

Number 164

ORIGINS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHILEAN PARTY SYSTEM:
A PROPOSAL FOR A PARLIAMENTARY FORM OF GOVERNMENT

Arturo Valenzuela
Duke University

Paper prepared for the project "The Role of Political Parties in the Return to Democracy in the Southern Cone," sponsored by the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution and the World Peace Foundation.
Washington, D.C.

May 1985

Copyright © by Arturo Valenzuela

This essay is one of a series of Working Papers of the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. The series includes papers by Program Fellows, Guest Scholars, interns, staff and Academic Council, as well as work from Program seminars, workshops, colloquia, and conferences. The series aims to extend the Program's discussions to a wider community throughout the Americas, and to help authors obtain timely criticism of work in progress. Support to make distribution possible has been provided by the Inter-American Development Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Editor: Louis W. Goodman; Assistant to the Editor: Eric L. Palladini, Jr.

Single copies of Working Papers may be obtained without charge by writing to:

Latin American Program, Working Papers
The Wilson Center
Smithsonian Institution Building
Washington, D. C. 20560

The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars was created by Congress in 1968 as a "living institution expressing the ideals and concerns of Woodrow Wilson . . . symbolizing and strengthening the fruitful relation between the world of learning and the world of public affairs."

The Center's Latin American Program, established in 1977, has two major aims: to support advanced research on Latin America, the Caribbean, and inter-American affairs by social scientists and humanists, and to help assure that fresh insights on the region are not limited to discussion within the scholarly community but come to the attention of interested persons with a variety of professional perspectives: in governments, international organizations, the media, business, and the professions. The Program is supported by contributions from foundations, corporations, international organizations, and individuals.

LATIN AMERICAN PROGRAM ACADEMIC COUNCIL

William Glade, Chairman, University of Texas, Austin
Albert Fishlow, University of California, Berkeley
Enrique Florescano, Instituto Nacional de Antropología
e Historia, Mexico City, Mexico
Carlos Fuentes, Mexico
Bolívar Lamounier, IDESP, Brazil
Juan Linz, Yale University
Rex Nettleford, University of the West Indies, Jamaica
Walter B. Redmond, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
Joyce Riegelhaupt, Sarah Lawrence College

Richard Morse, Secretary

INTRODUCTION:

Only a few days after the overthrow of the 1973 government of Salvador Allende, the governing military junta in Chile issued a decree banning some political parties and declaring others in "recess."¹ For the next eleven years, the party leadership has struggled to survive under what became the longest lasting government in Chilean history. The parties of the left faced the greatest repression but even the Christian Democratic party, the country's largest, which had bitterly opposed Allende's government, soon found its actions severely constrained. The rightist National party welcomed the prohibition of party activity and voluntarily disbanded. Although several of its leaders took positions in the government, especially in the diplomatic corps, it is noteworthy that the military did not turn to prominent National party leaders for key political posts, preferring conservative but a-political technocrats -- with the exception of a brief period in 1983-84 when, after widespread riots, Pinochet turned to Sergio Onofre Jarpa, former president of the National party, to become minister of the Interior.

The military authorities had correctly concluded that if they were to impose their own imprint on the country they would have to curb all party activity. In few other countries had parties played as prominent a role and for as long a period of time as they had in Chile. Parties recruited leaders and determined policy options in Chile's powerful executive and legislative branches. But parties also structured cleavages throughout the society. Their influence extended into most interest groups, community associations, educational institutions and even soccer clubs and churches. Candidates for union offices and high school and university leadership positions ran on party platforms, and party organizations paid as much attention to the outcome as they did to that of congressional by-elections.

The prominent place of parties in Chilean politics is not a new phenomenon. It is closely related to Chile's long tradition of democratic politics. After 1830 and following a turbulent period of anarchy and dictatorship, the ballot box (albeit with a restricted electorate) became the sole mechanism for determining presidential and congressional leadership positions.

The only deviation from this pattern came in the crisis years of 1891, 1924, and 1932 when unconstitutional governments held office for periods ranging up to five months. With the partial exception of the "dictatorship" of Carlos Ibañez (1927-32), who drew on civilian technocrats for government positions while jailing and exiling some prominent political leaders, parties were the determining political force in forging the nation's democratic institutions, as well as prominent actors in periods of political unrest and instability. Indeed, Chilean parties played just as important a role in the periodic breakdown of democracy, as they did in the emergence and consolidation of democratic practices over several generations.

Any discussion of the prospects for redemocratization and the role of Chilean parties must bear these historical facts in mind. While military regimes may have certain common characteristics, their long-term impact is more dependent on the nature of the preexisting social and political institutions on which they seek to impose their policies, than on the policies themselves. But as the very presence of a military government demonstrates that the system has experienced a profound crisis. It is thus equally important to clarify the extent to which the preexisting system had disintegrated before military rule. Was the Chilean party system irrevocably destroyed before the coup? If not, did the experience of military rule accomplish this task? If the system had broken down severely beforehand, would the experience of military government be more likely to produce a similar or radically different party system once civilian rule was restored? Whether similar or different, what is the role for constitutional or political engineering in moving toward redemocratization?

This essay will seek to address these questions in five parts. The first part traces the origins of the party system by examining the cleavage structure of Chilean society over time and how such cleavages were manifested politically. The second part analyzes the role of party politics within the broader context of Chilean politics, emphasizing the fragile nature of the Chilean presidential system. Indeed, it is a premise of this paper that the rules of presidential politics seriously aggravated the confrontational nature of Chilean politics. Had Chile had a parliamentary regime rather than a presidential one, it is unlikely that the country would have experienced a regime breakdown. Part 3 of the paper analyzes the breakdown of Chilean democracy with particular attention to the role of parties. The fourth section describes the fate of parties under authoritarianism, stressing the extent to which party politics have been able to survive despite government repression. The concluding section of the paper argues that the objective of the Chilean military authorities is to create a new party system that would ensure a stable democracy as not only unattainable, but also counterproductive. Changes in party or electoral rules or the banning of Marxist parties will not have the desired effect. Since the underlying cleavage structure of society and its party system cannot be easily changed, the paper argues for a fundamental change in Chile's institutional system from a presidential form of government to a parliamentary form. A parliamentary system would provide the country with a more stable political regime precisely because it would be able to deal more effectively with the nation's competitive and polarized party system.

I. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CHILEAN PARTY SYSTEM:

The distinctiveness of the Chilean party system in Latin America has often been noted. According to Kalman Silvert, "Chile stands alone with respect not only to the number of its political parties, but in their national scope, their high degree of impersonalism, and the way in which they fit into three major ideological groups."²

Federico Gil adds that the Chilean parties seemed more akin to their European counterparts in sophistication and genuine pluralism than to those of other American republics.³ While catch-all parties predominate in the Western Hemisphere, Chilean parties are much closer to the mass-based European models. In no other country of North or South America did a party system evolve with three distinct ideological tendencies, each garnering between a fourth and a third of the vote, including a Marxist left and a political right that are both organizationally strong and electorally oriented.⁴

While the Center of the political spectrum has been occupied by parties whose fortunes have risen or fallen depending on the strength of the poles, for the most part the Center has been dominated by highly organized parties, which though cross-class, have advanced distinct ideological platforms devoid of populist or personalist characteristics typical of other countries in the region. And, when the Conservative Party lost its luster as the party of the Catholic faithful, a progressive Christian Democratic party -- with no exact parallel in Latin America -- gained national strength.

Indeed, although one can argue that the Chilean party system was more akin to a model European system, no individual European country, with the possible exception of the French Fourth Republic, embodied as many of the salient features of Chilean party politics.

