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INTERSTATE CONFLICT BEHAVIOR AND REGIONAL POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA

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ABSTRACT

Interstate Conflict Behavior
and Regional Potential for Conflict in Latin America

This paper is based on an analysis of 20 selected bilateral conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean between 1948 and 1981. It divides the conflict behavior of Latin American states into two distinct periods: from 1948 to 1965, and from 1965 to 1981. The central thesis of the paper is that the absence of conflict in the Western Hemisphere is due more to U.S. hegemony and the willingness of a number of countries to cooperate with the interests of the United States than to any specific peacekeeping efforts of the "inter-American system." Due to the waning of U.S. hegemony since 1965, the heterogeneous development of various nation-states in Latin America has given way to a more traditional conflict behavior which reflects both the increased internal capacity to wage conflict and the growing external interest articulation of Latin American states.

The paper assumes that the overlapping of the East-West conflict and the North-South conflict in the region will lead to additional conflict constellations, which might well transcend bilateral interstate conflict patterns during the 1980s. It discusses the various potentials for future conflict in the region within the framework of a typology of interstate conflicts in Latin America:

- ideological differences which lead to system conflicts
- great-power claims to supremacy, leading to hegemonic conflicts
- border controversies which lead to territorial conflicts
- securing of raw materials, leading to resource conflicts
- differences of economic development which lead to migration conflicts

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Introduction

The growing importance of Third World countries in the international system brings to the forefront their potential for conflict and cooperation. Given the fact that the East-West conflict tends to intensify the North-South conflict, a general tendency toward more warlike antagonism is becoming evident within the Third World. In view of this trend, Latin America as a region becomes particularly interesting. Conflict situations have always existed in Latin America, but specific historical factors have kept those conflicts from erupting to the extent that they have in other regions of the Third World.

Conflicts between two states do not suddenly occur. They develop gradually from a mixture of border conflicts, historical animosities, economic disputes, differences in political systems, arms races, and, certainly, the influence of the great powers. This is true for Latin America, where the economic integration of the 1960s has given way to a mixture of cooperation and conflict in bilateral relations. At the same time, the political and economic capacities of the individual Latin American states have developed so independently of one another that smoldering conflicts between these states present an ever-increasing threat. Also, the reduction in hegemonic influences in the region, as elsewhere in the Third World, has seemed to encourage competition and conflict among the states rather than decreasing tendencies toward conflict.

Since 1945, approximately 30 bilateral conflict situations varying in scope and intensity can be traced in Latin America. Many originated in the last century. Twenty are compared here, in order to establish a basis for assessing the danger of increased conflict in the region.[1] Although the selection does not attempt to cover the spectrum of conflict situations, it should be representative of the patterns of conflict existing in Latin America.[2]

The analysis is limited to those bilateral conflict constellations which have already led to tensions or which can be expected to do so. Multilateral conflicts, often developing as a result of the spread of a bilateral conflict situation to neighboring countries, are considered only insofar as they contribute to an analysis of the bilateral conflict constellation.

The conflicts have been studied in terms of their political relevance for bilateral relations, their impacts on the internal political systems of the countries involved, and their importance to the development of the region. Legal aspects and questions of international law have been put aside, as have some aspects of the historical and strategic dimensions of the conflicts.

The potential for conflict in Latin America is aggravated by the danger that the typical lack of consensus over internal rules of the game could spill over into the external scene. This is particularly true for states governed by military regimes, since there the political decision-making process, for both domestic and foreign-policy issues, is subject to fewer limitations than is the case in countries with democratic regimes, or in those with mixed forms of government.

Also, in view of current worldwide interest in the causal relationship between armaments and underdevelopment,[3] a study of the use of force in Latin America would seem particularly appropriate. Two aspects of force are considered here: (1) force in its verbal form, without employment of economic or military means, but taking into consideration the probability of such employment; and (2) force in its nonverbal form, such as the use of troop movements or other resources to the detriment of the other state.

Any enumeration of relevant conflicts since World War II demonstrates that conflicts involving extraregional powers play a particularly important role. There are both explicit and implicit reasons for frequent acts of military intervention by the great powers in the region:

* defense against what are felt to be hostile ideological influences
* protection of strategic or economic interests
* realization of political concepts or doctrines for development
* support for an affected "friendly" government within the region
* support for the opposition against an "unfriendly government" within the region

The mutually reinforcing effect produced by direct and indirect intervention in national and international conflicts is a significant aspect of the study of interstate conflict behavior and potential in the region. This reinforcing effect is of particular importance when: a national conflict seems to threaten the interests of another, possibly extraregional, state; when external engagement would distract from a national conflict; and/or when an external conflict replaces an internal conflict.

Our analysis of interstate conflicts between Latin American countries is limited to intraregional conflicts. Involvements by the United States and--in the case of decolonization conflicts--Great Britain are also included, but Brazilian participation on the side of the United States in the Second World War, Colombian participation in the Korean War, and Cuba's intervention in Angola have not been included here.[4] Although Cuban engagement in Africa led to the first credible external threat to the security of conservative anti-communist regimes in Latin America,[5] this form

of extraregional conflict behavior has not been included. Nor are conflicts caused primarily by the supply of arms by extraregional powers (e.g., in the case of Peru and Nicaragua by the Soviet Union). Indeed, little attention has been paid to the special function of arms expenditures as a decisive factor in the origin and development of interstate conflicts.[6]

The notorious lack of reliable data on the interaction of Latin American states renders any analysis of conflict situations extremely difficult. Given the large number of existing quantitative analyses with a basis in conflict theory on one hand and the far smaller number of purely descriptive case studies on the other, the cases presented here should form the basis of a classificatory and interpretive regional analysis.

Conflict Behavior and Potential for Conflict

From the OAS regional security system to U.S. interventions: Conflict behavior, 1948-1965. Since Latin American independence, only ten warlike conflicts of any size have occurred. Of these, five took place in the 19th century, three prior to the end of World War II, and two after World War II. The five 19th-century wars occurred in connection with the establishment of national frontiers, and were thus post-colonial wars. Included are the two Cisplatine Wars (1825-1828 and 1839-1852), which put an end to a continuing territorial controversy between Argentina and Brazil by establishing the republic of Uruguay. Included also are the first War of the Pacific (1839-1841), in which Chile blocked a political union between Peru and Bolivia; the War of the Triple Alliance (1865-1870), in which Paraguay lost considerable territory to Argentina and Brazil; and the second War of the Pacific (1879-1883), in which Chile took two southern provinces from Peru and in which Bolivia lost its access to the sea.

