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Authors' note: An earlier draft of this paper was presented at a May 15-17, 1980 workshop on "Six Years of Military Rule in Chile" sponsored by the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. 20560. The paper is a joint effort in the fullest sense of the term. Authors' names appear in alphabetical order. Research for the paper was conducted in Chile in July 1979, January 1980, March 1981, and November 1981. Additional interviews were conducted with observers and party leaders in the United States and Europe. They are not identified. The authors are extremely grateful to them for sharing so freely of their time and experiences.

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ABSTRACT

Party Oppositions Under the Chilean Authoritarian Regime

The thesis of the paper is that the overt political strategy of the Chilean military and its indirect efforts at political change through a transformation of the economy and society will not succeed in destroying the Chilean party system and the partisan attachments in the electorate. The thesis is supported by empirical studies of Chilean voting behavior before the coup, which show that Chile had developed a durable "political landscape"; by evidence of the way preexisting parties and organized groups, despite repression, have moved into new organizational spaces created, ironically, to thwart them; and by comparative references to France and Spain. The paper notes that analysis of authoritarian regimes must take into account the dialectic of interaction between state and opposition, and must consider the preexisting party and political system in any comparative analysis.

# PARTY OPPOSITIONS UNDER THE CHILEAN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME

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During the 1970s, the best political-science writings on Latin America shifted the field away from a preoccupation with political development, the prospects for revolution, or the transition to socialism, to an emphasis on the origins and nature of authoritarian regimes.[1] The demise of the Popular Unity government in Chile in 1973 helped to strengthen this trend as it brought Chile, the longest-lasting democracy on the continent, into line with military governments in power in almost every other country. The "rectification" of the status of this deviant case made it simpler for various schools to draw either on cultural, historical, or economic determinants (or a combination of these) to explain the emergence of corporatist military or bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes.[2]

The new literature has been rich and sophisticated. Preoccupation with the nature of the state and with the relationship between dependent capitalism and the advent of military regimes has brought us a long way from an excessive concern with ethnocentrically biased themes such as the functions of underdeveloped interest groups and parties, or with simplistic formulations about class consciousness. The focus has been on the attempt to uncover the socioeconomic etiology of authoritarianism or on regime characterization based on an examination of the formal outlines of the state and of official policy pronouncements and goals. The general emphasis has been on the more readily apparent elements of the authoritarian regime or "situation"; those which flow directly from the overt economic, social, and political blueprints, objectives, and conceptions imposed by the ruling circles on themselves.[3]

There is a danger, however, that in stressing some of the commonalities of authoritarianism and the broad determinants of the authoritarian phenomena, the literature runs the risk of losing sight of the fact that a political regime is not defined simply by the structures and actions of the state--it is also defined by the interplay between the state and civil society. Much of the thrust of military dictatorships, in particular, relates to their effort to stamp out opposition forces. Through direct repression and a destruction of institutions and procedures for popular participation, they seek to create conditions for an emergence of alternative political forces at the end of the period of exceptional rule which would guarantee that those elements anathema to the regime are not capable of reemerging. Though these "bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes" have specifically refused to set time-frames for a return to civilian rule, and have deliberately argued that they are not merely regimes of transition

but of transformation, the fundamental objective is to make possible a political and social order in the future which would involve a different type of political organization of society. The strategies followed to ensure a new outcome have varied widely. The Brazilian model preserved limited institutions of representation in an attempt to restructure the party system, even resorting to the creation of an "official" opposition while manipulating elections in a grand (and ultimately unsuccessful) strategy of cooptation. The Chilean military, by contrast, has closed the congress, banned elected local governments, and disallowed party activity in the hope that repression, combined with fundamental transformations instituted in the political and social order and in the functions of the state, will "sanitize" the political process, destroying party organizations and partisan affiliations within society. It is thus crucial to analyze what happens to opposition groups and forces during the authoritarian period in order to make judgments on the regime's success or failure in establishing its transformation project.

The fate of opposition elements, in turn, cannot be scrutinized by reference only to the authoritarian context--it is dependent on the historical importance of opposition forces in the period prior to the advent of authoritarianism. It is inconceivable in the Chilean case, given the importance of strong parties, to imagine the military authorities attempting to create, as in Brazil, two federated parties out of the remnants of historical party organizations, one favoring, and one "opposing" the government. It is also hard to imagine the Chilean ruler, General Augusto Pinochet, approaching trade-union leaders and party officials of the deposed regime in the same way that, in Argentina, Onganía attempted to recruit Peronistas, or that Galtieri sought a dialogue with party leaders before the conflict with Britain over the Malvinas.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the state of oppositions in the Chilean authoritarian "situation," by focusing on those opposition elements, namely political parties, which were at the center stage of the political system prior to the September 11, 1973 military coup. Of all opposition forces, they constitute viable regime alternatives, and are thus primary candidates for government obliteration. Our aim is to describe the internal problems of parties forced to shift their functions from essentially electoral and policymaking organizations, to semi- or fully clandestine organizations attempting to maintain organizational vitality. We will also focus on the relationships which exist between the various parties as they seek to work out common strategies to replace the military dictatorship, as well as on the varying and complex ties and relationships between party organizations and other elements of civil society.

The creation of an authoritarian state is an obvious defeat for democratic political parties and opposition forces, including, ironically, those that supported a military solution. The prohibition of meetings, the banning of demonstrations, the censorship of publications, and the intimidation of leaders through killings, exile, or imprisonment directly threatens organizational survival. At the same time, the destruction of institutions and procedures such as the parliament, state and local assemblies, elections, collective bargaining structures, etc., through which political parties functioned and thrived, deprives parties of their most basic justification for existence.

Our central thesis, however, is that the long-dominant Chilean party system will not be obliterated as easily as the military government sympathizers hope or as government detractors fear. The continuity of the party system in the body politic is assured by the existence of distinct political tendencies in the electorate, a "political landscape" which has evolved over several generations, reinforced by Chile's long tradition of electoral politics. Despite profound transformations in the role of the state and privatization of the economy, this "landscape" will endure, and parties will continue to play important roles in a radically different political context. To be sure, these roles have changed. No longer do parties concentrate their energies on electoral appeals, the structuring of political coalitions or the formulation of policy options. Instead, they must focus on the imperatives of organizational and ideological survival and on the structuring of opposition in other spheres of society.

In many instances parties appear to be taking a back-seat to other elements of civil society which are thrust into the limelight as parties are repressed--elements such as the Church, labor unions, and a host of informal community-based groups and associations structured to promote grassroots survival. The political vacuum occasioned by the stripping away of traditional institutions and mediating structures exposes in a stark fashion the very rudiments of civil society. The actual role of parties will vary depending on the nature of generalized repression, the range of political spaces available for party action, the level of support for the regime among other social sectors, and the degree of tolerance for the party in question on the part of the regime. In periods of significant repression, when few organizational spaces are available, party militants may become inactive and party members will turn to private pursuits.

But it is crucial to emphasize that demobilization of society based on the repressive actions of the regime should not be taken to mean that the society has been depoliticized. The parties, by virtue of their prior insertion into the fabric of national life and their continuing and critical function as catalysts for the maintenance and expansion of organized dissent--in party and nonparty arenas--will continue to spearhead opposition to the regime. And perhaps more ominously for the authorities, the parties will succeed, as they did under even more adverse conditions in Spain, in maintaining an organizational presence and societal support such that they will once again become the principal mediating and defining forces of the political process once the authoritarian regime leaves power. The Chilean military will fail to create alternative structural arrangements and the necessary fundamental changes in allegiance patterns in civil society to ensure the perpetuation of the authoritarian coalition once democracy is restored.

Before turning to a discussion of parties as opposition groups under the Pinochet government, it is necessary to describe very briefly the range of opposition to the regime and the place of party politics within that opposition. It is also necessary to describe in more detail the nature of the preexisting party system, stressing those aspects which contribute to our understanding of their place within the new authoritarian context.

## A General Note on Oppositions to the Chilean Military Regime

The stage for post-1973 Chilean politics was set by the fact that the leaders of the 11th of September pronunciamiento defined the nation's crisis as one of regime rather than one of government.[4] In their view, the crisis was simply a symptom of fundamental inadequacies in Chile's democracy and party system, characterized by forces pushing for the construction of an increasingly dominant and centralized state which exacerbated underdevelopment, and by a rampant and divisive politicization which favored the rise of a Marxist left. As such, their aim was not merely a reactive attempt to curb the perceived excesses of a mobilized society by providing a short inter regnum that would allow a reversion to the status quo ante; they also saw their task as a regenerative one, requiring the destruction and rebuilding of the fundamental features of Chile's economy, democracy, and party system.[5] The formulation of this renovationist project set the scene for post-coup politics as it produced a fundamental distinction within the kaleidoscope of oppositions. Thus, it is possible to distinguish, on the one hand, an oppositionist but pro-military regime sector, one whose pro-regime stance stems from its acceptance of the need and legitimacy of the regenerative task. It is also possible to identify an opposition characterized by its rejection of the renovationist project.

The pro-regime opposition corresponds to the groups or individuals that Juan Linz identifies as the "semi-opposition" to the authoritarian regimes--that is, those who "are not dominant or represented in the governing group but that are willing to participate in power without fundamentally challenging the regime. This attitude involves partial criticism and some visibility and identity outside the inner circle of participants in the political struggle."[6] The pro-regime opposition groups, however, are not nearly as numerous in Chile as they were under the Francoist regime which serves as the basis for Linz's analysis of oppositions to authoritarian regimes. One reason for that is because, unlike Spain, Chile did not have a large array of right-wing organizations--from Carlists to Falangists--each with its specific institutional blueprints for the future. Of three extreme right-wing organizations in Chile, Fatherland and Liberty, the Society for the Defense of Tradition, Family and Property, and Opus Dei, only the first was well known given the visibility of its militants in street demonstrations, and only it can be said to have become representative of a semiopposition.[7] Though formally in self-declared dissolution since 1973, Fatherland and Liberty's main leader, Pablo Rodríguez Grez, has insisted over the years since the military coup on the necessity of generating a "national civic movement" in support of the government, and at least until the approval of the 1981 constitution, he argued in favor of a corporative institutional arrangement.[8] While it is true that many other individuals and groups that supported the government at the beginning, including many associated with the rightist National party, have criticized the regime, particularly its economic policies, they do so on an ad hoc basis, with little organizational cohesion, and with no articulated alternative policy in mind.

A second reason for this relative paucity of semiopposition groups in Chile, when compared with Spain, lies in the fact that the Pinochet government is a good deal more rigid, principled, less institutionalized, and more narrowly based than Francisco Franco's ever was. The Franco regime contained representatives of virtually all of the groups that opposed the losing side in the civil war, including the Church and moderate Catholics, as well as right-wing organizations. It developed a host of institutions at all societal levels for representation and control.[9]

By contrast, the Chilean dictatorship is a military regime, in which Pinochet has succeeded in gaining enormous personal power by virtue of his manipulation of the promotion system in the armed forces, the pillar of support for the government. Pinochet relies on a small circle of advisors who design policies by deriving them from a doctrinal free-market vision of society without even consulting the views of affected interests. Since any persistent criticism by groups outside the governing team will inevitably be suspected of harboring ulterior political motives of an anti-regime nature, there is little space or incentive in Chile to create groups which will be visible opponents of specific policies but supporters of the overall regime. There is simply little chance that such groups will have any influence in the policymaking process given the inflexibility of the government and its monolithic character, or that their visible leaders will be called upon to form part of the governing team given the narrowness of recruitment to policymaking positions. Criticisms by individuals favoring the government therefore are generally expressed in private. The fact that the only vocal group of semi-opponents to the regime is an extreme rightist one only confirms this analysis: the extreme right was completely isolated under the previous democratic regime, and it therefore cannot be suspected of wishing to return to the past. It represents a "holier-than-thou" semi-opposition.

