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SOVIET-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS UNDER
UNITED STATES REGIONAL HEGEMONY

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ABSTRACT

Soviet-Latin American Relations Under United States Regional Hegemony

In this paper* I will analyze diplomatic and political linkages between Latin American countries and the Soviet Union and examine how these linkages affect Latin American relations with the United States. My main hypothesis is that the Soviet-Latin American linkages are conditioned by United States-Soviet Union relations; that these relations are political and economically profitable for both parties; and that these developments pose no threat against the United States nor a reduction in its strategic security.

I will analyze historical Soviet-Latin American relationships, the role played by the Soviet Union in the foreign policy of Latin American nations, Soviet political involvement in the area, and how important Latin America is for the Soviet Union in shaping its relations with the United States.

I will also describe the increasing economic and commercial linkages between the Soviet Union and Latin America and United States perceptions of them.

Finally, I will suggest future directions for Soviet-Latin American relations in the next decade.

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Introduction

The foreign relations of Latin American countries have become diversified in the last two decades. This process of diversification has also been related to a global tendency toward fragmentation (or "multipolarization") of world power.¹ Accordingly, Latin American countries have reinforced and improved their own sovereignty in international affairs.

These two related processes have resulted in an increasing number of diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations as well as in the growing common presence of extraregional commodities, financial flows, weapons, and ideologies.

In this new international setting United States-Latin American relations have also changed. The latter has gained higher autonomy in the decision-making process of its foreign relations. The current independent political initiative of the Contadora group is just an example of this trend. In this context the maintenance of a diversified network of international relations is crucial for the improvement of regional self-determination.

Accordingly, new diplomatic linkages, economic and technical assistance, and even military agreements, cannot any longer be viewed in a simplistically understood context of American national security. As it was stated in 1981 before the Subcommittee on Interamerican Affairs: "The reasons for Latin America's increased significance to the United States are different from those that prevailed when traditional United States concepts were fashioned. United States national security, in the narrowly defined sense of safety from direct military attack, can no longer be seriously threatened in the Western Hemisphere."²

The maintenance of an old-fashioned approach to regional politics, oriented to manage local politics as well as Latin America's foreign relations,³ will prove an increasingly ineffective policy in relation to the improvement of either American prestige or her economic interests in the area. For these reasons a nonideological approach to regional external relations is not only necessary for Latin American countries, but also for the future of hemispheric relations.

The analysis of Latin American-Soviet relations in the eighties has to be inserted in this new structure of international relations.

For these reasons our study of Latin American-Soviet relations should consider these world realities. Accordingly, we will analyze these diplomatic and political linkages in the global setting of the triangular relation among Latin America, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Our main hypothesis states that Soviet-Latin American linkages are nondependent, but conditioned by United States-Soviet Union relations; that these relations are politically and economically profitable for both parts; and that these developments do not imply any military threat against the United States nor a reduction of its strategic security.

In order to establish the way that these conditions work, we will analyze both historical Soviet-Latin American relationships as well as the role played by the Soviet Union in the foreign policy of Latin American countries, and the priority that Latin America has for the Soviet Union regarding its relations with the United States.

We will describe the increasing economic and commercial linkages recently developed among the Soviet Union and her Latin American counterparts, its political involvement in the area as well as American perceptions of these linkages.

Finally, we will draw the main prospects of these relations for the next decade.

I. Latin America and the Soviet Union

The policy of the Soviet Union toward Latin America has been conducted, since the October Revolution, through two fundamental channels: interstate relations and also through the links between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the communist parties of the region.

Until the First Latin American Communist Congress⁴ (Montevideo, June 1929), Soviet-Latin American relations had been determined by the Soviet interest in incorporating the Latin American left into the Communist International. Latin America was seen as an area under the unchallengeable influence of the United States, as a group of countries that had to pass from their agrarian structures to capitalist forms in order to project themselves toward a socialist revolution. The reduced size of the working class in these countries inhibited a process led by the proletariat. The Mexican Revolution, agrarian and peasant in character, tended to strengthen such judgment.

Nevertheless, international changing conditions in the twenties led the Soviet Union to consider Latin American countries from the standpoint of the new interests of the endangered Russian Revolution. The intervention against the Bolshevik power after World War I required an international initiative capable of widening the political international front that supported the Soviet state. For these reasons the All-Russians Communist Party sent a member of its Central Executive Committee to report on the political conditions of South American countries.

According to his report,

At first glance, the situation of South American republics appears very favorable. The general economic crisis occasioned by the war persists in a very acute form throughout the whole continent of South America.... Of all the states at the present time, the Argentine Republic must be considered the most important. Moreover, its soil presents us the most advantageous conditions. From the point of view of the domestic economic situations, as well as from the point of view of the significance of Argentina for capitalistic Europe and other South American republics, Paraguay and Uruguay present no independent value of importance, and undoubtedly will be controlled by every movement in Argentina. Work can also be done in Chile, but I consider it more expedient to pay all attention to Argentina, as only by the triumph of the proletariat there, shall we actually be in position to strike a hard blow at European capital.⁵

In addition to this interest in promoting a socialist-oriented revolution in Argentina, Soviet trade interests in Uruguay and the activities of the Soviet Trade Office in Montevideo and Buenos Aires help to explain the presence of the Soviet Union in the Southern Cone of Latin America in the twenties and thirties. The situation continued relatively without change until 1953.

The Soviet coordination of the action of the Communist parties of the region and the creation of others, established in the Fourth Congress of the Executive Committee of the Communist International in 1922, materialized in 1929 with the creation of South American Secretariat of the Comintern, and the First Congress of revolutionary trade union organizations of South and Caribbean America, both held in Montevideo, Uruguay. The policy of the Secretariat, which stemmed from the Sixth Congress of the Comintern (1928), consisted in projecting the Bolshevik strategy toward the region: formation of committees of peasants, soldiers, and workers, and expropriation of private capital.

This policy coexisted with weak interstate relations and conspired against their diversification due to the subversive character of their orientations. Politicians such as Haya de la Torre of the Peruvian "American Popular Revolutionary Alliance" (APRA), ceased maintaining relations with the Communist International for these reasons.

Political failures in Colombia, the difficulties with Sandino in Nicaragua, the frustrated Socialist Republic in Chile, and the repression of revolutionary forces in El Salvador were factors that, in the III Conference of the Communist Parties of South and Caribbean America, held in Uruguay, in October of 1934, convinced the Communist International of the isolation of Communist parties in the area and the impossibility of carrying out those orientations.

The main reason that the development of the revolutionary crisis in South and Caribbean America is being delayed is

the fact that the Communist Parties continue to lag behind the big tasks that are called forth by the level of development of the mass movement, and that the proletariat is poorly organized. The Communist Parties are not sufficiently ready for decisive revolutionary struggle for power.⁶

For these reasons, the Comintern tried to promote in this region National Liberation Alliances, which could be defined as a proto-form of the peoples fronts subsequently developed. As it was stated in the Cuban case, "[t]his is the only correct path. For only the creation of a united national revolutionary front against the common enemy in Cuba--will the Cuban proletariat being the chief driving force of the revolution...."⁷ The same line was promoted in Brazil.⁸

The Seventh Congress of the Comintern (1935) formalized this deep strategic and ideological turn through the new Peoples Front policy. This strategy removed the Communist parties from their isolation, related them to other political forces, and moderated their tactics, directing them into institutional channels. These changes, which had to be understood in the international situation created by Hitler's Germany, intended to avoid the danger of a Nazi-armed intervention against the Soviet power.

In addition to these international factors there were ideological formulations that supported such lines. The position of Lenin, since the beginning of the Russian Revolution up to his death in 1924, emphasized that socialism could not succeed totally in only one country and concluded that there was a structural need to promote the socialist revolution throughout the globe. From this point began the initiative to create Communist parties in Latin America that would work according to this perspective.

After Lenin's death, Stalin reformulated such theses affirming that the socialist revolution could be achieved in only one country: the Soviet Union.⁹ This line was strengthened after the defeat of Trotsky in the Sixth Congress of the Comintern (1928). The thesis of "socialism in one country," that coexisted with the political contradiction of the Comintern in Latin America of developing proletarian revolutions during the period 1928 to 1935, eventually required coherent and symmetrical relations between the United States and Latin America, that the foreign policy of the Soviet state had to be oriented toward a line which was similar to the one that guided the relations between the Latin American Communist parties and the Communist International.

The policy of the Peoples Fronts allowed a diversification of the diplomatic relations of the Soviet Union in Latin America, especially after World War II. Even before the end of the Second World War, Stalin dissolved the Comintern (1943) in order to facilitate negotiations with Roosevelt and Churchill.

According to Marcou,

La disolución de la Komintern correspondía también a las necesidades de la gran alianza en tiempos de guerra. Con la desaparición de la Internacional, Stalin daba seguridades a sus aliados. Por ese gesto, los occidentales debían concluir que se había abandonado la idea inicial de la Komintern, la de la preparación de la revolución mundial.^{10*}

East-West tensions, their crystallization in the Cold War, and Latin American alignment at the perimeter of military and political defense of the hemisphere established in 1947 through the Interamerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance altered the former political and diplomatic links with the majority of the governments in the region. This deterioration coincided with the illegalization of almost all Latin American Communist parties.¹¹

In spite of this situation, the policy of the CPs in Latin America did not vary substantially. The thesis of the Peoples Fronts was recycled in terms of Democratic Governments of National Liberation, in which all the anti-imperialist and anti-latifundist forces were included. This formulation was predicated on the notion that the principal obstacles to Latin American development were located in the domination of latifundist forces and American capital, both of which limited national capitalist growth. The cold war too had an internal correlation to the extent that the Soviet Union opposed the positions taken by domestic political forces which tried to insert themselves in the National Liberation Front. The tactics had to fit the nature of that broad alliance, excluding the use of military force and fortifying parliamentary and electoral positions of the Communist Parties' National Liberation policy, which brought about a coincidence of political and diplomatic objectives, internal purposes of the CPs, and the international interests of the Soviet Union.

This policy had maximum expression under Krushchev (1958-1964), even though it was initiated some years prior to the beginning of the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party (1956). Nevertheless, the tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Krushchev regime impeded the expression of the broad alliances of the local CPs toward greater diversification and hampered the presence of the Soviet state in Latin America.

The political and ideological interests of the Soviet state and of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Latin American diplomatic

*The dissolution of the Comintern was related to the needs of the great alliance in times of war. With the disappearance of the International, Stalin gave assurances to his allies. By his attitude, the Western world should conclude that with the abandonment of the initial idea of the Comintern so went the concept of a world wide revolution.

relations and political linkages with their counterparts also have been matched by the permanent Latin American interest in these relations.

The most interesting aspect of the evolution of Soviet Union-Latin American relations has been the permanent interest of Latin American countries to establish regular ties with the Soviet Union. This may be explained on the basis of two main reasons which we will analyze below.

In the first place, the foreign relations of Latin American states had traditionally been conditioned by the specific position and external policy of the United States. Considering the growing close economic links existing between the region and Washington, any modification of the international environment of Latin America was perceived to have external ramifications for the United States. For this reason, hemispheric defense was defined as a question of the highest relevance in Inter-American relations, even before the Second World War, as it was stated in the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace in 1936.

It is not surprising, therefore, that historically, in the face of situations of international conflict, the United States exerted pressure upon the foreign policies of Latin American nations in order to produce a common, united bloc reaction against potential aggressors.

For these same reasons, the role of the Soviet Union in the external policies of Latin American states represents a critical case if one considers their special relations with the United States and the subversive character of the hemispheric order of Soviet policy up to 1935.

Although the new ties that were established between the Soviet Union and Latin America towards the end of the 1960s were undoubtedly related to the emergence of a multipolar international system, this factor alone cannot explain the well diversified Soviet presence in the region towards the end of the 1970s. An important element in this process is--as we shall see later--the package of benefits that the Latin American countries could derive from the economic exchange with the Soviet Union. But more transcendental than this is the political role that the Soviet Union plays in the foreign relations of the region.

The early relations among Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico with the Soviet Union serve as counterpoints to the difficult relations between these same countries and the United States. Mexico historically had many conflicts with the United States, while Argentina and Uruguay were primarily under the influence of England and only more recently have experienced the overwhelming economic and political presence of the United States. On another vein, current relations among Brazil, Peru, and Colombia with the Soviet Union indicate their willingness to achieve an independent position in the international scene in line with their current foreign policies.

Consequently, it may be stated that the political role played by the Soviet Union in the foreign relations of some Latin American

countries serves to strengthen their search for positions of relative independence with respect to the United States. The fragmentation of international political power that began in the 1970s offers the Latin American nations the possibility of establishing the type of links which are truly expressive of this more decentralized reality. But, at the same time, it also opens the possibility of an impending reversal or alteration of the new situation on Washington's part. The Soviet Union exercises thus a double role, both as a testing factor and as an escape valve. This double role gives the Soviet Union a greater political weight than any other extracontinental power and turns it into a valid political actor in the regional context.