The first three wars of the 20th century were the Chaco War (1932-1935), in which Paraguay annexed certain areas of Bolivia; the "Leticia incident" (1932-1933), in which Peru seized Colombia's Amazonian port for a couple of months; and the Marañon dispute (1941-1942), in which Ecuador lost territory in the Amazon to Peru. The two wars after World War II were the so-called "soccer war" between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969, and the 1981 conflict between Peru and Ecuador. With few exceptions, all of these bloody clashes were connected at least in part to the interests of the great powers. Thus the second War of the Pacific has also correctly been called the "Saltpeter War," in which British interests played an important role. And in the Chaco War, which involved suspected oil reserves in the controversial region, the United States influenced the outcome.[7]

With the exception of the two post-World War II conflicts, it is not possible to treat these wars within the scope of this paper. They are proof, however, that bloody conflicts have taken place in Latin America. Thus, the almost general absence of armed conflict in Latin America after the Second World War should not lead one to conclude that Latin America is for the most part a peaceful region. If, as is usually the case in studies of wars in various parts of the world, internal wars are dealt

with together with conflicts between states, then the otherwise positive balance of conflicts in Latin America no longer supports the region's image of a peace-loving area. If one includes internal wars, 23 such conflicts took place between 1945 and 1976 alone.[8] Nevertheless, in terms of duration and intensity of warlike controversies, Latin America remains at the tail end of the regions of the Third World. In Latin America, as in the rest of the Third World, however, there has been a recognizable growth in the capacity to wage conflict on a regional basis.[9] The number of direct interventions--which, during the Cold War, had been the typical form of foreign interference, particularly by the United States--has also declined in Latin America. What is interesting is that these interventions came about as a result of structural conflicts rather than coups d'etat, guerrilla wars, or so-called revolutions.[10] The United States in particular has tended to intervene when it feared that, beyond the internal use of force, a new regime might introduce structural changes. Examples are the U.S.-Guatemalan, U.S.-Cuban, and U.S.-Dominican Republic conflicts. The recent U.S.-Nicaraguan conflict seems to be evolving along the same pattern.

Of the 20 Latin American conflicts under consideration, only five (Costa Rica-Nicaragua, Dominican Republic-United States, Guatemala-Great Britain, Guatemala-United States, and Honduras-El Salvador) have actually been concluded. The vast majority still continue in some form. Half of them are so-called traditional or historical conflicts in existence at varying levels of intensity since the previous century (Argentina-Brazil, Argentina-Great Britain, Chile-Argentina, Chile-Bolivia, Colombia-Venezuela, Guatemala-Great Britain, Panama-United States, Peru-Ecuador, Peru-Chile, Venezuela-Guyana). The role which force has played in these interstate conflicts is not always clear.[11]

Conflict behavior in Latin America must be divided into two different phases: from 1948 to 1965 and from 1965 to 1981. During the first phase, the binding together of Latin American states in the OAS regional security system[12] began with the Rio Pact of 1948, and direct U.S. military intervention in the region seems to have ended in 1965. The second phase (1965-1981) has been characterized by a greater willingness of individual states to enter into conflicts with one another.

The fact that comparatively few conflicts occurred during the 1948-1965 period is the result of three important factors: (1) U.S. hegemony, which remained practically unquestioned until 1959 (Cuba); (2) the emphasis placed on extraregional security problems (Cold War); and (3) the emphasis placed on internal security problems (regime-stabilization).[13] Undoubtedly, Latin American integration into the U.S. security system had the effect of reducing conflict. This is particularly evident in the fact that interstate conflicts during the period were mostly confined to a limited time span, usually had an ideological base, and were clearly dominated by internal problems. Furthermore, the actions of the OAS--and in particular the Inter-American Peace Committee (IAPC), founded in 1940 but active only since 1948--contributed to the quick settlement of conflicts which arose.[14] The "peacekeeping" role of the United States between 1948 and 1965 should not be overestimated, however, since Latin American participation in the OAS regional security system--which was dominated by the United States--simultaneously caused certain conflicts (Guatemala-United States,

Cuba-United States, Dominican Republic-United States) to take on a supranational character. These were, in fact, alliance-based conflicts which must be seen in the context of the Cold War.

An additional important reason for the small number of conflicts during this period, and their relatively low level of intensity, was the inadequate national integration of Latin American states at that time, combined with a lack of intraregional interaction. Inadequate national integration led to a situation in which a number of conflicts were not seen as interstate controversies but rather as personal feuds. They were carried out mainly on a subnational level and mobilized only a small portion of national resources (Costa Rica-Nicaragua, Dominican Republic-Haiti, Honduras-Nicaragua). The political instability prevalent in many states led to a situation in which political opponents in exile would often attempt to achieve a change of government in their own land, with the help of interested neighbors or hegemonic states. In such cases (Costa Rica-Nicaragua, Dominican Republic-Haiti, Guatemala-United States, Cuba-United States), the distinction between an internal change of system and a true interstate conflict becomes blurred.[15]

Three factors explain U.S. interest in avoiding intraregional conflicts during the period: (1) interstate conflicts would have threatened the stability of the regional system within the U.S. sphere of influence; (2) interstate conflicts would have weakened the internal control which individual states could exercise over undesired changes within their own systems; and (3) conflict would have given the external enemy (the Soviet Union) an opportunity to offer support (the Cuban effect).[16] This interest of the United States as a hegemonic power, together with the historically defined legalism of the Latin American states, helped to limit the potential for the use of force in regional disputes. Often the slightest indication of a regional conflict was immediately followed, after a brief phase of "sabre-rattling," by the convening of a court of arbitration, usually from the IAPC of the OAS. Since this willingness to enter into arbitration, along with the principle of nonintervention, was rooted not only in the inter-American system but also in the national interest of most of its members, the regional security system without doubt often contributed to a reduction in the use of force in conflict situations between states.

There were two main types of conflict between 1948 and 1965: first, ideological and personal controversies--i.e., primarily a type of system conflict which can be summarized in the term "democracy versus dictatorship" (Costa Rica-Nicaragua, Cuba-United States, Dominican Republic-United States, Guatemala-United States); and second, traditional disputes growing out of the messy border situations inherited from the colonial era (Argentina-Great Britain, Chile-Argentina, Chile-Bolivia, Guatemala-Great Britain, Honduras-Nicaragua, Peru-Ecuador, Venezuela-Guyana). These conflicts were, for the most part, verbal in nature--threatening gestures and "sabre-rattling" were far more frequent than military actions. In a subregional comparison, the Caribbean was the most active area during the period.[17] This was true prior to Castro's takeover in Cuba, and the pattern of conflict in the Caribbean did not change significantly after 1959. It did, however, expand to encompass the ideological component present in conflicts over political systems within the broader East-West

context. This ideological component was present once before--in the 1954 U.S.-Guatemalan conflict--and has intensified since the 1979 Nicaraguan revolution.

