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ABSTRACT

Demilitarization and the Institutionalization
of Military-Dominated Polities in Latin America

When direct military power becomes the rule, as is the case in a number of Latin American nations, it is by nature unstable and fragile if not institutionalized. But the type of government which may follow an authoritarian military regime cannot be known in advance. The retreat of the armed forces from power does not necessarily lead to a pluralistic representative system. Indeed, what appears to be a process of demilitarization and return to democracy is often little more than the use of representative procedures to legitimate and consolidate an authoritarian model.

The institutionalization of modern militarism has taken several forms in Latin America. These can be grouped into two dominant tendencies: personalization and legalization. Both models may or may not be coupled with a real opening to democracy or a democratic façade.

The first and rarest case implies the transfer of power to a military leader who imposes himself on his peers and subordinates the armed forces to himself (as executive), preserving nondemocratic structures. In the second case--legalization within a constitutional framework--two methods are possible: a controlled and coercive multiparty system or the creation of a dominant military party. These variants admit of more or less sizable doses of "supervised" democracy, possibly extending to the complete return of civilians to the government.

Democratic restoration depends essentially on the international situation and on internal processes within the armed forces. But the military generally bends to the pressure of political conditions. And the government may very well return to the civilians if the military does not guard its power.

DEMILITARIZATION AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF MILITARY-DOMINATED POLITIES IN LATIN AMERICA

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Any assessment of the possible evolution of military-dominated polities in Latin America depends on the perspective used to explain their recurrent emergence in the past. If one believes that contemporary militarism is merely a culturally-determined anachronism offering transitory resistance to the ultimate political good--i.e., representative democracy --one assumes a unilinear evolution which is predictable and practically inevitable. Infrastructural interpretations of the appearance of modern authoritarian regimes likewise underline the latters' transitory nature. Functionalist determinism, by establishing a more or less instrumental correspondence between dominant economic actors and regime types, foresees an end to the authoritarian system when its supposed "objectives" have been fulfilled. The "necessary" or indispensable character of authoritarian rule for peripheral capitalism in its present phase will therefore assure with equal inevitability the disappearance of authoritarian regimes once they complete their historic role. These two contradictory perspectives have in common a facile and dogmatic certainty concerning the "exceptional" nature of authoritarian regimes. In effect, those who interpret Latin American history in terms of a protracted "struggle for democracy," like those who perceive the political arena as directly subordinated to the episodic necessities of capital, take for granted an inevitable outcome of liberalization.

The partisans of both of these theses generally ignore the strictly military dimension of the great majority of Latin American authoritarian regimes. The "liberal" perspective does so because its adherents have decided that armies as political forces are only an atavistic legacy of the past. Since modern politics is based exclusively on representative government and rational procedures of administrative specialization, obstacles to attaining this ultimate good must stem from some hangover from the past. Starting from these premises, one cannot envisage professionalized military institutions in terms of bureaucratic modernity, nor analyze the political implications of this development. The "economicist" perspective is equally neglectful of the martial component. Its mode of analysis omits the institution which is at the center of power since this is merely supposed to be the expression or instrument of exogenous socioeconomic factors. In short, the specific manifestations and particular processes of military organizations are treated as epiphenomenal by both approaches.

A less reductionist approach would focus the analysis on the real power holders in political systems dominated by the military, take into account the specificity of the military corporation and of its pattern of

alliances and civil support, and locate its extra-institutional political resources in the framework of structural constraints derived from each national society. It would not assume that the nature of post-authoritarian outcomes is known in advance. This is not to assume that military power is ineradicable, but that it has its own logic. The successive waves of militarization and demilitarization which the continent has experienced since 1945 should be enough to inspire caution on the part of those who would make predictions in this realm.

In effect, whereas in 1954 twelve out of twenty republics were being governed by military leaders who had come to power by force, by the middle of 1961, only one such leader was left: Stroessner in Paraguay. In seven years, revolutions and assassinations terminated 10 military presidencies, while in Peru another withdrew "legally."[1] It is true that these military leaders headed very diverse regimes, including some virtual democracies, and that the disappearance of the leader did not always change the regime's character, as demonstrated by the situation in Nicaragua after the assassination of the not-very-military dictator Somoza in 1956. These regimes were often military only in the sense of the president's profession and by virtue of their origin, but they evolved in quite different directions. Should one attribute to a burst of anti-militarism the deposing of Perón, who was a legally reelected constitutional president, or the overthrow of the personal tyranny of Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela, of General Magloire of Haiti, or of Colonel J. M. Lemus in El Salvador, even if all of these military leaders, like Batista in Cuba and Rojas Pinilla in Colombia, had been at least at a certain point the army's choice to occupy executive office? What should one say, after this ebbing of the tide, about the military wave which from March 1962 (Argentina) to November 1964 (Bolivia) and June 1966 (Argentina, again) put an end to civil regimes in nine of the continent's countries? Was it a prolongation or a phenomenon of another kind when, at the beginning of the 1970s, a series of coups d'etat hit countries with solid traditions of civil government that some had estimated to have been "definitively" demilitarized (Chile and Uruguay), while in Argentina a new military intervention assumed a violent nature unprecedented in that nation's history?

As of 1976-77, democracy seemed to be making some headway once again. The time was apparently ripe for some liberalization of military rule and, even, the return of civilians to power. If one judges merely on the basis of figures, in 1978 twelve electoral consultations took place on the continent. This intense electoral activity seemed to augur a return to representative procedures. In fact, it ranged from authoritarian plebiscites to competitive elections, and included some ambiguous cases in between. The Chilean referendum and the fifth reelection of President Stroessner are far from indicating the termination of despotic systems. In Venezuela and Colombia, elections occur regularly and hardly constitute remarkable events. In Brazil, legislative elections took place in a framework of conditions and restrictions designed to assure regime continuity, but they were nevertheless unfavorable to the government. In Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia, elections had the principal aim of preparing for the return of civilians to power, the free play of democratic institutions, and an orderly retreat of the military to their barracks.

This historical survey provides little support for unilineal and synchronic interpretations of military power, such as those described above. Nor do we believe that these movements in opposing directions condemn the states of the continent to an indefinite alternation between civil and military regimes. They indicate rather that the forms of demilitarization are complex and diverse, and that they may have their limits. Such an ebb and flow invites us to examine, without a priori assumptions and reassuring generalizations, the realities of demilitarization and, thus, the real impact of the militarization of the state. Does the latter phenomenon constitute a simple parenthesis without institutional consequences, after which, once the army returns to barracks, countries return to their previous regimes? Or, on the contrary, is it the case that the military do not withdraw until they judge that they have removed the political obstacles to a civil regime and created socioeconomic conditions favorable to the normal functioning of democratic institutions? We are inclined to be rather doubtful about either of these scenarios, and feel it necessary to empirically examine the outcome of post-militarism in all its ambiguity.

The Exception and the Rule

Reference has often been made to the instability of concentrated power. Institutionally, military regimes--even when they appear to be the most common form of domination in a country--nevertheless remain "exceptional," paradoxical though this may seem. In effect, the official and dominant ideology throughout the continent is liberal and democratic. The incessant transformation of military regimes and the limited duration of noncivilian governments derive in part from their illegitimacy as perceived by the principal actors involved. In the Latin American normative and cultural context, those who hold military power know that, whatever they say, there still exists above them a superior legitimacy, that of the constitutional order. Not only can they not claim its support, but they also must ultimately pay lip service to it.[2] In fact, military regimes are only really legitimized by their future. If elected governments have legitimacy by virtue of their origin, de facto governments have legitimacy only by the way they exercise power, and almost, one might say, by the performance they ultimately accomplish. The past may be used to justify the arrival of the military in power, but customary references to political and social chaos, to the vacuum of power, and to menaces of every kind, still reflect objectives that must eventually be attained or outcomes that must finally be avoided. The military regime, therefore, always lives for the future. It is, in its essence, transitory. A permanent system of military rule is almost a contradiction in terms.[3] The army cannot govern directly and durably without ceasing to be an army. And it is precisely the subsequent government, the successor regime, that legitimates the prior military usurpation.

Even if one makes a relatively arbitrary distinction between provisional (or caretaker) governments and constituent military regimes, in neither case has the historical experience been based on an explicitly avowed intention to create a new type of state, a definitive and durable mode of exercising political power. The democratic regime has been and still remains more legitimate in Latin America than this omnipresent state of exception. Contemporary Latin American military regimes differ notably in this regard from the dictatorships that Europe or other continents have

known in modern times, precisely because of their constitutional precariousness. They do not pretend to create a new legitimacy, to construct a new system of political values on the ruins of the old. The European authoritarian regimes between 1920 and 1945 had the ambition of founding a "new order" in opposition to liberalism and democracy, of creating a "thousand year Reich." The Latin American military dictatorships of today are first of all regimes without a stable justifying ideology. The "doctrine of national security" which in one form or another is shared by these institutionalized military governments provides a discourse or language which serves to temporarily disguise their illegitimacy, but it is incapable of generating a new and permanent source of legitimacy. Moreover, the doctrine has above all performed the internal function of forging and mobilizing a consensus within the military institution, around the alarmist image inherent to the profession of arms. Its hypotheses concerning internal war, by enlarging the spectre of threats and by situating them inside national society, provide an institutional basis for the army's intervention, but they do not explain it. Such hypotheses may justify a more or less enduring occupancy of the posts of national leadership, but they do not establish a new basis of power. In a word, the theory of national security cannot substitute for a legitimating ideology. Neither the consistency of the theory, nor the extent of its diffusion, nor the constitutive nature of its functions, permit such a substitution.

