimity either within the governing coalition or among opposition political groups on this matter. López Portillo was personally convinced of the necessity of such a measure, and Reyes Heroles and liberal factions within the established regime were active proponents of a political reform initiative.[40] However, more traditional sectors of the PRI and the incumbent political elite saw an extensive reform measure as a threat both to their political power base and to their access to political patronage resources. Participation in a regime-sponsored political reform also proved to be a divisive issue for the political opposition. While virtually all opposition groups and parties across a wide ideological spectrum favored major changes in regulations governing the electoral process and the registration of political parties, few opposition parties were initially willing to show much enthusiasm for a reform proposal which maintained major state controls over the political process.

The López Portillo government was challenged to persuade both members of the governing coalition and opposition elements to accept a political reform which neither fully supported. The negotiations which shaped the political reform law constituted the reform process itself.

Although the idea had been widely discussed during the 1976 presidential campaign,[41] the first official announcement of the López Portillo government's intention to implement a "political reform" came in an April 1, 1977 speech by Jesús Reyes Heroles in Chilpancingo, Guerrero. Speaking in his capacity as Minister of the Interior and as President López Portillo's official representative at ceremonies commemorating the end of the incumbent state governor's second year in office, Reyes Heroles argued for an open, "nonauthoritarian" political response to the potential problems posed by Mexico's 1976-1977 economic crisis.[42] He warned that the principal danger consisted of pressures from conservative sectors for a hardening in the government's position toward new sociopolitical conditions and forces for change, which would in all likelihood lead to a rupture in the established national political order. Reyes Heroles recognized the need for legal, institutionalized means for opposition political participation, and he proposed a political reform as a means of including new political forces and ideological tendencies in existing representative bodies. The clear goal of such a reform would be to encourage "minority" groups' participation through established institutions rather than by illegal, possibly violent, means. Reyes Heroles and other progressive elements within the regime clearly feared the ultimately destabilizing consequences of such a development, and both Mexico's recent experience with urban and rural guerrilla movements and the lessons offered by "southern cone" countries such as Uruguay reinforced their convictions regarding the necessity of such a measure. Reyes Heroles endorsed ideological and political diversity as the necessary basis for "democratic unity," and he advocated political reform as part of normal national political evolution.[43]

Reyes Heroles' speech was significant both because it indicated the government's goal of strengthening the established political system by increasing its representative capacity and legitimacy, and because it clearly signalled the importance of conjunctural factors and socioeconomic conditions surrounding the government's reform initiative. The proposed liberalization measure was an attempt to reestablish the regime's claim to political legitimacy as the broadly inclusive representative of all significant tendencies and viewpoints by incorporating the previously unrecognized political opposition into the established political party system. By opening the party system to new forces on the left, liberal elements within the regime sought to create a counterbalance against the political resurgence of conservative groups and the overall conservatism of López Portillo's socioeconomic policies. Mexico's 1976-1977 economic crisis had produced severe new tensions within the governing coalition. The end of the Echeverría administration saw increased rural violence and land invasions, massive capital flight by private businessmen wishing to express their discontent with measures such as emergency wage increases and increased labor mobilization, and speculation regarding a military coup and the armed forces' renewed open involvement in national politics. These developments demonstrated convincingly that the problems and demands which had surfaced in 1968 had grown in intensity and required

new policies to confront them. In this way the 1975-1976 economic crisis served as a catalyst for the 1977 political reform. While the López Portillo administration forcibly suppressed some opposition movements and pursued a series of economic policies designed to regain the confidence of the private sector and restore the balance of political forces within the "revolutionary coalition" (including policies of severe wage restraint and the relaxation of price controls on basic commodities), the political reform sought to expand institutional channels for the expression of political opposition as a means of responding to this changed sociopolitical environment. It constituted, along with significantly different state economic policies and an effort to restructure the public administrative apparatus, a basic part of the program of government announced by López Portillo shortly after taking office.

There is some indication that the López Portillo government had clearly established the principal dimensions of the political reform initiative before Reyes Heroles' 1977 address in Chilpancingo.[44] Some features of the political reform measure that was finally implemented had been outlined in the PRI's 1975 Plan Básico de Gobierno. But in order to maintain the spirit of the initiative it was important to keep the reform process formally open-ended and subject to influence by the political opposition. López Portillo thus directed Reyes Heroles to convene a series of special public hearings under the auspices of the Federal Electoral Commission (Comisión Federal Electoral, CFE) to permit broad-ranging discussion of the political reform proposal by political organizations, academic institutions, and private citizens. At the opening session of these public hearings Reyes Heroles denied that the government had a preconceived project or detailed formula for the political reform at that point.[45] However, the overall character of the political reform process indicates that the government had established the principal dimensions of the reform in advance. Pressures for change from opposition forces affected the context in which the liberalization measure was formulated, but the specific initiative came from the federal executive.

Public discussion and comment on the political reform proposal began only after Reyes Heroles' Chilpancingo address. It is likely that some opposition party officials and political observers close to the government were aware that the political reform project was in the offing, but there is also evidence to suggest that several of the opposition parties were caught off guard by Reyes Heroles' April 1 announcement. The first CFE public hearings began on April 28, 1977, only four weeks after the government's announcement of its intention to implement such a measure. The overall content of party statements presented before the CFE suggests a general lack of preparation regarding specific details of a possible political reform law. Opposition parties such as the PAN, PCM, PMT, and MAUS had for some time advocated reforms in the existing law regulating electoral procedures and the requirements for political party registration, and they could comment on these matters in more detail. But most party presentations before the CFE were limited to an overall analysis and critique of existing socioeconomic and political problems.[46] While these public hearings and a broad discussion of various options, priorities, and problems may have been useful to government representatives and planners as they prepared a detailed draft of the political reform law, they served principally to focus public attention on the reform

process and the importance of the government's liberalization initiative. Various specific proposals made by opposition parties at the CFE hearings for an expanded political reform--including full proportional representation rather than a modified "party deputy" system, and opposition political representation in the federal Senate--were all turned aside. There is no evidence that opposition party participation in the hearings had any significant effect on the final shape of the political reform law.[47]

The prospect of participation in a regime-sponsored political reform which maintained important state controls on the political process posed a divisive issue for many opposition parties. Several of these political organizations, especially Marxist-Leninist groups and parties, had been founded on the basis of their ideological opposition to the governing "revolutionary coalition," the established socioeconomic and political order, and the PRI. With the exception of the few "opposition" groups which unreservedly supported the government initiative and those very ultraleftist groups which eschewed any participation in the electoral process, the opposition parties were divided on the overall merits of the political reform initiative and its specific provisions. Some favored participation in the reform process and the 1979 congressional elections as the best available opportunity to advance their political cause. Despite its limitations, the liberalization project would provide a more open national political environment in which they could articulate alternative programs and proposals and expand their organizational bases and party membership. Advances such as these might open the way to broader political change at a later date. But other groups and parties feared that opposition participation in the reform would result in their cooptation by the regime. They were fully aware of the limited opportunities to effect substantial change which minority participation in the executive-dominated Chamber of Deputies offered, and they feared the corruptive effects which access to government resources and opportunities for individual political advancement might have on opposition leaders. This was a particularly serious problem for those parties or groups with serious internal factional divisions and for more reformist political organizations with a heterogeneous membership and no rigorous ideological orientation. Moreover, opposition participation within the existing political system might strengthen the established regime's position and make fundamental change more difficult.[48]

Reyes Heroles and the political reform's liberal sponsors within the regime thus faced an early challenge in the need to win previously unregistered opposition party participation in the reform process via formal participation in the 1979 elections for the federal Chamber of Deputies. The PDM and PST were willing participants: the PDM's leaders and principal supporters had long sought to win official recognition for a party organization which represented their conservative, Catholic, agrarian constituency, and the PST's reformist orientation advocated collaboration with liberal elements within the government and the PRI as part of a "popular revolutionary alliance." Both these parties accepted the political reform proposal as an important initiative and readily offered their support. The PCM, PPM, PRT, PSR, MAUS, and UIC all offered major criticisms of the proposed reform law.[49] They drew public attention to the distinction between the "electoral" reform proposal offered by the López

Portillo government and the measures required for a more far-reaching "political" reform which would effectively reshape the national political process. Yet, after prolonged internal debates, these organizations ultimately agreed to participate in the 1979 elections as the necessary first step in effecting more substantial political change. Although there were significant differences of opinion within the PCM, the majority of party leaders was convinced that the party's long history and political experience, its defined ideological positions, and the demonstrated commitment of party members would reduce the dangers of participation in the government-sponsored political reform. The PCM had lost its official registration in 1949, and it hoped that its renewed legal status might facilitate its effort to regain the mass base among labor and peasant organizations which it had enjoyed from the 1920s until the early 1950s. Similarly, the PRT, PSR, and UIC appear to have concluded that their relatively rigorous ideological orientations would decrease the cooptive perils inherent in participation in the reform process, while electoral campaign activities would increase their opportunities to expand their mass membership. The reformist orientations of the PPM and MAUS inclined these organizations toward participation in the López Portillo political reform, and the long practical political experience of their principal leaders convinced them that they should not forego this opportunity to win official registration as a basis from which to pursue more fundamental reforms.

The PMT constituted the most difficult case. The reform's sponsors initially judged that of the various opposition parties, participation by the PCM, PMT, PST, and PDM was vital to the liberalization measure's ultimate success. These were the most important unregistered opposition parties in terms of membership and prestige. Moreover, they comprised a comfortably balanced set of existing opposition forces: the PCM and the PDM represented ideological parties of left and right, respectively, while the PMT and PST were more heterogeneous political coalitions representing somewhat diverse opposition orientations. The PMT and the PST represented left-of-center political forces, but the PMT's more aggressive criticism of the established regime and government policies was balanced by the PST's open willingness to collaborate with progressive factions within the PRI and the government.[50] The PMT was deeply divided internally regarding participation in what it considered to be only a partial political reform and the relative merits of seeking "conditional" registry (with "definitive" registry dependent upon its success at the polls) via participation in the 1979 elections. In the end, the party leadership decided not to seek its registration by that means.[51] The political reform law permitted a political party the option of seeking definitive registry by holding a series of state-level assemblies to verify its membership size.[52] The PMT publicly chose this option rather than flatly rejecting participation in the liberalization project. But the logistical and political obstacles to organizing these assemblies effectively eliminated the PMT from the reform process in 1978-1979.

The political reform also produced division and opposition within the authoritarian regime's governing coalition. However, apart from scattered public statements which indicated the discontent of these more conservative political actors, their position within the governing coalition meant that their efforts to restrict the scope and limit the

impact of the political reform occurred as internal, behind-the-scenes negotiations and bargaining.[53] There appear to have been two general sources of opposition within the regime to the political reform. The first focused on the CTM, the PRI's labor sector and the single most important representative of the organized labor movement. In contrast to organized labor's attitude toward political liberalization or transition in a number of other cases, the CTM opposed a major reform in the electoral process and the existing party system for a variety of reasons. At the most general level, the CTM was concerned that a political reform which greatly increased the importance of popular elections as a political arena and legitimacy formula within the national political process would diminish its own political role. Political negotiations within the PRI involved bargaining among the party's three sectors, and in comparison with the amorphous "popular" (middle class) and agrarian sectors, the CTM's more easily mobilized membership, its greater organizational coherence under the strong leadership of Fidel Velázquez, and its relatively closer ties between leaders and the mass membership provided it with important internal political leverage. To the extent to which the electoral process was to become a major arena of political competition and the principal source of political legitimacy, the CTM's own political role would be diminished. Although the CTM appears to have been the first sector to voice its opposition, conservative elements within the PRI's other two sectors--the National Peasants Confederation (CNC) and the National Confederation of Popular Organizations (CNOP)--apparently soon lined up behind the CTM on this issue.

This was not the first time that the CTM had faced a challenge to its political position within the governing coalition. When Alemán reorganized and renamed the "official" party in 1946, the basis of party membership and internal candidate selection shifted from sector organizations such as the CTM to individual, direct affiliation. The CTM perceived this change as an attempt to diminish its political importance within the PRI, in line with Alemán's more general antilabor, probusiness economic development policies. Continued lobbying by the party's labor and peasant organizations finally resulted in a return to the PRI's sector-based party structure in 1950.[54] Again in 1965, Carlos A. Madrazo used his position as president of the PRI's national executive committee to push through reform measures designed to democratize the party's candidate selection procedures. Madrazo sought to replace the sector-dominated nomination process for local elective offices with a series of direct primary elections open to individual party members. However, this reform measure also failed in the face of intense opposition from conservative actors such as the CTM.[55]

López Portillo's proposed political reform also threatened CTM interests in more immediate ways. The government's original plan for opposition representation in the Chamber of Deputies apparently involved an increase in the number of seats from 235 to 250, with 100 of those seats going to opposition parties. This would have reduced the PRI's share of total Chamber seats from 82.6 percent in the 1976-1979 legislature to 60.0 percent at most in the 1979-1982 legislature. This reduction, in turn, would have involved the loss of Chamber seats traditionally distributed by the party leadership to its labor, agrarian, and "popular" sectors. These positions serve as political patronage

resources which each sector's leadership distributes to reward followers and consolidate internal alliances. Each sector's relative share of PRI deputy positions also serves as an indication of its political weight and importance within the party. The CTM was thus concerned about a potential loss of its relative position within the PRI's congressional delegation and an absolute decline in its available patronage resources.

The CTM also feared the consequences which a legalization of new opposition parties and groups might have on its own membership base. With the exception of the PDM, the minority parties most likely to win official registry under the political reform were leftist political organizations which advocated a more aggressive, combative role for labor unions in economic negotiations and in the national political process. The emergence of an important number of "independent" unions (that is, unions not affiliated with any of the "official" labor confederations, such as the CTM) during the Echeverría administration had occurred principally at the expense of the CTM. Opposition political groups and parties had actively sought to undermine the CTM's control over its affiliates in a number of different economic sectors, especially in more modern manufacturing activities in which structural changes in labor-force characteristics and limited competition from other "official" labor organizations for the allegiance of these relatively highly-paid workers already threatened the CTM's position. Quite expectedly, then, the CTM did not welcome the prospect of these same opposition political groups' legal recognition and more active public organizational activities. The political position of "independent" unions would almost certainly be strengthened by their links to opposition political parties with a national forum in the federal Chamber of Deputies. At one point López Portillo noted that one purpose of the political reform was to direct opposition groups' political activity through the Chamber so as not to "contaminate" union activities.[56] But the CTM leadership was not convinced by assurances such as this.

However, the CTM itself was divided internally regarding the political reform measure. The most intransigent opponents to the reform were the leaders of large industrial unions such as the petroleum workers', sugar workers', and electrical workers' unions. These old-line labor leaders were particularly concerned about potential losses in political patronage resources as a result of the political reform. They represented the most significant power bases within the CTM, and their opposition to the political reform apparently accounted for the confederation's initial opposition to it. In contrast, younger CTM leaders such as Arturo Romo Gutiérrez (who in 1979 was chosen to head the CTM's Chamber delegation) supported the reform measure. Romo argued that the Chamber of Deputies could offer an important forum for the articulation of labor interests and demands, and he favored active CTM involvement in the political reform process as a means of expanding the size of the CTM's representation in the Chamber.[57] But younger leaders such as Romo often worked on the CTM's national administrative staff. They frequently enjoyed the support and protection of Fidel Velázquez, long-time national leader of the CTM, but they lacked a firm base in major CTM unions. They were joined by "independent" union elements in the telephone workers', electrical workers', and university workers' unions in the national Labor Congress (Congreso del Trabajo, in which the CTM was the most

important single member) in their lobbying efforts to persuade the CTM to change its initial position regarding the political reform.

Given López Portillo's personal commitment to the political reform idea, the CTM could not flatly reject the proposal and oppose it publicly. But the CTM could use its weight as the nation's single most important labor confederation to bargain for concessions regarding the political liberalization measure's final form. Significantly, the CTM's political and economic importance had been greatly increased by Mexico's 1976-1977 economic crisis. Restraint in wage increases was a major element in López Portillo's economic stabilization program, and the key to controlling wage and salary increases on a national scale was the CTM's commitment to lower wage demands. The impact of this policy on workers' real wages was dramatic: between October 1976 and December 1979 the average national real minimum wage dropped 19.3 percent.[58] The CTM leadership argued that economic support for the López Portillo government of this magnitude merited special consideration for the labor organization's concerns regarding the likely consequences of the political reform.

The CTM also formulated a specific series of demands against which it sought to negotiate concessions on the political reform. Early in his term López Portillo had defined the principal priorities of his presidency in terms of the implementation of complementary reforms in public administration, the national economy, and the political system. The CTM argued that the achievement of the political reform's broader goals depended on the simultaneous implementation of major economic reform measures. Its list of demands included: a constitutional guarantee of the right to remunerative employment; the unionization of agricultural workers and bank employees; unemployment insurance; price-indexed wage increases; a 40-hour work week with pay for 56 hours; an increase in the share of firm profits distributed to workers under legislation dating from 1963; expansion of the social security system and subsidized worker housing programs; employer-financed worker training programs; tax reforms; and state control of additional major economic sectors (including food production and the pharmaceutical, textile, construction, petrochemical, and steel industries).[59] This strategy allowed the CTM to express its public support for the political reform in the context of López Portillo's overall goals and priorities.[60] The CTM surely did not expect all of these economic reform measures to be implemented by the government, and it did not announce plans for mobilizing its rank-and-file membership in support of these demands. But to the extent to which its economic demands were met, the CTM would also gain important socioeconomic benefits which it could use to maintain its affiliates' allegiance and deflect the advances made by opposition labor groups and political parties. Also, important spokesmen for the private sector--who had in private welcomed the prospect that the political reform might in several ways reduce the CTM's relative political importance--found these demands completely unacceptable. The CTM thus appears to have gained some private-sector support for its resistance to the political reform initiative.

The second group of actors within the governing coalition which sought to modify and limit the scope of the political reform consisted of state governors and local and regional political bosses (caciques). Their leader and principal spokesman was Carlos Sansores Pérez, former

governor of the state of Campeche and president of the PRI's national executive committee from 1976 to 1979.[61] This group's principal opposition to the political reform focused on the possible extension of the liberalization measure to the states and municipal governments. Recognized opposition parties such as the PAN, PARM, and PPS had been most effective in challenging the PRI in municipal and state elections. Opposition party activities and mobilized citizens' groups at the municipal level often posed delicate political problems for state governors.[62] Because guaranteed opposition party representation in state legislatures and local municipal governments would have constituted a major expansion in these parties' organizational presence and political role, it was vigorously opposed by a large number of state governors whose political power depended on the PRI's continued domination of state and local politics. PRI sector organizations such as the CTM also feared the loss of political patronage resources at the state and local level, and they joined these governors in their opposition to the extension of the political reform below the federal level. In addition, these same groups specifically opposed liberal elements' efforts to extend the political reform to the federal Senate. While their expressed concerns regarding the preservation of Mexican federalism were essentially formal (that is, that there is no easy way to introduce proportional representation for opposition parties in a legislative body in which the unit represented is each state as a whole), minority party representation in the Senate would have involved an important change in the balance of political power in the states affected. While reiterating the PRI's support for "democratic development" and the importance of political democracy in achieving social and economic democracy, and repeating the government's argument that political pluralism must have institutional channels so as to avoid "political marginalization" or illegal opposition, Sansores Pérez stressed the PRI's continued "political representation of the majority." The political reform consisted of an effort to find representation for "the minority." But under his leadership the PRI could not accept that the "minorities" displace the "majorities." In addition to opposing publicly opposition party representation in the federal Senate, Sansores Pérez argued that the issue of minority party representation in state legislatures and local government be decided by each state individually.[63]

The more conservative members of the governing coalition appear to have succeeded in influencing the scope of the political reform initiative in several ways in exchange for their final support. In the political reform's final form, the number of Chamber of Deputies seats was increased to 400, and the number of seats reserved for opposition parties was set at 100. This change softened somewhat the reform impact on the PRI's internal balance of political forces; indeed, it constituted a major increase in the absolute number of Chamber seats which could be distributed among the party's sectors as political patronage resources. The final reform proposal did not automatically extend minority party representation to the federal Senate. It allowed each state to decide individually whether or not to provide guaranteed opposition party representation in state legislatures and local governments. But in a clear effort to protect the PRI's rural base from opposition party competition, the reform law limited representation to districts (municipios) with at least 300,000 inhabitants.[64] (The census definition of an urban area is one with 2,500 inhabitants or more.) From the perspective of

the political reform's most liberal proponents, these were important limitations. López Portillo and Reyes Heroles' commitment to reform the electoral process and the political party system was realized, but the reform was not as comprehensive as some of its early supporters envisioned. By limiting opposition representation to the federal Chamber of Deputies and not expanding it to the Senate, state legislatures, and local governments, the 1977 liberalization measure remained within the general tradition of earlier initiatives such as the 1963 "party deputy" political reform.[65]

The Mexican political reform contrasts with efforts at regime liberalization in a number of other authoritarian regimes in the relative absence of two major actors from the reform process:[66]

(1) The armed forces. The formal elimination of the armed forces from open participation in politics was a major achievement in the historical consolidation of the Mexican political system. The military has continued to play a political role in Mexico--its presence is recognized in the practice of including retired military officers among PRI appointments to its national executive committee and its nominations for nationally important elected offices, and military zone commanders frequently are actively involved in political developments at the state level, particularly where internal security is at issue--but one which is generally characterized by behind-the-scenes consultations.[67] This consultative arrangement, in which the commanders of the different branches of the armed forces are consulted on all issues of national political importance (usually through the Ministry of the Interior and the president's personal advisers, though generally not with the president himself), was almost certainly employed in the case of the López Portillo liberalization initiative. However, there is no evidence available to indicate a more direct intervention in the discussions and negotiations comprising the political reform process, and the armed forces do not appear to have influenced in any way the scope and form of the reform itself. This reflects both the military's position in the established regime and its perception of the degree of change at stake in the 1977 reform. The armed forces would, of course, become deeply concerned were the political reform to result in fundamental instabilities in the established regime. But these internal security issues were not involved in the 1977 political reform. The military considered the liberalization measure to be the government's project and responsibility.

It is quite possible, however, that the Mexican armed forces will play a more prominent role in national politics in the future. The recent discovery of massive petroleum reserves and Mexico's increasing international strategic importance clearly provide the Mexican military with new defensive tasks. Continuing bilateral tensions with the United States (especially regarding issues which involve the defense of national boundaries and territorial waters), growing political instability in Central America, and Mexico's emerging role as a regional power provide a further rationale for an improved military capability. Moreover, large new revenues from oil and natural-gas sales provide the financial resources for military modernization.[68] Since the 1940s the Mexican armed forces have focused their activities on the maintenance of public order in urban and rural areas and limited socioeconomic development tasks,[69]

but changing national and regional conditions may alter this role over time by increasing the importance of the armed forces and expanding the range of issues with which they are involved. Of course, the form and consequences of future military participation in Mexican politics may also be significantly influenced by the success which measures like the 1977 political reform have in directing political opposition into established institutional channels.