Secondly, the Soviet Union plays an internal political role in Latin American societies. To the extent that social and political mobilization in Latin American countries has had increasing anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist connotations, their external counterpart was, for some time at least, the Socialist countries, and especially, the Soviet Union. Hence, ties with the Soviet Union represented, often, not only demonstrations of independence vis-a-vis the United States, but also the necessary outcome of the integration of popular sectors in local institutionalized political struggle. This wider domestic political consensus has been expressed in a wider international arch of diplomatic relations. This became reflected in a greater diversification of international links between the Soviet Union and various Latin American countries such as Bolivia (1970), Brazil (1959), Chile (1964), Ecuador (1967), Peru (1969), and Venezuela (1970).

In sum, the presence of the Soviet Union in the internal and external politics of Latin American nations can hardly be ignored.

II. Latin America and the Soviet Foreign Policy

Even though Latin American-Soviet relations can be, to a large extent, understood by their reciprocal political and economic interests, one can see that they are actually conditioned by the state of United States-Soviet Union relations and the role that this relationship plays in the region.

The specific Soviet policy towards the Latin American nations has to be analyzed in the context of this international political triangle. For this reason, it is necessary to analyze more closely the factors that allow the Soviet Union to have a policy which Latin American countries have taken advantage of within the framework of Soviet-United States relations and yet have not destabilized them.

The replacement of Krushchev for Kosygin-Brezhnev in 1964 as Prime Minister and Secretary General, respectively, was the product of a number of national and international tensions that had accumulated during the 1960s and that Krushchev was unable to control and resolve.¹²

One of the precipitating elements in Krushchev's departure was the dissident position adopted by the Rumanian Communist Party in April 1964, which culminated in concatenation difficulties within the

Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The Soviet-Rumanian dispute on the economic relations between these nations revived within the Central Committee of the CPSU the danger of recreating the problems registered with Yugoslavia during the Stalin era, in a context aggravated by the de facto rupture with China, all of which threatened to disintegrate the system of relations within the Socialist bloc.

A second factor of importance was the domestic economic crisis. This was expressed in a weak rate of economic growth due to differences registered between administration and planning, the disregard for financial self-management, and the incomplete utilization of material and moral incentives.¹³ As a result, the regional planning system was modified, centralized at the national level; the functioning of more than four hundred industrial enterprises was liberalized, leaving decisions to be guided by market indicators; and material incentives were massively incorporated into production, eliminating subsidies to failing enterprises.¹⁴ These measures were complemented later with the introduction of the five-day labor week. With these changes in the functioning of the Soviet economy, it was expected that the meager economic achievements of the Krushchev era would be overcome.

In the field of foreign relations, the Soviet Union was encouraged to deepen its policy of peaceful coexistence and project it into detente with the United States in an attempt to transcend the bottlenecks and contradictions unresolved in the previous administration. This deepening of the aforementioned policy was possible owing to the progressive isolation of the Chinese Communist Party, whose political defeats in Africa and Indonesia--along with other factors--drove its leaders to launch in 1966 the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. This turned the Chinese inward and away from the principal international affairs.

The shift in the Soviet Union's foreign policy and detente with the United States were necessary to the extent that they permitted the freeing of resources to overcome the economic crisis. For this reason, the first budget presented by Brezhnev and Kosygin in 1965 reduced the funds assigned to defense, emphasizing peaceful coexistence as one of the permanent features of Soviet policy for more than a decade. Hence, the XXIII Congress of the CPSU (1966) concluded that the Soviet Union,

Is a firm supporter of the maintenance of normal and peaceful relations with capitalist countries, of the solution of controversies between the states through negotiation and not war ... these relations, besides being peaceful, include wider mutually advantageous links in the fields of the economy, science, and culture.¹⁵

In this fashion, the Soviet Union helped to open the way in 1969 to the agreements on limitation of strategic weapons, SALT I, to the accords on detente between East and West, and to the opening of the Soviet economy to technology and to capital and consumer goods from advanced market economy nations.

The Soviet Union maintained until then its international posture vis-a-vis the West, already started by Stalin after Yalta and the dissolution of the Comintern, that is to maintain, what Stanley Hoffman called, a "world condominium."¹⁶ Stability and peace, from the point of view of Stalin's, Krushchev's, Brezhnev's, and Andropov's short administration period, imply on the one hand, the recognition of post-World War II European borders and the neutrality of the rest of her periphery on the other.

According to Brezhnev at the Congress of Soviet Trade Unions in 1972,

No es materia de discusión ni ahora ni en el futuro. Las fronteras de los países socialistas son inmutables y a este respecto los tratados no son más que el reflejo de lo que es una realidad.... Quisiera subrayar que, por otro lado, también somos partidarios de mantener buenas relaciones con Pakistán, con el cual no tenemos conflicto alguno, ni intereses contradictorios.... Ultimamente se ha perfilado un viraje notable en nuestras relaciones con Japon.... Nos satisface el que con muchos países de Asia, por ejemplo, Afganistán, Birmania, Ceilan, Iran y Turquía--mantenemos buenas relaciones, si bien con algunos de ellos podrían ser mejores de lo que son.^{17*}

This international posture is strongly intertwined with Soviet-Latin American relations. From our point of view, Brezhnev's statements on these issues during his visit to Cuba in January of 1974, coincide.

Peace, as we understand it, is absolute respect for the right of the peoples of the socialist countries to build a new society without any interference from outside. Peace is complete respect for the right of every state and all peoples to sovereign and independent development.... For a long time the statesmen of the capitalist world were deaf to the Soviet Union's proposal to build relations between the two systems on the principle of peaceful coexistence. They tried to crush the world's first socialist state

*It is not a matter of discussion now nor in the future. The borders of the socialist countries are not negotiable and in this respect the treaties are no more than the reflection of what is real.... I would like to underline, on the other hand, that we are also advocating the maintenance of good relations with Pakistan, with whom we bear no conflicts nor contradictory interest whatsoever. Lately a notable shift in our relations with Japan has become evident. We are pleased with the present status of our relations with many other countries of Asia, such as Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Iran and Turkey, although with some of those countries our relations could be better than what they are now.

through intervention, to strangle it by economic and political blockade. They hoped to smash the Soviet Union in a big war.... Finally the capitalist world had to face the truth. It had to recognize the impossibility of solving the historical dispute between capitalism and socialism by military means. In these conditions, far-sighted leaders of bourgeois countries found it advisable to respond to the proposals of the socialist states for peaceful coexistence.¹⁸

It is interesting to underline the fact that this perspective is restated on Cuban soil. If one regards United States-Cuban tensions in the last twenty years, this message implies a calling to the United States and also to Cuba to seek a similar path for a peaceful settlement of their own disputes and disagreements. This is why the inviolability of European frontiers and the peaceful coexistence between two different social systems is underlined.

Nevertheless, peaceful coexistence from the Soviet perspective implies several other dimensions. According to Brezhnev in Cuba:

The concept of peaceful coexistence is not limited to a mere recognition that war can no longer be seen as a means for settling disputes between states, especially between the two social systems. In our days there is a growing conviction that active and fruitful cooperation among all states is essential.¹⁹

The same reasoning was extended in December 1977, when Brezhnev stated that peaceful coexistence,

Consist[s] in recognizing and enacting in international documents a kind of a code of rules for honest and fair relations between countries, which erects a legal and moral-political barrier to those given to military gambles. They consist in achieving the first--if only modest, for the present--understanding blocking some of the channels of the arms race. They consist of a ramified network of agreements covering many areas of peaceful cooperation between states with different social systems.... The Soviet Union is effectively looking after its defence capability, but it does not, and will not, seek military superiority over the other side. We do not want to upset the approximate equilibrium of military strength existing at present, say, between East and West in Central Europe, or between the USSR and the USA. But in exchange we insist that no one else should seek to upset it in his favour... we are proposing a radical step: that agreement be reached on a simultaneous halt in the production of nuclear weapons by all the states, [and] to reach an agreement on a moratorium covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes along with a ban on all nuclear weapons test for a definite period..., the contest between socialism and capitalism should not be

decided on the field of battle, not on the munitions conveyors, but the sphere of peaceful work.²⁰ (Underlined in the original)

In the strategic-military sphere, detente was reflected in a policy oriented to

Prevent any first or second strike, to prevent nuclear war in general. Our perspective on these matters may be formulated as follows: the USSR's defense potential must be sufficient to prevent the risk that our peaceful life be disturbed. We do not seek superiority in armaments but the way to reduce, to eliminate military confrontations.²¹

The rationale of this standpoint lies in the Soviet assumption that a military confrontation between the two super powers would imply the complete destruction of both. As Brezhnev stated later in 1981:

As a matter of fact, there can be no 'limited' nuclear war at all. If a nuclear war breaks out, whether in Europe or in any other place, it would be inevitable and unavoidable that it would assume a world-wide character. Such is the logic of war itself and the character of present-day armaments and international relations. One should see and understand this.²² (our emphasis)

Soviet policy towards the United States establishes a necessary relation among these different elements. The main components of the Soviet posture vis-a-vis the other super-power imply an indivisible relation among: military parity, economic and technological cooperation, a set of international rules of behavior, nonintervention of western powers in socialist countries (including Cuba), respect for international frontiers as settled after World War II, and neutralization of the Soviet periphery. These complex and necessary relations imply that no one of these components could be altered without a modification of the whole.

For these reasons Giorgi Arbatov, head of the Soviet Institute for the Study of the United States, in agreement with Hartman and Hoffman, proposes that, the

Soviet conviction [was] that the Reagan administration has brought with it a ruthless all-embracing strategy geared to acquiring nuclear superiority, waging an ideological, political, and economic war and changing the world correlation of forces--all at Moscow's expenses and removing from Soviet-American rivalry elements of cooperation which, although limited, previous presidents, at least since Dwight Eisenhower, have sought to preserve and expand.²³

This very same understanding of current Soviet-American tensions can be observed in Andrei Gromyko's speech at the Stockholm Conference.²⁴

It is important to stress the consistency of the Soviet approach to these international matters since Stalin's days. Regardless of differences among Soviet administrations and their specifics in their relations with the United States, it is possible to observe the increasing importance of peaceful coexistence as a consistent foreign policy approach.

Detente and peaceful coexistence policies had their counterpart in the relations between the Soviet Union and Latin America. This demonstrates that this system of relations is dependent not only upon the internal political-economic developments in the Soviet Union, but also upon wider Soviet global policy with regard to the United States.²⁵

From the Soviet standpoint and from the perspective of Latin American Communist parties, peaceful coexistence is a particularly important aspect of regional revolutionary strategy. From their perspective there is a close relation between social and political mobilization in Latin American countries that supports the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence and those favorable conditions that contain United States policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

Peace will be more stable and the conditions for revolutionary struggle more favorable if the Communist parties of various regions promote collective peaceful initiatives, such as the highly successful conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties in Karlovy Vary in 1967.²⁶

The relation between peaceful coexistence and local social change is also favorable from the point of view of regional politics since the former allows for increasing possibilities of the latter in Latin American countries. According to Sergo Mikoyan, Editor of América Latina,

Es evidente asimismo la relación directa existente entre la coexistencia pacífica y la exitosa lucha de los pueblos oprimidos por su liberación. La distensión maniata a las fuerzas de la agresión, a las fuerzas de la reacción extrema. La distensión abre perspectivas a las formas pacíficas de la lucha victoriosa contra el imperialismo, contra las distintas formas de explotación del hombre por el hombre.^{27*}

This relation achieves its deepest political meaning when a de facto necessary relation between peaceful coexistence and Latin American working classes is stated. From the Soviet standpoint,

*It is evident, likewise, the direct relation existing between peaceful coexistence and the successful struggle of the oppressed peoples for their liberation. The distension ties the forces of aggression and the forces of extreme reaction. The distension opens up perspectives to the peaceful end in the victorious struggle against imperialism, against the different forms of exploitation of man by man.

Se puede constatar que el proletariado latinoamericano se pronuncia por el establecimiento y el fortalecimiento de principios democraticos generales y progresistas en la politica internacional, como el derecho de las naciones a la auto-determinacion, el respeto de su soberania, la no-injerencia en los asuntos internos de otros estados, la renuncia a las guerras anexionistas, la coexistencia pacifica entre paises de regimen social diferente; y en las relaciones con los estados socialistas, con otros sectores de la clase obrera internacional y las fuerzas del movimiento de liberación nacional, el proletariado latinoamericano se pronuncia por la estricta observancia de los principios del internacionalismo proletario.^{28*}

In the Soviet framework, proletarian internationalism of the Latin American working class as well as of all revolutionary forces in different countries establishes an inner relation in the context of the policy of peaceful coexistence. Internal social change and international detente turns out to be a two-sided coin. In addition, the real political practice of the Latin American progressive forces demonstrates, for the Soviet viewpoint, the validity of these assertions.