Representative democracy always remains on the horizon for these regimes. They must invoke it for their own legitimation and in their own policy objectives, while at the same time proposing to improve, reinforce, amend, and even protect it, but never to annihilate or destroy it as has been the case elsewhere. Such an observation holds for the Brazilian "sistema," which has always preserved (under careful supervision) parties, elections, and a legislative assembly--not to mention the archaic militarism of Stroessner, who, like all of the classic dictators on the continent, has himself regularly reelected to the presidency, and tolerates (under strict surveillance) a decorative multiparty system. In Uruguay and Argentina also, the proclamations, declarations, projects, and maneuvers of the ruling military refer to no other political system and no other source of legitimacy than those identified with representative democracy. The justification is certainly superficial--a façade behind which quite different practices are promoted--but for all that it serves to contradict martial messianism and undermine any idea of permanent military rule. No matter how central their position in the political system and how great their autonomy of decision-making, the governing military are constrained by the political culture of the dominant internal or external classes, whose self-interested liberalism constitutes a restraint on the organicist tendencies of the men in uniform. It is as if the dominant classes believe that the reestablishment of the market in economic matters cannot really be legitimized unless accompanied by a certain restoration of the market in political affairs.

Thus, in Argentina, all of the corporatist and antiliberal overtones of the military in power--from Uriburu in 1930 to Onganía in 1966-70--have only provoked a defensive rallying of the economic and social establishment, and the replacement of the "anti-constitutionalist" generals by more liberal members of the military.[4] In Uruguay, Bordaberry, the civilian president of a military dictatorship imposed by the "slow-motion" coup d'etat of 1973,

was dismissed by the high command in June 1976 for advocating "new institutions" in opposition to "the most cherished democratic traditions of the country." He had in effect pushed the logic of "military sovereignty" to the limit by proposing in a memo the suppression of the party system, and the introduction of a new authoritarian state in which the armed forces alone would assure legitimacy. Although they have militarized power, and have promoted the hypertrophy of the nation's defense institutions and an unlimited expansion of their responsibilities, Uruguay's generals will not for one moment renounce the fiction of a civil executive. Uruguay, the garrison state, has a nonmilitary president and a government from which officers are practically absent. The parties are only suspended, and the text of the constitutional referendum of November 30, 1980, although it made the participation of the armed forces in executive power official, also anticipated the legalization of the two traditional parties and a return to limited and purified representative procedures. The rejection by the electorate of this plan after the pretense of a campaign had the merit of showing that the military had been correct not to underestimate the vigor and appeal of the party system--even after seven years of prohibition and adverse propaganda. This was also demonstrated by the Peruvian elections of May 1980 and the Argentine elections of 1973, after twelve and seven years, respectively, of suspension of institutionalized political competition.[5]

The government presided over by General Pinochet since September 1973 in Chile figures among the most antiliberal military regimes in Latin America, and among those which concede the least to even the rhetoric of democracy. Indeed, the authoritarian discourse of the Chilean military--their insistence on the need for new institutions--is very reminiscent of Franco's Spain. Corporatist inclinations are expressed without concealment by advisors and those responsible for the "hard" line of the regime--the "renovators," as they call themselves--who reject absolutely the parliamentary and partisan institutions in force until 1973. Immediately after the coup d'etat, General Pinochet himself promised a new constitution which would "dispense forever with politicians, sectarianism, and demagogy."[6] The minister of the interior declared in September 1975 that "all political parties...act only to divide citizens, to favor demagogically their adherents and to cause the soul of the nation to deteriorate." The influential newspaper Mercurio, spokesman for the moderates (blandos) and partisan of a limited opening, commented on these remarks in the following way: "the government desires the annihilation or progressive disappearance of parties."[7] But although the constitutional debate on the aims and timetables of the Plan of Chacarillas (July 1977) may have encouraged the hopes of the "hard-liners" for the establishment of an "authoritarian democracy," the constitution submitted to a plebiscite on September 11, 1980, apart from the gradualism and the restriction of liberties which it imposes, nevertheless anticipates in the relatively distant future (1989) the establishment of a representative system, including parties, a congress, and a president elected by universal suffrage. Needless to say, this juridical structure is intended above all to justify the permanence in power of General Pinochet himself. But the reliance upon a constitutional text of noncorporatist inspiration and the fixing of a time-limit to exceptional rule are sufficient to prove that, even in the Chilean case, the antiliberal temptation and the wish to definitively exclude the "vanquished" politicians of 1973 must be accommodated within the dominant democratic ideology.

These attempts to place representative practices under strong surveillance differ fundamentally from the ways and means adopted by dictatorships outside the continent to achieve the same objectives. If one compares the regime of General Franco with that of General Pinochet, the similarities may catch one's attention at first, but the differences are nonetheless important. These two counterrevolutionary systems both sought to break with the previous political situation, to deny open expression to political dissidents,[8] and to exclude the "defeated" from power forever, by prolonging the victorious coalition (of the coup d'etat or civil war) via the unlimited personal authority of the leader of the successful military operation. But in the case of Franco, antipluralism made no concessions for forty years, except at the summit of state power and within his technocratic-bourgeois coalition. Liberal democracy was perpetually condemned without regard for internal developments or the international context. Franco, caudillo of Spain "by the grace of God," never tolerated even incidental questioning of his permanence in power. Neither the referendum of 1947 nor that of 1966 posed the question of choosing the chief of state, or of setting the length of his mandate. Furthermore, the opposition eventually accepted the idea that the dictatorship was lifelong and that a change of regime could only take place after the caudillo's death.[9] General Pinochet, for his part, has stipulated the duration of his provisional regime (only after four years in power, it is true)--whatever may be his real intentions for the future--and he has not excluded the revival of parties and of competitive elections, although tempering the possibility of such developments by diverse prohibitions designed "to protect democracy." This is proof, in my view, that one cannot create a new legitimacy just as one wishes in an environment which is hostile to such ideological adventures. With this awareness of the limits of state militarization in Latin America, let us now examine the extent to which demilitarization is being accomplished, at what level, with what scope, and the kinds of regimes being established when the state is demilitarized.

The Post-Military State and the Forms of Institutionalization

An analysis of the retreat of the army from power discloses diverse phenomena. Civilianization of the military state, however extensive, is by no means the same as a return to "democratic normality." For purposes of comparative equivalence, we will only examine the transformation of systems of extensive military domination--that is, regimes initiated by force in which the sovereignty of military institutions is exercised collectively and controls not only the selection of the executive but the making of all major policy decisions. We will therefore leave aside authoritarian regimes of other kinds, patrimonial or partisan, even though coercion and officer participation play large parts in them.

We can also set aside, almost from the start, a first type of demilitarization--that brought about by force through a civilian pronunciamiento. In general, it is the military who overthrow regimes of their peers by violence (or sometimes, and indeed most frequently, by the threat of violence). Some personal dictatorships, patrimonial autocracies, and post-military tyrannies have been driven out by uprisings of civilians, occasionally allied with factions of the armed forces. Without going back to Peru in the nineteenth century or to the civilian montoneras of Piérola,

it was a combined civil and military revolution that overthrew General Ubico and his brief successor in Guatemala in 1944. That same year, in El Salvador, students and soldiers put an end to the dictatorship of Hernández Martínez. It was guerrillas and, therefore, civilians who fought Somoza's National Guard in 1979 and put an end to the dynasty in Nicaragua, repeating in different circumstances the Cuban precedent. But among institutionalized military governments, only that of Bolivia in 1952 was overthrown by civilians. The military junta which annulled the electoral victory of Paz Estenssoro's Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario was in effect routed in the streets of La Paz. In this case, the relatively low level of effective militarization of power was followed by a drastic demilitarization. The Bolivian army was largely dismantled. Its officers were violently purged and, hence, rendered harmless to the new revolutionary civilian government.

The most common form of demilitarization, however, consists of leaving military structures in place while attempting to remove the armed forces from power. For reasons both external and internal to the institutions of the armed forces, direct military government cannot be made permanent, so that the continuity of martial power requires additional developments. We can group these into two dominant tendencies: personalization and legalization. Both of these models may, but need not necessarily, be linked to a democratic opening, which itself may be either real or a façade.

The transfer of power to a military leader who personally dominates the established hierarchy constitutes one means of subordinating the armed institutions to the executive and of returning the army to its professional tasks. The transition from the impersonal power of an institution to the personal power of a man, even a general, is never accomplished very easily. This personalization of power is naturally less difficult the less bureaucratized the military institution. Somoza, jefe director of the National Guard of Nicaragua, and Trujillo, generalísimo of the Dominican Army, "personalized" the neocolonial military institutions which had been placed in their hands. This had occurred before they assumed power. It was an act performed in their own name and not in the name of the military as such. Personalization occurred quite differently in Bolivia in 1964, when Barrientos had to prevail over his rivals by ratifying his power as "first among equals" through an electoral mobilization in which he appropriated a specific historico-military legitimacy (the Chaco tradition) and created a basis of popular support that was partly personal in character (the military-peasant pact). The eventual establishment of Barrientos as constitutional president served to prolong the military junta at the same time that it represented an extension of the preceding legal regime in which the putschist general had served as vice president. General Banzer had less success than his predecessor when he attempted to repeat the operation. Having come to power as a result of a coup d'etat in 1971, he governed until 1974 with a section of the political class at the head of a conservative coalition. When, in 1974, he reshuffled his government and replaced the civilian politicians of the MNR and the Falange with military officers, he seemed to have emerged with enhanced personal power, but in practice the army had once again taken over the state apparatus.[10] After having announced presidential elections at various intervals from 1974 onwards, General Banzer had to resign in 1978 when the army insisted that he not be a candidate in the election he was organizing. He then

supported Juan Pereda, his former minister of interior, and the hopelessly divided armed forces proclaimed their neutrality. The ensuing elections of July 1978 were immediately followed by a coup d'etat led by the "official" winner, a weakly legitimated and fraudulently elected successor of a military power structure that had been incompetently institutionalized.