(2) The national bourgeoisie. The revolutionary origins of the Mexican political system and the sociopolitical aspirations articulated by Mexico's "revolutionary ideology" preclude the formal participation of business organizations in the PRI. While the national bourgeoisie is by law represented through a variety of business chambers and national associations, and small businessmen and urban property owners are eligible for membership in the PRI's "popular" (middle class) sector, there is no formal mechanism for business participation per se within the party structure. However, the informal alliance between the state and the national bourgeoisie in pursuit of national industrialization and economic growth goals has been a crucial underlying element in Mexico's post-1940 development experience. And like the armed forces, leading spokesmen from the private sector are regularly consulted on matters of national political concern. There is no evidence available to suggest that the 1977 political reform deviated from this pattern. Although leading representatives of the economic establishment appeared at Federal Electoral Commission hearings in their capacity as private citizens, no business group made a formal appearance. This is a comment both on the structure and functioning of organized politics in Mexico and the nature of business participation. In general, the national bourgeoisie appears to take an active interest and role only in those matters of direct policy concern to business. Given the highly probusiness orientation of the López Portillo administration's public policies at the time, it is very unlikely that the business community would have offered resistance to the measure unless it was perceived as an immediate challenge to the private sector. This has not been the case with the political reform to date. To the extent to which the actions of leftist political parties might affect base-level union affiliations, wage and salary demands, and so forth, employer interests regarding political reform measures might well differ substantially in the future from the 1977-1979 political reform process. But much of the comparative ease with which the López Portillo political reform was implemented can be attributed to the fact that the reform posed no direct threat to the private sector.[70]

The political reform measure was formally debated in the federal Chamber of Deputies and Senate from October 19 to November 11, 1977. However, given the generally subordinate position of the Congress in Mexico's executive-dominated system, few changes in López Portillo's legislative initiative were made during the course of this debate and review.[71] Previously unregistered opposition parties and the PAN, with the support of liberal elements in the PRI, successfully lobbied to amend the original project so as to allow candidates in single-member electoral districts to stand in party list circumscriptions. Although the number of dual candidacies that each opposition party can field is limited by the Federal Election Commission, this modification did considerably benefit smaller parties with only a limited number of well-known leaders. The

stipulation that parties would lose their official registration if they failed to win 1.5 percent of the national vote in two consecutive elections was also extended to three consecutive elections. The opposition parties' share of representatives in the national electoral college was increased to 40 of the 100 total positions, a significantly larger proportion than the opposition's representation within the Chamber of Deputies as a whole.[72]

Thus the reform measure enacted on December 31, 1977 as the "Federal Law on Political Organizations and Electoral Processes" ("Ley Federal de Organizaciones Políticas y Procesos Electorales," LOPPE) had the following principal characteristics:[73]

(1) Reforms in the procedures for political party recognition. Those political organizations which present a declaration of principles, program for action, and statutes can seek their official registry as parties through either of two methods. A "conditional registry" can be validated by receiving at least 1.5 percent of the total national vote in the election during which registry is sought. This was a particularly significant change in existing electoral legislation and substantially eased the registration process for opposition political parties. "Definitive registry" can be achieved by legally affiliating the minimum required party membership (at least 3,000 members in each of at least half of Mexico's 31 states and the Federal District, or at least 300 affiliates in each of at least half of all single-member electoral districts, for a total of at least 65,000 members) through a series of party assemblies.[74] The reform law also recognizes "national political associations" which have at least 5,000 members throughout the country, a national directorship, delegates in at least ten states, and at least two years of political activity prior to requesting official registration. The LOPPE allows electoral alliances to be formed for a particular election, such as the Leftist Coalition ("Coalición de Izquierda") formed by the PCM, PPM, PSR, and MAUS during the 1979 congressional elections. Recognized national political associations can run their own candidates under a registered party's name without losing their own registration so long as they participate in a formal electoral alliance of this kind.[75]

While these reforms significantly eased the requirements for political party recognition in Mexico, this situation contrasts considerably with measures which other countries have enacted to liberalize the political process in transitions from authoritarian rule. For example, in contrast to the Spanish electoral reform which permitted virtually unrestricted party formation prior to the 1977 parliamentary elections and allowed the electoral process itself to eliminate marginal political groups, under the LOPPE the Mexican state retains important controls on the process of party formation. And even these relaxed registration requirements can constitute a heavy burden for some opposition parties. While it might prove relatively easy to mobilize 3,000 people for the purposes of validating party membership in the state of México, it would be considerably more difficult to do so in the rural, sparsely populated neighboring state of Tlaxcala. Even the best organized opposition parties may have considerable variations in their support across the country. While the possibility of demonstrating the minimum required party membership through a series of district-level assemblies is perceived by most

opposition parties as more feasible logistically given these parties' scarce resources, this registration method requires a rather extensive party organizational network at the local level.

(2) Reform of the federal Chamber of Deputies. The Chamber of Deputies was enlarged to 400 members, and a two-tier electoral structure was created: (i) 300 deputies elected by a simple majority of votes cast in single-member (uninominal) electoral districts, and (ii) 100 deputies elected by proportional representation in party-list (plurinominal) circumscriptions. These 100 seats are reserved for minority political parties, but these parties can also compete in the single-member districts.[76] However, in order for minority parties to participate in party-list circumscriptions they must present candidates in at least 100 of the single-member districts. Once minority parties have been accepted for participation in party-list circumscriptions, they must submit complete regional lists in all party-list circumscriptions formed by the CFE for a given election (three in 1979, but the LOPPE allows up to five). A party winning more than 60 seats in single-member districts is barred from competing in party-list circumscriptions.[77]

(3) Changes in electoral procedures. Registered opposition parties were represented on the Federal Electoral Commission and state and district electoral committees under the 1973 electoral law, but the 1977 reform extended this formal representation to conditionally registered parties. This CFE representation does not include voting rights until the party in question has won its definitive registry. However, conditionally registered opposition parties do have the right to name representatives to the supervisory committees at each polling place and the authority to challege questionable conduct throughout the electoral process. Political parties are also eligible to receive modest material support from the CFE to offset their campaign expenses.[78] This material support includes financial assistance for campaign literature, meeting halls, and transportation.[79] In agreeing to provide such material aid, the regime recognized that the various political parties have unequal means and resources. This measure also indicated the government's intention to encourage party formation so far as possible without producing extreme party fragmentation.

(4) Expanded party access to mass communications media. Political parties were first given access to mass communications media during election campaigns under the 1973 electoral reform, but the LOPPE provides parties with permanent regular access to television and radio. A minimum of from two to four hours of the state's allotted television and radio time is set aside each month for political party programs, with at least fifteen minutes allotted to each party. More air time and more frequent programming are available after March 1 of each election year. These programs are to be produced by the Ministry of the Interior's "Radio Broadcasting Commission" ("Comisión de Radiodifusión") under party supervision. Registered political parties were first required to offer a regular party publication under the 1946 electoral law, but the LOPPE provides for Federal Electoral Commission support for parties' monthly and trimestral (theoretical) publications for the first time. The LOPPE also retains the 1973 electoral law's provision granting parties free access to postal and telegraph privileges and exempting them from all taxes and duties.[80]

In addition to these other provisions, the LOPPE also altered the role of the judiciary in the electoral process. Under previous legislation the Supreme Court was the final authority in disputes regarding the legality of electoral proceedings. The 1977 reform permits the Supreme Court to examine the legality of the electoral process on appeal and offer a nonbinding declaration regarding its findings, but the Chamber of Deputies remains the final authority regarding the validity of electoral results. The electoral college had previously consisted of the full Chamber of Deputies; under the LOPPE it is composed of 60 "majority" (PRI) and 40 "minority" (opposition) deputies. The powers of the Federal Electoral Commission are also substantially increased under the 1977 reform law. The CFE, in which progovernment members hold a decisive majority, becomes the effective final authority on several important matters concerning the electoral process. It is responsible for interpreting the LOPPE's various provisions. As previously noted, the CFE also determines the number of single-member district candidates that can appear as candidates in party-list circumscriptions in each election, and this body is in charge of material assistance to political parties. The CFE is also responsible for dividing the country into electoral districts prior to each election.[81]

III. Consequences of the Political Reform

The first phase of the political reform process culminated in the 1979 elections for the federal Chamber of Deputies. While the opposition parties' showing at the polls provides one means by which to judge the success of the López Portillo government's liberalization project, the political reform has also had a broader impact on the Mexican political system. Although the PRI remains the most important political party by far, expanded electoral competition has reduced somewhat its previous large majorities. The reform has also contributed substantially to the established regime's political legitimacy by incorporating the bulk of the opposition into the existing party system according to regime-formulated "rules of the game." The opposition's representation within the federal Chamber of Deputies provides it with an important new forum for political activity, and over a longer period of time the Chamber may achieve new importance as a source of legislative initiatives in an executive-dominated system. However, the political reform has had less impact in other areas. Voter apathy and abstention remain a major challenge to both the established regime and the political opposition, and there have so far been no significant changes in the PRI's internal operating procedures as a result of the political reform. Participation in the 1979 congressional elections and representation within the Chamber of Deputies have to date made little contribution to the political opposition's base-level organizational activity and the development of an extensive political constituency. But the López Portillo government's political reform does create the opportunity for broader change in these areas in the future.

The 1979 Election Results and the Problem of Voter Abstention. The immediate consequences of the political reform were measured by the 1979 election results for the federal Chamber of Deputies (see Table 1). The PRI won 74.0 percent of the valid votes cast and 296 seats in the simple majority voting. The PAN retained its position as the most important

opposition party by winning 11.5 percent of the majority vote, a better showing than its 9.0 percent in 1976 but considerably less than the 16.5 percent of the vote it won in the 1973 congressional elections. The PAN was the only opposition party to win seats in the simple majority districts, two in Nuevo León and one each in Coahuila and Sonora. Although the PCM won 5.5 percent of the vote, it won no seats by majority. The other parties' shares of the total vote were as follows (none won any seats by majority): PPS, 2.8 percent; PST, 2.3 percent; PDM, 2.0 percent; and PARM, 1.9 percent. In the proportional representation voting, the parties' shares of the total vote were as follows: PRI, 72.7 percent; PAN, 11.9 percent; PCM, 5.4 percent; PPS, 3.0 percent; PST, 2.4 percent; PARM, 2.3 percent; and PDM, 2.3 percent. The three conditionally registered parties thus won definitive registry by gaining more than the 1.5 percent minimum share of the total vote required by the reform law.[82]

The 1979 election results also clearly demonstrated that voter abstention continues to be a serious problem. The proportion of total votes cast as a share of total registered voters was only 49.2 percent. This turnout was a continuation of a long-term decline in voter participation, and in 1979 the total number of abstentions (13,872,259) exceeded the total number of votes cast (13,413,295) for the first time. This reduced turnout can in part be attributed to the generally lower voter participation in congressional elections in Mexico; presidential elections are accompanied by a long, intensive campaign which raises general citizen interest in the electoral process. However, despite previous expectations that the presence of new, opposition parties in the 1979 elections would increase voter participation, the 1979 abstention rate (50.8 percent) was higher than that recorded in either the 1973 congressional elections (36.2 percent) or the 1976 presidential election (38.1 percent). Some observers attributed this outcome to the generally lackluster, nonideological campaign conducted by a number of opposition parties.[83] Regardless of its specific cause, the substantial increase in voter absention in 1979 indicates a continuing crisis in the PRI's traditional mobilization capacity. Generalized voter abstention thus remains a major problem both for the PRI and for opposition parties seeking to expand their electoral support.

The election returns indicate that the political reform has had a somewhat mixed impact on the PRI. The PRI's share of the total national vote declined somewhat as a result of additional party competition in the 1979 elections, from 84.9 percent in 1976 to 74.0 percent in 1979; in 1979 its electoral support ranged from 52.2 percent of the total vote in the Federal District to 97.0 percent in Campeche. The 1979 elections also confirmed the long-term erosion of the very large--and probably fraudulent--majorities which the PRI had traditionally won in a number of areas.[84] However, the 1977 political reform does not appear to have produced a dramatic acceleration of this trend (see Table 2). Between 1973 and 1979 (disaggregated data for the 1976 elections are not available), the PRI's level of electoral support remained within the same percentage category in 19 (59.4 percent) of the 32 Mexican states (including the Federal District).[85] The PRI improved on its 1973 showing in 7 states (21.9 percent of total), increasing its majorities to the 80.0-90.0 percent range in Michoacán, Oaxaca, and Tlaxcala, and rising above 90 percent in Chiapas, Tamaulipas, Veracruz, and Yucatán. In the cases

Table 1

General Results of 1979 Federal Chamber of Deputies Elections

	Simple Majority Voting	Proportional Representation System
Votes cast	13,413,295	13,788,940
Valid votes	12,763,397	12,949,162
Void votes	649,898	839,778
Abstentions	13,872,259	13,512,829
Share by Party*		
PRI	74.0%	72.7%
PAN	11.5	11.9
PCM	5.5	5.4
PPS	2.8	3.0
PST	2.3	2.4
PARM	1.9	2.3
PDM	2.0	2.3

*As a proportion of total valid votes cast

Source: Simple majority voting: Comercio Exterior de México, v. 25, no. 8, August 1979, p. 281.
Proportional representation voting: Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados, LI Legislatura, v. 1, no. 13, p. 7.

Table 2

Level of PRI Support in Federal Chamber of Deputies Elections, 1967-1979

(total number of states at each percentage level, including Federal District)

PRI Percentage of total vote	1967	1970	1973	1976	1979
Less than 80.0%	7	10	17	N.A.	16
80.0% to 90.0%	10	8	10	N.A.	10
More than 90.0%	15	14	5	N.A.	6

N.A. = Not available.

Source: 1967-1973: Rafael Segovia, "La reforma política: el ejecutivo federal, el PRI y las elecciones de 1973," in Centro de Estudios Internacionales, ed., La vida política en México, México: El Colegio de México, 1974, appendices 4-6.

1979: Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados, LI Legislatura, v. 1, nos. 1-12. Partial results only.

of Michoacán, Chiapas, and Veracruz, these gains appear to be a return to the high levels of electoral support which the PRI received in these states before 1973. PRI support fell in a total of 6 states (18.8 percent of total), declining to the 80.0-90.0 percent range in Colima and Tabasco and falling below 80.0 percent in Baja California Sur, Coahuila, Sonora, and Zacatecas. The available 1979 election returns for Sonora and Zacatecas are somewhat incomplete, but this 1973-1979 decline in PRI support in Baja California Sur, Coahuila, Tabasco, and Zacatecas appears to be the continuation of a long-term trend in these states.

These data suggest, then, that the overall decrease in the PRI's share of the national vote--and the opposition's increase in electoral support--came in areas where the PRI's strength was already in decline. The information presented in Tables 3 and 4 supports this interpretation. In addition to those states already listed, the PRI's 1979 electoral support was relatively low (less than 80.0 percent of total; Table 3) in the Pacific North and the North (Baja California, Chihuahua, Nayarit, Nuevo León, Sinaloa), some Center states (Aguascalientes, Guanajuato, Jalisco, México, Morelos, Puebla), and in heavily urban areas such as the Federal District.

Table 3

PRI and Opposition Support in 1979 Federal Chamber of Deputies Elections, by State and Region

(in percent)

	PRI	All Opposition
Pacific North		
Baja California	62.5%	37.5%
Baja California Sur	72.3	27.7
Nayarit	79.4	20.6
Sinaloa	69.6	30.4
Sonora	79.9	20.1
Regional Average	72.7	27.3
North		
Chihuahua	70.8	29.2
Coahuila	71.8	28.2
Durango	84.6	15.4
Nuevo León	66.9	33.1
San Luis Potosí	87.1	12.9
Tamaulipas	95.3	4.7
Zacatecas	75.3	24.7
Regional Average	78.8	21.2
Center		
Aguascalientes	75.8	24.2
Distrito Federal	52.2	47.8
Guanajuato	77.4	22.6
Hidalgo	89.7	10.3
Jalisco	66.4	33.6
México	69.0	31.0
Michoacán	86.0	14.0

Table 3 (continued)

Center (cont.)	PRI	All Opposition
Morelos	77.1	22.9
Puebla	77.6	22.4
Querétaro	82.4	17.6
Tlaxcala	85.2	14.8
Regional Average	76.3	23.7
Gulf		
Campeche	95.6	4.4
Quintana Roo	97.0	3.0
Tabasco	87.9	12.1
Veracruz	90.7	9.3
Yucatán	96.6	3.4
Regional Average	93.6	6.4
Pacific South		
Chiapas	93.7	6.3
Colima	81.2	18.8
Guerrero	87.7	12.3
Oaxaca	82.1	17.9
Regional Average	86.2	13.8

Source: Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados, LI Legislatura, v. 1, nos. 1-12. Partial results only.

Table 4

Regional Dimensions of PRI Support in Federal Chamber of Deputies Elections, 1967-1979*

Region and PRI Percentage of Total Vote	Number of States at Each Percentage Level (including Federal District)			
	1967	1970	1973	1979
Pacific North				
Less than 80.0%	2	1	3	5
80.0-90.0%	1	1	2	0
More than 90.0%	2	3	0	0
North				
Less than 80.0%	2	2	2	4
80.0-90.0%	2	3	4	2
More than 90.0%	3	2	1	1
Center				
Less than 80.0%	3	6	9	7
80.0-90.0%	6	3	2	4
More than 90.0%	2	2	0	0
Gulf				
Less than 80.0%	0	0	1	0
80.0-90.0%	1	1	1	1
More than 90.0%	4	4	3	4
Pacific South				
Less than 80.0%	0	1	2	0
80.0-90.0%	0	0	1	3
More than 90.0%	4	3	1	1

*Data for 1976 not available.

Source: 1967-1973: Rafael Segovia, "La reforma política: el ejecutivo federal, el PRI y las elecciones de 1973," in Centro de Estudios Internacionales, ed., La vida política en México, México: El Colegio de México, 1974, appendices 4-6.

1979: Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados, LI Legislatura, v. 1, nos. 1-12. Partial results only.

The PRI did not receive less than 80.0 percent of the total vote in any state in the Gulf and Pacific South regions. The PRI's average 1979 electoral support in each of these five regions was: Pacific North, 72.7 percent; North, 78.8 percent; Center, 76.3 percent; Gulf, 93.6 percent; Pacific South, 86.2 percent. Table 4 shows that these 1979 results reflect changing regional patterns of PRI support over the 1967-1979 period; only in the Gulf and Pacific South regions does the PRI continue to enjoy a virtually unchallenged electoral position.

The 1979 political reform does not appear to have affected significantly the PRI's own internal operating procedures. Between 1977 and 1979 there was considerable speculation that the political reform process might modify internal candidate selection procedures within the PRI. This has been a continuing theme in longstanding efforts to reform the PRI from within, and it was a stated goal of the 1977 political reform.[86] There may have been some improvement in the quality of PRI candidates in 1979 (the candidates included a large number of government and diplomatic luminaries) as the government sought to win a convincing victory in this first campaign against new opposition parties and overcome the increasingly technocratic image of PRI candidates in recent years by nominating individuals with a broader political base and more diverse political experience. But there does not appear to have been any significant change in the internal process by which these candidates were selected; it remains a closed selection process, a series of negotiations among specific interests and political groups.[87] Indeed, the principal effect of choosing well-known former government and diplomatic officials as candidates appears to have been to increase the "popular" sector's share of PRI deputy positions at the expense of the labor and agrarian sectors. Between 1976 and 1979, the "popular" sector's share of total PRI Chamber seats rose from 41.1 percent to 50.2 percent; the labor sector's share declined slightly from 24.9 percent to 23.4 percent, while the agrarian sector's share fell from 34.1 percent to 26.5 percent.[88] To the extent to which the agrarian and labor sectors' share of total PRI nominations declined, one might argue that the party leadership's concern with fielding more individually capable candidates triumphed over the representation of the party's traditional social bases.

The political reform has also had important consequences for the political opposition, although its impact on different opposition parties has varied considerably. The political opposition's total share of the national vote increased from 15.1 percent in 1976 to 26.0 percent in 1979. But there was great variation in the several opposition parties' vote, ranging from the PAN's 11.5 percent to the PARM's 1.9 percent of the total vote in simple majority (single-member district) voting. Only the PAN and the PCM won more than 10.0 percent of the total vote in a single state, and only the PAN won more than 15.0 percent of a state's total vote. The PPS, PARM, and PST each recorded at least one state in which it received 5.0-10.0 percent of the total vote, but the PDM failed to win over 5.0 percent of the total vote in any state (see Table 5).

In general, the 1979 election returns demonstrate considerable regionalization in PAN and PCM electoral strength. The PAN enjoyed its greatest support in the Pacific North and North; its share of the total state vote averaged 13.5 percent and 13.2 percent, respectively, in these

Table 5

Level of Support for Opposition Parties in 1979 Federal Chamber of Deputies Elections

(number of states at each percentage level, including Federal District)

	Share of Total Statewide Vote				
Party	5.0<10.0%	10.0<15.0%	15.0<20.0%	20.0<25.0%	Over 25.0%
PAN	6	9	5	1	1
PPS	2	0	0	0	0
PARM	2	0	0	0	0
PDM	0	0	0	0	0
PCM	5	2	0	0	0
PST	1	0	0	0	0
Total	16	11	5	1	1

Each party's support in a given state is recorded only once in the above table.

Source: Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados, LI Legislatura, v. 1, nos. 1-12. Partial results only.

regions, and it was relatively weak only in the states of Nayarit and Tamaulipas (see Table 6). The PAN's regional average in the North was significantly increased by its very large showing in Nuevo León (30.8 percent, an opposition party's single largest share of total state vote in the 1979 elections), especially in the city of Monterrey.[89] The PAN received considerable strength in the Center region (its 19.0 percent of the Federal District vote was larger than any other opposition party's showing there), but its electoral support fell off sharply in the Gulf and Pacific South regions. In these two regions, the PAN received more than 5.0 percent of the total vote in only two states, Colima (11.5 percent) and Oaxaca (6.0 percent).

The PCM also showed considerable regional variation in its electoral strength. Its average share of the total state vote ranged from 6.0 percent in the states of the Pacific North to 0.9 percent in the Gulf region. The PCM's greatest support (over 5.0 percent of the statewide vote) came from Baja California, Nayarit, Sinaloa, Chihuahua, México, Puebla, and the Federal District. With the exception of Chihuahua, these are all in the Pacific North and Center regions. The PCM appears to have picked up some of the anti-PRI vote that had previously gone to the PAN in these areas.