The lack of incentive to create groups of visible pro-regime opponents should not be taken to mean, however, that there are not appreciable differences of opinion among supporters of the authoritarian project to transform Chilean society. These differences do appear openly on the rare occasions when the government encourages public comment on a pending policy matter, or as is more often the case, when it unwittingly does so as it stalls on determining a clear course of action on a particular issue it has set out to resolve. Characteristically, however, these differences among various personalities, groups, or circles within the regime disappear rapidly under a veil of consensus once the chief of state charts a clear course of action. The debates preceding the unveiling of the new constitution of 1981 provide an example of a factionalization among regime supporters over differences of opinion regarding a pending and highly important question, since they led to a distinction between the so-called hard- and soft-liners. Both groups were clearly motivated by the attempt to generate a political framework which would preempt the reemergence of the Marxist parties. And yet, the hard-liners argued in favor of an indefinite continuation of military rule, or in terms of designing a corporative charter that would break with Chile's constitutional tradition. The soft-liners argued in favor of a return to a constitutional system approximating the previous liberal-democratic one, with parties and elections based on territorial rather than corporative units, noting that the Marxist parties would be prevented from reemerging by the profound changes that the government's

policies would produce in the Chilean economy and society--all of which would in the long run create a consensual political and social order.[10] However, in a characteristic way, these apparently profound differences were put aside by the regime's supporters when Pinochet announced a definitive course of action. Thus, at least for the moment, these internal debates have produced factions within the regime but not clear-cut semi-oppositions. For this to occur, the regime would have to become less narrow and inflexible, allowing institutionalized and legitimate spaces for the expression of disagreements within the broader framework of the authoritarian polity and project.

We will now turn to the anti-regime oppositions which will concern the bulk of these pages. They can be classified along two dimensions as summarized in Figure 1:

Figure 1.

Location of anti-regime opposition according to level of toleration and character as regime alternative

| | TOLERATED | NOT TOLERATED |
|---|---|---|
| Regime alternative | Christian Democrats | Unidad Popular parties<br>Clandestine military groups |
| Non-regime alternative | Church<br>Unions<br>Research groups | Clandestine political networks in the labor and student movement |

The first dimension refers to the character and objectives of the opposition groups: whether they can provide power alternatives--or whether they are constituted for some other purpose. Political parties and clandestine military organizations are the only opposition groups with the will and capability to provide a ruling alternative to the military authorities. Other organizations have neither the objective nor the organizational and leadership capabilities to constitute a new regime, although they can raise the costs of ruling, help maintain political space for regime alternative oppositions, and contribute to delegitimizing the authorities.

Non-regime alternatives include overtly political groups such as intellectuals and some union and university groups, and nonpolitical mediating groups or institutions such as social service organizations at the grassroots of civil society ranging from soccer clubs, to soup kitchens, to mothers' groups, to mutual aid societies, to informal networks of solidarity and support in the face of poverty and unemployment. They are best characterized as latently political. Their leaders often have close ties to parties or are recruited by the parties as they gain prominence within their organizations. In periods of significant repression, they remain apolitical. In periods of liberalization, they become important channels for partisan organization and expression and constitute an

important link between the parties and civil society in a nonelectoral context.

Anti-regime opposition groups also vary significantly in the degree of toleration for the group or institution's activities on the part of the authorities. This second dimension is a continuum rather than a clear-cut duality, nor is it immutable. The level of toleration may change for all groups or for particular groups depending on the particular conjuncture. Some anti-regime groups in Chile have enjoyed a high level of toleration. After a period of repression, independent intellectual groups, supported in large measure by international foundations, have succeeded in establishing themselves as legitimate, if precarious, participants in a restricted national debate. Other groups such as labor unions, the press, and professional associations (once purged of leadership directly identified with the Popular Unity parties) have been generally tolerated because they are functional, as opposed to primarily political, organizations, and their complete destruction would countervene efforts to encourage privatization in economic and social spheres. Still others, such as the Christian Democratic party, have been tolerated because the domestic as well as the international costs to the government of repressing a party which was so closely identified with the democratic opposition to the Allende government generally outweighed the benefits. Nevertheless, the government has increasingly moved against the party as it has continued to assert itself as a major threat to Pinochet's rule.

On the other end of the continuum are the parties and labor organizations closely identified with the Popular Unity government, which have suffered the brunt of official repression and continue to be closely monitored by the security apparatus.

The most important "non-alternative" opposition institution under the Chilean military regime is without doubt the Church. It has been able to operate relatively freely because of its strong institutional legitimacy.[11] As we will note in more detail below, it has played a key role in providing a "political umbrella" for much of the activity of opposition organizations--and has thus provided the parties with "organizational spaces" which have helped to keep them alive.

The identification of the Church with opposition elements is another key difference from the Spanish case, in which the Church vigorously aligned itself with the Nationalist cause and lent the Franco regime its institutional and spiritual legitimacy. The position of the Chilean Church, which has strongly endorsed liberal and democratic institutions and criticized the government's human-rights record, has deprived Pinochet of a crucial legitimizing factor which can be claimed by opposition sectors, from moderate Catholics to the left.

## The Historicity of the Party System: Misconceptions and Realities

The cardinal objective of the regenerative project of the Chilean military junta is to do away with the traditional party system. There is a consensus in government circles that this can be accomplished directly through repressive measures and the creation of new intermediary

organizations purged of party influence, and indirectly through the significant transformations occurring in the economy and society. These transformations would presumably lead to greater modernization, a greater stake in the system, and a more consensual political process where the "politics of outbidding" and Marxist groups become things of the past. The official line is that Chilean parties have already become obsolete, and that all that is left are a few unemployed ex-leaders clinging to the past.

This political project is based on certain assumptions about the Chilean party system which have only recently been elaborated by government spokesmen. The best example, so far, is an article written by government ideologue Jaime Guzmán, a member of the committee which drafted the new constitution and a close adviser and speech writer for General Pinochet. The article, "El Camino Político," was reprinted prominently in El Mercurio, the country's leading newspaper.[12] Guzmán, in an argument which closely parallels some of the major speeches of the chief executive, maintains that Chilean parties were an abnormal expression of the politics of an underdeveloped society with the formal trappings of democratic procedures.[13] Although Chilean democracy functioned well in the 19th century, when popular sectors were excluded from the political system, it deteriorated significantly with the expansion of the electorate and, particularly, with the 1960 electoral reforms which contributed to a dramatic increase in the number of voters. The advent of mass democracy in an underdeveloped country which lacked the requisite economic wealth to ensure the loyalty of the population to the prevailing socioeconomic order lies at the root of the rise of the electoral fortunes of Marxist parties who fueled the politics of outbidding in their successful effort to overwhelm the established parties and gain control of the state.

This analysis assumes that the growth of the left is a recent phenomenon, one closely tied to the extension of suffrage. Leftist voting is a product of underdevelopment, the natural result of a mobilized and "inmiserated" population which is easy prey to demogogic appeals and radical solutions.

While opposition leaders and intellectuals strongly disagree with the government on most issues, including its claim that the economic model will succeed, many are concerned that government economic and social policies will seriously undermine the major Chilean parties. They view with trepidation free-market policies which have flooded the country with imported goods available even to low-income sectors, fearing that a consumerist bonanza will erode the appeal of traditional political forces. They also worry that the privatization of health care and social security will have the effect of tying the fate of working-class elements too closely with those of the private sector, reducing political militancy. And, more fundamentally, they are alarmed by the implications of an export-oriented economic model that has seriously weakened an industrial infrastructure which provided the base for the parties of the left.[14]

Both government supporters and critics base their analysis on the assumption that political loyalties in Chile were relatively ephemeral; that the parties did not have strong roots in society. According to the former, they depended on opportunistic or ideological leaders and militants with no real following in the body politic. According to the

latter, they were the product of particular underlying economic forces which, if changed, would change the pattern of loyalties. It follows that either an elimination of party militants and leaders, or a gradual "modernization" of society, would contribute to a substantially different political and party system.

It is our contention that the major parties have not disappeared, nor are the fundamental political loyalties within the society likely to erode in the foreseeable future. The assumptions behind the "party decline" thesis are based on a series of misconceptions about Chilean party politics. An examination of these misconceptions will help not only to point out the limitations of government policies, but to provide the necessary background to understand the continuity of the party system under the Chilean authoritarian situation. It should be underscored that these "misconceptions" are closely interrelated and are separated here only for analytical purposes.

> Misconception No. 1: The rise of the left is closely associated with the incorporation into the Chilean political system of large numbers of previously unmobilized sectors of the population.

By comparison with other countries, Chile did have a lower level of electoral participation until the 1960s. However, the expansion of suffrage was not related to the rise in the fortunes of the Marxist parties. Figure 2 plots the growth of electoral participation in Chile since 1920 with the growth of support for the Communist and Socialist parties. As early as the first decades of this century, the Marxist parties (Socialista Obrero, founded in 1912, becoming the Communist party in 1921; and Socialista, founded in 1933) emerged in working-class constituencies at a time when the electorate was contracting, not expanding. Likewise, the significant expansion of the late 1960s was not accompanied by a comparable rise in leftist voting until the Allende administration. Indeed, the two leftist parties in 1973 had approximately the same percentage of the total vote they had in 1943, with the decline in the intervening years explained by the outlawing of the Communist party in the immediate post-war period. (See Table 3.)

More systematic examinations of the relationship between turnout and party voting confirm these general observations. Table 1, which reports the correlation coefficients between the percentage of the population eligible to vote in 1969 with voting for each major party for all communes, shows little relationship between the two variables. The only positive association of any consequence is not with the parties of the left, but with the rightist National party, suggesting that the right, particularly because of its influence in rural areas, could still be a dominant factor in mobilizing new voters.

Similar conclusions can be derived from a detailed examination of the political correlates of electoral expansion in the post-war period from 1958 to 1973. The return of the Communist party to electoral politics, after the repeal in 1958 of the law which proscribed the party, and several electoral reforms which guaranteed a secret ballot and established penalties for not registering, led to a dramatic expansion of the electorate.[15]

Figure 2

Political Participation




Source: Electoral data from the Dirección General del Registro Electoral, Santiago, Chile. Demographic information from the Dirección de Estadística y Censos, "Población Total por Provincias de Chile, 1885-1960" (Santiago 1964), and "Población del País" (Santiago 1964), and El Mercurio, September 4, 1970, pp. 11-12.

Table 1

Correlations between the vote for major Chilean parties and the percentage of the eligible population registered to vote by commune in the 1969 parliamentary election

| | Party Vote | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Communist | Socialist | Radical | Christian Democrat | National |
| Level of participation | .04 | -.04 | -.03 | -.05 | .13 |

N=287

SOURCE: Calculated from electoral data available in the Dirección del Registro Electoral, Santiago.

These reforms were followed by those of 1970 which reduced the voting age to 18 and abolished the literacy requirement. The total vote rose from 880,000 in the congressional election of 1957 to 1.4 million in 1961. By 1969, the electoral population was close to 2.5 million; by 1973 it had risen to 3.5 million. Registered voters had doubled from about 15 percent of the population to 30 percent.