Democratic procedures may also enable a military regime which has fallen into an impasse to find a legal means for self-perpetuation in power. In Argentina in 1945, the regime born of a coup d'etat in 1943 was caught in an apparently fatal cross-fire between internal and external oppositions strengthened by the defeat of the Axis powers. Nevertheless, one officer among their ranks, the "workers' colonel," was at the height of his personal popularity. Ill-regarded by one part of the army, which rejected his pro-labor stance and opposed his political ambitions, Perón still presented his candidacy for the presidency in free elections, and thereby offered an honorable way out to the institution which had brought him to power and which he sought to represent. The "revolutionary" officers of 1943, even though hostile to Perón, had no choice but to accept the return of the traditional parties and the candidacy of the man who had used the vice presidency in the military government as a stepping stone to elected office. Moreover, Perón, throughout his first presidency, took great care to draw attention to his military investiture, and sought to appear as the successor to the "Revolution of June 4, 1943." Thus, by an electoral sanction favorable to the candidate of the army or to one who presents himself as such, the military institution can recover its coherence and cease in principle to be directly responsible for policy. Vertical discipline can impose itself once again, reestablishing internal unity after a period of deterioration. Demilitarization may stop here, or it may, on the contrary, be pursued and extended as a result of alternative political resources which become available to the elected military leader, to the point that he can sometimes end up cutting himself off dangerously from his support in the armed forces. This is what happened to Perón after 1951.

The transfer of power to a military head of state may permit demilitarization without immediately leading to dangerous and uncertain electoral procedures. Usurpation by the military institution can culminate in the dictatorship of one man. This is what seems to be evolving today in Chile. Since 1977, there has been a prolongation of the military regime, reflecting the tutelary role in which the armed forces have found themselves, and confirming the absolute power of General Pinochet. His irresistible ascension, which has relegated the junta to a merely legislative and constituent role, was skillfully promoted by the success of the January 1978 referendum, whose text, imposed on the other members of the junta, stipulated: "I support General Pinochet."

In the Chilean case, it may be argued that the high level of professionalization and the limited political experience of the armed forces are not unrelated to this process of personalized institutionalization of the military regime. Hierarchical discipline has substituted for political consensus. Fear of a return of the "vanquished" has cemented cohesion around a single leader who symbolizes a counterrevolutionary policy questioned by no one in the army. This may explain the feeble response to the criticisms made by General Leigh, the air force representative in the junta,

with regard to General Pinochet's political projects, and the subsequent lack of response to Leigh's dismissal in 1978, which was accompanied by the early retirement or resignation of 18 of the 21 air force generals. The slowness of the "constitutional itinerary" and the persistence of international isolation have had the effect of reinforcing military support for an "institutionalization without opening" that, nevertheless, gives the army essential guarantees. The army may no longer govern Chile, but it is still not very far from power, and above all it continues to regard itself as an integral part of the power structure.

Most often, what is called the institutionalization of a military regime involves its legalization within the constitutional framework. This transformation, which has certain features in common with a return to democracy and which may be associated with a certain liberalization of political practices, signifies that the political power of the military is embedded purely and simply within an institutional framework which is presumed to be legitimate. The military then uses that framework to dispose of the major sources of uncertainty inherent in the democratic process. These processes may lead--as, for example, in Guatemala--to "military governments which are at the same time elected, constitutional, and anti-democratic."[11] This legalization generally takes place according to two modalities: either a controlled and coercive multiparty system, or the creation of a dominant military party.

This last formula is well illustrated by the system in operation in El Salvador from 1950 to October 1979, the date of General Carlos Humberto Romero's overthrow by a civil and military junta. The military in power in 1948 attempted to imitate the Mexican Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI), but without its popular base, by creating an official party, the PRUD (Revolutionary Party of Democratic Unification),[12] a true party of colonels. The Party of National Conciliation (PCN) which succeeded it was both the partisan expression of the military institution[13] and its electoral prolongation. But it was also the party of the state, in which, under the aegis of the army, transactions between civilian or military bureaucracies and the dominant class were carried out. With alternations between political openings and restrictions on political competition, notably whenever the PCN lost ground, this "military party" subsequently controlled political life, obtained a parliamentary majority, and caused a colonel or a general to be elected to the presidency--although not without occasional resort to visible fraud, as in 1972. The PCN's defeat by the opposition in 1972 revealed the decline of this partially open electoral system. The resort to fraud, repression, and limitation of electoral competition which followed revealed the importance and decay of the machinery created to assure the legal continuity of the military-controlled state.

The institutionalization of General Torrijos' nationalist military regime in Panama seems to have followed a parallel path to that of the Salvadorean colonels--despite differences in political orientation. The Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) launched by its partisans nearly ten years after the national guard's 1968 coup d'etat against the traditional oligarchic parties seemed also to aspire to transform itself into a Mexican-style institutionalized party. Its success in the legislative elections of 1978 permitted the new civilian president, elected by the Assembly, to democratize the regime without taking great risks.[14] Will the renaissance of

competitive political life eventually take place at the expense of the PRD, and will the process of democratization extend to acceptance of an eventual defeat of the official party? By retaining personal command of the national guard, General Torrijos remained the strong man of Panama in the classic Central American tradition of military caudillismo and continuismo, and such outcomes seemed quite unlikely. It was whispered in Panama that the new president, Aristides Royos, was no more than the transitory occupant of a six-year term conceded by Torrijos.[15] The latter's unexpected death in 1981, of course, may have upset these calculations.

The very fluid politico-military situation in Honduras offers us a singular case of an attempt at institutionalization within a traditional two-party arrangement. As in Peru, the reformist military officers who came to power in December 1972 found themselves confronted by conservative demands for a return to normal political practices. After the eviction of General López Arellano, and then of his successor, Melgar Castro, in August 1978 the government of the armed forces entered a third stage which put an end to the cycle of reforms. The conservative National Party which supported the new government offered to play the role of a "military party, that is to say, a civilian organization through which the military could continue to exercise power."[16] For this, elections were necessary. They took place on April 20, 1980, but gave an unexpected victory to the traditional Liberal adversaries of the National party. Thanks to Liberal good will and international circumstances, this vote of protest against the military did not have the predictable consequence of provoking a coup d'etat to annul the "unwelcome" results. Liberal and Conservative deputies joined forces to elect General Paz García, head of the military junta, to the provisional presidency of the republic until subsequent elections could be held after the drafting of a new constitution,[17] and the winning party accepted a minority position in the intervening government.

In Guatemala, the state has been profoundly militarized. The army not only occupies power but also fulfills numerous civilian functions, and constitutes a veritable bureaucratic bourgeoisie. The military high command supervises nominations to all posts of responsibility.[18] In spite of more or less regular competitive elections, there is no single and distinctive military party. But in 1974 all three presidential candidates were generals. Since the overthrow of Arbenz, the progressive civilian president, by Castillo Armas in 1954, "anti-communist" governments supported by the army have occupied power with or without popular ratification. Since 1970--in a climate of increasing violence--generals have regularly acceded to the presidency as a result of elections which the army always manages to win. The same scenario is repeated with variations: the armed forces choose a candidate who will necessarily become the chief executive. They then negotiate with one or two parties on the right or extreme right which provide the incumbent with his label and his electoral base. Pluralist competition is limited to a "constitutional arc" from which the parties of the left are banished by definition.[19] In 1970 General Carlos Arana Osorio was elected president with the support of the Movement of National Liberation (MLN), "the party of organized violence" and of counter-terrorism; in 1974 General Kjell Laugerud was the candidate of a coalition of the MLN and the Institutional Democratic Party (PID); in 1978, the ironically named Revolutionary Party allied itself with the PID in order to elect General Romeo Lucas García. It seems that only Arana Osorio really won any of

these elections. His successors owed their accession to power to fraud or to strong-arm measures by the previous government. For example, in 1974 General Laugerud certainly obtained fewer votes than General Ríos Montt, but the government had his election ratified by the Congress.[20] Ríos Montt, having insufficient support in the army, had to leave the country. These legal and constitutional governments are therefore really the expression of an institutionalized military state in its "controlled and coercive multiparty" mode. But simultaneously they represent a type of demilitarization which may alternatively close or open in the direction of establishing less exclusionary systems.

The evolution of Brazil illustrates both the ambiguities and the opportunities of a redemocratization controlled by military power in which the military have not suppressed formal democratic procedures, even if they have emptied them of much of their content. The policy of "decompression" and "opening" undertaken since 1974 by General Geisel and pursued by his successor, General Figueiredo, has provoked an undeniable liberalization, involving the suppression of dictatorial powers given to the president by Institutional Act No. 5, the suppression of censorship, an amnesty, a return of political exiles, and the reestablishment of direct elections for governors and senators. These were all stages of a "gradual" democratization managed by the government at a rhythm of their own choosing. The reactivation of civil society and the enlargement of the arena of political tolerance (as demonstrated by the proliferation of extreme left publications which now circulate legally) may nevertheless be perceived as forming a new strategy of institutionalization following the failure of the compulsory two-party system installed after 1965. The continual electoral progress of the tolerated opposition (the Brazilian Democratic Movement--MDB) and the poor showing since the legislative elections of 1974 of the official party, ARENA, created a delicate and potentially uncontrollable situation for those in power. It was thought by some strategists of the regime that a well-regulated opening could assure continuity by limiting from the outset the "plebiscitary deadlock"[21] which the regime had created for itself because of its identification with ARENA and the existence of a clear two-party choice offered to the electorate. Some observers have argued that the return of the pre-1964 leaders to political activity and the restoration of a multiparty system are measures calculated to split the MDB and, thus, to weaken the opposition while ostensibly freeing it.[22] Although the new law on parties has not succeeded for the moment in completely isolating the left by provoking profound political regroupings, it has favored the formation of two more conservative parties--the Social Democratic Party (PDS), party of the president, and a moderate, centrist opposition, the Brazilian Popular Party (PPB). This new range of parties could make possible an alternation in power without risks, acceptable to the military on condition that the more militant opposition was divided or, even better, atomized. However, the continued good showing of the MDB (transformed into the PMDB) did not seem part of the plan, while the rise of an unexpected "Workers' Party" (PT) complicated the intended opening even more.