Table 6

Opposition Support in 1979 Federal Chamber of Deputies Elections, by Party, State, and Region

(in percent)

	Opposition Party					
Region and State	PAN	PPS	PARM	PDM	PCM	PST
Pacific North						
Baja California	21.0	5.4	1.5	1.8	5.4	2.3
Baja California Sur	16.4	2.5	0	1.2	4.3	3.3
Nayarit	1.2	4.6	.9	1.3	12.0	.7
Sinaloa	13.9	2.2	7.4	.3	6.3	.3
Sonora	15.0	1.6	.9	.1	2.2	.4
Regional Average	13.5	3.3	2.1	.9	6.0	1.4
North						
Chihuahua	14.9	3.3	1.7	1.7	6.1	1.5
Coahuila	18.9	1.0	.7	.3	3.1	4.0
Durango	8.6	2.0	.8	1.0	2.2	.7
Nuevo León	30.8	.3	.4	.2	1.2	.2
San Luis Potosí	5.6	.6	.7	2.8	1.6	1.6
Tamaulipas	.7	.6	1.0	.5	1.4	.5
Zacatecas	12.7	1.2	2.3	3.5	4.3	.7
Regional Average	13.2	1.3	1.1	1.4	2.8	1.3
Center						
Aguascalientes	10.9	1.8	2.0	2.6	1.8	5.2
Distrito Federal	19.0	4.8	2.1	4.0	13.3	4.6
Guanajuato	13.7	2.6	.7	3.9	1.0	.6
Hidalgo	3.8	1.6	0	.4	2.6	1.9
Jalisco	16.1	2.7	3.1	4.5	4.6	2.6
México	12.5	3.8	1.2	3.2	7.3	3.0
Michoacán	5.7	1.1	.1	3.7	2.4	1.1
Morelos	9.8	1.3	2.6	3.3	4.3	1.6
Puebla	11.6	2.0	1.8	.7	5.1	1.2
Querétaro	10.0	.8	1.3	2.2	1.9	1.4
Tlaxcala	5.9	2.0	.5	2.8	2.9	.6
Regional Average	10.8	2.2	1.4	2.8	4.3	2.2

Table 6 (continued)

Region and State	PAN	PPS	PARM	PDM	PCM	PST
Gulf						
Campeche	1.6	1.1	0	0	1.3	.4
Quintana Roo	.9	1.3	0	0	.4	.2
Tabasco	2.9	6.6	0	0	1.5	1.1
Veracruz	1.4	2.2	2.4	.7	.7	1.8
Yucatán	1.6	.5	.4	.1	.8	.1
Regional Average	1.7	2.3	.6	.2	.9	.7
Pacific South						
Chiapas	2.0	1.6	.1	0	1.9	.7
Colima	11.5	2.1	0	1.4	1.5	2.4
Guerrero	2.7	.6	.2	1.6	4.5	2.7
Oaxaca	6.0	2.5	5.7	.4	2.7	.6
Regional Average	5.6	1.7	1.5	.9	2.7	1.6

Source: Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados, LI Legislatura, v. 1, nos. 1-12. Partial results only.

Indeed, its strongest showing was in several states where PAN support declined in comparison with previous years: Chihuahua, Federal District, Guerrero, Jalisco, México, Morelos, Nayarit, and Puebla. The PCM may also have benefitted from the severe internal division within the PPS after 1975 and the absence of the PMT from the 1979 elections.[90] The PCM's 13.3 percent share of the Federal District vote was its single best performance in the 1979 elections. Its overall regional support in the North, Gulf, and Pacific South was quite limited.

The other opposition parties showed less regional variation in their strength, but they also demonstrated less overall electoral support. The PPS received its strongest support in two widely separated Gulf and Pacific North states, Tabasco (6.6 percent) and Baja California (5.4 percent), respectively. Similarly, the PARM received 7.4 percent of the total state vote in Sinaloa (Pacific North) and 5.7 percent in Oaxaca (Pacific South).[91] The PARM's highest regional average was only 2.1 percent of the total vote, in the Pacific North. While the PDM experienced some regional variation in its average share of the total state vote (ranging from 2.8 percent in the Center to 0.2 percent in the Gulf), its overall level of electoral support was very low. The PST's electoral strength was reasonably evenly distributed across the country's different

regions, but it never received a higher regional average share of the total vote than its 2.2 percent in the Center region. The PST received its highest share of the state vote in Aguascalientes (5.2 percent). It was especially weak in the Gulf states.

Two additional dimensions of opposition party strength include the parties' success in meeting the 1.5 percent minimum support requirement in all states and these parties' capacity to field candidates in all 300 single-member electoral districts. While the LOPPE stipulated only that a party receive a minimum of 1.5 percent of the total national vote, a party's claim to truly national status is in fact reflected in its ability to meet this minimum level of electoral support in all 31 states and the Federal District. The number of entities in which each opposition party failed to win at least 1.5 percent of the total state vote is one indication of these parties' relative organizational strength: PAN, 4; PCM, 7; PPS, 12; PST, 18; PDM, 18; PARM, 21. The opposition parties were somewhat more successful in fielding candidates across the country. Only the PDM and the PARM failed to run candidates in all 300 single-member districts. However, these two parties' performance further underlines their weak political position: the PDM failed to present candidates in 36 districts, and the PARM failed to do so in 95 districts (12.0 percent and 31.7 percent of the total single-member districts, respectively).[92]

It is difficult to offer more than a tentative characterization of the opposition parties' socioeconomic bases of support on the basis of the available data. However, despite their formal identification with somewhat different political constituencies, all the opposition parties appear to have mobilized quite heterogeneous electoral support in the 1979 federal Chamber of Deputies elections. The PAN's original identification with an urban middle-class, conservative Catholic constituency changed considerably during the 1970s as the PAN emerged as a "catchall" opposition party drawing support from a wide variety of sources. Despite the geographical regionalization of its electoral strength and new competition from left and right in the 1979 elections, its constituency in those areas remained quite heterogeneous. The PCM's greatest electoral strength was concentrated in many of those states in the Pacific North and Center regions in which the party had established relatively firm organizational bases among labor and peasant groups between the 1920s and the 1940s. But those ties were severely eroded or broken during the party's long period of illegal activity. While the PCM may have some remaining working-class support in these areas, the party's principal electoral backing came from its urban middle-class supporters. Indeed, fully 62.6 percent of the PCM's electoral support in 1979 came from the Federal District and the state of México.[93] Heavily urban, socioeconomically diverse areas like the Federal District constituted major sources of electoral support for all the opposition parties, including the PPS and PST. The PPS and PST have sought to expand their organizational bases among marginalized groups in rural and urban areas (the PST appears to have been especially active in Chiapas, Chihuahua, Guerrero, Veracruz, and Tabasco), but their support from these sectors remains fluid and heterogeneous. The PARM's principal support in Sinoloa and Jalisco also came from urban districts. The PDM successfully mobilized its core constituency of conservative Catholic, agrarian supporters in states which had been among the original strongholds of the Church-

supported cristero movement in the 1920s (especially Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, and Zacatecas). But the PDM also appears to have received support from among urban marginals in the states of México and Morelos and in the Federal District.

The 1979 election results also suggest that the presence of new political parties in the electoral arena resulted in a loss of votes for previously registered opposition parties. The PPS and the PARM suffered significant losses in electoral support (19.3 percent and 24.7 percent, respectively) in comparison with their 1976 levels. The PAN increased its total vote in comparison with a particularly poor showing in 1976, and it clearly remains the single most important opposition party. But the introduction of the PCM on the left and the PDM on the right has seriously eroded the PAN's success as an opposition party receiving votes from a wide diversity of sectors as the only viable party alternative to the PRI. This has contributed to the compartmentalization of minority parties' electoral constituencies as a result of expanded opportunities for voters to choose among parties representing a wide ideological spectrum.[94] In many cases, opposition parties compete for votes within the same general constituency. For example, the PCM, PPS, and PST compete for support among middle-class and urban marginal voters in urban areas. The PAN and the PDM both seek the support of the conservative, religiously-oriented petite bourgeoisie, especially in the northwestern parts of the country.[95] This suggests that one consequence of the reform may be to marginalize further the political opposition. The anti-PRI vote, both to the left and the right, may remain divided and diffused--and thus no challenge to the PRI's position as the "moderate" majority party. While this development clearly serves the interests of the governing political elite, it constitutes a significant challenge for the opposition political leadership. Whether or not the various opposition parties can overcome internal division and factionalism--an especially persistent problem for the political left--and field candidates in the 1982 presidential election will be a major test of these parties' ability to unite or cooperate in order to push the established authoritarian regime toward increased political liberalization in the future.

The opposition parties' ability to participate in the electoral process provided them with an important opportunity to develop organizational and mobilizational skills. Much of this had to be accomplished on the basis of the parties' own resources, for the material support provided by the Federal Electoral Commission proved quite modest. Each party's government-provided television and radio time did not exceed the minimum 15 minutes per month set by the LOPPE. Transportation support apparently amounted to 10 light vans for each party to use during the course of the campaign. Only government support for monthly and trimestral party publications proved a substantial aid, since parties could win reasonable financial support by placing as many as 20 to 30 activists on the publications' payroll.[96]

Perhaps more importantly, leftist opposition parties successfully cooperated in the 1979 congressional elections through a Leftist Coalition ("Coalición de Izquierda"). A number of different leftist political organizations had engaged in cooperative activities since 1974-1975, especially in the form of joint statements and announcements. The Coalition

originated in discussions held during 1976-1977 among the PCM, PMT, PPM, PSR, and the "Democratic Tendency" of the national electrical workers' union. The PCM and the PMT initially emerged as the leftist groups with the greatest chance of winning conditional registry, and the formal proposal for an electoral alliance among leftist groups apparently came from the PCM in 1979.[97] Although the coalition tended to be dominated by the Mexican Communist Party, it grouped the PCM, PSR, PPM, and MAUS behind common candidates. The coalition allowed these leftist parties and groups to present candidates in all 300 single-member electoral districts and complete lists in each of the three party-list circumscriptions.[98] The coalition also proved to be an important precedent for subsequent cooperation among these opposition political parties. For example, the PCM headed the Communist Parliamentary Group in the 1979-1982 Chamber of Deputies as an alliance of the PCM, PPM, PSR, and MAUS.

Electoral Fraud in the 1979 Chamber of Deputies Elections. One goal of the 1977 political reform was to reduce the incidence of electoral fraud by including representatives from conditionally registered opposition parties on the supervisory committee attached to each polling place and by providing opposition parties with access to documentation regarding election results. Most observers of the 1979 elections for the federal Chamber of Deputies believe that the electoral process in the principal urban areas was comparatively free of fraud.[99] However, despite the formal opportunities which the LOPPE provided opposition parties to oversee the voting process and discourage electoral fraud, the large numbers of polling areas--some 43,000 throughout the country--meant that opposition parties faced large logistical problems in actually placing a representative on each committee. These parties' limited memberships, reduced resources, and the limited accessibility of some polling sites in remote rural areas effectively restricted minority party supervision to elections in urban areas. Opposition party vigilance at the polls was thus important but not decisive in the conduct of the 1979 congressional elections. In many rural areas the PRI was able to conduct elections much as it always had, mobilizing peasants en masse through local political bosses and engaging in various forms of electoral fraud; it is not accidental that a very large share of the PRI's electoral support continues to come from these same rural areas.[100] In many cases local bosses saw the political reform and the activities of opposition parties as a direct threat to their own authority and political position. The opposition of local political figures to political reform and continuing electoral fraud in many areas remains an important obstacle to future political liberalization. Some progress has also been made in updating voter registration lists, but much remains to be accomplished in this area.[101]

Electoral fraud was reported in 144 (48.0 percent) of the 300 single-member electoral districts in the 1979 Chamber of Deputies elections.[102] Some of these cases of electoral fraud were indeed remarkable. In Chihuahua's District 2, the PRI-affiliated national mining and metallurgy workers' union apparently deducted ten pesos per worker per week in the period before the 1979 elections to fund the PRI candidate's candidacy. The local union leadership was also accused of threatening to fire workers who failed to vote for the PRI. In this same district, the PRI managed to compile more total votes than names registered on the electoral rolls. The PRI won impressive electoral victories in six isolated rural areas

where polling sites had not even been set up on election day. In this case, the PAN succeeded in documenting an obvious case of electoral fraud. The district electoral commission acknowledged this situation, but it argued that the results from these sites had not affected the overall outcome of the election.[103] In Puebla's Districts 1 and 11 and Michoacán's District 9, the PRI apparently engaged in an "Operation Milkman" (operación lechero)--opening the polls before the legal hour so as to stuff ballot boxes in favor of its candidates.[104] This tactic was apparently especially common in rural areas. In some isolated indigenous communities in San Luis Potosí, opposition parties failed to win a single vote, and the PRI's total often amounted to more votes than there were names on the electoral rolls.[105]

There was considerable regional variation in the distribution of districts in which fraud was reported during the 1979 elections for the federal Chamber of Deputies.[106] If one compares each region's share of total districts in which electoral fraud was charged (irrespective of the number of fraud charges which political parties made in a given district, or the level of severity of such charges) to that region's share of total single-member electoral districts, the resulting indices for each region are: Pacific North, 1.47; Pacific South, 1.42; North, 1.14; Center, .86; Gulf, .69 (see Table 7).[107] An index value of 1.00 would indicate that a region's share of districts in which fraud was charged was directly proportionate to that region's share of total single-member districts in the 1979 elections. The indices suggest, then, that electoral fraud was disproportionately common in the Pacific North, Pacific South, and North, while it was considerably less prevalent in the Center and Gulf regions.

Two somewhat different factors appear to account for these regional variations. The Pacific North involved a number of hotly disputed elections and considerable party competition. The PAN, PPS, PARM, and PCM all received their highest average regional electoral support in the Pacific North. It is likely that the disproportionately high number of electoral districts in which fraud was charged reflects the intensity of election competition and parties' active presence in the region. In contrast, the very low index value for the Gulf region appears to reflect the PRI's electoral dominance in the area and opposition parties' difficulty in effectively supervising the electoral process. The values for the other three regions appear to be somewhat more accurate indicators of the presence of electoral fraud in these areas. For example, the disproportionately high index value for the Pacific South region suggests that electoral fraud is prevalent in the area. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the single largest number of charges of violence and extreme distortion of the electoral process came from this region.

There is also considerable variation in the number of charges which different political parties made regarding fraudulent conduct in the 1979 elections. The PAN was by far the most aggressive challenger, accounting for 40.1 percent of all charges of electoral fraud--nearly twice as many as the second place PCM (20.8 percent of the total) (see Table 8). With the exception of the PPS (15.0 percent of the total), the remaining parties each accounted for less than 10 percent of the public charges of

Table 7

Regional Distribution of Districts in which Electoral Fraud Charged in 1979 Federal Chamber of Deputies Elections

Region	Electoral Districts in which fraud charged		Single-Member Electoral Districts in Region		Ratio
	Number	Percent of Total(A)	Number	Percent of Total(B)	A/B
Pacific North	19	13.2%	27	9.0%	1.47
North	30	20.8	55	18.3	1.14
Center	62	43.1	151	50.3	.86
Gulf	12	8.3	36	12.0	.69
Pacific South	21	14.6	61	10.3	1.42
Total	144	100.0%	300	99.9%	

Source: Calculated from information presented in Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados, LI Legislatura, v. 1, nos. 1-12.

election misconduct. In general, there is a relatively close relationship between parties' organizational presence and electoral performance in a given area and the incidence of these parties' charges of electoral fraud in that region. Table 9 presents Spearman's rank-order coefficients for the six opposition parties competing in the 1979 elections. For each party, the different regions are ranked according to the party's share of the total vote in a given area, and according to the number of electoral fraud charges made by the party in each region. The correlations between the two rankings for three of the six opposition political parties range from substantial to very strong (PAN, .6; PST, .657; PCM, .9), and in the case of the PDM there is a perfect association between regional distributions of electoral support and charges of electoral fraud. Only in the cases of the PPS and the PARM are these correlations absent or slightly negative. The PARM has a long history of close association with the PRI, and during the course of the Chamber of Deputies' review of the election results it was accused of collaboration with the government to effect inflated vote totals in some districts. If these charges of PARM vote fraud were accurate, this might provide some explanation for the PARM's slightly negative correlation coefficient.[108] However, the absence of any association between regional electoral support and electoral fraud charges made by the PPS cannot be explained on the basis of the available information.

It is somewhat surprising to find the PRI among those parties charging violations in the electoral process. The PRI filed six (2.9 percent) of the total 207 charges of electoral fraud made before the Chamber of Deputies. These charges were relatively evenly distributed around the

Table 8

Regional Distribution of Party Charges of Electoral Fraud in 1979 Federal Chamber of Deputies Elections, by Party*

Political Party Charging Violation	Region					
	Pacific North	North	Center	Gulf	Pacific South	National
PAN	13 (15.7%) (40.6%)	22 (26.5%) (51.2%)	37 (44.6%) (42.0%)	3 (3.6%) (21.4%)	8 (9.6%) (26.7%)	83 (100.0% (40.1%)
PPS	4 (12.9) (12.5)	3 (9.7) (7.0)	8 (25.8) (9.1)	7 (22.6) (50.0)	9 (29.0) (30.0)	31 (100.0) (15.0)
PARM	1 (5.9) (3.1)	5 (29.4) (11.6)	9 (52.9) (10.2)	1 (5.9) (7.1)	1 (5.9) (3.3)	17 (100.0) (8.2)
PDM	1 (12.5) (3.1)	2 (25.0) (4.7)	4 (50.0) (4.5)	0 (0) (0)	1 (12.5) (3.3)	8 (100.0) (3.9)
PCM	11 (25.6) (34.4)	8 (18.6) (18.6)	19 (44.2) (21.6)	1 (2.3) (7.1)	4 (9.3) (13.3)	43 (100.0) (20.8)
PST	1 (5.3) (3.1)	1 (5.3) (2.3)	10 (52.6) (11.4)	2 (10.5) (14.3)	5 (26.3) (16.7)	19 (100.0) (9.2)
PRI	1 (16.7) (3.1)	2 (33.3) (4.7)	1 (16.7) (1.1)	0 (0) (0)	2 (33.3) (6.7)	6 (100.0) (2.9)
Total	32 (15.4) (99.9)	43 (20.8) (100.1)	88 (42.5) (99.9)	14 (6.8) (99.9)	30 (14.5) (100.0)	207 (100.0) (100.1)

*Horizontal percentage values represent that region's share of a given party's total charges of electoral fraud. Vertical percentage values represent that party's share of all electoral fraud charges made in a given region.

Source: Calculated from information presented in Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados, LI Legislatura, v. 1, nos. 1-12.

Table 9

Rankings for Opposition Parties' Electoral Support and Electoral Fraud Charges, by Region

Region	PAN		PPS		PARM	
	Electoral Support	Fraud Charges	Electoral Support	Fraud Charges	Electoral Support	Fraud Charges
Pacific North	1	3	1	4	1	4
North	2	2	5	5	4	2
Center	3	1	3	2	3	1
Gulf	5	5	2	3	5	4
Pacific South	4	4	4	1	2	1
Spearman's Rank-Order Coefficient	.6		0		-.1	

	PDM		PCM		PST	
	Electoral Support	Fraud Charges	Electoral Support	Fraud Charges	Electoral Support	Fraud Charges
Pacific North	3.5	3.5	1	2	3	4.5
North	2	2	3	3	4	4.5
Center	1	1	2	1	1	1
Gulf	5	5	5	5	5	3
Pacific South	3.5	3.5	4	4	2	2
Spearman's Rank-Order Coefficient	1.0		.9		.675	

For each party, the different regions are ranked according to the party's share of the total vote in a given area, and according to the number of electoral fraud charges made by the party in each region. Rankings range from 1 for the highest to 5 for the lowest. Where two regions are of equal rank (for example, the PDM charged one electoral violation each in the Pacific North and the Pacific South and received an average of .9 percent of the vote in states in these two regions), the value expressed is the mean of tied rankings.

Source: Calculated from information presented in Table 6 and Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados, LI Legislatura, v. 1, nos. 1-12.

country (only in the Gulf region were none reported), and in all cases they concerned charges of miscellaneous irregularities committed by opposition parties. Except in one case each in Chiapas and Colima, these charges appear to reflect the PRI's concern with winning large majorities in districts where the political opposition was relatively strong. Indeed, in the case of Nuevo León's District 10, the PAN candidate actually won with 51.0 percent of the vote. In all six cases, the charge was eventually withdrawn, rejected due to a lack of evidence or on a legal technicality, or resolved by the district electoral commission.[109]

The charges made by different political parties regarding presumed election fraud predominantly concerned miscellaneous irregularities in the electoral process. Table 10 categorizes party charges regarding electoral violations by their level of severity: (I) miscellaneous irregularities in the electoral process; (II) widespread electoral fraud; (III) violence and other extreme forms of electoral fraud. (See the classification code attached to Table 10 for a detailed description of the violations grouped in each of these three levels.) At the national level, some 69.9 percent of the violations charged concerned a wide variety of illegal and extralegal practices (Level I), including irregularities in the location and opening of polling sites, errors in the electoral rolls, obstruction of opposition party representatives on local poll committees, and so forth. While these problems were relatively common (48.0 percent of all single-member electoral districts were involved in such charges), they were at a relatively low level of severity. Moreover, practices such as the PRI's use of government resources to mobilize voters in its favor involve issues which extend beyond the conduct of the 1979 elections. Some 21.1 percent of the violations charged concerned more widespread cases of electoral fraud (Level II), and 9.3 percent involved violence and extreme distortion of the electoral process (Level III).

While the level of severity of electoral violations in the Pacific North, North, and Center corresponded quite closely to this national pattern, there was some considerable variation from this pattern in the Gulf and Pacific South regions. In the Gulf region, a much higher percentage of the violations charged were at Level I (91.7 percent). Only 8.3 percent of the violations charged were of the Level II type, and there was no indication of Level III violations in the Chamber of Deputies discussions regarding the electoral process in this area. This situation appears to reflect the PRI's effective political dominance in the Gulf region (no opposition party received more than the PPS' 6.6 percent of the vote in Tabasco in any Gulf state, and the highest average opposition party support in these five states was the PPS' 2.3 percent) and the very marginal role of opposition parties in this area. In contrast, the Pacific South region saw a significantly higher percentage of Level II (28.6 percent of total) and Level III (20.0 percent of total) violations. These violations tended to be concentrated primarily in the states of Oaxaca and Guerrero. Both states are known for the prevalence of violence in socio-political life and the central role of local and regional political bosses in the political process. Thus it is not surprising that 38.9 percent of all reported Level III violations in the Pacific South occurred in these two states alone.

Table 10

Regional Distribution of Party Charges of Electoral Fraud in 1979 Federal Chamber of Deputies Elections, by Level of Violation*

Level of Violation Charged	Pacific North	North	Center	Gulf	Pacific South	National
1: Miscellaneous Irregularities in Electoral Process	19 (14.1%) (70.4%)	29 (21.5%) (72.5%)	58 (43.0%) (72.5%)	11 (8.1%) (91.7%)	18 (13.3%) (51.4%)	135 (100.0% (69.6%)
2: Widespread Electoral Fraud	6 (14.6) (22.2)	8 (19.5) (20.0)	16 (39.0) (20.0)	1 (2.4) (8.3)	10 (24.4) (28.6)	41 (99.9) (21.1)
3: Violence and Other Extreme Forms of Electoral Fraud	2 (11.1) (7.4)	3 (16.7) (7.5)	6 (33.3) (7.5)	0 (0) (0)	7 (38.9) (20.0)	18 (100.0) (9.3)
Total	27 (13.9) (100.0)	40 (20.6) (100.0)	80 (41.2) (100.0)	12 (6.2) (100.0)	35 (18.0) (100.0)	194 (99.9) (100.0)

Horizontal percentage values represent that region's share of all violations at a given level.

Vertical percentage values represent the share of all violations in that region occurring at a given level.

Source: Calculated from information presented in Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados, LI Legislatura, v. 1, nos. 1-12.

Table 10 (cont.)