Table 2 presents the simple correlation coefficients between the increases in the electorate in selected years and the vote for Chilean parties for each commune. Columns 1 and 5 focus on the immediate political correlates of the legal change of 1960 and 1970. The other columns focus on the cumulative expansion of the electorate from 1961 to 1965, 1969, and 1973. The only correlation of any significance is the expected correlation between the vote for the Communist party and the electoral expansion occurring in 1957-61 after the party was legalized. At no other time is there a strong correlation between leftist vote and increased electoral turnout. The only other correlation which stands out is the weak one of .25 for the Christian Democrats during their years of dramatic expansion from 1961 to 1965. That that correlation is as low as it is underscores the fact that increases in participation did not benefit any particular party to the detriment of others. The dramatic increase in voter participation in Chile was accompanied by a commensurate increase in the ability of all of the major parties to capture the voters added to the rolls. This meant that the fundamental political tendencies in Chilean society shifted only gradually over time, with the major shift involving the gradual decline of the right and the rise of the Christian Democrats as a new center force, replacing the Radicals. The political shifts which took place were the results of coalition shifts, such as the right's support for the Christian Democrats in 1964 (with spill-over into the 1965 election) and the instability of the center in a polarized party system.[16]

Table 2

Correlations between the vote for Chilean parties and the increase in electoral turnout in selected years

| Parties | Electoral Increase | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Increase from 57 to 61 | Increase from 61 to 65 | Increase from 61 to 69 | Increase from 61 to 73 | Increase from 69 to 73 |
| Communist | .40 | .08 | .04 | -.10 | -.01 |
| Socialist | .11 | .04 | .12 | .13 | .09 |
| Radical | .08 | -.13 | -.17 | -- | -- |
| Christian Dem. | -.11 | .25 | -.12 | .06 | -.09 |
| Conservative | -.15 | -.08 | | | |
| Liberal | -.08 | -.16 | | | |
| National | | | .05 | 1.2 | -.07 |

N = 287

Note: The National party was formed by the fusion of the Conservative and Liberal parties. Results for the Radical party are not reported after 1969 because the party split. Correlations are simple Pearson Correlation coefficients.

SOURCE: Calculated from electoral information available in the Dirección Nacional del Registro Electoral, Santiago.

The most telling evidence of the misconception that there was a direct relationship between suffrage expansion and a vote for the Marxist left is the fact that Allende received at most 13 percent of the new voters added to the rolls from 1964 to 1970, with the bulk going to the candidate of the right.[17] This explains why Allende received a smaller percentage of the total vote in 1970 than he did in 1964 when he lost to Frei.

> Misconception No. 2: The fortunes of the left are closely tied to its appeal to impoverished sectors of society. The availability of cheap imported consumer goods will severely tax the loyalty of these sectors to leftist parties.

The important research findings of Alejandro Portes have effectively put to rest deprivationist and relative-deprivationist hypotheses about leftist voting in Chile.[18] Portes has shown that the lower the income and occupational status of respondents among the working poor, the less likely their support for the left. Nor is status inconsistency and social frustration associated with voting for Marxist parties. The most humble and frustrated citizens have levels of leftist voting "quite similar to those exhibited by the highest and least frustrated category--intermediate services and white collar."[19]

Although the left in Chile drew more on working-class sectors, and the parties of the center and right had strong support among middle- and upper-class elements, all Chilean parties had heterogeneous bases of support, and drew the bulk of their voters from the poorer sectors of society. In Portes' sample, the Christian Democratic party received as much support from low-income elements as did the Communists and Socialists. The National party always relied on the rural poor for much of its voting support. Conversely, other surveys have noted that certain categories of professionals and middle-level managers were more likely to support the left than the right. Aggregate data analysis yields similar results. An examination of the socioeconomic correlates of the vote for Chile's parties reveals that with the exception of the Communist party, with strong roots in mining areas, only a small percentage of the variance in party voting was explained by economic or occupational variables.[20]

Nor does it follow that voting for the left is a feature of underdevelopment which will disappear with access to a higher standard of living. Leftist voting in France increased as the country became more industrialized and as its standard of living rose to one of the highest in the world. As Richard Hamilton's work has shown, the availability of a wealth of new consumer products for French workers did not translate into lower militancy.[21] The French experience contradicts the simplistic notion that economic development or a consumerist bonanza will create the ground rules for consensual as opposed to ideological politics. It should be recalled that in Chile the Popular Unity government was able to maintain a higher percentage of the vote in the 1973 election than it obtained in the 1970 presidential election at a time of enormous economic hardship. Had the electorate been mainly motivated by short-term economic benefits, they would have turned against the government at a time of massive shortages and triple-digit inflation.

Misconception No. 3: Government economic policies, by dramatically changing the economy, will erode the bases of support for political parties.

The military junta has instituted far-reaching changes in the Chilean economy, unprecedented in the nation's history. Reversing policies begun over 50 years ago, it has sought to reduce the role of the state as regulator, catalyst, and owner of the nation's productive resources. By reducing tariff barriers, it has encouraged domestic industry to compete with international firms, with the net effect that many of Chile's overprotected industries have failed. What are the likely political effects of these changes? Will the destruction of many enterprises, the high level of unemployment, the return to primary products for export, etc., lead to the erosion of the natural constituencies of political parties?

As noted above, all Chilean parties, including the parties of the left, have heterogeneous bases of support. Although it is true that the left relied on the industrial working class for core support, industrial workers also voted for other parties, and the left drew substantial support from nonindustrial workers and middle-class elements. In the absence of further research, it is difficult to judge the level of industrial decline required to bring about significant political changes. Nor is it merely a matter of examining overall decline in industrial employment--we need to know more about particular industries and how they have fared.

The evidence to date suggests that the opening of the Chilean economy to foreign competition has led to an increase of the tertiary sector, while mining has remained constant and employment in construction and industry has declined. From 1970 to 1980, the industrial share of the GDP fell from 24 percent to 20.6 percent, a drop of 14 percent, while the percentage of the population employed in industry dropped to 14.4 percent. Public employment between the same years dropped from 9.3 percent to 8.8 percent.[22]

It should be underscored that employment in mining, where the parties of the left have their strongest support, has not declined, and in fact may increase if new investments are realized. And it is doubtful whether an even steeper decline in industrial employment would cripple the parties of the left to the advantage of center and right parties. As noted earlier, the percentage of the vote garnered by the left in 1970 was comparable to that of 1943, before much of the expansion of Chilean industry based on the import-substitution strategy of the Radical governments. Furthermore, most of the industries that have failed have been small or medium-sized industries not noted for strong unions and with a greater heterogeneity of partisan attachments. Nor does it follow that in those industries where the work force was reduced will political militancy be reduced accordingly. Indeed, lay-offs and plant closings might have the opposite effect. Alejandro Portes found that while leftist voting and radical political orientations are explained primarily by "social context and interaction"---organizational efforts taking place in working-class settings---a pattern of unemployment or threats of unemployment was one of the few "objective" variables promoting higher levels of "political militance."[23] Rather than weakening the left, the current economic difficulties might in fact contribute to a strengthening of the left. Smaller craft industries

where the left was weaker have been decimated, while larger enterprises, where the left was strong, have been hurt enough to encourage organizational efforts of militants. Finally, it is not at all certain that unemployed workers will lose their militancy. In moving to other spheres of employment, they in fact may become catalysts for further organizational efforts, because most research efforts indicate that organization, and not the nature of work, contributes to militancy. As Hamilton noted for France, radicalization in certain industrial areas in that country was due in part to the fact that radical peasants from rural areas brought their militancy with them.[24] What is more important is not the aggregate shifts in employment, but the continuation of organizational capabilities and political militancy, a subject we will turn to below.

> Misconception No. 4: The Chilean party system consists of cadres and militants who developed in and benefitted from the previous political system, but who have few roots in society.

To characterize the Chilean party system as ephemeral is to deny the development over several generations of a party system deeply rooted in society. Political leaders and militants not only structured political alternatives, but drew on and responded to more basic and historically defined tendencies in the electorate, a complex and dialectical relationship to be described in more detail below. At this point some observations will be provided on the historicity of party alternatives in Chile and their importance in creating what we call a "political landscape," or pattern of partisan identification in the electorate.

The creation of a political landscape. The basis for party formation lies in the presence of a series of historical, social, and ideological cleavages in a nation's society which develop issue polarities around which segments of the political elite and groups of militants cluster.[25] Two fundamental generative cleavages have acted to create the Chilean parties: state-versus-Church and worker-versus-employer. Regional cleavages ceased to be important in the early years of the republic as Santiago-based elites succeeded in imposing their authority through defeat of regional challenges.[26]

The three centenarian Chilean parties--the Conservative, Liberal, and Radical parties--trace their roots to differences in elite opinion in a Catholic country, which crystallized in the second government of Manuel Montt (1856-61). The Conservative party, dominated originally by extreme ultramontanist sentiments, defended the authority and interests of the Church, while the Radical party became an ardent proponent of anticlericalism. The Liberals were also committed to a secular society and to the authority of the state, but distinguished themselves from their Radical colleagues through a more moderate anticlericalism. They played the center game in 19th-century politics, forging alliances of convenience with both Conservatives and Radicals. The presence of the Radicals in the political game, decades before their counterparts in Argentina had access to power, helped to cement the allegiance of all politically relevant sectors to the developing democratic system.

These traditional parties were, in Duverger's terms, of "parliamentary origin." They emerged from controversies and debates over the role of the

Church in society centered in congressional and intellectual circles. By contrast, the parties of the left, as elsewhere, were parties of "external origin." Their development was associated with the difficult process of building the labor movement.[27]

The history of working-class parties shows that leaders and militants who succeeded in organizing unions were also those with the best chance of creating parties that would become expressions of working-class constituencies. In time, these parties diversified their base of support considerably, especially in situations of regular electoral contests. Chile, unlike other Latin American nations, developed Communist and Socialist parties in conjunction with the labor movement. This resulted from a complex chain of events that was partly accidental and partly conditioned by a political opportunity context which favored radical militants in the labor movement.[28]

This context included a highly repressive response to workers whenever they organized to present concrete demands. Under such circumstances modern union leaders did not succeed in garnering worker support. They could not show tangible results for their leadership efforts, and had no clear ideological explanations for their lack of success. The first and most important victims of this repressive environment were the labor leaders tied to the ideologically centrist Partido Democrático. The extensive wave of anti-union repression which followed in the wake of the 1907 Iquique massacre limited them to relatively ineffective mutual aid organizations with no relationship to work-place bargaining with employers.

The political opportunity context also involved considerable freedom for workers to organize outside the work place, a freedom associated with the existence of competitive electoral politics. This meant that the early labor leaders could publish newspapers, call rallies, present candidates for regional and local elections, and debate publicly the issues of the day. Ironically, while radical leaders were repressed for organizing at the industrial level, they had ample opportunity to communicate their revolutionary message at the political level, articulating political and social organizations into an embryonic labor movement with a strong political content. By the end of the decade, both Socialists and Communists had gained important footholds in the labor movement and became the principal political expressions of Chile's organized urban working class.[29]

The religious and class cleavages were, in turn, woven into a complex of "interconnected dimensions," to use Sartori's term.[30] The emergence of a class dimension did not lead to unambiguous polarization, even though the traditional parties became the defenders of the dominant sectors. The sharp divisions within the elite over clerical matters encouraged the establishment parties to seek alliances with the new actors in order to maximize their own electoral fortunes vis-a-vis traditional adversaries. When the half-hearted efforts of the Conservatives to capitalize on the emergence of a politically aware working class fizzled, the Radicals were able to structure a pattern of alliances with the new working-class leaders which would become a principal and, at times, dominant feature of Chilean politics until the 1973 coup. Both the Popular Front (1938-1946) and Popular Unity (1970-1973) governments were forged with Radical support, an alliance safe in its anticlericalism, but threatened by differing positions on class issues, leading over the years to shifts in the Radical family.

And, in what can be labeled for convenience the "Christian bloc," the Falange split from the Conservative party in the 1930s, expressing the development of forces within Catholicism which took a much more progressive stance on the worker-employer cleavage. The Falange became the Christian Democratic party in the 1950s and gradually replaced the Radicals as the country's premier center party as it sought to advance a progressive position on class matters, while attracting the support of many voters, particularly women, concerned about clerical issues.

Lipset and Rokkan have noted that, once formed, a party system becomes frozen in place.[31] The freezing image is, however, somewhat overdrawn. Important changes do occur over time. The most important change in recent decades is the decline of the salience of the state-versus-Church dimension. This has been accompanied by an increased emphasis on the worker-employer cleavage as the principal criterion for evaluating the ideological basis of the various parties. Indeed, the Conservative and Liberal parties found themselves to be virtually indistinguishable on the class dimension and joined together to form the National party after their poor showing in the 1965 congressional elections. This fusion was aided by the fact that the Chilean Catholic Church, which mirrored the international Church, severed its close ties to the Conservatives, openly favoring the Christian Democrats. This relationship should not obscure the fact that it is very different from the one which existed between ultramontanist bishops and tradition-bound conservative elites. There is a wide consensus today in Chile on the basic outlines of the separation of Church and state.