The most important interstate crises between 1948 and 1965 can thus be reduced to external threats to political systems or to controversies with the hegemonic power arising from internal political-system changes. In both types of conflict, the limited ability of the Latin American actors to use military force in pursuing the conflict was clearly evident, since not once did an externally induced change in political system succeed when the United States was not involved. The only case in which a hegemonic conflict was decided to the disadvantage of the United States was in the latter's dispute with Cuba, and this result occurred not because of a national or regional decision process but rather because of the political support of the other super-power.

From the "doctrine of national security" to the "diplomacy of national security": Conflict behavior, 1965-1981. The coincidence of the last armed intervention by the United States in Latin America (Dominican Republic, 1965) with the development of a new type of military regime in the region marks the beginning of a period of change in conflict behavior. Since the 1964 coup d'etat in Brazil, the military has assumed a new role with regard to the state: not only supportive but formative as well. The military's basic "doctrine of national security"[18] helped to destroy, to a certain extent, the seeds of internal instability. The total military capacity of the individual state, through an alliance of the military and the technocrats, has been concentrated on bringing all groups in society under control and propelling the necessary modernization process forward. In addition to the Brazilian coup, the military takeovers in Bolivia (1971), Chile and Uruguay (1973), and Argentina (1976) are examples of this development.

With increased military control over the states of the region, the number of interstate conflicts developing from ideological differences fell markedly. Exceptions during this period were the system-related conflicts between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, Honduras and Nicaragua, and, naturally, the continuing conflict between Cuba and the United States, as well as the new U.S.-Nicaragua conflict. Beginning in the mid-1960s, as the new military regimes established themselves, the potential for interstate conflict between ideologically competitive systems of government, so typical of the previous conflict period, disappeared in some parts of the region, until 1981 when this pattern reemerged in Central America (Honduras-Nicaragua).

Continued willingness to enter into conflict was due less to differences arising among the various forms of government or ruling elites, and was more a result of the connection between the "doctrine of national security" (at first internally and later externally applied) and the conflict constellation in question. During the so-called anti-terrorist wars in Uruguay, Chile, and Argentina, there was also regional interstate cooperation, in particular between the military and security organizations of these countries. This cooperation was based on a common definition of the enemy and the military's conviction that subversion was an internal conflict guided by external forces. Thus it was considered necessary

to mount a common ideological defense throughout the region. Similar trends could be observed in 1981 in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.

The recent collapse of some Central American governments has produced a new variant, the mixture of internal and external conflict situations. Internal support given to either of the parties involved in an internal conflict introduced a new conflict-intensifying dimension. Not only neighboring states and the United States, but also the leading regional powers (Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela) tended to intervene, more or less openly, on behalf of one or the other of the political systems in conflict within a particular state. Thus, with the intensification of popular insurrections and class struggles, a trend developed during the 1970s in which other actors used the intervention of neighboring states as an excuse for their own direct or indirect interference in internal conflicts in Central American states.

Disagreements between the United States and various Latin American states also took on a new dimension, especially after the advent of the Carter administration in 1976. States which otherwise were of little importance to U.S. security policy were extremely affected by U.S. human-rights policy (originally conceived as global in scope). In addition to causing diplomatic conflicts, the new emphasis on human rights caused Guatemala and Brazil to reject U.S. military aid (1977), and caused the United States to discontinue military aid to Chile and Uruguay (1976), and to Argentina, Nicaragua, and El Salvador (1978).[19] While it previously had been progressive regimes whose interests had diverged from those of the United States, conservative military regimes now felt threatened by the application of the U.S. human-rights policy.[20] The ruling military, however, often assumed that this change in policy was not a structural change but rather a passing phase which would end with the Carter administration--an assessment which proved correct given the change of policy under the Reagan administration.

The most important changes of the last 16 years, however, stem from the sharper competition among the Latin American states themselves. Since the internal stabilization of government under the "doctrine of national security," some of these states have begun to concentrate on external tasks and have become more interested in regional and international problems. The "doctrine of national security"--at least in some states (Argentina, Brazil, Chile)--has been expanded to become the "diplomacy of national security."[21] Some of the most important conflict constellations still existing within the region are thus mixtures of post-colonial territorial claims and economically motivated disputes involving natural resources (Argentina-Brazil, Argentina-Great Britain, Chile-Argentina, Chile-Bolivia, Colombia-Venezuela, Nicaragua-Colombia, Mexico-United States, Panama-United States, Peru-Chile, Peru-Ecuador, Venezuela-Guyana). What is involved is a divergence in the interests of neighbors, as they become ever more heterogeneous. In order to secure their own economic stability, thereby ensuring political stability, it is essential that they retain or gain access to raw materials, markets, and, in certain cases, foreign labor. In that context, the role of conflicts over fishing rights or the use of economic zones (Argentina-Great Britain, Chile-Argentina, Colombia-Venezuela, Cuba-United States, Nicaragua-Colombia, Mexico-United States, Peru-Chile) should not be underestimated.[22]

What is interesting is the fact that the largest number of interstate conflicts have occurred in Central America and the Caribbean region. There are two mutually reinforcing explanations for this. First, this is the region of Latin America with the smallest and most unstable states, many of which have only recently become independent. Second, the strategic position of the Caribbean region and its bordering states is of such geopolitical importance to the United States that the potential for conflict is reinforced by extraregional influences, as recent developments have amply demonstrated. The spreading of the East-West conflict to the region, as well as its energy potential, will make it even more conflict-prone in the future.

The peacekeeping role of the inter-American system has failed two of its most important tests in Central America. Neither in Nicaragua nor in El Salvador could it stop two of the bloodiest internal wars in the modern history of Latin America. Given the worldwide emphasis on the growing divergence of interests between North and South, any regional organization such as the OAS which has as its basis the harmony of interests between North and South would have to decline in legitimacy and efficiency. The OAS, since its inception, has suffered from this dilemma of wanting to reconcile two mutually exclusive goals. From the Latin American viewpoint, the OAS should serve as an instrument of cooperation to further economic development. For the United States, the OAS has served as an instrument of power, to be used to secure political stability in the region and thus the United States' hegemonic position.