The Chilean party system owes its basic characteristics to three fundamental generative cleavages which have found expression at different times in history: center-periphery, religious (state versus church) and class (worker versus employer).⁵

It is crucial, however, to stress that societal cleavages alone are not responsible for the characteristics of a given party system. Center-periphery, religious and class cleavages were also present in other countries, with very different results. What is determinative is not only the presence of particular societal divisions, but when and how they are expressed politically. This depends on the timing of the development of a particular cleavage and the nature of the institutional structures and political norms interacting with the political forces emerging from such cleavages. These structures and rules can in turn be transformed in response to the new political circumstances.⁶

What made the Chilean case distinctive was the way in which the first cleavage, the center-periphery one, was resolved early in the nineteenth century. As in the rest of Latin America, in Chile there was strong resistance to the development of a centralized secular state. This resistance stemmed from personal and family rivalries; from regional rivalries from regional economic interests such as mine owners in the northern provinces; and from conservative landed elites who were jealous of their autonomy and supported the preeminence of the church on educational and social issues. Though paying lip-service to some of the new republican political groups did not hesitate to resort to violence, notably in the civil wars of 1851 and 1859, in an attempt to advance their own interests and curb central authority.

While the emerging political class in Chile embarked successfully on a program of economic development and expansion of state authority over national territory and rival groups and institutions, it also managed to defeat all armed challenges and establish an effective hegemony over the military establishment. This was done by creating a powerful but politically subservient national guard as a counterforce to the regular army.

This meant that challengers to state authority were forced to advance their interests through ballots rather than bullets. The religious issue soon became the dominant one as anti-clerical state elites pushed for greater secularization, while the Conservative party and the Church sought to defend the temporal influence of religious elites. But, because opposition was centered in the legislature and not the battlefield, elements as diverse as the Conservatives and Radicals often made common cause in attempting to settle their grievances and advance their programs.

Of utmost importance for opposition elements was suffrage expansion and the curbing of official intervention in elections. As in Britain, the Chilean Conservatives, from their position of strength in the countryside, soon realized that they would stand to gain from suffrage expansion and so joined Radicals and ideological liberals in seeking that goal, despite the even more staunchly anti-clerical posture of these new allies than that of the government liberals. Indeed, as early as the 1860s Conservatives collaborated in Congress on common political strategy with members of the Radical party -- which managed to achieve parliamentary and cabinet representation decades before their counterparts did in Argentina.⁷

These efforts led to broad electoral reform in 1874, and to further democratization and local autonomy in the aftermath of the Civil War of 1891, which was the culmination of efforts among broad sectors of the political elites to curb arbitrary executive authority. The war ushered in a forty-year period of parliamentary rule in which congressional majorities determined the composition of cabinets, and parties strengthened their organizational roots in an attempt to expand their electoral appeal.

The rules of political contestation, with a central role for parliament in the policy process, emerged before universal manhood suffrage. Political participation was a gradual process which responded to the development, in Maurice Duverger's terms, of internally created parties which reached out of the legislative arena to build local and popular organizations for electoral advantage. Legislative and party politics also preceded development of a strong state bureaucracy. So individuals and interest groups expressed their demands through parties and legislative cliques, rather than directly with state agencies, or through corporatist schemes. This relationship reinforced the instrumental and even corrupt nature of the politics of the period, a politics based on log-rolling and distribution of national wealth to benefit constituents and supporters; and a system which often clashed with the ideological and principled declarations of parties and leaders. And yet, it had the effect of reinforcing democracy by making parties and representative networks the fulcrum of the political process, insulating Chilean politics from the statist, corporatist and populist tendencies of countries where the legislative arena was weak and public agencies developed through the tuition of the executive.⁸

It was in the institutional context of the Parliamentary Republic, one of highly competitive politics and expanding partisan organizations, that class cleavage became politically salient. The period of the Parliamentary Republic coincided with extraordinary changes in the levels of urbanization and industrialization, fueled by a booming nitrate economy. But while the Radical party sought to expand its base from urban professionals, teachers, shopkeepers, and skilled tradesmen (and in the South wheat farmers) and reach the growing industrial and mining proletariat, it failed to capture the full allegiance of these elements.

As Samuel Valenzuela has noted, this failure was due to the fact that the industrial climate at the time was not favorable to collective bargaining and worker unionization. Indeed, the response of the authorities was to repress the working class movement with extraordinary brutality. Moderate politicians such as the Radicals could not represent working class interests, as they did not have a leadership capable of standing up to employer and government repression.⁹

But while union rights were limited, political rights were far reaching. The new working class leaders, who drew their inspiration from European anarcho-syndicalism and socialism, soon discovered that while they could not press their grievances in the work place, they could organize and run for office. The first working class party of any note, the Democratic party (founded in 1887), elected its first candidate to Parliament in 1894. Other parties soon found that electoral pacts and alliances with the new working class group advanced their own standing vis-a-vis traditional rivals. The Democratic party allied with the Liberals and Radicals, and even structured electoral pacts with the Conservative party. This willingness to ally with traditional groups led to a split in the party's ranks in 1912 and to the formation of the Socialist Workers party, which in turn led to the founding of the Communist party in 1922.

Although the Communist party rejected alliances with traditional forces, after considerable struggle it opted for a strategy of pursuing its objectives through electoral gains, a strategy that would profoundly mark the character of Chilean communism until the breakdown of democracy in 1973. It obtained three senators as early as 1926. And in 1938, it allied with the Radicals and the newly formed Socialist party in the successful election of a Popular Front candidate. The party continued to make electoral gains despite efforts to ban it, until such efforts succeeded in 1948.

In sum, the competitive nature of a political system centered on the parliament permitted parties created outside the legislative arena to become incorporated into the political process.¹⁰ To the parties which developed in the mid-nineteenth century in response to the center-periphery and religious cleavages, but which continued to represent elite economic interests, parties were added representing the working class. Their presence on the political stage only redoubled the efforts of the traditional parties to expand their own organizational and recruitment efforts. In writing about Europe, Lipset and Rokkan have noted "it is difficult to see any significant exception to the rule that the parties which were able to establish mass organizations and entrench themselves in the local government structures before the final drive toward maximal mobilization have proved the most viable."¹¹ This applies to Chile as

well, as does their suggestion that the character of the party system remains remarkably similar to the one which becomes consolidated at the time of early suffrage expansion. If the system is competitive during suffrage expansion, the "support market" seems to become exhausted, leaving few openings for new movements, although as will be noted below, numerous parties attempted through the years, with little success, to become established. The only notable exception to this rule was the emergence of the Christian Democrats in the late 1950s as a major party -- a latter day version of the religious issue as Catholic voters and church officials broke with the Conservative Party in search of a Christian and reformist alternative to the Left.

II. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHILEAN PARTY SYSTEM AT MID-CENTURY:

The best starting point for describing the dynamics of the Chilean party system is a review of the broad electoral trends of the last half century. The year 1932 is a convenient starting point because Chile returned to constitutional stability in that year after an interlude in which several presidents resigned from office unable to cope with political and economic crises; and in which Chile experienced direct military involvement in politics on two separate occasions for several months each.

The 1930s in Chile culminated with the election of the Popular Front and the inauguration of a series of left-of-center governments which would last until 1952, when Carlos Ibañez's populist appeals presented the traditional party system with a brief, though significant, challenge. His government would be followed in succession by a conservative administration under Jorge Alessandri (1958-64), a reformist government under Eduardo Frei (1964-1970) and the leftist government of Salvador Allende (1970-73).

Table 1 gives an overview of the overall voting trends in Chile for all Chilean parties receiving more than 5% of the vote in elections to the Chamber of Deputies from 1937 to 1973. In the 1930s and 1940s the parties of the Right had the largest plurality of support, with about 40% of the electorate. Unlike their French and German counterparts, and more like the Conservatives in Britain, the Chilean Right maintained a strong electoral base and long resisted fragmentation.¹²

In the 1950s and 1960s, however, rightist support began to erode and support for the left increased steadily. Center parties obtained between thirty and forty percent, with the notable exception of the 1965 congressional election, when the Christian Democrats alone obtained 42.3% of the vote, the highest total for an individual party in modern Chilean politics.

It is noteworthy, however, that as early as 1941 -- the first congressional election after the inauguration of the Popular Front government of Radicals, Communists and Socialists in 1938 -- the Left outdistanced both the Center and Right; obtaining 34% of the vote. The Communist party in particular made notable gains throughout the 1940s, at times at the expense of its coalition partners, attaining impressive victories in the 1947 local races.

