

LATIN AMERICAN PROGRAM

THE WILSON CENTER



SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION BUILDING WASHINGTON, D.C.

WORKING PAPERS

Number 149

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IN THE 1980s: THE EXTRA-CONTINENTAL DIMENSION

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A revised version of this paper will appear in Kevin J. Middlebrook and Carlos Rico f., eds. United States-Latin American Relations in the 1980s: Contending Prospectives on a Decade of Crisis.

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SECURITY AND UNITED STATES LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE 1980s:
THE EXTRA-CONTINENTAL DIMENSION

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Security as a concept has so many meanings, misuses, and controversial associations that the term itself has become a problem in United States-Latin American relations. Without clear meanings or limits, security has become a catchball for policy problems.

The public often associates the term "security" with military security--that is, the protection of territory and inhabitants from external physical threats by the armed forces of another nation. In fact, many conflicts do not involve armed forces at all. Most leaders devote much of their time to protecting the nation through non-military means, such as treaties of friendship, trade agreements, multilateral treaties, and the like.

Confusion about what security means has often complicated the resolution of public problems. Officials have characterized the threat to a "friendly" government by hostile forces as a security problem. The United States' public has then associated that situation with a physical threat. In fact, the episode may have involved only a conflict between opposing political forces in a remote country and may not have posed any direct military threat to the United States.

Congressional appropriations are often justified and defended on security grounds--namely, that they help protect the United States from the Soviet Union and international communism. This has been the justification for much foreign military assistance. Yet, except for the 1962 missile crisis, most United States' and Latin American officials have considered the prospects of a Soviet attack on the hemisphere remote. Most of the funds appropriated and transferred to protect Latin American nations from external enemies have actually been used for internal security purposes--that is, to maintain order or suppress internal opposition, most of which has been non-communist.

No Latin American country is capable by itself of seriously threatening the military security of the United States. In fact, barring some small country's use of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union is now the only nation likely to threaten the military security of the United States in Latin America, and that, only with the cooperation of some Latin American government such as Cuba. None of the

post-1945 security crises in Latin America, except the 1962 missile crisis, threatened United States' territory or its citizens there. Nor was the Soviet military threat a major preoccupation of Latin Americans; their security concerns focused primarily on internal matters or perceived threats from hostile neighbors.

United States' official behavior toward Latin America since 1945 may be explained by two dominant themes, one explicit and familiar, the other implicit and often conveniently overlooked. United States' actions with respect to security have been consistently shaped by perceptions of possible Soviet military threats to the hemisphere, and of political threats through Soviet ties with Latin American governments. Sometimes the Soviet threat has been real in a military sense, as in Cuba in 1962. Thereafter, it has been real in a military sense only potentially, and in a political sense actually. At other times the perceptions of a Soviet threat, whether military or political, have been shown in retrospect to be unfounded, as in Guatemala before 1954 and the Dominican Republic before 1965. The operative aspect of United States' official perceptions has often been related to United States' domestic politics. Presidents have feared that failure to take decisive action against perceived threats would be punished at the next election; President Kennedy's decisions at the Bay of Pigs and President Johnson's in the Dominican Republic are cases in point. Kennedy did not want to be accused of "losing" Cuba, nor did Johnson wish to be accused of permitting "another Cuba".

United States' analysts, and Americans generally, have been reluctant to face up to the other dominant theme explaining United States' behavior, namely the United States' hegemonic role in the hemisphere. Hegemony is not, after all, something new. It began before Rome and will very likely continue after the United States' global dominance is a dim memory. China, Spain, Britain, France, Russia, Germany, the Soviet Union have all acted or act like hegemons in different areas. Americans might prefer to be exceptions in history, but they are not. Thus, when revolutionary movements or governments attempt to change the status quo in particular countries inside the United States' sphere or change their relationships with the United States, United States' leaders, subject to all the domestic and foreign pressures involved, resist change.

However, for United States' leaders to justify their conduct primarily as a means of maintaining dominance--economic or political --is not convincing to others. A more effective defense for such policies is to claim there is some external threat to legitimate interests. Some leaders may not be fully aware that their actions are mainly a means of protecting a hegemonic position. Or, even if they are, it would be unrealistic to expect them to lay the realities bare. For example, United States' responses to the Allende Government in Chile may ultimately be understood best as an attempt to return to an old order more responsive to United States' public and private interests.

Subsequent sections describe United States' and Latin American security interests, post 1945 security crises, and trends in national strategies, including recommendations for United States' policy.

DEFINITIONS OF SECURITY INTEREST

It is essential to recognize the divergent and sometimes even contradictory security interests of the United States and Latin America in order to understand United States-Latin American relations. Radicals at one end of the political spectrum insist that these interests are irreconcilable. Many reactionaries, at the other end of the spectrum, press their governments to act as if these interests were the same. An important step toward constructive United States-Latin American relations is to identify and understand differences in security interests.

The United States

Military Threats: the classical United States security interest in Latin America has long been to prevent any rival Great Power from establishing a military presence in the hemisphere. In 1962 the Soviet Union attempted to breach that interest by installing nuclear missiles in Cuba. The United States forced the removal of the missiles, and the Soviet Union agreed not to return them to the island. When United States' authorities became concerned in 1970 about evidence that the U.S.S.R. was building a submarine base in Cienfuegos, Cuba, Soviet leaders reassured Washington that no such base would be built. Subsequently, the Soviet Union signed Protocol II of the treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America thereby reinforcing and broadening its earlier policies. Soviet spokesmen have explained that the U.S.S.R. has no need to establish nuclear weapons in Latin America.

For many years concern has been expressed in the United States about Soviet deployments of conventional forces in the western hemisphere. Large numbers of Soviet military advisors and instructors are assigned to the Cuban armed forces, and a Soviet contingent--sometimes referred to as a brigade, and numbering between 2,000 and 3,000 men--is stationed in Cuba. Soviet naval deployments--usually two or three warships, and often including a submarine and one or more supply ships--visited Cuba about twice a year between 1969 and 1979. Pairs of Bear D reconnaissance aircraft have been flying to Cuba or stopping over in Cuba since 1970; in 1978 there were 11 such visits. Deployments of this kind continue.

As a result, the Soviet Union now has limited naval and air capabilities in the Western Hemisphere. Warships and airplanes refuel and operate from Cuba. Such operations, at least naval operations, would be possible from Soviet bases outside the hemisphere but in far fewer numbers and with greater difficulty without Cuba. These Soviet ships could, of course, operate against American shipping en route to Europe or the Pacific from Gulf of Mexico ports.

The major questions are not whether the U.S.S.R. has a new military capability--which it does--but what the significance of that capability is, and what should be done about it. So long as they move in international waters and air space, Soviet ships and planes cannot be forced out of the hemisphere peacefully. United States naval and air forces are far stronger and operate from permanent bases on national territory or nearby, while Soviet ships and aircraft operate at great distances from home bases and are isolated and vulnerable. If the Soviet Union anticipated or were to become involved in a conventional war elsewhere, Soviet strategists would have to decide whether forces at grave risk in the Caribbean were more useful there or nearer home. It seems unlikely that Soviet leaders would initiate a conventional war in the Caribbean where the odds are strongly against them. Moreover, Soviet leaders maintain that a conventional war between the United States and the Soviet Union would probably escalate rapidly into a nuclear conflict. Although some analysts maintain that this is an era of conventional wars, this is not the case between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, nor has it been since 1945.

Clearly, all Soviet military deployments in the Caribbean need to be closely watched. No doubt there also should be certain military countermeasures taken in the area. However, the heavy emphasis on the military aspects of the Soviet-American confrontation in Latin America is dangerous in so far as it implies that the solutions are more military than political. The Caribbean is a minor military theater for the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's primary interest in Latin America is in strengthening its political ties with governments in the larger and more powerful countries: Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. And there is, of course, a strong interest in revolutionary movements which lead to pro-Soviet socialist governments, like Cuba's. Military action against several dozen Soviet ships and aircraft on visits to the Caribbean will not meet that challenge.

Access to Strategic Raw Material: Access to strategic raw materials is closely associated with military security. The Congressional Research Service has identified eight strategic and critical raw materials, only four of which are imported from Latin America. In the years 1976-1979 the United States imported three of these strategic raw materials from Brazil; 66% of its imports of columbium, 24% of its manganese ore, and 4% of its tantalum. Another such raw material was bauxite from Jamaica. Brazil was one of six countries which are suppliers of more than one strategic and critical material. Although the availability of such materials must be constantly kept under review, it would appear that United States' dependence on Latin America involves few countries and few raw materials.