In addition, the gradual decline in U.S. influence during the 1970s led the Latin American countries to seek new external partners. Given the security situation within the region, this diversification of dependencies has caused the configuration of conflicts to become even more complex. New international actors, mainly west European nations, Japan, and, to some extent, the socialist countries, are now able to exercise influence in the region through their relations with individual states. At the same time, the military capacity of certain states to further their own foreign-policy interests has improved significantly.[23]

As a result of geographic, geopolitical, and economic developments, new regional leaders have begun to appear. Brazil and Mexico, in particular, have developed into leading regional powers, based on their relatively more advanced levels of national viability, power, and influence. Following them in the intraregional hierarchy are Venezuela and Argentina, each of which competes to some extent with the other regional power within its own geopolitical sphere of influence.[24] All four, however, have achieved the status of relative political autonomy, especially where their relations with extraregional powers are concerned.

This intraregional hierarchy has more or less supplanted any movement toward formal regional integration. Rather, one can now speak of an informal integration of those states which belong to the spheres of influence of the above-named regional powers. Given the overlapping spheres of influence, such a development necessarily leads to an increase in the potential for intraregional and interstate conflict. A significant result of the integration movement of the 1960s and early 1970s was greater intraregional interaction, which to a large extent went hand in

had with the physical integration of the continent. What developed, however, were not only additional levels of cooperation, but also additional levels of conflict, since the number of divergencies of interest inevitably increased simultaneously with any increase in the number of interactions.

Parallel to these international and intraregional developments, changes in the internal structure of many Latin American states during the last 16 years contributed significantly to the growth in conflict potential. I refer primarily to the increased national integration of many states and the resulting capacity to engage in external conflict. Efficient, technocratically-administrated military systems of government founded on the "doctrine of national security" tend to compensate for their lack of internal legitimacy by taking external action in the name of the nation as a whole. Thus, it is precisely those military regimes now holding power in Latin America which tend to use internal instabilities as a motive for entering into external conflicts. In order to distract from their internal problems, they substitute a common enemy for a lack of national consensus. They also attempt to compensate for a lack of legitimacy by seeking to broaden their nation's resource base. This leads to a growing demand for control of resources and markets beyond their own borders. The new causes for conflict produce new conflict constellations, which in turn produce new forms of conflict.

Changes from the preceding period of conflict can be summarized as follows. In the 1950s and 1960s, interaction between most of the Latin American states was often limited to the economic sphere and was directed toward integration efforts. In the 1970s, regional cooperation between the military and security organizations of various countries grew due to the military regimes' common perception of what constituted a threat to their national security. Their foreign relations thus became more diversified. In the past few years, interstate cooperation between political parties and labor unions has also increased, not least because of growing west European influence--i.e., interstate relations are influenced not only by governments, but also by the political opposition interested in a change of government. Transnational actors have gained considerable importance.

This parallelism of the planes of interaction has also changed the form of conflict. Other actors are now in a position to provide financial, logistic, and diplomatic support to opposition elites, just as the United States used to do. Examples are the roles which Cuba, Venezuela, Panama, and Costa Rica played in the 1979 Nicaraguan change of power.

Another new form of conflict stems from the growing rivalry between individual states and the resulting suspicion of each other's intentions. This suspicion has now been transferred, at least in part, from the United States to the new regional powers. Mixtures of rivalry with regard to foreign-policy successes, integration into the world market, and the procurement of raw materials, together with suspicion of possible internal political changes which foreign neighbors might assist, have become basic elements of interstate behavior in Latin America.

These altered forms of conflict are conditioned by the continuing discrepancy between goals and instruments, and by the military's willingness to enter conflicts. This is particularly true of the pursuit of individual state interests with regard to securing natural resources and the instruments available in pursuing these goals. In the Cono Sur, for example, the discrepancy between the organizational and technical capabilities of the countries involved is clearly visible. In their development and in their various phases, these interstate conflicts seem to retain their 19th-century style (e.g., Chile-Argentina). It appears, in fact, that the increased potential for conflict is made up of two different but corresponding levels, the mixture of which cannot be predicted in any individual conflict constellation--that is, historical causes and conflict behavior developing along historical lines can exist side by side with very modern motives for entering into conflict and an increasingly modern capacity for conducting conflict.

A typology of Latin American interstate conflicts. Five criteria are useful in constructing a framework for the analysis of Latin American conflict constellations:

(1) The ideological differences between two states which lead to system conflicts. Included are controversies between dictatorships and democracies, between civilian and military regimes, and between capitalist and socialist models of development. Also included are disagreements over violations of human rights and the nationalization of foreign property.

(2) Great-power claims of supremacy in a certain region, leading to hegemonic conflicts. Included are attempts to force dependent states to act as members of a bloc. Special cases are the hegemony of a colonial power (Great Britain) and the hegemony of a regional power (Brazil).

(3) Border controversies, occasionally dating back to colonial times, which lead to territorial conflicts. Because of the concept of "wandering borders" and the increasing importance attached to the pieces of territory involved, the concept of sovereignty has changed radically.

(4) Procurement of raw materials to aid national economic development, leading to resource conflicts. These center on oil, gas, and iron-ore resources, and, increasingly, on questions involving hydroelectric power and the concept of a 200-mile economic zone beyond the continental shelf.

(5) Disparities in economic development between states within the region, and especially between the United States and her neighbors, leading to migration conflicts. Included are migrations of laborers for economic reasons as well as politically motivated migration.

In the past few years, interestingly, system conflicts and hegemonic conflicts have become less frequent due to the increasing difficulty of imposing ideological concepts on countries within the Third World, and

the relative homogeneity of many political systems in Latin America. This trend seems to be changing due to the policies of the Reagan administration. Territorial conflicts, on the other hand, because of their close association with resource conflicts, have increased. Migration conflicts have thus far been infrequent; because of the growing disparities in Latin American development levels, however, they seem to offer the greatest potential for conflict. Resource conflicts will also play an increasing role in the 1980s.

Only a few Latin American conflicts fit perfectly into such a typology, of course. A large number of conflict constellations are made up of a mixture of two or more of the above conflict types. Bilateral conflicts do, however, lend themselves to the following breakdown:

System conflicts: Costa Rica-Nicaragua, Cuba-United States, Dominican Republic-Haiti, Dominican Republic-United States, Guatemala-United States, Honduras-Nicaragua, and Nicaragua-United States.