For the aforementioned reasons, Soviet foreign policy makers remain inside a theoretical-ideological framework from which they draw their main policy approaches to world politics. Even though these approaches could be pragmatic and nonideological, they are consequences already existent inside a general conceptual scheme towards the rest of the world. In this way they systematize their international approach into a stable political framework.

This has been accomplished through the reassertion of some Leninist principles of foreign policy. Through this systematic endeavor, foreign policy behavior of the Soviet Union, as well as of local Communist parties, is conceptualized as guided by scientific or permanent principles.

Soviet foreign policy correctly reflects the objective law of world development, which makes it so powerful. It rests on the fundamental Leninist principle of proletarian internationalism in relations with the peoples fighting against imperialism and colonialism, and of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist states. These interrelated principles

*It can be stated that the Latin American proletariat favors the establishment and strengthening of general democratic and progressive principles of international politics as the right of nations to self-determination, respect of their sovereignty, noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, the renouncement of annexation wars, the peaceful coexistence among countries of different social regimes, and among relations with socialist states, with other sectors of the international working class and the forces of national liberation movements, the Latin American proletariat favors the strict observance of the principles of the international proletarianism.

have always determined the essence of the international course of the CPSU and the Soviet state. [Our emphasis] Of special significance is the joint struggle by the socialist countries for the common goals in the international arena and close coordination of their foreign policy actions [and] with the national liberation movement and the newly independent states.... The Soviet state was the first country in history ever to propose disarmament and the elimination of a material base of wars... has always attached great significance to the promotion of world trade and economic, scientific, technological, cultural and other relations.²⁹

From this international standpoint, Soviet policy towards the foreign policy of Latin American countries is nothing other than non-alignment. Anti-imperialism and anticapitalist policies of local revolutionary movements are transformed at the level of international relations into a policy of independence from the United States, but not into an automatic and mechanical insertion of Latin American diplomacy inside the Soviet international posture. Even though this non-alignment could be seen as favoring Soviet interests in the area, it is important to underline that this approach is completely different from the aforementioned international policy vis-a-vis other socialist countries.

According to the Soviet posture towards Latin America it is possible to understand the recovery of the Peronist foreign policy that the leadership of the Argentine Communist Party has emphasized.

To quote General Peron, the late President of Argentina, 'each Latin American country should use its own methods based on its sovereignty.' However, he added, 'we also need Latin American cohesion. This is a real possibility for our continent and an objective goal we must all strive for without the slightest hesitation.'³⁰

For these reasons non-alignment implies for Latin American Communist parties and Soviet scholars the development of increasing intra-regional commercial ties and a common economic front able to contain the pressures of multinational corporations over local economies, but not to eliminate economic relations with them.

Nevertheless, non-alignment from these perspectives implies more than a simple noninvolvement in super-powers competition and an independent foreign policy. It also implies an independent military policy and a genuinely independent economic policy. The rationale of this policy is oriented to isolate international corporations and local monopolies in national politics, and to promote wider options for local bourgeoisies which are defined as searching for new opportunities in the international scene.³¹ Economic independence, as defined by Soviet analysts, is the containment of transnational corporations instead of their exclusion from local economies.

This approach is validated in the Soviet current position towards Nicaraguan foreign policy. From the Soviet point of view, Nicaragua is following a path of independence from the United States, nonalignment and collaboration with European capitalist countries as well as with the socialist ones, a pattern that all Latin American countries should seek.³² This is the reason why the Non-Aligned Movement is strongly supported as a way to,

Resolver en comun los problemas acuciantes del desarrollo y ultimamente, cuando el imperialismo despliega una ofensiva en America Central y el Caribe, [urge] la necesidad de la unidad de accion para poder defender en plena lucha el derecho a la vida y la libertad, resguardar los legitimos intereses frente a los atentados de los imperialistas (como muestra la crisis en el Atlantico Sur) [y] puede hacer menos pesante la falta de consciencia de objetivos exclusivamente nacionales en el No Alineamiento latinoamericano y convertirse en factor primordial, fundamental, de su consolidacion.^{33*}

Peaceful coexistence and progressive social change are seen as reinforcing each other. For these reasons the Soviet policy towards Latin American revolution will emphasize the pursuit of political gains through nonviolent means.

III. Soviet Policy Towards Social Change in Latin America

Even though the Cuban revolution had strongly attracted Soviet attention and the Latin American Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union was founded in 1961, it was not until 1969 that the Soviet Union began to publish studies on Latin America through the journal Latinskaya Amerika, with which the interest for analyzing regional matters became generalized.³⁴ This interest was reflected, additionally, in the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with most Latin American countries and the beginning of a new phase in commercial and economic cooperative ties with the region.

In the relations with Latin American Communist parties, the CPSU adopted a policy consistently symmetric with the orientations of peaceful coexistence and detente. Thus, the policy was asserted, common for the Third World, of incorporating Latin American Communist parties into wide political and social national fronts. The XXIII Congress of the CPSU pointed in this direction when it indicated that,

*To jointly resolve the pressing problems of development and ultimately, when imperialism unfolds an offensive in Central America and the Caribbean, [urges] the need of unity of action to be able to defend in open struggle the right to life and liberty, to safeguard legitimate interests in the face of the imperialists' attempts (as it was shown in the South Atlantic crisis) [and] can diminish the lack of consciousness of exclusive national objectives in the Latin American Non-Aligned Movement to transform it into a fundamental factor in its consolidation.

The success of the struggle for social progress and national independence is greater to the extent that there is cohesion among all the patriotic, progressive, and democratic forces of liberated countries... we are committed to... developing multidimensional collaboration with the countries that have conquered their national independence and to help them in the growth of their economies, in the preparation of national cadres and in their struggle against neo-colonialism.³⁵

The policy of wide political fronts, integrating extensive social strata, did not deny political opposition to anti-national policies. Hence, Brezhnev later stated that,

The antagonism sharpened between imperialism which reinforces social oppression and negates democracy, and the popular masses which fight for their vital interests and aspire to freedom and democracy. In this struggle take part, increasingly, together with the working class, the great masses of peasants, intellectuals, employees, students, and the middle sectors of urban populations... presently the conditions are emerging to unite all democratic currents in a political alliance capable of firmly limiting the role of monopolies in the economy of countries.³⁶

This policy of wide fronts was reinforced by the victory of the Popular Unity in Chile in 1970, an event that the CPSU esteemed and underlined emphatically during its XXIV Congress in 1971.³⁷

As it may be observed, then, Soviet foreign policy combined the needs generated by the Soviet economic development process when establishing peaceful interstate and exchange relations with market economy nations and, at the same time, was able to formulate a policy for the Communist parties of the region which did not alter that level of relations with the United States, but that, simultaneously, opened political perspectives to the unity of internal opposition forces. This policy, approved by the Conference of Communist and Workers Parties in 1969, emphasized that

It is essential to take advantage of the strong tendency of recent years toward cohesion of the anti-imperialist, democratic forces, unify them and act together. This is one of the most important objectives of Communist activities and it involves solution of cardinal problems.³⁸

Nevertheless, this policy of unified national fronts has been facing serious challenges in Latin America since the end of the 1970s.

In the first place, the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia showed, among other things, the limits that the Soviet leaders were willing to accept in the movement towards economic and political liberalization. To the extent that the CP of Czechoslovakia tried to widen the political space for the resolution of the principal problems faced

by socialism in that country, and that one of the economic measures of Dubcek's action plan implied the decentralization of planning and economic management,³⁹ the CPSU saw threatened the unity of the already divided Communist bloc and, more importantly, saw questioned the fundamental political and economic parameters of the five-year plan advanced in the XXIII Congress of 1966. Aside from the international political costs, the Soviet intervention only was able to delay a crisis that later erupted in Poland, but which affected the relations with the CP's of Latin America and with other socialist forces giving rise to splits, as in the case of the MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo) of Venezuela.

Secondly, and closely linked to the Czechoslovakian problem, relations between the CPSU and the Cuban CP have deteriorated. To the degree that the Cuban policy towards Latin America implied support of guerrilla forces that had organized in most countries of the region, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union faced the same dangers that Krushchev had not been able to prevent in 1962.

Tensions increased considering that the Tri-Continental Conference of Havana (January 1966), held only three months before the XIII Congress of the CPSU defined its detente policy, was explicit in its support for revolutionary movements in the region. This latter policy, reiterated in the Conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organization (OLAS) in 1967, placed Soviet foreign policy in a difficult position in light of the fact that its support of Cuba and its Latin American initiatives were progressively contradictory with detente with the United States.

Since the new foreign policy orientations were a necessary complement to the effort to overcome domestic economic problems, the time for a ripening of the economic reforms required that the policy of detente would not be interrupted in the short term by the type of contradictions that were already emerging.

Faced with this situation, the Soviet Union reacted in a similar fashion as it would in the Czechoslovakian case, suspending deliveries of oil to Cuba in January 1968. Even though this action did not silence the criticism of Fidel Castro of the decision taken against Czechoslovakia, the measure carried a clear message to all Latin American Communist parties, including the Cuban one, that the policy of peaceful coexistence and detente should be translated in the domestic sphere into a nonguerrilla option⁴⁰ which sought and emphasized the widespread unity of leftist forces.

It is possible to understand along the same line the Soviet willingness to support the Revolutionary Government of General Velasco Alvarado in 1968 in Peru. Since the "foco" guerrilla warfare strategy found a new source of criticism in the progressive orientation of the Peruvian armed forces, the Soviet Union backed this military government with full political support.

The recognition that "it seems that in the last twenty years or so the social structure of Latin American armies is changing, taking on a

more anti-imperialist course"⁴¹ led to political support of the Peruvian revolutionary government. The same attitude, with some political differences, was adopted by the Peruvian Communist Party in regard to the military government.⁴² Nevertheless, Soviet economic assistance was still of little importance and the transfer of weapons only started in October 1973, right after the Chilean army coup.

The electoral success of the Popular Unity coalition in Chile in 1970 was an additional argument which reinforced Soviet posture towards Latin American social change. This was the best compromise to date between peaceful coexistence and the construction of the premises of socialism. For these reasons the head of the Soviet delegation to the 40th Anniversary of the Chilean Socialist Party in 1973 stated that,

En las relaciones internacionales se afirma cada dia mas el principio leninista de la coexistencia pacífica de los estados con regimenes sociales diferentes y se fortalecen las tendencias favorables a la colaboración mutuamente ventajosa.

Por supuesto, esto no significa de ninguna manera una atenuación de la lucha de clases que se libra en el mundo entero o la 'reconciliación' del socialismo con el capitalismo, la 'coexistencia pacifica de sus ideologias.' El PCUS siempre se ha atenido y se atiene a los principios marxistas-leninistas de la irreconciliabilidad ideológica con el capitalismo.^{43*}

Nevertheless, this structural and permanent struggle between capitalism and socialism does not imply the "export" of local revolutions throughout the region. As socialism was in Stalin's thinking, possible in only one country, revolution in Latin American countries is defined as existing without the need to be reproduced in all other countries of the area. For these reasons, at the ideological level, Soviet officials have tried to establish a conceptual relation between peaceful coexistence and revolutionary change in an area of special sensitivity to American interests. Accordingly, the Soviet posture in this respect was not to "export revolutions," a statement which implied a clear message to the Cuban leadership not to expand the revolutionary wave throughout the continent. As Brezhnev stated in Havana,

The Soviet Union has always considered impermissible, indeed, criminal, any attempt to 'export counter-revolution,'

*The Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social regimes is affirmed with increasing support in international relations, and the favorable tendencies toward mutually advantageous collaboration are strengthened. Certainly, this does not mean in any way an attenuation of the class struggle which is released worldwide or the 'reconciliation' of socialism with capitalism, the "peaceful coexistence of their ideologies." The CPSU always has adhered and adheres to the Marxist-Leninist principles of ideological irreconcilability with capitalism.

any interference from outside with a view to suppressing the sovereign will of a revolutionary people. Nor do Communists support the 'export of revolution.' A revolution matures on the domestic soil... [a]nd how and when it breaks out, what forms or what methods may be used in this revolution--are all matter for the people of a given country to decide.⁴⁴

This "non-exportable" revolution was a precondition for the establishment of correct and stable relations with the United States in this area considered by the Soviets to be under permanent American hegemony.

Nonexportable revolutionary changes and ideological irreconcilability with capitalism were plugged with postures of non-alignment and peaceful coexistence. Nevertheless, it was extremely difficult for the CPSU to maintain a single political and international approach during these years. As we will see later, tensions would arise inside the Soviet policy-making circles when relations with the United States deteriorated. For these reasons coherent political discourse would observe some fragmentation during the last part of the seventies and, especially, during the eighties.

From this global picture of the general Soviet approach to Latin America it is possible to understand why the Soviet Union reacted so strongly vis-a-vis the American involvement in the Chilean political crisis of 1973. The Chilean peaceful transition to socialism attempted in 1970-1973 attracted strong Soviet interest. For the very same reason the overthrow of Allende implied important political consequences for the Soviet policy towards the United States in the Latin American region, as we will see later.