According to the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States imported about 37 percent of the crude oil it consumed in 1981, nearly 6 million 8 barrels per day (bpd). About 1.2 million bpd were imported from the main Latin American suppliers, Venezuela, Mexico and Ecuador--that is, 20% of imports and about 13% of total United

States' consumption. Access to this oil is important to the United States and may become more so in the future. Submarines of a hostile power could threaten supplies, especially from Ecuador and Venezuela. However, it is unlikely that such attacks would occur except in a major military confrontation between the two superpowers.

To summarize, United States' military security interests in Latin America are: (1) to enforce understandings prohibiting Soviet military bases and nuclear weapons in the hemisphere, (2) to monitor Soviet military deployments, and (3) to maintain access to oil and a few raw materials, especially in Mexico and Brazil.

Regarding security in its broader, political sense, the United States has an interest in maintaining collaborative relations with as many governments in the region as possible. Such an objective means making friends, not enemies. The diplomatic challenge is how to structure relations so that governments find it in their interests to be responsive to United States' influence. Several recommendations of a general character are proposed at the end of this paper; the implementation of such a policy requires, of course, discussions and negotiations with each government.

Latin America

Whereas the United States has only one power to fear in Latin America, the Latin American nations have two, the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States has a long history of military actions against Latin America. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, such episodes included war with Mexico (1846-48) and military occupations, for many years, in Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico. Since 1945 the United States has mounted paramilitary operations against Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1961), and Nicaragua (1982), a military occupation of the Dominican Republic (1965), and covert political operations against Chile (1970-1973). The only comparably dramatic Soviet military action was the installation of missiles in Cuba, and this was directed primarily against the United States. United States' military actions against Latin America have been real, Soviet actions mostly hypothetical.

Most Latin American governments, however, do not now fear United States' military action. Those that do are the revolutionary governments of Cuba, Nicaragua, and possibly Grenada. The other governments in the region, although watchful for signs of intervention and interference elsewhere, do not have serious apprehensions about United States' intervention on their own soil. Nor do Latin American governments, generally, believe that the U.S.S.R. has the intention or the capacity to launch a successful conventional attack on the Hemisphere. More serious for some countries are the possibility of armed attacks from a neighbor: for example, against Nicaragua from Honduras, against Guyana from Venezuela, against Ecuador from Peru, against Chile from Argentina. Most of these cases represent long-standing rivalries.

With a few exceptions, the greatest threat to the security of Latin American states is internal. The revolutionary states, like Nicaragua, fear revolt from within, perhaps sponsored by the United States. Right wing dictatorships fear revolts from revolutionary groups, perhaps sponsored by the U.S.S.R.. In some cases the incumbents tend to exaggerate the role of the external power for political reasons, domestic and diplomatic.

Security for Latin American governments is very close to political autonomy. Such governments hope that foreign powers, especially the United States, will not use their great power, especially economic power, to change the desired direction of their domestic and foreign policies.

POST-1945 SECURITY CRISIS

More knowledge of past security crises, who participated and why, and how governments coped with them will help in dealing with crises in the future. Most of the major crises in Latin America since the end of World War II have involved the Soviet Union in some way as well as the United States. The 1962 missile crisis was the most important of these cases, but that has been dealt with so exhaustively elsewhere that there is no need to take it up as a case study here. Foreign powers other than the United States and the Soviet Union were seldom involved in an important way. One obvious exception was Great Britain in the Falklands/Malvinas crisis, discussed elsewhere in this volume.

Four cases have been selected for study: Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1960-1961), the Dominican Republic (1965), and Chile (1970-1973). United States' officials left the impression in three cases (Guatemala, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic) that United States' military security was threatened. How else could United States' paramilitary and military responses be justified? In the period of high detente in United States-Soviet relations, the crisis in Chile was placed in a less threatening context, nonetheless: the United States did apply extraordinary financial and covert sanctions against Allende.

The cases will be examined in terms of the behavior of three categories of participants: Latin American governments, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The cases of Nicaragua (1979-) and El Salvador (1980-) are discussed in the concluding section. The purpose is to identify the United States interests threatened, the actors who threatened these interests and why, and the responses of United States' governmental authorities. An effort will be made to determine the extent of Communist and Soviet participation in each crisis.

Revolts and Revolutions: The origins of these four security crises were the efforts of revolutionary elites to seize power from incumbent elites in order to introduce revolutionary changes in the structure of local societies and in the structure of the nations'

relations with foreign countries. The revolutionaries sought to remove old elites permanently from power, establish state control over many of the nation's resources, and redistribute wealth and income.

Because the United States was deeply involved in all the countries under consideration, the changes undertaken by revolutionary groups affected adversely many different United States' interests. The leaders of these revolutionary movements believed that United States' influence--both public and private--inside their countries was excessive, and sometimes illegitimately acquired. Most particularly, they objected to foreign control over their economies and foreign interference in their political affairs. Many sought to reduce or eliminate the foreign presence. Newly-installed revolutionary governments expropriated private United States' land in Guatemala and Cuba: nickel and copper properties in Cuba and Chile, respectively; certain public utilities in Guatemala, Cuba, and Chile; and other United States-based businesses in these countries. In view of these revolutionary leaders' critical attitudes toward the private sector in general, foreign business was put on the defensive along with nationally-controlled firms, some of which were allied to foreign companies. Since all these governments lacked the necessary resources to pay for the properties expropriated, the American owners felt despoiled of their properties.

Revolutionary changes in these societies also affected United States' foreign policy interests. The new revolutionary governments took a much more critical view of United States' policies toward their country, as well as United States foreign policies in general. Washington could no longer count more or less automatically on their cooperation on either bi-lateral or world issues. For example, Arbenz in Guatemala refused to toe the United States' line on the Korean War, and Allende in Chile criticized the United States' position on the Vietnam War. All three of these governments--and most particularly Castro's--conducted a stubbornly independent foreign policy.

The Dominican Revolt differed from the Guatemalan, Cuban, and Chilean revolutions in that the Dominican rebels did not gain power. Yet because most of them were followers of former President Juan Bosch, whose political positions were well known, there was reason to believe that the leaders of Dominican revolt would follow a nationalistic course with anti-imperialist overtones and seek greater social change than had occurred so far. As a result, many of the reasons for United States' opposition to the rebels were similar to those in the other three cases.

Almost all the revolutionary leaders in the four countries came from the middle class, most from comfortable families. Many were doctors, lawyers, businessmen, teachers, and the like. Some had been influenced by Marxism, but few could be called orthodox Marxists. Castro, who eventually moved further to the left than any of the other principal revolutionary leaders, was the son of a well-to-do sugar planter; the platform on which he won the revolution against

Batista was based on the Cuban constitution of 1940, a mild reformist document. Castro's sharp turn to the left came after he had been in office for a year and one-half. Similarly, the leaders of the Guatemalan revolution were mainly reformists, as were members of the Dominican Revolutionary Party--at least until after the United States' intervention. Allende's Socialist Party had members of many Marxist stripes, and there were more Marxists--some seeking rapid and radical change--in his government than in other countries. However, members of prerevolutionary pro-Soviet Communist Parties did not play the leading role in the seizure of power or in controlling governments thereafter. The various patterns of Communist participation are described below.

Soviet Involvement: The perceived involvement of the Soviet Union is what made these "security" crises. From the United States' perspective, the seizures of power by the four revolutionary movements identified here probably constitute the four most important such crises in Latin America in the post World War II period, except for the closely related and more dangerous missile crisis. In any event, the first three were treated as if United States' military security were at stake. If that were so, then some power other than the Latin American countries must have been threatening the United States. Chile, the largest of the four countries, had only about ten million inhabitants, the other countries less. The populations involved did not exceed by much the population of greater New York City. Nor were they rich countries. What caused the furor in the United States was the alleged Soviet tie to these revolutions. Without such a tie, these little countries could pose no significant threat to the United States.