Such an opening of the electoral arena constitutes a novel legitimation tactic by an isolated regime which is in crisis, and which is looking for an enlarged base of support. According to this scenario, "slow and gradual" democratization would in no way be the prelude to a transformation of the "system," but would prolong the existing practice of changing the

rules of the game when the previous ones had become disadvantageous. This new manifestation of casuismo and flexibility by a regime which is a past master in elections at the game of "whoever loses, wins," could produce--in spite of all its built-in safeguards--certain unexpected consequences which could in the longer run affect its very nature.[23] As Fernando Henrique Cardoso so rightly points out, until now "it was the system which legitimized the parties."[24] Now the parties have become essential elements in the functioning of the regime, to the point where the head of state is regarded as a party leader. Within this framework, liberalization could have its own dynamic. The utilization of authoritarian measures to contain a tolerated democracy could become unfeasible--it is only by playing the electoral game that the project can result in something, and bring the regime what it needs: legitimation. An eventual authoritarian regression would cause the political dividends of the strategy to be lost. Restricted political liberalization may not remain compatible with a potentially uncontrollable social opening now that long repressed and delayed popular demands have burst spontaneously into view. The repression of major strikes in April-May 1980 and of free trade unions seems to indicate that the regime does not intend to modify its control over the "dangerous classes" bequeathed by Vargas' Estado novo, which had hardly been modified during the "democratic experience" of 1946 to 1964. Will this authoritarian resource remain in reserve, and does it indicate the limits beyond which liberalization will not be allowed to go? Is this, indeed, the social price to be paid in order to make the political opening irreversible? Whatever the case, it would seem that the regime does not intend to hold back, or to lose the initiative. It holds all the trump cards in its own hands, and seems to assume that democracy will work in its favor. What is being created, then, is not so much a restricted democracy but rather a democracy in which those in power cannot lose.[25] The key test evidently remains the presidential succession. The renaissance of civil society and the reactivation of the parties and of parliamentary life, by reducing the scope of authoritarianism, also reduce the space for military sovereignty. The regime is changing its nature, but to whom will power ultimately belong?

Civil Government and Military Power

While one can see the ambiguous character of controlled liberalization without rupture, one must also be aware of the opportunities provided by the conservation of even a democratic facade. Both imply a certain degree and form of demilitarization. In the recent history of Latin America, noninstitutionalized military governments have generally agreed to withdraw from power only in the context of certain guarantees. They have endeavored, to the best of their ability, to fix the subsequent rules of the game. What is more, they have not hesitated, when the situation permitted it, to demand a place for the military institutions in the constitutional structure of the emergent democracy and, hence, a permanent right to supervise ensuing political decisions. The plan for a constitution proposed by the Uruguayan military in the referendum of November 30, 1980 was intended to provide just such a juridical basis to their de facto power, by stipulating that the National Security Council (COSENA), made up of senior officers, would have the right to challenge the conduct of members of both the executive and legislative branches of power, without itself being responsible to any higher authority, and that it could intervene in "matters relating to

national security" and even (with the president) declare a "state of emergency" without reference to parliament--except a posteriori.[26] As we know, this tutelary democracy was rejected by the electorate after having been condemned by a spectrum of parties ranging from the Frente Amplio on the left to the traditional Blanco and Colorado organizations.[27]

In 1972, the Argentine military, in power since 1966, faced a climate of crisis. In order to avoid an uncontrollable social explosion, it was decided to organize elections without proscriptions for the first time since 1955. But the military wanted to avoid an electoral "leap in the dark," which, according to them, could allow a return to the "disastrous errors of the past." To this end, General Lanusse, president of the government of the armed forces, sought to obtain a series of guarantees from civilian political forces which would have given the army the upper hand. The military, in search of an honorable outcome, even made the holding of elections conditional on a "Grand National Accord" of all the political groups under its aegis. A military candidate of transition and national unity would have nicely suited the high command. When the political groups rejected any institutionalization of military participation in the reestablished democracy, and the attempts at generating an official candidate had failed, the military, in extremis, insisted on a double guarantee. They reformed the electoral law to institute two rounds of voting for the presidential election if a majority was not obtained the first time, and imposed a residence clause which effectively would have prevented Perón from becoming a candidate. This accumulation of safeguards and strategems imposed by the de facto regime hardly elicited much support from the political forces. Finally, the junta of the commanders in chief issued a declaration, in the absence of an agreement, which recorded the principles that the military wanted to have respected. This text foresaw that the armed forces would oppose, among other things, an "indiscriminate amnesty" of subversives, and it anticipated that the armed forces would have to "share governmental responsibilities."[28]

In reality, the regime had already lost the initiative. The massive electoral victory of the Peronist candidate swept away the restraints placed by the departing government. The slogan "Campora to government, Perón to power" rendered ridiculous the proscriptive clause imposed by the generals. In spite of their own electoral law, the military declared the Peronist candidate, Campora, elected, even though he had received only 49.5 percent of the votes, in order to avoid the humiliation they would have faced in a second presidential round, in all likelihood even more agitated and more massively hostile to the holders of power. The two political parties against which the coup d'etat of 1966 had been directed (the Peronists and the Radicals) together received 70 percent of the suffrage. The semi-official candidate of the armed forces did not even get 3 percent of the votes! The group of candidates who collectively represented continuity scarcely surpassed 18 percent.[29] What is more, the new government promulgated an immediate general amnesty, and the elected president refused all institutional suggestions regarding the choice of men charged with representing the armed forces. Command over the army was even disrupted by the nomination of a commander-in-chief who did not come from the cavalry, the branch which had dominated it since 1960.

In Ecuador, mutatis mutandis, the military (which had come to power in 1972) withdrew while trying to impose conditions analogous to those of the Argentine army. The Ecuadorian military, having decided to return the government to civilians after a palace revolution in 1976 which removed General Guillermo Rodríguez Lara from office, announced their wish to give the country a truly representative democracy. Nevertheless, the junta took its own precautions, or rather tried to establish a democratic system which would conform to the military's image and interests. The transition process was thus marked by a stately slowness: it would last not less than three years and began by excluding from the election the three most representative candidates considered by the army to be dangerous demagogues. As an added precaution, an electoral law was promulgated in February 1978, providing that the future president must not be a previous incumbent. This deprived both Velasco Ibarra, an eternal caudillo who had already been elected president five times, and Carlos Julio Arosamena of any future. Yet another ad hoc clause stipulated that the future president must be an Ecuadorian and the child of an Ecuadorian. This requirement was specifically directed against Assad Bucarám, head of the Concentration of Popular Forces and one of the leading potential candidates, who was the son of a Lebanese. This populist leader, who enjoyed great support among the sub-proletariat of Guayaquil, was the heavy favorite in the election, as he had previously been in 1972 at the time of the coup d'etat.

This use of the veto and control over candidacies, contrary to democratic norms, augured poorly for the reestablishment of a legitimate and constitutional regime. The imposition of voting in two rounds on the French model, leaving only the two leading candidates in the competition at the second stage, was apparently intended to promote a united front of conservatives. The interlude of nearly ten months between the two rounds, and the numerous incidents which accompanied the campaign, hardly gave much grounds for hoping that the results would be respected if they did not correspond to the wishes of the military. More especially, the military's support for Sixto Durán, the conservative candidate, was almost visible, while Bucarám, excluded, was represented by proxy, through his nephew by marriage, Jaime Roldós. Eventually, after an obstacle-ridden process as difficult as it was uncertain, it was Roldós who won the election and who became the constitutional president of Ecuador in August 1979, without the military attempting to question the result of the vote.

It does not always work out like this. The military appear not to accept withdrawal unless the civil government which replaces them is very similar to their own policies or preferences, or unless the elections produce a victory for their own candidate. In any other cases, the result may be invalidated either immediately or eventually, after a period of observation, when circumstances are more propitious. According to the formulation of François Bourricaud, the multiplication of "contentious elections" expresses this continuista behavior. The agitated political life of Bolivia from 1978 to 1980 illustrates this tendency well. General Banzer's official candidate in the election of July 9, 1978, General Pereda, was the author of a coup d'etat on July 21 designed to assure his "victory," --a victory whose legality was strongly contested, notably by the moderate left-wing candidate, Siles Suazo. In November 1978, the constitutionalist sector of the army, led by General Padilla, overthrew General Pereda and

organized new elections, which were held in June 1979. Since these elections did not yield a clear majority, the president of the Senate became head of state. The process of constitutionalization pursued its course until November 1, 1979, when Colonel Natusch Busch seized power but was compelled to resign after a fortnight. He was replaced by the president of the Chamber of Deputies, Mrs. Lydia Gueiler. New elections were held on June 29, 1980, and marked a clear shift to the left. Siles Suazo, who was ahead with a center-left coalition, would have been ratified by Congress as head of state on August 4. General Banzer, who had presented himself as a candidate in these elections, had obtained only 15 percent of the votes. However, on July 17, 1980 a bloody and overpowering coup d'etat installed General García Meza as president of the republic. The putschists no longer speak of elections. Their primary stated objective, to "extirpate the Marxist cancer," postpones any form of institutionalization to a very nebulous future.