Even if the freezing image is too strong, it does capture the outlines of an important reality: once formed, party systems have remarkable endurance. The decline of the religious issue after the adoption of the 1925 constitution has left the Chilean party system with two center parties--one "Christian" and one "anti-clerical." Christian Democrats and Radicals continue to exist as separate parties, stressing the symbols which separate them, competing for control of white-collar organizations that provide an important base for the centrist vote, and jockeying for alliances with the less volatile extremes of the system on both right and left.[32] In a polarized party system, both parties are vulnerable to shifts in electoral fortunes, even if the center vote is a relative constant; and both suffer from actual and potential splits, either to the left or right, which only intensify competition.

The continuity of a party system is the result of organizational efforts of militants and leaders in each party under challenging circumstances. It is also a product of what we have labeled a "political landscape," the development of which requires a history of regular electoral contests over several generations in order to become firmly entrenched in the minds of the citizenry. This "landscape" consists, in the first place, of an awareness on the part of the electorate of the issue polarities which generated party alternatives, together with a self-identification at some point along a political continuum separating the extremes of each polarity. In Chile this means identification along the left-right dimension, a manifestation of the salience of the worker-versus-employer cleavage and, to a lesser extent, a degree of identification along the clerical/anticlerical dimensions, a throwback to the Church-versus-state cleavage. It also involves

an understanding of a set of party alternatives located along the various points of the most salient polarities, and a relatively strong identification with particular parties and labels. Finally, it entails a familiarity with a set of political leaders associated with various parties, a name-recognition factor which results from the exposure received by these leaders through electoral campaigns of national importance, or through their holding of highly visible posts in government service.

The stability of electoral cleavages between left, center, and right over several decades, alluded to earlier and summarized in Table 3, is evidence of the continuity of the Chilean "political landscape." Not even the catastrophic political upheaval of the Allende years was able to shift the basic parameters of Chilean voting patterns, as the 1973 congressional elections practically duplicated the results of the 1969 election.[33] This continuity is also evidenced in analyses of surveys of Chilean voters, such as the one done by James Prothro and Patricio Chaparro, which reflects remarkably little change in the ideological splits in the electorate between 1958 and 1970.[34]

Further evidence is provided by the analysis of electoral data presented in Table 4. The table records the simple correlation coefficients, by commune, between the vote for Chilean parties in the municipal election of 1963, held during the conservative Alessandri administration at the outset of the expansion of suffrage, with the vote for the same parties in the highly visible 1971 municipal elections held during the Allende administration. Between these two years the voting population increased from 2 to 2.8 million, an increase of voters to total population from 20 percent to 28 percent, and the country underwent significant political changes with an increase in political mobilization, unionization of the rural sector, and heightened political competition between Christian Democrats and the parties of the right and left.

The table shows that the stability of the vote for the two parties at the extremes of the political spectrum was very high, with a correlation of .84 for the Communist party and .72 for the National party. The coefficients were also high for the Socialists and Radicals, while the Christian Democrats, the new surge party which benefited most by electoral changes in the 1960s, had the lowest correlation, .27. However, the correlation for the Christian Democrats in 1963 and 1971 was .49 and .93 in regions V and VIII respectively.

The dialectical relations between militants and followers. To say that there is an endurance in the "political landscape" should not be taken to mean that there is a strict or mechanical relationship between electoral constituencies and party leadership. In all societies there is often considerable difference between the orientations of party leaders, party militants, and party electorates. The party leaderships, and to a lesser extent the militants, articulate, formulate, and organize programmatic alternatives laid before the electorate and tie these to more or less coherent ideological visions. The dramatic change in Communist party strategy in 1935, from a rejection of coalitions with other groups to an acceptance of the Popular Front, was clearly a leadership decision that had little to do with sentiments in the party's electorate. Nor is the socialist electorate a factor in the frequent splits and divisions in the

Table 3

Diputado Elections: Percentage of the vote received by parties on the right, center, and left in Chilean congressional elections from 1937 to 1973 (political party votes as a percentage of the total vote)

| | 1937 | 1941 | 1945 | 1949 | 1953 | 1957 | 1961 | 1965 | 1969 | 1973 | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RIGHT (Conservative, Liberal, National after 1965) | 42.0 | 31.2 | 43.7 | 42.0 | 25.3 | 33.0 | 30.4 | 12.5 | 20.0 | 21.3 | 30.1 |
| CENTER (Radical, Falangist, Christ.Dem., Agrarian Laborist) | 28.1 | 32.1 | 27.9 | 46.7 | 43.0 | 44.3 | 43.7 | 55.6 | 42.8 | 32.8 | 39.7 |
| LEFT (Socialist, Communist) | 15.4 | 33.9 | 23.1 | 9.4 | 14.2 | 10.7 | 22.1 | 22.7 | 28.1 | 34.9 | 21.5 |
| OTHER | 14.5 | 2.8 | 5.3 | 1.9 | 17.5 | 12.0 | 3.8 | 9.2 | 9.1 | 11.0 | 8.7 |

Source: Dirección del Registro Electoral, Santiago, Chile.

Table 4

Correlations between the vote for major Chilean parties in the 1963 and 1971 municipal elections by commune, for the nation, major urban centers, and eight regions

| | COMMUNIST | SOCIALIST | RADICAL | CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT | NATIONAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nation | .84 | .53 | .45 | .27 | .72 |
| Major Urban Centers | .85 | .39 | .82 | .49 | .71 |
| Region I Tarapaca-Coquimbo | .83 | .60 | .43 | .47 | .65 |
| Region II Aconcagua-Valparaiso | .80 | .60 | .67 | .27 | .73 |
| Region III Santiago | .83 | .22 | .55 | .23 | .64 |
| Region IV O'Higgins-Nuble | .74 | .60 | .42 | .12 | .73 |
| Region V Concepcion-Arauco | .72 | .59 | .47 | .69 | .70 |
| Region VI Bio-Bio-Cautin | .86 | .28 | .33 | .03 | .35 |
| Region VII Valdivia-Chiloe | .57 | .43 | .05 | .12 | .60 |
| Region VIII Aysen-Magallanes | .67 | .60 | .24 | .93 | .93 |

N = 287

Note: The vote for the Conservative and Liberal parties was added for the 1963 election. Major urban centers are those with a population of over 50,000, a total of 40 communes.

SOURCE: Electoral results available at the Dirección del Registro Electoral, Santiago, Chile.

Socialist party, or with the shifts in programmatic orientations, as witnessed more recently in the 1967 Chillan Congress. Party elites structure the issues which will be discussed publicly and have a major effect on the greater or lesser polarization of opinion in the mass public. The relationship, however, is dialectical; the leadership cannot be completely out of tune with the sentiments of the electorate without losing its support in the end. The orientations of the electorate constrain the choices and positions of party elites and cadres, as the party leaders searching for compromise during the Allende years became painfully aware.

Given this dialectical relationship between electorate and party leadership, a "consensual" citizenship (such as that which exists in the United States) provides no effective room for Marxist party leaders. The constraint of having to build electoral support stifles the development of party options that deviate substantially from the basic orientation held by the majority.[35]

Despite the expectations of officials of Chile's military government, the development of a "consensual" citizenship is out of the question within the foreseeable future. The Spanish case provides a sobering reminder of the stability of a "political landscape" and an indication of what Chileans might expect in a transition back to democratic politics. Juan Linz notes that after nearly four decades of Franco rule, the self-identification of the Spanish electorate is still structured along the left-right ideological continuum. Party leaders at various points along the continuum are able to find a segment of the electorate willing to respond to their programmatic options and symbolic appeals. The importance and relative independence of party leadership formulations can be appreciated by the fact that the polarization of public self-identification in Spain increased significantly once the political system freely permitted the formation of party organizations and the dissemination of ideological and programmatic messages.[36] This experience will be repeated in the Chilean case.

Authoritarian rule and the endurance of the political landscape. The political landscape is more or less impermeable to change once it has been firmly established. Periods of authoritarian rule, however long, do little to undermine it. The notion that an authoritarian government can somehow start anew and produce a "new generation of citizens" may be attractive to the rulers, but runs against the stubborn resistance of the very past they seek to eliminate.

A characteristic of most authoritarian situations, regardless of the clarity of the cleavages in the political landscape, is that it freezes name recognition for prominent leaders of periods of democratic opening. This is an unexpected consequence of the elimination of electoral contests, and helps to explain the ubiquity of the same "old" political leaders in Latin America. As democratic politics returns, the preexisting leadership is thrust into center stage as new leadership lacks the name recognition to take its place. It is for this reason that Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre, Fernando Belaunde Terry, José Maria Velasco Ibarra, Juan Domingo Perón, Ricardo Balbín, or Victor Paz Estenssoro (in countries with interrupted electoral politics the list is long) retained their positions as central figures in any democratic opening.[37] It goes without saying that the longevity of individual leaders is a necessary condition for this leadership resurgence to occur. It is not one of the minor ironies of

authoritarian regimes that the effort to displace all politicians by banning political activities results, in the end, in permitting the retention of the very set of political leaders the authoritarian rulers moved against in the first place.

In countries where the party system was not well developed, political parties tend to be identified closely with the surviving leaders, often taking their names (Peronista, Velasquista). In countries where the party system had more time to develop before the advent of authoritarianism, and thus where it reflects more closely a clearly delimited political landscape, party labels will remain household names even if the dictatorship outlasts party leaders. The party organization itself is the conduit for the generation of new leadership--provided, of course, that the organization is sustained by the militants and that new leaders are able to survive the internal dissension which is so typical of clandestine organizations. The emergence of a Felipe González, capitalizing on the historic Partido Socialista Obrero Español label, furnishes an excellent example of the retention of a party identity which predated the authoritarian regime.[38] The lack of continuity of party labels of the center and right in Spain reflects, to a large degree, the dissolution of those party organizations during the Franco years.

It must be underscored, once again, that the survival of particular organizations is the product of the retention within the mass public of a sense of self-identification with a political tendency in the overall landscape. In turn, the political landscape is reinforced under authoritarianism through political socialization, which is most effective if there are strong memories of civil war or repression. It is also reinforced by the survival of clandestine organizational efforts, and through occasional contacts with civil organizations through which partisan political messages are diffused. The process of evaluating all public declarations by government, military, religious, and civil authorities in light of preexisting political categories also provides continuity. After four decades of Franco rule, the correlations between the 1936 and 1977 votes were as follows: PSOE/PSOE, .60; Left/Communist, .68; Confederación Española de Derechos Autónomas/Unión Centro Democrático, .46; Right/Acción Popular, .38. By contrast, the party most closely tied to the past (Fuerza Nueva) gained only one deputy in the parliament, and the rightist Coalición Democrática led by Fraga Iribarne garnered only 6.1 percent of the vote. The centrist UCD electorate identifies itself more closely with the Communist party than with the antidemocratic right.[39] The Chilean military authorities would do well to recall that Franco's attempt to reduce all political differences to the "legítimo contraste de pareceres," in a society in which the party system was far less developed than in Chile, met with resounding failure despite the fact that authoritarianism survived the generation of the civil war.

## The Repercussions of the Authoritarian Situation on the Internal Structure of Chilean Parties

The imposition of authoritarian rule has profound consequences on parties as organizations. Leaders have great difficulty maintaining ties with the rank and file. Party decisions are often made without consulting party members and followers, leading to serious difficulties in legitimizing

their decisions and authority. Party congresses cannot be held openly and, in order to escape detection, party meetings involve few individuals. Militants suffer from a lack of information regarding party activities in other areas of the country, engendering isolation, rebellion, or simply apathy. Limitations on party activities increase the importance of study groups for ideological and programmatic purposes among core militants. Ironically, the effort to depoliticize society by imposing a political recess encourages a greater stress on ideological debates among leaders and militants seeking to retain a sense of distinct identity.[40]

However, authoritarianism affects party autonomy differentially, depending on the position of the government with respect to individual parties, the degree of rejection of the authorities by party leaders and followers, and the preexisting structure and relative cohesiveness of parties prior to authoritarianism.