The U.S.S.R. had ties with those countries through two channels: the Soviet Government, and/or national Communist Parties. The Soviet Union did not maintain diplomatic or other governmental ties with any of the three Caribbean basin countries. Guatemala had recognized the U.S.S.R. in 1944, but diplomatic relations had never been established. Batista had bought sugar from the Soviet Union but there were no official diplomatic ties before Castro. Trujillo had turned to the U.S.S.R. after the Eisenhower administration rebuffed him in the late 1950's, but Moscow turned down his advances and little is known to have happened since. There is no historical record of any significant contact between the revolutionary movements in Guatemala, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic and the Soviet Government, not even in the early months of the Guatemalan and Cuban revolutionary governments:

-- Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made much of a large shipment of Czech arms from a Baltic port to the Arbenz Government in Guatemala, which it desperately needed because it faced an armed opposition on its own soil. United States' protests about the Guatemalans turning to a socialist source for arms seemed bizarre when United States' authorities were enforcing an embargo on the sale of arms to that government, while providing arms itself to the Guatemalan rebels. Guatemalan and

Soviet representatives were in brief contact at the United Nations during the crisis, but with few results.

-- An early--perhaps the first--substantive contact between the Cuban and Soviet governments after Castro took power was the arrival of a correspondent from the Soviet press agency Tass to Havana in December 1959. More important was the February 1960 visit of Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan, who stopped in Havana on his way home from a visit to Mexico. Mikoyan arranged for the purchase of 425,000 tons of sugar for the first year and a million tons in each of the following five years. Batista had sold the U.S.S.R. substantial but smaller amounts earlier. Arrangements for the exchange of diplomatic representatives came in May, 1960. At the urgent request of Castro and his close associates smarting under heavy United States' economic sanctions and fearful of United States-sponsored armed intervention, the U.S.S.R. began in July and August 1960 its active and far-reaching support for the Cuban economy and armed forces.

-- Chile opened diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. in 1964 long before Allende came to power. The latter's predecessor, Eduardo Frei, had called for relations with the socialist countries in his presidential election campaign in order to attract more votes from the left and to diversify Chile's foreign relations. The Soviet Union maintained an ambassador in Chile during most of the next decade, but there is little or no evidence that he became involved in domestic politics. To have done so openly would have jeopardized the future electoral chances of the Communist Party and its allies.

The Soviet Union exerts influence in Latin America not only through the official channels described above, but also through pro-Soviet Communist Parties in the region. Attention here is focused on these parties because they have a direct link to Soviet military and political power, long the principal concern of the United States. On the Latin American left there is a great range of political parties--from christian democrats and social democrats to other socialists, Marxists, anarchists, Trotskyists, Maoists, etc. This discussion distinguishes sharply between the pro-Soviet communist--that is, the orthodox communists linked to Moscow--and other leftist parties. The latter, or almost any party of the center or right, theoretically could raise security issues for the United States. However, United States' concern usually arises over leftist movements, such as the Sandinistas in Nicaragua--the most visible non-Communist leftist government in the hemisphere. Cuba and the U.S.S.R. both seek to influence leftist movements. Since right and center governments tend to stay in the western camp, the main Soviet-American rivalry in the hemisphere tends to be over socialist to other leftist forces.

There were Communist parties in all four countries under consideration here, but the only two with a history of achievement were in Cuba and Chile--possibly then the two strongest Communist parties in Latin America. Both had been active and influential in their respective organized labor movements, controlling important national labor confederations. Both were also active in electorally successful political coalitions in the late 1930s and the early 1940s. The Communists were the third members of the Popular Front in Chile. In Cuba, they were the first to nominate Fulgencio Batista for the presidency, and Communist Party members served in the cabinet without portfolios in the 1940-1944 period. When subsequent governments turned sharply against Communist-controlled sectors of the labor movement and the parties themselves in the early years of the Cold War, the Communists suffered major setbacks but the parties held together.

The Guatemalan Communists were decimated by the Ubico dictatorship in the 1930's. In part for this reason, the Party did not play a major role in the revolution of 1944. In the early 1950s it first began to play a prominent role in the land reform institute, in the media, and in the president's own office. Nonetheless, the cabinet, the legislature, and the armed forces were overwhelmingly non-Communist. Arbenz's political opposition--foreign property interests threatened by his Government, and hostile foreign governments--labelled him a "communist" in order to discredit him. The weakness of the Arbenz government was shown by its sudden collapse once armed opposition had crossed onto Guatemalan soil.

In Cuba the Communists had not yet regained their former influence when Castro launched his guerrilla campaign against Batista from the Sierra Maestra. Castro himself came from the orthodox wing of the Cuban Revolutionary Party, long the Communists' major rivals. His attack on the Moncada Barracks in 1952 and his landing from Mexico in 1956 were accomplished on his own. Many of the Communists considered his strategy putschist, ultra left, or infantile. Such criticisms continued until the eve of his victory. However, some Communists led by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, joined him in his mountain hideout. Their initiative prevented the Communists from being totally disassociated from Castro's victory. When Castro came to power, his own lieutenants--not the Communists--were appointed to the principal positions. Eventually Castro and these lieutenants took over the Cuban Communist Party, not the reverse. The old-line Communists have had only a small percentage of the leading government positions, usually about 20 percent. In 1980, for example, three of the 16 members of the Politburo were old-line Communists.

The pro-Moscow Communists were among many small political parties on the left in the Dominican Republic. They did not play an important part in Dominican politics before or during the 1965 revolt. The leaders and most of the participants in the revolt were anti-Communist or non-Communist. Several dozen Communists, some trained in Cuba, did participate in the revolt, sometimes as leaders of armed units. Interviews with eye witnesses suggest that perhaps

as many as one in twelve participants in the revolt served under Communist leadership. Participants in the Constitutionalist cabinet and the Constitutionalist military leaders were non-Communists.

In Chile, the Communists were a major ally of the Socialists and helped make possible Allende's 1970 electoral victory, whose total popular vote was a plurality (36%). The Communists had a fairly secure but small political base, accounting for about 17% of the electorate in the municipal and congressional elections of 1971 and 1973, respectively. As a member of the government coalition, the Communists played a moderating role--attempting to check the radicalism and extremism of the left socialists and other leftists (such as the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, MIR) who used violence. The Communists feared that these extremist elements would push Allende too far, too fast and provoke a successful military coup. The Communists' predictions and their counsels for measured change proved correct, but ineffectual.

During the Allende government the U.S.S.R. provided Chile with a generous line of credit, much of it tied to purchases from the Soviet Union. This assistance was not of much use to Allende, particularly during his last year in office when he needed hard currency to meet payments to western creditors. The U.S.S.R. gave Allende strong moral support, but avoided close financial or military involvements. The reason probably was that the Soviet government sought to avoid heavy subsidies such as those granted to Cuba, had doubts about the viability of Allende's government, and considered Soviet capabilities insufficient to assist effectively in a crisis. Allende was also cautious about Soviet ties in order to avoid criticisms in the West.

United States' Responses: The revolutionary changes that all these leftist governments introduced (and in the Dominican case, would like to have introduced) also had a revolutionary impact on relations with the United States. Important private and public United States interests were affected in each case. The revolutionary leaders gave the United States genuine cause for concern. American companies had large investments in all these countries, investments which were explicitly threatened by the announced policies of the new governments. United States' official figures put United States' investment in Guatemala in 1953 at \$107 million, in Cuba in 1958 at \$861 million, and in Chile in 1970 at \$748 million. Although the Latin American revolutionary forces' interest in gaining national control over their own natural resources and infrastructure was understandable, it was clear why American interests viewed the new arrangements with alarm. Many associated business people in trade, commerce, and banking felt their interests threatened, too. All these groups had influential ties in the United States, up to and including the White House.

The diplomatic and military establishment in the United States had been used to receiving exemplary cooperation from Ubico, Batista, Trujillo (until the late 1950s) and earlier presidents of Chile. The

new revolutionary leaders made a point of taking independent stands on various foreign policy questions. Also, they could not be counted on to fall promptly into line behind military arrangements in the hemisphere. Such governments seemed likely to strengthen their ties with neutralist and socialist nations.