Then, the picture changed radically. Communist success, splits in the government coalition and the onset of the Cold War led to the banning of the Communist party in 1948, a ban which would last ten years. In 1949, leftist support dropped to 9.4%, its lowest level for the period. The Left, however, gradually regained its electoral strength, though it would not again attain its 1941 strength until the tumultuous Popular Unity years of Allende.

During this period significant changes took place in the Center of the political spectrum. The Radical party dominated Chilean politics throughout the 1930s and 40s. By the early 1950s, however, the citizenry demanded changes, deserting the Radicals and other traditional parties for the populist appeals of former president Carlos Ibañez and a host of smaller and regional parties. The Radicals never fully recovered even though Ibañez's movement proved ephemeral. They were largely replaced by the Christian Democrats who grew at both their expense and of the Right. Between 1961 and 1973 (the last congressional election) the Right dropped from 38.4% of the vote to 21.1%, and the Radicals from 21.4% to 3.6%. The Christian Democrats went from 16.1% to 28.5%, while the parties of the Left increased their share of the vote from 22.1% to 34.6% -- an all time high.

While national totals reveal the importance of these shifts, it is important to stress that they were far reaching, affecting large as well as small communities in urban and rural areas across the nation. A detailed analysis by commune, focusing on municipal elections, which often revolved much more around local issues, confirms a similar pattern. According to Table 2, the National party lost an average of 14.8% of the vote, while the Radicals lost an average of 16.2%. By contrast the Christian Democrats saw their fortunes rise by 14.2%, while the Communist and Socialist vote increased 6.9% and 7.3% respectively. Minor parties increased their vote by an average of 2.7%. Even more dramatic is the fact that these parties increased their vote in over two thirds of Chilean communes, whereas the Radicals and Nationals lost an average of 17.8% and 16.7% in 268 and 263 communes respectively. In high-gaining communes (above the national mean) the Communists gained 18.9% in 89 communes, the Socialists 20.4% in 86 communes and the Christian Democrats 25% in 112 communes. The trend in local elections showed erosion of the Right in favor of Left and Christian Democrats -- even if in presidential elections the shift did not appear that great, and Allende won a smaller percentage of the vote in 1970 than he did in 1964.

This brief overview of trends in party support in Chile reveals two basic characteristics of Chilean party politics: its high degree of competitiveness and its marked polarization.

Party Competition:

The most striking characteristic of the Chilean party system was its competitiveness. There were no giants in Chilean party politics, no party or tendency with a clear majority. In the period 1932 to 1973, 45 different parties managed to elect at least one representative to the lower house of parliament. Of these, 23 parties were successful in only one election, seven achieved representation in two successive elections,

and four in three. Eleven parties were able to make use of Chile's modified D'Hont electoral system to elect their candidates for office for more than three terms.

Table 3 indicates that the number of parties was highest at times of political crisis, such as in the aftermath of the Depression and in the early 1950s, when Ibañez challenged the traditional parties with his populist appeals. Rae and Laakso and Taagepera's fractionalization indices were highest in 1932 and 1952, when 17 and 18 parties obtained parliamentary representation respectively. By the 1960s the number of parties electing candidates to office had declined substantially as the four large historical parties and the Christian Democrats consolidated their position. As the table shows, the five largest parties in Chile have in fact always commanded the lion's share of the electorate and an even greater proportion of the congressional seats.

In an examination of party fractionalization in 27 "stable democracies" in the period 1945-1973, Giovanni Sartori notes that Chile ranks third on that measure after Finland and Switzerland with the French Fourth Republic, the Netherlands and Israel close behind. Uruguay, the only other Latin American country in the sample, ranked 19th.¹⁴

Fractionalization in Chile was also ubiquitous at all levels -- not simply an artifact of national aggregates or of voting patterns in Santiago and other large urban areas, where over a third of the population is concentrated. Multiple regression analysis, reported in Table 4, reveals that neither size nor degree of urbanization explains the level of political fractionalization. Nor do variables such as the percentage of the population employed in mining or agriculture, or the percentage of the population in working or middle class categories, explain any of the variance in fractionalization. What is more, party competition in Chile was as intense in national elections as it was in local ones, a phenomenon which differentiates Chile from France, where local elections fought on local issues led to considerably less fractionalization than elections for the National Assembly fought on national issues. Table 5 confirms this assertion by comparing an index of party competition for both kinds of elections, by commune, in Chile and in France. The same table shows that party competition was uniformly high in all of Chile's regions in both elections, and that party competition in local elections exceeded the level of party competition in national elections in four out of eight regions of the country.¹⁵

Party Polarization:

Sartori has eloquently argued, however, that fractionalization, or degree of competitiveness, while amenable to easy quantification, is not enough to capture the most important characteristic of a multiparty system. Several countries such as Switzerland, Israel, the Netherlands and Denmark have levels of fractionalization comparable to Chile's. However, in those countries the ideological distance between parties is not as great, clearly underscoring the fact that fractionalization is independent of polarization. Chile, in Sartori's terms, can be classified along with Finland, Italy and the French Fourth Republic as one of the most polarized

party systems in the world because of its clearly defined Right and Left poles, consisting of parties with strongly diverging policy objectives including sharp differences on the very nature of the regime.¹⁶ Though it must be stressed again that Chile's Communist party opted early on for an electoral and not an insurrecting route to power.

As with party competition, this ideological distance is not an artifact of national totals, it is a reflection of politically homogenous geographical areas expressing different political preferences leading to a sharply different national totals. In any given election the degree of polarization is obviously due to the extent to which both Left and Right found support, and the extent to which the center parties managed to hold their own. This relationship can be seen during the 1960s by examining the number of communes which gave more support to both the Right and the Left than those parties obtain in the 1965 congressional election, the least polarized of the decade. As Table 6 shows, in 1961 102 communes, or 35% of the total, were highly polarized with electoral support for both Left and Right of over 30%. The number of such polarized communes dropped to 77 in 1969 (27%) as the Christian Democrats managed to maintain a large average vote. But by 1973, polarization increased sharply, with over half of all communes registering high votes for both Right and Left. In the 1973 congressional elections the Center allied with the Right to form the Confederación Democrática (CODE) in opposition to the Popular Unity coalition (U.P.). Each side drew up jurist slates, making the complete polarization of Chilean politics.

The Heterogenous Base of Party Support:

To the dimensions of competitiveness and polarization, we can add a third factor, not readily discernable from voting trends over time. Though the contemporary Chilean party system was marked by a strong ideological debate revolving around class issues, it would be a mistake to assume that the electoral bases of the parties were defined strictly by class lines.¹⁷

It is clear that the parties of the Left, and particularly the Communists, obtained much of their support from working class elements, particularly miners and industrial workers. Parties on the Right and Center clearly garnered more votes from upper and middle class individuals -- though voting support for these parties included large percentages of working class people. For the Right, rural workers were a safer voting block, though the Radicals in some areas of the country had substantial rural support. Chart 1 captures some of these associations by describing the characteristics of those communes where Chilean parties obtained their highest support (upper 25%). Communes with high Communist votes were much more likely to be mining communes than national ones, with the Socialist party gaining more support in mining areas than the Radicals and Christian Democrats in that order. A less stark and yet still clear association can be observed with the working class characteristics of communes. Communes with high Communist and Socialist vote were characterized by higher industrial working class population. Socialists communes had slightly higher working class populations than those where the Christian Democrats did well, while those communes where the Radicals and Nationals

did well had approximately the same percentage of working class elements. By contrast, in communes where the Communist party did best, the percentage of the population active in agriculture was substantially lower than in communes where the Nationals did well. The other parties, including the Socialists, however, seemed to do well in communes with approximately the same rural vote. Multiple regression analysis using aggregate data confirms these trends, but also makes clear that working class occupational categories did not explain a substantial amount of the variance in party vote for any party, with the exception of the Communists, whose vote was highly correlated with the incidence of mining population. Table 7 summarizes some of these findings.