*Categories of "levels of violations" are as follows:

(1) Miscellaneous irregularities in the electoral process: Includes charges of a broad range of illegal and extra-legal practices such as irregularities in the location and opening of polling sites; failure to request proper identification from voters; more than 10% of the votes at a given polling place appearing on the "additional list" for voters whose names did not appear on the regular electoral rolls, as well as other errors in the electoral rolls; obstruction of opposition party representatives on the local poll committees; government-PRI collaboration and/or local political bosses' mobilization of voters in favor of PRI candidates; apparent ineligibility of PRI candidate in a given electoral district.

(2) Widespread electoral fraud: Includes charges of voter coercion by PRI and/or government officials; major restrictions on opposition party activities during electoral campaign; widespread voting by unregistered voters; unauthorized relocation of polling sites; theft and/or stuffing of ballot boxes; improper opening of ballot boxes and/or electoral packets containing votes, as well as other errors in vote count; major discrepancies in number of registered voters and final vote count.

(3) Violence and other extreme forms of electoral fraud: Includes charges of kidnapping and/or murder of opposition political figures; extreme coercion of electoral officials and/or voters through physical intimidation at polling sites; widespread climate of violence in electoral district that severely distorted electoral process.

While the LOPPE specifies several different procedures by which a political organization can legally challenge the conduct or results of the electoral process,[110] there is no formal, legal importance attached to the discussion of a particular case of ostensible electoral fraud before the Chamber of Deputies' electoral college. The electoral college can review a case and present its findings without provoking extensive public discussion, or considerable debate can occur in cases in which no formal charge has been filed regarding the conduct or results of elections in a particular district. Moreover, the conduct of such public debates can concern issues ranging from an opposition party's general attack on PRI-government collaboration to the specific criticism of different forms of electoral fraud at the polling place.

However, public discussion in the Chamber of Deputies of cases of ostensible electoral fraud may provide a general indication of political parties' perception of the severity of fraud in a particular electoral district. Of the 144 single-member districts in which one or more political parties charged some form of electoral irregularity or fraud, only 64 (44.4 percent) of these cases resulted in extensive discussion and debate in the Chamber of Deputies (see Table 11). Only in the North and Gulf regions were there significant variations from this national pattern, and the determining factor appears to be the degree of party competition in these two areas. The relatively greater political competitiveness of the electoral process in the North produced the highest percentage of cases (60.0 percent) receiving detailed public consideration in the Chamber of Deputies, while the relative absence of such competition in the Gulf area appears to account for the low percentage (25.0 percent) of electoral fraud charges discussed in the Chamber.

Although the political reform provided opposition parties with opportunities to supervise the electoral process and voice their public discontent regarding cases of electoral fraud, the PRI's continued dominance of the Chamber of Deputies and its electoral college allowed the political opposition little ability to overturn questionable electoral results. Of the 164 reported actions resulting from parties' charges of electoral fraud, only 42 (25.6 percent) involved findings by electoral authorities which recognized the legitimacy of the protest and overturned election returns completely or in part (results D, E, and F in Table 12). These actions included 17 cases (10.4 percent of the total) which were resolved locally by district electoral authorities without any formal action by the Chamber of Deputies' electoral college. Some 20 cases (12.2 percent of the total) resulted in the invalidation of the returns from some polling sites. Only 5 cases (3.0 percent of the total) resulted in the annulment of an entire electoral district's returns. Some 12.8 percent of all cases ended with a party's public protest in the Chamber of Deputies and did not involve a formal legal charge, but 101 actions (61.6 percent of the total) involved the dismissal of the electoral fraud charge by either the district electoral commission (11 actions) or by the Chamber's electoral college (90 actions) for lack of evidence, on the basis of a legal technicality, or for both reasons. There do not appear to be meaningful regional variations in the actions taken by electoral authorities regarding fraud charges.

Table 11

Discussion of 1979 Electoral Fraud Charges in Federal Chamber of Deputies, by Region*

Discussion of Charge in Chamber of Deputies	Region					
	Pacific North	North	Center	Gulf	Pacific South	National
Yes	8 (12.5%)	18 (28.1%)	25 (39.1%)	3 (4.7%)	10 (15.7%)	64 (100.1%)
	(42.1%)	(60.0%)	(40.3%)	(25.0%)	(47.6%)	(44.4%)
No	11 (13.8)	12 (15.0)	37 (46.3)	9 (11.3)	11 (13.8)	80 (100.2)
	(57.9)	(40.0)	(59.7)	(75.0)	(52.4)	(55.6)
Total	19 (13.2)	30 (20.8)	62 (43.1)	12 (8.3)	21 (14.6)	144 (100.0)
	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)

*Horizontal percentage values represent that region's share of all "yes" or "no" cases.
Vertical percentage values represent the relative frequency of "yes" or "no" cases in a given region.

The total numbers of cases in Tables 10 and 11 differ because multiple party charges of electoral fraud in a single district are reported in Table 10.

Source: Calculated from information presented in Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados, LI Legislatura, v. 1, nos. 1-12.

Table 12

Results of 1979 Electoral Fraud Charges *

		Total	Percent
(A)	Protest only; no formal charge filed	21	12.8%
(B)	Formal protest dismissed by district electoral commission for lack of evidence, on a legal technicality, or for both reasons	11	6.7
(C)	Formal protest dismissed by federal Chamber of Deputies for lack of evidence, on a legal technicality, or for both reasons	90	54.9
(D)	Protest resolved at district level by local electoral authorities	17	10.4
(E)	Charges sustained in part and electoral results from some polling sites annulled by federal Chamber of Deputies	20	12.2
(F)	Charges sustained in full and electoral results for entire district annulled by federal Chamber of Deputies	5	3.0
	Total	164	100.0

*The total numbers of cases in Tables 11 and 12 differ because several parties' charges of up to three kinds of electoral fraud could result in one or more actions by the Chamber of Deputies.

Source: Calculated from information presented in Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados, LI Legislatura, v. 1, nos. 1-12.

Of those 90 actions which involved the dismissal of charges of electoral fraud, 48 (53.3 percent) were dismissed for lack of evidence, 30 (33.3 percent) were dismissed on legal technicalities, and 12 (13.3 percent) involved both of these reasons. The legal technicalities frequently involved a party's failure to meet the specific legal deadline for filing formal charges regarding an electoral violation. On some occasions procedural errors in filing such charges were involved. Dismissal of electoral fraud charges as a result of lack of sufficient evidence is in many ways one of the most serious problems highlighted by this analysis of the 1979 elections for the federal Chamber of Deputies. Among the most common criticisms of the Mexican electoral process raised by the political opposition was the obstacle which PRI-government collaboration posed to the conduct of open and honest elections.[111] For example, in the Distrito Federal's District 22, PAN campaign materials sent through the mail were apparently never delivered, and even though the LOPPE exempted registered political parties from telegraph fees, the PAN was required to pay for telegrams before local operators would send them. In the Distrito Federal's District 28, the PRI's candidate (secretary general of the local section of the national petroleum workers' union located in the district) was charged with using some 120 employees of the state-owned petroleum company, Petróleos Mexicanos, for three months at full pay to assist with his electoral campaign. Soldiers from the local military base were also apparently mobilized to vote for him. In the Distrito Federal's District 30, goods from the local branch of the state-owned public commodities corporation were distributed free of charge by the PRI candidate in order to win public favor during his electoral campaign.[112] Apart from the difficulties which opposition parties face as a result of inadequate communications and the geographical isolation of many electoral districts, these opposition organizations often find it impossible to gather incontrovertible evidence to demonstrate electoral fraud where local or state government authorities are in more or less open collaboration with the PRI to guarantee the "official" party's candidates victory. As a PAN representative observed in a discussion of this problem in Chihuahau's District 4, "when your car is stolen, does the thief leave you a receipt with his name, address, and telephone number?"[113]

The available data do not permit an extensive analysis of the results of electoral fraud charges in terms of the party making the charge or the level of violation involved.[114] Several different political parties often made similar charges regarding electoral violations in a given district, and thus it is not possible to determine which parties were most effective in advancing their charges of electoral fraud. In all five actions which involved the invalidation of an entire district's election returns, the Chamber's electoral college acted on the basis of recommendations from district electoral authorities or an internal working group. There was no extensive debate regarding these charges, and the party making the original charge was not identified. Three of these same five actions involved Level II violations and two of the actions concerned Level III violations. Thus, at least in the very few cases in which an entire district's election returns were invalidated, there does seem to be some positive relation between the severity of the fraud charge and the action taken by the Chamber of Deputies. But in other actions involving the partial annulment of a district's electoral returns (action E), the precise nature of the electoral violation charged was not identified in the course

of Chamber of Deputies debates. These cases were all coded as Level I violations, but it is quite probable that they involved more serious forms of electoral fraud. For this reason, it is likely that the information provided in Table 10 underestimates the severity of electoral fraud in 7 cases (3.4 percent of all 207 party charges of electoral fraud).[115] Moreover, more than one action frequently resulted from electoral fraud charges in a single district. Thus it is difficult to draw meaningful conclusions regarding the overall relationship between the level of violation charged and the result of the party protest. Similarly, because actions by the Chamber of Deputies' electoral college were often taken on the basis of district authorities' or internal working groups' recommendations, the partial or complete invalidation of a district's election results often did not involve extensive public discussion in the Chamber of Deputies. Indeed, in the 24 actions of this kind (results E and F), only 9 (37.5 percent) followed considerable debate in the Chamber.

Internal Changes in the Federal Chamber of Deputies. As a result of the political reform and the 1979 elections, the several opposition parties have significantly increased their representation in the federal Chamber of Deputies. In the 1976-1979 Cámara, the three opposition parties then registered (PAN, PPS, PARM) held 41 of the existing 235 seats (17.4 percent) under the "party deputy" system.[116] In 1979, with the inclusion of the PCM, PST, and PDM, the opposition nearly doubled its representation to 104 seats and 26.0 percent of the total (400) (see Table 13). The proportional representation system used to distribute opposition seats significantly biased the final distribution of Chamber seats in favor of the smaller opposition parties. The PARM, PST, and PDM benefitted from this arrangement, while the PAN and PCM were penalized.[117] However, for the first time since the elimination of various political factions in the Chamber following the formation of the "official" PNR in 1929,[118] the 1979 elections introduced an ideologically defined political opposition in the Chamber of Deputies. The representation of diverse ideologies and political tendencies has increased the national political prominence of the federal Chamber of Deputies.

This increased representation has opened a new political arena to the opposition and allows it to play a more active role within the Chamber of Deputies. For example, the larger number of opposition deputies allows the political opposition to participate on a greater number of committees and commissions within the Chamber.[119] The presence of opposition party deputies has introduced new ideas and altered the character of Chamber debate as the PRI majority modifies legislative initiatives in order to avoid confrontations on some issues. During the 1979-1980 legislative session, as many as one-half of the 35 legislative initiatives considered were modified substantively as a result of opposition participation on Chamber committees and commissions, and several measures were further modified in the course of floor debate.[120] Moreover, the opposition parties have used the Chamber as a forum to advance their positions on a number of issues. The PCM, leader of the Communist Parliamentary Group which includes the MAUS, PSR, and UIC, has been especially active in this regard.[121] PCM deputies have consciously pursued a strategy designed to generate maximum public awareness of PCM programs and the party's presence in the Chamber. In addition to introducing legislative

Table 13

Party Representation in 1979-1982 Chamber of Deputies

	Deputies by:		Total	
	Simple Majority	Proportional Representation	Absolute	Percent
PRI	296	0	296	74.0%
PAN	4	39	43	10.8
PCM	0	18	18	4.5
PARM	0	12	12	3.0
PPS	0	11	11	2.8
PDM	0	10	10	2.5
PST	0	10	10	2.5
Total	300	100	400	100.1%

Source: Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados, LI Legislatura, v. 1, no. 13, p. 11.

initiatives on questions such as tax reform and labor legislation (for example, on the legal status of university workers' unions), the PCM has also called for the legalization of abortion and voting rights for the Catholic clergy and military personnel. From the perspective of liberal elements in the PRI, this activity performs the positive function of opening controversial ideas and proposals to national political debate that might be awkward to articulate from within the "official" party. Opposition activity has also resulted in some novel legislative alliances. While leftist opposition parties have generally criticized the CTM's domination of the organized labor movement, the PCM, PST, and PPS supported the CTM's July 1980 demand for a 30 percent general wage increase to counteract the impact of inflation.[122] Leftist opposition parties have lobbied in favor of legislation that would permit the unionization of banking employees--even though these workers would almost certainly be organized by a CTM-affiliated union. The PCM, PPS, and PRI have also jointly endorsed a proposal calling for the revision of legal injunction procedures in the agrarian reform process (amparo agrario).[123]

The importance of opposition participation in the federal Chamber of Deputies has in part been increased by the new regulatory powers which the LOPPE granted to the legislature in areas such as the annual review of the national budget and the supervision of state-owned enterprises.[124] For example, the Chamber can now form a commission to investigate the operation of decentralized state agencies and state-controlled economic enterprises at the request of one-fourth of its members.[125] This would theoretically allow the political opposition to initiate such an

investigation without support from the PRI. On occasions when the Chamber has requested that directors of major state-owned enterprises appear before it, opposition political parties have used these opportunities to question public officials regarding their conduct and to solicit detailed information concerning their agencies' performance. Jorge Díaz Serrano's September 1979 testimony as director of Petróleos Mexicanos regarding the enterprise's production and accounting policies and his personal role in subcontracting companies employed by the firm was an important element in the continuing debate on national petroleum policy. The director of the Federal Electrical Commission, Alberto Escofet Artiga, appeared before a session of the Chamber's "Gran Comisión" in July 1980 when delays in generating capacity expansion and a series of power shortages produced massive electrical blackouts and became a major source of public concern.[126] The opposition parties' minority position in the Chamber of Deputies of course limits their ability to shape legislation on matters such as these, and their success in influencing executive-formulated policy is often limited due to their general lack of an independent research capacity. But these new Chamber responsibilities do appear to have contributed to the greater public accountability of important state officials. In this way the LOPPE has also served as an important complement to López Portillo's reforms in the state administrative apparatus.

However, Chamber participation holds its own challenges and dangers for opposition parties. For those parties which had based their political legitimacy and developed followings on the basis of a longstanding opposition to the established order, entry into that same system and participation in the federal Chamber of Deputies constitute a major change. Despite the Chamber's new role in national political debate, the political opposition's expanded presence there is in the short run unlikely to affect firmly established executive control over the legislature. None of the opposition's own legislative initiatives has yet been enacted into law, and for some time to come opposition party leaders may be hard-pressed to show their constituents substantive results from legislative action. This problem is likely to be accentuated when the opposition's most prestigious and skilled deputies are barred from participation in the 1982-1985 Chamber of Deputies under the "no reelection" rule. Given the opposition parties' comparatively weak position when they entered the Chamber of Deputies, participation in the established system may tempt opposition leaders to collaborate more broadly with the incumbent political elite. Moreover, for opposition parties with limited personnel, election campaign activity and legislative participation may absorb scarce resources that might otherwise be devoted to base-level organizational work and the expansion and diversification of party membership. These problems have already surfaced in the PCM, emphasizing existing internal divisions and concentrating dissension on the appropriate focus of party activity.[127] Despite legal recognition and an active public presence, none of the opposition parties has made major progress in expanding political bases among labor unions, peasant organizations, and other groups. Without progress in this area, it is unlikely that the opposition can develop the power and independent political base necessary to move the established regime toward further liberalization in the political process.

Perhaps most importantly, the opposition's representation in the Chamber of Deputies and its formal inclusion in the existing political

party system constitute a major contribution to the political legitimacy of the established regime. The registration of leftist opposition parties represents an important symbolic change in Mexican national politics: for the first time this recognizes the existence of a legitimate political opposition to the left of the PRI-led "revolutionary coalition." But from the perspective of the incumbent political elite, the López Portillo political reform has removed an important potential source of political instability. The reform incorporated the bulk of organized political opposition into the established party system under regime-defined rules and procedures. The introduction of new political forces and ideological tendencies into the existing party system and the Chamber of Deputies expands the representative capacity of the existing political system and significantly strengthens its claim to popular consent and political legitimacy.

IV. Conclusions and the Prospects for Future Regime Change

The López Portillo government's political reform was an attempt by the established regime to respond to a broad range of sociopolitical challenges: a generally perceived erosion of the regime's political legitimacy resulting from widespread public disapproval of the government's handling of the 1968 student strike and changing popular evaluations of government policy performance; the emergence of a number of opposition political parties and groups that remained unincorporated by the existing electoral process and party system; and elite concern regarding the deteriorating organizational viability and mobilizational capability of the PRI as a result of declining electoral competition. The 1977 political reform fell within the general tradition of earlier regime-sponsored reforms in the procedures regulating the electoral process and political party registration, and it followed Echeverría's effort to defuse accumulated political discontent through a combined strategy of negotiation, selective repression, leadership cooptation, and electoral reform. Like these earlier measures, the 1977 reform was initiated by the federal executive. It also conformed to the more general Mexican revolutionary pattern of incorporating diverse political interests in the established regime, and it demonstrated the regime's continued flexibility in response to ongoing sociopolitical change. However, the 1963 and 1972-1973 electoral and party reforms sought to maintain a limited degree of political competition in the electoral process by subsidizing already recognized "opposition" parties that, with the partial exception of the conservative PAN, had ceased to constitute a real source of criticism and opposition to the established regime. In contrast to these earlier measures, the López Portillo political reform program admitted new political actors to the electoral arena and thus improved the possibility for long-term change in and transformation of the Mexican authoritarian regime.

Although the Mexican regime faced a number of important political challenges in the late 1960s and 1970s, the López Portillo government undertook the 1977 political reform from a position of considerable strength. The established authoritarian regime's institutional characteristics and its broad sociopolitical bases were important factors in determining the character of the reform process itself. In comparison with a number of other political transitions in authoritarian regimes, the Mexican liberalization process has so far lacked a flexible, open-ended

quality. This was due to the fact that the process was initiated from within the established regime and encountered significant opposition among conservative elements in the governing "revolutionary coalition." Because the organized political opposition was relatively weak and the pressures from below for political liberalization were indirect, the government was able to determine the timing, structure, and speed of the political reform process. The comparatively closed nature of this process made coalitions and realignments among central sociopolitical actors relatively less important to the direction and outcome of the process than in other cases of regime transition.[128]

The political power of the Mexican federal executive was the driving force in the formulation and implementation of the López Portillo political reform, yet effective political leadership was also central to the successful enactment of the liberalization measure. Leadership was important in determining the timing of the 1977 political reform and the creation of new participatory channels to bolster the stability of the established political system. The existence of an unincorporated political opposition was a principal motive for the 1977 reform, but the relative weakness of the opposition vis-à-vis the established regime reduced its ability to influence the final content of the political reform law. Talented political leadership was thus important in overcoming the uncertainty, reluctance, and internal division within opposition parties regarding their participation in the reform process. Even though regime-sponsored efforts at political change in Mexico have traditionally occurred within quite predictable limits and have sought to maintain a balance of forces within the system, the López Portillo reform program encountered significant opposition from conservative elements in the governing coalition due to their concerns regarding the immediate costs and possible long-term consequences of the liberalization process. In contrast to the relative weakness of the political opposition, the importance of major sociopolitical actors such as the "official" organized labor movement allowed the CTM to exert considerable influence during the reform process. That influence was substantially increased by the CTM's critical role in the management of Mexico's 1976-1977 economic crisis. The López Portillo administration's success in accommodating these concerns through internal regime negotiations and bargaining in large part accounts for smooth implementation of the liberalization measure. However, this dimension of the political reform process emphasizes the extent to which established elite-mass linkages and institutional relationships can limit an authoritarian regime's capacity for self-transformation. It also underscores the importance of the conjunctural socioeconomic and political factors that constitute the context in which the reform process evolved, shaping both the final form of the liberalization measure and influencing its chances for success.

The long-term consequences of this liberalization process are difficult to predict with any certainty, but in the short run the López Portillo political reform does appear to have contributed significantly to the established regime's political legitimacy. By bringing the bulk of the recently-emerged organized political opposition into the existing party system under rules and procedures determined by the governing coalition, the political reform removed a major potential source of political instability and expanded the established regime's claim to the broad

representation of diverse political forces and ideological tendencies. The PRI can take renewed pride in winning landslide victories in local, state, and national elections actually contested by opposition parties.[129] The reform reinforced the left of the national political spectrum at a time when national economic crisis strengthened the position of conservative elements within the governing coalition. Furthermore, the existence of a recognized leftist opposition serves liberal interests within the PRI by creating a new source for the articulation of ideas and programs that might be difficult to advance from inside the PRI itself.

The PRI's share of the total national vote declined in the 1979 congressional elections, and the "official" party's unchallenged control in many electoral districts may be a thing of the past. However, the overall decrease in the PRI's share of the national vote--and the opposition's increase in electoral support--came in areas where the PRI's strength was already in decline. This suggests that, to date, long-term structural trends, such as rural-urban migration, that erode the PRI's more easily mobilizable rural support base, may be as important a cause of these changes as the expanded organizational presence and electoral competition of opposition political parties. Three new opposition parties (the PCM, PST, and PDM) won definitive registry as a result of their showing in the 1979 elections, and the Mexican Communist Party emerged as the second most important opposition party in Mexico (after the PAN). Yet the PRI remains far-and-away the most important national political party; indeed, opposition party candidates won in only four of the 300 single-member electoral districts in the 1979 elections.[130] From the perspective of the governing political elite, this is a relatively small loss in terms of the overall gains in political legitimacy for the established political system resulting from the 1977 political reform. The liberalization process has had less impact on the problems of voter apathy and abstention and the PRI's internal nominating procedures. But at least in the short run the reform has been an important political success for the established regime.

The political reform has also had important consequences for the political opposition. The opposition's combined share of the 1979 national vote increased substantially over its 1976 showing, but there was great variation in the several opposition parties' electoral support. The most important opposition parties, the PAN and the PCM, also evidenced considerable regional variation in their electoral strength. All of the opposition parties appear to have mobilized quite heterogeneous electoral support in the 1979 federal Chamber of Deputies elections, and heavily urban, socioeconomically diverse areas constituted major sources of electoral support for all the opposition parties. However, the 1979 election results also suggest that the presence of new party alternatives in the electoral arena resulted in a loss of votes for previously registered opposition parties. Opposition parties frequently competed for votes within the same general constituency, and one consequence of the 1979 reform measure may be to divide and diffuse these parties' political support. Increased opposition party presence at the polls provided new opportunities to prevent electoral fraud, but the political and material support available to the PRI through its close government ties, the opposition parties' own limited resources and personnel, and the "official" party's firm control over the election-returns review process limited the

opposition's ability to challenge effectively and overturn PRI electoral victories in districts where fraud occurred. Opposition party efforts to improve the honesty of elections may eventually have important consequences for the political process, but close PRI-government ties and the ready availability of government resources to coopt opposition leaders will continue to mediate the future evolution of the political reform. Nonetheless, the new political importance of opposition parties and groups may make the liberalization process difficult--if not impossible--to reverse.