In light of these different developments, it is not surprising that various United States' governments took defensive steps. Secretary of State Dulles was angered by the domestic and foreign policies of the Arbenz government in Guatemala, its adverse impact on United States' economic and political interests, and its independent line generally. It seems likely that he may have already begun planning to overthrow Arbenz in 1953. In any event, he prepared the ground for such an action diplomatically at the Inter-American Conference in Caracas in early 1954 by charging that the Communists had established a beachhead in the Americas. Subsequently, his brother (Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency) organized armed emigre forces to invade eastern Guatemala and sent planes over Guatemala City. When Guatemalan military forces launched a coup, Arbenz fled the country. The American ambassador acted as mediator in the rivalry for the presidency. The officer who eventually won was the head of the CIA-sponsored emigre forces.

As the Eisenhower team's chief foreign policy spokesman, John Foster Dulles had taken office decrying the reactive nature of the Truman and Acheson policies and calling for the eventual liberation of Eastern Europe. Once in office he had to make good on these claims, yet he backed away--quite wisely--from liberating Eastern Europe. Nor was it necessary to take such risks when a country nearer home needed "liberating". After the CIA operation and the overthrow of Arbenz, Dulles could point to a great "victory" in Latin American, to which he and the President made frequent references in the 1954 and 1956 election campaigns.

Following the Guatemala pattern, President Eisenhower--who was angered by what he considered Castro's insolence and disturbed by Mikoyan's visit to Havana--authorized in March 1960 a series of steps, including the organization of emigre forces, to unseat Castro. Eisenhower initially thought that economic pressures would do the job, and he did not expect to call on the emigre forces. President Kennedy inherited those forces, and he was forced to reach a decision about their use before he had time to gain full control of his administration. Concerned about the adverse political effects of backing down, disbanding a disgruntled Cuban emigre force in the United States, and accepting Soviet-Cuban ties, Kennedy ordered the Cubans on to the beaches of the Bay of Pigs. Domestic political considerations and concerns about United States-Soviet relations appear to have dominated his thinking.

President Johnson was panicked by the armed effort to restore Juan Bosch to the presidency of the Dominican Republic in 1965. He at first explained the United States' troop occupation of Santo Domingo as necessary to protect American lives and property. Later, he

explained it more convincingly as necessary to prevent "another Cuba". Early on Johnson claimed that the Communists controlled the revolutionary movement; later he dropped that charge. The most convincing explanation of his action was that he was trying to protect his presidential prospects in the 1968 elections.

In 1970 the Central Intelligence Agency maneuvered covertly to prevent Allende from being elected president, and it later took other clandestine actions to promote his fall from power. Much of this CIA plotting appears to have come to naught, and the actions that did take place were not very effective. What probably hurt Allende more than CIA operations were the various economic and financial sanctions the United States levied against him. During these years president Nixon and Mr. Kissinger met frequently with General Secretary Brezhnev and his associates. Any kind of direct Soviet threat to Chile did not make sense in that context, and they also had reason for greater confidence in their appraisals of the Chilean Communist Party. Chile, in short, posed a sharp challenge to United States' hemispheric leadership that could not be tolerated. Nixon and Kissinger wanted a non-Marxist government in Chile that would be amenable to close ties with the United States.

In reality, all these conflicts were essentially political, with the economic and military aspects tending to reinforce political considerations. Expropriations of United States' private property in themselves were not enough to cause United States' military intervention or covert interference. Nor were fears of direct Soviet military action central in United States' government decisions. United States' leaders did not want any Latin American governments to fall under Communists or Soviet influence.

Many of these leaders' decisions were the results of perceptions of United States' public attitudes and the operations of the American political system. Secretary Dulles sought to capitalize on these attitudes politically with respect to Guatemala. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson acted to protect themselves politically, and President Nixon was not to be outmaneuvered over Chile. As long as the American public believes that there should not be leftist or pro-Soviet governments in Latin America, and that the United States should act forcefully to oppose those which appear, it will be difficult (especially in the Caribbean basin) for presidents not to make a "security" case out of them, cases that could require the use of force.

In the cases of Cuba, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic, United States' leaders dealt with these episodes as "security" threats with implications of actual or potential physical threats to the United States. In many ways, the United States' responses were more a product of East-West rivalry and United States' domestic politics than of bilateral relations with the particular country concerned. Overall, United States' responses to these cases may be best understood as the misguided efforts of a series of presidents to maintain United States influence and political pre-eminence in the Western Hemisphere.

Some of the policy relevant conclusions that may be drawn from these four cases are:

1) Non-Communist nationalists--some reformist, some radical--led the revolutionary forces that sought to seize power in all these countries. The Communists did not play a significant role in the attempts to seize power in any of these cases; in Chile, the Communists did attract about 17% of the popular vote, an essential but not the leading component in Allende's electoral victory. Nor did the prerevolutionary Communists dominate any of the other left-wing governments. In Cuba, Castro's movement took over the Communists; in Chile, leftist extremists defeated Communist appeals for more moderate change.

2) The Soviet government had nothing to do with the coming to power of revolutionary movements in Guatemala and Cuba, nor the armed revolt in the Dominican Republic. United States' intervention in these cases could not be justified by an existing Soviet military threat.

3) Soviet aid had everything to do with sustaining Castro's power after United States' plans to overthrow him were widely known. The U.S.S.R. provided Allende with strong moral support, but it avoided close economic and military relations in order to protect its own economic and political interests.

4) The United States moved to crush the three revolutionary movements by paramilitary or military means, and to bring down Allende by economic sanctions and covert political action. The President's decisions in these cases seemed to be motivated mainly by domestic political considerations, the desire to maintain United States' political preeminence in the country concerned, and United States-Soviet political rivalry.

5) The 1962 missile crisis was obviously a challenge to United States' military security, but the four cases treated here are better understood in terms of political security--that is, how to maintain United States' influence and preeminence in the Latin American countries concerned.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES

Effective United States' security policies for dealing with Latin America must take into account the security strategies of more than two dozen Latin American governments and of the Soviet government. The Latin American governments run the gamut from the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba to the nineteenth-century style dictatorship in Paraguay. Soviet policy must be understood in its many facets, including the application of its different dimensions to individual countries. In order to cope with this bewildering array of forces, United States' security strategies need to identify and deal with the most urgent bilateral security problems, while at the same time providing a hemispheric framework which will accommodate a wide range of bilateral relations in the the long term.

Latin America. Whereas the United States has been primarily concerned in its national life with external security, Latin American nations have tended to follow an opposite pattern. Most are primarily concerned with internal security. Different categories of governments have different security policies, and external security orientations are often shaped by internal security considerations. Latin American governments are too numerous to examine individually, but security considerations in the region can be made more intelligible by discussing the subject in terms of three groups of governments.

Most governments in the region may be categorized according to their political system and related strategies. Political upheavals in countries like Chile and Nicaragua move a country from one group to another. Group I includes those governments of the right which eschew free elections and hold power by force. Examples are contemporary Guatemala and Chile. Group II includes governments of the right and center in which there is some legitimate political competition and whose hold on power is not currently threatened. Examples are Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. Group III includes governments of the left, which eschew free elections and maintain power by force. Examples are Cuba and Nicaragua. This categorization of Latin American governments is intended solely for the purpose of this analysis.

Group I governments like Guatemala must devote their major energies to staying in power. Well-organized opposition groups, often armed, are determined to overthrow them. If these governments fear external threats to their security, such fears usually are aroused by neighboring states which host opposition forces. Typically, Group I governments seek to draw United States' authorities into the domestic conflict in order to bolster their political influence and gain support for their repression of opposition forces. In order to attract United States' economic and military assistance, they raise cries of Soviet interference and Communist subversion. Communists are almost always on hand there as elsewhere in the world; the question is whether their presence has political significance. In the past, the Communists were not very powerful; charges of subversion were often an exaggeration employed by incumbents to defend their vested political interests. Such governments may endorse United States' armed intervention as a means to prevent their own collapse.

The rightist or centrist governments of Group II often have a good grip on power, and although they are not seriously and immediately concerned about external threats to their security, they perceive that such possibilities exist. These governments are aware that, just as the Soviet Union have played a hegemonic role in Eurasia, the United States has played a hegemonic role in the Americas in this century. Latin American governments of this kind, although not expecting United States' intervention in the foreseeable future, are concerned about protecting their political autonomy. They tend to oppose United States' intervention in neighboring countries. Most of these governments would probably prefer to have the United States to the Soviet Union as a neighbor, but nonetheless, they seek to diversify and strengthen their international position by maintaining

beneficial economic and political relations with the Soviet Union. Soviet ties constitute a counterbalance to their more useful and comprehensive relations with the United States. As a result of the United States grain embargo and the deeply troubling outcome of the Falklands/Malvinas crisis, Argentina (which does not fit any of these groups) has moved further from the United States and toward the Soviet Union.