Survey research supports the findings that there was a substantial cross class base of support for Chilean parties. As Table 8 indicates, 31% of a sample of Santiago citizens identified themselves as rightists, while 24.5% thought of themselves as leftists. These percentages are close to the 30% and 22% figures respectively for voting in the next congressional election in 1961 (See Table 1 above). The survey, conducted in 1958, demonstrates that the ten year-ban on the Communist party had little effect on voting preferences. Where the survey findings differ with electoral results is on identification with the center. In 1961 Center parties received 44.3% of the vote, whereas only 17.8% of the respondents in 1958 identified themselves as centrists. These findings may reflect a reluctance, particularly in the working class categories, to make an ideological identification. 25% of the sample chose not to answer the question. They also support Sartori's contention that in a highly polarized system, the Center is weak, more a reflection of the exclusions from the two extremes than a positive center tendency. The Center is the recipient of votes from weak identifiers or from voters defecting from right or left parties. This was particularly so in 1958 when Ibañez's center coalition had all but disappeared, but new center parties -- notably the Christian Democrats -- had not as yet emerged to replace it.

On the other hand Table 8 also shows that the Right as well as the Left received strong support from working class groups in Chile. Thus, while 31.1% of the working class identified with the Left, 29.4% identified with the Right. In the upper class category no respondents expressed preference for the Left. However, 18.2% of the upper middle class respondents chose the Left, as opposed to 33% who chose the Right. Subsequent surveys, as well as aggregate data analysis, confirmed that distribution of Left-Right support remained surprisingly stable up through the election of Salvador Allende.¹⁸

The heterogeneous base of support was due in part to the strong appeal to voters on clientelistic and personalistic lines. The Right, for example, continued to draw important support from rural workers and people engaged in service occupations, based on these traditional ties. But heterogeneous support was also due to the continued vitality of the other generative cleavage of Chilean party politics -- the religious cleavage -- years after the major issues of Church and state had been resolved.

Voters with strong religious identification, regardless of class station, were more likely to vote conservative, and later Christian

Democrat, than voters with more secular orientations. Since women were more likely to be religious, women voters in particular (as in many European countries) voted for the Right and the Christian Democrats. By contrast, protestant voters and voters with weak religious commitments in different socio-economic strata were far more likely to turn to the centrist Radicals or to the Left.¹⁹

The rise of the Christian Democrats with their strongly reformist appeal clearly undermined the ability of the Left to make further inroads among the more Catholic elements of the working class. But it also undermined the rightist parties by appealing to their working class voters, particularly in rural areas. The severe loss of support that the historic Liberals and Conservatives experienced in the early 1960s led them to merge into a new party, the National Party -- along with a few more minor nationalist groups. The joining together of these parties, which had been separated primarily by the religious question, thrust the new party's concern for class issues to the fore, giving the Christian Democrats a greater monopoly over devout Catholics. This trend was supported by internal changes in the church, which shifted away from a close identification with the Conservative party as late as the 1950s. In the face of what it perceived as a growing challenge from the Marxist left, the party felt it had to become more progressive.

Both of the generative cleavages (worker-employer and secular-religious) were expressed politically over several generations through repeated elections. These elections, which were akin to a national sport, helped to structure veritable "political subcultures" around each of the parties. On the street, in stores, in the workplace, on trains, in local clubs, unions, Catholic action organizations, Masonic leagues, and countless other groups and associations, Chileans of all walks of life lived and breathed party politics. Over the years, parties structured a host of organizations, including the famous Radical and Liberal clubs and party-affiliated sports organizations, which served as much as social organizations as they did political ones.

In turn, political affiliations were reinforced by other societal reference groups. Thus socialist and radical upper and middle level leaders from the Socialist and Radical parties tended to go to public high schools and send their children to state universities or the University of Concepción -- while conservatives and Christian Democrats were more likely to be educated in parochial schools and Catholic universities. Radical and Socialist political elites were much more likely to come from middle class extraction and have "Chilean" names -- while leaders of the Right and the Christian Democrats were more likely to come from professional families and have "foreign" names, although Jews were more likely to achieve leadership positions in the parties of the Left, including the Communist party. Indeed, even when significant sectors of the Christian Democratic party broke away and veered to the Left, they formed new leftist parties and did not merge with the older "secular" ones. Even today, The leadership of these small parties is quite distinct in terms of background from the leadership of the Socialist or Communist parties.

The Communist party, in particular, developed its own very distinct "subculture," one clearly reinforced by years of underground activity.

More than other Chilean parties, the Communists developed a genuine working class leadership, recruited primarily from unions and some popular organizations. Secondary associations created by the party, along with newspapers, magazines, and even folk songs and artistic expressions (embodied in artists and poets such as Violeta Parra and Pablo Neruda) helped to consolidate a strong sense of community and purpose which transcended the mere quest for votes.

This does not imply that ideological considerations were unimportant. To the contrary, they were very salient, helping to define a distinct world view for militants and followers. Ideology, however, was interwoven with cultural, class and religious differences. These factors combined to cement distinct party identities, which were passed on through the generations, and further reinforced by a succession of meaningful electoral contests at the center of national life. Party identification was shared most strongly by militants, but they extended into the wider community of supporters and voters as well.

Though powerful, party identification was not immutable. In the late 1930s, it was the youth wing of the Conservative party that led to the creation of the Falange (later the Christian Democrats), a party which in turn saw much of its youth leave its ranks to create the Christian left parties in the 1960s. At the same time, the Socialist party was a major beneficiary of the disillusionment with the Radicals among middle class elements coming from Chile's secular tradition. These defections, however, did not change the broad lines of Chile's political landscape; rather, they reinforced them.²⁰

It is the continued existence of these subcultures -- Radical, Socialist, Communist, Christian left or right -- which help explain much of the underlying stability of Chilean voting behavior. An analysis of the intercorrelation of party vote across several elections in the 1960s shows that even in a period of significant electoral realignment, there was underlying stability in voting patterns. As Table 9 shows, the Communists and Conservatives had the highest degree of interparty stability, with very high correlation coefficients between the municipal election of the Alessandri years and the congressional election of the Allende years -- two dramatically different periods in Chilean history separated by years of significant change. The Socialist party followed with somewhat lower correlation coefficients, while the two center parties showed the lowest level of inter-party stability, with one declining and the other gaining dramatically in this period.

The Party System and the Political Process:²¹

A party system cannot be understood with sole reference to specific parties -- their number, ideological distance and bases of support. Any party system shapes and is shaped by the institutional context in which it operates -- the formal rules and procedures as well as the informal practices which are characteristic of all political systems. We thus can distinguish between two distinct levels: the party system in the electorate and the party system in the decision making process.

Giovanni Sartori, drawing on his studies of Italian politics, has attempted to clarify the interplay of both levels in multiparty polarized systems.²² He argues that in a highly polarized context, with a clearly defined Right and Left commanding substantial percentages of the electorate, the principal drive of the political system will be centrifugal. This means that a polarized system has a tendency to move toward the extremes; or, toward greater divisions in society. Unlike political systems which have avoided the emergence of clearly opposing partisan tendencies, a polarized party system has no strong centripetal drive; no dominant centrist consensus. Ironically, polarized systems do have Center poles occupied by one or more parties. However, Sartori argues, under such circumstances the Center does not represent a significant political tendency in its own right, but tends to be composed of fragments emanating from both the Left and Right poles. Sartori notes that the "center is mainly a feedback of the centrifugal drives which predominate in the system" and is "more negative convergence, a sum of exclusions, than a positive agency of instigation."²³

Sartori's analysis is extremely helpful in understanding the Chilean case, because it explains the repeated surge of centrist movements in Chilean politics which rose at the expense of both Right and Left. Since these centrist movements only minimally represented a viable centrist tendency and were in fact primarily reflections of the erosion of the two extreme poles, they crumbled, only to make way for new centrist coalitions. The instability of centrist movements in turn, contributed to the difficulties in building common public policies because centrist consensus at the decision-making level was so fragile. The erosion of centrist consensus accelerated dramatically during the Allende years and contributed to the crisis culminating in regime breakdown.