It should be noted that the interruption of Soviet diplomatic and commercial relations with Chile immediately after the military coup and the condemnation of United States intervention in Chile clearly departed from Soviet global policy towards the region. This is fundamentally due to the fact that the Chilean case was the best example of the possibility of acceding constitutionally to government, which undoubtedly strengthened Brezhnev's Latin American policy. The Chilean case shows the way in which, without altering the relations with the United States in an area so sensitive to American interests, the Soviet Union could gain regional positions backing the development of processes that could fit its expectations and its reduced possibilities of providing financial and economic assistance. That the United States intervened in Chile meant a questioning of a policy with which the Soviet Union was involved. This explains the shifts that Soviet regional policy underwent later.

The possibility of affecting a peaceful transition to socialism was strongly emphasized as realizing the ideas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin on the desirability and possibility of revolutionary change under peaceful conditions.⁴⁵ For the same reasons, the failure of the Chilean left to gain influence over middle sectors and other progressive classes was a very important setback to their ideological endeavors. As Victor Volsky stated,

La clase obrera chilena no supo aprovechar a plenitud las posibilidades de la etapa anti-imperialista, democratico-popular y captarse a las masas trabajadoras no proletarias y a las capas medias, condición necesaria para crear una real superioridad de fuerzas.^{46*}

Even in the midst of the Central American armed struggle of today Soviet scholars differentiate those countries where armed struggle is inevitable from those countries where violence is inadvisable. The latter is the case of Honduras where these analyses state that progressivist organization should oppose the American endeavor to convert Honduras into a land base for United States Marines. This should be accomplished, in the Soviet's view, through the unity of all political forces coming from the left as well as other democratic sectors.⁴⁷ In this context of a Central America made tense by the armed struggle, the theoretical and ideological restoration of Georgi Dimitrov as a socialist thinker is meaningful and should be underlined in these circumstances.⁴⁸

The unity of all democratic forces, either centrist or leftist, has been converted into the Soviet ideological and strategical stronghold in the Latin American revolutionary process. Since it is not possible to maintain a tight political or ideological control over all the diversified revolutionary processes which occur in contemporary Latin America, Soviet scholars and decision-makers emphasize the need for wider political fronts. Regardless of the fact that armed violence is being used, the main thrust in the Soviet approach to Latin American politics is the need for the formation of pluriclassist and multiparty political fronts or coalitions. This is the common element that in Soviet eyes could produce a real unity of all revolutionary forces in Latin America as a whole.

The question of the necessity of organizing active joint unified actions by the working class and the popular masses and by all of the progressive and democratic forces of various countries arose with special sharpness, determining the scope of the solidarity movement with the struggle of the peoples of Chile and other countries against reaction and imperialism and for democracy.⁴⁹

This permanent drive to achieve coherence at the ideological and political levels requires a theoretical or conceptual support of the idea that Soviet involvement in national liberation processes is not contradictory with this global approach. Accordingly, an endeavor to support these linkages establishes that,

*The Chilean labor class did not take advantage of the numerous possibilities of the popular-democratic, anti-imperialist stage and to gain influence over the non-proletarian working and middle class sectors, a necessary condition for the creation of a real superiority of forces.

The issue of the admissibility and scope of foreign assistance to revolutionary liberation movements remains central in the acute political and ideological struggle in the world. The practice of international relations has led to the adoption by international law of the principle of rendering assistance to peoples struggling for national liberation from colonial, and in certain cases, other types of foreign domination. National liberation movements fighting against colonialism and racism are entitled to practically any kind of assistance, including military, since colonialism is an international crime and it is the duty of all states to help eliminate it as soon as possible.

This norm comprises part of the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, as well as of United Nations resolutions and other international documents.⁵⁰

Pluriclassism and multiparty coalitions seem to be the marrow of Soviet policy towards local revolutionary processes. The linkage of these principles and their relation with peaceful coexistence is established through the principles of nonexportable revolutions and irreconciliability with capitalism.

From the Soviet viewpoint a pluralist political coalition, even though it is pushed by local political conditions to use military means of struggle, is enough warranty for the unexportability of this process. As far as wider coalitions respond to the very same nature of each local politics and that they cannot be created artificially, these limits to the "exportability" of the revolutionary process in Latin America establish the narrow margin of action which permit the conciliation of local social change and peaceful coexistence with the United States.

Precisely for these reasons the Soviet Union is supporting a political settlement of the Central American crisis. The World Conference of Communist Parties of 1983 reasserted the need for:

Achieving a political settlement of the conflicts in Central America and the Caribbean, where imperialist quarters in the United States of America and their accomplices are continuing to bring brute pressure to bear on Cuba, threatening its freedom and independence, planning to crush the Nicaraguan revolution, and persistently preventing the people of El Salvador from deciding their destiny by themselves.⁵¹

Along the very same line Andrei Gromyko emphasized the role of the Contadora group and the new role of some Latin American countries. Due to this new Latin American presence in the world political arena the Soviet Union is willing to "expand and strengthen bilateral relations and cooperation in tackling contemporary problems."⁵²

Accordingly, Soviet foreign policy towards Latin American social change combines a support for revolutionary internal politics and detente with the United States in the region.

IV. Latin American - Soviet Economic Relations

Soviet management of foreign policy towards the United States and Latin America helps understand the stabilization of economic and commercial relations registered in that period between the Latin American governments and the Soviet Union, relations which expanded significantly during the decade of the 70's as will be⁵³ shown below.

Supported by the policy of detente and wide fronts on the internal plane, the Soviet Union formulated, in practice, a model of state-to-state relations with the countries of the region.

In the first place, this model starts from the premise that:

The Socialist part of the world with its development and perspective on international relations provides a good example of the best way to resolve the big issues that humanity faces. But, it cannot, of course, resolve the problems for all of humanity. For this it is necessary to count on the conscious efforts of each country and an extensive and constructive cooperation among all countries and peoples.⁵⁴

Therefore, Soviet policy toward Latin America places emphasis on economic exchange and cooperation with a view that, within the political framework described before, better terms of exchange will tend to favor independent policies on the part of underdeveloped nations.⁵⁵ Likewise, economic cooperation oriented to support the social infrastructure and state industries "is, in essence, the economic basis of the revolutionary-democratic policy."⁵⁶

According to the "guidelines for the Development of the National Economy of the Soviet Union for 1976-1980," adopted at the 25th Congress of the CPSU,

The Soviet Union wishes its cooperation with the developing countries to take the form of a stable and mutually advantageous division of labour. These aims are served by the treaties and agreements on long-term economic cooperation signed in recent years with a number of Asian, African and Latin American countries. We shall expand cooperation with the developing countries on democratic and just principles and help them to strengthen their economic independence.⁵⁷

As a summary of achievements of this policy, there was witnessed the construction of 860 industrial and other projects in 47 underdeveloped countries. In 1973 Soviet credits reached 6,000 millions rubles available at low interest rate, to be paid back with deliveries of raw materials, farm produce, and other traditional exports, as well as with the products of those industries already in existence. In

some cases repayment of these credits with local currency for the purchase of local commodities by the Soviet Union was allowed.

The property of the new industries is national and the Soviet Union does not transfer profits from these projects to her territory. These long-term relations at the economic level provide a stable market for Latin American exports. They are defined as "the most important external factor enabling states to take the non-capitalist path of development."⁵⁸ The world socialist system, in the Soviet's view, "provides a pattern of what is to be built and how to go about it,"⁵⁹ and protects the new independent economic policy from imperialist pressures while strengthening the state sector. This emphasis on strengthening the state sector is derived from the conviction that in newly independent countries--colonies or neo-colonies--the state plays the very fundamental role of nation builder. In the context of this function, the state provides the basis for a socialist construction process.

In Latin America different favorable conditions are seen as supporting the increasing economic complementarity of both actors' economies. The Cuban Revolution and the general political mobilization process of the beginning of the seventies, the economic and social achievements of the Soviet Union and of other socialist countries, and especially the general weakening of the capitalist or Western economies led by the United States, are the main driving forces which have enabled Latin American countries to develop their economies.⁶⁰

As a general overview to these relations in the eighties a Soviet analyst has stated that,

With eleven Latin American countries, the Soviet Union has agreements to deliver machines on favourable terms. These goods are to be paid for in installments spread over a period of up to 10 years at 4.5 percent yearly interest, which is much less than interest rates charged by Western firms.⁶¹

In Latin America the Soviet Union exhibits the same economic behavior as that in other Third World countries, receiving manufacturing and semi-finished products as payments for their debts. Considering the permanent balance of payments deficits and huge lack of foreign currency in a context of increasing external debt, these terms of economic relations relieve pressures upon Latin American economies. See Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Even though the general Soviet approach to Latin American economic problems emphasizes the need for a noncapitalist path of development, this policy is not conceived as eliminating the existence of external investments. On the contrary, what is mainly sought is a strong control of foreign investments, rather than their total elimination. This is why a formal code of transnational corporations behavior is seen as progressive economic policy.⁶²

The anti-imperialist and anticapitalist policies supported by the Soviet Union in Latin American countries do not imply an economic isolation from the world capitalist market. In this context the pursuit of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in which socialist countries would play an important role is defined as a progressive policy. Coordination of actions by socialist and developing countries at multigovernmental level international organizations such as the United Nations is one of the main measures to be adopted in order to produce a reorganization of the world economy on behalf of a stable economic development of Third World countries.⁶³

This global approach to Latin American economic development does not imply a revolutionary transformation of hemispheric economic relations. It implies the rearrangement of these relations instead of a radical change in them. For these reasons this approach could be defined as an extension at the international level of the new economic policy which at this moment seems to reappear at Soviet economic decision-making levels.⁶⁴

This Soviet approach to the specific traits of a new economic policy for newly independent or underdeveloped countries is also related to the political meaning of these transformations. The establishment of the premises for socialism or the construction of a socialist-oriented state is one of the main political achievements for these countries. The limits to a decisive and truly socialist construction, or a socialist transformation tout court is viewed not only at the level of international relations, or at the level of the limits imposed by the United States and its pressures upon Latin American countries and governments but at the level of the very same political bloc that is carrying out these transformations. Considering that the political approach to Latin American political transformations implies multiparty and pluriclassist coalitions, the peculiar trait of a socialist-oriented state is defined by the "bloc of socially heterogeneous class forces which can and in fact does include antagonistic social sections. And although the interests of these sections coincide on the basis of the struggle for democratic objectives they may diverge on questions of the fight for socialism."⁶⁵ This heterogeneity arises from the "practice of revolutionary-democratic transformations" which "generates a multitude of state-political forms which in the last analysis, is determined by the national specific conditions in each state."⁶⁶

Secondly, to the extent that the support of the Soviet Union and the CPSU of the peaceful forms of struggle in the 1970s did not alter the relations with the United States in the region, Soviet-Latin American ties were basically established at the state level.⁶⁷ This gives Soviet policy in the region, excluding Cuba, a nonideological and pragmatic character by which politics is viewed as a concentrated form of the economic dimensions, which explains, how for example, after so many changes, Soviet-Bolivian relations still survive.

In sum, the Brezhnev model for Latin America implied: the least unilateral cost financially; reciprocity on commercial matters; economic cooperation in areas reserved preferably for the State, stimulating a type of development which, in the likelihood of national-popular or

socialist forces coming to power, could direct that accumulation toward forms of economic organization similar to those of the Soviet Union.

Evidently, this model permitted an achievement of higher levels of cooperation with governments which, nonsocialist in nature, could accept Soviet military aid and cooperation, just as the Peruvian case shows. At the same time, it developed a policy of economic assistance which directly questioned the core of the American activities in the region, that is, neo-conservative economics and free trade, and a rightist ideological and political bias.

In this framework of political definitions and orientations, relations between the Soviet Union and Latin American countries (excluding Cuba) developed very rapidly. The volume of merchandise and the amount of trade between the two parts grew substantially in the last decade.⁶⁸

The most important feature in the economic relations between the Soviet Union and Latin America has been the permanent leaning in the balance of trade in favor of Latin American countries. The Soviet Union imports raw materials, particularly agricultural goods and ferrous materials. This is the reason why in the "first extraordinary meeting of SELA (Latin American Economic System which integrated all Latin American countries) in January 1976, it was considered possible to increase Latin American exports to CMEA (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance) countries, establish cooperation in industrial development and to realize different economic projects in Latin America."⁶⁹ In turn, the Soviets export machinery and equipment.