The pro-socialist governments in Group III have become, through their own actions or those of the United States, the target of official United States' hostility. Depending on their particular situation, such governments have become dependent to a greater (Cuba) or lesser (Nicaragua) degree on the U.S.S.R. for their own welfare and for protection against existing or threatened United States' sanctions. Fearful about becoming the victim of United States' intervention, Castro has supported Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan.

Group I governments, like Guatemala, do not want and will not have relations with the U.S.S.R.. The feelings are mutual. The Soviet Union is now inclined to back armed revolt more boldly in these countries than before the Nicaraguan revolution in 1979. Group II countries, such as Mexico and Brazil, will probably expand their political and/or economic relations with the U.S.S.R.. This expansion in bilateral contacts is only natural, given these countries' common political and economic interests. The Soviet Union wants very much to deal with these countries, and it will go to great lengths to make the relationship attractive. Nonetheless, the relative weakness of the Soviet economy, the nature of the Soviet and international communist systems, and the inherent contradictions between socialist and capitalist societies constitute limits to these ties. Bilateral relations will probably grow steadily, but they will not be very extensive compared to relations between the United States and Western Europe.

Cuba represents the upper limit for Soviet ties with Group III countries. Nicaragua clearly prefers more ties with the West and less dependence on the U.S.S.R. than Cuba, and the U.S.S.R. would no doubt wish to give up some political influence in Cuba in order to reduce its economic burdens there.

Some of the most destabilizing changes in international relations in the Western Hemisphere will come not from governments, whatever their political complexion, but from revolutionary movements seeking to transform their own countries and their relations with foreign powers. Such movements are not historical aberrations, but recurring phenomena in history; social structures have tended to adapt to the churning social forces beneath them as frequently by revolution as by peaceful change. The United States is rare in having adapted peacefully to social change, yet even it experienced the War of Independence from Great Britain and the Civil War.

Revolutions are directed mainly against tyrannical leaders or oligarchies. Their hostility to foreign powers--usually the United States in Latin America--is a by-product of the more important domestic struggle for power between competing elites, between "ins" and "outs". Yet, nations are so interdependent, including nations in revolution, that far-reaching changes inside a country invariably disturb its external relations as well. This is especially true in Latin America because most of the economies depend heavily on foreign trade for the industrial products and technology needed for national development. United States corporations are necessarily tied to incumbent elites--the only groups with which they could do business in the past. When revolutions occur, United States private property becomes a hostage to the new leadership. Violent upheaval batters external as well as internal structures.

The revolutionary movement in El Salvador has already served to produce one of the major security crises faced by the Reagan administration. The civil war in Guatemala seems likely to become an even more serious crisis over time. Chile and Paraguay are also candidates for future domestic political upheaval. Contemporary Brazil appears to be under reasonable control, but should that country ever experience revolution, the consequences are frightening to contemplate. Although the location of revolutionary conflict cannot always be anticipated, new revolutionary outbreaks should come as no surprise in the future.

The U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union has pursued flexible and pragmatic strategies with respect to Latin America ever since Castro came to power in 1959. Soviet policy toward Cuba has been tolerant and farsighted, and its huge economic costs have paid important political dividends. Soviet policies towards other Latin American countries have also been adaptive and pragmatic, though less costly and less beneficial. In general they have positioned the U.S.S.R. well with respect to both the most powerful Latin American governments and to revolutionary movements in the more politically unstable countries. Soviet influence outside Cuba is not great compared to that of the United States or other powers, but it merits respect considering the weakness of the Soviet economy, the limited influence of Communist parties, and the low priority of Latin America in Soviet policy. The U.S.S.R. has been fortunate in that United States policy has fairly consistently played into Soviet hands in Cuba and elsewhere in Latin America.

The centerpiece of Soviet policy in the hemisphere is still Cuba. The Soviet leadership, which enforces such tight political discipline at home, has done a remarkable job for over two decades of dealing with an unpredictable, fractious, and temperamental Fidel Castro. Castro's political virtuosity has been equaled only by the Soviet Politburo's patience and adaptability. The U.S.S.R. has recently subsidized Cuba at the rate of several billion dollars a year--a large sum for the U.S.S.R. to give to any nation, much less a small country on the other side of the world. But the political gains for the U.S.S.R. in Africa, the Middle East, Central America,

and the Third World generally are equally remarkable. However, it now appears that the U.S.S.R. has begun to exert more pressure to scale down Soviet grains and increase Cuba's repayable debt burden. Nonetheless, a tougher Soviet line on aid will not be effective unless the performance of the Cuban economy improves substantially--an outcome not to be expected on the basis of current performance. This may be one reason why Soviet policies encourage the expansion and diversification of Cuba's economic relations (including relations with the United States) as one promising means of strengthening the Cuban economy.

Soviet military policy toward Cuba is another major element in their Latin American policy. No doubt Soviet and Cuban leaders both would like Cuban troops to return from Angola and Ethiopia, two costly operations now in overtime. It seems likely, however, that events in Africa--not in Moscow or Havana--will decide that issue. Both powers are so heavily committed to the integrity of pro-Soviet and pro-socialist regimes in Angola and Ethiopia that Cuban troops are likely to remain there as long as they are really needed. In the meantime, social and economic pressure is building in Cuba to bring the boys home.

The Soviet Union has literally made a gift to Castro of the Cuban armed forces' military hardware. After the Bay of Pigs, the most pressing need to build up those forces was to make another United States-sponsored attack on Cuba so costly as to deter the United States. And it is clear that while the United States should be able to defeat Castro's forces in a direct confrontation, the monetary and human costs of such an effort would be great, not to mention resulting adverse political fallout and the incalculable risk of Soviet military involvement. The Cuban armed forces have not generally been structured for offensive off-island operations, but they did manage to get a surprisingly large number of Cuban troops into Angola under Cuban power. Castro carries the historical burden of having mounted unsuccessful armed landings against Caribbean governments in 1959 and ineffectual covert arms deliveries in the 1960s. Although he has recently transferred Soviet tanks and possibly other arms to Nicaragua, he does not appear to be inclined to initiate offensive military operations in the Caribbean Basin. Although one should not necessarily rely on Castro's restraint in this respect in the future, the U.S.S.R. will be cautious about staking Castro to offensive military capabilities that it cannot control. In the meantime, given its already huge military investment on the island, the U.S.S.R. can be counted on to keep Castro's armed forces up-to-date.

The Soviet Union applauded Somoza's fall in Nicaragua and has given strong moral support to the Sandinistas ever since. Moscow has received several high-level Nicaraguan delegations, and it has maintained diplomatic relations with the Sandinista government since early 1980. Nicaragua's revolutionary government has a handsome new modern embassy a few hundred yards from the Cuban embassy in Moscow. The Soviet Union has provided Nicaragua with about \$150 million in grant aid for necessary raw materials and semi-manufactured items,

and it has extended the equivalent of open-ended credits on standard terms for the purchase of Soviet machinery and equipment. Also, there are parallel relations between the Soviet Communist Party and the Sandinistas.

Although the U.S.S.R. might eventually develop relations with Nicaragua similar to those it has with Cuba, this seems unlikely for two reasons. First, the Sandinistas much prefer to retain extensive economic ties with both the United States and other western countries; they are cautious about becoming as dependent as Cuba on the Soviet Union. Nicaragua's overland connections with other Central American countries mean it does not enjoy the advantages and disadvantages that Cuba's island position offers. Then, too, its economy is more diversified.

Second, the U.S.S.R. prefers not to develop in Nicaragua a client as financially costly as Cuba. Nevertheless, Soviet-Nicaraguan relations could become much closer--and more useful to the U.S.S.R.--without duplicating the Cuban pattern. That could become a reality especially if the Nicaraguan economy continues to deteriorate and if U.S. economic sanctions and hostile covert activities continue. In that event, Nicaragua might seek arms from the Soviet Union. When pressed on that point, one Soviet scholar replied, "Why not?" Both are sovereign governments entitled to trade in arms. More likely, however, would be further transfers to Nicaragua of Soviet arms from Cuba so that the Soviet Union would not need to be involved directly.