Hegemonic conflicts: Argentina-Great Britain, Cuba-United States, Dominican Republic-United States, Guatemala-Great Britain, Guatemala-United States, Mexico-United States, Panama-United States, and Nicaragua-United States.

Territorial conflicts: Argentina-Great Britain, Chile-Argentina, Chile-Bolivia, Colombia-Venezuela, Cuba-United States, Guatemala-Great Britain, Honduras-El Salvador, Honduras-Nicaragua, Nicaragua-Colombia, Mexico-United States, Panama-United States, Peru-Chile, Peru-Ecuador, and Venezuela-Guyana.

Resource conflicts: Argentina-Brazil, Argentina-Great Britain, Chile-Argentina, Chile-Bolivia, Colombia-Venezuela, Guatemala-Great Britain, Nicaragua-Colombia, Mexico-United States, Panama-United States, Peru-Chile, Peru-Ecuador, and Venezuela-Guyana.

Migration conflicts: Chile-Argentina, Colombia-Venezuela, Cuba-United States, Dominican Republic-Haiti, Honduras-El Salvador, and Mexico-United States.

Because of the considerable overlap of conflict causes, one can determine that the conflict situation between, for example, Argentina and Great Britain is simultaneously a hegemonic, territorial, and resource conflict; that the conflict situation between Chile and Argentina is at the same time a territorial, resource, and migration conflict; and that the Chile-Bolivia and Colombia-Venezuela conflicts are both combinations of territorial and resource conflicts. The conflict between the Dominican Republic and Haiti involves both a system and a migration conflict, while the conflict between the Dominican Republic and the United States was a combination of a system and a hegemonic conflict. The Guatemala-Great Britain controversy was a hegemonic as well as territorial and resource conflict; while the Guatemala-United States conflict was clearly both a system and hegemonic conflict. The conflict between Honduras and El Salvador was a territorial and migration conflict, and that between Honduras and Nicaragua is a system and territorial conflict. The current conflict between Nicaragua and Colombia is a typical case of the

intersection of territorial and resource conflicts, while the traditional conflict between Mexico and the United States is simultaneously a territorial, resource, and migration conflict. The conflict between Panama and the United States was at the same time a hegemonic, territorial, and resource conflict, since the Panama Canal can correctly be seen as the object of a resource conflict. The Peru-Chile conflict is both a territorial and resource conflict, as are the Peru-Ecuador and Venezuela-Guyana conflicts.

The conflict between Argentina and Brazil must be considered a special case. Basically it is a resource conflict, but with regional significance. In light of the military and economic importance of these two states, both of which have traditionally vied for a leadership position in South America, this conflict must be viewed as potentially hegemonic, not least because Brazil in the medium-term future could play a role in Latin America similar to that played earlier by the hegemonic powers. Because the Argentina-Brazil controversy is primarily a contest for economic influence, access to markets, and control of resources in the bordering states of Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay, it clearly demonstrates the transitions in conflict patterns typical of the region. Given their continuing competition in the nuclear field and their different preferences with regard to alliances in the international system, future conflicts must be expected despite recent cooperative efforts between the two countries.

Not all virulent Latin American conflict situations can be explained exclusively in terms of a bilateral conflict constellation. Central America and the Caribbean are particularly unstable and conflict-prone regions because of the given combination of geopolitics and power politics to be found there. In Central America, this is primarily a result of the continuing hegemonic influence of the United States and the slow disintegration of outdated social and political systems. In the Caribbean, in addition to U.S. influence, the distortion of regional structures due to their alignment with former colonial powers is an important reason for the high level of instability. There are also the general problems faced by all small states: competing development models and the movements of certain factions or ethnic groups for secession and independence. Both the Cono Sur[25] and a number of Andean states (Peru, Chile, Bolivia) are considered to be particularly conflict-prone. This is a result, for the most part, of the expansive regional attitude of Brazil--on both the diplomatic and economic levels. The skillful Brazilian policy of manipulating the Platine republics and Amazon Pact countries has made it possible for Brazil to pursue its interests without seeming to encourage massive conflict.

Another extremely conflict-prone region, for strategic as well as resource-related reasons, is the Antarctic. After expiration of the Antarctic Treaty in 1989, conflicts over sovereignty, presently frozen, could once again heat up, not only between Argentina and Chile but with the extraregional powers (Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, and Norway) which are also party to the treaty.[26]

The partial shift from hegemonic and system conflicts to territorial, resource, and migration conflicts is an obvious result of economic

modernization and efforts to advance national self-interest in the field of development. The importance of traditional territorial conflicts has taken on a new face, since these conflicts today have less to do with questions of sovereignty, status, and prestige, and more to do with securing access to natural resources. This shift in conflict type is characteristic of the increasing nation-state development within the region and simultaneously of the increased need to exercise economic options.

Changing bilateral patterns of conflict and potential for regional conflict. The new context for interstate conflict behavior in Latin America is the result of a series of factors, mainly economic, growing out of changed international and regional, but also national, conditions. The inclusion of Latin America in the overlapping axes of the East-West and North-South conflicts could clearly lead to a complex conflict situation similar to that which has developed in southeast Asia, the Middle East, and southern Africa. As soon as the region as a whole steps out of the shadows and into the full glare of world politics, a broad range of actors will try to influence its bilateral conflict constellations. On the other hand, it is easy for a country or party which feels deprived in a given controversy to vie for a better position in an interstate conflict situation based on its position in the East-West conflict. The danger that such a regional conflict could expand to become the source of an even larger conflict is particularly great when one of the two parties in the regional conflict is openly and closely allied with one of the super-powers.[27] Thus the close military cooperation between individual Latin American states and the United States has repeatedly led to a situation in which the United States has been drawn into conflicts rather than being able to prevent them from developing.

With the Third World's growing "bargaining power," the super-powers' ability to prevent or limit such regional conflicts is steadily declining. Nevertheless, the influence which the great powers can exercise over the development of conflicts and the forms which they take remains considerably greater than any destabilizing effect these conflicts may have on the industrialized countries. This assertion was particularly true for the period during which the United States enjoyed an almost uncontested hegemonic position, but it is also true for the most recent period of conflicts. In view of the growing tendency of the super-powers to carry out their competition and rivalry within the Third World, the probability and frequency of conflict in Latin America will also depend on whether or not the Soviet Union continues to accept Latin America as the exclusive sphere of influence of the United States (disregarding Cuba for the moment).[28] Should the Soviet Union, in the medium-term future, decide to involve itself more heavily in this region, the East-West conflict would no longer be projected from only one side in certain conflict constellations within the region, as has been the case until now, but rather, as in the case of Cuba, would open up to the other super-power the option of forming more viable alliances with Latin American states.