While the 1977 political reform has had a significant impact on contemporary Mexican politics, there are both short-term and long-term challenges to further political liberalization in Mexico.[131] López Portillo adopted the political reform as a basic part of his program of government. When Reyes Heroles was replaced as Minister of the Interior in May 1979 by the more conservative Enrique Olivares Santana, the 1979 elections and other aspects of the reform program proceeded on schedule as a result of continued presidential support for the liberalization project.[132] But López Portillo's successor may not be equally committed to additional political reform. New presidential administrations in Mexico frequently produce important shifts in national political and socioeconomic policies. The central role which the federal executive played in the formulation and implementation of the 1977 political reform underlines the critical importance which the orientation of future presidents will have for continued political liberalization. Yet at the same time, the highly closed presidential selection process and the diversity of possible candidates' political orientations make it difficult to predict presidential attitude toward additional political reform after 1982. This is likely to be the most important factor shaping the prospects for further regime liberalization in the short run.

The logic of recent political reform efforts in Mexico might suggest that future presidential administrations would pursue further political liberalization as a continuing response to changing sociopolitical conditions. Since the 1963 electoral reform and the creation of "party deputies," various governments have sought to expand the legitimate role of opposition parties in the established political system. The importance of such measures became especially clear following the events of 1968, the appearance of rural and urban guerrilla groups, and the emergence of several unincorporated opposition political parties. Future administrations might use the option of further expanding opposition parties' political role to retain relative state autonomy vis-à-vis the national bourgeoisie. Yet reforms in the electoral process and the requirements for political party recognition are only one means by which the established regime can respond to change, and the reform achieved so far will not necessarily make further political liberalization more likely.

Perhaps most important, the crisis environment which surrounded the formulation and implementation of the 1977 political reform disappeared with the resumption of rapid economic growth in 1979. Although the 1977 reform addressed problems which had emerged over a longer period of time, the context in which the López Portillo administration formulated a liberalization program was critical to its successful implementation.

Continuing economic decline and the crisis of Mexico's post-World War II economic model contributed significantly to the regime's willingness to undertake a political reform. The widely shared assumption that a political response was necessary to the 1976-1977 economic crisis was a very important element in the success which liberal elements within the governing coalition had in pushing through a reform measure over the opposition of more conservative actors.[133] But the absence of those conditions surrounding the 1977 political reform may lessen the prospects for future liberalization. Mexico's post-1978 petroleum boom and the generally held belief that massive oil and natural-gas reserves will provide the financial means with which to resolve longstanding socioeconomic problems may make further broad political reform appear unnecessary. At the very least, the relative success achieved by the 1977 political reform and substantially different economic prospects may increase the reluctance of conservative elements to accept additional political liberalization. Future governments will continue to rely on negotiation, leadership cooptation, and selective repression to manage new political challenges. But given the resistance which conservative members of the governing coalition have offered to broader changes in the structure of the established political system, further liberalization of the kind represented by the López Portillo reform may prove far more difficult in a significantly different national political environment.

Mexico's large new financial resources and renewed national economic growth may in fact alleviate a number of major development problems and improve public perceptions of regime performance in the near future. Nevertheless, over a longer period of time the socioeconomic consequences of petroleum-led development are likely to pose new dilemmas for Mexican political leaders and require additional institutional change to respond to rapidly changing national circumstances.[134] Mexico's relatively large industrial economy, its growing population and expanding domestic market, and its diversified export structure should absorb some of the disruptive effects of large petroleum revenues. But rapid growth in the petroleum sector may create distortions in the domestic labor market, disequilibria among internal factors of production, and greater income concentration. Increasingly unequal income distribution has been a persistent problem in Mexican economic development, and it is likely to be an especially difficult problem in the future. In addition, rapidly growing petroleum revenues also increase the potential political problems associated with rising popular expectations. Although some of these problems are already evident, it may be some time before they assume major dimensions. The availability of new financial resources may help the government satisfy immediate socioeconomic demands in the short run. However, high rates of inflation, inequalities in income distribution and geographic development, widespread unemployment, and the continuing need for large imports of basic foodstuffs are problems that will not be easily resolved in the near future despite the availability of petroleum revenues.

These are issues that raise difficult political questions regarding the future direction of Mexican development. Perhaps most important, the broad socioeconomic and political changes resulting from petroleum-led development are likely to increase the importance of institutional channels for the expression of political opposition. In oil-rich

Venezuela, the existence of a competitive party system helped defuse the political problems posed by rising popular expectations by allowing the incumbent leadership to be removed from office.[135] But this option is not available in the PRI-dominated Mexican party system. To rely only on the selective distribution of new financial resources to resolve problems such as these is to ignore their broader sociopolitical implications and consequences. Mexico's political leaders will thus be challenged to maintain a broad political liberalization strategy in a petroleum-dominated national context which seems to belie the need for continued institutional innovation and change. Failure to do so in the context of increasingly broad, rapid sociopolitical change might well lead to the imposition of a conservative, nationalist authoritarian ruling coalition in which the armed forces and the national bourgeoisie play much more prominent, open political roles. There is no necessary political outcome to the period of rapid socioeconomic change that Mexico is now entering; much depends on the political strategies which the established regime pursues.

Political opposition forces in Mexico will also face major challenges in their efforts to promote further political liberalization. The political opposition's first task will be to develop coordinated strategies that advance alternative programmatic proposals and increase their electoral support. Opposition parties' ability to participate in the 1979 elections provided them with an important opportunity to develop organizational and mobilizational skills. Four leftist opposition parties (the PCM, PPM, PSR, and MAUS) successfully cooperated in the 1979 elections through a Leftist Coalition that allowed them to present a complete slate of candidates throughout the country. This experience provided the basis for a subsequent parliamentary alliance in the 1979-1982 federal Chamber of Deputies and an electoral coalition in 1980 state gubernatorial and legislative elections. The 1982 presidential election will present the next major test for such cooperative strategies. In many cases strategy coordination may require opposition parties to develop innovative ties with local groups and organizations that increase their combined mobilizational capacity and electoral strength.[136] Some opposition figures have called for a single, common opposition candidate to contest this election, but the diversity of ideological orientations and political perspectives among opposition forces effectively precludes this possibility. Indeed, the PAN has already announced its intention to field its own presidential candidate in 1982, and the PPS and the PST have agreed to endorse the PRI's candidate. There have been some suggestions that the PMT may seek its conditional registry in 1982 as part of an alliance with the PCM and its Leftist Coalition partners.[137] However, an electoral alliance of this kind may not materialize, and there is no indication that it would be joined by other leftist parties and groups.[138] Nor is there any evidence available to suggest that the PDM might ally with the PAN. Considerable negotiation and compromise would be necessary to construct "left" and "right" electoral alliances such as these, and some diversity in opposition presidential candidates may increase the vitality of party debates during the 1982 election campaign. But if there is extreme factionalization and internal division among the different opposition forces, especially among leftist parties, their electoral support in 1982 is likely to be severely diluted.

Second, and perhaps more important, opposition political forces will be challenged to expand their mass organizational bases in order to develop a viable, lasting national political presence. In more abrupt, open-ended transitions from authoritarian rule, it may be important for the political opposition to pursue at least a partial demobilization strategy in order to reassure conservative actors closely identified with the ancien régime and to preserve an often fragile balance of forces favorable to a nonauthoritarian outcome.[139] But in cases of more limited political liberalization in well-institutionalized, broadly-based authoritarian systems such as Mexico where the degree of change is still modest, the opposition must challenge the established regime's sociopolitical support bases and elite-mass linkages on a variety of fronts in order to push the liberalization process forward. This is especially necessary in Mexico where the political opposition is quite heterogeneous and diffuse due to the inclusive nature of the established authoritarian regime. The 1977 political reform was less extensive than that sought by its most liberal proponents, and the measure retains important state controls over the electoral process and the registration of political parties. However, the political importance of this liberalization measure should not be underestimated. Although it has initially strengthened the legitimacy of the established regime, the reform may also have set in motion long-term processes of change. It expanded electoral and legislative arenas for the political opposition, and for the first time since the late 1940s, ideologically-motivated parties such as the PCM have an opportunity to work openly to expand an independent organizational base.

Much depends on the abilities and strategies of the newly-registered opposition parties in this area. Their relative lack of resources and experienced leadership, coupled with the opportunities for political activity and public recognition offered by electoral campaigning and their representation in the federal Chamber of Deputies, may incline these parties to place less emphasis on base-level organizational activities among urban and rural workers. Opposition parties can indeed make important contributions to the liberalization process through their campaign activity and their participation in the legislative process at state and national levels. Elections and competitive political mobilization are likely to become increasingly significant as sociopolitical tensions caused by petroleum-led development surface, and over time elections may be important in specifying opposition parties' constituencies. But only the creation and consolidation of independent social bases and durable ties with popular sector organizations will allow opposition parties to develop identifiable constituencies and move beyond the very heterogeneous, largely urban-based electoral support that these parties mobilized in the 1979 elections. This may be especially important as the PAN recovers from its 1975-1976 internal crisis and attempts to recoup the urban middle-class support that benefitted leftist opposition parties in 1979. The newly-registered opposition parties' success in expanding their mass political bases will ultimately determine their fortunes at the polls, the political role of the federal Chamber of Deputies, and their ability to reshape the national political process. Several opposition parties currently have limited support bases among established mass organizations. For example, the PCM, PPS, and PST are represented on the national committee of the National Education Workers' Union (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación, SNTE). Yet linkages of this kind for the

most part remain tenuous. Most of the PCM's current union strength is in university workers' unions in the major urban centers. The PCM's shift toward Eurocommunist positions under the leadership of Arnaldo Martínez Verdugo has emphasized its heterogeneous urban middle-class support base, but this orientation is unlikely to provide the party with a broad mobilizational capacity.[140]

The expansion of opposition parties' mass bases, even if relatively successful in the long run, will certainly be a slow process. The Mexican Communist Party was quite effective in organizing labor unions and peasant leagues in the 1920s and 1930s when little previous organizational work had been done among workers and peasants. But the existence of progovernment, "official" mass organizations which occupy important political space in these sectors makes the formation of new, alternative organizations much more difficult in contemporary Mexico. Incumbent leaders in CTM-affiliated labor unions and CNC-affiliated peasant leagues have vigorously resisted efforts by opposition political groups to develop contacts with rank-and-file members and to challenge their leadership position. Despite major limitations of organizations such as the CTM and CNC as channels for the articulation of members' sociopolitical demands, their PRI-mediated ties to the established regime are firmly established. These organizations' potential or real access to government resources and political power, the possibility of members' political mobility through PRI and government channels, and their relative openness and flexibility under changing conditions are major strengths. Given opposition parties' lack of access to significant resources and power, and the relatively small probability that this situation will change in the near future, these factors will make opposition parties' mass organizational work difficult.

Nonetheless, there are both conjunctural factors and long-term trends that increase the opportunities which opposition parties have to challenge the established regime's sociopolitical bases. The rapid processes of socioeconomic change resulting from Mexico's petroleum boom are likely to generate tensions and problems that will offer the political opposition new opportunities to articulate alternative policies and development approaches. The natural aging of Mexico's postrevolutionary regime also generates a growing pluralization of interests and political perspectives, gradually eroding the governing coalition's internal cohesion and its claim to political legitimacy as the embodiment of the revolutionary transformation itself. This process is accelerated by the gradual replacement of political elites that rose to power during and after the Mexican Revolution. Moreover, the declining appeal of "national unity" and revolutionary symbols and the absence of a more coherent political ideology have contributed to these changes. The 1977 political reform's goals of reducing voter abstention, improving the PRI's electoral mobilization capacity, and directing younger generations' political participation through officially sanctioned institutional channels sought to arrest these trends. However, developments such as these create a national socioeconomic and political environment substantially different than the context in which "opposition" parties functioned in the 1950s and early 1960s.

In addition, long-term shifts in the national economy may create new organizational opportunities for leftist political parties and groups.

The rapid growth of the urban service sector has created a working-class population that is not easily incorporated in "official" mass organizations, and the end of land distribution under agrarian reform policies has effectively eliminated an important incentive for the creation of peasant organizations affiliated with the CNC.[141] Similarly, long-term changes in the socioeconomic characteristics of the urban industrial labor force have frequently threatened the established position of "official" union leaders and may create expanded opportunities for leftist parties and groups to develop mass organization affiliations in important economic activities. For example, the rapid expansion of the Mexican automobile industry after the mid-1960s produced significant changes in the character of the labor force and resulted in challenges to "official" union control in nearly all of the major automobile manufacturing firms.[142] In comparison with more traditional manufacturing activities such as textiles, shoes, and food processing, the automobile industry employed a more highly-paid workforce with substantially larger worker concentrations per firm. The high degree of repetitiveness in work tasks, relatively unskilled and highly standardized work techniques, and the considerable subdivision of the productive process combined to make the automobile manufacturing plants a potentially more conflictive working environment in which new kinds of workplace problems surfaced.[143] At the same time, the centrality of labor in the automobile manufacturing process, greater worker concentrations per firm, and automobile workers' relatively higher remunerations increased their bargaining leverage and mobilizational capacity. Faced with rapid changes in these areas over a relatively short period of time, old-line labor leaders' control techniques proved inadequate, and they were unable to maintain their control over rank-and-file workers. By 1973, workers in three of the industry's firms had broken with CTM federations and formed "independent" unions. In all but one of the industry's remaining four principal firms, major opposition movements had also emerged to challenge "official" control. Where successful, these opposition movements produced unions that were much more aggressive in protecting rank-and-file interests. In comparison to "official" unions in the automobile industry, they generally sought higher wages and more advantageous contract conditions, were more aggressive in their defense of employees' interests in cases before labor conciliation and arbitration boards, and were more inclined to strike in support of their demands.

The formation of opposition party linkages to independent labor organizations such as these is not an automatic or necessary outcome to this process of structural socioeconomic change. Automobile worker actions were encouraged and supported by Echeverría's relatively open policy toward change in the organized labor movement. López Portillo's more conservative orientation toward organized labor has slowed the emergence of such "independent" labor unions, and future presidential policies toward labor will certainly affect such developments. In some cases "official" labor leaders in organizations such as the CTM appear to have learned to adapt workplace strategies to changing socioeconomic conditions. The appearance of independent unions has also been most prominent in capital-intensive, technologically-advanced industrial activities such as automobile manufacturing, steel and metalworking, electrical products, machine-tool manufacturing, and so forth. However, these changes in the Mexican automobile industry suggest that a national development strategy

favoring industrialization and the growth of capital-intensive, technologically advanced manufacturing sectors may necessarily create tensions that are not easily contained by "official" mass organizations like the CTM. This will prove a significant challenge to the established regime regardless of leftist political organizations' response. Independent unions such as those that have appeared in the automobile industry have often been reluctant to compromise their hard-won organizational autonomy by establishing political affiliations with leftist political groups and parties. But nongovernment-aligned organizations such as these offer an important focus for opposition political forces seeking to establish a presence in significant worker concentrations in major economic activities.[144]

So far the emergence of opposition parties and the formation of independent movements among industrial workers and urban marginals have been relatively independent developments. Unless new party/mass-organization linkages are forged, the erosion of "official" controls over mass organizations and the construction of broad-based political oppositions may occur as asymmetrical processes. However, to the extent to which newly recognized political parties and groups do succeed in linking these independent mass organizations to their efforts in favor of more extensive sociopolitical change, the 1977 political reform may mark the first step in a much broader process of regime transformation. The emergence of class-oriented, mass-based opposition political parties could constitute a major force for change in the Mexican authoritarian regime. Significant shifts in the structure of sociopolitical pluralism and the degree and kind of sociopolitical mobilization would alter existing power relations. Broad-based political oppositions might also constitute an effecive base from which to pressure for the fulfillment of formal constitutional guarantees of liberal political rights and the redefinition of institutional power arrangements toward a more equitable distribution of authority among different branches of government (including a reduction in the institutional and political power of the federal executive). Major changes in areas such as these would constitute an effective transformation of the established authoritarian regime.

As a result of considerations such as these, the future of political liberalization in Mexico remains open and subject to influence by innovative leadership both from within the governing authoritarian coalition and from the political opposition. Even in the context of rigidities within the established regime that limit the speed of change and affect possible outcomes, the perception that additional future change is possible is important both to regime constituents and to the political opposition in fashioning future strategies. The formulation and implementation of the 1977 political reform occurred principally at the initiative of liberal elements within the regime that favored an institutionalized response to sociopolitical change. Pressures from specific opposition groups contributed only indirectly to the decision to reform the legislation governing the electoral process and the requirements for political party registration. However, further political liberalization in the future may depend on the capacity of liberal elements within the regime and opposition forces to work in coalition toward this goal. Given the renewed strength of the established regime following the onset of the petroleum boom and relatively successful 1977 political reform, this

coalition may be quite difficult to construct. The political reform benefitted liberal groups within the governing coalition by constructing a counterbalance to the national bourgeoisie's increasing power and autonomy from the state in the contemporary period of accelerated economic growth. Yet these liberal elements will be hard-pressed to demonstrate to conservative actors the merits and necessity of further reform in the structure and functioning of the established system. Opposition groups will continue to face dangers such as leadership cooptation, the development of organizational dependence on government material support, and the possibility of compromised substantive positions as they participate in the recognized party system and the electoral process. As a result, they may encounter significant problems in maintaining an autonomous political identity, internal organizational coherence, and legitimacy vis-à-vis their memberships. Coalition activity, even if on only an informal basis, will thus be an especially delicate task for these actors. But it is unlikely that substantial further political liberalization can occur in the near future without combined, coordinated efforts from both within and without the established regime.

However, further political liberalization will surely pose a number of specific dilemmas for the established authoritarian regime. If opposition political forces do show success in expanding their support bases and eroding "official" control over mass organizations such as labor unions, peasant leagues, and urban marginals' associations, how much additional political change would be acceptable to the Mexican regime? While the national political leadership would probably accept close ties between leftist political parties and individual, enterprise-level independent unions in different sectors, it is unlikely that opposition-party efforts to organize or control a major industrywide national union would be tolerated in the contemporary Mexican context. Not only would a labor-party linkage of this kind constitute a threat to the established system of controls over organized labor, but it would also create a major potential mobilizational challenge to the regime. If a strategically important union such as the National Petroleum Workers' Union (Sindicato de Trabajadores Petroleros de la República Mexicana, STPRM) were involved, this development would have major national economic and political implications. In this regard it is significant that important groups within the established regime perceived the 1977 López Portillo liberalization measure as an "electoral reform," not as a "political reform" that involved significant changes in areas such as party-labor affiliations. Conservative actors' tolerance of these linkages may well be curvilinear--and decreasing--over time as more opposition-party progress is made in this area. Opposition party-labor linkages may become even more sensitive if the national organized labor movement begins to splinter after the death of Fidel Velázquez.

Similarly, while opposition parties have been allowed to hold elected positions in local municipal government, state legislatures, and the federal Chamber of Deputies, a significant opposition-party presence in the federal Senate or control of a major city's government would pose a more difficult (although probably still acceptable) political dilemma. Given the continuing political problems that the urban middle class poses for the established regime, challenges at this level will probably be quite common in the future. But it is quite unlikely that the established regime could tolerate the precedent-breaking election of an opposition

party's candidate as state governor in the foreseeable future. A change of this magnitude would begin to challenge the basis of the established system by introducing major new alternatives in policy and leadership. And it is doubtful that political-party registration requirements will be so greatly relaxed that a large number of small local or regional parties are formed. The "official" Partido Nacional Revolucionario was formed in 1929 precisely to eliminate the very large number of factional political parties that existed at the time and to remove what was perceived as a major source of national political instability.

Issues such as these will confront future presidential administrations with difficult choices concerning the direction of the political liberalization process. Given the relatively open character of the Mexican authoritarian system, it is likely that future political change will involve a series of "liberalization thresholds" rather than an abrupt, dramatic break in the established regime. For many of the reasons already indicated, initiatives for further liberalization may encounter significantly more resistance from conservative sectors than the 1977 political reform. To the extent to which the process of future change is discontinuous and episodic, the period of time between specific political shocks and the implementation of accommodative measures will become an important issue. Regime responses to future political challenges will certainly be shaped by a variety of pressures from within the governing coalition and by contextual considerations, especially the amount of accumulated change that has occurred up to that time and major sociopolitical actors' perceptions of the risks and problems involved in additional political liberalization. The key factor in determining both the period of time over which this regime response occurs and the character of that response will be the stability of the established regime's sociopolitical support bases. For this reason, the outcome of these critical decision junctures will be strongly affected by the political oppositions' capacity to mobilize support in coalition with liberal actors within the regime in favor of broader political liberalization. At the same time, however, opposition forces must avoid an openly confrontational style that would cause conservative actors to conclude that the liberalization process was rapidly escaping regime control.

Finally, although international actors and external factors played no direct role in the conceptualization and implementation of the 1977 political reform, it is possible that external influences will be substantially more important in determining parameters to the future course of political change in Mexico. The 1977 political reform and the accompanying 1978 amnesty for political prisoners have to date provided the Mexican government with issues to enhance the regime's international reputation at a time when other Latin American countries have been severely criticized for extreme human-rights violations.[145] However, over a longer period of time, Mexico's bilateral relations with the United States and increasing regional political instability in Central America are likely to constitute far more important influences on domestic political developments than international public opinion.[146] Political change and stability in Mexico have historically been issues of considerable importance to the United States. Since the late 1940s, U.S. policy concerns regarding Mexico have focused primarily on economic issues and border problems, but during the early decades of this century the U.S. concern with political events in Mexico frequently took an aggressive, interventionist form.[147] U.S. concern with the direction of political change in

Mexico is a direct consequence of the extent and diversity of its interests there. In addition to the 2,000-mile common border and U.S. private investments in Mexico, large flows of capital, commercial goods, immigrants, and tourists between the two countries make events in Mexico of direct relevance to the United States. The large number of Mexican nationals and Mexican-Americans living in the United States and the possibility that Mexico's massive oil and natural-gas reserves could provide a secure source of supply for the United States in an emergency also contribute to these political and strategic concerns.[148] The contemporary Mexican system's broad sociopolitical bases and institutional strength to some extent insulate it from bilateral political pressures, and Mexico's petroleum resources have provided it with new leverage in its efforts to assert its national autonomy in negotiations with the United States. But Mexico's geopolitical position is of continuing relevance to the speed and direction of internal political change, and domestic events in Mexico will continue to be significantly influenced by the character of bilateral relations with the United States.

Future developments in this area will in large part depend on U.S. policymakers' comprehension that measures such as López Portillo's political reform constitute a necessary regime response to specific problems and the broader processes of socioeconomic modernization. The absence of U.S. involvement in Mexico's 1977 political reform process in the context of high overall dependence on the United States was in large part due to the fact that the degree of change involved was comparatively modest. The liberalization measure was implemented in conjunction with López Portillo's conservative socioeconomic policies, and overall U.S. interests were quite well protected by the established authoritarian regime. But as Mexico's importance to the United States continues to grow, the process of sociopolitical change in Mexico may adversely affect specific U.S. interests. For example, the activities of opposition parties and dissident labor unions in advanced manufacturing sectors such as the automobile industry have already affected the activities of U.S.-based multinational enterprises. Labor strikes in the petroleum industry might at some point in the future threaten the disruption of Mexican oil and natural-gas exports to the United States. Events of this nature would challenge the political leadership of both countries. But U.S. policymaking elites' acceptance of the broader consequences of sociopolitical change in Mexico and respect for Mexican national sovereignty constitute the essential bases for the long-term conduct of Mexico-United States relations. Mexican national elites would be the first to resist uncontrolled political change, and continued political liberalization may be necessary to preserve long-term political order in Mexico.