The Soviet Union has welcomed the new pro-soviet government in Grenada, but the nation is so small--about 100,000 inhabitants in an area of 344 square kilometers--and has so many ties with other socialist and nonaligned countries that Soviet aid may not be essential. The U.S.S.R. will probably keep its options open with respect to Grenada while minimizing political and other risks.

Soviet policy toward the rest of Latin America shows the same cautious, steady, and flexible qualities it has demonstrated toward Cuba and Nicaragua, but the roles of wooer and wooed are reversed. Cuba has to "buy" most of its goods from the U.S.S.R. and socialist countries, and the Soviet Union must trade with and aid Cuba. In contrast, other Latin American countries need to buy little from the U.S.S.R. and require cash payment in hard currencies for what they sell; the U.S.S.R., in turn, needs many products from these countries and exports little to the region. Soviet traders have bought substantial quantities of goods from Latin America for years--at least substantial when compared with what Latin America buys from the U.S.S.R.. Soviet needs for grain and meat have increased substantially in recent years, but Latin American purchases have been and continue to be most disappointing.

Nonetheless, Soviet export agencies doggedly continue their promotion efforts in the region despite the superior products and marketing organizations of European, Japanese, and United States' competitors. At the present time they are trying to turn Soviet

economic weaknesses (that is, shortages of grain, meat, and other products) into a tool for bolstering their own exports, and the Soviets' argument that their extensive purchases from countries like Argentina and Brazil should reciprocally generate much increased imports from the U.S.S.R. will doubtless have some positive effect on Soviet sales. Argentina is now the target of Soviet export promotion efforts seeking contracts for demonstration projects for water control, thermal and electric power, and transport, which over the long run are likely to attract other business for the Soviet Union in the hemisphere. Soviet determination in this area is based partly on the conviction that several generations of Soviet experience in huge development projects on the Eurasian landmass have value for a continent where low- and medium-level (and thus lower cost) technologies are suitable. Although lack-lustre so far, Soviet trade promotion bears watching both for its possible economic repercussions (because Soviet economic interests in the hemisphere are more important than many observers think) and for its probable impact on Soviet political relations in Latin America.

Argentina is the main case in point. The U.S.S.R., its principal foreign customer, takes a third of its exports. Although at opposite ends of the political spectrum, Argentina's and the Soviet Union's shared economic interests have resulted in (often tacit) political collaboration. For example, Argentina's post-1976 military government has discriminated in favor of the Communist Party's political operations, and the latter, for its part, has supported what it considers positive aspects of the government's policies. Similarly, the Soviet Union has avoided criticizing Argentina's violations of human rights, and Argentina has softened its criticism of aspects of Soviet foreign policy. Although not wishing to be associated with the Argentine forceful seizure of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, the U.S.S.R. sided with Argentina against Britain thereafter--as it had earlier in Argentina's dispute with Chile over the Beagle Channel. The U.S.S.R. has also provided Argentina with heavy water and enriched uranium for its nuclear energy program.

One of the most interesting aspects of Soviet-Argentine collaboration concerns military affairs. For some years now the armed forces of both countries have exchanged professional visits, although military attaches are not assigned permanently to the respective embassies. Prospects for Argentine purchases of Soviet arms are better than ever. The U.S.S.R. needs to improve its huge payments deficit with Argentina, and the Argentines may want to diversify their arms sources --especially since the U.S. arms embargo in the Falklands Islands crisis. Argentine leaders perceive the two countries to have many military and political interests in common, as well as the obvious economic ones. These shared interests have assured the Soviet Union better relations with Argentina, one of the most influential and important nations in Latin America.

Like Argentina, Brazil has long been a target for Soviet economic and political initiatives. However, efforts there have focused on formal government-to-government relations rather than on ties with

the Brazilian Communist Party. The U.S.S.R. wants good and active relations with Brazil because it is the most populous and powerful state in Latin America. The bilateral relationship is similar to that which Argentina in that leading groups in both these Latin American countries are ideologically and politically anti-Communist (and to some extent anti-Soviet), yet both welcome the benefits of economic and political diversification that come from their Soviet ties. The U.S.S.R. will continue to expand its official relations with Brazil, while attempting to minimize any negative impact that the local Communists may have on bilateral relations.

Mexico has always occupied, and will continue to occupy, a priority position in Soviet Latin American policy, most particularly because it is the United States's closest Latin American neighbor. The U.S.S.R. will push for bilateral collaboration on a wide front. Although prospects for increased trade between the two countries seemed slight before Mexico's 1983 financial crisis, it will now be interesting to see if Soviet credits--however small in the overall economic picture--become more attractive. In any case, both governments are likely to take advantage promptly of mutually useful political opportunities.

Similarly, the U.S.S.R. will continue to develop its relations with the democratic countries in Latin America such as Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica. In these cases, as with Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, the Latin American section of the Soviet Central Committee will probably attempt to check the revolutionary proclivities of the local Communist parties, encourage them to remain on civil terms with the established governments, and thereby minimize friction in government-to-government relations with the U.S.S.R.. In the days of the Communist International, the party line tended to be fairly uniform. But in the recent past--and from now on--it will be highly differentiated. Only in those countries in which revolutionary prospects are good (and this excludes Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica) will the Soviet Union support the "armed road".

Armed revolt, however, will receive Soviet moral and possibly material support in countries where the ancien regime is fragile. For the immediate future that includes El Salvador and Guatemala. Farther down the road are Chile and Paraguay, where dictators and exploitative systems must eventually exhibit the infirmities of age. Soviet leaders appear wise enough to know that Soviet help will probably not be decisive in any of these cases; that is, these revolutions will be won or lost according to the strength of the established regime and the strategies of the armed opposition. The old order in all these countries is so repressive, backward, and anti-democratic that Soviet leaders are confident of ending up sooner or later on the winning side. By waging a continuing media campaign against these established regimes, the Soviet authorities leave themselves in a favorable position to deal with the revolutionary victors.

Nevertheless, the U.S.S.R. will be tempted to sell arms to Latin America, not only to leftist governments like Nicaragua, but

also to countries such as Argentina. Arms deliveries to guerrillas are a more delicate matter, but the U.S.S.R. surely would not rule out all covert deliveries. Rather, it is more likely that the Soviet Union will rely upon third parties such as Cuba to provide arms to Latin American allies, knowing that ultimately the guerrillas themselves can procure the necessary minimum through local capture, bribery, or purchases from traditional commercial sources. More Soviet effort is likely to be devoted to revolutionary propaganda than to politically dangerous arms supply.

Claiming to believe that the victory of revolution and socialism in Latin America is inevitable, the Soviet Communists are in no hurry to achieve that end, especially when haste could damage formal Soviet bilateral relations and cripple the local Communist parties. Instead, the U.S.S.R. will pursue its classical, political, and economic state interests with the large Latin America countries, maintain good relations with the middle powers, and back armed revolt in small and politically vulnerable countries.

EVALUATING UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICIES

Lessons from the Past. In mapping policy for the future, United States' leaders should try to benefit from the country's past experiences. Fortunately, that has not been all bad. The United States's most dangerous crisis in Latin America since 1945 was the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. President Kennedy and his associates managed that crisis masterfully. Everything considered, the United States and, importantly, Mexico have reached one important accommodation after another; thus, there are many lessons to be learned from the United States' accommodation to the Mexican Revolution. Similarly, the Eisenhower administration responded effectively to the Bolivian revolution of 1952.

Regrettably, United States' authorities have not dealt very effectively with most post-1945 security crises in terms of stated long-term United States' objectives. Short term objectives have involved the overthrow of particular governments, but such events would have to make sense in terms of longer term objectives. Ordinarily, these objectives have been expressed in terms of defending or promoting democracy and stability in particular countries, and preventing Soviet interference in the region. The two top priorities are stability (defined as continuity for a government collaborating closely with the United States) and the exclusion of Soviet influence from the hemisphere. Judging from the postures of most postwar United States' administrations, democracy has been farther down the list of priorities in Latin America.

The proponents of United States' intervention might argue that forceful responses to security crises in Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and Chile succeeded, in that the Soviet Union did not gain a foothold in these three countries. To be persuasive, that argument would need to show that United States' policy prevented the U.S.S.R.

from establishing such a presence. But there is no persuasive evidence that the Soviet Union was about to make important gains in either Guatemala or the Dominican Republic. In Chile, where the Communists were the second party in Allende's governing coalition, Soviet trade, economic and, political ties were not great. To justify United States' policy it would also be necessary to show that United States' intervention was responsible for, or decisive in, securing a particular result. The historical record does not support such an interpretation.

In Guatemala, where Arbenz was overthrown after the United States-sponsored paramilitary invasion, the most authoritative retrospective accounts hold that United States' fears of Communist victory in Guatemala were exaggerated. In any event, it was the Guatemalan armed forces that actually overthrew Arbenz, not the distant and small paramilitary units. Arbenz' overthrow did mark the achievement of a short term objective, but Guatemala ever since has been one of the most unstable and strife-torn countries in the hemisphere. For years it has been in a state of virtual civil war with appalling executions, tortures, and the like. Neither democracy, stability, nor a capacity to resist foreign intervention was ultimately achieved.

The United States' paramilitary intervention in Cuba at the Bay of Pigs failed to achieve both its short and long term objectives. Castro's government has established virtually total control over national economic and political life. The Bay of Pigs crisis led to the brief installation of Soviet rockets in Cuba. United States citizens lost all their property. Cuba has become a leading political and military collaborator with the Soviet Union. United States' policy was a total failure.

Although United States' economic and covert sanctions against the Allende government contributed to his overthrow, many commentators do not regard these efforts as especially important in his political demise. A strong case can be made that the Allende government fell because it lost the support of the Chilean middle classes, which put the Chilean military in a strong position to launch the 1973 coup. Many analysts believe that Allende would have had a difficult time completing his term with or without United States' covert opposition. In any case, democracy in Chile has been dead under Pinochet, and prospects for political instability have recently increased, particularly because of a severe national economic crisis.

The United States' military occupation of Santo Domingo in 1965 achieved its apparent short term objective, preventing the return of constitutional president Juan Bosch to office. However, Johnson and subsequent United States' administrations never proved the early charges (later dropped) that communists controlled the Constitutionalist's revolt. Also, unlike other countries in which United States' intervention occurred, the Dominican Republic has since enjoyed relative prosperity and order. This is partly because the United States' authorities played a conciliatory role with various opposing forces during the intervention. Perhaps the chief difficulty in terms of long pers-

pective is that the Dominican Republic is still one of the Latin American nations most dependent on the United States economically and politically. Dominican trade with and investment from the United States have intensified, and United States authorities helped guarantee a successful democratic political transition in 1978. In the past, the United States's worst political crises in the hemisphere have occurred in countries with which, like the Dominican Republic, it had the closest relationship: because United States' influence in these countries has been so great, the nationalist backlash is particularly strong. Other examples include Mexico before the 1910-1917 revolution, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Panama.

Finally, it is rather narrow to evaluate United States' policy toward these countries solely in terms of their relationship to possible Soviet influence. Any sensible judgment would also have to take into account the great political and other costs of the policies actually implemented.

Contemporary Cases. Revolutionary change in Latin America has taken place most recently in Nicaragua, and this process is now at work in El Salvador and Guatemala. The Reagan administration's policies toward these countries have been distressing in that they appear not to be informed by the lessons of the past. President Reagan and former Secretary of State Alexander Haig took a hostile and threatening stand toward Nicaragua, sponsoring various economic sanctions and covert para-military activities. These policies gave the Sandinista government no incentives to cooperate with Washington. On the contrary, United States' sanctions have forced the Nicaraguan government to seek economic, military, and diplomatic assistance elsewhere. Moscow has been, perhaps, the most promising source. Washington's policies in the early tenure of Secretary of State George Schultz did not yet show any prospect for achieving the removal of the Sandinistas from power, nor any possibility for accommodation with them. The result was an impasse that did not serve United States' interests.

Meanwhile, the United States has become increasingly embroiled in the civil war in El Salvador, first closely identified with the Duarte government and then with its more authoritarian successor. Regardless of the political orientation of the Salvadoran Government toward either fascism or socialism, the United States stood to lose the benefits to be derived from its aid, its prestige, and its influence. Increasing polarization diminished prospects for a centrist political outcome to the conflict. Similarly, the Reagan administration appeared to be seeking closer ties with the military dictator in Guatemala at a time when the local situation there seemed beyond the control of either local or foreign leaders. Washington may have backed the wrong side in both El Salvador and Guatemala.

It is both easy and fashionable to hold American presidents (and their associates) exclusively responsible for this doleful record. However, the United States' public shares responsibility. In fact, the public beliefs and attitudes have been the fundament of official error. The most pernicious and widespread belief is that

the United States "knows what's best" for Latin American countries--for example, that Arbenz, Castro, Bosch, and Allende were not suitable presidents for their countries. Americans criticize and disagree with European leaders, but it ordinarily does not occur to them that those leaders should be displaced because they are not in American favor. A second and more damaging belief is that the United States has the ultimate responsibility to replace Latin American leaders viewed as dangerous to United States' interests. United States' authorities tried to manipulate the presidencies in all four of the above cases and succeeded in three, with sad results or worse in each case.

The consequence of these twin popular beliefs is that presidents fear, not unreasonably, that if they fail to act against troublesome revolutionary movements and governments, and the revolutionaries win, the electorate will take its revenge at the first opportunity. American presidents feared "losing" Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and so forth. Opportunists in the political opposition are poised to mobilize an ill-informed public opinion against any president who can plausibly be charged with being "soft" on communism. Such charges could be leveled at presidents who failed to use United States' power to check Latin American revolutionaries tarred as pro-Communist or pro-Soviet. The tragic lessons of Vietnam may have helped shake this dangerous public view, but too many Americans still do not realize that United States' interference abroad can be costly in money, lives, and power, and it can set the scene for a subsequent expansion in communist influence.

If models abound for what not to do, knowing what to do is another matter. Public opinion and public policy should base American strength on a free and prosperous America--the physical and political base of American power. The tail of foreign and military policy should not wag the American dog. The American example needs to be first demonstrated at home.

The American public also needs to develop more genuine respect for Latin Americans and how they rule themselves. Put bluntly, Americans should stay out of the latter's business. The stereotypical form of United States' meddling has been the provision of economic and military assistance to keep a favored leader in power. Too many American ambassadors have been unable to resist participating in their assigned country's local politics. Notorious past examples include Henry Lane Wilson in Mexico, Spruille Truden in Argentina, and Richard C. Patterson, Jr., in Guatemala. Some recent ambassadors also qualify. Sensationalistic speeches about "projecting" power in the Third World, calling in the fleet, deploying counter-insurgency forces to put out "brush fires", and waving missiles at rivals have more to do with political posturing than genuine diplomatic achievement.

Revolutions in Latin America are not going to go away. They have occurred intermittently throughout the century. The most realistic response for foreign powers like the United States and the Soviet Union is not to try to start or stop revolutions, but to protect and advance one's national interest as they take place. In spite of

failure after failure, Washington continues to try to stem revolutionary tides--most recently in El Salvador. Soviet leaders, chastened by many policy errors of their own, have developed a healthy skepticism about their capacity for influencing revolutions. As a result, they devote most of their effort to maneuvering to capitalize on possible outcomes. The United States, too, has an interest in protecting itself, whoever wins.

In order to protect its security and other interests in Latin America, the United States should take two sets of foreign policy actions--the first, country-specific and immediate, and the second, of wider application and for a longer term.

The first actions should aim at reducing international tensions in Central America and the Caribbean, positioning Washington to deal with a variety of possible political outcomes to ongoing conflicts in the area. The present United States' policy in Nicaragua is sterile and dangerous. Although the Reagan administration has repeatedly denied any intention to overthrow the Sandinistas, and the present level of pressures appears unlikely to have such a result, economic and covert sanctions are in practice forcing the Sandinistas into a closer relationship with the Soviet Union. Although earlier it seemed likely that the U.S.S.R. would avoid close ties with Nicaragua, there is now reason to believe the Soviets might expand these relations substantially, even if they remain less extensive than those with Cuba. The United States should cease its hostile activities against the Sandinistas and arrange for nations which share United States' interests, such as Mexico and France, to reassure the Nicaraguans that the United States will not sponsor armed attacks against them. If the Sandinistas are permitted to retain strong ties with the United States and the West, they will not be able to afford to be hostile to them.

Similarly, the United States should step back from its entanglements in El Salvador and Guatemala. If the Salvadoran incumbents deserve to rule the country, they should be able to do so without large-scale American aid. The volatile political situation there is beyond United States' control. Again, Washington should invite countries--perhaps especially Mexico--to help achieve stability there. So too should Washington promptly disassociate itself from the civil war in Guatemala. It is dangerous for the United States to take sides in violent conflicts such as these whose outcome it cannot control. It should retain its options to deal with whatever governments emerge from these prolonged political and military struggles.

Cuba is still the key to United States' security in northern Latin America. The United States has failed in its efforts to get rid of Castro, and the prospects for doing so in the future are no better than in the past. The present relationship of tension and hostility endangers United States' interests throughout the Caribbean and strengthens the Soviet position globally. The United States has no satisfactory alternative to seeking a negotiated settlement of the major points at issue between the two nations at the first suitable

opportunity. Castro greatly wants trade with the United States and access to United States' technology, in addition to security against a United States' attack and recovery of the Guantanamo Bay naval base. The United States needs to lessen Cuba's hostility, making it more responsive to United States' interests and less dependent economically and militarily on the U.S.S.R.. Any such negotiation will not turn Castro away from communism, break his ties with the U.S.S.R., nor end his championship of the poor nations against the rich. Yet, a negotiated settlement would mean a better chance for peace in the Caribbean, and eventually less Soviet influence in the area.

The second set of recommendations serves as a framework for long-term United States' policies toward the region as a whole. That framework would rule out:

- (1) Soviet military bases and nuclear weapons;
- (2) United States' armed intervention; and
- (3) United States' political interference.

This first recommendation is that the United States should be prepared to take whatever action may be seemed necessary to prevent the Soviet Union from establishing a military base or stationing nuclear weapons in the hemisphere. Since any United States' armed action would risk Soviet retaliation in some other part of the world, every effort should be made to prevent Soviet nuclear weapons or bases from being established in the first place. If such efforts were ineffective, American action should proceed under the Rio Treaty or, failing that, by the exercise of the inherent right of self-defense. As in the 1962 missile crisis, such action should not be directed against Latin American forces but against the forces of any hostile non-hemispheric power. Nor should such action be a vehicle for United States' military occupation or the overthrow of an established government.

The second recommendation is that the United States should take the first convenient opportunity to reaffirm the solemn principle of non-intervention--that it will not initiate armed action against its neighbors in Latin America. Apparently oblivious to United States' treaty obligations, former Secretary of State Alexander Haig seemed to take satisfaction in leaving open the option of United States' armed intervention in Central America and against Cuba. Perhaps he thought, as President Eisenhower did in 1960, that such options were not dangerous until implemented. This is not the case. When Castro heard about Eisenhower's plans in May 1960, he began his rapid build-up of the Cuban armed forces with Soviet equipment--the forces that crushed the invaders at the Bay of Pigs. Similarly, the U.S.S.R. has supported a rapid build-up of Cuban military forces since Reagan came into office, and the Cubans have assisted in the expansion of Nicaragua's armed forces. Washington has expressed concern about such build-ups. But what else could it have reasonably expected given its own stated policy of opposition to these regimes?

A third recommendation is that the United States should solemnly reaffirm the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of Latin American states. Most North Americans and Latin Americans have grown so used to United States' meddling over the years that ruling out political interference appears naive. "Political interference" here is used to describe attempts to shape the outcomes of leadership struggles in Latin America.

As suggested earlier, the United States has long persisted in seeking to influence the outcome of leadership struggles in Latin America. United States' officials in Washington or in embassies abroad sometimes wield great power, and too often they cannot resist using it to seek various short- and longer-term local objectives. Such meddling endangers United States' interests in unfamiliar, unpredictable, and uncontrollable situations. United States' leaders and others lack the knowledge, the experience, and the expertise to determine what is best for these countries. The United States government is singularly unfitted for such a role. In the first place, presidents seldom average much more than four years in office, often requiring one or two years to establish their priorities. Usually they reverse the policies of their predecessors on many issues. Rarely do presidents and secretaries of state know anything about Latin America in general, much less the politics of a particular country. The United States simply lacks the capacity for deciding internal questions in the several dozen nations of Latin America.

Some may find the prohibition on Soviet military bases in the hemisphere inconsistent with the injunction against United States' intervention and interference in Latin America. That would be true if the United States used military action against such bases as a pretext for manipulating Latin American countries. Such efforts have been transparent in the past. The United States should confine any enforcement of this policy to actions against Soviet ships or offending aircraft, not against a Latin American country. Timely action of this kind would also minimize complications later. In the 1962 missile crisis, President Kennedy showed the effective measures against Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba could be taken without directly intervening in Cuba itself. Multilateral action--the preferred course--is another way of avoiding unilateral intervention.

In the past, economic and military assistance has been justified mainly on security grounds. Such aid is often granted to prop up shaky governments or, in effect, to insure the continued hold on power of a particular leader or group against internal opposition. Such assistance has become a way of life in American diplomacy, and United States' officials count on it as a working tool not easily forfeited. When some nation is deprived of aid, its government may complain about discrimination, as if United States' aid were a right. Sometimes aid is justified on the grounds of communist or Soviet intervention. Frequently such charges are exaggerated, distorted, or false. In any case, economic and military aid has often been authorized to protect the hemisphere from external enemies. Yet there has never been a reasonable prospect of a Soviet conventional

attack on the hemisphere, nor of a Cuban attack with which United States' forces could not cope. As a matter of practice, almost all military aid in the hemisphere has been used not for "external security", but to maintain the "internal security" of Latin American nations--and occasionally to help dictators repress a restive population. Economic and military aid has also often been convenient for specific short-term political purposes.

The favored instruments of United States' security policy for influencing events abroad (which has often meant meddling in the politics of other nations) has been economic and military assistance. Between 1946 and 1982 the United States extended to Latin America (less repayments and interest) \$7.2 billion in grants and \$5.1 billion dollars in loans; \$10.7 billion of this amount was for economic assistance, and \$1.5 billion for military assistance (most of the latter in grants). Among the largest aid recipients were Brazil (\$2.1 billion), Colombia (\$1.1 billion) and Chile (\$850 million). In retrospect, one wonders whether the United States really needed to spend over \$4 billion in these countries during this period. Or, to take another group of countries, the United States provided substantial aid over the same period to Guatemala (\$457 million), El Salvador (\$646 million), and Nicaragua (\$386 million). The current situation in these countries does not stimulate faith in the effectiveness of foreign aid.

Some observers might note that the amounts of aid to Latin America were relatively small. Such comments make clear the extent to which United States' officials have become big spenders. If one requires large amounts to be convinced of the inefficacy of foreign aid, why not compare the amounts extended to Vietnam (\$22.9 billion), Israel (\$18.7 billion), and Iran (\$1.3 billion) with the existing condition of United States' interests in those countries? Does the experience of any of these countries give reason to support existing United States' economic and military assistance policies? Even if apologists for aid can find bright spots here and there, these cases hardly offset an otherwise dismal record for aid as a political tool. With respect to bilateral aid extended for political purposes, the United States might better save the money, avoid the entanglements, and forego the transient benefits. Latin American governments will collaborate with the United States when it suits their interest. When it does not, paid collaboration is unreliable.

Proponents of foreign assistance for the purpose of shaping internal developments in Latin American countries to prevent Soviet interference miss the main point. These nations will only be able to resist foreign interference when they can independently make important political decisions by themselves. Foreign meddling prevents this. Latin Americans will be vulnerable to Soviet interference as long as they are vulnerable to United States' interference. Americans must stay their meddling hands to permit Latin American states to stand strong and independent. The United States should continue its disaster relief programs as always. Since the growth of Latin American economies is essential to United States' economic health, the

United States should sharply increase its contributions to the most cost-effective international organizations promoting economic development in the region.

These three security recommendations are actually long-established public policy. All presidents since John F. Kennedy have stood behind the prohibition of Soviet nuclear arms in the hemisphere. The principles of non-intervention and non-interference were articulated in the Good Neighbor policy, approved by the Congress, and reaffirmed by the executive and legislative branch on many occasions ever since. The urgent need now is to implement those policies, recognizing that United States' interests will be best served by negotiations with Latin American governments. With its immense bargaining powers, the United States does not need to use force against these countries. Military operations are costly in economic and human terms, create unpredictable dangers, and facilitate extra-hemispheric interference.