According to Soviet sources "different commodities of Latin American origin have a very important place in Soviet imports. In 1979 Ecuador was the largest exporter of bananas to the Soviet Union; Argentina held second position (after Australia) in wool exports; Brazil was the second largest exporter of cacao (after Ghana); and Costa Rica was in third place (after India and Angola) in coffee exports."⁷⁰

The most prominent sources of Soviet imports are Argentina, which provides cereals, wool, and meat; Brazil, which exports soya, corn, rice, coffee, cocoa, and cooking oil; Peru, which sells cotton, coffee, sugar, nonferrous metals, fishmeal, and wool; and finally, in recent years, Bolivia, which exports tin. Of the \$981.1 million in goods exported by Latin America to the Soviet Union in 1979, Argentina represented 57.8 percent, Bolivia 7.8 percent, Brazil 26.9 percent, Costa Rica and Peru 8.0 percent, and Uruguay 2.3 percent.⁷¹

Argentina receives from the Soviet Union machinery and transportation and pumping equipment, nonferrous metals, and chemical products. Bolivia imports machinery and equipment, cars, energy, pumping and transportation systems. Brazil purchases oil, flour, mineral fertilizers, chemical products, watches, and cameras. Peru receives the same type of machinery and equipment, and besides, airplanes, tractors, electric buses, and equipment for oil exploration.⁷² See Table 5.

Although the volume of commerce between the two areas cannot compete in importance with the exchange that exists between the Latin

American countries and the United States, the trade of some Latin American nations with the Soviet Union in some years has even paralleled the exchange with countries like Japan. This is the case of Argentina—in 1978, Ecuador in 1975 and 1976, Guyana in 1971, 1973, and 1975, Jamaica in 1971 and 1975, and Uruguay during the entire decade of the 1970s.⁷³ Nonofficial sources indicate that in the final years of the past decade Bolivia became an important commercial partner of the Soviet Union in Latin America.⁷⁴

The importance of this commercial exchange can be seen if one compares exports to the Soviet Union as a percentage of total exports. Thus, for Argentina, trade with the Soviet Union represented in 1975 9.7 percent of its total exports, 6.4 percent in 1978, and 33.7 percent in 1981. For Brazil trade with the Soviet Union amounted to 4.6 percent in 1975, declining to 1.4 percent in 1978; even though it is estimated that it will grow back owing to the lack of alternative markets that Brazilian exports face. Guyana exported to the Soviet Union 8.9 percent of its total exports in 1975; Jamaica, 3.2 percent in 1974; Peru, 9.7 percent in 1975; and Uruguay 7.5 percent in 1974.⁷⁵

Along with the exchange of merchandise, the Soviet Union favors technical cooperation accords to support the building of infrastructure and industries in Latin American countries. In line with this policy, the Soviet Union renders technical assistance and scientific cooperation to large projects such as the hydroelectric energy programs of Rio Parana Medio, Salto Grande, Costanera, Bahia Blanca, and Yacireta signed with Argentina. Recently, the Argentine president of the binational Chamber of Commerce, Hector Monsón, was informed that a permanent Soviet industrial fair will be installed in the Rio de la Plata area.

Similarly, the Soviet Union is installing an astrophysic laboratory in Tarija, Bolivia; hydroelectric plants of Sobradino and Itaipu in Brazil; and the main equipment for the hydroelectric project of Alto Sinu with two main electric plants, Urra I and II, in Colombia. The Soviet Union is also installing an electric bus system in Bogota.⁷¹ The Soviets have also provided support for the hydroelectric complex Los Olmos and to the fishing complex Paita, both in Peru.

With the latter, the Soviet Union is renegotiating its external debt amassed at US\$519 millions. It will be paid with new long-term credits, as well as with manufactures and semifinished products.

Cooperation agreements also exist with Mexico which on August 13, 1975, became the first nonsocialist Latin American country to sign a long-term cooperation agreement with CMEA.⁷⁶ The Soviet Union has supplied textile machinery, and starting in 1974, Mexico has assembled tractors with Soviet parts delivered by the Vladimir plant. Since this time more than 4,000 units have been produced.⁷⁷ The Soviet Union is also cooperating with the Mexican government regarding the exploitation and processing of nonferrous minerals.

As can be noted, the Soviet Union channels its experience into the promotion of hydroelectricity, transmission of electric power at

long distances, and fishing. All these activities tend to support the role of the state in the economy and provide stable markets for Latin American products.

This latter aspect has a special relevance considering that there continue to exist strong fluctuations in the world prices of raw materials, a common feature of foreign commerce of Latin American countries which tends to impede the dynamic growth of their economies.⁷⁸ According to Soviet sources "up to now the following long-term commercial agreements have been signed: with Argentina, for the purchase of cereals, soy beans, and meat; with Brazil on reciprocal trade; with Nicaragua, for the purchase of sugar, coffee, and cotton; the following long-term contracts: with Peru, for the purchase of nonferrous metals; with Mexico, for the purchase of azufre and the selling of Soviet tractors; with Panama, for the selling of Soviet cars."⁷⁹

In order to strengthen these economic relations, binational commercial committees have been created in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Mexico, and Ecuador.

An interesting new way to expand Soviet commercial influence in Latin American countries has been the establishment of an assembly plant in Panama which permits the Soviet Union an indirect delivery of Soviet commodities to those countries which still have no diplomatic or commercial relations with the Soviet Union. This commercial agreement enables the Soviet Union to assemble touring cars, watches and clock mechanisms, and cameras in the harbor of Colon. In order to assure the delivery of spare parts for cars and trucks, the Soviet Union has created the firm "International Motors" which manages a spare parts warehouse.⁸⁰

To the extent that the Soviet Union provides markets and stable prices, such long-range commercial agreements protect Latin American economies from the irregular prices of the world market and constitute an alternative road to resolve the problems derived from their respective trade deficits.

The Soviet policy of technical assistance and economic cooperation to the region follows a similar logic. The emphasis placed on public investment tends to stimulate and support development strategies in Third World countries different from those drawn from laissez faire theories and approaches which feature privatization of social capital.

While the Soviet Union maintained a state-to-state rapprochement with the countries of Latin America, the internal changes of various ideological and political tints that often occur in the area did not alter the system of relations that had been established. This allowed such a policy to be observed and deepened in accordance with favorable political conditions without having to start the whole process all over again. Together with this policy, the Soviet Union began joint venture initiatives with the Latin American private sector, such as the newly created Consorcio Sovietico-Brasileiro designed to work out hydroelectric projects through subcontracts in Peru.

The initiatives of binational Chambers of Commerce, joint ventures with the Latin American private sector, and the diversification of Soviet purchases in Latin American countries have the very important consequences of wider internal political support for Soviet-Latin American linkages. As far as other sectors of individual countries, different from the local CPs, are involved and interested in these relations, the Soviet Union has strengthened its regional presence in Latin America and will continue to project it across the long term.

V. Soviet Response to United States' Foreign Policy

The general Soviet approach to Latin American economic development and politics can be defined as a stable model or permanent structure of interstate linkages. Nevertheless, this model, which achieved important successes during the last two decades, presently faces serious challenges. These obstacles to a smooth pattern of relations among these nations are the outcome of a number of contradictions which the Soviet foreign policy has been unable to overcome.

Since we have considered that Soviet-Latin American relations cannot be understood without taking into account the triangular structure of relations among the Soviet Union-United States-Latin America, the main reasons for these obstacles can be identified at the level of super-power confrontation and at the level of hemispheric relations.

The opening of diplomatic relations between the United States and China in 1971 marked the beginning of a process of recuperation of the political initiative of Peking. At this time a new phase in its international behavior began, in which it expanded its diplomatic and commercial ties. This policy became consolidated after recent domestic changes, coupled with American support for its military modernization. The reduction of China's isolation implied that the Soviet Union again faced problems in its foreign policy to the extent that China not only criticized Soviet "hegemonism" but also formulated territorial claims in border areas with much greater strength. This new Chinese foreign policy guided by anti-sovietism precipitated the trauma of isolation of the Soviet Union.

But this new element in the international milieu was defined by the Soviet Union as a new offensive by the United States, now under the form of the "China card." As Henry Kissinger stated, "[t]he Sino-Soviet conflict may indeed be the most profound and potentially explosive current international conflict."⁸¹ But Stanley Hoffman indicated that Kissinger's triangular diplomacy was not oriented, in practice, to contain the Soviet Union in the world arena, but "his own strategy left room for only two options: a constant manning of barricades, permanent crisis management, an endless vista of confrontations and tests, or else the Soviet acceptance of the inevitable United States dominance."⁸² The "China card" was practically oriented to isolate the Soviet Union rather than to maintain world stability. Containment as a blockade to Soviet international behavior was transformed through Kissinger's initiatives into a new form of confrontation. The American response to the Soviet initiative of a "world condominium" was permanently rejected by the Nixon-Kissinger administration. Even a Soviet-American nonaggression pact was rejected.

Kissinger's conception is one that, in its obsession with Moscow, discounts the internal problems of other countries, and dismisses local circumstances. He seeks an order of restraint, yet his global view obliges him to universal intervention. Kissinger wanted to put an end to America's oscillations from one form of idealism--isolation--to another--crusades.⁸³

This permanent contradiction during the period when Kissinger had some decision-making power in United States foreign policy was expressed in political interventions at the American periphery, as during the overthrow of Allende in Chile in 1973.

From the Soviet point of view these contradictions were read as a new version of the secular confrontation with the United States.⁸⁴

The American intervention in Chile was especially sensitive due to the heavy political meaning that the Soviet Union have invested in it. American involvement in the Chilean crisis was a clear sign for the Soviet Union that the United States was not yet ready to enforce seriously a new world equilibrium and that confrontation was still the permanent banner of their relations.

Even though these were some of the conclusions drawn by the Soviet Union after these circumstances in Latin America, they still maintained their will to negotiate a global equilibrium. Nevertheless, in 1980 a new administration defined as enforcing a much more aggressive policy towards the Soviet Union assumed office.

Starting from the assumption that "human rights is the genuine historical inevitability of our times,"⁸⁵ the Carter administration began a new foreign policy different from the former administration's, but with some coincidence at the level of the American confrontational policy towards the Soviet Union.

The idea of human rights as the center of an American foreign policy that produces the coincidence of "our idealism and self-interest,"⁸⁶ was rationalized through the argument that the circle of countries which share those values would be increasing and that American national security would strengthen proportionally.

But just as Kissinger's conception of Soviet containment led him to intervene all over the world and to recreate Soviet fears of encirclement, Brzezinski's ideas led the Carter administration to intervene in internal Soviet issues and on its periphery.

According to Carter:

The universal declaration and other international human rights covenants mean that one nation may criticize another's treatment of its citizens without regarding each other as enemies.⁸⁷

This direct reference to Eastern European dissidents as well as to Soviet ones was read by the Soviet Union as an escalation of aggression that characterized the former administration. Since the effect of this policy in Latin American countries was not as successful as was imagined,⁸⁸ what remained was its anti-Soviet orientation against which the Soviet Union reacted accordingly.

It is in this context of high political sensitivity that the democratizing process in Poland erupted. It questioned the value and the leading role of the Soviet Union in the system or relations among socialist countries. It is highly probable, therefore, that Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was guided by such a frame of reference. However, this international conduct of the Soviet Union, instead of helping it avoid isolation, had deepened it by alienating the support of an important portion of the European communist parties and socialist parties of other regions.

To this set of challenges to the international position of the Soviet Union one may add the nonratification of SALT II treaties on the part of the United States, one of the fundamental components of Soviet detente policy dangerously questioned by the United States Congress initially, and by the Reagan administration posteriorly.⁸⁹

Secondly, these problems for Soviet foreign policy come at a moment of sharpening domestic economic troubles. The continuing bad harvests have not yet been solved by the successive changes in the highest governmental positions. Likewise, the decreasing production of oil is not coupled with a declining trend in the productivity of its industry, which restricts the supply of consumption goods in a social system in which this type of problem, given the relatively homogeneous distribution of income and services, affects the whole of the social conglomerate and its political structures.

As the international position of the Soviet Union becomes endangered as the target of the simultaneous offensive of China and the United States, two systems of contradictions which had been stagnated by detente begin to operate. The first has to do with the tensions which any international crisis generates in the Soviet Union due to the lack of flexibility characteristic of its political system. To the extent that the power game within the CPSU and the Soviet state surpass the established forms of procedure and structures, the formulations of policies and decision making to reinforce them becomes a long-range process which threatens the existing positions, functionalities, and policies. Consequently, the capacity to adopt a quick response regarding new situations conflicts with the lack of flexibility of Soviet political institutions, placing in question the existing power structure.

The second system of contradictions has to do with the position of the Soviet Union within CMEA. As the lack of political flexibility prevents it from enacting opportune responses and achieving adjustments which do not entail high political costs, the rest of the countries belonging to CMEA react to such emergencies by aligning themselves behind the Soviet position, just like the Polish crisis has demonstrated.

In this environment of political constraints, the questioning of the Soviet Union's international posture by the Reagan administration and the present Chinese leaders forces the Soviet Union to face these challenges by defining them as crisis situations. To the extent that the situation is managed with mechanisms appropriate to the crisis, the foreign policy responses are equivalent.