The Right. The Partido Nacional and the much smaller Democracia Radical (a conservative offshoot of the Radical party), as well as the electorally insignificant fascist groupuscles of which the most prominent was Patria y Libertad, were declared in "recess" by government decree.[41] This meant, officially at least, that the parties could not accept new members, renew their leadership, or hold meetings without notifying the authorities. The rightist parties responded favorably to government action because, with few exceptions, they identified closely with the regime and accepted its definition of the Chilean crisis.[42] As a result of this identification, the rightist parties have largely ceased to exist as organizations, although individuals associated with the parties occupy important positions in the judiciary, the Council of State, the constitutional drafting committee, the diplomatic corps, universities, and most local governments.[43]

Even so, the identification of conservatives with the government has not been total. Some individuals, such as Hernán Correa Letelier and Julio Subercaseaux, moved to the opposition by forming part of the so-called "Group of 24," the highly visible constitutional and legal-studies committee set up with representation from all parties to propose an alternative constitution to the one being drafted by the government. Others, as noted earlier, constitute a semi-opposition, disagreeing with specific government policies, but willing to enter government service if conditions are right. This is the case with former Senator Francisco Bulnes, who has acted in the diplomatic service but whose public declarations have emphasized preference for a democratic model different from that envisioned by the military. By contrast, Pedro Ibáñez, Sergio Onofre Jarpa, and Mario Arnello, representatives of the less "traditional" wing of the National party, have given steadfast support to the government.[44]

Although the right-wing parties have not maintained their organic unity, many of their programs and policies have been implemented, to their satisfaction, by the military. But many leaders of the right worry that the disarticulation of political organizations is a serious matter, reducing the right's ability to present a coherent and unified electoral appeal when a democratic opening takes place. With the serious economic difficulties the country faced in late 1981 and 1982, they saw sectors of the business community (who would naturally have turned to an organized

rightist opposition option) approach Christian Democrats to express their dissatisfaction with policy and their concern with the future. By identifying so closely with a government that eschews politics and condemns parties, they have provided no space for a rightist democratic option to the regime. This in Chile presents a serious problem for a democratic future. Without a rightist electoral organization, the Chilean party system runs the risk of becoming "Argentinized," with an organizationally weak right (with a substantial measure of support in Chile's political landscape) turning to nonelectoral means and military alliances in order to advance its interests.

The Christian Democrats. The top leaders of the Christian Democratic party never accepted the military's definition of the Chilean crisis as being one of regime and society. From the outset, they criticized the legitimacy and validity of the renovationist themes in the government's long-range project.

And yet, the Christian Democrats were at the forefront of the coalition which opposed the Popular Unity government, and the party's national directorate welcomed the 1973 military coup as the inevitable outcome of what they saw as the Popular Unity government's errors, ambiguities, and creeping totalitarianism.[45] The Christian Democrats thus proved to be a serious thorn in the side of the government. They had the "legitimacy" of having opposed "Marxism," and yet their rejection of the military's effort to blame the Allende years on Chilean democracy, rather than on the Popular Unity government iself, inevitably led the party into growing confrontation with the government, and closer ties with the leftist parties. As such, they did not accept the political "recess" as the parties of the right did, and sought to retain and expand their organizational coherence and vitality. This inevitably meant that they were suspect of "doing politics," leading the authorities to repress the party in various ways, from a curtailment of their broadcasting outlets, to censorship of their publications, to removal of party leaders and members from the civil service, municipalities, public enterprises, and universities.[46] A few leaders were imprisoned, and others, including two presidents of the party, were sent into external exile.[47] Continued "violations" of the "recess" on the part of the Christian Democrats finally led the government, in March of 1977, to issue a new decree declaring the "dissolution" of the party under the guise of dissolving all parties.[48]

As an opposition force, the Christian Democrats enjoy clear advantages over the parties of the left. The party's principal leaders and public figures remain in Chile and are often quoted in the press. Its labor and student leaders are public figures. The party retains certain media channels, including the country's largest weekly news magazine, a radio station, and publishing houses, although these remain in business by exercising a carefully balanced strategy of self-censorship which at times makes them appear timid and ineffectual. Its close ties with the Church, and the Church's increased opposition to the regime, which paralleled the falling-out between the party and the government, provides the party with an "umbrella" of support, an "umbrella" which also benefits the parties of the left, as we will note below.

The relative ease with which the party has been able to act within Chile has allowed it to renew its top leadership, to hold frequent meetings with current and past middle-level and even local leaders, and to hold a degree of consultation for informative purposes with a significant portion of the rank and file. These meetings are necessarily low-key, and take place during periods when repression diminishes. The objective of the meetings is primarily to maintain party presence, to study and reflect on various policy problems with party experts and leaders, rather than to plan strategies for immediate political action. The Christian Democrats worry that their middle-class supporters, perhaps more than the core supporters of the other parties, will lose commitment in a time of middle-class prosperity. The meetings help ensure party loyalty and identity, and reflect the leadership's attempt to counteract the possible influence of government propaganda campaigns on the rank and file.

The death of former President Frei in early 1982 deprived the party of its most visible leader and the nation of a leader with great popular appeal. His opposition to the military government, although measured at first, was a continuous problem for Pinochet, and Frei would have played the leading role in any transition attempt. His death, however, may not be as devastating for the party and the opposition as many observers thought. Frei was a constant reminder of the past. Not only was he a controversial figure on the left, but also a much resented figure in rightist circles. Within the party, he often served as a mediator, but at the same time his presence had something of a stifling effect on efforts to create a dynamic response to authoritarian rule. His death means that it will be easier for party leaders, provided they avoid a bitter internecine succession squabble, to ensure continuity of the party image per se, without having that image inexorably intertwined with Frei's. The selection of a leader such as Gabriel Valdes to become the new party president will provide the party with both new leadership and a personality of "presidentiable" dimensions capable of dialoguing across the political spectrum.

The parties of the left. The parties of the Unidad Popular bore the brunt of governmental repression and have been severely hurt by the dispersion of their most prominent leaders throughout the world. They also lost many experienced middle-level leaders who were highly visible in neighborhoods, small towns, and the labor movement. As a result, the parties have faced enormous difficulties in the complex task of re-creating a leadership and organizational structure capable of surviving the authoritarian experience. The most significant problem is that the process of rebuilding internal leadership under authoritarian rule leads to the questioning of the legitimacy of the new leaders by militants and followers. It also contributes to differences between internal leaders, working in a clandestine environment, and the highly visible external leaders who command the attention of the international press and continue to play key roles in delineating broad party positions on significant issues and long-term programs. These problems affect some parties more than others, depending on the degree of prior cohesiveness of the party in question.

The Socialist party has been most affected by authoritarianism because it lacked a cohesive leadership prior to the 1973 events and did not have a developed sense of internal party discipline.[49] The party

has always been plagued by competing factions and considerable internal dissent, which at times have led to the creation of new splinter parties.

The current problems within the party stem from the 1967 Chillan Congress which adopted a revolutionary line not shared by many party leaders. The militant sector of the party backed Senator Carlos Altamirano as Secretario General in January 1971, a choice which Allende concurred with for complex reasons which relate in part to his personal rivalries with other moderate party leaders and to his frequently used strategy of attempting to coopt opponents by giving them responsibility. During the Popular Unity years, the Altamirano leadership became a source of continual difficulties for the president, who could not count on the undivided loyalty of his own party when party militants felt Allende was not pushing fast enough in the implementation of a revolutionary program. While Allende never broke openly with Altamirano, he continually attempted to shore up the position of his foreign minister, Clodomiro Almeyda, in the top party leadership as a moderating, countervailing force. After the coup, the party divided into several factions, the most important of which are followers of Almeyda and Altamirano, with Almeyda holding a decisive edge of support within the country after the Altamirano faction had temporarily produced a semblance of coordinated party activity. The split has consumed much of the energy of leaders and followers. A breach has also developed between the more visible and less vulnerable leaders, such as intellectuals, and the new leadership of clandestine party organizations, or the older leadership in the union movement, content for the time being in tending to strictly organizational tasks in their own spheres.

The Socialists face the intractable problem of a basically democratic party attempting to legitimize its leadership under conditions of political repression. Under democratic politics, leadership disputes could be brought out and settled, at least temporarily, in party congresses attended by delegates elected by local party organizations. A more or less open electoral process had for decades helped to define the relative power capabilities of various party factions. Furthermore, under democratic conditions, the electoral calculus--the need to coalesce in order to ensure a respectable showing at the polls--was always a powerful incentive to party unity.

While the absence of effective internal mechanisms aimed at legitimizing leadership and resolving balances within the party is time-consuming, and has contributed to exacerbating ideological and factional disputes and a degree of paralysis in party activities--these difficulties are not as serious as may appear at first glance. Party disarticulation does not mean party disintegration. Fragmentation is a natural result of the authoritarian context. Indeed, there is a real advantage to the imperative of party survival for the party to be divided into disparate if uncoordinated nuclei. If these fragments are capable of surviving, the changing context of a democratic opening will place pressures on the party to resolve the problem of unity and central authority. The work being conducted by intellectuals (known as the "Swiss," for their neutrality) to bridge gaps between various factions, in what has come to be known as the "convergencia socialista," is not likely to produce dramatic results in the near future. Nevertheless, it plays a crucial role in preparing the road for more serious unification efforts when electoral alternatives once again become the order of the day.

The Communist party, although severely affected by government repression, has managed to weather authoritarianism more successfully than the Socialists. Its experience with clandestine organizations during the 1950s, when it was outlawed, and its much greater internal party discipline and cohesion have enabled the party to maintain a segmented party organization, without a serious loss of unity and direction. Of particular value has been the cellular organization of the party, the practice of appointing an alternative and clandestine Central Committee as soon as the incumbent one assumes leadership, and the longevity of the current leadership. The Communists have also benefited significantly from access to highly powerful short-wave radio broadcasts from Moscow to Chile which have kept the regular party leadership before militants and followers while providing them with information on the internal situation and party activities.

The split between an external and internal leadership, however, is not without serious problems for the party. While the internal group is in charge of immediate political strategy and the external leadership provides broader, long-range policy directions, it is at times difficult to separate the two. The most serious crisis resulted from the declaration of party leaders in Moscow, perhaps with Soviet pressure, that the party would turn to an armed insurrectionary strategy to overthrow the junta after the adoption of the 1980 constitution. So far, however, the party has not implemented this strategy, as local leaders have objected to its advisability. The party is also under substantial pressure in Chile from some elements within the party, as well as from other political circles in the opposition, for its open support of the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and of the Polish military's crack-down on Solidarity.

The smaller parties of the left face some of the same difficulties that the Socialists do, but their fragmentary nature, and the fact that they have no clear place in the traditional Chilean party spectrum, means that they are not likely to have much of a presence in a democratic opening, regardless of the energy of their organizational efforts. Their activities tend to be reduced to the small-scale operations of embryonic networks attempting to maintain a sense of identity. As will be noted below, they do not play an important role in providing links between various political groups and maintaining a presence in intellectual and journalistic circles.

## The Articulation of Party Networks in Civil Society

Chilean parties penetrated most organizations of civil society. Party militants were present in neighborhood committees, student associations, mothers' clubs, soccer clubs, evangelical churches, etc. They also structured the debate in labor unions, trade groups, and professional associations. The military authorities have interpreted this interpenetration of party networks with civil organizations as a manifestation of an unhealthy politicization. For them, the elimination of parties and the creation of a consensual order implies the extirpation of partisan influence from the nation's secondary associations.