Similarly, growing political instability in Central America is likely to affect Mexican domestic politics in several ways. Mexico has to date been able to maintain a relatively neutral and distanced position regarding developments in the area, but its emerging role as a significant regional power in Central America and the Caribbean is likely to lead to much closer involvement in the future. It is possible that Mexico's position as a regional power and a leading spokesman for developing countries will contribute to further domestic political liberalization as the regime attempts to maintain a favorable international image. But on balance, regional political developments are likely to complicate

future domestic political change. Southern Mexico shares many of the same socioeconomic problems and potential political difficulties that exist in several Central American countries. Continuing political instability in the area is likely to confront Mexico with a number of delicate issues, including the problems raised by immigrants, refugees, and guerrilla activities in frontier areas. In the early 1960s the example of the Cuban Revolution spurred the Mexican left to greater activity and resulted in the formation of the National Liberation Movement (Movimiento de Liberación Nacional, MLN). It is possible that the political-military victory of radical groups in several Central American countries would similarly affect the contemporary Mexican left and encourage some groups to attempt to overturn the established regime by force. Border tensions and the perceived need to protect oil and natural-gas resources in southeastern Mexico may also contribute to the increased importance of the armed forces in Mexican politics. Developments of this kind would significantly complicate future liberalization efforts. Considerations such as these underline the likely future importance of international factors in the continuing process of political change in Mexico.

APPENDIX

Chronology of Events in 1977 Mexican Political Reform

April 1, 1977	Minister of the Interior Jesús Reyes Heroles announces government's plans for a political reform
April 14	President José López Portillo asks the Federal Election Commission (CFE) to conduct public hearings regarding the proposed political reform
April 21	CFE begins public hearings; a total of 12 public sessions are held between April 28 and July 21
August 4	CFE concludes public hearings and summarizes its findings
September 1	López Portillo announces proposal for a series of constitutional reforms needed to make the political reform possible
October 4	Constitutional reform proposal submitted to Congress; debates held October 19-November 11
December 2	Congress formally approves constitutional reforms (published in Diario Oficial on December 6)
December 6	Proposed "Federal Law on Political Organizations and Electoral Processes" (LOPPE) submitted to the federal Chamber of Deputies
December 27	LOPPE approved by the Chamber of Deputies (published in Diario Oficial on December 30)

Source: Antonio Martínez Báez, "La representación popular en una sociedad política pluralista," pp. 9-12, and Iván Zavala, "¿Qué es y a adónde va la reforma política?", p. 34, both in Comisión Federal Electoral, Ensayos sobre la reforma política II, México, 1978.

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[1]This focus on the structure of sociopolitical pluralism and the degree of political mobilization in the characterization of the Mexican system follows Linz's more general theoretical discussion of authoritarian regimes; see Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political Science, v. 3 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), especially pp. 264-269. In this article, Linz also examines a variety of different kinds of authoritarian regimes.

The Mexican regime's "official" political party was founded in 1929. In 1938 it was restructured as the Partido Revolucionario Mexicano (PRM) on the basis of labor, agrarian, military, and "popular" sectors. The military sector was formally eliminated in 1940 and became part of the "popular" (middle class) sector after its formation in 1943. Further internal reforms were effected in 1946, and the party was renamed the PRI. Organized business and religious groups have never formed a part of the party, although both business interests and the military constitute important parts of the broader "revolutionary coalition."

[2]An analysis of the origin and historical evolution of the Mexican authoritarian regime extends considerably beyond the scope of this essay. For discussions of various critical phases in this process, see (on the 1929 formation of an "official" single party): Adriana Lajous Vargas, Los orígenes del partido único en México (México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas, 1979); Robert K. Furtak, El partido de la revolución y la estabilidad política en México (México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1978); (on the 1935-1938 period and the organization of the "official" party's mass labor and peasant bases): Arnáldo Córdoba, La política de masas del cardenismo (México: Ediciones Era, 1974); Wayne A. Cornelius, "Nation Building, Participation, and Distribution: The Politics of Social Reform under Cárdenas," in Gabriel A. Almond, Scott C. Flanagan, and

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Robert J. Mundt (ed.), Crisis, Choice and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973); Joe C. Ashby, Organized Labor and the Mexican Revolution under Lázaro Cárdenas (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967); (on the 1948-1951 consolidation of government control over mass organizations): Kevin J. Middlebrook, "The Political Economy of Mexican Organized Labor, 1940-1978" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1981), especially chs. 2, 4.

The text's description of the Mexican authoritarian regime does not intend to overemphasize the actual political role of the PRI vis-à-vis the president, political factions (camarillas), or patron-client ties. However, this analysis does stress the real and continuing contribution which formal political institutions such as the governing single party make to the functioning and stability of the Mexican system. For a contrasting view, which emphasizes personal and factional interaction and questions the extent to which Mexican politics is institutionalized, see Susan Kaufman Purcell and John F. H. Purcell, "State and Society in Mexico: Must a Stable Polity Be Institutionalized?" World Politics, 32:2 (January 1980), 194-227.

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[3]On the origins of the 1968 student movement and the strike movement's specific demands, see Ramón Ramírez, El movimiento estudiantil de México (México: Ed. Era, 1969), esp. v. 1, pp. 23-39, and Judith Adler Hellman, Mexico in Crisis (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978), esp. pp. 132-134, 141. For a discussion of the 1968 student movement and two major political conflicts which preceded it, the 1958-1959 railroad workers' strikes and the 1965 doctors' strike, see Stevens, op. cit., chs. 4-6. For participants' accounts of the 1968 student movement and the subsequent government repression, see Eduardo Valle E., Raúl Alvarez G., and José Revueltas, Tiempo de hablar (second ed.; México: Ed. Estudiantes, 1971).

Estimates of the number of students killed and wounded in the "Tlatelolco massacre" vary considerably, ranging from 50 killed and 1,000 wounded to 325 killed and thousands wounded. See John Womack, Jr., "The Spoils of the Mexican Revolution," Foreign Affairs, 48:4 (July 1970), 684,

for the lower estimate, and Octavio Paz, "Mexico: The Last Decade," in Stanley R. Ross (ed.), Is the Mexican Revolution Dead? (second ed.; Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1975), p. 246, for the higher estimate. In addition, large numbers of students were also arrested at this time.

[4]The most thorough examination of these postrevolutionary political beliefs is by Arnaldo Córdoba, La ideología de la revolución mexicana (México: Ed. Era, 1973), esp. pp. 215, 247, 262.

[5]For an insightful and suggestive discussion of the relationships among political legitimacy (the belief that existing political arrangements are better than others that might be established, and that they therefore can demand obedience), efficacy (the capacity of a regime to find reasonably satisfactory solutions to basic problems), and effectiveness (the capacity actually to implement chosen policies to achieve the desired results) in democratic systems, see Juan J. Linz, "The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration," in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (eds.), The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 11-13, 16-23. For evidence of the relationship between government policy performance and political support for the government and the PRI, see Wayne A. Cornelius, Politics and the Migrant Poor in Mexico City (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press), pp. 56-57, 220, 222; and Charles L. Davis, "The Mobilization of Public Support for an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of the Lower Class in Mexico City," American Journal of Political Science, 20:4 (November 1976), 662. There is also some indication that the government channels resources to areas in which PRI electoral support has fallen; see Barry Ames, "Bases of Support for Mexico's Dominant Party," American Political Science Review, 64:1, 166.

[6]On the broader meaning and political significance of this concept, see Luis Medina, "Orígen y circunstancia de la idea de unidad nacional," in Centro de Estudios Internacionales (ed.), La vida política en México, 1970-73 (México: El Colegio de México, 1974), pp. 5-32.

[7]For analyses which emphasize the "demystifying" and "delegitimating" impact of the 1968 crisis, see Octavio Paz, op. cit., esp. pp. 242-247; Carlos Pereyra, "Estado y sociedad," in Pablo González Casanova and Enrique Florescano (eds.), México, hoy (México: Siglo XXI, 1979), pp. 289-305; and Manuel Moreno Sánchez, "Los signos de hoy," Excelsior, September 23, 1968, cited in Ramírez, op. cit., v. 1, pp. 24-25. Ramírez argues that the 1968 student movement specifically challenged a number of assumptions or "myths" of the Mexican revolution: the coincidence of labor and capital interests; the country's socioeconomic stability; the "intangibility" of the executive, legislative, and judicial powers; the veracity of the national press; the validity of "guided democracy"; the presumed independence of worker and peasant organizations; the existence of independent political parties within the federal legislature; and the authenticity of different representative groups and associations.

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[8]For CTM statements regarding the 1968 student movement, see Ramírez, op. cit., v. 2, pp. 214-220, 462-467.

[9]For an examination of Mexico's contemporary socioeconomic problems, see the collection of articles in González Casanova and Florescano (eds.), México, hoy, op. cit., especially those in "Segunda Parte: La sociedad, cambios y alternativas." See also John F. H. Purcell, "Mexican Social Issues," in Susan Kaufman Purcell (ed.), "Mexico-United States Relations," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 34:1 (1981), 43-54. On the urban middle class and the political problems it poses for the government and the PRI, see Francisco López Cámara, El desafío de la clase media (México: Ed. Joaquín Mortiz, 1973), and Arturo González Cosío, Clases medias y movilidad social en México (México: Ed. Extemporaneos, 1976).

[10]Several analyses of the 1977 political reform emphasize the 1976-1977 national economic crisis as a principal cause of the reform initiative; for example, see the statement by Luis Villoro in Comisión Federal Electoral, Reforma política (Mexico, 1978), v. 1, "Audiencias públicas," p. 186, and Francisco J. Paoli, "Posibilidades de la reforma política," Seminario de economía del sector público, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, October 1979, p. 46. For a discussion of the sense of national crisis prevailing at the end of the Echeverría administration, see Soledad Loaeza, "La política del rumor: México, noviembre-diciembre 1976," in Centro de Estudios Internacionales (ed.), Las crises en el sistema político mexicano, 1928-1977 (México: El Colegio de México, 1977), pp. 119-150, esp. pp. 136-145. See also Laurence Whitehead, "La política económica del sexenio de Echeverría: ¿qué salió mal y por qué?" Foro Internacional, 20:3 (January-March 1980), 484-513.

[11]Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), pp. 48, 64, 83.

[12]Cited in Rafael Segovia, Vuelta (August 1977); reproduced in Comisión Federal Electoral, La reforma política, op. cit., v. 2, "Comentarios," p. 506.

[13]Citizen demands presented to the PRI's presidential candidate during the course of his election campaign are compiled and classified (by region and by subject) by the PRI's Institute of Social, Economic, and Political Studies; they are subsequently published as La campaña presidencial en cifras. For a description of this demand-articulation process during election campaigns, see Patricia M. Richmond, "Mexico: A Case Study of One-Party Politics" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California-Berkeley, 1965), pp. 424-428. Writing in 1976, Coleman emphasized the "expressive utility" of the Mexican electoral process as "an opportunity to express allegiance to the party, to the revolution, and to the political community." He also called attention to the possible future problem of Mexican citizens' questioning the instrumental utility of the electoral process and the federal legislature; see Kenneth M. Coleman, Diffuse Support in Mexico: The Potential for Crisis, Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, #01-057 (1976), pp. 7, 23-24, 26-27, 30-32.

[14]Javier López Moreno, La reforma política en México (México: Centro de Documentación Política, 1979), pp. 181-182. The abstention rates for the interim years were: 1964 (33.3%), 1967 (37.4%), 1970 (35.0%), 1973 (36.2%).

[15]In addition to major urban areas such as Mexico City and the Federal District, guerrilla groups were active during the late 1960s and early 1970s in the states of Aguascalientes, Chiapas, Chihuahua, Guerrero, Jalisco, Nuevo León, Oaxaca, Sinaloa, Sonora, and Tabasco. There is no comprehensive study of the variety of different groups and organizations formed during this period, but for discussions of the guerrilla opposition, see Juan Miguel de Mora, Las guerrillas en México y Jenaro Vázquez Rojas (second ed.; México: Ed. Latino Americano, 1972), passim; Octavio Rodríguez Araujo, La reforma política y los partidos en México (third ed.; México: Siglo XXI, 1980), p. 98; Hellman, op. cit., pp. 125, 127, 173; Kenneth F. Johnson, Mexican Democracy: A Critical View (New York: Praeger, 1978), pp. 156-166. A partial listing of writings on the guerrilla phenomenon during this period appears in Miguel Aroche Parra, Los secuestros de Zuño, Figueroa y la muerte de Lucio Cabañas (México: Ed. Nacional de Publicaciones, 1976), p. 10. For comments by participants in one of the best-known urban guerrilla groups, the "Liga Comunista 23 de Septiembre," see Proceso, 108 (November 27, 1978), pp. 16-19; 109 (December 14, 1978), pp. 10-11. In addition to the areas indicated above, former members of the "Liga" maintain that there were also active guerrilla fronts in Baja California, Coahuila, Michoacán, and Tamaulipas; Proceso, 108 (November 27, 1978), p. 17.

[16]This list does not include several other smaller groups and factions representing opposition political forces, especially on the left. For a partial listing of such groups, see Rafael Junquera, La reforma política (Jalapa, Ver.: Universidad Veracruzana, 1979), p. 56; Manlio Fabio Murillo Soberanis, La reforma política mexicana y el sistema pluripartidista (México: Ed. Diana, 1973), pp. 186-189.

This list is drawn from Rodríguez Araujo, pp. 53, 96-97, 99, 168-187, 205, 234; López Moreno, pp. 262-277; Junquera, p. 46; Murillo Soberanis, pp. 106-117, 182-185. The PST was formally founded in 1975, but it was an active and politically identifiable entity by 1973. The PPM originated in a split within the Socialist Popular Party following the 1975 Nayarit gubernatorial elections. It was known as the "PPS Mayoritario" before its formal organization as the PPM in 1977.

[17]The PDM is the most recent political-party representation of the conservative, Catholic agrarian movement dating from the 1930s which has long been associated with the Unión Nacional Sinarquista. The PSR is a Marxist-Leninist political party. The PSR evolved from the Movimiento de Organización Socialista (MOS, Socialist Organization Movement), formed in 1974 by dissident members of the Partido Popular Socialista (PPS, Socialist Popular Party, 1948) and leaders of the 1968 student movement. The PRT is the Mexican affiliate of the IV Communist International (Trotskyist). The PST, while advancing such concepts as "scientific socialism" and "historical materialism," is more reformist in overall

orientation. It specifically advocates collaboration with liberal elements within the government and the PRI as part of a "popular revolutionary alliance"; for evidence of relatively close PST-government collaboration, see El Sol de México, June 17, 1977, and Proceso, 108 (November 27, 1978), pp. 30-31. The PMT also supports nationalist, progressive reform positions without advocating a Marxist-Leninist ideology. Until 1973, elements now constituting the PST and the PMT together formed the National Consultation and Coordination Committee ("Comité Nacional de Auscultación y Coordinación") organized in 1971 by former leaders of the 1958-1959 railroad worker strikes and the 1968 student movement. The UIC formed when a dissident faction separated from the Partido Comunista Mexicano (PCM, Mexican Communist Party, 1919 [the PCM is also of Marxist-Leninist orientation, although it is increasingly aligned with positions associated with Eurocommunism]) in 1973. The MAUS was organized among a heterogeneous group of political activists (including former PCM and PPS members) advocating nationalistic reforms. The PPM formed after a faction under the leadership of Alejandro Gascón Mercado separated from the PPS. The PPM has its principal support in Nayarit.

For summaries of these different organizations' political orientations and programs, see Murillo Soberanis, op. cit., pp. 106-117; Comisión Federal Electoral, Reforma política, op. cit., v. 2, "Comentarios," pp. 143-146; Tiempo, "La reforma política en acción; la compaña electoral 1979," May 21, June 18, July 2, 1979. On the historical development and role of the PCM, see Manuel Márquez Fuentes and Octavio Rodríguez Araujo, El partido comunista mexicano (México: Ed. El Caballito, 1973); Karl Schmitt, Communism in Mexico (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1965); Manuel Aguilar Mora, La crisis de la izquierda en México (México: Juan Pablos Editor, 1978).

[18] For comments on the PRI's internal problems by PRI loyalists, see Rodolfo Siller Rodríguez, La crisis del Partido Revolucionario Institucional (México: Ed. B. Costa-Amic, 1976), pp. 133-179, and Manuel Moreno Sánchez, "Crisis in the Political Structures," in Ross (ed.), op. cit., pp. 273-288.

[19] For programmatic statements by the PARM, PPS, and PAN, see Tiempo, "La reforma política en acción: la campaña electoral 1979," May 28, June 4, 11, 25, 1979. For more general discussions of the Mexican party system, see Vicente Fuentes Díaz, Los partidos políticos en México (México: Edición del autor, 1954), 2 vols.; Daniel Moreno, Los partidos políticos del México contemporaneo, 1916-1975 (5th ed.; México: Ed. B. Costa-Amic, 1975); López Moreno, op. cit., pp. 139-252; Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, Cincuenta años de oposición en México (México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1979).

[20] PRI candidates for congressional seats were also without opposition in some districts. The irony of an electoral campaign in which the PRI faced no recognized opposition presidential candidate is apparent in the November 15, 1975 speech with which José López Portillo initiated his election campaign; see Partido Revolucionario Institucional, Comisión Nacional Editorial, "Dos mensajes al partido," n.d., p. 4.

The growing abstentionist movement within the PAN centered on the party's 1970 presidential candidate, Efraín González Morfín, and apparently reflected the PAN's disillusionment with its defeat in fraudulent elections in Baja California, Sonora, and Yucatán in the 1960s. In 1976 the PAN failed to field a complete list of candidates for seats in the federal Chamber of Deputies, and the number of PAN "party deputies" (diputados de partido) declined from 25 in 1973 to 22 in 1976. For details on these developments, see Paoli, "Posibilidades...," op. cit., pp. 52-53, 63. On the historical development and political role of the PAN, see Soledad Loaeza "El Partido Acción Nacional: la oposición leal en México," pp. 101-125 in Centro de Estudios Internacionales, La vida política en México, 1970-1973 (México: El Colegio de México, 1974); Carlos Arriola, "El Partido Acción Nacional, origen y circunstancia," Foro Internacional, 16:2 (October-December 1975), pp. 233-251; and Franz A. von Sauer, The Alienated "Loyal" Opposition: Mexico's Partido Acción Nacional (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1974). On the 1975-1976 crisis that prevented the PAN from nominating a 1976 presidential candidate, see Carlos Arriola, "La crisis del Partido Acción Nacional (1975-1976)," in Centro de Estudios Internacionales, Las crisis..., op. cit., pp. 101-118. For a discussion of the more effective electoral competition offered by the PAN, PARM, and PPS at the local municipal level, see Paoli, "Posibilidades...," pp. 53-54.

Valentín Campa, a well-known member of the PCM and a long-time leader of the political opposition, opposed José López Portillo as the unregistered, "symbolic" opposition candidate in 1976. The Partido Femenino Mexicano (Mexican Feminist Party) also had a little-known candidate in the 1976 presidential elections; see Francisco J. Paoli, "Legislación electoral y proceso político," Jurídica (Universidad Iberoamericana, July 1978), pp. 63, 168 fn. 1.

[21]While the governing political elite could not have been happy with the growth in PAN electoral support and its emerging role as a "catchall" opposition party in the early 1970s (especially in the 1973 congressional elections), this development may have been perceived as less threatening to the overall health of the regime than increasing rates of voter abstention and the potential availability of citizens for mobilization by radical unincorporated opposition groups. For example, the PAN's very heterogeneous electoral support did not actively challenge the PRI's control over its labor and peasant bases. For evidence that defectors from the PRI do not necessarily become permanent supporters of opposition parties such as the PAN, see Coleman, op. cit., p. 39. The PRI's position on this issue was aptly summarized by Echeverría during his 1970 presidential campaign: "We prefer a vote for the opposition to an abstention"; quoted by Rafael Segovia, "La reforma política: el ejecutivo federal, el PRI y las elecciones de 1973," in Centro de Estudios Internacionales, La vida política en México, 1970-1973, op. cit., p. 58. In contrast, the radical left has often argued in favor of "active abstention" during PRI-dominated elections.

[22]Peter H. Smith, Mexico: The Quest for a U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Policy Association, 1980), p. 4. One Mexican political

analyst has argued that the selective nature of repression in Mexico is due to the state's long-term effort to maintain a broad social base, incorporating diverse elements into the established regime and thus permitting the state to maintain its own relative autonomy and mediative capacity; see Julio Labastida, "Proceso político y dependencia en México, 1970-1976," Revista mexicana de sociología, 39:1 (January-March 1977), 199.

[23]For discussions of Almazán's candidacy and evidence of fraud in the 1940 presidential election, see Ariel José Contreras, México 1940: industrialización y crisis política (México: Siglo XXI, 1977), esp. pp. 189-216; Martin C. Needler, Politics and Society in Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1971), p. 16, citing Emilio Portes Gil, Autobiografía de la revolución mexicana (México: Instituto Mexicano de Cultura, 1964), pp. 633-34; and James W. Wilkie and Edna Monzón de Wilkie, México visto en el siglo xx: entrevistas de historia oral (México: Instituto Mexicano de Investigaciones Económicas, 1969), p. 598. The official returns for the 1940 presidential election appear in González Casanova, op. cit., table 1, p. 231.

[24]These cases are discussed in Miguel Angel Granados Chapa, "Nayarit: consolidación del monopartido," in Centro de Estudios Internacionales, Las fronteras del control del estado mexicano (México: El Colegio de México, 1975), pp. 15-16.

[25]Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," op. cit., p. 266. For a specific example of cooptation as a regime political strategy, see Bo Anderson and James D. Cockcroft, "Control and Cooptation in Mexican Politics," International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 7 (March 1966), pp. 11-28.

[26]On political recruitment and elite rotation in Mexico, see Peter H. Smith, Labyrinths of Power: Political Recruitment in Twentieth-Century Mexico (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), esp. pp. 159-187.

[27]Luis Medina, Evolución electoral en el México contemporáneo (México: Comisión Federal Electoral, 1978) presents an excellent analysis of the historical evolution of the Mexican electoral system; see pp. 14-21 on the origin and content of the 1946 law. For additional discussion of the 1946 electoral reform, see Luis Villoro, "La reforma política y las perspectivas de democracia," in González Casanova and Florescano (eds.), op. cit., esp. pp. 349-350. On the historical evolution of Mexican electoral legislation in general, also see Paoli, "Legislación electoral...," op. cit., pp. 167-217.

[28]von Sauer, op. cit., pp. 82-85. The PAN had called for reform of the electoral law since 1942. It presented its first presidential candidate in 1952.

[29]Some twelve parties were formed under the 1946 electoral law; ten of them received official recognition. One indication of the regime's interest in channelling political opposition through electoral channels is the 1946 law's stipulation that while the normal national minimum party

membership was 30,000 members, a transitory article set this minimum level at 10,000 for the 1946 elections only (with at least 300 members in each of at least two-thirds of the states): Rodríguez Araujo, op. cit., p. 42, fn. 39. See also Comisión Federal Electoral, Legislación electoral mexicana, 1812-1977, compiled by Antonio García Orozco (México, 1978), pp. 336, 338, 361-362.