However, since the impact of particular party system characteristics is dependent on the nature of the institutional structures, it is crucial to stress that a polarized party system affected Chile's presidential system differently than it did the Italian parliamentary regime Sartori studied. Despite competitiveness, polarization and the instability of centrist options, the government in Chile was not in danger of "falling" if it lost majority support in the legislature. By the same token, coalitions, which were formed in the legislature after a parliamentary election in Italy, had to be structured before the presidential election in Chile. No single party or tendency was capable of winning the presidency on its own. Candidates of the Center were elected with support from the Left in the presidential elections of 1938, 1942 and 1946; with support from the Right in 1964; and with support from both sides in 1932 and 1952. Only on two occasions during that period did the presidency go to a candidate representing the Right or Left; in 1958, when independent Jorge Alessandri was elected with support of the Right, and in 1970 when socialist Salvador Allende was elected. In both cases the poles rejected compromise and the parties of the Center mistakenly thought they would succeed on their own. As will be noted below, the selection of a candidate strongly influenced by maximalist tendencies on one side of the political spectrum would have serious consequences for institutional stability.

Since preelection coalitions were constituted primarily for electoral reasons, in an atmosphere of considerable political uncertainty, they

tended to disintegrate after a few months of the new administration. Ideological disputes were often at the root of coalition changes, as partisans of one formula would resist the proposals of other partisans. But narrow political considerations were also important. The president could not succeed himself, and it soon became apparent to the leadership of other parties in his own coalition that they could best improve their fortunes in succeeding municipal and congressional elections by disassociating themselves from the difficulties of incumbency in a society fraught with economic problems. For in the final analysis, only by proving electoral strength in subsequent elections in which parties ran on their own could a party demonstrate its value to future presidential coalitions.

Elections were characterized by the politics of outbidding, since the fate of governments did not hang on a lost vote. Parties went out of their way to criticize incumbents and would seize on every inflationary increase, every incident of police repression, every allegation of partisan or corrupt practice in an effort to pave the way for a better showing at the polls. The rhetoric of the party controlled press and of the skilled orators of the party leadership occasionally reached frenzied proportions. In such an atmosphere, centrist parties with different ideological currents or pragmatic postures, who shifted from support to opposition and then again to support for an incumbent, suffered politically.

Erosion of preelection coalitions inevitably led to new temporary alliances with parties and groups willing to provide congressional and general political support to the executive in exchange for presidential concessions. A president was forced to seek these out, because he was not able to dissolve the legislature in the case of an impasse. In concrete terms, this meant the adjustment of the presidential cabinet to reflect the new working alliances not only in the Chamber of Deputies, but also in a Senate which retained substantial powers. Although Chile had no formal prime minister like the French Fifth Republic, the Minister of the Interior, as head of the cabinet, was expected to be responsive to the realities of political alignments, vital not only for the president's program but for the continued administration of the country.²⁴

With the 1925 Constitution, ministers were no longer held responsible to passing majorities in either House of Parliament. However, Congress still retained the right to impeach ministers, and most contemporary presidents repeatedly faced impeachment proceedings designed to keep the presidential coalition honest and congressional opposition happy. This guaranteed that ministerial appointments would be drawn from individuals with impeccable party ties.

Indeed, the parties further assured their influence by requiring that candidates nominated for cabinet posts be given official party permission (pase) to serve in office. Presidents could not simply appoint militants from various party organizations; they had to actively bargain with party central committees to gain their consent. In critical moments, in order to overcome political stalemates, presidents often sought prestigious non-partisan technocrats or military officers to fill ministerial positions -- a practice to which Salvador Allende also resorted -- with ominous results.

Table 10 summarizes the coalition patterns in the last five constitutional governments in Chile. In most, coalition agreements fell apart mid-way through a presidential term requiring new coalition arrangements. As the table notes, only in the 1961-63 period did a president have a majority coalition, meaning that he still had to depend on additional support for key measures. Cabinets, were highly unstable. An analysis of cabinet turnover for all presidential terms from 1932 to 1973, reported in Table 11, shows that with the exception of the Alessandri administration -- which enjoyed majority support in the legislature, and the Frei administration -- which attempted to govern without coalition support because of its majority support in the Chamber, cabinets lasted for an average of less than one year and individual cabinet members held office for only a few months.

In a real sense, because of the competitiveness and polarization of the party system, the effort to return Chile to a presidential form of government with the 1925 Constitution failed. The Chilean system was a semi-presidential one, without the formal guarantees provided by parliamentary rules and procedures aimed at generating executive authority from majority support. Presidents had continually to engineer working coalitions in order to survive, and were repeatedly frustrated by the semblance of instability and permanent crisis that this bargaining process gave Chilean politics.²⁵ It is no accident that at one time or another, most recent Chilean presidents extolled the example of President Balmaceda who, in 1891, committed suicide rather than give into the demands of congressional parties.

And yet, this description of the competitive and polarized party system of Chilean politics captures only a part of the overall picture. While the collapse of party agreements, the censure of ministers and the sharp disagreement over major policy issues captured the headlines, the vast majority of Chilean political transactions were characterized by compromise, give and take, and a profound respect for the institutions and procedures of constitutional democracy. Indeed, Chilean democracy would not have lasted as long as it did had it not been for the fact that the political system was capable of structuring working arrangements that responded to the demands placed on it by highly mobilized and competitive political forces.

Thus, over the years agreements were structured which permitted the implementation of such far-reaching policies as state-sponsored industrial development, national educational welfare and health care systems, a university system with few parallels on the continent, an elaborate collective bargaining structure, price control and wage readjustment mechanisms, agrarian reform, and copper nationalization. All of these measures were the product not only of executive initiative, but of the efforts of innumerable working groups which cut across the party spectrum. Some were ad-hoc and informal; many others were mandated by law and included such bodies as the boards of government agencies and the all-important commissions of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, where fundamental legislation was hammered out.

But working relationships also revolved around more mundane, if no less important matters. Party leaders and congressmen from particular regions or provinces often joined hands, regardless of party affiliation,

in pressing for initiatives of benefit to constituents -- a new road, a dam, a special piece of legislation earmarking revenues for development projects or aimed at proclaiming a special holiday for a favorite son. Indeed, all party leaders, elected and non-elected, spent most of their time attempting to respond to demands from groups and individuals for such things as pensions for widows, jobs for school teachers, social security benefits for a trade-group, wage readjustments for union groups etc. Much of the work involved serving as intermediaries before government agencies too overburdened to respond effectively to the public according to universalistic criteria.

Chilean party politics was thus characterized not only by sharp disagreements in ideology and program, but by the structuring of compromise and cooperation to achieve joint policy objectives and respond to demands from constituents, both organized and unorganized. This pattern of political give-and-take can be attributed to three factors which are mutually reinforcing: the imperatives of electoral politics, the existence of a pragmatic center, and the viability of representative institutional arenas for decision making.

The Chilean party system was characterized by relatively cohesive and highly ideological parties. But it must be remembered that their principal function was to participate in the country's continuous stream of elections. Municipal, congressional and presidential elections, all held in separate years, forced the parties to devote the bulk of their energies to candidate selection and electoral campaigning. Electoral success, in a country where elections had been held for generations, was as valued an objective as ideological purity. This was the case not only because all parties sought to gain elected representatives, but also because elections helped to define the value of a party for coalition formation.

Elections were also instrumental in determining the internal correlation of forces within parties. Elected representatives invariably carried a great deal of weight in party circles, and the ability of a particular faction to obtain the largest number of officials strengthened its claim in party caucuses and congresses.