Because political parties played such a central role in the organization of interests, the articulation of demands, and the structuring of mediation between institutions of civil society and the state, their abrupt removal from center stage has given Chile a vulnerability that is not apparent in other authoritarian contexts where elements of civil society were more independent of party networks, and have been able to survive with more autonomy and vitality in expressing opposition to the regime. The "cordobazo" incident, in which the Peronist unions flexed their muscles after the 1976 military coup in Argentina, is not conceivable in the Chilean case. Furthermore, the Chilean parties' lack of experience with survival under military rule makes them less capable than some of their neighbors in maintaining a visible presence.

As noted in the introduction, however, political demobilization does not imply a depoliticization of society. In fact, the elimination of institutions of representation and mediation displaces political conflict from the state and public level, to the institutions of civil society which become a surrogate political arena as party activities are maintained by an identification with sectoral interests.

Politicization is, however, qualitatively different. In the absence of outright party activities and elections, the political arena is significantly reduced, with many followers turning to nonpolitical and private activities. Those activities which are undertaken are often undertaken in an "apolitical" fashion, with leaders and militants maintaining some distance from more prominent party leaders in order to ensure the effectiveness of organizational efforts and the primary short-term goal of creating associations outside of the control of the state. This contributes to the impression of quiet "normality" so typical of authoritarian regimes, as soccer clubs or bible-study groups go about their daily business.

Some organizations, including mutual aid societies, social clubs, and soccer clubs, are specifically created by political parties as part of their organizational strategy. In most cases, however, political parties seek to retain a presence or enhance their influence in established organizations such as professional associations, student organizations, or labor unions. Even in cases where party-identified leaders have been purged, and mechanisms are created to select new leaders in an "apolitical" fashion--such as through the new labor code, or through class representation in the universities--rank-and-file members soon become aware of the partisan attachments of various potential new leaders. In those situations where independents emerge as "natural" leaders, they are quickly recruited by party militants who compete with each other to capture the allegiance of the ablest figures. Partisan allegiance furnishes them not only with organizational support and resources, but with a common identity which helps them draw on supporters with established or potential affinities. The distinction between party militants and independent figures is one which is consciously blurred, however, as the activists present themselves first and foremost as members of the constituent group in question. The process in Chile is very similar to the one which took place in Spain, under even more difficult circumstances during the repression of the immediate postwar period. As José Maravall notes, "the emergence of the working-class and the student movements was dependent on the underground survival of the parties of the left. Those parties provided the strategies

and the leaders, and it was the capacity of these parties to survive that kept the workers' and the students' resistance alive in the long and difficult period of the 1940s and 1950s, and that later rekindled the struggle."[50]

The parties vary in the degree to which they are able to shift partisan activities to the sphere of civil organizations. Those most favored are those that had higher organizational presence in the various organizations in question prior to the advent of authoritarianism, and those best able to take advantage of the "organizational spaces" afforded by the new context. These "spaces" include the Church and a whole series of organizations that have emerged under its auspices; the trade unions and professional associations; and cultural and social institutions.

The Church and its "umbrella." During the first years of military government, a restrictive lid was placed on the activities of most of the organizations of Chile's civil society. Meetings were prohibited without prior permission from the authorities and all elections were suspended, freezing in place leaders who were not removed by order of the authorities. A few months after the coup, the women's society of the Methodist Church in Angol, Chile, meeting in a private home, was surrounded by armed soldiers, and the leaders forced to explain that their activities were not political. Nine years later, all nonprofit organizations must submit to the authorities lists of officers, leading many organizations to have two sets of officers--an "official set," acceptable to the authorities--and an "informal set" which actually conducts all of the business of the organization except for signing official documents.

The Roman Catholic Church and its organizations escaped the restrictions placed on unions, student and neighborhood associations, and other private organizations identified as "political." As Brian Smith notes, most of Chile's bishops welcomed the coup as an inevitable outcome of the chaos of the Allende years. However, the Church quickly parted company with the junta, as the human-rights situation deteriorated, and became an open adversary of the military government when prominent Catholic laymen and the Christian Democratic party came under attack.[51]

In the early years, the Church occasionally lent its prestige to the authorities in ceremonies such as the dedication of the Maipu memorial to the nation in the spring of 1974. On occasion it has acceded to government demands when these have been uncompromising, as it did when the authorities appointed an admiral as president of the Catholic University and removed the institution from Church control. However, the Church has refused to allow the regime to use Catholicism as a legitimating formula and it has strongly rebuked the government for its disregard of human rights and for the social costs of the economic model. It has also rejected the "regenerative" formula of the regime, preferring a return to Chilean constitutional practices.

In opposing the regime, the Church, and particularly the Cardinal as archbishop of Santiago, has created a host of institutions to support its activities. The Vicarate of Solidarity (originally the Committee for Peace) has served as the principal organization assisting in legal defense and has produced extensive documentation on human-rights violations.

Organizations of the Workers Pastoral Vicarate, as well as countless organizations in Church parishes, have helped in the creation of neighborhood organizations, soup kitchens, committees for families of the disappeared, mothers' clubs, and the like.

The Church has also supported the creation of institutions to provide technical aid and credit to peasant cooperatives and worker self-managed enterprises. And, when faculty members were dismissed from the Catholic University, the Cardinal set up the Academy of Christian Humanism, a loose organization which houses several important research groups of various political tendencies.[52] The Church, which is not subject to prior censorship, provides an outlet for publications, both directly, or through the Academia. The magazine Mensaje, published by the Jesuits, has become the most hard-hitting mass-circulation publication publishing popularized versions of serious research on national issues. Análisis, under the auspices of the Academia, has also been an important organ for the dissemination of dissent opinions. Solidaridad, published by the Vicarate, is the basic organ for human rights.

There is little doubt that the Christian Democrats, whose leaders are close to the hierarchy, benefit most from the position assumed by the Church. The Church provides the party with an institutional base to retain ties with nuclei of support in shanty towns, in rural areas, and even in the labor movement. Some of the Church-sponsored support organizations are staffed by prominent leaders of the Christian Democratic party. Party militants thus remain active through Church conduits, helping to ensure the survival of the Christian Democratic party option in a democratic opening. The contrast with Spain on this score is instructive. The anti-clerical excesses of the Republican forces in Spain thrust the Church into the anti-Republican camp and a close identification with the Franco regime. This identification made it difficult to retain the organizational viability of a Catholic option when the democratic opening took place.[53]

However, the close tie between the Church and the Christian Democrats should not be interpreted as having a negative effect on the other parties. Quite to the contrary, by providing for the existence of base communities, by sheltering workers and intellectuals, and by encouraging the publication of dissenting views, the Church has created an "umbrella" for the parties of the left. Indeed, and sometimes to the chagrin of the Christian Democrats, many of the organizations that survive under Church sponsorship are dominated by Marxist parties able to make new organization inroads, or simply to maintain traditional strengths through new organizational channels. Thus, some of the committees associated with the Vicarate of Solidarity are primarily Communist, and the Academia includes many researchers from MAPU and the Christian Left party, while neighborhood and parish organizations have a broad representation of political groups.

The trade unions and professional associations. The trade-union movement provides one of the best organizational contexts for party organization when electoral contests are suspended. Unions allow the parties to place their militants in important positions of working-class leadership and to retain active contact and presence among the rank and file. They also provide an important arena of organized activity, especially when some form of collective bargaining is allowed. And, since they can claim

to speak for thousands of workers, top union leaders became key political actors at a time when party leaders are denied the limelight.

In the first few years after the coup, the labor movement was quiescent. The leadership ranks had been extensively purged, and all meetings and elections banned. Plant-level leaders were selected by appointing workers with the greatest seniority to fill vacancies. Labor-movement activities were reduced to an occasional public declaration issued by top confederation leaders, primarily Christian Democrats. The severity of the economic recession further dampened the activities of militants who expressed themselves through small May Day rallies or occasional job actions in the large copper mines.

Pressured by the AFL-CIO, which threatened to establish a boycott of all shipping to and from Chile unless the government allowed union elections and collective bargaining, the junta finally called elections and promulgated a new labor law. The elections, called with a 48-hour notice, were held on October 31, 1978. Workers with a recognized history of partisan activities or those that held union leadership posts were barred from becoming candidates. Since there were no ballots with printed names of candidates, voters could vote for anyone by filling out a blank ballot and handing it to the government labor inspectors.

Despite the extraordinary restrictions on the electoral process, about 60 percent of the new leaders were linked to either the Communist or Socialist parties, and about 35 percent to the Christian Democrats.[54] The election of a completely new set of leaders produced a distribution of political allegiance very similar to the one which prevailed before the 1973 military coup. The results illustrate the fact that a formal suspension of union activities does not eliminate the development of informal ties and associations among workers. New workers rely on the aid and guidance of more experienced ones and turn to individuals with leadership qualities for leadership roles. Party militants can fit those roles much better than others. Not only are they generally more articulate and knowledgeable, and willing to take risks in a repressive environment (as the founding fathers of the labor movement did in the early years), they also have access to outside resources (such as legal advice, political contacts, financial aid, and solidarity) that workers can appeal to in time of need.[55] Furthermore, in an election which makes use of write-in procedures resulting in a broad dispersion of the vote, the results will favor individuals who are more visible and have organizational ties, no matter how small.

In October 1979, the government finally issued a new labor law. The objective of the legislation was to place limits on the power and effectiveness of unions, and as such received the condemnation of all labor leaders, including the small group forming part of a government-inspired labor federation. The legislation prescribes a highly atomized and controlled bargaining process. At the same time, however, it made possible the holding of union assemblies for the first time since 1973, providing the workers with a renewed forum for the expression of grievances and a new platform for union leaders. Because of the complexity of the law, unions are forced to turn to outside legal advice, once again making relevant the party ties of the leadership.

Because of the high degree of party competition in the unions, the Socialist party, with its current divisions, is at a distinct disadvantage as compared with the Christian Democrats and the Communists. What is important, however, is not the extent of support in raw numbers, but the continued survival of an organizational capacity, no matter how fragmented. As Maravall notes, the Communist party in Spain clearly gained the upper hand in the organizational struggle in the "comisiones obreras" under Franco, particularly in the period of the most significant repression. But despite this advantage, once democracy was restored, the Socialist party, by virtue of the survival of its organizational effort, was able to make significant headway in capturing that segment of the labor movement with Socialist proclivities.[56]

The professional and trade associations did not suffer as much from government repression as the unions did. In fact, most trade associations were controlled by elements who opposed the Allende government, and those leftist leaders that did exist were removed after the overthrow of the Allende government. For some time after the coup, the associations gave general support to the government while seeking to advance their interests. However, many associations soon became disenchanted with the free-market and laissez-faire policies of the government which directly affected their interests. Truckers, taxicab drivers, small businessmen, and civil servants all rejected a policy that deprived their members of government benefits and threatened their economic interests. As a result, in each of these associations, leadership identified with opposition parties, particularly the Christian Democrats, came to the fore.

A similar phenomenon occurred with professional associations, which in 1981, through Supreme Decree 3,621, lost many of their privileges, including the right to screen and limit members and to police standards. Elections in the "colegios profesionales" led to the structuring of slates based on political understandings among opposition parties opposed to the "official slates." In several colegios, including medicine, pharmacy, journalism, social work, and civil engineering, the opposition slates won a majority of leadership positions. In agronomy, physical therapy, dentistry, and law, progovernment slates prevailed. However, even in the Bar Association, characterized by its strong support of the government after the coup and the conservative predispositions of many of its members, the opposition slate obtained several seats with over 48 percent of the vote.[57]

While the work of political parties does not proceed in the clandestine or semi-clandestine manner that it does in the labor movement or in community associations, the parties continue in a more or less open fashion and with more or less informal procedures to structure opposition alternatives within the nation's most important professional and middle-class associations. It is at this level that the right has succeeded in maintaining something of an organizational presence, either as a majority, or a significant minority, defending government policies and positions.