[30]For details on these earlier electoral laws and constitutional reforms, see López Moreno, op. cit., pp. 62-68. Party-membership modifications introduced by the 1954 reform are discussed in Comisión Federal Electoral, Legislación electoral..., op. cit., p. 430. The 1946 membership requirements were not changed in 1949 and 1951. Women's suffrage was introduced in 1953.

[31]Rodríguez Araujo, op. cit., p. 42. Official registration of Henríquez Guzmán's leftist Federation of Parties of the Mexican People ("Federación de Partidos del Pueblo Mexicano") was cancelled under the terms of the 1954 law; Olga Pellicer de Brody, "La oposición en México: el caso del henriquismo," in Centro de Estudios Internacionales, Las crisis..., op. cit., pp. 31-45.

[32]For data showing these parties' declining Chamber representation 1955-1961, see López Moreno, op. cit., p. 69.

[33]This subsidy was not applicable to parties--i.e., the PRI--winning the majority of votes in 20 or more electoral districts; Congreso de la Unión, Cámara de Diputados, L Legislatura, Los derechos del pueblo mexicano; México a través de sus constituciones (México: Manuel Porrua, 1978), v. 6, pp. 9, 43, 57. These minority-party deputies were elected at large rather than from specific districts (Art. 127[ii]) in order to avoid internal tensions within the PRI that would have resulted had PRI candidates been displaced in order to provide seats for minority party candidates; see Needler, op. cit., p. 32; Comisión Federal Electoral, Legislación electoral..., op. cit., p. 440.

[34]López Moreno, op. cit., p. 72.

[35]Segovia, "La reforma política...1973," op. cit., pp. 53-54; Medina, "Evolución electoral..., op. cit., p. 38; Congreso de la Unión, Los derechos..., op. cit., v. 12, p. 189. Only the PAN ever achieved this maximum number of 25 party deputies, and it succeeded in doing so only in 1973; in 1976 its total fell to 22. Under the 1973 electoral reform, each party was also required to have a minimum of 25 affiliates in at least half of the municipal districts in the states in which it met the 2,000-affiliate minimum. This additional distribution requirement apparently posed major problems for parties other than the PRI; see Paoli, "Las posibilidades...," op. cit., pp. 62-63; Medina, p. 40. On the 1973 electoral reform and its consequences, see Segovia, "La reforma política...1973." The same 1972 constitutional reforms lowered the minimum age for deputies from 25 to 21, and for senators from 35 to 30. In January 1970 Díaz Ordaz had lowered the legal voting age from 21 to 18; see Comisión Federal Electoral, Legislación electoral..., op. cit., p. 444.

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[36]I am grateful to Albert Hirschman for his suggestions on this point.

[37]This document revived an earlier tradition, embodied in party plans published in 1933 and 1939, of outlining the presumed priorities of the incoming presidential administration. For comments on these earlier "national plans," see Daniel Cosío Villegas, La sucesión: desenlace y perspectivas (México: Ed. Joaquín Mortiz, 1979), p. 45.

[38]Partido Revolucionario Institucional, Plan Básico de Gobierno, 1976-82 (México, 1975), pp. 8, 14. However, opposition political parties were mentioned specifically only in connection with the creation of a special commission in the Chamber of Deputies to investigate the violation of public liberties and political rights; ibid., p. 14.

[39]On Reyes Heroles' role in the formulation of the 1975 Plan Básico de Gobierno, see Cosío Villegas, La sucesión..., op. cit., pp. 44-45, 81.

[40]In addition to Reyes Heroles, there were a number of other cabinet officials within the López Portillo government at this time who apparently supported the political reform project, including José Andrés Oteyza (Minister of National Property and Industrial Development), Emilio Mújica Montoya (Minister of Communications and Transportation), and Carlos Tello Macías (Minister of the Presidency). They were joined by old-line cardenistas (especially in the PRI-affiliated National Peasants Confederation and the ministries of agriculture and agrarian reform) and echeverristas in support of the measure. However, given the heterogeneity of the PRI--especially its "popular" or middle-class sector (the National Confederation of Popular Organizations, CNOP)--it is otherwise difficult to identify any single group or faction within the PRI that actively backed the political reform, except in terms of major individual political leaders and their personal orientation toward the political reform.

[41]See, for example, López Portillo's October 5, 1975 speech accepting the PRI candidacy, in which he promises to continue Echeverría's policy of dialogue, criticism, and apertura as outlined in the party's 1976-1982 Plan Básico de Gobierno; Partido Revolucionario Institucional, Comisión Nacional Editorial, "Tenemos un camino," p. 9.

[42]Pablo González Casanova has argued that the goal of "social democratic" elements within the government was to prevent a drift toward fascism by recognizing political parties aligned with the "immediate and historical interests of the working class" through a political reform. In this way, the political reform was to be part of a general effort to construct social democracy in Mexico; see his La reforma política y sus perspectivas (México: Comisión Federal Electoral, 1979), pp. 11-12, 14.

[43]Reyes Heroles' address is reproduced in Comisión Federal Electoral, Reforma política, op. cit., v. 1, "Audiencias públicas," pp. xi-xiii. López Portillo, reviewing the first year of his administration, also referred to the need to direct political differences through institutional

channels in order to preserve existing political structures and establish a "new consensus"; ibid., v. 3, "Reformas a la constitución," pp. 7-9.

[44]See, for example, the highly accurate predictions which political columnist Manuel Buendía offered shortly thereafter regarding the likely future shape of the political reform law; El Sol de México, April 17, 1977, reproduced in Comisión Federal Electoral, Reforma política, op. cit., v. 2, "Comentarios," pp. 86-89.

[45]Ibid., v. 1, "Comentarios," p. xvi.

[46]Twelve public hearings were held between April 28 and July 21, 1977. In addition to the political groups and parties that appeared during these sessions, the CFE interviewed some 70 individuals and representatives of professional organizations and educational institutions in order to solicit their opinions regarding the political reform. Written opinions were also submitted to the CFE. In addition, the government sent delegations abroad to examine other electoral systems. These delegations were especially interested in studying electoral procedures and representation arrangements in countries such as Belgium, France, and Germany. For further details, see Antonio Martínez Báez and Iván Zavala, Ensayos sobre la reforma política, II (México: Comisión Federal Electoral, 1978), pp. 9-12, 33-35, 38. In addition to the MAUS, PCM, PDM, PMT, PRT, PST, PSR, and UIC, the following unregistered groups and parties also appeared at the CFE hearings: Partido Laboral Mexicano (PLM, Mexican Labor Party), Partido Obrero Agrario Mexicano (POAM, Mexican Agrarian-Worker Party), Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR, Revolutionary Worker Party). The PAN, PARM, PPS, and PRI also made appearances at the CFE hearings. Of the principal opposition groups, only the PPM did not make an appearance. Complete transcripts of presentations made to the CFE by all groups, parties, institutions, and individuals appear in Comisión Federal Electoral, Reforma política, op. cit., v. 1, "Audiencias públicas," pp. 1-334.

[47]The various parties' positions on these different issues are summarized in López Moreno, op. cit., pp. 80-111. One partial exception to this conclusion concerns the September 28, 1978 political amnesty enacted by the López Portillo government. This action was apparently taken in response to numerous comments by opposition parties regarding the need for such a measure if the political reform process were to be genuinely democratic. The amnesty applied to all those political prisoners whose political dissent did not involve physical attacks on other individuals, terrorism, or kidnapping; López Moreno, op. cit., pp. 22-25.

[48]For a representative selection of opposition groups' comments on the relative merits of the political reform, see La reforma política y la izquierda (México: Ed. Nuestro Tiempo, 1979).

[49]These parties were joined by the already-registered PAN in their call for a more fundamental "political" reform. The PAN sought an extensive revision of voter registration lists as one means of reducing electoral fraud. The PAN proposed automatic voter registration in the form of a national identity card, and it called for an end to the PRI's close government ties.

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[50]As previously indicated, this effort to maintain a rough balance among recognized opposition forces is a continuing theme in Mexican politics. The government's handling of a request by the PDM for official recognition in 1975 also exemplifies this: in denying the PDM's petition, government representatives apparently argued that at the time there was no leftist party to balance an officially-registered PDM in the national political spectrum; see Rodríguez Araujo, op. cit., p. 170, fn. 6.

[51]Several interpretations have been offered regarding the PMT's decision not to take part in the 1979 elections. Some PMT leaders have argued that the party's aggressive public criticism of the government's national petroleum policy (especially the government's controversial decision to build a natural gas pipeline to the U.S.-Mexican border to facilitate gas exports) resulted in purposeful efforts by conservative elements within the regime to exclude it from the political reform process by altering the registration requirements for political parties. While the reform initiative originally offered registration to all parties formed at least three years previously, this requirement was later increased to four years (Art. 32, iii)--thus disqualifying the PMT, which was formally organized in 1974. The PMT apparently sought an alliance with the PAN and the PCM to overturn this revision by threatening a joint boycott of the reform process, but this strategy failed as it became clear that the PAN and PCM were unwilling to boycott the reform in support of the PMT's demand. Reyes Heroles apparently offered the PMT his support as president of the Federal Electoral Commission (CFE) in backing the broadest possible interpretation of the new requirement. This would potentially have allowed the PMT to participate in the 1979 elections as a result of having engaged in at least one year of general political activity before its formal founding. But the PMT leadership turned this offer down, preferring to assume a position of principle and perhaps fearing that their formal registration petition would be turned down even with Reyes Heroles' support before the CFE. Other observers have argued that this debate regarding recognition requirements offered the PMT a pretext by which to avoid further internal division regarding participation in the reform process--although some analysts doubt that there was agreement within the PMT leadership even on this position. Some observers stress that as a result of the personal political experiences of the principal PMT leaders--Heberto Castillo (founder and secretary general of the PMT) and Demetrio Vallejo (leader of the 1958-1959 railroad worker strikes and secretary of organization for the PMT) had both served long prison sentences for previous opposition political activities--the party was reluctant to take part in a reform measure which offered anything less than fundamental political change, since PMT participation in it might contribute to the legitimacy of limited political reform.

[52]The reform law allowed a party to seek definitive registry either (a) by validating at least 3,000 party members in each of at least half of the states, or (b) by showing at least 300 affiliates in each of at least half of all single-member electoral districts (150 of 300 districts) for a minimum national membership of 65,000. This party membership distribution was to be notarized in a series of state or local assemblies called for that purpose. See Comisión Federal Electoral, Ley federal de organizaciones políticas y procesos electorales (Mexico, 1978), articles 27-28.

[53]This section is based largely on interviews conducted in Mexico City in June-July 1980.

[54]Needler, op. cit., pp. 26-27; Medina, op. cit., pp. 20-25.

[55]Madrazo was forced to resign his position in November 1965. For details on this episode, see Proceso, 121 (February 26, 1979), pp. 6-9; Needler, op. cit., pp. 33-35; Hansen, op. cit., pp. 123-124, 127; Padgett, op. cit., pp. 83-84, 86-89.

[56]Comisión Federal Electoral, Reforma política, op. cit., v. 5, "Comentarios," p. 471. For one expression of CTM concerns on this issue and its opposition to the possibility that "party conflict be transmitted indiscriminately into the internal life (al seno) of unions," see the summary of the CMT's XC National Council meeting presented in Carlos Sánchez Cárdenas, Reforma política: estrategia y táctica (México: Ed. Extemporáneos, 1979), p. 155.

[57]For evidence of Romo's support of the political reform, see El Día, February 26, 1979, pp. 1, 6, 7, and Crítica política, 4 (May 15, 1980), p. 17.

[58]Carlos Tello, "La disputa por la nación," Nexos, 3 (1980), p. 3.

[59]El Día, February 26, 1979, p. 7; Confederación de Trabajadores de México, Memoria, Reunión Nacional para la Reforma Económica, 1978, pp. 15-16, 202-210, 219-223.

[60]See, for example, El Día, February 26, 1979, p. 6.

[61]The PRI leadership took a very different position vis-à-vis the 1973 political reform--actively supporting Echeverría's initiative--when Reyes Heroles had been president of the party's national executive committee. For details, see Segovia, "La reforma política...," op. cit., pp. 56-57. Sansores Pérez was replaced by Gustavo Carbajal Moreno on February 8, 1979.

[62]Paoli, "Posibilidades...," op. cit., pp. 53-54, 73, and "Legislación electoral...," op. cit., pp. 195-196.

[63]Comisión Federal Electoral, Reforma política, op. cit., v. 1, "Audiencias públicas," pp. 81-83, 85.

[64]Comisión Federal Electoral, Reforma política, op. cit., v. 3, "Reformas a la constitución," p. 8. According to article 40 of the reform law, conditionally registered parties can only participate in federal elections. However, after 1979 opposition parties which won their definitive registry would be free to participate in elections at all levels. As of February 1979, 26 states had adopted legislation extending minority-party representation to state legislatures and municipal governments (ayuntamientos). Five of the remaining six states had begun the reform process. Of those 26 states, 24 chose a system basically

similar to that adopted at the national level (that is, a system in which opposition-party proportional-representation seats are a minority of all legislative seats). The states of San Luis Potosí and Veracruz chose a system which gave special weight to proportional representation and produced a more balanced representation of opposition parties in the state legislature. For details, see Jesús Reyes Heroles, "La reforma política y sus repercusiones en los estados," Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública, Cuadernos, 18 (1979), p. 13.

[65]The question of "party senators" had also been debated and rejected by the federal legislature in December 1966; Tiempo, February 26, 1979, pp. 3-4.

[66]It is unlikely, of course, that either of these two groups speaks with one voice on issues such as the political reform. Individual military officers or businessmen may have been active opponents or proponents of the political reform measure. The observations offered in the text generalize regarding the participation of these actors on the basis of information gathered in interviews in Mexico City in June-July 1980.

[67]The contemporary political role of the Mexican armed forces remains an understudied subject. For general treatments, see David F. Ronfeldt, "The Mexican Army and Political Order Since 1940," in James W. Wilkie, et. al. (eds.), Contemporary Mexico (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 317-336; Jorge A. Lozano, El ejército mexicano (second ed.; México: El Colegio de México, 1976), pp. 103-126, and González Casanova, op. cit., pp. 50-52. Smith, Labyrinths of Power, op. cit., p. 122, presents data regarding military officers' political mobility during the 1946-1971 period. For a critical analysis of the constitutional provisions and practical measures regulating the Mexican military, see Elisur Arteaga Nava, "Las conjuraciones: una interpretación política de la constitución," Revista de Investigaciones Jurídicas (Escuela Libre de Derecho), 2:2 (México, 1978), esp. pp. 167-184. This "consultative arrangement" also appears to characterize the contemporary participatory role of the Catholic Church hierarchy regarding major political decisions in Mexico. See González Casanova, op. cit., pp. 53-62, on the general role of the Church and religious organizations in the Mexican political system.

[68]New York Times, October 10, 1980, p. 23. While it is quite possible that considerable military modernization will occur in the future, for obvious political reasons there is likely to be considerable resistance within the regime to an expansion in the size of the armed forces.

[69]Ronfeldt, op. cit., pp. 292-293.

[70]For statements from the magazine Impacto reflecting some business-sector orientations and positions regarding the political reform (ranging from questions regarding its true significance and concern about additional "fiction" parties, to support for López Portillo's "democratic initiatives"), see Comisión Federal Electoral, Reforma política, op. cit., v. 2; "Comentarios," pp. 12-13, 125-126, 173-174, 246-249. For discussions

of the private sector's role in Mexican politics, see Vernon, op. cit.; Kaufman Purcell, op. cit.; González Casanova, La democracia..., op. cit., pp. 64-70; Susan Kaufman Purcell, "Business-Government Relations in Mexico: The Case of the Sugar Industry," Comparative Politics, 13:2 (January 1981), pp. 211-233; and Carlos Arriola, "Los grupos empresariales frente al Estado (1973-1975)," in Centro de Estudios Internacionales, Las fronteras del estado mexicano, op. cit., pp. 33-81.

[71] López Moreno, op. cit., pp. 115-117. See González Casanova, La democracia..., op. cit., pp. 29-33 on executive-legislative relations in Mexico.

As one reflection of the effective centralization of Mexican politics by the regime's "official" political party, the Mexican federal legislature has been dominated by the executive since the early 1930s. For example, between 1935 and 1964 no Chamber of Deputies approved less than 59.2% of presidential legislative initiatives by unanimity. During the 1935-1941 period, 100% of these initiatives were approved unanimously, and the average for the entire 1935-1964 period is an astonishing 85.6%. Since 1935 no presidential legislative initiative has been rejected by the Chamber of Deputies. For legislative initiatives approved by majority, opposition votes exceeded 5% of those cast only twice between 1935 and 1964 (5.3% in 1955 and 12.1% in 1964). Opposition votes against legislative initiatives averaged 4.3% of total votes during the 1943-1964 period. Most important presidential legislative initiatives were approved unanimously; see González Casanova, La democracia..., op. cit., p. 32 and table 4, p. 235. Several factors contributed to executive dominance over the federal Chamber of Deputies: the reduction of the Chamber's annual working sessions from two to one and the shortening of each session; the prohibition of deputies' consecutive reelection, thus increasing the number of new and inexperienced legislators and undermining their potential autonomy; and the executive's tendency to submit legislative proposals late in the session, so that they must be approved without extensive debate. See Manuel Moreno Sánchez, "Crisis in the Political Structures," in Ross (ed.), op. cit., pp. 273-288, esp. pp. 283-284. One recent exception to the Chamber's historically subordinate role that preceded the entry of new opposition deputies into the federal legislature was the 1978 debate on a nuclear energy law. The measure was debated in the Chamber over a period of eleven months, and the Chamber held ten public hearings and five public legislative sessions concerning the measure. The Chamber eventually introduced substantial modifications in the presidential legislative initiative that had already been approved by the federal Senate; see Rodríguez Araujo, op. cit., p. 51, fn. 55.

[72] These first two modifications concerned articles 18 and 68. The CFE determines the number of dual candidacies each opposition party can field prior to each election; see footnote 76. Zavala, op. cit., p. 44; Paoli, "Legislacion electoral...," op. cit., pp. 211-212; interviews in Mexico City, June-July 1980. The PAN's deputies voted against the political reform bill in the Chamber of Deputies, calling it "confusing,

contradictory, and insufficient." The PAN also argued that specific sections of the political reform measure were directed against it: (a) suspension or cancellation of a party's registry when its elected deputies refuse to participate in the Chamber of Deputies (as PAN deputies had done in 1958 to protest the PRI's fraudulent conduct of elections), when the party withdraws its representatives from the Federal Electoral Commission, or when party deputies refuse to participate in the electoral college (article 247); (b) the requirement that each registered political party present candidates in at least 100 single-member electoral districts (article 166[b]). The PAN also abstained from CFE approval of the political reform's reglamento (implementing regulations), and PAN and PPS deputies on the relevant Chamber commission refused to approve the political reform initiative before it went to the full Chamber. The PAN had similarly opposed the 1963 "party deputy" legislation. See Junquera, op. cit., p. 207; López Moreno, op. cit., p. 13; Medina, op. cit., pp. 30-31; Excelsior, December 20, 1977, p. 1, 10; El Día, December 20, 1977, p. 6. Texts of the Chamber of Deputies and Senate debates appear in Comisión Federal Electoral, Reforma política, op. cit., v. 4, "Ley federal de organizaciones políticas y procesos electorales," pp. 45-311. Prior to the formal passage of the political reform measure, Articles 6, 41, 51-55, 60-61, 70, 73-74, 76, 93, 97, and 115 of the Mexican constitution were reformed. The reform of constitutional article 41 established political parties as constitutionally-guaranteed entities for the first time; see also LOPPE article 21.

[73]The reform law and its implementing legislation are reproduced in Comisión Federal Electoral, Ley federal de organizaciones políticas y procesos electorales (Mexico, 1978).

[74]Arts. 19, 22, 27, 32 (2,3), 34. While the 1977 reform lowered the number of states in which a party seeking its registration must demonstrate a minimum membership (from two-thirds to half of all states), it increased the minimum required membership in each state from 2,000 to 3,000.

[75]Arts. 50-54, 56, 60-67.

[76]Art. 3. The CFE retains the right to determine in January of the year in which an election is to be held the number of candidates per party that can compete in both single-member districts and party-list circumscriptions (article 18). The CFE limited this number of 40 in the 1979 congressional elections. The CFE can also choose between two proportional-representation formulae for any given election, either a Hare-Andrae "simple electoral coefficient" system or a Hagenbach-Bischof "corrected electoral coefficient" system. See Pericles Namorado Urrutia, "Teoría y práctica de los sistemas electorales," pp. 27-28, in Rafael Corrales Ayala and Pericles Namorado Urrutia, Ensayos sobre la reforma política III (México: Comisión Federal Electoral, 1979), for a discussion of these different systems and their probable electoral consequences, especially pp. 62-78. This dual electoral system, combining single-member districts and party-list circumscriptions, generally approximates the West German system; see Medina, Evolución electoral..., op. cit., p. 46.

[77]Article 166(b) and constitutional article 54(ii), respectively. According to the reformed constitutional article 54(4), if two or more parties participating in party-list circumscriptions win a total of 90 or more seats in single-member districts, only 50 Chamber of Deputies seats are to be distributed according to proportional representation. This represents a further safeguard against total opposition representation in the Chamber.

[78]Arts. 37-39, 49, 106, 141, 143, 151.

[79]Reglamento articles 52-58.

[80]Arts. 48-49; Reglamento Arts. 34-45, 48, 51; Paoli, "Legislación electoral...," op. cit., pp. 194, 203.

[81]Arts. 18, 78, 226, 237, 239-241. The CFE membership consists of: the Minister of the Interior (president); one deputy and one senator chosen by each legislative body; one representative from each recognized political party; and one notary (secretary) named by the CFE itself (article 78). The government can thus count on the votes of the CFE president, both legislative representatives (chosen by PRI-dominated bodies), the CFE secretary, and parties such as the PRI, PARM, and PDM. After the 1979 elections, this arrangement would give the government at least a 7-4 voting majority. The CFE is no longer required to take demographic representation into consideration in establishing electoral districts. The total number is set at 300, and the CFE is responsible for periodic redistricting; art. 82(7-9). For additional comments on the CFE's expanded powers, see Villoro, op. cit., pp. 357-358. The LOPPE also eliminated previous electoral laws' penalty for failing to vote or to register to vote (up to a 300-peso fine or six months in jail under article 188 of the 1973 electoral law). While this penalty was never effectively enforced, opposition parties maintained that it intimidated a depoliticized citizenry that sought to avoid any possible penalty for "opposition" political activity. The elimination of the penalty was perceived as removing an obstacle to minority parties' organizational activities; Villoro, p. 356.

[82]The PRT and UIC were registered by the CFE as "national political associations." They joined two previously registered groups, "Unificación y Progreso" and "Acción Comunitaria," in this category. Ten other groups petitioned the CFE unsuccessfully for this status. "Unión y Progreso" is a quasi-Masonic group which is internally divided between pro- and anti-PRI factions. "Acción Comunitaria" is Christian Democratic in orientation. For additional details on these groups, see Proceso, 109 (December 4, 1978), pp. 26-27; López Moreno, op. cit., pp. 262-284.

[83]Punto Crítico, 100 (July 1979), pp. 8-9; Comercio Exterior de México, 25:8 (August 1979), p. 281; Proceso, 137 (June 18, 1979), pp. 8-9.