In addition to this altered international situation, there are also regional shifts. In particular, the new perception of security in Latin America is the decisive indicator of a change in conflict patterns. From 1948 to 1965, despite Latin American criticism of the United States, the

concept of hemispheric defense was based on a silent consensus in the region which even made it possible to tolerate U.S. intervention in Guatemala and the Dominican Republic. After 1965, the "doctrine of national security," whereby security was interpreted almost exclusively to mean internal security, became the decisive factor in the perception of political threats to security in the region. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a third concept of security moved to the forefront--involving a combination of national-security and regional-conflict concerns. Recent developments in Central America have also shown that the definition of the term "security" has changed since the 1970s, and also that the term "intervention" is now interpreted far more broadly by the Latin Americans.[29] These new interpretations may produce an increase on the conflict side of the conflict-cooperation dialectic, even more so in the 1980s than before.

What is true for the region as a whole is also true for bilateral relations between Latin American states. In this regard, the common attitude toward the United States is beginning to crumble. A search is underway for a tangible and viable new "external enemy" which can be used to promote "national unity." The period between the departure of one dominating power and the development of new leadership roles in the region must, in view of the bilateral conflict constellations once again coming to life, tend to encourage conflict. The regional-alliance relationship, in part historically-based, tends to intersect with border conflicts between the individual states. Chile, for example, is interested in a special form of cooperation with Brazil because Chile is involved in conflicts with Argentina and Bolivia. At the same time, Chile is interested in maintaining close relations with Ecuador because both countries are in conflict with Peru. Argentina, on the other hand, is interested in good relations with Bolivia and Peru, because all three are involved in conflicts with Chile. Small Guyana leans closely on Brazil because of its border conflict with Venezuela. One cannot dismiss the possibility that these alliances will be extended beyond regional borders, depending on the power situation.

Thus, the intrusion of the Soviet Union in the Third World caused Argentina and Brazil to consider the possibility of mounting a regional defense effort. The planned--although for various reasons not yet implemented--south Atlantic defense pact (SATO)[30] is a typical example of the increased readiness of Latin American states to enter into conflict, also within the global framework. It was not primarily the United States which propelled such security-policy considerations forward, as was the case with the Rio Pact, but rather the naval and air forces of Argentina and Brazil, which hoped in this way to improve the quality of their armaments. The original intention to include South Africa in such a pact has prevented its formation, primarily because of Brazil's economic interests vis-a-vis black Africa. Brazil, for obvious foreign-policy reasons, is not willing to enter into such an alliance, while Argentina might cooperate with the United States in security matters in the south Atlantic and elsewhere.

Factors essentially internal have produced the growing heterogeneity within the region and the resulting new patterns of conflict. Militarization and technocratization have, in many states, produced a thrust toward

modernization which at first had a mainly national impact but which increasingly carries with it international implications. The conclusion of the phase of internally-directed national-security policy, particularly in the case of states dominated by the military, has released a considerable capacity for the gratification of external security needs.[31]

This situation was also precipitated by the fact that during the past decade Latin American military expenditures have risen considerably, in absolute figures as well as relative to the domestic gross national product.[32] The maintenance of the armed forces, the modernization of armaments, and the development of armaments industries have swallowed up vast amounts of money.[33] The resulting growth in military capacity will very likely contribute to a greater readiness to enter into conflict.

This "externally-directed militarization" proceeds hand in hand with the increasing production of armaments, characteristic of many developing countries, notably Brazil and Argentina. The resulting impressive armaments capacity makes possible interstate military aid from Third World armaments producers to smaller Third-World states, interjecting a new dimension into regional interstate conflicts. The conflict-reducing effect of arms-transfer limitations imposed by traditional supplier countries can, to a large extent, be undermined. This new aspect of "South-South" relations also leads to direct military intervention in internal or at least externally-perceived conflict situations in partner countries--conflicts which are often labelled "proxy wars." Cuba in Angola and, to a certain extent, Venezuela in El Salvador, are typical examples. The growing militarization in the Third World causes military or strategic South-South cooperation to become ever more probable. It will be difficult if not impossible for the great powers to exercise any control over the resulting situation.

Independent of the growing willingness to enter into conflict, there exists a correlation between military government and arms expenditures which becomes even stronger due to increased use of arms as a result of internal political and social conflict.[34] The domestic political function of interstate conflicts is directly correlated to the lack of legitimacy of the respective military regimes. Their accent on national unity and emphasis on an external enemy are aimed at stabilizing their regimes and distracting from internal problems. The job of nation-building is thus pursued at the expense of their neighbors.

The growing willingness to enter into conflict has, to the same extent, an effect on the region's political systems and armaments levels. Since the majority of Latin American states have not yet reached the international average in their capacity to employ external force, one must continue to expect a "catch-up" mentality in the field of armaments. Although, in terms of internal security, a degree of military saturation is observable in various states, the military, owing to their absolute control in many states of the region, are able to use the national treasury as a "self-service store" for their own priorities. One of the main consequences of this increased potential for conflict in the region is that in many Latin American states an "externally-directed militarization" will probably follow on the heels of the "internally-directed militarization."

Just as integration politics formed the basis for an "ersatz foreign policy" for the technocrats, now geopolitics forms the basis of an "ersatz foreign policy" for the military--a policy fixed to the idea of borders and spheres of influence.[35] Concern with improved control over entire sub-regions of states and related discussion regarding the role and function of borders[36] have replaced the preoccupation with integration--i.e., the elimination of borders within the continent--so prevalent during the 1960s. The impact of such ideas--characteristic of, but by no means limited to, the military--on the future constellations of conflict in Latin America cannot be overestimated.[37] Where traditional border conflicts overlap with the ever more important resource conflicts--which are, after all, a question of national survival--there exists, given the internal situation and the lack of legitimacy of many of these governments, a predisposition toward interstate controversy.

Conclusion

The study of interstate conflict behavior and the potential for conflict in Latin America makes two things particularly clear. First, the structural bases of most of the conflicts occurring during the period after the Second World War have hardly changed at all. Quite the opposite. In view of the growth of population, the growing gap in income distribution, and the differing levels of development among the individual countries in the region, they have become even stronger. Second, the conditions under which conflicts are carried out have changed significantly. The growing tendency of Latin America to step out of the "security shadow" of the United States has led directly to an increase in the potential for conflict.