Social and cultural institutions and the student movement. Before 1973, party activists and sympathizers were often instrumental in creating a whole series of social organizations and cultural events which revolved around the life of the party. Small towns in many areas, for

example, were noted for their Radical clubs, social centers where people could pass the time of day playing parlor games. Often fire departments, composed of volunteers, were organized and manned by individuals of the same political coloration. Sports clubs and social clubs were favorite devices to bring youth into a party network. The party headquarters themselves often served a multitude of functions, from obtaining a job, to solving petty disputes, to marriage counseling. The phenomenology of small town and neighborhood Chile abounds in such examples. These aspects of Chilean society continue in evidence today, although the party labels have disappeared. Since 1973, party militants have given considerable effort to creating innocuous organizations such as sports clubs.

Theatrical productions and folklore festivals, never devoid of political messages in the past, carry these messages in a more charged atmosphere, though in more veiled fashion. The double entendre with political meaning is developed into a fine art, so that a Pablo Neruda poem about a dog is capable of bringing the house down as audiences cling to lines that suggest an inner meaning for the current predicament. Occasionally, audiences will respond spontaneously to cues in public places, by booing government spokesmen at soccer matches, or refusing to sing the stanza of the national anthem added after 1973 which glorifies the armed forces, forcing the authorities to bring choirs to athletic events to try to camouflage dissent. Obviously, the artistic productions reach a limited public. However, their effect is to maintain alive an oppositionist culture which reinforces the broad tendencies not represented in government circles.

The universities constitute one of the most important centers for the maintenance of an oppositionist culture. The student movement channels a good deal of effort into cultural and folkloric events which emphasize elements of Chilean tradition that are related to an oppositionist posture. Pablo Neruda plays a particularly important role in this regard. As a Nobel Prize poet of international renown, the government cannot censor his work or erase his memory.

The student movement has been largely reduced to such activities because the military government has continued to keep close watch over higher education. In 1982, universities were still run by officers appointed by the president. Student leaders have been appointed directly by the authorities, or elected under restricted circumstances. In April 1979, elections were unexpectedly called at the University of Chile to elect class presidents. Most observers, including those writing for the conservative El Mercurio, described even that election as a victory of the opposition student movement. This occurred despite the renovation of the student body, its reduction in size, and the purging over the years of faculty and students associated not only with the left, but with the Christian Democrats. Students, following the political allegiance of their families and influenced by the presence of party-affiliated leaders who emerge in a manner similar to the one described for the union movement, provide an important base for continued party organizational efforts. As in Spain, the continued organizational viability of the political parties provides a base for the continuation not only of the labor movement, but also of the student movement.[58]

Finally, opposition parties maintain a presence not only in cultural institutions or civil organizations created by the parties to maintain their strength. As with the labor movement, they attempt to establish a base in some of the organizational spaces created by the regime itself. Although it is difficult to judge the extent to which parties actually operate within government-sponsored organizations, there is some evidence that some parties, particularly the Communists, have made some effort to gain leadership positions in organizations such as the welcoming committees that greet the president of the republic when he travels to the provinces, or the charitable associations set up by the wives of the junta leaders with substantial government funding.

## Summary and Conclusion

While this paper has stressed the importance of political parties in the Chilean political landscape, and their ability to maintain a presence in the organizational space provided by the parties, by other institutions, and by the regime itself, it is important to conclude by noting that Chilean parties are not absent from a public debate with the military authorities. Significant strides have been made to reach across party lines in an effort to define the postauthoritarian regime and the party system of the future.

Public opposition to the regime has been primarily carried out by the Christian Democrats. Its position as a semi-legal organization close to the Church, whose principal leaders, including the late former President Eduardo Frei, were immune from repression, has given the party considerable ground for maneuver. Its various media outlets, noted earlier, have given it the ability to maintain critical scrutiny of government policies.

One of the most important activities to date was the work of the counter-constitutional committee, the "Grupo de los 24," so named because of the number of members of the principal working group. The committee provided a forum for broad consultation across party lines in the period prior to the adoption of the government constitution. Representation on the committee came from all parties, including the Communists and Conservatives.

The committee was an extraordinary achievement because it succeeded in breaking down the barriers which had been erected between rival political groups during the Allende period and in the immediate aftermath of the coup. Its work included the structuring of countless subcommittees that have included approximately 1,000 scholars, experts, and community leaders throughout the country. Its mandate was broad, ranging from highly theoretical discussions of "nationality," to considerations about the future of the judicial system, to examination of the controversial and complicated issue of social property and state enterprises (which proved to be a severe stumbling block to compromise under Allende), to the volatile issue of party organization and conduct. In its public pronouncements, the committee stressed the importance of electoral democracy as the only viable system for the nation, stressing that any constitutional innovations had to accord with the basic outlines of Chile's fundamental constitution, the constitution of 1833, as modified in 1925. Juan Linz has

noted that a similar unified and broad-based organizational effort to define a future regime never took place in the 40 years of Franco Spain, and has been rare in other Latin American countries.

While the referendum approving the constitution drafted by the government brought to an end the momentum of the Group of 24, efforts continue to arrive at broad understandings across parties. Such efforts have been aided by the progress being made in the Socialist party toward Socialist unity. However, they have also been set back by the pro-Soviet line of the Communists in the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan. It is certainly not our intention to belittle the enormous obstacles which still remain. The heightened importance of ideology under authoritarian regimes devoid of elections is a clear stumbling block to finding common ground, as is the uncertainty of the timing of a political opening, which discourages common efforts and favors short-term strategies of survival. Indeed, it is unlikely that Chilean parties will be able to structure a significant alternative to the regime, or be a significant factor in regime overthrow.

However, as this paper has suggested, the parties will succeed in maintaining their autonomy and identity, denying the regime the possibility of creating a significant constituency of its own, while maintaining continuous pressure on the authorities. Furthermore, the parties remain poised to rapidly mobilize followers should the regime falter, either through a severe economic crisis or an open split in military ranks. And they also stand ready to provide for the reorganization of mass politics and electoral contests when a democratic opening occurs.

The experience of other countries such as Spain, with a much longer trajectory of authoritarianism following a more ambiguous period of democratic rule, points to the durability of the "political landscape" and the continuity of partisan options when organizational efforts are maintained. The limitation placed on organizational and electoral activities, rather than undermining politics, contributes to freezing the positions of recognized leaders and shifting party organizational activities to available spaces in civil society. Such a task has been facilitated by the dissolution of the right's organizational presence and the unwillingness of the military authorities to risk the consequences of launching a political movement of their own to absorb the traditional right and mobilize middle-class elements. This unwillingness is not only the product of a reluctance to engage in "politics," but is also the result of their perception that they would face a severe challenge from enduring partisan allegiances.

It is possible to describe the Chilean regime as one which fits the general pattern of reactive Latin American military dictatorships which came to power in order to curb excessive mobilization and/or implement a more dynamic model of development in accord with the pressures of local and international interests. Such a description, however, runs the risk of overlooking the broader--and, in the long run, significant--differences between these regimes. These differences stem from the prior political experience of the nations in question, and the interplay of these historical political forces with those created by the new political context.

The key is that a characterization of regime must go beyond a mere characterization of government. The latter is preoccupied with the intentions of the rulers, their advisors and allies, and the short-run impact of repressive policies on target and nontarget groups. Regime characterization is broader in focus--it transcends government actions and intentions and analyzes the nature of opposition elements and how these interact with one another and with the authorities. Oppositions can only be understood, in turn, by understanding the historicity of groups, and particularly political parties, prior to the advent of the dictatorship.

We are not arguing for cultural relativism, that each country will face different conditions even in the face of what appear to be striking parallels in the nature of authoritarian regimes. Nor are we arguing against the importance of the effort to come to a generalized understanding of the authoritarian phenomenon. What we are suggesting is that a taxonomy of authoritarian regimes cannot rely exclusively on the outward characteristics of those regimes, but must take into consideration the contexts within which those regimes are imposed. The important differences between the Chilean and the Argentine case are due less to differences in the level of repression or of governmental policy, than to the different characteristics of the political and party system which succumbed to military rule. This insight is not only important for characterizing regimes, but for understanding their future prospects and the prospects for an eventual democratic opening. Thus, the autonomy of the institutions of civil society in Argentina, and particularly of the labor movement, gives the appearance that Argentines are better able to resist repressive policies than their Chilean counterparts where parties were so pervasive and controlling, and yet more easily repressed. While this observation is correct, it does not follow that the future outcome in Chile is more likely to favor the project of the authorities. The Chilean party system, although more quiescent, is more deeply rooted in the country's political landscape and has a clearer set of partisan alternatives associated with it, making the prospects for a restructuring of the same or a very similar party system much more likely in the future.

[1]For an excellent review and evaluation of work in this area, see David Collier (ed.), The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979). This book reflects on the pioneering effort of Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1972). Other works on authoritarianism include James Malloy (ed.), Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Pittsburgh University Press, 1976); Alfred Stepan (ed.), Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973); Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Autoritarismo e Democratizaçao (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1975); Norbert Lechner, La Crisis del Estado en América Latina (Caracas: El Cid Editor, 1977). For broader conceptual analysis of authoritarianism, see Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 3 (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1975).

[2]For cultural explanations of authoritarianism, see Howard Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model," World Politics, 25:2 (January 1973), 206-235. For an influential essay on corporatism, see Philippe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" The Review of Politics, 36:1 (January 1974), 124-149. An early attempt to evaluate the Chilean experience in light of this literature is Robert Kaufman, Transitions to Stable Authoritarian Corporate Regimes: The Chilean Case? (Sage Professional Papers, Comparative Politics Series 1, No. 01-060, 1976).

Guillermo O'Donnell provides the economic-structural set of explanations to the rise of authoritarianism. For a recent article which discusses the Chilean case within the framework of other Southern Cone cases, see his "Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State," Latin American Research Review, XIII:1 (1978).

[3]Juan Linz uses the term "authoritarian situation" to refer to those authoritarian cases which have little political institutionalization; he explicitly contrasts this notion with that of authoritarian regime. See his "The Future of an Authoritarian Situation," in Stepan, Authoritarian Brazil, p. 235.

[4]This assessment by government officials is apparent in all of their important declarations on the past and visions for the future. For the most significant of the early statements in this regard, see the "Declaración de principios de la Junta de Gobierno de Chile" contained, among other sources, in El Mercurio, International Edition, March 10-17, 1974, p. 4.

[5]Again, all important policy pronouncements by the government refer to the necessity of pursuing this regenerative task, a theme which was already contained in the government's Declaración de Principios. However, the regenerative task received its most explicit formulation in General Pinochet's "seven modernizations" speech; see El Mercurio, September 12, 1979, pp. C-6 to C-8 for its text. This speech complements an earlier,

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vaguer formulation of the regenerative task which is contained in Pinochet's address to the government's youth movement at Chacarillas hill in Santiago. Known as the Chacarillas Plan, the text of this speech appears in El Mercurio, July 10, 1977, pp. 33 and 37.

[6]Juan Linz, "Opposition to and under an Authoritarian Regime," in Robert Dahl (ed.), Regimes and Oppositions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 191-192. We have eliminated the emphasis which appears in the original.

[7]For a brief analysis of these groups, see Armand Mattelard, "Un fascisme créole en quete d'idéologues," in Le Monde Diplomatique, July 1974, p. 7.

[8]Rodríguez's line of thought obviously did not prevail over others, since the 1981 constitution contemplates mechanisms of corporate representation only for the municipal level. However, Rodriguez declared himself satisfied with the 1981 document when interviewed by El Mercurio. See that paper's edition of August 17, 1980, p. D-1, where he argues that a corporatist political framework in fact requires a greater "political maturity" than that which Chile has.

[9]For a discussion of the wide variety of groups that took part in the Franco regime over the years, see Amando de Miguel, Sociología del Franquismo (Barcelona: Editorial Ergos, 1975).

[10]This is particularly the line of thought of the Grupo Nueva Democracia, which publishes the magazine Realidad. It is close to the "Chicago boys" who articulate and implement the government's economic policy.