Chile's proportional representation system only reinforced the importance of elections for internal party competition and for cross-party bargaining. The lack of cumulative voting meant that while each party presented a list with up to as many candidates as there were seats, voters could vote for only one of those candidates. The total vote for all candidates on each list was used to decide how many seats a particular party could fill. This effectively meant that candidates were running not only against rivals on opposition lists, but against their own correligionists. Before the electoral reforms of 1958, the order of placement on the list, decided by party officials before the election, determined which candidates were elected -- meaning that a candidate lower down on the list might not be seated even if he gained a greater number of votes. His success, however, put pressure on party leaders to take him or his faction into greater account in subsequent contests. After the 1958 reforms, the candidates who gained the largest number of votes were seated -- with the number being determined by the strength of the ticket,

turning the election simultaneously into an intra-party primary and a general election.²⁶

Bargaining, however, went on historically within parties but across parties. Before 1958 joint lists made up of very disparate parties were not uncommon, as parties sought to maximize their voting success in different areas. After 1958, joint lists were outlawed, so parties made regional and even national pacts to support each other's lists in areas of mutual strength by not presenting competing lists. While most pacts were structured by parties that were close to one another in ideological distance, it was not uncommon to find pacts that spanned the full length of the spectrum. In addition, voters often found that their votes for a particular candidate on a list might lead the seating of a candidate of a completely different party or ideological tendency, in a pattern strikingly similar to that followed in Uruguay under the double simultaneous vote system.

The importance of the electoral process inevitably meant that parties had to pay primary attention to particularistic and clientelistic criteria as they reached beyond the faithful to party identifiers and potential voters. The multiple member district system and the large number of parties meant that voters had to choose from a large number of candidates. It also meant, however, that congressional candidates could be elected with a relatively small number of voters. The average number of voters per candidate in the 1969 congressional election, for instance, was 4,200; 3,700 if the Santiago area is excluded. This only reinforced the importance of direct personal appeals. Candidates for congressional seats in larger communities made use of lower level brokers such as municipal councilmen in consolidating their own voting strength. Local brokers, in return, expected help in delivering concrete benefits to their own supporters. These benefits could only be derived from the maintenance of good contacts in the capital, many of which crossed party lines. The centralization of government structures and decision making, as well as the scarcity of resources in Chile's inflationary economy only reinforced the importance of these brokerage roles.

Brokerage roles would have been meaningless, however, had elected representatives not had access to resources. The second factor which reinforced a pragmatic dimension in Chilean party politics was the existence of viable representative institutions with significant policy making roles. The foremost among these was the Chilean Congress. The Congress was the locus of compromises on major legislation, as well as the key arena for processing such important matters as budget legislation and legislation on wage readjustments, perhaps the most crucial public policy measure in an inflationary economy. Congress' law making, budgetary, and investigatory powers provided the clout for cross-party agreements, as well as the influence for individual congressmen to make use of their position to attend to the constituency related duties which were fundamental for reelection. The Chilean Congress was the foremost arena for expression of major policy positions and disagreements; it was also the fundamental locus for fusing divergent objectives into common public policies.

This aggregation process -- the structuring of broad coalitions as well as alliances on particular measures -- was, in turn, made possible by a third feature of Chilean politics alluded to earlier. Compromise and accommodation, however, would not have been possible without the flexibility provided by center parties, notably the Radical party, which inherited the role of the nineteenth century Liberals as the fulcrum of coalition politics. The fact that presidents were, for the most part, members of centrist parties, or attempted to project an above-parties posture (like Jorge Alessandri or Carlos Ibañez), only helped to counteract the centrifugal tendencies of the party system and reinforce the bridging mechanisms of Chilean politics.

The literature on political parties has distinguished between mass-based parties, primarily oriented toward issues and policy goals and more concerned with ideological purity and the mobilization of militants than capturing elections; and catch-all parties, with little ideological coherence, whose sole purpose is to structure agreements to win elections and allocate tangible rewards to followers.²⁷

In Chile, ideological self-definition has been the most salient characteristic of the country's party system. But, it would be mistaken to hold that electoral orientations and clientelistic criteria have been absent. Though some parties took more seriously the ideological element, party doctrine was important to all political organizations. As noted earlier, even the Chilean Communist party defined as its principal objective the capturing of meaningful public posts through the electoral process. Chilean party politics survived for generations as a complex, often contradictory mixture of both dimensions.

III. REGIME BREAKDOWN: THE ROLE AND FATE OF THE PARTY SYSTEM

Did the breakdown of Chilean democracy in 1973 result from the structural characteristics of the Chilean party system? Much of the contemporary discussion in Chilean official circles about the future of the party system is based on such an assumption. Because it is assumed that the breakdown was the inevitable result of the physiognomy of the party system, Chilean authorities have concluded that only a dramatic change in the competitive and polarized party system will ensure a stable democratic future and prevent another regime collapse. Such a change, which would be engineered with new electoral and party rules, would aim at creating a two or three-party system of constituency-oriented parties without strong ideological contrasts; a party system that would be the polar opposite of Chile's historical party system.²⁸

The difficulty with this argument is that its fundamental premise is highly questionable. Comparative evidence, as well as evidence from the Chilean case, suggest that there is little if any direct relationship between the nature of the party system per se and the incidence of regime breakdown. And, regardless of whether such a relationship can be established, it is equally questionable whether changes in electoral and party laws would yield a different party system.

In this section we will briefly examine the general comparative evidence, followed by a discussion of the role of parties and the party system in the Chilean breakdown. The paper will conclude with a consideration of the fate of the party system under the Junta and its future prospects.

A. The Comparative Evidence:

The view that multiparty systems are less stable or effective than two party systems has been effectively challenged by several authors. In particular, the inclusion of smaller European democracies, especially the Scandinavian and Benelux countries, in comparative studies of European regimes has demonstrated that multiparty systems are associated with successful democracies.²⁹ Indeed, multiparty systems are the norm among stable democracies, while two party systems are clearly the exception.

As Sartori has argued, it appears the fundamental test for stability revolves not so much on the number of parties, but on the extent of polarization in the party system, i.e. the presence of large anti-system or extremist parties which garner substantial electoral support. Polarized party systems face grave challenges and often are unable to surmount them -- witness the fate of the Weimar Republic, the Spanish Republic, the French Fourth Republic and Chile.³⁰

While empirical studies have suggested that party systems with significant "extremist parties" are more likely to experience reduced cabinet durability and greater executive instability, it does not follow that polarized multiparty systems are more prone to regime breakdown.³¹ Or, to put it another way, it simply is not the case that countries with catch-all, non-ideological parties are more likely to be stable democracies and avoid regime breakdown. G. Bingham Powell, after examining the stability of a wide range of regimes, underscores this point by noting that "once one controls for level of economic development, the type of party system shows no relationship to regime durability or overthrow." If anything, he adds, regime breakdowns were more likely to occur in "non-extremist party systems" of the "aggregative majority" type (such as those found in the United States, Canada, the Phillipines and Turkey) than in "extremist party" systems with strong anti-system parties (such as Japan, Denmark, Finland, Italy and Chile).³²

Indeed, non-ideological catch-all party systems are the norm in Latin America. And yet, as noted in the introduction, only one or two other countries on the continent have had as strong a record of democratic rule as did Chile. Multi-party countries like Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil have been characterized by their diffuse, clientelistic parties -- but their record of democratic continuity has been decidedly mixed. And, two-party or one-party dominant systems with ideologically centrist orientations have not fared too much better. The Colombian case illustrates the extent to which party competition can lead to extraordinary violence and breakdown even in the absence of a multiparty polarized system, defined in ideological terms. In Argentina a one-party-dominant system was not capable of structuring a governing consensus -- but instead led to extreme praetorianism.³³

Uruguay is the best comparative case in Latin America for the purpose of dispelling the notion that the nature of the party system is directly related to democratic breakdown. Like Chile, Uruguay established one of the longest lasting democratic regimes in the Third World. But unlike Chile, its party system consisted of two loosely structured clientelistic parties, with moderate policy objectives, capable in principle of structuring a governing consensus. And yet, Uruguayan democracy broke down in 1973, the same year of the Chilean military coup.

It is noteworthy that observers and political leaders in Uruguay have also attempted to attribute that country's political breakdown to its party system. By contrast with their Chilean counterparts however, they find fault with precisely those features of the Uruguayan system which Chileans in official circles are extolling for their country. Thus, Uruguayan parties are criticized for forcing into a two-party mold a range of different ideological viewpoints better expressed in a multiparty system. And Uruguayan parties are seen as too clientelistic and diffuse, too concerned with electoral objectives and a willingness to compromise at the expense of principle.³⁴

If the regime breakdown in Chile and Uruguay resulted from party system features, and the party systems were mirror opposites of each other, how credible is an explanation which draws on party system characteristics per se in explaining regime crisis? The comparative evidence strongly suggests that this is an instance of the logical fallacy of non causa pro causa, mistaking what is not the cause of a given event for its real cause. Indeed, it comes quite close to falling victim to a variant of this fallacy, the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy-- where it is assumed that because a certain phenomenon (the nature of the party system) preceded a subsequent phenomenon (regime breakdown), the former necessarily caused the latter.

It is very important to underscore, however, that if the particular structure of a party system is not in itself the cause of regime breakdown, this should not be taken to mean that party system variables may not play a role -- even a central one -- in the crises of democratic regimes. In both Uruguay and Chile, the party leadership bore a heavy responsibility for the final outcome and parties often sought to accommodate narrow group stakes over broader regime stakes. And in both cases, features of the party system, such as clientelism or polarization, provided important constraints on the room for maneuver. But in both cases, the outcome was not inevitable -- there was room for regime-saving choices. The structure of the party system did not inevitably lead to regime breakdown. Party system variables, affected in different ways in different party systems, were contributory and maybe even necessary conditions to regime breakdown; they were not, however, sufficient ones.

B. Parties and the Chilean Breakdown:

As noted above, in the description of the salient characteristics of the Chilean party system, a party system is more than the sum of individual parties, their degree of coherence, ideological distance and the mobilization of followers in electoral contests. It also involves the complex interplay of parties in the broader political system, an interplay which is conditioned

by formal rules and structures as much as it is by informal practices and agreements. Chile's polarized multiparty system cannot be understood without reference to the system of bargaining and accommodation which took place in arenas ranging from local elections to the national legislature within the context of a presidential system.

Several developments led to the progressive erosion of Chile's system of accommodation, thus, given the peculiarities of the country's institutional as well as party system, contributing to an increase in the regime's fragility.³⁵

Some of these developments include reforms enacted to institute greater efficiency and rationality in politics and decision making. Thus, in 1958, a coalition of the center and left enacted a series of electoral reforms among which was the abolition of joint lists. This reform ended the long established system of political pacts -- a system which permitted parties of opposing ideological persuasions to structure agreements of mutual electoral benefit. While it succeeded in making pre-electoral arrangements less "political," it eliminated an opportunity for cross-party bargaining.

More important were reforms aimed at curbing some of the power of Congress in the guise of strengthening executive authority to deal with Chile's chronic economic troubles. Among these were those dealing with executive control of the budgetary process, including the creation of a Budget Bureau in 1959 and subsequent restriction of congressional prerogatives in the allocation of fiscal resources. Indeed, under the Christian Democratic administration (1964-70), Congress was restricted from allocating funds for particular projects -- a traditional source of patronage and an important instance of log-rolling.

The most serious blow to congressional authority came with the constitutional reforms enacted by a Christian Democratic and rightist coalition in 1970. Among other provisions, the reforms prohibited amendments not germane to a given piece of legislation and sanctioned extensive use of executive decrees to implement programs approved by the legislature in only very general terms. It also barred the Congress from dealing with all matters having to do with social security, salary adjustments, pensions, etc. in the private and public sectors -- the heart of legislative bargaining.³⁶

Ironically, the constitutional reformers assumed that they would easily win the presidency in 1970. Instead, as an opposition force they inherited a weak legislature with essentially negative powers while providing the Left with an executive less compelled than ever before to seek compromise and accommodation with legislative elites. In the name of political efficiency, they had reduced the importance of the principal arena of accommodation, accentuating the confrontational quality of Chile's polarized party system.

These changes in the rules of the game coincide with, and indeed are partly explained by, other far reaching changes in Chilean politics, the most notable of which was the rise in the 1960s of a new center party with a markedly different political style. Unlike its predecessors, the

pragmatic Radicals, the Chilean Christian Democrats conceived of themselves as a new absolute majority force in Chilean politics -- a middle way between Marxism and reaction -- capable of capturing the allegiance of the electorate from both sides of the political divide.

The Christian Democrats succeeded in capturing the presidency in 1964 in a coalition arrangement with the Right, and the following year managed the most impressive showing of any single Chilean party in modern history.

Once in office and heartened by their electoral success, the Christian Democrats sought to implement a far-reaching program by disdaining the traditional give-and-take of Chilean politics, thereby antagonizing all opposition elements -- Left, Right and Center. They were particularly hard on the centrist Radicals, refusing overtures for collaboration and dismissing or bypassing Radical functionaries in the bureaucracy. While they succeeded in displacing the Radicals as Chile's center party, unlike the Radicals, they were unwilling to tolerate clientelistic and logrolling politics or to serve as an effective mediator or bridge across parties and groups. The Christian Democratic posture added to the growing radicalization of elite groups on the Left (particularly in the Socialist party), while resentment in rightist circles over government reforms heightened the level of ideological confrontation.

Had the Christian Democrats succeeded in becoming a genuine center majority, the increased political tension would not have had such serious institutional repercussions. But despite vast organizational efforts, extensive use of government resources and programs for partisan advantage, and extraordinary levels of foreign aid, they did not succeed in breaking the tripartite division of Chilean politics.

As a result, even when it became apparent that they could not win the 1970 presidential elections on their own, they were unable to structure a pre-electoral coalition either with the Right or the Left. The bulk of the diminished Radical party joined in support of the candidacy of socialist Salvador Allende who, in the resulting three-way race, surprised most pollsters by edging out rightist Jorge Alessandri by a plurality of 36.2% to 34.9% of the vote and Allende's came even though he received a smaller percentage of the vote than he did in the 1964 two way presidential race against Eduardo Frei. The results vividly illustrated the repercussions of the failure of the Right and Center to coalesce in 1970 as they had in 1964. Christian Democratic candidate Radomiro Tomic came in third with 27.8% of the vote.

Christian Democratic support in the Congress enabled Allende to assume the presidency, marking the first time in Chilean history that the Left captured the nation's highest office. But the president's minority status, and his lack of majority support in the Congress, meant that like other presidents before him, he would have to tailor his program to the realities of coalition politics in order to succeed -- even though the very reforms that the Right and the Christian Democrats had enacted made such compromise more difficult than before.

Compromise was easier said than done. Important elements in the Popular Unity coalition, including Allende's own Socialist party, were openly committed to a revolutionary transformation in the socio-economic order and the institutional framework of Chilean politics. Furthermore, the coalition was unwieldy and fractious, with parties and groups competing as much with one another for spoils and popular support as with the opposition.

At the same time, Allende's election touched off an extraordinary reaction from important sectors in Chilean society, fearful that a pro-Moscow Marxist-Leninist system might be established in Chile to their detriment. On both sides of Chile's divided party system, the commitment to change or preservation of the socio-economic order at all costs far exceeded any commitment to the principles of Chile's historic democracy.

Under these circumstances the structuring of a center coalition, committed to significant change while guaranteeing traditional liberties, was crucial to the survival of the political system. However, like the Christian Democrats before them, many leaders in the Popular Unity coalition became convinced that bold use of state power could break the political deadlock and swing the balance to the Left. This misconception led them to enact a host of ill-conceived redistributive and stimulative economic policies which created sky-rocketing inflation and other economic woes. When combined with measures of questionable legality to bring private business under state control, these policies profoundly alienated big and small business interests and much of the nation's large middle and lower-middle class.

But government failures were not only the result of irresponsible policies and pressures from the extreme Left to accelerate a revolutionary process. They also resulted from a rejection of these policies by an increasingly mobilized upper and middle class population, as well from sabotage, subversion and foreign intrigue undertaken by enemies bent on destroying the regime even at the expense of democratic institutions. In this growing climate of suspicion and violence, the lines of communication between leaders and followers of opposing parties eroded, accentuating the polarization of Chilean politics.