[84]Rafael Segovia, "Las elecciones federales de 1979," Foro Internacional, 79 (January-March 1980), 398.

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[85]Actual election returns by state are not available for the 1967-1976 period. Given the available data, it is possible to detect significant change in the level of PRI electoral support over time only when movement from one percentage category to another occurs; see Table 2. The analysis of the 1979 election returns in this section of the essay is based on an examination of the returns from 230 (76.7%) of the 300 single-member electoral districts presented in Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados, LI Legislatura, v. 1, nos. 1-12. The electoral returns in the states of Sinaloa, Tamaulipas, Yucatán, and Zacatecas are somewhat incomplete, and one should use caution in drawing conclusions regarding party performance in these areas on the basis of the available information.

[86]See the statements by López Portillo in Comisión Federal Electoral, Reforma política, op. cit., v. 3, p. 8, and Iván Zavala, "¿Qué es y adónde va la reforma política?" in Antonio Martínez Báez and Iván Zavala, Ensayos sobre la reforma política II, op. cit., p. 32.

[87]For evidence of internal PRI dissension regarding the arbitrariness of candidate selection for the 1979 congressional elections, see Proceso, 123 (March 12, 1979), p. 9. On the problems created by the increasingly "technocratic" orientation of PRI candidates and the party's intention to diversify candidates' political experience, see Proceso, 92 (August 7, 1978), pp. 18-21, and Excelsior, July 9, 1980, p. 4.

[88]Calculations based on Cámara de Diputados internal rosters; n=185 (of 193) for 1976, and n=291 (of 296) for 1979.

[89]The PAN's electoral success in Nuevo León was strengthened by the fact that its candidate for state governor, José Angel Conchello, led a vigorous campaign there during the 1979 elections. The PAN also benefitted from internal divisions within the state PRI organization in 1979 and the overall weakness of the PCM in Nuevo León; Segovia, "Las elecciones...," op. cit., p. 403.

[90]Ibid., pp. 403-404.

[91]The PARM officially won 5.7% of the vote in Oaxaca. However, this statewide average is largely due to the 35.7% of the total vote it received in District 7. This result was almost certainly fraudulent. During debates in the Chamber of Deputies concerning the 1979 election results, the PPS charged the PARM with fraudulently inflating its vote totals in this district; Diario de los Debates, op. cit., v. 1, no. 12, p. 19. Not only was this result far higher than the PARM's reported support in any other district in the country, but it was also out of line with the PARM's overall performance in Oaxaca. The PARM failed to present candidates in five of the ten electoral districts in the state, including the district which included the state's more accessible capital city.

[92]The two parties' unfilled candidacies were distributed regionally as follows (as percent of total districts in each region): (a) PDM: Pacific North, 33.3%; North, 0%; Center, 3.3%; Gulf, 25.0%; Pacific South,

41.9%; (b) PARM: Pacific North, 22.2%; North, 9.1%; Center, 31.8%; Gulf, 47.2%; Pacific South, 61.3%; Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados, LI Legislatura, v. 1, nos. 1-12. The PPS cancelled its candidates in District 4, Morelos.

[93]Segovia, "Las elecciones...," op. cit., p. 404.

[94]Ibid., pp. 400-403, 405-407. For PAN statements confirming this consequence of the political reform, see Razones, 31 (March 9-22, 1981), p. 14.

[95]For an example of competition among opposition parties for the same basic constituency in Oaxaca's District 8, see Diario de los Debates, op. cit., v. 1, no. 2, p. 19.

[96]This paragraph draws on interviews conducted in Mexico City, June-July 1980. Of those opposition parties participating in the 1979 elections, only the PAN refused to accept material support of this kind. However, the PAN did accept free access to television and radio time.

[97]Rodríguez Araujo, op. cit., pp. 98-99, argues that the PCM issued a call for "unity of action" by leftist forces in October 1974 and sought to coordinate specific leftist actions thereafter. Aroche Parra, op. cit., pp. 194-201, reproduces a joint declaration by the PMT, PCM, MOS (later the PSR), and MAUS dated April 1975. The "Democratic Tendency" ("Tendencia Democrática") was a coalition of labor and student groups headed by the sections of the national electrical workers' union led by Rafael Galván; for additional details, see Raúl Trejo Delarbre, "Cronología de la Tendencia Democrática, 1960-1978," Siempre, 1319 (special section) (October 4, 1978).

[98]For examples of cooperation among leftist political organizations in the selection of candidates for the 1979 elections in Hidalgo's District 2 and Guerrero's District 10, see Diario de los Debates, op. cit., v. 1, no. 4, pp. 8 and 35, respectively.

[99]Segovia, "Las elecciones...," op. cit., p. 398; interviews conducted in Mexico City in June-July 1980.

[100]For analyses of the structure and operation of PRI politics in rural areas, see Roger Bartra, et al., Caciquismo y poder político en el México rural (2nd ed.; México: Siglo XXI, 1976), and Frans J. Schryer, Faccionalismo y patronazgo del PRI en un municipio de la huasteca hidalguense, Cuadernos del CES, no. 16 (México: El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Sociológicos, 1976). The PRI also apparently sought to protect its rural bases through the CFE's redistricting of certain areas for the 1979 elections. For example, formerly urban electoral zones in Puebla (Puebla) and Culiacán (Sinaloa) were combined with rural areas in 1979; Segovia, "Las elecciones...," op. cit., p. 408.

[101]The existing electoral rolls were compiled in 1964. In 1973, 52 of the 196 electoral districts had more voters registered than eligible

resident citizens; in 1976 there were 32 such districts; see Segovia, "Las elecciones...," op. cit., p. 398. The electoral rolls were reduced from 29 million names to 27.6 million names before the 1979 elections; Comercio Exterior de México, 25:8 (August 1979), p. 281; Unomásuno, June 16, 1979, n.p. Yet the 1980 updating of voter registration lists in Aguascalientes resulted in a reduction of 23.3% of the names on the electoral rolls; Excelsior, July 13, 1980, p. 1.

[102] Opposition parties and groups also formulated 12 complaints regarding the conduct of elections in a total of 11 party-list districts. No election results were ruled invalid in part or as a whole as a result of these charges. These cases are not included in the text's analysis of electoral fraud charges in the 1979 elections. See Diario de los Debates, op. cit., v. 1, no. 13, pp. 5-6, 16.

[103] Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados, LI Legislatura, v. 1, no. 10, pp. 46, 48-51, 53-54.

[104] Ibid., no. 5, p. 26; no. 5, p. 7; and no. 5, pp. 38-39, respectively.

[105] Ibid., no. 3, pp. 15, 17.

[106] The data in this section are based on charges of electoral fraud made in the course of the Chamber of Deputies' formal review and approval of the 1979 election results. It is possible that some of these charges were inaccurate or motivated by partisan political considerations. However, given the extremely small number of cases in which election results were actually annulled due to fraudulent activities, political party charges of electoral fraud probably provide a better overall indication of the incidence of fraud than an analysis of these few cases would. Although opposition parties often encountered considerable difficulty in substantiating fraudulent activities, observers' general observations regarding continued extensive corruption in the Mexican electoral process give considerable credibility to the charges made by different political parties.

[107] If one compares each region's share of all electoral fraud charges made by political parties (n=207; see Table 8) to that region's share of total single-member electoral districts, the index values change slightly: Pacific North, 1.71; Pacific South, 1.41; North, 1.11; Center, 0.84; Gulf, 0.57. However, the rank order of the different regions remains the same.

[108] For example, see the evidence of probable PARM vote fraud cited in footnote 91.

[109] The six electoral fraud charges made by the PRI concerned Chiapas, district 6; Colima, district 1; Mexico, district 23; Nuevo León, district 10; Sonora, district 1; Tamaulipas, district 1. For details of these charges, see Diario de los Debates, op. cit., v. 1, no. 8, p. 8; no. 4, pp. 5-6; no. 11, pp. 17-18; no. 11, pp. 59-60; no. 5, p. 54; no. 10, p. 9, respectively.

[110]The LOPPE provides a political organization with six different, progressively broad means by which to question or dispute the conduct of the electoral process: it can express inconformity ("inconformidad") with the electoral rolls; it can file a protest ("protesta") with the poll committee or with the district election commission within 72 hours after the polls close concerning the election results; it can file a complaint ("queja") with the district electoral commission regarding district-level electoral results within 24 hours after their announcement; it can request the revocation ("revocación") of the findings of state or district electoral commissions or the Federal Electoral Commission; it can request a revision ("revisión") of presumed legal violations occurring in the process of reviewing the dispute in question; or it can file a reclamation ("reclamación") before the Supreme Court. For details, see Section 5, chapters 1-2, especially articles 225-231 of the LOPPE and its Reglamento, chapter 7, sections B, C, especially articles 137-139, 140-143. The 1973 electoral reform (article 103) also made provisions for political parties to challenge electoral results.

[111]For examples of opposition party charges that PRI-government collaboration inhibited honest elections, see the comments regarding the following electoral districts in Diario de los Debates, op. cit.: Baja California #3 (no. 7, p. 24), Chiapas #5 (no. 12, p. 10), Chihuahua #4 (no. 9, p. 56), Distrito Federal #1 (no. 2, p. 72), Distrito Federal #28 (no. 11, p. 8), Guerrero #10 (no. 4, p. 43), México #12 (no. 9, p. 32), México #20 (no. 11, p. 16), Michoacán #9 (no. 5, pp. 38, 44), Morelos #4 (no. 2, pp. 49-50), Oaxaca #3 (no. 4, p. 24), Oaxaca #9 (no. 9, p. 36), Oaxaca #10 (no. 11, p. 50), Puebla #5 (no. 8, pp. 13-14), San Luis Potosí #7 (no. 8, p. 48).

[112]For these three examples from the Federal District, see Diario de los Debates, op. cit., v. 1, no. 8, p. 24; no. 11, pp. 8, 12; no. 6, p. 51, respectively.

[113]Ibid., v. 1, no. 9, p. 57. For other specific examples of the difficulty in compiling adequate evidence regarding electoral fraud, see comments regarding the following electoral districts in ibid.; Guerrero #10 (no. 4, p. 43), Hidalgo #2 (no. 4, pp. 10-11), México #12 (no. 9, p. 32), Morelos #4 (no. 2, pp. 49-50), Nuevo León #9 (no. 8, pp. 35-36), San Luis Potosí #4 (no. 3, pp. 15, 17).

[114]This paragraph draws on information found in Diario de los Debates, op. cit., v. 1, nos. 1-12.

[115]In Guanajuato's District 5, Level I violations were specified and type D and E actions resulted; in Veracruz' District 18, Level I violations were specified and a type E action resulted.

[116]The PARM won two of these seats by majority decisions over PRI candidates; see Medina, Evolución electoral..., op. cit., p. 41.

[117]The Hagenbach-Bischof "corrected coefficient" (coeficiente rectificado) formula was used by the CFE rather than the Hare-Andrae "simple

proportion" (proporción integral) formula. Had the latter formula been employed, the distribution of proportional-representation seats in the Chamber of Deputies would have been: PAN, 43; PCM, 20; PPS, 11; PARM, 9; PST, 9; PDM, 8; see Segovia, "Las elecciones...," op. cit., pp. 409-410. Thus the PARM received more Chamber seats than the PPS and the PST even though it received a smaller share of the national vote in party-list districts. The PARM was accused of electoral fraud in the proportional representation voting in two districts which may have improved its overall showing in the distribution of Chamber seats. In Tamaulipas' District 2, the PARM was credited with 403 votes in the simple majority voting and 10,425 votes in the proportional-representation voting. Similarly, in Veracruz' District 11 the PARM received 5,832 votes in the simple majority voting and 23,356 votes in the proportional-representation voting. The great discrepancy between vote totals in the same district suggests that the proportional-representation vote may have been fraudulently inflated so as to increase the PARM's share of proportional-representation Chamber seats. See Diario de los Debates, op. cit., no. 13, n.p. 16.

[118]On opposition representation in the Chamber of Deputies before 1929, see Lajous, op. cit., pp. 28-30, and González Casanova, La democracia..., op. cit., p. 30.

[119]The "Ley Orgánica del Congreso General de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos" (July 1979) recognizes 22 regular commissions in different functional areas as internal working groups. Each commission is comprised of 17 deputies, and a special effort is to be made to represent different parliamentary groups in the composition of each commission; arts. 54-55.

[120]Interviews conducted in Mexico City in June-July 1980. For a discussion of the Chamber's changed internal atmosphere and some of the minor legislative victories won by the political opposition, see Visión, 55:12 (December 1, 1980), pp. 45-46, and New York Times, January 10, 1980, p. 6.

[121]The group's 18 seats are distributed within this alliance as: PCM, 9; PPM, 5; PSR, 3; MAUS, 1. Two of the PST seats are held by the UIC, which is officially registered as a "national political association." Another PST seat is held by a representative of the Partido Obrero Socialista (POS, Socialist Labor Party), formed in 1979 following a split in the PRT. "Parliamentary groups" are formed with a minimum membership of five deputies. The Chamber of Deputies provides these groups with office space and administrative staff members, which constitutes one additional form of state financial subsidy for minority parties. For details on the registration and operation of parliamentary groups, see "Ley Orgánica del Congreso...," op. cit., arts. 38-45.

[122]Excelsior, June 26, 1980, p. 14.

[123]Excelsior, July 4, 1980, p. 16. The CTM and the Leftist Coalition have coincided in the demand for change in 1937 legislation regarding banking employees' unionization and right to strike, but the specific

legislative proposals they have offered differ somewhat. Some 140,000 banking employees would be affected; El Día, June 24, 1980, p. 2; July 12, 1980, p. 3; Excelsior, July 12, 1980, p. 20. There has been some speculation, although certainly very tentative, that two "ideological blocs" may be emerging in the 1979-1982 Chamber of Deputies on the basis of legislative alliances such as these. The first of these groups includes some PRI deputies (especially those representing the CTM and the CNC), the PPS, and the PST. The "center-right" coalition groups other PRI deputies, the PAN, and the PDM. For additional comments on these developments, see El Día, July 6, 1980, p. 7.

[124]These changes concerned reforms to constitutional articles 61, 74, and 93. For additional details, see López Moreno, op. cit., pp. 19-20.

[125]This represented a change in the original political reform initiative made in the course of Chamber of Deputies debates before the final approval of the LOPPE. The original version called for such investigations at the request of one-third of Chamber members. See Zavala, op. cit., p. 38.

[126]For additional information on these two cases, see respectively, Latin America Political Report, September 28, 1979, p. 300, and Proceso, 194 (July 21, 1980).

[127]Proceso, 166 (January 7, 1980), pp. 32-33; Punto Crítico, 105 (March 1980), p. 8. See also the series of debates on this issue in the PCM's El Machete, 1 (May 1980), n.p.; 2 (June 1980), pp. 12-14; and 3 (July 1980), pp. 30-34.

[128]See Guillermo O'Donnell, "Notas para el estudio de procesos de democratización política a partir del estado burocrático-autoritario" (Buenos Aires: CEDES, 1980), pp. 8-19, for a discussion of the role of political coalitions in regime transformation.

[129]For comments to this effect by PRI spokesmen after the 1980 state gubernatorial and legislative elections, see Excelsior, July 7, 1980, pp. 4, 23.

[130]The PRI also won decisive majorities in the 1980 gubernatorial and legislative elections in five different states. The PRI's share of the total valid gubernatorial vote was: Campeche, not available; Chihuahua, 74.4%; Durango, 86.0%; Michoacán, 93.2%; Zacatecas, 93.7%. The PRI's share of the total valid vote for the state legislature was: Campeche, 96.7%; Chihuahua, 72.6%; Durango, 86.6%; Michoacán, 92.4%; Zacatecas, 93.1%. See Excelsior, July 24, 1980, p. 23. For additional details on opposition parties' participation in these 1980 state elections, see Excelsior, June 30, 1980, p. 5; July 7, 1980, p. 23; July 8, 1980, p. 11; July 14, 1980, p. 4; Unomásuno, July 7, 1980, p. 1.

[131]Other efforts to analyze the future of Mexican politics include Susan Kaufman Purcell, "The Future of the Mexican System," in José Luis Reyna and Richard S. Weinert (eds.), Authoritarianism in Mexico

(Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1977), pp. 173-191; Pablo González Casanova, La reforma política y sus perspectivas (México: Comisión Federal Electoral, 1979); and Manuel Camacho, "Las opciones políticas de hoy," Vuelta, July 1977, reproduced in Comisión Federal Electoral, Reforma política, v. 2, "Comentarios," op. cit., pp. 432-436.

[132]Three recent developments are relevant in this regard. First, in July 1980 the Ministry of the Interior announced that its material support for political parties' electoral activities would be extended to state and municipal elections. A total of 3.898 million pesos was allocated for this purpose, with the amount of support for each party to correspond to its share of total candidates in the election in question. One-third of this money was distributed during the 1980 state gubernatorial and legislative elections as follows: PRI, 27.8%; PDM, 18.2%; PPS, 17.9%; PCM, 17.7%; PST, 11.5%; PARM, 6.9%. Only the PAN declined such material support for these elections; Unomásuno, July 3, 1980, p. 2. Second, on September 1, 1980, President José López Portillo announced further plans to reform and update voter registration lists through the creation of a national elector's identification card. The CFE approved a "Programa Padrón Electoral, 1982" on September 23, 1980. Although this program has yet to be completed, its goal is to produce new voter registration lists for the 1982 presidential elections; Razones, 31 (March 9-22, 1981), pp. 17-18. Finally, discussions continue regarding the possible "conditional registry" of the PMT, PRT, and Partido Social Demócrata (PSD, Social Democratic Party) for the 1982 elections; Razones, 31 (March 9-22, 1981), p. 6.

[133]On the role of crises in the promotion of reform, see Albert O. Hirschman, Journeys Toward Progress (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973), pp. 260-264.

[134]See Kevin J. Middlebrook, "Energy Security in U.S.-Mexican Relations," in David A. Deese and Joseph S. Nye (eds.), Energy and Security (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1980) for an analysis of the domestic and foreign consequences of the Mexican petroleum boom, especially pp. 161-176. This section of the text draws on pp. 163-166.

[135]Summary comments regarding the Venezuelan case appear in Kevin J. Middlebrook, "Notes on Transitions from Authoritarian Rule in Latin America and Latin Europe," Latin American Program Working Paper No. 82 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1981), pp. 43-44.

[136]For example, the PCM-Worker, Peasant, and Student Coalition in the Isthmus ("Coalición Obrera, Campesina y Estudiantil del Istmo," COCEI) combined organizational resources to win the municipal elections in Juchitán, Oaxaca in 1981, increasing to six the number of municipal governments controlled by the PCM; Razones, 31 (March 9-22, 1981), p. 22.

[137]Ibid., pp. 6, 11-13; Latin America Weekly Report, March 20, 1981, p. 7.

[138]El Machete, 2 (June 1980), pp. 8-11. One precedent for cooperation of this kind was the PCM's 1976 electoral alliance with the "Liga Socialista" (Trotskyist) and the "Movimiento de Organización Socialista" (MOS, later the PSR); Rodríguez Araujo, op. cit., p. 52, fn. 58.

[139]Middlebrook, "Notes on Transitions...," op. cit., pp. 37-38.

[140]For a summary of internal PCM discussions which suggest that the party's support among workers is very limited, see Punto Crítico, 105 (March 1980), p. 8. One further indication of the PCM's predominantly middle-class support base is the orientation of the party magazine, El Machete: it is a glossy, relatively expensive (30 pesos per issue) publication whose coverage is clearly addressed to the educated middle class. The principal article in its first edition focused on the question of homosexuality in Mexico--hardly a subject of tremendous interest to workers and peasants. This orientation is in distinct contrast to the El Machete published by the PCM in the 1920s and 1930s, which focused on questions such as organizational tactics, international solidarity, inflation and wage policies, and so forth.

[141]Kaufman Purcell, "The Future...," op. cit., p. 184.

[142]For a detailed examination of these developments in the Mexican automobile industry, see Kevin J. Middlebrook, "The Political Economy of Mexican Organized Labor," op. cit., esp. chs. 5 and 6.

[143]For a comparative analysis of workplace problems posed by different production processes and manufacturing technologies, see Michael Fullan, "Industrial Technology and Worker Integration in the Organization," American Sociological Review, 36:6 (December 1970), pp. 1028-1039.

[144]For an analysis which also stresses the importance of creating durable linkages between opposition parties and mass organizations such as labor unions, see Arnaldo Córdova, "La política de masas y el futuro de la izquierda," in González Casanova and Florescano, op. cit., pp. 385-404.

[145]Under the September 28, 1978 political amnesty, some 242 prisoners were released by the federal government. Fourteen states enacted similar laws and released another 317 prisoners, for a total of 559; Jesús Reyes Heroles, "La reforma política y sus repercusiones en los estados," op. cit., p. 17. By August 31, 1979, a total of some 1,589 prisoners had been released under the law, but as many as 142-500 individuals were still held as political prisoners or had disappeared following their arrest by security forces. According to the PCM, this total included 120 former guerrillas still held in prison, 363 disappeared individuals (desaparecidos), and 9 political exiles; Latin America Weekly Report, August 31, 1979, p. 267. For a discussion of the adoption of the amnesty law, see López Moreno, op. cit., pp. 22-25. For information on the limitations of the law's content and continuing problems in its application, Punto Crítico, 91 (October 1978), p. 6; 92 (October 1978), pp. 12-13; 93 (November 1978), p. 5; 102 (September 1979), p. 8; 105 (March 1980), pp. 4-5; 108 (June 1980), p. 7.

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[146]For a general discussion of the international aspects of political reform in Mexico, see Claude Heller, "Las condiciones internacionales del cambio social y participación política en México," Foro Internacional, 20:3 (January-March 1980), pp. 411-426.

[147]On the broader implications of political change in Mexico for United States-Mexico bilateral relations, see Kevin J. Middlebrook, "Political Change in Mexico," in Susan Kaufman Purcell (ed.), Mexico-United States Relations, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 34:1 (1981), pp. 55-66. This section draws on pp. 55-56, 66. During the Mexican Revolution, the United States used diplomatic and military means to influence the outcome. The U.S. ambassador to Mexico helped to overturn the Madero administration in 1913, and President Woodrow Wilson used arms embargoes and the power of diplomatic recognition in his efforts to influence events in Mexico. The occupation of the port of Veracruz in 1914 and Pershing's 1916-1917 military incursion into Mexico clearly demonstrated the determination of the United States to protect its interests by affecting the outcome of the revolutionary process. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s the United States exerted pressure on Mexico over issues such as United States citizens' and companies' property claims (especially U.S.-based firms' claims to Mexican petroleum reserves) and Mexico's public foreign debt. Direct U.S. aid to President Obregón helped him defeat a major military revolt in 1923, and as late as 1929 the United States stationed troops along the United States-Mexico border and provided considerable military assistance to help the Mexican government put down the Escobar military rebellion.

[148]For a recent example of U.S. concern regarding developments in Mexico, in the form of public opposition in the United States Congress to relatively modest tax-code reforms and foreign-investment restrictions enacted by the Echeverría administration, see Wayne A. Cornelius, "Immigration, Mexican Development Policy, and the Future of U.S.-Mexican Relations," Working Papers in U.S.-Mexican Studies, no. 8, August 1980 (Program in United States-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego), p. 24, fn. 23.