Unable to impose their preferred form of government and prolong their ascendancy, the armed forces may qualify their withdrawal by insisting on corporative defense measures which would impede the reestablishment of civilian supremacy in all domains. Thus the "post-military" civilian regime may rule only if elected authorities agree not to exercise control over military appointments. Such an affirmation of military autonomy is a frequent legacy of the militarization of power, and a standard price paid for the return of the military to their barracks. In Peru, President Belaúnde, elected after the military interlude of 1962, was required in 1963 to designate as commander in chief of each branch of the army the highest ranking officer and to nominate military ministers, in accord with the wishes of the high command. In Ecuador, shortly before the first round of presidential elections in July 1978, the military reformed the organic law of the armed forces and decreed that the future president would have to name as minister of defense the officer occupying the highest position in the hierarchy.[30]

Even a military defeat at the polls accompanied by a veritable rout in the face of exasperated public opinion, such as occurred in Argentina in March-May 1973, may not guarantee a return to full representative democracy, even if the army respects the results of the elections. The demilitarization of government need not signify demilitarization of power where the military have entrenched themselves as quasi-legitimate actors in the political game. Thus from 1973 to 1976, Argentine military leaders, apparently routed by Peronism and swept aside by the electoral landslide, in fact "accompanied" the evolution of the political situation step by step. It was only after the high command restored Perón to his rank of general and gave him the green light that Perón deposed his proxy, Campora. Under subsequent commanders in chief, the army was still a force in public life--regardless of its more-or-less strong inclination toward neutrality when faced with a regime which rapidly fell apart after the death of the "leader." The effort by Mrs. Perón's government to attract military participation and, therefore, legitimacy, provoked a very serious crisis in August 1975, and was a prelude to the eventual collapse of civilian power. The ostentatious political neutrality of the Argentine high command was revealed in March 1976 to have been a mere façade behind which they were preparing the way for a subtle form of putschist intervention. Their theory of the "ripe fruit" and the military's complacency about allowing the situation to

worsen contradict any suggestion that the uprising of 1976 was either accidental or spontaneous.

These mock withdrawals from government by the Argentine army[31] in no way signify that countries which have once known military power in the contemporary period are condemned to inevitable repetitions of it. With its half-century of martial domination, Argentina is without doubt the extreme case of a militarized political system. Nevertheless, who would deny that the return to barracks is never definitive, and that the post-military state, whatever its degree of democracy, continues to live in the shadow of the barracks? This reality conditions the conduct of civilian actors. They always face the alternatives of discouraging a putsch or attempting to provoke one. No one knocks on the barracks doors who is not sure there is some chance of being asked to enter. But there is nothing inevitable about the outcome. To defer a military intervention is to affirm civilian power and to make militarist usurpation more and more difficult, thereby serving to demilitarize the political system. On the other hand, the permanent menace or fear of a putsch is a real form of intervention, as has been evident recently in Spain. Since Franco's death, allusions to military "tolerance" continue to fill political life, while the specter of Pavia's horse still haunts the Parliament.[32]

Demilitarization therefore has its degrees. The return of civilians to power is not automatically equivalent to the "civilianisation" of power, even after free and representative elections. One may ask why, under what influences, and in what conditions the military hand over office to civilians, but one may also inquire as to what explains the limitations on the process of "extricating" militarism from politics. We will first of all consider the reasons for the formal opening of systems dominated by the military, and then the causes of recurrent "praetorian" militarism.

The Moment of Civilian Politicians

The multiplicity of hypotheses that one might put forward with regard to the causes of transition from military authoritarian rule to civilian representative regimes in Latin America complicates all attempts at explanation. The political, social, and economic conditions generally listed as explanatory factors apply in fact to all sorts of authoritarianism--not just to the martial variety. Besides, a certain number of them seem of little explanatory value by reason of their reversibility, and even their "mythological" nature. It is by this latter term that Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos critically evaluates the contradictory economic interpretations of authoritarianism:

> It is thus that economic recessions are presented sometimes as an explanation of the erosion of authoritarianism, given that it would be impossible for these regimes--according to these theories--to coopt the masses and/or the elites via the distribution of advantages; sometimes the same recession is presented as an explanation of the survival of authoritarianism, given that only authoritarian procedures may be possible if one has to suppress popular demands, in a context of acute penury.

> Inversely, high rates of economic growth and accumulation have been used both to explain the continuation of authoritarianism, since the regimes can thus anesthetize the population, and particularly the masses, via the distribution of new advantages, and to explain the erosion of authoritarian systems; on the argument that the social groups benefitting selectively from the growth will begin to demand a greater political participation. The erosion, just as the permanence of authoritarianism--political phenomena--are thus "inferred" as much from economic growth as from economic recession. When contrary processes simultaneously explain inverse results, they belong to the mythology of conventional classification.[33]

Deterministic hypotheses of closer and more immediate bearing seem at the same time both convincing and of little operational use. This is true of those interpretations of the recent "hesitations" of Latin American military regimes and of their tendencies towards liberalization and institutionalization which rely on the assumption that they have accomplished the process of "authoritarian restructuring of capitalism" which necessarily gave rise to them.[34] If one considers that Pinochet's Chile is the most accomplished example of such a transformation, to the point where it has been possible to speak of a veritable "capitalist revolution," the recent evolution of the Chilean situation would seem to contradict the validity of this thesis. Both officials of the regime and a number of its more crucial civilian supporters have stated that there are still "objectives" to be attained rather than a timetable to be followed, even if in practice some not very restrictive timetable has been adopted. But the future prospect of the "seven modernizations," concerning the privatizing and "modernizing" of the essential sectors of national activity by denationalizing them (so as to establish the ascendancy of the market and to change mentalities), has not prevented the fixing of a calendar for the progressive construction of an institutionalized and representative polity.[35]

If it is evident that such factors as the behavior and expectations of the different actors, the range of political resources at the disposal of martial power, the duration of its ascendancy, and the initial justification for its emergence should be taken into consideration, the international hemispheric conjuncture and the processes internal to the military institutions also seem to merit serious consideration in any explanation of political changes occurring within systems of martial domination. Two sequences which appear contradictory, but are most often complementary, help to illuminate these transformations. One concerns the voluntarism and intentionality of the military actors, and relates to the overarching question of legitimacy which we have already discussed, as well as to the necessity of avoiding or obviating the risk of democratic uncertainty. The other, involving multiple social determinants as well as the particular functioning of "factions" and "parties" within the military, underlies the difficult, unprogrammed, and undetermined nature of the demilitarization process, the result of a whole series of perverse and accidental influences, of misunderstandings or errors by the protagonists.

It does not require much argument to demonstrate the importance of the hemispheric conjuncture as a factor affecting the diffusion and fluctuation, as well as the orientation, of martial power.[36] The hemispheric

policy of the United States--the alternation after 1945 between anti-communist vigilance and democratizing preoccupations of successive U.S. administrations--imparts a rhythm to the phases of autocracy and the waves of demilitarization which follow with only short time lags. This does not diminish the role of internal dynamics in the more autonomous Latin American states, but does imply formal and other "cosmetic" adaptations in their case. If the overthrow of President Frondizi in Argentina in March 1962 was a response to strictly national conflicts dating back to 1955, the military putschists borrowed their justification from the defensive perspective outlined by the Pentagon in the framework of post-Cuban-revolution strategic objectives, but disguised their illegitimacy with a legal cloak--by making Vice President Guido the president--in order to satisfy the criteria of respectability inherent in the Alliance for Progress. In this case, the contract between the civilian reformism of Kennedy and the counter-insurrectionary anti-reformism of the hemispheric defense inspired by the Pentagon permitted a double reading of the politico-military process and resulted in a policy operating at two levels.

More recently in Bolivia, the failure of the November 1, 1979 putsch and the success of the July 17, 1980 coup d'etat are not unrelated to the continental conjuncture and, hence, to U. S. policy. Colonel Natusch Busch was compelled to resign after a fortnight under pressure from the Carter administration, which was supporting the process of democratization. The member countries of the Andean Pact, forming a veritable democratic bloc,[37] reinforced the stand of Washington by not recognizing the usurpers. In July 1980 President Carter, at the end of his term and in mid-electoral campaign, could condemn only morally and feebly a determined and brutal military intervention which, itself, was anticipating the victory of his opponent. Observers have in fact remarked that General García Meza's coup took place the day after the Republican convention's nomination of Ronald Reagan, who was (and remains) the hope of all conservative forces on the continent.

More generally, it is appropriate for a martial regime to demilitarize and legalize itself somewhat--both by reason of the global ideology we alluded to earlier and by virtue of the specific nature of the military apparatus in its relationship to power. Not only do the internal tensions brought about by the tasks of government weaken corporative cohesion and thus the defensive capacities which provide the foundation for the (provisional) legitimacy of the military's usurpation of power, but they also reduce the political resources of the institution. In power, the military suffer a dangerous "desacralization." Furthermore, the overt, unconstitutional form of military governance is neither a necessity nor even a good solution for military power and those who support it. Such direct rule corresponds rather to a stage, to a moment of political domination. Legalization is the next stage. In terms of a cost-benefit analysis, the choice for the military involves a difficult equilibrium between the political costs deriving from the risks of democracy and the institutional costs required by martial authoritarianism. This is why institutionalization only rarely implies the withdrawal of the military from power, and why legalization does not often have complete and unrestricted democracy as its objective. On the contrary, the military withdrawal contains an element of continuity, and represents the accomplishment of the mission invoked to justify the initial intervention. The calling of elections, even if pluralism is not limited by the authorities, does not <u>ipso facto</u> entail the

restoration or installation of an authentic democracy. If one adopts the definition of democratic procedures proposed by Schumpeter, according to which "it means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them,"[38] the post-military state is more likely to organize elections without surprises and without effects. The true holders of power are not affected by them.