However, any evaluation of the role of the hegemonic power in reducing or preventing conflict from 1948 to 1965 must differentiate between the interest profile and the effect profile. In any case, it has not yet become clear to what extent new instruments for the reduction of conflict in the region can be effective. Even the relatively successful reduction of conflict under the influence of the United States or the OAS was achieved by merely stifling conflicts rather than eliminating their causes.[38] In the past few years, those causes have expanded and intensified and their elimination has become ever more urgent. The greater internal latitude resulting from the decision-making freedom enjoyed by nondemocratic regimes, combined with expanded external latitude, make it possible that interstate conflicts will increasingly be used as a means for reaching political ends.

Given prevailing conditions in world markets, foreign policy for many Latin American states has become a form of economic survival strategy, in which the choice of means has assumed secondary importance. The unquestionably increased independence of the region, together with the greater capacities of individual states and their accelerated insertion in the international system, will also lead, in all probability, to more frequent resource-related conflicts within the sphere of interstate relations.

Given the search for a new balance of power in the region, a repetition of the conflict situation of the 1930s and early 1940s in Latin America cannot be considered out of the question.[39] The growing interaction

between the individual Latin American states, and the increased number of actors in originally internal and later bilateral conflicts, make the development of conflict--or at least a greater willingness to enter into conflict--all the more probable.[40] The growing heterogeneity now visible among the states of the region contributes to this process. The varying importance of individual states and their advocacy of regional interests toward the outside world constantly creates new potential for conflict, which tends to exacerbate the existing conflict patterns.

If the region is not to succumb to typical post-colonial, nationalistic crises, then it will be necessary to politically intercept this increase in conflict potential, putting aside external conflict-preventing--or at least conflict-solving--mechanisms, and addressing the substance of the problem through confidence-building measures. One possible catalyst, similar to the Cold War image of a "common enemy," is a common Third World consciousness which could replace the antagonism of the cooperation-conflict dialectic with a combination of cooperation and regional integration. The preconditions for such a consciousness already exist in most Latin American states, paralleling the increased potential for conflict. Thus the increasingly tense situations arising out of the partly traditional, partly new, interstate conflicts by no means need always end in violence.

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[1]For the purpose of this paper, the following 20 bilateral conflicts have been selected:

1. Argentina-Brazil since 1825
2. Argentina-Great Britain since 1833
3. Chile-Argentina since 1881
4. Chile-Bolivia since 1879
5. Colombia-Venezuela since 1834
6. Costa Rica-Nicaragua, 1948-1956
7. Cuba-United States since 1960
8. Dominican Republic-Haiti since 1949
9. Dominican Republic-United States, 1961-1965
10. Guatemala-Great Britain, 1859-1981
11. Guatemala-United States, 1951-1954
12. Honduras-El Salvador, 1967-1980
13. Honduras-Nicaragua since 1957
14. Nicaragua-Colombia since 1979
15. Nicaragua-United States since 1980
16. Mexico-United States since 1864
17. Panama-United States since 1903
18. Peru-Chile since 1889
19. Peru-Ecuador since 1882
20. Venezuela-Guyana since 1899

In the original study on which this paper draws, these 20 conflict constellations are compared as to: parties directly involved, parties indirectly involved, duration of conflict, subjects of differences, intensity of conflict (diplomatic tensions, nationalistic propaganda, arms races, economic sanctions, military threats, breaking of diplomatic relations, armed conflict), development of conflict, settlement efforts, settlement results, and potential for conflict. See Wolf Grabendorff, Zwischenstaatliches Konfliktverhalten und regionales Konfliktpotential in Lateinamerika (Ebenhausen: SWP-AZ 2269, 1980), pp. 47-90.

[2]Due to the absence of sufficient data, a number of interstate conflicts in Latin America could not be included in this analysis (Anguilla-Great Britain, Argentina-Paraguay, Argentina-Uruguay, Bolivia-Cuba, Dominican Republic-Venezuela, Guyana-Great Britain, Guyana-Surinam, Panama-Cuba, Puerto Rico-United States, Venezuela-Cuba). Another evaluation of 15 interstate conflicts can be found in Wolf Grabendorff, "Gewalt und Außenpolitik: Zum Konfliktverhalten lateinamerikanischer Staaten seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg," in Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas, vol. 15 (1978), pp. 397-424.

[3]See North-South: A Program for Survival. Report by the Independent Commission on International Development Issues (London, 1980), as well as Peter Lock, "Armaments Dynamics: An Issue in Development Strategies," Alternatives, 2:6 (July 1980), 157-178.

[4]Concerning these extraregional activities of Latin American states, see Raul Mattos A. Simoes, A presença do Brazil na 2ª guerra mundial (Rio de Janeiro, 1966); Lewis A. Tambs, "Five Times Against the System: Brazilian Foreign Military Expenditures and Their Effect on National Politics," in Henry H. Keith and Robert A. Hayes (eds.), Perspectives on Armed Politics in Brazil (Tempe, Arizona, 1976), pp. 177-223; Russell W. Ramsey, "The Colombian Battalion in Korea and Suez," Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 9:9 (October 1967), 541-560; Wolf Grabendorff, "Cuba's Involvement in Africa: An Interpretation of Objectives, Reactions and Limitations," Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 22:1 (February 1980), 3-29.

[5]See José Enrique Greño Velasco, "Estrategia y política en el Atlántico Sur," Revista de Política Internacional, 148 (November/December 1976), 19-43.

[6]See Grabendorff, "Gewalt und Außenpolitik," op. cit., pp. 407-413; Geoffrey Kemp, "Rearmament in Latin America," The World Today, 23:9 (1967), 365-384; Jerry L. Weaver, "Arms Transfers to Latin America: A Note on the Contagion Effect," Journal of Peace Research, 11:3 (1974), 213-219; Norman M. Smith, "Conventional Arms Transfers to Latin America," in Roger Fontaine and James D. Theberge (eds.), Latin America's New Internationalism: The End of Hemispheric Isolation (New York, 1976).

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[8]See Istvan Kende, "Dynamics of Wars, of Arms Trade and of Military Expenditure in the 'Third World', 1945-1976," Instant Research on Peace and Violence, 7:2 (1977), 60, 65.

[9]See William Eckhardt and Edward Azar, "Major World Conflicts and Interventions, 1945 to 1975," International Interactions, 5:1 (1978), 95.

[10]See Frederic S. Pearson, "Foreign Military Interventions and Domestic Disputes," International Studies Quarterly, 18:3 (September 1974), 284.