[11]On the position of the Church under the current military government, see Brian Smith's The Church and Politics in Chile: Challenges to Modern Catholicism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), and his "Old Allies, New Opponents: The Church and the Military in Chile, 1973-1979," Latin American Program Working Paper No. 68 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1981).

[12]See El Mercurio, December 26, 1981, pp. C-4 and C-5.

[13]See General Pinochet's "Seven Modernizations" speech, op. cit.

[14]In a brilliant paper entitled "Political Process in an Authoritarian Regime: The Dynamics of Institutionalization and Opposition," in a forthcoming anthology edited by Arturo and Samuel Valenzuela, Manuel Antonio Garretón notes that there are "sectoral structural changes which modify the whole of society and reconstitute the structure of classes and social actors and are capable of redefining the rules of the game."

[15]The Ley Permanente de Defensa de la Democracia was adopted in 1948 in the wake of the onset of the Cold War by the administration of Gabriel González Videla, who had ironically been elected in 1946 with Communist party support and had included members of this party in his cabinet. The

turnabout resulted primarily from a concern over the increasing electoral fortunes of the Communist party and from considerable pressures applied on Chile by the United States. The law led to the arrest of numerous prominent Communist party militants, including a good number of union leaders, and proscribed the party from participating in electoral contests. The law became an issue in the presidential campaign of 1952. The winning candidate, former President Ibáñez, promised in the course of the campaign to abrogate the law, but he did not do so until 1958, months before the presidential elections of that year.

The major innovation in the 1960 electoral law was the adoption of the "Cédula Unica." This meant that instead of having separate slips of paper for each of the lists of candidates, the names of the various lists were to be printed on a single ballot. This change prevented party agents from ascertaining the preferences of electors in the secret chamber through various indicators which were refined to a fine art, tactics which were used especially to control the electoral preferences of the peasantry. For a discussion of these tactics, see Federico Gil, The Political System of Chile (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966). The other major change in 1960 was a strengthening of the obligation to vote by requiring the presentation of electoral registry numbers in dealing with the state bureaucracy and even to open bank accounts.

[16]For a discussion of the Chilean party system, see Arturo Valenzuela, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), ch. 1.

[17]Ibid., p. 39.

[18]See Alejandro Portes, "Political Primitivism, Differential Socialization and Lower Class Leftist Radicalism," American Sociological Review, 6:5 (October 1971), 820-835; "Status Inconsistency and Lower Class Radicalism," The Sociological Quarterly, 13 (Summer 1972), 361-382; "Occupation and Lower Class Political Orientations in Chile," in Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela (eds.), Chile, Politics and Society (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1976).

[19]Portes, "Occupation and Lower Class Political Orientations in Chile," 217.

[20]Valenzuela, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile, pp. 11, 13, 86-87.

[21]Richard Hamilton, Affluence and the French Worker in the Fourth Republic (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967).

[22]For these statistics, see Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, "Import Liberalization: The Chilean Experience, 1973-1980," and Pilar Vergara, "The Transformations of the Chilean State," in the forthcoming anthology edited by Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela.

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[23]Portes, "Occupation and Lower Class Political Orientations in Chile."

[24]Hamilton, Affluence and the French Worker in the Fourth Republic.

[25]We take the notion of party generative cleavages from Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments," in Lipset and Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives (New York: The Free Press, 1967).

[26]For a discussion of center-local cleavages in Chile, see Arturo Valenzuela, Political Brokers in Chile: Local Government in a Centralized Polity (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press), ch. VIII. This historical section draws on our The Origins of Democracy: Theoretical Reflections on the Chilean Case (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

[27]See Maurice Duverger, Les partis politiques (Paris: Armand Colin, 1951), pp. 2-15.

[28]For a study of the historical process that led to the formation of the Chilean labor movement in connection with Communist and Socialist parties, see J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Labor Movement Formation and Politics: the Chilean and French Cases in Comparative Perspective, 1850-1950" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1979).

[29]For a brief overview of the characteristics of the Chilean labor relations legal framework as well as a succinct account of the manner through which the Communist unionists accepted it, see J. Samuel Valenzuela, "The Chilean Labor Movement: The Institutionalization of Conflict," in Valenzuela and Valenzuela (eds.), op. cit. For an account of the Popular Front government, see John R. Stevenson, The Chilean Popular Front (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1942).

[30]Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

[31]Lipset and Rokkan, pp. 50-54.

[32]It is unlikely that the electoral constituencies of both the Christian Democrats and the Radicals would balk at a fusion of the centrist parties by bolting massively either to the right or the left. Such a fusion is bound, however, to meet great resistance among the party leaderships--and is therefore improbable. And yet, if the Christian Democrats were to drop the religious reference from their label, the Radicals would have some difficulty in the context of a possible future democratic Chile to retain their electoral constituencies by stressing their secularism, given the fact that the Christian Democrats have already taken over the center. The current attempt by the Radical party leadership to develop a "Socialist-Democratic" program is an expression of the effort to stave off just such an eventuality by locating the party visibly to the left of the Christian Democrats; in other words, to differentiate the two parties clearly on the left-to-right rather than the anticlerical-to-clerical

dimensions. Paradoxically, the Christian Democratic leadership may welcome such an attempt as a means of developing a non-Marxist interlocutor to its left.

[33]See Valenzuela, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, table 27, for a full breakdown of the votes received by the various parties in the 1969 and the 1973 congressional elections. The Communists, the Christian Democrats, and the Nationals received virtually identical proportions of the total vote; these parties were supported by two-thirds of the electorate. The Socialists gained 4.2 percent (the result, primarily, of the fact that a Socialist was president), and the Radicals lost votes proportionately (the result of the fact that the party split into three groups, which together gained 5.7 percent fewer votes than the 13 percent which the united party garnered in the 1969 contest).

[34]James W. Prothro and Patricio E. Chaparro, "Public Opinion and the Movement of Chilean Government to the Left," in Valenzuela and Valenzuela (eds.). These authors argue that the shift to the left in government coalitions resulted from changes in party alignments rather than from a shift of public opinion to the left.

[35]On the consensus of the U.S. citizenry, see Robert Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consensus (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1967), especially pp. 329-337. Naturally, in addition to this majority consensus over fundamentals, institutional and administrative procedures and divisions in the U.S. militate against the success of political leaders with deviant views.

[36]See Juan Linz, "The New Spanish Party System," manuscript paper, table 7. The data are difficult to interpret, however, since it is likely that the early surveys after Franco's death and before the legalization of the Communist party underestimate the size of the electorate that places itself on the left. And yet, the spread is a sizeable one: from July 1976 to July 1979 the percentage of respondents in a national sample that place themselves on the left increases from 18 to 41, while those placing themselves in the center decrease from 38 to 30, and those on the right from 22 to 13.

[37]A significant exception to this observation can be found in the Brazilian case, because the post-1964 Brazilian situation generated new civilian political leadership. And yet, this is an exception which proves the rule because the military government did not do away completely with all political space for civilian leadership. The mere fact of forcing the organization of two parties, of holding elections, and having a parliament grants such a space. Still, figures such as Lionel Brizola and Miguel Arraes have been able to return as political leaders in present-day Brazil, given their previously set name recognition.

[38]Gil Robles is the only major figure to have survived the nearly four decades of authoritarian rule. Josep Taradellas' return to Catalonia had a symbolic legitimating importance, but Taradellas was too old and frail of health to become a factor in the leadership constellation.

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Santiago Carrillo and, of course, Dolores Ibarruri date back to the Second Republic, but they were not major political figures, particularly before the onset of the Civil War.

[39] Juan Linz, "The New Spanish Party System," pp. 3, 55, and tables 1 and 6. All correlations are at the provincial level.

[40] These observations are based on interviews with both party leaders and militants as well as with knowledgeable observers, conducted by both authors.

[41] The recess was imposed by Decree No. 77 of September 1973.

[42] For a telling interview with the principal leader of the National party during the Unidad Popular government, Sergio Onofre Jarpa, see Qué Pasa, 144 (January 25, 1974). In it, Onofre Jarpa states clearly that the military government has adopted the policy line of the National party, and that the party willingly accepts the political recess. He also states that it is necessary to go beyond simple reforms to create a "new state."

[43] After the military coup, the government appointed many Christian Democrats to the nation's mayoralties. However, they were soon forced out of office in favor of rightists and military personnel.

[44] Ibáñez has argued that democracy is "congenitally" bad. See his interview in Hoy, III:124 (December 5 to 11, 1979), 13.

[45] There was by no means unanimity in the party when reacting initially to the 1973 events. See in particular a document dated November 7, 1973 written by Radomiro Tomic, in which he analyzes the divisions in the party. Although meant for internal party debate, the document achieved wide circulation through multiple photocopying. See also the declaration signed by Bernardo Leighton, Ignacio Palma, Renán Fuentealba, Fernando Sanhueza, Sergio Saavedra, Claudio Huepe, Andrés Aylwin, Mariano Ruiz Esquide, Jorge Cash, Jorge Donoso, Belisario Velasco, Ignacio Balbontín, Florencio Ceballos, Radomiro Tomic, Waldemar Carrasco, and Marino Penn--all prominent Christian Democrats who energetically condemned the military coup, and disagreed with a bland statement which virtually accepted the military's action issued by the party's National Directorate. These declarations are contained in Chile-América, 4(January 1975), 43-44. Chile-América published a very useful chronology of the relations between the Christian Democratic party and the military government during the latter's first year and a half, which details the growing opposition and confrontation between the two. See Chile-América, 4-5 (January 1975) and 6-7 (April 1975).

[46] This is according to the same Decree Law No. 77. Christian Democrats refer colloquially to their removal from office as "salameo," i.e., the cutting of the party's positions of power slice by slice as would a salami cutter.

In fact, the deterioration in relations between the military government and the Christian Democratic party began the very moment that Eduardo

Frei, the Christian Democratic former president, refused to accompany the two other former presidents, Gabriel González Videla and Jorge Alessandri, in greeting the four members of the Governing Junta after the traditional independence day Te Deum mass on September 18, 1973. General Pinochet mentions the incident in his account of the manner in which the military coup was planned and executed, and attributes Frei's attitude to the latter's annoyance at not having been informed prior to the fact of the closing of congress and of the retrieval of his official car (Frei was at that point president of the senate). See Augusto Pinochet, El Día Decisivo: 11 de Septiembre de 1973 (Santiago: Editorial Andrés Bello, 1979), p. 153.

[47]An account of the first detentions of Christian Democrats and of the party leadership's reactions appears in Chile-América's chronology of the relations between the party and the military government, cit. supra, footnote 45.

[48]See the text of the Decree Law (No. 1,697) in La Tercera de la Hora, March 13, 1977, p. 2. The commentary in the newspaper clearly notes that although the dissolution is a measure taken against all parties in "recess," it is directed exclusively at the Christian Democrats since "the National Party dissolved itself motu propio after the Armed Forces took power and the radical Democratic Party practically does not exist." p. 2.

The same March 13, 1977 issue of the newspaper contains the internal Christian Democratic documents reprinted in full. It is probably correct to say that some of the party leaders wished to give publicity to the papers as a means of making their position on current events widely known.

[49]For a comprehensive treatment of the crisis in the Socialist party, see Chile-América's dossier entitled "La crisis en el Socialismo chileno," 54-55 (June 1979), 81-137.

[50]José Maravall, Dictatorship and Political Dissent (London: Tavistock, 1978), p. 166.

[51]Smith, "Old Allies, New Opponents: The Church and the Military in Chile."

[52]See "The Academia de Humanismo Cristiano," a report to the Inter-American Foundation, prepared by Arturo Valenzuela (coordinator), William Glade, Henry Landsberger, Pablo Latapi, and Larissa Lomnitz, for details on the Academia and its role in Chilean intellectual life.

[53]For a good account on Spain, stressing the anticlerical excesses of some of the Republican forces, see Gabriel Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

[54]See J. Samuel Valenzuela and Manuel Barrera, "The Labor Movement and Military Rule," in the forthcoming anthology edited by Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela.