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INTERSTATE CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA

Gregory F. Treverton  
Harvard University

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## INTERSTATE CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA

Gregory F. Treverton  
Harvard University

Many North American stereotypes of Latin America are wrong. The region has not, for example, been violent or prone to conflict in the middle decades of the twentieth century. Prior to the South Atlantic War of 1982, the last major interstate war in the region had been the Chaco War of 1932-35. Between the Peru-Ecuador conflict of 1941 and the 1969 clash between Honduras and El Salvador, there was no sustained outbreak of interstate violence. Nor is the region heavily armed in comparison to other areas of the world. During 1976-78 military expenditures consumed only 1.6 percent of the region's gross national product (GNP) and only 10.2 percent of central government budgets, compared with figures for the developing world as a whole of about 5 and 20 percent, respectively. Arms imports by Latin American countries were only about 7 percent of all arms imports by the developing nations during 1976-78.

That is not to say, of course, that the region has been tranquil or its military establishments inactive. There have continued to be changes of government by other than legally-prescribed means. In South America these have been accompanied by decreasing bloodshed. That has not been true in Central America: the revolution in Nicaragua ranked with the bloodiest events in the post-World War II period, leaving some 50,000 dead. By the late 1970s most of the guerilla insurgencies of the previous two decades, both rural and urban, had waned, whether because adaptations within domestic politics rendered them unnecessary or because increased sophistication of national means of repression made them unfruitful. Yet the civil war in El Salvador continues, and insurgencies have begun again even in South American countries. It is easy to imagine combinations of political and economic circumstances that would make them still more probable.

### Defining the Study

This chapter looks at one set of security issues underscored by recent events, in particular the South Atlantic war coming on the heels of the armed conflict between Peru and Ecuador. Are interstate conflicts such as these aberrations or coincidences? Or do they suggest that "traditional" conflict, even armed conflict, between states--over territory, resources, colonial legacies, political rivalries, or some combination of these--will be more likely in the future than in the past? If so, why? What implications would this development have for the policies of governments of the hemisphere and among them? It is not necessarily disparaging to observe that Latin American militaries have dressed better than they have fought because, happily, they have fought (each other) so seldom; or that they have been more likely to be preoccupied with governing than with responding to external threats. Will that continue to be



the case? Or will nations of the region begin to feel that they must prepare for war even if they do not seek it, fuelling arms races and raising the chances of armed conflict by miscalculation? Will temptations to prepare nuclear options increase?

The chapter does not presume that interstate conflict is a more important topic than others in Latin America or in relations between it and the United States--economic issues, for example. Yet it will have a place on the agenda of hemispheric affairs it would not have had a few years ago. A wave of major wars is unlikely in the extreme, but tension to the point of armed conflict is not. And the implications of those conflicts, even if shooting does not ensue, are serious--for governments of the hemisphere and for existing "security" arrangements in which they participate.

The term "interstate conflict" refers here to conflicts between Latin American states, or between them and nonhemispheric powers, that could lead to the use of armed force, because one side or both explicitly plan such a use or, more likely, because one or both are prepared to take military actions for political purposes, raising the possibility that fighting might occur even if it was not explicitly intended. The chapter does not treat conflict between Latin American states and the United States.

The focus on interstate conflict is less sharp than it might appear, for the line separating interstate from intrastate conflict is sometimes blurred. Hostile governments may support domestic insurgencies within opponent states; or even if they do not explicitly support them, insurgencies in one country may depend on assistance from or through, or on sanctuaries in, neighboring countries--thus raising policy issues for those neighbors even if they wish to avoid them. Similarly, internal actions by one state may provoke a response by its neighbor, thus initiating an interstate conflict. The "football war" between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969 began when the latter initiated a land reform that might have meant the eviction of thousands of Salvadorean migrants to Honduras. These broader ramifications of internal violence are even harder for countries of the region and hemispheric institutions to come to grips with than are interstate conflicts. That is so because they involve delicate questions of national sovereignty and of what constitutes "aggression."

#### The Historical Record

Any conclusions based on the history of interstate conflict in Latin America since World War II must be treated with considerable caution. Small numbers of cases make for weak generalizations. That is all the more so because the more interesting conclusions turn on definitions that are inherently subjective. Are "weak" states more likely to initiate conflict? Are politically weak leaders more likely to conjure external threats? Nevertheless, the historical record permits a series of rough conclusions that at least serve as a baseline for inquiring about the future. The first conclusions presented here apply to Latin America generally; the others underscore the extent of differences within the region.

(1) Conflict with neighbors seldom has dominated the foreign policy agenda of any Latin American state. Most of the dogs have not barked: most conflicts have been contained short of war or even shooting, and many incidents between states have not become lasting conflicts.<sup>1</sup> Explaining absences is even harder than explaining what did occur. Yet speculations about why the dogs have not barked at least sharpens thought about what has changed and what has not.

One factor muting interstate conflict may have been the shared history and relative similarity of governing elites in Latin America, in contrast to the variations in colonial patterns and the ethnic and racial cleavages that exist in neighboring states in other parts of the developing world. Until recently, the preponderance of external economic and even political intercourse of many Latin American states was directed outside the region, to Europe or the United States, not toward neighbors; hence there was little to fight over (or gain). And, again until recently, many disputed boundaries were real frontiers, physically distant from national centers of political and economic activity. Thus there was little urgency to the disputes.

Two other explanations are even more difficult to evaluate. One is the frequent assertion that United States influence--often labelled grandly as "hegemony"--muted interstate conflict in the region.<sup>2</sup> Because the United States, the argument runs, was preoccupied with East-West conflict, it promoted solidarity, not conflict, among Latin American states. Because it was so preponderant in the region, the United States could prevent or contain interstate conflict. Earlier much more than later, it could direct the activities of the Organization of American States (OAS) to its own purposes (maintaining a relatively tranquil status quo) rather than those of the Latin American members (for example, pressuring the United States on economic questions).<sup>3</sup> Although this argument has a ring of truth to it, it is generally hard to test, and difficult to disentangle from other factors. For instance, conflict has been no less frequent in the area of greatest United States influence, Central America, than elsewhere in Latin America.

A more specific form of the argument holds that United States influence with regional military establishments has contributed to diminishing conflict by prodding militaries toward other roles.<sup>4</sup> In the 1950s Latin American militaries--and governments--generally accepted the United States definition of the security threat as external, the East-West conflict. In the 1960s the drive for "national integration" brought militaries to power. Then, their primary task was internal: maintaining and altering the circumstances that bred them. Again, it is difficult to know how important the influence of the United States was in the regard; Latin American militaries may simply have reached conclusions about their domestic mission on their own.

(2) Surprisingly, most internal characteristics of states and their governments have been only weakly associated with conflict and its outcome. To be sure, these conclusions must be interpreted with special caution because of the subjectivity of judgments about internal characteristics of regimes. With that caveat, however, "weak" rulers do not appear to have been more likely to initiate conflicts (with one important

exception, noted below--that of conflicts between Latin American and European states) than politically secure ones. Shaky governments have not seemed especially prone to conjure external enemies to distract attention from internal failings, a conclusion contrary to common images of Latin America.

Similarly, military governments do not appear to have been especially prone to conflict. In fact, neither the character of the regime--civilian or military--nor the ideological distance between regimes has explained much of the pattern of conflict. Civilian regimes have been about as likely to initiate conflict with fellow civilian regimes, even ideologically close ones, as with military governments, and vice versa. Likewise, they find it neither easier nor harder to settle conflicts with civilian counterparts than with military governments. Again, the conclusions run contrary to customary images.

There is no obvious explanation for these conclusions, but they at least hint at a certain rationality in national calculations. "Weak" governments may be deterred from reckless behavior because they know that any upsurge in popular support for them produced by external adventures will be short-lived and may turn negative if popular opinion deems the adventure a failure. As the Argentine junta found in 1982, the crowds may cheer when the adventure succeeds, but their retribution will be severe when it fails. By the same token, military governments may be particularly sensitive to the fact that it will be their job if bluffs are called and reckless action leads to fighting.

(3) Nongovernmental relations--mostly trade and investment--between potential adversaries have had more beneficial than harmful effects. When those links have been significant and not directly connected to the source of dispute, they have helped to contain conflict. That seems reasonable; when states have more to lose by active conflict, they are less likely to engage in it. However, when economic issues have been mixed up with territorial or boundary disputes--when, for example, governments have given private companies resource concessions in disputed areas, or when resources have been discovered in those areas--that has exacerbated conflict. Of course, there are exceptions on both counts: Brazil made concessions in 1976 over the Itaipu project in part because private financial institutions financing the project were unwilling to do so over Argentine opposition. Similarly, Venezuela agreed in 1970 not to press its claims on Guyana for a dozen years, notwithstanding the absence of significant economic links (and the presence of the cultural abyss) between them.

(4) Specific economic issues--resources, fishing rights, and the like--have become more important sources of conflict. In particular, resource questions have become bound up with many conflicts over territories and boundaries. Longstanding claims that had lain dormant or old grievances that seemed tolerable have been revived when governments have thought disputed areas contained valuable resources.

The extension of coastal "economic zones" to 200 miles created new conflicts and made preexisting territorial disputes less tractable. Multiplying oil prices made energy resources life and business for Latin



American states, while new technology meant that energy sources formerly unreachable, hence irrelevant, became exploitable. Now even the hint that contested territory may contain oil is enough to prevent a resolution of the dispute. Peru and Ecuador contested only distant jungle until oil was found to lie beneath it. The Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile ostensibly concerns sovereignty over several islands, but to the disputants it is charged with the possibility that oil and krill may be found within a 200-mile zone around the island, or that the disposition of the islands may one day affect competing claims to Antarctica.

By contrast, as suggested above, ideological distance between regimes does not appear to have been a principal source of interstate conflict. Indeed, at least until recent events in Central America, it seemed to be even less important later in the postwar period than earlier. Most of the democracy-versus-dictatorship conflicts, for example, occurred before 1965 (and most of those involved the United States).<sup>5</sup>

(5) If conflicts mostly have been contained short of fighting, still they seldom have been resolved. They have been only frozen, or they have receded from attention. Definitive resolutions are the exception, not the rule. Less than a quarter of the disputes over boundaries have been resolved.

(6) Similarly, mediation has been neither the rule nor especially successful. Various mediating efforts on balance have helped in Central American conflicts, have had a mixed record in South America, and have seemed more often hurtful than helpful in conflicts between Latin American and European states. The record of United Nations institutions has been the worst, while mediation by individual states or small groups of states generally has had positive results. The record of inter-American institutions has been mixed: largely positive in Central America, at least in the boundary and territorial disputes, but probably more negative than positive in South America. The signal success of the Organization of American States was its mediation of the 1969 El Salvador-Honduras war. Not surprisingly, inter-American institutions have not played an effective role in the more recent cases mixing internal and interstate conflicts--Nicaragua and El Salvador in particular.

There has been some pattern to who has been asked to mediate particular conflicts and why. Central American states have been more likely to resort to inter-American institutions. That is not surprising, given the combination of United States preeminence in inter-American institutions and the greater weight of the United States in Central America than elsewhere in Latin America. By contrast, given different traditions and relationships to the United States, South American states have been less likely to look to inter-American institutions, preferring instead mediation by individual states or small groups. Latin American states have used UN institutions less as forums for conflict resolution than as audiences for continued conflict; again, that is probably not surprising given the nature of the UN and its historically limited role in peacekeeping or mediation in Latin America.

(7) The pattern of conflict has varied a great deal--from Central America to South America to conflicts between Latin American and European states. To speak of "Latin America" is all too easy but all too misleading. The record of conflict across the region has been different.

(a) Central America: The historical record of interstate conflict provides at least limited support for the conclusion that there has been more conflict in Central than in South America.<sup>6</sup> At least it is clear that interstate and internal conflict have been much more entangled in Central America. That is understandable given the history of close links among the societies, economies, and ideologies of the region. Thus, any Central American definition of "security" must reckon with a high degree of permeability of national honors--to the flow of people, goods, and ideas. By contrast, interstate conflict in South America seems to fit more closely traditional European concepts of conflict between states.

The "typical" pattern of conflict in Central America has reflected that permeability. Conflict has begun with an "internal" action by one state: in the case of the 1969 war, the Honduran land reform. The "stronger" neighbor typically has responded by taking an action or making a demand across its borders. That "stronger" state has then been more likely to "win," where winning means achieving an outcome closer to its initial preferences than those of the other state.

By contrast, in South America "weaker" states--as measured by gross national product, size of armed forces, and size of military budget--have been more likely to make the first action or demand across their borders, and to "win" thereby. The pattern suggests, first, that war may be more thinkable in Central than in South America.<sup>7</sup> At a minimum, both national political leaderships and their command and control of armed forces are relatively fragile in Central America, so that national leaders know steps toward war may be self-fulfilling even if armed conflict is not the original intention. Hence strong states are more likely than weak ones to embark on what may be a slippery slope to war. Since both strong and weak know war may actually ensue, the actions of the strong are successful in achieving outcomes they desire. By contrast, war has been less credible in South America--military movements to buttress political claims run less risk of provoking armed conflict--so weaker states have been more prepared to take actions that would seem to threaten it.

Second, stronger South American states, more cohesive and self-assured, may have been more able to act in pursuit of broader political and economic objectives, even at the price of acquiescing in specific demands made by weaker states. There may be less chance that actions by weaker states will provoke nationalistic reactions in the stronger neighbors that preclude sober calculations of real national interests. That seems to have been particularly the case for Brazil, which has been remarkable adept at muting conflicts with neighbors while it emerged as South America's preeminent state. In the case of the Itaipu project, for example, Brazil was prepared to make concessions in political symbols and in long-term economic benefits in order to secure tangible economic interests and amicable political relations with its neighbors.

(b) South America: The armed battle between Peru and Ecuador in 1981 was exceptional in that fighting occurred; yet it otherwise ran true to most of the observations noted earlier, moreover, it illustrated many of the features that have seem particular to interstate conflict in South America. An unresolved border conflict was compounded by--or became salient because of--natural resources later discovered in the disputed territory; at the time fighting broke out, Peru produced 13,000 barrels of oil per day in that area. The origins of the 1981 conflict are murky, but the weaker state, Ecuador, appears to have taken the first action. That fact that democratic forms of government had recently been restored in both countries seemed neither to have increased nor dampened the potential for conflicts. Similarly, in keeping with South American practice, the parties did not break diplomatic relations even as they fought. The OAS was only moderately effective in mediating the conflict; indeed, the two parties initially disagreed over the desirability of an OAS role. The principal means of arranging a cease-fire was a smaller group, the four nations that were guarantors of the 1942 agreement between Peru and Ecuador. Finally, just as the 1942 agreement--denounced by Ecuador in the early 1960s--hardly "resolved" the conflict, so the 1981 fighting ended only with an agreement to disengage forces.<sup>8</sup>

(c) Latin American-European: These conflicts have been exceptional in almost every way. Indeed, they have been exceptional in the strictest sense of the term because there have been so few of them--a half dozen or even fewer in the entire post-World War II period, depending on whether conflicts of longstanding are subdivided into their episodes of particular intensity. Moreover, in all cases the European power was Britain. Still, the exceptional pattern of these conflicts is striking and would have been so even before the South Atlantic war of 1982, even granting the small number of cases.

In all cases the "weaker"--that is Latin American--state made the first action or demand across its borders. As with the conflicts between South American states, it appears that war seemed improbable enough, and the chances of "winning" without war good enough not to deter the Latin American states from initiating action. Or at least that was so before the South Atlantic war. Yet unlike the South American cases, the weaker (Latin American) state was not particularly likely to "win" through taking the first action. There was before 1981 no clear pattern to which state prevailed.

In contrast to other conflicts, politically vulnerable Latin American leaders have been especially likely to initiate action with European powers. That was striking in 1982 but also apparent in earlier Latin American-European conflicts. (Interestingly, if those "weak" leaders became stronger during the course of the conflict, their nations have been more likely to achieve something like the outcomes they desired. European governments have thus appeared more inclined to make concessions if they deemed that the Latin American leader was not using the dispute primarily to build internal support.) Certainly, Latin American states must have felt they ran little risk of war by taking an initial action. Even if the European state responded with a military move of some sort, actual fighting still was hard to imagine. Taking an initial action was all the



more attractive because, given the colonial flavor of the Latin American-European conflicts, the Latin American state could be sure of rhetorical backing from its fellow Latin American states and from most of the Third World as well.

No doubt these same factors make an initial action particularly attractive to weak Latin American leaders seeking to shore up their domestic support. The existence of a "colonial" enemy and the certainty of international support mean that action will be popular all across the political spectrum. The Falklands/Malvinas case was intriguing because that national sentiment was overriding even though nongovernmental ties between Argentina and Britain have been important--considerable trade, cultural affinity, and a visible Anglo-Argentine community in Argentina.

The South Atlantic war of 1982 fits the (exceptional) pattern of previous conflicts between Latin American and European states, again but for the sad fact that war actually occurred. Argentina took the first action, whether by calculation, inadequate command and control, or sheer happenstance. Certainly the Argentine willingness to take risks owed much to the government's desperate search for some internal legitimacy. Argentina received broad international support for its position, though less than it must have hoped. It failed to secure critical active support from African and Asian--and communist--states at the United Nations, and even its Latin American backing was qualified in the sense that its most ardent supporters were those nations, like Venezuela, that had irredentist claims of their own to press.<sup>9</sup>

The British disinclination to make concessions was reinforced by the Argentine regime's unpopularity, both at home and abroad. Both sides used the United Nations as an audience for conflict, while the OAS was ineffective first because of divisions among its "Latin" American members and later because the United States sided with Britain. Mediation by third parties, especially the United States, did better but also failed in the end.

As an important sidelight, the fact that Britain had nuclear weapons made no difference to the war, and, logically, it is hard to see how Argentina's possession of crude nuclear weapons would have changed the outcome. Argentina would have been hard-pressed to make credible nuclear threats. Threats against the islands hardly would have been so, given Argentina's claim of sovereignty over them. Nuclear threats against British troops on the islands or at sea would have been more credible, but delivering one or several crude weapons to make an overwhelming military effect against moving enemy forces would have been questionable. At least it is not obvious that even a desperate government would have risked the international approbrium of using nuclear weapons first in those circumstances.<sup>10</sup>

#### What Has Changed Over Time?

Vivid events in the recent pass often make for overly dramatic predictions about the future. So it may be with the outbreaks of armed conflict in Latin America in the early 1980s. After all, what the South Atlantic war and the fighting between Peru and Ecuador share in common is

that shots actually were fired in anger. In most other respects they differed widely, and the foregoing has suggested how exceptional the Falklands/Malvinas case was along almost every dimension. Nevertheless, there are reasons for believing that those armed conflicts were not pure aberrations, and there is a basis for concern that conflict between states will be more of an issue in the future than it has been in the past.

(1) Military conflict may be more thinkable. Recent conflicts may change old assumptions, especially in South America. The firebreak between mobilizing troops and using them in anger may itself break down. There is the real danger of self-fulfilling prophecies. If parties to past conflicts did not believe their adversaries' mobilization was a signal that war was imminent, they had little reason to react dramatically with military moves of their own. Hence Ecuador did not reinforce its border posts in January 1981 even though it had acted first and even though it had declared a state of emergency; meanwhile, Peru mobilized effectively within 48 hours. Similarly, even after Argentina had taken the Falklands/Malvinas by force of arms and even though it had weeks to prepare, its troops were woefully unprepared when the British attacked. Different assumptions about the link between mobilization and war could induce states of the region to react sharply to moves by a would-be adversary, reducing the time for crisis management and raising the risks of rapid escalation.

Recent events may also underscore for Latin American states the lesson that seems to run through events as distant as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or the Israeli incursion into Lebanon: military force works. If war is thinkable, then military balances cease to be esoterica to be studied only by lobbyists in London. Acquisitions of military weapons cease to be merely means of placating armed forces or of maintaining a balance among them. Britain was both skillful and lucky in the South Atlantic war. But if Argentina's air force had possessed longer-range fighter aircraft and more time to improvise, or if the Argentine navy had not been at least as worried by its position vis-a-vis the army as it was about the British.... The list of "ifs" is long, and the list may not be lost on other Latin American states. Only time will tell.

(2) There will be more to fight over, and there may be less incentive not to fight over those objects of conflict. As noted earlier, new technologies and international developments have made hitherto unattainable natural resources available for exploitation. This has created new objects of conflict, particularly by giving new economic salience to old territorial disputes. And as all states of the region face prolonged periods of low economic growth, all seek to increase oil supplies or raw material exports, thus adding more urgency to the quest for resources. That is clear enough, and important.

Economic difficulties may also increase the likelihood of conflict in another way. Logically, increased trade and other contact between potential adversaries may either increase the chance of conflict (if those contacts themselves become something to fight over) or decrease it (if both parties stand to lose more should conflict occur). Yet the historical record suggests that economic issues are most likely themselves to be sources of conflict when access to resources is at stake; there is

little reason to believe this type of conflict will be rarer than in the past, and some grounds for thinking that it will be more frequent.

Additional economic ties between potential adversaries seem, on balance, to have muted conflict in Latin America. Yet economic difficulties, either the sorry state of the global economy or special problems of particular countries, may diminish those nongovernmental links. Brazil's trade with Argentina, for example, collapsed in 1982, with exports to that country dropping by one-third. Diminished trade may reduce incentives to avoid conflict; at least, there is less at stake economically. Even if that effect is not important, the stronger Latin American states, notably Brazil, will have fewer resources--and less domestic support for spending those resources they do control--to engage in creative diplomacy vis-a-vis neighbors. For example, five years ago Brazil would have been likely to use economic aid in an effort to mute radical tendencies in Surinam; now, given Brazil's own economic straits, there is neither money nor domestic support for such endeavors.

(3) States of the region have more and more military wherewithal for armed conflict. Although the military establishments of most Latin American countries started from a small base, many of them nevertheless have grown rapidly. The overall size of Latin American armies has increased apace with population over the last two decades, although imports of major weapons systems have grown faster than imports generally. That growth is symbolized by recent imports of sophisticated weapons: American F-5 and F-16 aircraft by Mexico and Venezuela, respectively, and Soviet Mig-23s by Cuba. All Latin American countries, save Cuba, remain relatively modest in their ability to project power far from their borders and to sustain it long (and Cuba's African involvements clearly would be impossible without massive Soviet assistance). But recent acquisitions by the major states have increased their ability to project power--longer-range aircraft, troop transports and, to a lesser extent, elements of deep ocean navies.

Certainly it is appropriate to be skeptical about the role of arms "races" as independent sources of tension. At a minimum, the relationship between weapons and tension is complicated. Increases in armaments more often follow than precede serious interstate tension. And too few arms sometimes are as destabilizing as too many. For example, during the sharpest periods of tension over the Beagle Channel in the 1970s, Argentina might well have attacked Chile or taken the islands but for the knowledge that victory would not be easy or swift. At the same time, however, sharp increases in armaments--whatever their motivation--can increase tensions. Nicaragua's revival of territorial claims against Colombia, for example, is bound to be viewed as more ominous in the context of Nicaragua's emergence as the strongest military force in Central America's history.

Arms buildups are at best expensive. At worst they make war, if not more likely, then at least more serious if it occurs. Argentina and Chile, for example, rapidly increased their arms expenditures during moments of sharp tension in the Beagle Channel conflict. Argentina nearly doubled its expenditures (in constant value) between 1974 and 1976, while Chile doubled its outlays between 1976 and 1979.<sup>11</sup> The government of



these two states perceived that the military balance mattered and they were prepared to spend more money on their militaries even during difficult economic times. By contrast, Brazil evidently felt secure enough internally and externally to let its defense effort slide. Its spending in real terms and as a percentage of GNP declined after 1976; in 1974 Brazil spent about a fifth more on defense than Argentina, but by 1981 Argentina spent almost twice as much. (Needless to say, all these comparisons should be treated with skepticism, as no more than rough approximations.)

Even serious economic problems may not brake arms acquisitions. As a region, Latin America's per capita GNP fell 2.7 percent in 1981, the worse performance in the developing world. Yet with military budgets consuming only several percent of GNP, many countries in the region could manage continuing arms buildups even in the face of economic woes. The evidence from Argentina in 1982 is suggestive: it continued to give priority to military expenditures even amidst economic chaos, and it was even able to grant some military credits. Finally, since military establishments in the region remain relatively small, fairly modest increases in expenditures can produce significant changes in local military balances.

Two aspects of this expansion in military establishments merit special attention. First, the sophisticated armaments many nations in the region possess come close to making them a military match even for their suppliers from the developed world. That was graphically illustrated during the South Atlantic war when Argentina sank the British destroyer Sheffield with French-supplied Exocet missiles. In the same conflict, Argentina was armed with Type 42 destroyers made both in Britain and in Argentina under British licenses, with French-built Mirages and corvettes, and so on.

Second, and more important, several nations of the region--especially Brazil and Argentina--now produce considerable numbers of weapons domestically, including sophisticated aircraft. Brazil, for example, produces a wide variety of ships and submarines, armored vehicles, and military aircraft.<sup>12</sup> In 1981 Brazil sold missiles to Iraq and contracted with Malaysia to supply as many as 700 armored vehicles. France and Belgium have imported the Brazilian training aircraft, the EMB-121 Xingu, while the Soviet Union has purchased armored vehicles of the EE-9 Cascavel model. Major developing world customers of Brazilian weapons have been Libya, Iraq, Uruguay, Chile, Gabon, Togo, and Tunisia.

The Argentine arms industry, ranking seventh in the developing world, is smaller than Brazil's, but it still produces a wide range of weapons. These include the IA-58 Pucara, a multipurpose attack aircraft; the TAM, the first medium tank produced by a developing nation; and a wider range of small arms than Brazil. Argentina has been a smaller exporter of arms than Brazil, but it has sold aircraft to Bolivia, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Iraq, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela, and armored vehicles to China, Pakistan, and Peru.

These indigenous arms industries have several implications for interstate conflict in the region. They will increase the number of possible suppliers, thus making many nations of the region less vulnerable to the

decisions of any given supplier. Given the preponderant United States position in the Latin American arms trade in the 1960s, it was at least possible for the United States unilaterally to try to keep supersonic aircraft out of the region arsenals. That effort collapsed when first the French and later the Soviets filled the gap. With more and more arms being produced in Latin America, such attempts by any supplier will become more difficult, and, correspondingly, the number of parties necessary to any arms restraint agreement will grow larger.

Domestic arms production will also mean that producers within the region (notably Brazil and Argentina) will have additional military instruments to build influence in other Latin American states. Both countries have in the past transferred arms on concessional terms to Bolivia and Paraguay, but those have been obsolescent weapons originally acquired from industrialized countries. Whether future transfers of domestically-produced weapons will become competitive, or will fuel arms races in other states of the region, is hard to tell at this juncture. The answer is likely to turn on whether those other states perceive threats to which additional arms are relevant.

(4) There will be continuing turmoil in Central America. Whatever else may be said about the chaos in Central America, it does not seem about to end. Most of the turmoil there will continue to be internal, but it will also spill across national boundaries. Opposition movements from one country, sometimes armed, will continue to seek sanctuary or support in neighboring states. Actions taken by one state for one purpose will cause concern in other countries. Nicaraguan leaders may regard their military buildup as defensive, aimed at counterrevolutionaries and their supporters, but it is bound to make neighbors edgy about Nicaraguan intentions.

The East-West conflict will continue to intrude into the region, and ideology (sometimes compounded by political leaders' personal animosities) may again become a source of conflict. Nicaragua and Honduras are contemporary examples of this phenomenon. Cuban actions will cast a long shadow over the region. After the 1960s specific forms of Cuban foreign activities that other Latin American states found threatening waned; and even the smaller states of the region did not generally perceive Cuba to be a threat. Most Latin American states were preoccupied with internal development, thus unlikely either to fear ideological deviance in neighbors or to want to convert them. Yet the weight of evidence seems to suggest that Cuba resumed more active support to revolutionary movements in the last phases of the Nicaraguan civil war. At a minimum, the facts of Cuba's military might and well-trained expeditionary forces are factors with which states in the region will have to reckon.

Finally, declining United States influence may increase the potential for conflict in Central America more than South America, given the historically greater United States influence in Central America and the tendency of states in the region to look to Washington. The United States will continue to loom large in the affairs of Central America, but growing ideological variety and increasing external contacts of states and forces there will diminish United States leverage. That, in turn, will diminish the ability of the United States to prevent or mediate conflict, and it

is also likely to reduce the effectiveness of the OAS and other inter-American institutions.

(5) The "national security ethos" of military regimes may be a source of conflict. This argument is often made in South America especially, and it reflects how distinct experiences have been in different parts of Latin America. Military regimes took power in the 1960s, it is argued, based on national security doctrines tinged with geopolitics.<sup>13</sup> Those doctrines included an emphasis, if not on external enemies, at least on the external dimensions of internal tensions. For much of the last two decades, as suggested earlier, the South American militaries--as-governments concentrated on internal stabilization and national integration--rooting out internal insurgents and ameliorating the conditions which bred them. Now, however, these military establishments have become more sensitive to the external dimensions of security. At the same time, both the military capabilities acquired during the phase of internal stabilization and the increased degree of internal integration that resulted from it give these states more room to press their external interests.

Although this argument seems plausible enough, it is striking that the country to which it would seem to apply best--Brazil--is the Latin American state which has been perhaps the most active in regional diplomacy, and which has not been prone to conflict. Quite the contrary, Brazilian diplomacy seems to have been characterized by a willingness to make concessions on specific disputes in the interest of building broader political and economic influence. In that sense, more "national integration" may also mean more self-confidence, a clearer articulation of national interests, and thus a willingness to sacrifice some "face" for broader goals.

Nor is it clear what "national security doctrines" will mean as military governments give way to civilian ones in South America. The consequences surely vary in different cases. It may be, for example, that as military governments yield to civilian ones, those (often shaky) civilian governments will continue to look over their shoulders toward the barracks. Hence they will feel that they cannot yield on territorial questions that seem bound up with national sovereignty, of which the military is custodian. Something like that apparently occurred in 1980 in the dispute between Colombia and Venezuela over the Gulf of Venezuela when the Venezuelan armed forces blocked a settlement. There is a danger that something similar will happen in Argentina with respect to the Beagle Channel. Notwithstanding broad support among civilian elites for settling the dispute on terms close to those suggested by the papal mediation, civilian governments in Argentina may fear a military backlash on an issue that successive military governments heated up, were identified with, and in turn became identified with national sovereignty.

(6) The nuclear issue will become involved in interstate conflict. This is another area in which dramatic assessments must be treated with skepticism. The dire predictions of the last decade about nuclear weapons emerging out of the (one-sided) rivalry between Brazil and Argentina have not come true.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, in most respects these two countries' relations--including their contacts in the nuclear question, after the May



1980 nuclear cooperation agreement--are better than ever. Who would have imagined a decade ago that Brazil would represent Argentine interests in Britain after the South Atlantic war?

The basic facts of the Latin American nuclear situation are clear. Many nations of the region have some aspirations to, and some cooperation programs in, nuclear energy. Yet only three--Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico--have significant nuclear programs.<sup>15</sup> Mexico's ambitious plans have been sharply scaled back due to the precariousness of the country's general economic situation and the economics of nuclear power by comparison to conventionally-fired plants, especially in a petroleum-rich country. Thus attention continues to center on Brazil and Argentina. Neither is a full party to the regional nuclear free zone agreement, the Treaty of Tlateloloco, both have most--but not all--of their nuclear facilities under international safeguards, and both have reserved to themselves the right to "peaceful nuclear explosions" (PNEs).

In 1975 Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany signed a massive, and controversial, nuclear cooperation agreement. Under the terms of this agreement, Brazil was to receive assistance across the full range of the nuclear fuel cycle, including construction of up to eight light water power reactors, a uranium enrichment facility, and a plutonium reprocessing unit. The last two items aroused the most concern, for the uranium enrichment technology could be used to produce weapon-grade uranium, while the reprocessing facility could extract low-grade weapons plutonium from spent fuel. Both facilities were to be operated under safeguards, but the safeguards would apply only to the materials supplied by the Federal Republic, not to any subsequent national adaptations of the technology.

The agreement was also controversial from the outset--even within Brazil--on scientific, economic, and political grounds. In particular, the project was based on enriched uranium rather than natural uranium (the basis of the Argentine program), which meant continuing dependence for Brazil on foreign sources of enriched uranium. However, economic factors ultimately proved the most telling. The costs of the program envisaged in 1975 have doubled, and the government decided in March 1982 not to build more than the two power reactors then under construction. A pilot enrichment facility has been installed, but a commercial-scale plant could not be operational before late in the 1980s. Similarly, plans for the reprocessing facility were completed in 1979, but construction has been postponed. Although Brazil might somehow be able to acquire enough fissionable material to build one or several crude bombs, its current program leaves it a long way from a nuclear arsenal.

Argentina long has been regarded as Latin America's leader in nuclear technology. Its program has been generally insulated from the country's political and economic turmoil; for example, although Argentina has had fifteen presidents since 1950, its atomic energy commission (CNEA) has had only four directors. Argentina's first power reactor, Atucha I (350 megawatt capacity), began operating in 1974 and was the first in Latin America. A second is nearing completion, and a third, involving cooperation with both the Federal Republic and Brazil, is under construction. Argentina's program is less dependent on foreign suppliers than is Brazil's; in 1981, for example, it inaugurated a plant to fabricate fuel

rods for its power reactors, and it has proven reserves of natural uranium of about 29,000 tons (enough to operate one 1,000 MW reactor for about 200 years).

The focus of recent concern has been Argentina's operational pilot reprocessing plant, which Argentina argues was built without foreign aid and is thus not subject to international safeguards. The spent fuel rods from Atucha I probably contain enough plutonium, if reprocessed, to make several dozen small nuclear bombs. Those rods are subject to international safeguards, but there have been reports of a plan to build a small research reactor whose fuel would not be safeguarded. Estimates of how long Argentina would require to build a nuclear bomb range from three to five years if it made a dedicated effort.

So much for capabilities. What of intentions? Why would either Argentina or Brazil build a bomb? The most likely prospect is that neither will, but that advancing nuclear programs will give both nations a plausible capability to do so--and, over time, to do so quickly. Eventually both could resemble Israel and South Africa, which are presumed to have bombs or the capability to build them at will. Thus any major conflict between Argentina and Brazil would be charged with nuclear possibilities. That would be the case even if neither had exploded a bomb and even if strategic analysis suggested that both would lose from any nuclear exchange. Both would be tempted to attack preemptively the nuclear facilities of the other lest the other win the race to "go nuclear."

A less likely but starker future would be a decision by either Argentina or Brazil to create for itself a nuclear weapons option. In the near term this seems more feasible for Argentina, even if it is not very probable. The development of this option would not have to be especially explicit. An Argentina humbled by the recent South Atlantic war and frustrated by continuing domestic travails could, for example, simply become more ambiguous in describing its nuclear plans and more secretive in implementing them. For Argentina that might be merely an attempt to salvage some prestige from the area of its remaining advantage. Argentine sources close to the nuclear energy program have in recent years conveyed an undertone of such interest, not in building a bomb but in retaining a lead over Brazil in nuclear technology, even that with military applications. This may account for some of the off-handed comments in Argentina in the wake of the South Atlantic war about building a nuclear-powered submarine, a feat much more difficult than constructing a nuclear bomb. Yet Brazil could hardly permit Argentina to open a wider lead in this area even if Brazil had no real interest in a nuclear weapons option. And Chile surely would regard an Argentine nuclear option as an effort at intimidation.

#### Future Conflict and Implications

There are significant reasons for expecting more conflict of various sorts between states in Latin America than for predicting less.<sup>16</sup> Although precise predictions are impossible, even a brief review of the history of interstate conflict in the region would have suggested before the fact that serious conflict over the Falklands/Malvinas was more likely than other possible outcomes, especially since a failing government in

Buenos Aires would be tempted to clutch at some shred of domestic support. The foregoing pages do point to three kinds of interstate conflict that are more probable than others, in the following order.

The most serious threat is the interstate spillover from turmoil in particular Central American states. That spillover will arise in the future, as it has in the past, in at least three ways. Even if the conflict is primarily internal to particular countries, other states in the region and beyond will feel they have an interest in the outcome, and thus may provide support in various ways. As suggested above, Cuba's military might makes its possible actions a special source of uncertainty. Or even if other states seek to remain aloof, various parties to internal conflicts may seek to draw them in; using a neighbor's territory as a sanctuary is one obvious way in which this may happen. Finally, the "outcomes" of a particular domestic conflict may generate losers who continue the armed struggle at a lower level from a neighboring country. Outcomes may also produce, or deepen, ideological hostility to the point that neighboring states are willing to harbor armed dissidents; or that latent disputes over territory are activated; or that arms races result, as one state, feeling threatened, takes actions which themselves become threats to neighbors.

A second type of conflict of particular concern is that between Latin American and European states. That set of possible conflicts probably now is reduced to one--the Falklands/Malvinas--but little the less worrisome for that fact. New conflicts of this type might arise, for example, as France's American departments move to independence, and there remain "colonial" overtones to other existing conflicts (for instance, over Belize). But Belize could hardly be portrayed as a struggle against colonialism as the Falkland conflict can, and so no action against Belize would receive the broad support from Latin American states that Argentina received, even if that support was thin in many cases.

In the case of the Falklands/Malvinas, all the elements for conflict remain: a clear issue, unanimously supported by Argentineans of all political stripes; the surety of broad support from fellow Latin Americans and from Third World countries generally, which will increase any temptations a government in Buenos Aires feels to act; an understandable but regrettable British disinclination to negotiate; and, in that context, the absence of any effort at mediation. What prevents armed conflict is deterrence--the heightened British military presence in the Islands. But that presence itself deepens Argentina's sense of humiliation. Argentina is bound to resort to force of arms again, not now or next year but eventually, when Britain again forgets about the Falklands and/or when a government in Buenos Aires becomes especially desperate.

The third type of conflict is more numerous but less immediately likely to result in fighting: boundary and territorial disputes compounded by question of access to natural resources. Conflicts between Argentina and Chile and between Peru and Ecuador are only the most obvious examples. The Essequibo dispute between Venezuela and Guyana may be more cause for concern because it is compounded by a third factor: the absence of significant bilateral ties of any sort which might serve as a shared stake that would diminish the risk of conflict. Even if none

of these conflicts is likely to result in fighting, one or more may; the continuing skirmishing between Peru and Ecuador testifies to that. And even if fighting does not occur, the conflicts remain sources of uncertainty and bases for diverting scarce economic resources to purchase arms.

There are no easy recipes for resolving any of these three types of conflicts. Their variety underscores the diversity within Latin America. It also suggests a variety of different conflict resolution strategies that Latin American states, nonhemispheric actors, and institutions in which they participate might pursue.

Given the mixing of internal and interstate conflict in Central America, conflict there can only be reduced through parallel sets of discussions--between domestic political forces, between individual Central American states and neighboring countries, and among Central American countries and other states with a direct interest in the resolution of emerging conflicts. Something like that eventually happened in the case of Nicaragua, but haltingly and late. The more that states in the region--for instance, the Contadora group of Panama, Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia--take the lead, the better.

This is not the place for a detailed discussion of United States policy toward Central America. But given the relatively greater (if declining) United States influence there than elsewhere in Latin America, Washington's actions will continue to matter more. There will also be more room for an OAS role in Central America than elsewhere in Latin America. Certainly it would be helpful if Guyana and Belize--currently excluded, from OAS membership by the Charter provision denying membership to states disputing boundaries with preexisting OAS members--could join, and if the Caribbean states became more active in inter-American institutions.

For the United States, the parallel negotiations would reflect a clear calculation of real United States security interests that is so often lacking in discussions of Central America. United States security interests in the region are real but narrow: preventing more Soviet or Cuban troop deployments, bases, or facilities with clear military purpose. Provided that this United States objective could be achieved--through negotiated agreement with the Cubans and Soviets, or through parallel statements of self-restraint provided the other state did likewise, with the understandings recognized or joined by states in the region--the United States would afford to be less immediately preoccupied with the precise political coloration of particular regimes.<sup>17</sup> Apart from Cuban and Soviet activities, the United States frankly has little strategic interest in what form of government emerges in El Salvador. It should not shrink from making clear its preference for democracy, but it should also be prepared in the context of parallel discussions to pledge to respect existing governments, whatever their political orientation.

For the more traditional interstate conflicts, the watchword should be openness to any mediating mechanism that has a chance of working effectively. Again, the first responsibility lies with the parties themselves. For some conflicts, groups of eminent citizens from the countries involved can lay the basis for solution, both by suggesting possible



formulae and by beginning to change the political atmosphere so that a settlement will not be equated with treason. Even if the OAS is reoriented toward security and peacekeeping, its credibility in the wake of the South Atlantic war will remain low. Latin Americans have begun to discuss some new security arrangements independent of the United States. Those discussions are likely to founder, however, on divisive issues such as which nations to include and which to exclude. It may also be that the smaller states of the region are more worried about being left alone with the other Latin American states than the by-now-familiar position with regard to the United States. There will remain a need for some inter-American institution, and the OAS has the virtue of already existing.

A first necessity is creating some structure for discussions of the Falklands/Malvinas case. The United Nations Secretary General may be able to play a creative role in this instance, particularly if the current incumbent (Javier Perez de Cuellar, of Peru) means to enhance the role of his office. His effort before the 1982 South Atlantic war was constructive even if it was not ultimately successful in averting armed conflict.

It should not be beyond the wit of parties in the region to design novel approaches to territorial disputes. For instance, territorial claims might be separated from resource exploitation issues. Two decades ago Uruguay and Argentina settled their dispute over the La Plata river by agreeing to one boundary for navigational purposes and another for political and administrative purposes. States might freeze boundaries where they are, with the state which foregoes its territorial claim compensated by receiving a larger share than it otherwise might of any resource zone at issue. Or states might agree to joint resource exploitation, as reportedly is part of the Papal recommendation for the Beagle Channel.

The most promising way to reduce arms races is to diminish the tensions that provoke them. Nevertheless, a number of arms control efforts are worth making, led by Latin American states themselves. They might begin by agreeing not to introduce certain categories of weapons into the region, or to destabilize existing balances. That would be particularly important for Argentina and Chile, the Central American states, and, to some degree, the Andean nations. Beyond that, Latin American states and their arms suppliers could begin discussions of their respective policies and of areas of possible restraint. That would be useful notwithstanding the increased number of suppliers and the fact that some states in the region, notably Brazil and Argentina, are both suppliers and recipients.

At a minimum, these discussions would increase the transparency of military activities in Latin America, now often shrouded in secrecy and mistrust. Paradoxically, the decline of the United States military presence in the region may have decreased the flow of information. For example, when the United States had a large military assistance presence in Latin America, both its relations with local military establishments and its information about them were much better than now. It was thus in a position to convey information, to extend good offices, or to suggest to one state that the acquisition of advanced fighter planes by another reflected an interest in placating a disgruntled air force more than an increased military threat across its borders.

Direct discussions between states about their military activities would provide reassurance and reduce the risk of conflict through misunderstanding. A number of confidence building measures, formal or informal, might result from these discussions: advance notification of military maneuvers, invitations of observers to those maneuvers, agreements not to stage maneuvers in sensitive areas, and so on. There is no reason for the nations of Latin America to do less than has been possible for NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the heart of heavily-armed Europe.

Finally, the danger of nuclear proliferation in the region will continue to be cause for concern but not for alarm. Temptations to develop nuclear weapon options will remain (general frustration or the quest for prestige), especially for Argentina. But these should be relatively weak absent specific motivations. As with arms buildups, the best hope of averting nuclear proliferation lies with efforts by Latin American states themselves to reduce the mutual suspicions that might provoke it. In this regard, the Brazilian-Argentine nuclear agreement is a model.

It would require only a few additional steps by several nations to bring the Treaty of Tlateloloco into force. That would be a useful means of increasing confidence, even if Brazil and Argentina continue to assert the right to "peaceful" nuclear explosions. More helpful still would be a willingness by Argentina to put all its nuclear facilities--those developed domestically as well as those which have been imported from abroad--under international safeguards. Those safeguards are not fool-proof, but they would be a manifestation of Argentina's commitment not to increase uncertainty, hence concern, among its neighbors. Certainly it would be hard to justify any expansion in nuclear trade with Argentina by the United States or other nuclear suppliers until all Argentine facilities are placed under appropriate international safeguards.

In all of these approaches to interstate conflict resolution, the United States is likely to be more effective when it prods from behind the scenes than when it is out in front. The exception is Central America, where history and current commitment mean its role is bound to be more visible. Elsewhere, however, the United States role in helping arrange the Papal mediation of the Beagle Channel is a better model. The decline in United States presence and influence is sometimes a frustration for policy-makers, and as suggested several times in this chapter, it may paradoxically increase the risks of conflict in several ways. But on balance that decline is probably good, both for the nations of Latin America and for the United States. In any case it is a fact. Efforts to change it--for instance, by promoting arms sales to restore the United States to a preeminent position as arms supplier in an attempt to regain leverage--surely would be counterproductive.

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<sup>1</sup>These conclusions are based primarily on two studies: Jorge I. Dominguez, "Ghosts from the Past: War, Territorial and Boundary Disputes in Mainland Central and South America since 1960," unpublished paper, Harvard University, May 1977, and Wolf Grabendorff, "Interstate Conflict Behavior and Regional Potential for Conflict in Latin America," Working Paper No. 116, Latin American Program, The Wilson Center, Washington, D.C.

There is considerable overlap between the two sets of cases, but the two authors use somewhat different definitions. Dominguez limits his analysis to conflict over boundaries and territory and excludes the Caribbean. He also looks at relatively defined episodes of conflict; hence conflict between Argentina and Britain over the Falklands/Malvinas is divided into two episodes. Grabendorff examines a broader range of interstate conflict, and he includes conflicts between the United States and Latin American countries. He does not break longstanding conflicts into episodes, so Argentine-British conflict is one instance.

The cases are: Dominguez--Argentina-Uruguay, 1963-64, 1967-68, and 1972-73; Argentina-Chile, 1963, 1964, 1965, and 1967-71; Argentina-Britain, 1964-75 and 1975-77; Argentina-Paraguay, 1964-67; Paraguay-Brazil, 1962-66, 1970-75; Paraguay-Bolivia, 1969-75; Bolivia-Chile, 1962, 1967-70, 1973-75, and 1975 onward; Chile-Peru, 1974 onward; Bolivia-Peru, 1976 onward; Ecuador-Peru, 1960-61 and 1976-77; Argentina-Brazil, 1970 onward; Guyana-Surinam, 1969 onward; Guyana-Brazil, 1976 onward; Venezuela-Britain, 1962-66; Venezuela-Guyana, 1966-67 1968-70; Venezuela-Trinidad-Tobago, 1975; Venezuela-Dutch Antilles, 1972 onward; Venezuela-Colombia, 1966-70 and 1970 onward; Colombia-Nicaragua, 1971 onward; Nicaragua-Honduras, 1960-62; Nicaragua-Costa Rica, 1970-74 and 1976 onward; El Salvador-Honduras, 1967, 1969, and 1970-76; Guatemala-Britain, 1963, 1970-72, 1974 onward.

Grabendorff--Argentina-Brazil after 1825; Argentina-Britain after 1833; Chile-Argentina after 1881; Chile-Bolivia after 1879; Colombia-Venezuela after 1834; Costa Rica-Nicaragua, 1948-56; Cuba-United States after 1960; Dominican Republic-Haiti after 1949; Dominican Republic-United States, 1961-65; Guatemala-Britain, 1859-1981; Guatemala-United States, 1951-54; Honduras-El Salvador, 1967-80; Honduras-Nicaragua after 1957; Nicaragua-Colombia since 1979; Nicaragua-United States since 1980; Mexico-United States since 1864; Panama-United States since 1903; Peru-Chile since 1889; Peru-Ecuador since 1882; and Venezuela-Guyana since 1899.

The lack of attention a half decade ago to these issues is illustrated by Dominguez' comment that when he presented his paper, the audience regarded it as "lapidary poetry" of little relevance, and, alone of all his research, he did not publish it. Indeed, there has been scant study of Latin American foreign policies at all--not to mention these security issues--especially by Latin Americans and especially until recently. A few exceptions in the period before the late 1970s are: Gregory F. Treverton, Latin America in World Politics: The Next Decade, Adelphi Paper No. 137 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977); Luigi R. Einaudi, ed., Beyond Cuba: Latin America Takes

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<sup>2</sup>For arguments along these lines, see Grabendorff, *ibid.*, p. 4. See also Jerome Slater, The OAS and United States Foreign Policy (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967); and Tom J. Farer, "Limiting Intraregional Violence: The Costs of Regional Peacekeeping," in Tom J. Farer, ed., The Future of the Inter-American System (New York: 1970).

<sup>3</sup>One suggestive index is that the Inter-American Peace Committee of the Organization of American States was activated 34 times between 1948 and 1965 but only once thereafter, during the Honduras-El Salvador war. In 1970 it was replaced by the Inter-American Committee on Peaceful Settlement, which has not been activated.

<sup>4</sup>There are many examples of this argument. On the "doctrine of national security," see Manuel Antonio Garretón and Genaro Arriagada, "Doctrina de seguridad nacional y régimen militar," Estudios Sociales Centroamericanos, 7, 20 (1978), and Wayne A. Selcher, "The National Security Doctrine and Policies of the Brazilian Government," Parameters, 7, 1 (Spring 1977). On the external implications of these policies, see Alexandre S. C. Darros, "The Diplomacy of National Security: South American International Relations in a Defrosting World," in Hellmann and Rosenbaum, *op. cit.*, and David F. Ronfeldt and Luigi R. Einaudi, "Conflict and Cooperation Among Latin American States," in Einaudi, *op. cit.*

<sup>5</sup>For instance, of the 20 conflicts in the Grabendorff study, six were ideological but four involved the United States. Grabendorff, *op. cit.*, p. 5ff.

<sup>6</sup>Only seven of Domínguez' 41 territorial conflicts were Central American (he did not consider the Caribbean), but 11 of the 20 conflicts Grabendorff examined involved at least one Central American or Caribbean state.

<sup>7</sup>Domínguez, *op. cit.*, p. 22ff.

<sup>8</sup>For a military analysis of the conflict, see Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily, February 6, 1981.

<sup>9</sup>For a variety of Latin American perspectives on the war and its implications, see Estudios Internacionales, 60 (October-December 1982). See especially Carlos Moneta's discussion of Argentine miscalculations, p. 376ff. For a British assessment of the war, see Lawrence Freedman, "The War of the Falkland Islands," Foreign Affairs, 61, 1 (Fall 1982), pp. 196-210.



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- <sup>10</sup> For a good summary of arguments about the spread of nuclear weapons --one that concludes that nuclear proliferation may not be a bad thing, see Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper No. 171 (London: IISS, 1981).
- <sup>11</sup> These figures are from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1982 SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmaments (Stockholm, 1982), pp. 145 and 153.
- <sup>12</sup> Jozef Goldblat and Victor Millan, "Militarization and Arms Control in Latin America," *ibid.*
- <sup>13</sup> The best-known (though not most widely-read) work is Gen. Golbery do Couto e Silva, A Geopolitica do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Jose Olympio, 1967). His work is, however, relatively sanguine about the dangers of interstate conflict, calling explicitly for the maintenance of existing boundaries. For a review of geopolitical writings, see John Child, "Geopolitical Thinking in Latin America," Latin American Research Review, 14, 2 (Summer 1979).
- <sup>14</sup> This includes my own predictions, though they were prudently hedged; Treverton, op. cit., p. 39ff.
- <sup>15</sup> This discussion draws on a number of sources, including Treverton, op. cit., in its basic picture and strategic analysis. For recent summaries of the state of nuclear programs in the region, see "Latin American Nuclear Technology," International Herald Tribune, 30-31, and Goldblat and Millan, op. cit. On the German-Brazilian deal, see Hartmut Krugman, "The German-Brazilian Nuclear Deal," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (February 1981). For an interesting interview with Vice Adm. Carlos Castro Madero, the head of Argentina's nuclear program, see "Situacion nuclear argentina," Estrategia (Buenos Aires), 69 (1981), pp. 55-61. For a basic discussion of the strategic implications of this case, see Stephen M. Gorman, "Security, Influence, and Nuclear Weapons: The Case of Argentina and Brazil," Parameters, 9, 1 (Spring 1979), pp. 52-65.
- <sup>16</sup> Normal Arbaiza, Mars Moves South (Jericho, N.Y.: Exposition Press, 1974), argues that such a wave of wars is likely and no bad thing.
- <sup>17</sup> The United States-Soviet understandings over Cuba of 1962, 1969, and 1970 are suggestive. The United States agreed, in effect, not to try to overthrow Castro in return for Soviet commitments not to introduce nuclear weapons into Cuba.