The criticisms of the Soviet Union for the insufficiencies of its internal political regime are seen by the Soviets as:

An attempt on the part of imperialist forces to recuperate from their military, economic, and political defeats, through an all-out ideological war. It is in this context that the offensive against the Socialist world is launched under the pretext of its lack of respect for human rights.⁹⁰

For these reasons, "the Soviet Union believes necessary a constant political vigilance, an efficient, active, and convincing propaganda, and an opportune containment of ideological subversion."⁹¹

This rejection to an increasing ideologization of Soviet-American relations was reaffirmed by Brezhnev when in 1981 he asserted that,

Another thing is the visible sharpening of the ideological struggle. For the West is not confined to the battle of ideas. It employs a whole system of means designed to subvert or soften up the socialist world. This is what happened in fraternal Poland, where opponents of socialism supported by outside forces are, by stirring up anarchy, seeking to channel events into a counterrevolutionary course.⁹²

The Soviet Union defined United States foreign policy oriented to jeopardize "the pillars of the socialist state in Poland." American foreign policy was viewed as oriented against the Soviet Union, trying to deteriorate either internal socialist relations as well as United States relations with the Soviet Union. Carter's grain embargo and Reagan's pressures against the Soviet gasoduct and the European acceptance of this deal were all consistently defined as oriented towards the very same stability of the Soviet Union in its own area and of the CPSU inside Soviet society.

To understand the Soviet position on this issue implies distinguishing between what they call "ideological struggle" against capitalism and imperialism and what they label "ideological-military confrontation." The former is a permanent trait of the peaceful coexistence between two different systems. The latter is the consequence of a deliberated policy against the Soviet Union. What the Soviet Union complains of is the mixture of both postures in a single foreign policy approach. According to Soviet sources, the United States

Transplant the struggle of ideas into the realm of interstate relations and, citing ideological differences with the socialist countries, in effect try to obstruct the

normal development of these relations and the solutions of pending international problems in practice. Furthermore, they often turn the struggle of ideas into a veritable psychological warfare with other socialist countries, a warfare that cannot be regarded as a form of ideological confrontation between the two systems on the world scene.⁹³

In Ponomarev's words, this all embracing ideological warfare is also observed in those American approaches that emphasize negotiations from a position of strength, sanctions, threats, and attrition against socialism.⁹⁴

Andropov's administration insisted that this linkage of ideological struggle and interstate relations leads to a deterioration of interstate relations that could prove too costly and could even produce or transform the "battle of ideas into military confrontation."⁹⁵ Since the Soviet officials establish a direct relation between military confrontation and its escalation into nuclear war, from their perspective the very same existence of this ideological warfare presents a high military risk.

The ideological foreign policy of the United States towards the Soviet Union is confirmed, from the Soviet Union side, by the recent deployment of missiles in Europe. This confirmation of a transformation of the ideological struggle into a military confrontation finally leads the Soviet leadership to a very pessimistic approach to international issues and promotes its own reaction of force as was noticed in the Korean flight incident.⁹⁶

The increasing tensions between both super-powers is the main external factor that explains, in part, the deterioration of United States-Latin American relations and the response that the Soviet Union has had in this area under these conditions. The "reason of force" implemented by the United States in Chile in 1973, and in Grenada in 1983, as well as the threat against Cuba and Nicaragua in the eighties, only confirms to the Soviet Union the adequacy of their approach.

Soviet-Latin American relations could not maintain their previous character considering the increasing anti-Soviet and anti-Communist approach of the United States' policy in Latin America. Even though the Soviet model of interregional relations excluded any threat to the military security of the United States and was not oriented to destabilize American hemispheric security, the renewed anti-Soviet rhetoric in American circles strengthened those sectors in the Soviet Union which favored a more confrontational policy in this region vis-a-vis the United States and which supported a more orthodox-bolshevist way for the Latin American revolution, as we will see later.

In the Latin American region two main factors have changed previous Soviet-American relations in the area: the American intervention in Chile and the United States-Cuba confrontation on African and Central American issues.

Aside from the political importance of the American intervention in the overthrow of Allende's constitutional government,⁹⁷ the Soviet Union saw its policy, especially with regard to all Latin American countries, in question and interpreted this involvement as a new signal of the increasing United States anti-Soviet international⁹⁸ posture. Just as the military coup in Chile ideologically affected the European CPs,⁹⁹ the Soviet policy toward Latin America also felt its impact. The Soviet Union, which had reiterated the relevance of the Brezhnev approach to the region, going so far as to suspend petroleum shipments to Cuba in 1968, singled out the government of Velasco Alvarado in Peru as an acceptable limit of the use of armed force for the construction of the premises of socialism. The peaceful transition to socialism introduced in Chile motivated Soviet interest in that it optimally materialized the Brezhnev model: construction of the premises of socialism; unity of the principal parties of the left; broad social and class fronts; structural reforms leading to a state managed economy; and, conversion of the army in support of the government.¹⁰⁰ In spite of the sparse¹⁰¹ economic support it provided, the Soviet Union saw in this process a model capable of being followed by the Third World without risking a military confrontation with the United States.

With regard to the second Soviet-American source of tension, Cuban commitments with African governments are not new. Even though Cuban-Soviet cooperation in the seventies in this region has increased, this does not imply that Cuba's involvement is a consequence of its role as a "proxy" of the Soviet Union in African politics.¹⁰² Cuban presence in Africa was evident in early 1961 when it had military missions in Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Congo, and Zaire, as well as some military personnel in Algeria.¹⁰³ In the seventies the Cuban support for the Angolan and Ethiopian socialist-oriented forces did not initiate the internationalization of the conflict but was a reaction to the military intervention of the United States, Zaire, and South Africa in Angola, Somalia, Sudan, and Egypt and Saudi Arabia in Ethiopia.¹⁰⁴ Soviet support for the Angolan-Cuban military forces in 1978 was the consequence of a fait accompli instead of a previous joint Soviet-Cuban planning in this matter.

Their convergence in world political issues cannot always be seen as a "Soviet move" in which the Cubans react as "proxies" blackmailed by Soviet economic assistance. Their political relations are much more complex than this single-minded approach suggests,¹⁰⁵ and Cuban participation as a Latin American country in regional politics has to be seen as responding to its own commitments in the area.

Nevertheless, from the American point of view Cuban actions in Africa and Latin America have been defined as "Soviet aggressions." In this context the Soviet Union reacted accordingly, increasing its support to Cuba and to all Latin American governments whose policies manifested a degree of independence from Washington. The renewed Soviet support of Cuba in the eighties¹⁰⁶ is nothing else but the need to protect it against a military invasion as demonstrated recently in Grenada.

VI. Militarization of Politics

The character of United States-Latin American relations is one important part of this "triangle." Even though we are not going to summarize the entire history of these relations, we can roughly state that they have been characterized by a permanent contradiction between the Latin American social and political pressure for social change and the American tendency to intervene in order to prevent these processes and to try to monitor them.¹⁰⁷

In the most recent period, during the eighties, these relations have reached their worst level. The American pressure upon Cuba and Nicaragua, its controversial role in the Malvinas war, its rigid approach to the external debt problem, its support to authoritarian regimes, are all American policies that block not only an easy understanding among the actors, but deteriorate hemispheric relations.

Multilateral organizations like the Organization of American States substantively collapsed, and hemispheric institutions such as the Rio Treaty became obsolete. In the midst of this catastrophe, the only "clear voice" which is heard emphasizes the need to protect United States national interests in the area. In the context of an urgent re-definition of hemispheric linkages and structures, what appears the most important component of United States policy towards the region is American security interests.

The assumption that these interests have been jeopardized by Soviet influence has contaminated all hemispheric relations. Considering that this assumption plays such an important role, there is the need to take a closer look at the real situation in the region.

Irrespective of the analyses already produced on this paper,¹⁰⁸ we have to consider, in the first place, what is signified by the very same military definition of this eventual Soviet threat.

According to American military sources, the Soviet Union is not seeking a military confrontation with the United States in the Latin American area. Even more so, according to the same sources, "Moscow will work actively to prevent a nuclear war. Despite Moscow's nuclear 'war winning' strategy, there is no substantial evidence to indicate the extent to which Moscow seriously considers the use of nuclear weapons to achieve its objectives."¹⁰⁹ In addition to the inexistence of a nuclear military threat in general coming from the Soviet Union, which implies the exclusion of Cuba and all other Latin American countries as potential resources for these purposes, the American military does not define the current Latin American situation as containing any other conventional military threat against the United States.

Cuban military ties with the Soviet Union and the growth of Soviet air and naval presence in Cuba pose the most significant military threat to United States security interests in the hemisphere. ...isolated Cuban or Soviet adventurism in the hemisphere can be dealt with effectively, without a substantial increase in military cooperation

programs, combined with a willingness to provide equipment for collective defense.¹¹⁰

Since the military definition of the strategic situation in Latin America does not imply an actual conventional threat for the United States, the potential Cuban involvement in a conventional United States-Soviet Union military conflict could be handled without any significant military effort from the United States and would rest in the collective military effort of regional partners or allies.

The problem of Soviet support to Cuba is not military, but political. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff defined this situation when they stated that "although Cuba does not have the capability to win a direct confrontation with United States military forces ... it has trained Third World country military and insurgent forces."¹¹¹ Even though "Cuba provides ports and repair facilities for Soviet ship visits, airfields for Soviet reconnaissance flights, and a readily available surrogate forces which can support anti-United States movements in the regions,"¹¹² the Joint Chiefs of Staff have to recognize that:

To protect its security in Latin America, the United States must revitalize its relations with nations in the area. These relationships must be built upon converging interests and demonstrate that the United States is a reliable and capable security partner. Peacetime military involvement should be increased through greater military presence, increased security assistance, and expanded military-to-military contacts. At the same time, the United States must assist countries in the region in efforts to improve socio-economic conditions as an essential contribution to stability and progress.¹¹³ (Our emphasis)

According to these sources, there is no conventional or nuclear Soviet threat coming from the Latin American soil, but there is the need to support economic improvements in the region instead of deploying new military forces able to counterbalance extra-hemispheric military involvement.

A clear conclusion of these statements is that there is not a military but a political problem in hemispheric relations. As an Army officer stated:

The chief threat to the United States in the Eastern Caribbean is not military ... is political instability.¹¹⁴

The same definition of the hemispheric relations can be observed in the "political side" of the American military establishment. According to the Department of Defense, even though in its view the Soviet Union "supports massive intelligence collection and sits astride critical lines of communications," "[a]t the present time, however, Cuban and Soviet intervention in Central America and the Caribbean poses the more immediate danger." But, "No immediate external danger threatens

Latin America at this time. The challenges to our security in our backyard [sic] are growing. They are not primarily military in nature, but rather take the form of political instability and the potential exploitation of political instability generated by serious economic and social problems."¹¹⁵ (Our emphasis)

A sharp difference arises when these assessments are compared with the main assertions of the Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America: "The concerting of the power of the Soviet Union and Cuba to extend their presence and influence into vulnerable areas of the Western Hemisphere is a direct threat to United States security interests."¹¹⁶ (Our emphasis)

The American military appeared more political than the militaristic outlook of policy makers on Latin American issues. This change of roles at least means that from the specific military point of view there is no military threat, Soviet or Cuban or coming from elsewhere, against the United States, and that the emergence of this flurry of military concern is a political, but not a military issue.

As McGeorge Bundy, former National Security Advisor to the Kennedy administration, stated: "The realities of relative strength make it totally clear that no one is going to make war on us from Central America. There is something genuinely zany in thinking about the area in such terms."¹¹⁷

Even though political-military ties between the Soviet Union and Latin American nations represent a higher level of state-to-state relations, which could begin to develop out of prior commercial links, the transfer of Soviet armaments to Latin America between 1968-1977 only amounted to \$480 million in the Cuban case and \$550 million for Peru.¹¹⁸ In both cases, commercial and economic cooperation agreements allowed for the development of relations on a political and military plane. Similarly, five heavy water tons support the Argentinian nuclear program, and a great interest on the part of the latter in purchasing arms from the Soviet Union has arisen after their practical use was evidenced in the Peruvian-Ecuadorian border clash of 1981.

Nevertheless, in spite of a strong commercial exchange, high Soviet functionaries initiated an exchange with the Brazilian regime on international political themes, such as the Palestine issue and the Non-Proliferation Treaty on Nuclear Weapons, which the Soviet Union signed in 1975.

In sum, the inexistence of any Soviet or Cuban conventional or nuclear military threat in the face of underdevelopment as the main political feature of hemispheric relations shows that the militaristic rhetoric of some sectors of American society is a political function of other international interests.

The most important consequence of this biased foreign policy approach is the generation of a wide number of regional conflicts and tensions that cannot be solved in a stable way through a military perspective. On the Soviet side, this militaristic approach implies that

its reaction to the aggressive rhetoric and practice of American administration encourages tendencies inside the Soviet foreign policy decision-making process to gain more leverage.¹¹⁹ These sectors could influence Soviet-Latin American policy as well. These orthodox tendencies located inside the CPSU and in other parts of the Soviet milieu of Latin American specialists, either in the Foreign Minister or in the Academy of Sciences, increased political leverage proportionate to the increasing rhetoric of the American policy makers.