Moreover, the key figures in conservative military systems and their ideologues and allies very explicitly reject the uncertainties of the democratic game. Their avowed ideal, of "protected democracy," reflects the search for an absolute guarantee against the risk of a legal advent to power by the adversaries of the status quo. One of the ideologues most listened to by successive Argentine military regimes wrote, after the overthrow of the civilian government in 1976, that the new governments of the Southern Cone were in the process of founding "future democracies on a bedrock of order and development."[39] The "hardliners" of the Chilean regime aspire, for their part, to put in place definite remedies against democratic subversion since, in the words of one of them, "one cannot always live on one's guard."[40] But the best "protection" of democracy is in fact the use--perverted, denatured, controlled--of democratic procedures to legitimize authoritarian rule. The well-established and stable post-military state gives rise, like all durable authoritarian regimes in Latin America, to semicompetitive political systems--that is, to systems in which open and uncontrolled competition is restricted to the periphery of power, while the real holders of power keep out of the way of the electoral contest.[41] This system presents its users with the legitimizing advantages of representative regimes without the risks of alternation or massive shifts in coalitional strength. It is clearly in this direction that military-dominated systems move when they have the opportunity and when they have not lost the initiative. The conservative military do not have a monopoly on this strategy, as demonstrated by the experience of Panama, which under populist Torrijos moved smoothly toward an exemplary semicompetitive system.

General Figueiredo's Brazil, with its gestures toward "decompression," seems to be tending toward such an outcome. Certainly the development of forces favorable to the liberalization of the regime, as well as the convergence of the tolerated political opposition with the industrial bourgeoisie and of the new middle class with the old political class, have played a role, but the system controlled the choice of instruments and the timing of initiatives. Moreover, Geisel's project not only consisted of splintering the opposition front by abolishing the two-party system, but also of rendering the army politically autonomous. General Figueiredo was chosen by Geisel as a successor against the wishes of the military apparatus. The army lost its role as decisive elector. With the legitimacy of the military presence being contested by civil society,[42] as illustrated by the electoral results, it was undoubtedly opportune to provide a legal base for the system without recourse to the army. Demilitarization without risk is also evident in the care subsequently taken by General Geisel and the "palace group" surrounding him to separate within the army those with institutional responsibilities from those with military leadership roles (chefia against liderança, to apply Rizzo de Oliveira's distinction[43]), in order to impose a bureaucratic hegemony on the armed forces and, most notably, in order to prevent the appearance of politico-military leaders

possessing their own legitimacy and following.[44] This nondemocratic plan could, of course, escape the control of those who put it into operation. The "perfect political crime," in the words of an opposition deputy, could fail to be consummated. There is a narrow margin between risk and legitimacy. The maximum of uncertainty--and thus of electoral fair play--produces a maximum of legitimacy. Thus in Brazil the die is not yet cast in spite of the precautions taken (i.e., the new electoral law, the redrawing of electoral districts, the weakening of the opposition). If the opposition parties united to combat the official candidates in the henceforth direct elections for governors, the "system" would have some difficulty in selecting a president without taking account of this situation, and in any case, the semicompetitive system would have acquired a life of its own.[45] Even more problematic from here on are the tensions emerging within the military apparatus as it faces the reawakening of civil society, which could always provoke some unexpected reaction.

In fact it is frequently the case that processes internal to the military apparatus shape the phases of demilitarization and open the way to eventual democratic alternation. A failure in the martial apparatus, a grave conflict within the officer corps, can condemn the project of institutionalization. An appeal may then be made to civilians and to democratic sanctions in order to escape from the impasse or to overcome further destabilizing splits. We do not wish to imply by this that the behavior of other actors is unimportant, nor that the outcome of the processes of demilitarization-institutionalization is unaffected by other factors such as the duration of the noncivilian government, the circumstances of its installation, and the level of violence which it introduces into the society. But the return of the military to barracks is above all a military problem, and it would be somewhat paradoxical to study it without considering this decisive angle. It is evident that the erosion accompanying the exercise of power is more demoralizing for the military establishment as a state institution than for a political party,[46] and that economic and social crises amplify its internal conflicts around military issues.

A civilian restoration, accomplished by unconditional elections and without proscriptions, frequently comes about as the result of a change in the inner circle produced by a palace revolution. The project of the military which initially justified their seizure of power is thus overwhelmed after several years of uncertainty and indirection (three years in Argentina after 1970, three years, too, in Ecuador after 1976, but five years in Peru from 1975-1980). Then, the military have only to prepare their retreat in good order and with "honor." Military refusal to sustain a political orientation or to endorse a caudillista attempt often gives rise to intervals marked by multiple coups. Thus, in Peru and Honduras in 1975, and in Ecuador in 1976, the conservative sector of the army opposed the military reformists in power, provoking the fall respectively of Velasco Alvarado, Rodríguez Lara, and López Arellano. But a second factor was the refusal, in the name of the corporative functioning of military power, to give a blank check to a man brought into government by the army. This factor has the same consequences. The two courses sometimes coincide, as in Peru. In the name of institutional rotation of the members of the executive--such as occurred in Brazil after 1964, and in Argentina after 1976--the Peruvian high command deposed Velasco Alvarado, who wanted to hold onto power beyond the time prescribed by military regulations and

who had attempted to acquire a personal following. The changed alignment of the "military party," explicable according to certain observers in terms of the economic crisis and the urgency of negotiating with resurgent social forces,[47] led to the restoration of democracy. In the absence of charismatic resources and given the refusal to attempt any partisan mobilization, a bureaucratic system without support or project could only retreat or collapse. The regime of General Morales Bermúdez, bereft of partisan support and of the will to obtain it, nevertheless lasted five years, certainly representing an unprecedented case of "political levitation," but also illustrating the difficulties inherent in an orderly transfer of power when the internal military situation is so lacking in consensus.

In Argentina, after the overthrow of General Onganía, who had not fixed any limit on his power and who intended to place the army outside the government, General Lanusse, commander-in-chief and king-maker, brought to power the ephemeral General Levingston. The latter broke with the liberal economic policy of his predecessor without having the means to do so and without specifying alternative goals for his government. It only remained for the high command to acknowledge the failure of the "Argentine revolution" by preparing the withdrawal of the army. The acute internal cleavages and the intensity of social tensions hardly permitted them anything other than to transfer the government to civilians or to throw themselves into a repressive assault, which their internal conflicts within their ranks would scarcely allow.

In such cases, the resort to civilians and the opening up of free democratic competition without guarantees for the incumbents of government seems like the only outcome that would reconstitute the internal cohesion of the armed forces. Faced with the danger of the splintering and decomposition of their institution, an electoral consultation eases tensions and reunifies a military apparatus torn between contradictory tendencies. It is not out of a taste for the paradoxical that, parodying the martial rhetoric, one may say that on such occasions, civil intervention puts a limit on military dissension. In the absence of a minimal consensus, let alone a coherent program within the armed forces, formal demilitarization by the democratic route comes to seem inescapable. But in order for the tactical withdrawal to be effective, it is still necessary to have a minimum of agreement on the neutrality to be observed, if the military politicization is not to lead to a cascade of coups and counter-coups in the Bolivian style. Furthermore, since the military disagreements are not unrelated to civilian conflicts, such an outcome is only possible if the majority of the political forces have accepted the need for a demilitarization, and if the military do not perceive any direct peril or intention of seeking revenge on the part of returning civilians.

The Future of Military Rule--
or How to Keep Them in Their Barracks

There are numerous obstacles to the departure of the military from the political scene--that is, from command over government--which slow down or prevent the return of freely elected civilians to public affairs. They derive for the most part from a logic internal to the military corporation. The permanence of the threat which justified the army's coming to power obviously represents the most frequently mentioned obstacle. A

blaze of urban terrorism or an incompletely extinguished focus of rural guerrilla activity will engender militarist twitching scarcely propitious for a democratic relaxation. The abstract invocation of the "communist danger" or the "marxist cancer" which must be extirpated before returning to normal institutional functioning only has validity insofar as the specter of subversion remains a concrete threat for significant sectors of opinion. The counterrevolutionary logic cannot but nourish itself on the memory of the revolutionary menace. The recollection of three years of Popular Unity government is still the surest foundation of the Chilean dictatorship. But in Brazil, 16 years after the overthrow of the Goulart regime and the rout of the populist forces, those responsible for the "system," although they are the authors of the manichean doctrine of "ideological frontiers," have played down this worn-out and, henceforth, ineffective legitimation. In Argentina, on the contrary, the chaotic condition of Isabelita's government and "subversive aggression" so undermined the value of democratic coexistence that the counter-terrorist regime installed in 1976 has acquired a far-from-negligible stock of political capital.

The level of official violence constitutes another decisive variable. A weakly repressive military regime enjoys much greater freedom of maneuver. A terrorist government, on the contrary, risks being eventually called to account by the people. Violations of human rights, the problem of those who have "disappeared" in the course of the anti-subversive fight, will require at least illumination, if not the establishment of penal responsibilities when the situation becomes normalized. In Argentina, the specter of Nuremberg haunts the barracks and explains much of the present immobility: "Argentina does not confess except before God,"[48] proclaimed General Videla's minister of the interior only recently. The demoralization and defensive reflex of an army that has been carried along in the "dirty work" of a revolutionary war may lead to the prolongation of military power sine die. Thus, it is unlikely that the Argentine military could once again abandon the scene as they did in 1973. The stakes are too high this time for them to cede the initiative to civilians. The honor and future of the institution would be involved. In Brazil, despite a skillful amnesty which whitewashed the "dark moments" of the repression, public revelations and the denunciations of the officers' responsibilities in the assassination of opponents provoked a very vigorous response by the military ministers in February 1981. They warned against any "revanchist" attempt, saying that it might put brakes on the process of decompression. "The honor of the barracks is above the rights of man" was the headline of an opposition weekly.[49] The liberalization seemed at least to be hostage to that necessity.

It is with regard to this question in particular that the strategies of the civilians enter into play. Their margin of maneuver is narrow. The search for compromise and their acceptance of the "law of silence" imposed by the military may permit the political forces and supporters of democracy to make some gains.[50] Avoiding direct confrontation, dissipating any personal or institutional disquiet among the officers most compromised in the repression, can, curiously, facilitate progress toward the rule of law and representative procedures. But this also means restoring legitimacy by an act of weakness, underwriting the impunity of the usurpation--in a word--placing the military apparatus in an arbitrary and irresponsible position, thus demilitarizing the government while maintaining

the militarization of the political system. This is the eternal dilemma of the skillful and the pure--foxes and lions, Machiavelli would say--of accommodation and intransigence. But it is also a fundamental difference between a conceded transition and democratic rupture, which perhaps takes into account the evolution of the balance of forces.

The nature and the duration of the military government, tied to the preceding characteristic, condition the processes of eventual demilitarization. If democracy restores both the competitive procedures for the choice of rulers, and that substratum of freedoms which makes them possible and regular, certain Latin American military systems only suppress the former while but feebly restricting the latter. The restriction of party or union freedoms, and even to a certain extent restrictions on the freedom of expression, were not in fact major features of the Peruvian or Panamanian military regimes after 1968, or of the Ecuadorian between 1972 and 1979. The Argentina of Generals Onganía, Levingston, and Lanusse, in comparison with other neighboring or subsequent authoritarian regimes, allowed a remarkable level of tolerance vis-á-vis the opposition. The sustained vitality of civil society no doubt facilitated the diverse forms of demilitarization undertaken by these regimes.

By contrast, the persistence of noninstitutionalized military power, and the corruption caused by an absolutist exercise of authority, make political alternation more improbable. The case of Bolivia, and of an army highly fractionalized into cliques, in which the accession to officer grade seems like a path to social advancement, perhaps best exemplifies this phenomenon. It has even been possible to venture the hypothesis that the refusal on several occasions in 1979-80 to recognize the results of elections which did not assure military continuity had to do both with the fears of numerous officers that they would have to reveal, before public opinion or the tribunals, the origin of their enrichment, and with the wish of more junior officers of the army to take part in the feast of the corrupted. But it is true that besides these psychologistic and anecdotal explanations,[51] one can find a deeper significance in the Bolivian case which touches on the militarization of the whole political system.

If in Bolivia the defense of the institution which thought itself to be threatened by the return of civilians, and notably by the victory of a moderate left, blocked the transition, it was also and above all because in this case the army has provided the terrain and the arena in which all political struggles occur. In this "praetorianized" system, civilian political sectors have always been implicated in the military interventions. A military clique rarely launches a putschist adventure without a sectional endorsement or without an alliance with civilian groups. The civilian-military overlap, the permanent articulation of the two spheres, makes the "extrication" of militarism and the "civilianization" of power difficult. Contrary to a view marked by liberal ethnocentrism, in a system so militarized, there do not exist two worlds entrenched like two camps prepared for battle, with civilians on one side and the military on the other. Far from provoking a sacred union of the political class or of the social forces organized to defend democratic institutions in danger, any military uprising will enlist the public support of certain civilian forces competing with their rivals. It seems that in Bolivia this "praetorianization" of political life is not unrelated to the absence of a political majority, as indicated at the last elections. Also in Argentina, where the army has

dominated political life for 50 years, the demilitarization of government does not necessarily change the system for all that, and sets no real limit on the likelihood of a "praetorian inversion." Thus the opposition will cultivate military support in order to increase its weight; the military will establish relations with parties in order to gain recognition, to reinforce their faction or clique inside the institution; and successive governments will attempt to obtain from the army a source of legitimacy which often seems decisive. In this situation of interdependence, which leads to the militarization of public life and to a sui generis, but locally accepted, politicization of the armed forces, the disengagement of the military and the definitive, more or less durable, return to a liberal constitutional model of civil/military relations seem unlikely. As an expression of a structural crisis, and notably of a social stalemate, this situation is not likely to be overcome in Argentina without a profound transformation of national society.[52] This does not mean that the conduct of the actors is insignificant and without consequence, but it does imply that behavior and tactics cannot be chosen in a programmed manner, for they are themselves conditioned by a social reality which the recurrent military intervention helps to sustain.

By Way of Conclusion

Without doubt, it is easier to demilitarize the government than the centers of power. Many instances of opening up or of legal institutionalization represent merely tactical withdrawals that will allow subsequent interventions once the military apparatus has reconstituted its political resources. If not that, withdrawal may only be a question of assuring the juridical bases for the continuity of a system established by force. The objection can be raised that there have indeed been successful cases of demilitarization. Without having the cruelty to recall the precedents of Chile or Uruguay, let us examine these illustrative democracies of today, sheltered for twenty years or more from the military storms which have periodically or consistently shaken their neighbors. If one examines the civil-military relations of Mexico, Costa Rica, Venezuela, or Colombia, leaving aside what might happen in any of these countries tomorrow, one may inquire into the means adopted for establishing civilian preponderance and the steps required. The initial question, however, is whether these countries hitherto experienced protracted phases of militarization and, if so, how they overcame it. In fact, only Venezuela and Colombia emerged from a military dictatorship to a restoration of civilian power. But in the Colombian case, the brief interlude of General Rojas Pinilla in 1953 was based on the support of almost all political groups,[53] which called him to power in order to put an end of the violencia tearing the country apart. The rapprochement of the two traditional parties in 1957 sounded the death knell of the military government, just as their dissension had presided over its birth. In Venezuela, which had only recently emerged from decades of caudillo dictatorship, the army in 1948 ousted from government the civilian reformists whom they had previously helped install, but the ascension of General Pérez Jiménez to supreme and absolute power drew together the dispossessed officers and the democratic opposition. The putsches by opposing factions which punctuated the presidency of Rómulo Betancourt after 1958 underline the difficulties of civilian supremacy. Nevertheless, the Acción Democrática party's influence within the military helped to reinforce the democratic party all the more surely since Pérez Jiménez had so discredited army intervention in political life.

In Mexico, the generals of the revolutionary armies formed part of the power elite, and then of the dominant party. The stabilization of the revolutionary order in their collective interest facilitated the containment of spontaneous and predatory forms of military caudillismo. The "generals" had in some sense to recognize the civilian power in which they participated in order to assure their political preeminence. In Costa Rica, which has not experienced true military intervention since 1917, the army was suppressed in 1948. Even before its legal abolition, the permanent military apparatus was already on the road to institutional decline.[54] Thus, there has not been a transition from military domination to civilian preponderance there either.

Does this mean that the extirpation of militarism can only occur by some miracle, or under exceptional historical conditions? Could it be, as certain sympathizers with the Cuban or Sandinista revolutions think, that only "the total politicization of the military...will in future exclude all militarization of politics?"[55] Certainly, an army emerging from and guarantor of a revolutionary process and staffed with political commissars, selecting their cadres on the basis of extramilitary merits,[56] presents few risks for established power. The maximization of civilian power imposes a sort of "subjective control"--according to Huntington's distinction--which is very secure. But one should not confuse contexts, for we are not here considering the prospects for liberal democracy marked by pluralism and alternation. Thus suppressing the civilian/military distinction can and often does result in militarizing the whole of social life. The civil/military fusion in the ruling elite of Cuba seems to have overridden the distinction, in a way that has tipped the balance towards military preoccupations. Even there, the model of the "civic soldier" which according to Jorge I. Domínguez results from this fusion is not without its own forms of role conflict.[57]

Reverting to the capitalist societies of the continent and to outcomes framed within the pluralist constitutional context, it is evident that there are no preestablished scenarios for democratic reconstruction. Outside the revolutionary scheme which we have just mentioned, which is founded on the liquidation of the state army, there are only limited precedents that can give us merely a first approximation to a possibilistic model of demilitarization. We should, however, observe that the path to "civilianization" through armed struggle is not identical with the repudiation of capitalism in the short or medium term. Civilian supremacy in Mexico has its origin in the dissolution of the Porfirista army and its replacement by revolutionary armies, closely linked with the emergence of the new regime. But the same schema applied in Bolivia in another international context was a failure. The 1952 revolution purged the army to the point of practically annihilating it, but instead of creating a popularly based and politicized army, the government of the MNR, alarmed by social agitation and the workers' militias that they did not control, strove to reconstitute the classical army with the help of a U.S. military mission.[58] In Bolivia, far from favoring demilitarization, the specter of the dissolution of the military institution is today one of the unifying sources of military intervention.

The liberalization of military regimes often gives the impression of a stratagem, of bending to the wind in order to survive. Underlining the provisional nature of power may serve to disarm the opposition. The latter is often faced with a difficult choice: accepting the marked cards of the

regime and thereby legitimizing its activities, or refusing to participate and thereby paralyzing the institutional process. In fact, the distinction between an electoral farce and an opening which would be usable by civilian forces does not depend upon the degree of competitiveness of the elections. Elections without surprises, or won in advance by those in power, may advance the process of subsequent demilitarization--first, by sanctioning the competitive system without the aid of the military, and above all, by giving the right of self-expression to the forces of opposition. But the decisive test occurs not at the level of the electoral competition, but at that of constitutional liberties. Organizing apparently pluralistic elections may procure a façade of legality, which does not modify the authoritarian nature of power. Accepting the political game requires opening up a space of freedom which may, in turn, entail a "qualitative jump." The logic of these two outcomes is different; the risks are not the same. In the latter case, if the opening has a content, and even though it may not lead immediately to a "democratic rupture," the tactic of adopting a "low profile" by forces which are politically moderate (but not moderately democratic) and which are capable of temporary compromises, can be effective. This may allow them to ameliorate the balance of forces.

In this case, the precarious character of a civilian regime under close military surveillance implies first constructing democracy before changing society.[59] It means limiting the stakes in order to permit a political agreement on noninvolvement of the military so as to resolve subsequent political conflicts. This is the accord to which Venezuelan and Colombian parties subscribed in the 1950s. It is also what has underlaid the behavior of the parliamentary political forces of both right and left in Spain since 1976.[60] From here, several stages may be envisaged without prejudging their order. One of them consists of democratizing the institutions and notably the apparatus of the state (army, police, tribunals), and another, virtually contradictory with the first, consists of creating, in a less dramatic climate, the condition of alternation which is the very expression of real pluralism, and which thus constitutes, without any fireworks, the true "democratic rupture."[61] This long and uncertain path to democracy involves a gamble: one has to accept the game proposed by those in power, in order to beat them at their own game. For this to happen, it helps if the whole of the political class and the majority of social sectors participating favor democratic values and procedures, and accept the uncertainties of the polls, and if the civilian social and political forces can say a definitive farewell to arms--before their military brethren have.