[11]See also Grabendorff, "Gewalt und Außenpolitik," op. cit.

[12]See Gorden Connell-Smith, "The Inter-American System: Problems of Peace and Security in the Western Hemisphere," in Robert W. Gregg (ed.), International Organization in the Western Hemisphere (New York, 1968), pp. 47-90; Jerome Slater, The OAS and United States Foreign Policy (Columbus, 1967).

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[13]See Slater, ibid., p. 195.

[14]The IAPC was activated 34 times between 1948 and 1965, but only once after 1965, during the "soccer war" of 1969 (Honduras-El Salvador). For a detailed list of its activities, see U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Inter-American Relations (Washington, D.C., 1973), pp. 48-53. As to its evolution, see Mary-Jean Reid Martz, "Pacific Settlement of Controversies in the Inter-American System, 1948-1970" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1971); Aida Luisa Levin, "Regionalism and the United Nations in American Foreign Policy: The Peace-Keeping Experience of the Organization of American States" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1971); and Love O. Leger, "The Inter-American Peace Committee" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Temple University, 1974). In 1970, the IAPC was dissolved because of the reform of the OAS Charter and was replaced by the Inter-American Committee on Peaceful Settlement, which has not yet been activated. See Mary-Jean Reid Martz, "OAS Reforms and the Future of Pacific Settlement," Latin American Research Review, 12:2 (1977), 176-186.

[15]See Charles D. Ameringer, The Democratic Left in Exile: The Anti-Dictatorial Struggle in the Caribbean, 1945-1959 (Coral Gables, 1974).

[16]See Tom J. Farer, "Limiting Intraregional Violence: The Costs of Regional Peace-Keeping," in Tom J. Farer (ed.), The Future of the Inter-American System (New York, 1979), p. 196.

[17]This can be easily demonstrated by the fact that the United States has exerted the greatest pressure in this region by its military presence. Between 1960 and 1965, the U.S. Navy staged 13 "show of force" operations in the Caribbean, whereas only one such action (1970, off Trinidad) was conducted between 1965 and 1975. See the detailed list by Howard S. Eldredge, "Nonsuperpower Sea Denial Capability: The Implications for Superpower Navies Engaged in Presence Operations," in Uri Ra'anan (ed.), Arms Transfers to the Third World (Boulder, Colo., 1978), pp. 22-24.

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[19]See Gabriel Marcella, "Las relaciones militares entre los Estados Unidos y América Latina: Crisis e Interrogantes Futuros," in Estudios Internacionales, 13:51 (July/September 1980), 395-396.

[20]See Mariano Grondona, "South America Looks at Detente (Skeptically)," in Foreign Policy, 26 (Spring 1977), 184-203.

[21]This term has been borrowed from Alexandre S.C. Barros. See his excellent article, "The Diplomacy of National Security: South American International Relations in a Defrosting World," in Ronald G. Hellmann and H. Jon Rosenbaum (eds.), Latin America: The Search for a New International Role (New York, 1975), pp. 131-150.

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[23]Due to recent developments in Central America and the Caribbean, the United States has been trying to intensify its military relations with some Latin American states. See Marcella, op. cit.

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[27]See David F. Ronfeld and Caesar Sereseres, U.S. Arms Transfers, Diplomacy and Security in Latin America and Beyond (Santa Monica, 1977).

[28]See Andre Gunder Frank, "Arms Economy and Warfare in the Third World," Third World Quarterly, 2:2 (April 1980), 246; Alexandre Barros, however, argues: "One way or another the area is escaping the influence zone of the U.S. This does not mean a shift of alliances but rather the development of another independent power zone in the World." Barros, op. cit., p. 149. With regard to Soviet interests in the region, see Robert S. Leiken, "Eastern Winds in Latin America," Foreign Policy, 42 (Spring 1981), 94-113.

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[30]Concerning SATO, see Jorge Nelson Gualco, Análisis de un pacto defensivo en el Atlántico Sur," Geopolítica, 7/8 (January-April 1977), 28-34; Carlos P. Mastrorilli, "La cuestión del Atlántico Sur," Defensa, 7:7 (1978), 4-9; Greño Velasco, op. cit.; and Daniel Waksman Schinka, "El proyecto de la OTAS," Nueva Política, 2:5-6 (April-September 1977), 331-352.

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[33]An excellent comparison of military capacity in the Argentina-Brazil, Chile-Peru, and Ecuador-Peru conflict constellations can be found in Varas and Portales, op. cit.

[34]See especially the interesting thesis of Kim Quaile Hill, "Domestic Politics, International Linkages, and Military Expenditures," Studies in Comparative International Development, 13:1 (Spring 1978), 42-43.

[35]The best analysis of this subject is John Child, "Geopolitical Thinking in Latin America," Latin American Research Review, 14:2 (Summer 1979), 89-111. The article includes details on the pertinent literature and the different national schools of geopolitics. Child comes to the conclusion that "In the Southern Cone in particular, the prevalence of geopolitical thinking suggests the frame of reference for explaining some of the enduring international rivalries that have persisted in this area." (p. 109)

[36]A good indicator for the importance of this discussion is the influence of geopolitical and strategic journals in Latin America--e.g., Estratégia (Argentina), Geopolítica (Argentina), Segurança e Desenvolvimento (Brazil), A Defesa Nacional (Brazil), Geopolítica (Uruguay), Seguridad Nacional (Chile), Estudios Geopolíticos y Estratégicos (Peru), and Defensa Nacional (Peru).

[37]See Ronfeldt and Sereseres, op. cit., pp. 58-62.

[38]"The failure of the OAS to provide mechanisms for facilitating internal political change is not surprising in a hemisphere so sharply divided between the big and the small, the left and the right, the democracies and the dictatorships, and the civilians and the military; there is little possibility of agreement on what types of change to hinder and what types to assist." See Jerome Slater, A Reevaluation of Collective Security: The OAS in Action (Columbus, 1965), p. 55.

[39]See David F. Ronfeldt and Luigi R. Einaudi, "Conflict and Cooperation Among Latin American States," in Luigi R. Einaudi (ed.), Beyond Cuba: Latin America Takes Charge of Its Future (New York, 1974), p. 192. Ronfeldt also emphasizes: "I think we can expect that attention to regional foreign policies will take priority over, or assume as much priority as, relations with the major external powers." See U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Hearings: Arms Trade in the Western Hemisphere (Washington, D.C., 1978), p. 127.

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