Even before the overthrow of Allende's government in Chile some of these tendencies appeared. This was the case of Boris Ponomarev which has insistently reaffirmed the need of a clearer leading role of the working class vanguard in revolutionary processes in Latin America. In 1971, Ponomarev stated that a great deal depended on the position of the army in that political context. Considering this fact he emphasized the need to carry out the process of consolidation and expansion of the Popular Unity's positions through a combination of parliamentary behavior together with "mass extra-parliamentary struggle."¹²⁰

Obviously, this "extra-parliamentary" approach was much more closely related to the political strategy followed by ultra-leftist groups during the Popular Unity period. It is interesting to note that Ponomarev's approach was exactly the opposite of the Chilean Communist party's, which was trying to maintain the institutional strength of the constitutional government against the ultra-leftist banner of "people's power." These were the alternative noninstitutional forms of local government. For these reasons it is important to underline the coincident positions of Ponomarev and the Chilean orthodox left.

The same attitude was observed on the Soviet side after the military coup of 1973. The notion of an institutional or peaceful transition to socialism was not completely accepted in Soviet circles. As is shown in the review of Joan Garces' analysis of the Chilean experience.

It is hardly right to turn 'legality' into a fetish, as the author now and again appears to do. The ruling classes also broadly speculated on the concept of 'legality' when they were in effect obstructing the Popular's Government activity.¹²¹

It was against these orthodox tendencies inside the international Communist movement that the Secretary General of the Italian CP, Enrico Berlinguer, reacted in his well known article on the Chilean coup d'etat in Rinascita. He insisted that the working class' response to reactionary violence should be the renewal of its determination to defend democracy, and the working toward the creation of the broadest possible agreement.¹²²

These Soviet alternative approaches to the Latin American revolutionary process also can be observed in other areas, such as in Asia where local culture expressed in religious belief is obliterated.¹²³

These tendencies received additional support coming from the Nicaraguan Revolution. A recognition of the armed struggle as an

important way to achieve power was emphasized after the revolution. The rationale of this recognition lies in the new reality that has been shown in Latin America and the corrections of the traditional Marxist approach to this area that this new reality implied.

According to Sergo Mikoyan,

No existe un solo ejemplo de revolución victoriosa en el continente que se haya cumplido por la vía pacífica En una serie de países, donde ascendieron al poder gobiernos militares patrióticos (Perú, Panamá, etc.) no hubo derramamientos de sangre pero de todos modos hubo aplicación de las fuerzas militares, hecho que convierte su curso también en una vía armada... se trata de establecer la superioridad militar, y la variante ideal es la retirada. [In Nicaragua, armed opposition developed wide armed fronts] apoyándose sobre los vínculos más estrechos con las masas, sobre la potencia militar y organizativo-militar.... En consecuencia es posible hablar de un nuevo tipo de vanguardia revolucionaria, sobre su surgimiento objetivo en las condiciones de una serie de países de América Latina en nuestros días.... En la mayoría de los países del continente el problema del ejército será resuelto, por lo visto, de otro modo, bajo la forma de escisión de las fuerzas armadas, de atracción de los mejores elementos patrióticos hacia el campo revolucionario.^{124*}

The recognition of important improvements in Grenada after Bishop's coup,¹²⁵ the need to convert the working class party into a truly revolutionary vanguard,¹²⁶ the assertions that armed struggle is the only way to overcome dictatorships like those of Guatemala¹²⁷ and El Salvador,¹²⁸ led to a more theoretical consideration of the changes that are occurring in the revolutionary process in Latin America.

*Not a single example of victorious revolution, accomplished peacefully, exists on the continent. In a series of countries where patriotic military governments took power (Peru, Panama, etc.) there was no bloodshed, although there was the use of military forces, which transforms their movement into an armed process.... It tries to establish military strength and the ideal variant is withdrawal. [In Nicaragua, armed opposition developed wide armed fronts] strengthening themselves with the tightest ties with the masses, on military and organizational-military power.... In consequence, it is possible to speak of a new kind of revolutionary vanguard on their objective emergence in the conditions of a series of Latin American countries at the present time.... In the majority of the countries of the continent the problem of the army will be resolved by what is evident under the form of splitting the armed forces, by attracting its best patriotic members toward the revolutionary field.

In response to the analysis of Régis Debray's ideas on the Latin American revolution and his latest works on this matter, a Soviet analyst stated that,

El conflicto con los sectores medios en conjunto suele hacer sumamente problemático el desenlace pacífico, sin derramamiento de sangre. Por el contrario, la alianza con la mayor parte de la 'clase media' aumenta las probabilidades de la revolución de abrirse paso a través del 'cuello de botella' de la amenaza de guerra civil... al aplicar el mismo enfoque al último período de la revolución, cuando las posibilidades del desarrollo pacífico habían sido agotadas, obtenemos en total un cuadro adecuado del alineamiento y el dinamismo de las fuerzas de clase. En ese período la revolución y la contrarrevolución entablaron batalla decisiva, que ya no podía terminar con un compromiso.^{129*}

Even though these postures vis-a-vis the Latin American revolutionary process have not been converted into a governmental policy, it is hardly correct to say that these alternative policies will never be expressed in a different approach to the region. For these reasons, the militaristic approach of American foreign policy circles and the Soviet orthodox views of the path that the Latin American social change has to follow found feedback in each other. The demilitarization of hemispheric relations as well as a pacific course of local political change seem to be the only reasonable ways to overcome both strategic tensions and local military confrontations.

VII. Prospects for the 1980s

The Soviet Union has been forced to operate in Latin America within a very narrow margin of action. Pushed by the prevailing American axiom that almost all Latin American problems are the consequence of or are produced by an East-West internal confrontation, the Soviet Union has reacted by increasing its own level of political opposition to United States policies in the area, yet without destabilizing its strategic relation with the United States in the continent.

This permanent tension or balance in Soviet policy towards Latin American politics is the outcome of the presence of the above mentioned

*On the whole the conflict within the middle sectors makes a peaceful outcome, without bloodshed, highly problematic. On the contrary, the alliance with the greater part of the "middle class" increases the probabilities that the revolution make it across the "bottleneck" to the threat of a civil war... upon applying the same approach to the last period of the revolution, when the possibilities of peaceful development had been exhausted, we obtain as a whole an adequate picture of the alienation and the dynamism of the class forces. In this period the revolution and the counterrevolution entered into decisive battle, which could no longer end with a compromise.

differences inside the Soviet policy-making process. The difference between those who favor detente with the United States and extend this argument to a mild and smooth path to power in Latin America and those who wish to maintain peaceful coexistence but provide a stronger support to the Latin American revolutionaries will be sustained if American policy in the region remains unchangeable.

Soviet relations with Latin America have been obstructed by all those American policies that oppose regional economic, social, and political change with the East-West confrontation argument. This is the reason why in the last few years there has been a contradictory coexistence of a strong anti-Soviet rhetoric with a consensual opinion that the Soviet Union will not use Latin American territories as bases for launching an armed attack against the United States. As it has been stated, the Soviet

Approach to Latin America has been cautious--exploiting limited opportunities for exacerbating United States difficulties but (except for Cuba) avoiding heavy investment or high risk involvement.¹³⁰

Even though the Soviet Union has been pushed to react strongly in the political field against United States current policies in the area, it has, on the other hand, supported the peaceful settlement of conflicts in the region¹³¹ as observed in its endorsement of the Con-tadora initiative and the United Nations Security Council resolution on the Malvinas war.

It is important to stress the point that the Soviet Union did not take advantage of the United States' failed participation in the resolution of the Malvinas conflict. Even when Soviet-Argentine relations had already reached a military level, as observed in the first interchange of visits of high level officers in 1978-1979,¹³² the Soviet Union did not veto the United Nations resolution.

This attitude is coherent with its current general approach to Latin American issues. The Soviet Union will continue to oppose United States military and political covert and noncovert actions in Latin America, but at the same time it will not provoke a conflict with the United States in the region.

This segmented political response of the Soviet Union has implied increasing support to all those local and foreign policies of Latin American ~~countries~~ detached from American direct interests. For this very same reason, even when the Soviet Union is importing huge volumes of wheat from Argentina and Australia, it continues to make purchases from the United States. From the Soviet point of view, this is a demonstration or a "signal" to American policy makers of its willingness for detente in the region, but at the same time shows all Latin American countries that the Soviet Union is an alternative economic and political counterpart if the United States continues with its "managerial" approach to regional politics.

According to our previous analysis it is possible to understand why, while the Reagan administration planned the Grenada invasion and deployed missiles in Europe, and the United States Congress approved new funds for covert actions in Nicaragua, the Soviet Union carried out a different policy in Latin America at both the intergovernmental and interparty levels.

Together with a delegation, headed by Ivan Kalin, Deputy Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, sent to Bolivia and Colombia, the Soviet Union strengthened its economic positions in the region with Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia. Simultaneously, delegations of the Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM) and the People's National Party of Jamaica (PNP), together with a delegation of the government of Guyana and a delegation of the Peruvian Air Forces, were received in Moscow.

The Soviet delegation which visited Bolivia and Colombia at the end of October and November 1983 aimed to explain to those governments and parliaments the Soviet policy towards the region as well as Soviet proposals for detente in Europe. Even though press releases were delivered in both countries, the major aspect of the visit was the direct contact between Soviet delegation, headed by Kalin, and different congressmen in both Latin American countries. On these occasions, the Soviet delegation emphasized its world peace proposal, reaffirmed its support of the Contadora group for a peaceful settlement of the Central American conflict, condemned the Grenadan invasion, and declared the need to find solutions to regional problems in the framework of the United Nations and the Organization of American States charters.

Even though the purpose of Kalin's visits was almost exclusively political, following it the Bolivian government signed an agreement for the selling of a significant amount of white tin to the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Thus, the Soviet Union reinforced its political role through previous economic linkages.

At the party-to-party level of relations, the PSUM and PNP visits were of special importance. The Jamaican delegation, headed by its Secretary General, Paul Robertson, had conversations with members of the Central Committee and with the international, propaganda, and organization departments of the CPSU. They also had interviews with the Minister of Agriculture and the Central Trade Union Council, the State Committee for Economic External Relations, and with CMEA. If one considers that the PNP is an almost sure political alternative in the future of Jamaican political life, these interviews become especially meaningful.

The same could be said of the PSUM delegation which was received by Chernenko [the new Secretary General] and Ponomarev, member and candidate, respectively, of the Politburo and Secretaries of the Central Committee during that time. These interviews imply that the CPSU is open to diversifying its international relations and to strengthening them not only with Latin American Communist parties, but also with other leftist organizations. The effects of this visit were the

immediate interview of the Mexican ambassador with the Soviet Minister of Foreign Relations and a joint press release on general matters.

Kalin's delegation visits and the Latin American PSUM and PNP political relations with the CPSU show that the Soviet Union is widening its political support in Latin America. Through a more active diplomacy in the area and through a diversification of its political linkages, the Soviet Union is consolidating its presence in the region.

These new developments in Soviet-Latin American relations demonstrate that the Soviet Union has maintained itself within the limits of the latter party. The Soviets use American failures in order to isolate politically the United States in the hemisphere, but do not produce any strategic or military confrontation with it. This is why it is possible to understand the declarations of the Soviet ambassador in Nicaragua when questioned by journalists on the Soviet attitude towards eventual American intervention in this country. "Our solidarity has been active and strong until this moment. The Soviet Union has been the most important deterrent to an American aggression against Nicaragua. An invasion of Nicaragua should be precluded in its beginnings, even before it is started."¹³³ In the same vein the Soviet ambassador to Mexico stated that the Soviet Union should not abandon friendly countries in the case of an American attack, just as it did not abandon Czechoslovakia in 1938 when it was invaded by Nazi troops.¹³⁴

Soviet behavior in Latin America will be maintained inside the framework stabilized during the Brezhnev administration, establishing and consolidating its economic, technological, and commercial linkages, but limiting its initiative in the military field vis-a-vis the United States interests in the area.

Latin American-Soviet relations in the eighties will become increasingly dependent on United States approaches to inter-American issues. The Soviet Union will maintain its support for social change in Latin American countries. If the United States continues with its East-West policy approach toward Latin American problems, the Soviet Union will be seen as increasingly involved in Latin American politics. As a consequence, the United States will escalate its confrontation with the Soviet Union in this area. In this form the American prophecy of a Soviet presence in Latin American politics will be self-fulfilled.