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[2]See Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," Latin American Program Working Paper No. 61 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1979), pp. 5-8.

[3]The idea of a "permanent military government" seems as transitory and dated as that of the irresistible rise of democracy. Cf. Mario Esteban Carranza, Fuerzas armadas y estado de excepción en América Latina (Mexico, 1978), ch. 5.

[4]See Alain Rouquié, Pouvoir militaire et société politique dans la Republique Argentine (Paris, 1978), passim.

[5]Cf. Alain Rouquié, "L'Uruguay, de l'Etat providence a l'Etat garnison," Etudes (Paris), June 1979, p. 750.

[6]Speech by General Pinochet on September 11, 1973, cited by Cristina Hurtado-Beca, "Le processus d'institutionnalisation au Chili," Problèmes d'Amérique Latine (Paris), LVIII (December 1980), p. 78.

[7]See El Mercurio, September 26 and 28, 1975.

[8]Jorge de Esteban and Luis Lopez Guerra, La crisis del estado franquista (Madrid, 1977), pp. 28-29.

[9]Cf. Carlos Semprun Maura, Franco est mort dans son lit (Paris, 1978).

[10]Cf. Yves Le Bot, "Bolivie: les militaires, l'Etat, la dépendance: une décennie de pillage," Amérique Latine (Paris), July-September 1980, p. 8.

[11]According to Edelberto Torres Rivas, "Vie et mort au Guatemala, réflexions sur la crise et la violence politique," Amérique Latine, April-June 1980, p. 5.

[12]See "El Salvador: The Process of Political Development and Modernization" in Ronald McDonald, Party Systems and Election in Latin America, (Chicago, 1971), pp. 260-263.

[13]He is not alone; one may read in El Salvador, Election Factbook, 1967, Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, p. 13: "Ninety percent of the dozen political parties which have functioned since 1944 have been in reality military cliques or factions in disguise."

[14]Cf. Latin America Weekly Report (London), "Mixed Blessings for Government in Panamanian Poll Result," October 3, 1980.

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[17]Ibid., and Latin American Weekly Report (London), August 22, 1980.

[18]Cf. Salvador Sanchez Estrada, "La repressión des indiens dans la frange transversale nord du Guatemala," Amérique Latine, April-June 1980, pp. 73-77.

[19]The anti-communist right consists of six parties. In 1979 the legal opposition included the Christian Democratic party, the Social Democratic party, and the United Front of the Revolution. These legal opposition parties have lost a great number of cadres assassinated by paramilitary forces.

[20]Cf. Susan Jonas and David Tobis, Guatemala, una historia inmediata (Mexico, 1976), p. 318.

[21]According to the formulation of Jose Alvaro Moises, "Crise política e democracia: a transicao dificil," Revista de Cultura e Política (São Paulo), no. 2 (August 1980), p. 13.

[22]Cf. Luciano Martins, "La réorganisation des partis politiques et la crise économique au Brésil," Problèmes d'Amérique Latine (Paris), LV (March 1980), p. 23.

[23]See Alain Rouquié, "Le modèle brésilien a l'épreuve," Etudes, May 1977, pp. 628-632.

[24]F. H. Cardoso, "Les impasses du régime autoritaire: le cas brésilien," Problèmes d'Amérique Latine, LIV (December 1979), p. 104.

[25]The plans for electoral reform designed to give an advantage to those in power and to conservative parties would thus be associated with sophisticated forms of "gerrymandering," assuring a comfortable majority to the "system." But even in the bosom of the PDS there is not agreement on the use of such strategies. Cf. Latin American Regional Report (Brazil), "Golbery Plots on Strategy for the Rest of the Year."

[26]Cf. Le Monde, November 29, 1980, and La Prensa (Buenos Aires), December 3, 1980.

[27]Cf. Luis Rico Ortiz, "Uruguay, un análisis del plebiscito," (Paris 1981) (multigr.), p. 37.

[28]Cf. Alain Rouquié, "Le retour du general Perón au pouvoir," "Les élections generales du 11 mars 1973 et l'élection présidentielle du 23 septembre," Problèmes d'Amérique Latine, XXXIII (September 1974), p. 20.

[29]Ibid., p. 31.

[30]Le Monde, July 14, 1978.

[31]See my article "Argentine: Les fausses sorties de l'armée et l'institutionnalisation du pouvoir militaire," Problèmes d'Amérique Latine, LIV (December 1979), pp. 109-129.

[32]General Pavia, in 1874, at the head of an infantry battalion dissolved the Cortes and put an end to the ephemeral republic before delivering power to Serrano, who governed dictatorially. Cf. F. G. Bruguera, Histoire contemporaine d'Espagne, 1789-1950 (1953), p. 286, and Manuel Tunon de Lara, La España del siglo XIX, 1808-1914 (Paris, 1961), p. 194.

[33]Wanderley Guilherme Dos Santos, "A ciẽncia política na América Latina (notas preliminares de autocritica)," Dados (Rio de Janeiro), vol. 23, no. 1 (1980), p. 24.

[34]Cf. Sergio Spoerer, América Latina, los desafíos del tiempo fecundo (Mexico, 1980).

[35]Thus, retirement will henceforth be established on a system of individual "capitalization," and not as a function of the principle of national solidarity; cf. "Reforma provisional. Compare su futuro," Ercilla (Santiago), November 26, 1980.

[36]On this subject the reader should look at my article, "Révolutions militaires et indépendance nationale en Amérique Latine (1968-1971)," Revue Française de Science Politique, XXI: 5-6 (October and December 1971).

[37]Cf. "Declaración del Pacto Andino contra el golpe militar," El País, (Madrid), November 14, 1979.

[38]J. Schumpeter, Capitalisme, socialisme et démocratie (Paris, 1965), p. 368.

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[41]Cf. Alain Rouquié, "La hipótesis bonapartista y el surgimiento de sistemas políticos semi-competitivos," Revista Mexicana de Sociología, no. E (1978), pp. 164-165.

[42]Cf. on this point Eliezer Rizzo de Oliveira, "Conflits militaires et décisions sous la présidence du général Geisel," in Alain Rouquié, et. al., Les partis militaires au Brésil (Paris, 1980), pp. 134-139.

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[44]As Goes Monteiro, Dutra, Teixeira Lott, or Albuquerque Lima all had been in their time.

[45]This is what F. H. Cardoso, in particular, thinks: "Una constituinte convocada depois de forte derrota do regime nas eleições de 82 significará o fin da dictadura," Entrevista con F. H. Cardoso, Movimento, February 23, 1981.

[46]This is what General Morales Bermúdez stated in an interview in April 1979, "Un entretien avec le président du Pérou," Le Monde, April 13, 1979.

[47]According to Hugo Neira, "Au Pérou le retour de l'oligarchie," Etudes (Paris), October 1980, p. 304.

[48]"Posición oficial ante la Comisión fue expuesta anoche al pais por Harguindeguy," La Nación, September 24, 1979.

[49]Movimento, February 23, 1981.

[50]According to the formulation of Ricardo Balbin, leader of the Argentine Radical party, who would accept the imposition of this "law."

[51]The relations with the narcotics mafia and the self-interested protection given by the present leaders of the country to the drug traffickers (see Newsweek, February 2 and March 9, 1981, and Le Matin-Magazine, Paris October 18), in fact cover over structural, permanent phenomena that one might characterize as "privatization of the state" or "patrimonialization of the bureaucracy" and that Laurence Whitehead has analyzed as an "absence of relations of legitimate authority" and of "group domination" in his article "El estado y los intereses seccionales: el caso boliviano," Estudios Andinos, no. 10 (1974-75).

[52]See the conclusion of our book Pouvoir militaire et société politique, op. cit.

[53]Gerard Fenoy, "L'armée en Colombie," Cahiers du monde hispanique el luso-brésilien (Toulouse), 26 (1976), pp. 86-87. Only supporters of the conservative Laureano Gómez were opposed to the military solution to the crisis.

[54]See Constantino Urcuyo Fournier, "Les forces de securité publiques et la politique au Costa Rica, 1960-78," (Thesis, Paris, September 1978), ch. 1.

[55]Régis Debray, "Nicaragua, une modération radicale," Le Monde Diplomatique, September 1979, p. 8.

[56]This is what appeared on reading the military program of the Sandinista government; see "Organización de un nuevo ejército nacional," in Programa de la Junta de Gobierno de Reconstrucción Nacional de Nicaragua, published in Bohemia (Cuba), August 3, 1979.

[57]Jorge I. Domínguez, "The Civic Soldier in Cuba," in Catherine Mardle Kelleher (ed.), Political-Military Systems, Comparative Perspectives (Beverly Hills, 1974), pp. 209-237.

[58]See Alfonso Camacho, "Bolivia: militares en la política," Aportes, October 1971, pp. 73-76.

[59]This is the position defended by the leadership of the Spanish Socialist Worker's Party (PSOE) against its left wing. This position was reinforced by the failed putsch of February 23, 1981. See the interview of Felipe González, general secretary of the PSOE, in L'Unité, March 7, 1981.

[60]Where one has been able to witness joint action at the time of the great demonstration for democracy which followed the anti-parliamentary putsch, by former high officials of the Franco regime like Fraga Iribarne and the communist, socialist, and syndicated leaders of the opposition.

[61]Post-Kemalist Turkey offers this type of scenario in the framework of an elected regime set up by the post-military state. But with a coup d'etat every ten years since 1960, one can scarcely offer it as an example of demilitarization of the political system.