Table 1

TRADE AMONG COUNTRIES MEMBERS OF CMEA AND LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES , 1970-1976
(Thousand of US dollars)

COUNTRIES MEMBERS OF CMEA	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Total Trade	482,152	527,756	626,412	928,846	1,353,597	2,176,143	2,408,649
Exports	154,522	168,227	226,404	230,456	420,146	597,190	632,511
Imports	327,630	359,529	400,008	698,390	933,451	1,578,953	1,776,138
Bulgaria							
Total	11,717	16,193	26,436	36,331	55,497	45,888	59,702
Exports	2,199	6,177	7,518	11,798	6,879	3,383	3,195
Imports	9,518	10,016	18,918	24,533	48,618	42,505	56,507
Czechoslovakia							
Total	94,490	99,402	112,866	138,965	181,200	224,726	281,819
Exports	34,248	36,734	49,457	44,000	70,755	94,657	81,379
Imports	60,242	62,668	63,409	94,965	110,445	130,069	200,440
Hungary							
Total	60,810	51,040	47,700	83,120	123,840	134,760	200,710
Exports	14,650	15,900	17,600	37,360	40,170	31,910	30,710
Imports	46,160	35,140	30,100	45,850	83,570	102,850	170,000
Poland							
Total	111,132	118,218	140,951	133,748	229,053	276,647	391,362
Exports	48,507	57,571	76,319	38,603	85,879	143,085	221,608
Imports	62,625	60,647	64,632	95,145	143,174	133,562	179,754
German Democratic Rep.							
Total	89,400	87,400	78,500	102,900	143,200	140,400	237,400
Exports	36,800	27,400	20,000	32,700	44,500	40,400	47,000
Imports	52,600	60,000	58,500	70,200	98,700	100,000	190,400
Rumania							
Total	27,936	27,059	47,824	40,093	86,115	139,585	220,533
Exports	9,451	9,778	24,026	10,682	28,222	84,609	107,910
Imports	18,485	17,281	23,798	29,411	57,893	54,976	112,623
Soviet Union							
Total	86,667	128,444	172,135	393,599	534,692	1,214,137	1,017,123
Exports	8,667	14,667	31,484	55,313	143,641	199,146	150,709
Imports	78,000	113,777	140,651	338,286	391,051	1,014,991	866,414

Source: E. Kossarev, *op. cit.*

Table 2

SOVIET UNION : TRADE WITH LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, 1970-1975
(Millions of US dollars fob)

	1975	1974	1973	1972	1971	1970
Total						
Exports	1,780.8	1,367.4	980.5	774.8	683.4	653.2
Imports	3,022.3	1,337.6	922.2	388.5	434.8	594.5
Argentina						
Exports	14.8	7.9	6.1	2.2	2.1	1.9
Imports	407.2	173.8	97.9	27.6	33.8	31.3
Bolivia						
Exports	4.2	5.4	5.4	1.0	0.0	0.0
Imports	13.3	15.1	16.1	3.0	10.0	3.4
Brazil						
Exports	129.3	118.9	12.7	8.6	2.2	2.7
Imports	419.8	148.0	158.0	79.4	46.3	23.1
Colombia						
Exports	2.6	1.3	1.1	3.3	1.2	1.7
Imports	9.8	5.7	12.6	1.4	4.8	10.4
Costa Rica						
Exports	0.7	0.8	0.3	0.0	-	-
Imports	-	2.1	6.9	3.4	2.4	6.9
Cuba						
Exports	1,581.7	1,223.8	925.1	743.3	668.9	644.4
Imports	2,287.3	946.5	583.9	247.9	321.0	516.7
Chile						
Exports	-	-	21.8	13.9	7.7	0.6
Imports	-	-	17.1	8.8	0.9	0.3
Ecuador						
Exports	0.8	0.7	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.1
Imports	17.9	5.8	0.9	2.8	3.7	0.8
Mexico						
Exports	6.1	1.5	0.7	0.7	0.3	0.8
Imports	2.4	1.7	0.1	9.4	10.2	0.3
Peru						
Exports	39.2	6.1	6.0	0.2	0.0	0.1
Imports	125.1	6.2	20.9	2.2	0.2	0.2
Uruguay						
Exports	1.4	1.1	1.1	1.4	1.0	0.9
Imports	19.4	32.6	7.2	2.6	1.4	1.1

Source: Tomberg, *op. cit.*

Table 3

SOVIET UNION: TRADE WITH LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, 1976-1982.-
(Millions of US\$)

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
Argentina							
Imports	219	211	385	415	1614	2963	1558
Exports	12	18	10	28	13	30	29
Bahamas							
Imports	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Exports	-	4	8	12	16	18	17
Barbados							
Imports	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
Exports	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Brazil							
Imports	400	288	179	226	370	621	509
Exports	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Colombia							
Imports	10	-	-	7	20	15	13
Exports	3	3	2	7	14	9	7
Costa Rica							
Imports	3	3	2	3	-	1	2
Exports	1	1	1	1	2	1	1
Dominican Rep.							
Imports	-	-	-	-	3	14	68
Exports	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
Ecuador							
Imports	13	12	5	5	5	5	3
Exports	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Guyana							
Imports	-	2	3	4	5	5	4
Exports	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Honduras							
Imports	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Exports	-	-	-	-	1	1	1
Jamaica							
Imports	-	-	12	-	50	50	42
Exports	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
Mexico							
Imports	14	3	5	5	4	4	8
Exports	8	1	4	1	12	15	8
Panama							
Imports	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Exports	-	-	-	1	2	1	1
Peru							
Imports	25	20	22	27	16	12	10
Exports	9	2	10	-	1	3	2
Suriname							
Imports	-	3	2	1	1	1	1
Exports	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Uruguay							
Imports	6	14	16	14	48	67	79
Exports	3	1	1	3	3	3	2
Total							
Imports	688	556	631	708	2136	3757	2297
Exports	55	40	55	94	103	108	267

Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, Yearbook 1983. Washington, D.C., 1983

Table 4
TRADE AMONG COUNTRIES MEMEBERS OF CMEA WITH LATIN AMERICA : 1970 - 1976
(US\$ Thousands)

	1970			1971			1972			1973			1974			1975		
	value	%		value	%		value	%		value	%		value	%		value	%	
Total	482,152			527,756			626,412			928,846			1,353,597			2,176,143		
Exports	a/ 154,522	100.0		168,227	100.0		226,404	100.0		230,456	100.0		420,146	100.0		597,190		
Imports	b/ 327,630	100.0		359,529	100.0		400,008	100.0		698,390	100.0		933,451	100.0		578,953		
Argentina																		
Exports	17,600	11.4		17,993	10.7		19,745	8.7		19,444	8.4		46,183	11.0		92,569		
Imports	80,423	24.5		66,280	18.4		66,083	16.5		154,588	22.1		215,831	23.1		460,075		
Bolivia																		
Exports	1,377	0.9		1,225	0.7		3,333	1.5		8,781	3.8		10,597	0.5		9,027		
Imports	3,964	1.2		11,512	3.2		6,876	1.7		21,625	3.1		29,642	3.2		26,746		
Brazil																		
Exports	57,081	36.9		62,161	37.0		78,918	34.9		67,209	29.2		204,023	48.6		275,992		
Imports	78,963	24.1		98,702	27.5		154,343	38.6		285,539	40.9		326,595	35.0		656,399		
Colombia																		
Exports	15,883	10.3		6,501	3.9		30,892	13.6		12,918	5.6		18,299	4.4		11,935		
Imports	21,977	6.7		21,080	5.9		18,187	4.5		28,657	4.1		37,970	4.1		38,218		
Costa Rica																		
Exports	645	0.4		648	0.4		875	0.4		1,847	0.8		1,960	0.5		4,112		
Imports	7,210	2.2		3,589	1.0		3,990	1.0		7,984	1.1		4,439	0.5		6,455		
Ecuador																		
Exports	4,988	3.2		4,500	2.7		3,197	1.4		3,968	1.7		6,511	1.5		4,834		
Imports	9,814	3.0		13,623	3.8		15,009	3.8		10,278	1.5		22,294	2.4		42,176		
Guyana																		
Exports	4	-		33	-		14	-		-	-		205	-		275		
Imports	-	-		-	-		-	-		-	-		-	-		4		
Jamaica																		
Exports	19	-		8	-		40	-		11	-		141	-		21		
Imports	1,036	0.3		884	0.2		231	-		433	0.1		1,121	0.1		1,406		
Mexico																		
Exports	5,908	3.8		5,432	3.2		7,566	2.3		7,837	3.4		13,278	3.2		34,042		
Imports	2,896	0.9		13,475	3.7		11,716	2.9		6,049	0.9		11,883	1.3		7,963		
Peru																		
Exports	2,129	1.4		14,398	8.6		10,142	4.5		21,760	9.4		28,575	6.9		70,482		
Imports	34,123	10.4		46,519	12.9		40,536	10.1		46,975	6.7		64,607	6.9		192,974		
Uruguay																		
Exports	3,576	2.3		3,353	2.0		2,290	1.0		2,531	1.1		2,783	0.7		7,114		
Imports	11,585	3.5		7,433	2.1		6,865	1.7		28,474	4.1		47,614	5.1		30,717		
Venezuela																		
Exports	7,609	4.9		6,281	3.7		7,199	3.2		5,781	2.5		12,333	2.9		24,055		
Imports	1,256	0.4		428	0.1		551	0.1		56	-		3,099	0.3		2,521		

Source: *Ibid.*: a/ Exports from CMEA; b/ Imports from CMEA.

Table 5

STRUCTURE OF COMMERCE BETWEEN THE USSR AND LATIN AMERICA, 1970-1978

Country	- Date of Initiation - Trade Relations	Diplomatic Relations	----- Date of Current ----- Commercial Agreement	Cooperation Accord and Content	Imports from the USSR in the 1970's	Exports to the USSR & ave. vol. in the 1970's
Argentina	1927	1946	1971	1974 hydrologic & thermoelectrical resources; elect transmission; steel & coal production; oil refinery.	Machineries, pumping equipment & cranes; transportation equipment; ferrous metals & chemical products.	Cereals; wool; meat. 1970-79; US\$ 171.2 millions.
Bolivia	1970	1945* 1969 (a)	1970	1979; no ferrous metallurgy; geological exploration.	Machineries, mining & metallurgical equipment; elevation, transportation, energy & pumping equipment; cars; tools.	Tin & tin concentrate.
Brasil	1959	1945-1947 1961 (a)	1963	1970; electronic equipments; electricity transmission; hydroelectricity.	Crude oil; wheat; mineral fertilizers; chemical products; paper & cellulose; aluminum; zinc; medicines; cement; cameras; ball bearings; watches; machineries; tools.	Soya; corn; sugar; coffee; cocos; table oil; rice. 1970-1978: US\$ 187.2 millions.
Chile	--	1944-1947 1964-1973				
Colombia	1959	1935-1948 1968 (a)	1968	1975; (b) raw materials; hydroelectric energy; astronomy.	Machineries & equipment; cars; buses; tools; diesel motors; medical equipment; watches; television sets.	Coffee; sugar; raw leather. 1970-1978: US\$ 11.1 millions.
Costa Rica	1970	1944* 1970	1977	--	Tractors; trolleys; auxiliary equipment.	Coffee; non-refined sugar. 1970-1978: US\$ 3.44 millions.

STRUCTURE OF COMMERCE BETWEEN THE USSR AND LATIN AMERICA, 1970-1978

Ecuador	1967-1968	1945* 1969	1969	--	Cars; tractors; cement.	Cocoa; bananas; non-refined sugar. 1970- 1978: US\$ 5.6 millions.
Guyana	1973	1970	1978	1977; geological & mining studies; forestry resources; medicine; education.	Cotton fabrics; paper for newspapers.	Aluminium ore; non-refined sugar. 1971- 1978: US\$ 6.5 millions.
Jamaica	1977	--	1977	1977; cement; mining & geology.	Machineries & equip- ment.	Pimentos. 1971- 1975: US\$ 11.68 millions.
Mexico	1924	1924-1930 1942 (a)	1973	1976; energy; mining; me- tallurgy & mechanics; cement; aluminum ore; potassium; tin; scientific & technical cooperation.	Tractors; pieces & equipment for assem- bling tractors; turbo- drills.	Corn; beans; pepper; coffee; cocoa. 1970- 1978: US\$ 3.42 millions.
Nicaragua	1944*	1980	1980	1980: social and econo- mic planning	1980: coffee, cotton, sugar.	n.a.
Peru	1969	1969	1970	1971; energy; mining; steel production; geolo- gy; hydroenergy; irriga- tion; fishing.	Machinery & equipment; sunflower oil; planes; helicopters; equipment for airports; tractors; digging shovels; trol- leys; ships; equipment for oil exploration.	Cotton; coffee; sugar; non-fer- rous metals; fishmeal; wool. 1970-1978: US\$ 22.23 millions.
Uruguay	1926	1926-1935 1943 (a)	1972	--	Machinery & equipments; means of transportation; chemical products; watches; cameras; paper for newspapers.	Leathers; fine wools. 1970- 1978: US\$ 10.62 millions.
Venezuela	1970	1945-1952 1970 (a)	1975	1975; oil & gas; mining; geology; electric energy; fishing.	Watches & parts; strain- ed iron; machines; tools; tubes. fishing boats.	Sugar; steel

SOURCE: Romuald G. Tomberg, "Relaciones Economicas de la Union Sovietica con paises de America Latina," E/CEPAL/PROYC. 4-R 12/November 1979.

(a) Reestablished.

(b) No ratified.

* Without exchange of diplomatic representatives.

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