At several key junctures, despite the pressures from both poles, attempts were made to forge a center consensus and structure the necessary compromises to save the regime. But the center groups and moderate politicians on both sides, who had it in their grasp to find solutions, abdicated their responsibility in favor of narrower group stakes and short-term interests, thus further aggravating tension and reducing institutional channels of accommodation. The involvement of "neutral powers," such as the courts and the military, only served to politicize those institutions and pave the way for the military coup that destroyed the very institutions of compromise and accommodation which the moderate political leaders had professed to defend.³⁷

The Chilean breakdown was thus a complex dialectical process, one in which time-tested patterns of accommodation were eroded by the rise of a Center unwilling to bridge the gap between extremes, and by the decline of institutional arenas of accommodation in the name of technical efficiency.

It was also the product of gross miscalculations, extremism, narrow group stakes and the lack of courage in key circumstances. Breakdown was not inevitable. While human action was severely circumscribed by the structural characteristics of Chilean politics and by the course of events, there was room for choice; for leadership willing to prevent the final denouement.

IV. THE PARTY SYSTEM IN POST AUTHORITARIAN CHILE

The breakdown process marked a profound crisis in Chile's institutional system, but it did not signal the destruction of the Chilean party system. Indeed, the breakdown was not, in Samuel Huntington's terms, an example of weak institutions unable to cope with rising political demands of an increasingly mobilized population. On the contrary, a strong case can be made that mobilization was the product of the increased strength of Chile's major parties, spurred on by the outbidding of the Christian Democratic and Allende years.³⁸

As the institutional arena was replaced by the electoral arena and the street as the primary loci of party activity, party organizations increased in strength and militancy. Even though the 1973 election was contested under the banner of two party coalitions, the Popular Unity and the Democratic Confederation, each party retained its identity and appealed to voters on the basis of that identity. If anything, party organizations and militants gained the upper hand, as national leaders found it increasingly necessary to respond to the demands of the rank and file.

In the immediate aftermath of the military coup, it soon became clear that the new authorities were not simply going to restore order and return the political system to the party elites. The military rulers blamed the parties and Chilean democracy itself for the institutional breakdown -- and were determined to remold the nation's "civic habits."

The parties of the Left bore the brunt of the regime's fury as its leaders were killed, imprisoned or exiled and party assets confiscated; but the center parties also soon found their activities severely circumscribed. The parties of the Right simply declared themselves out of business, accepting for the most part the military's definition of the crisis and the country's future.

It should be emphasized, however, that the military leaders were confident repression was not the only factor that would place the parties in the dust-bin of history. They were convinced that the parties consisted only of self-serving politicians, and that Chileans would abandon them for a different kind of party as soon as they experienced progress and order without the usual demagoguery.

Moreover, the military leaders found eloquent support for this view in the team of young free-market technocrats they had hired to run the economy. According to the "Chicago Boys," economic growth and access to a host of consumer goods made possible by an opening to the international economy would undermine allegiance to traditional parties, particularly

the parties of the Marxist left. They viewed Chile's polarized party system as a vestige of underdevelopment and statist policies, an anachronism that would disappear with modernization.

The dramatic resurgence of political parties in the aftermath of the 1983 protests, ten years after the military coup, is vivid testimony to the failure of the assumption that Chilean parties would wither away. Party organization and leadership are once again at center stage, with officials of the regime itself having to spend much of their time countering party strategy. Parties are the determining forces behind the protest movements led by the centrist Democratic Alliance (AD) and the leftist Democratic Popular Movement (MDP).

Three factors account for the inability of the military authorities to destroy the party system.³⁹ In the first place, while Chile did experience sharp economic growth in the late 1970s, and imported consumer goods became available to broad sectors of the population, it is erroneous to assume that partisan attachments, particularly for the Left, could be fully explained by poverty or frustration -- or that prosperity and a decline in frustration would undermine those attachments.

Table 8, reported above, underscores the fact that the Left was supported by upper as well as lower income groups. Alejandro Portes' excellent studies have shown conclusively that indicators of poverty, low educational attainment or frustration don't adequately explain leftist voting in Chile. As Portes has shown, identification with parties of the left is the product of political socialization -- the influence of organization and key reference groups such as trade unions in the industrial work setting. Political socialization in turn contributes to changes in world view, whereby individuals are likely to associate their own, or the country's difficulties, with structural inequities, not their own failings. As Portes notes, the increase of the vote for the Popular Unity parties in 1973 (in relation to 1969), in a context of hyperinflation and severe deprivation, was testimony to the non-economicistic calculations of most supporters of the left.⁴⁰

In fact, political calculations based on narrow economic criteria may help to better explain the political allegiances of centrist voters with weak party identification, than the attachments of voters of the Left or voters with strong identification. As such, the severe economic decline which began in Chile in 1982, while making little difference in regime support for strong party identifiers, has had a profoundly disturbing impact among sectors that had been relatively enthusiastic for its policies.

Secondly, political parties have not disappeared despite significant repression, because parties have managed under duress to establish an important presence in a host of institutions of civil society. In neighborhood associations, labor unions, student groups, and even professional associations, leadership positions have gradually been occupied by activists with party ties. This process has ensured a presence of party activity among lower level leadership and militants. Indeed, the regime ensured free access to leadership positions by traditional party elements by refusing to make an effort to structure a mass pro-regime party movement, a refusal

that stemmed directly from the antipolitics, anti-popular attitudes of military leaders. While such a movement would have had substantial difficulty in Chile (as is illustrated by the fate of the pro-government labor unions), it nevertheless could have set back party efforts to regain a presence in societal leadership roles.⁴¹

Without overt and officially sanctioned organized competition, parties were able to recruit new leaders, often by selecting "natural" leaders who emerged after earlier party leaders were purged. The process in Chile has been similar to that in Spain under even more repressive circumstances. As Jose Maravall notes, referring to the parties of the Left, "the emergence of the working class and the student movement was dependent on the underground survival of the parties of the Left. Those parties provided the strategies, and the leaders, and it was the capacity of these parties to survive that kept the workers and the student resistance alive in the long and difficult period of the 1940s and 1950s, and that later rekindled the struggle."⁴²

But the failure of economic appeals to undermine party loyalty, and the ability of party activists to retain a significant presence in the various organizational spaces of society, is in many ways a function of the third and most important factor: the survival of Chile's "political landscape."

No democracy which has experienced political breakdown, with the possible exception of Uruguay, had as strong and as long lasting a party system. Identification with the major parties has strong roots in Chilean society, with party attachments passed on from generation to generation. As noted earlier, Chileans tend to speak of a Communist or Radical "subculture" to denote party affiliations which are often more of an indication of a way of life than simply of political preferences. And, as Table 9 above showed, changing totals in the overall percentage of the vote received by major parties did not obscure the strong continuity in geographical stability of party bases at the communal level. The weakest Chilean party may be the centrist Christian Democratic party -- because of its newness, and the volatility of centrist options in Chile. And yet, the party's roots go back over forty years, its organizational strengths and ideological appeal to progressive Catholic elements suggest that it still has a place in Chilean politics.

By banning the parties and restricting their activities, the regime actually contributed to "freezing" in place not only the traditional parties, but the very same leaders they pushed out of office in 1973. In the absence of internal contests and broader electoral appeals, new leaders have not been able to emerge to supplant the more easily recognized leaders who were prominent before the military coup.

This observation is not contradicted by the fact that several dozen party options have emerged since the regime attempted a political opening led by Interior Minister Sergio Onofre Jarpa in August 1983. Many of these proto-parties constitute rival claims to the leadership of established parties. It is logical that hyperfactionalism will be the norm in an authoritarian context of partial opening. This is the case precisely because rival claims to leadership cannot be effectively measured through

internal party democracy, and elections are not available to determine the difference between real parties and paper parties. With the return of democracy, those groups able to lay claim to the mainstream of the historical parties will capture the bulk of voter support.

But what if the electoral rules of the game are changed substantially? Government leaders have made it plain that they would like to see a non-ideological two-party system emerge in Chile. To this end, several proposals have been advanced, including the banning of Marxist parties; the shift away from a proportional representation electoral system; and a party law which would require as many as 150,000 signatures for a party to achieve legal recognition.⁴³

Government officials and supporters of the regime point to the prohibitions of "totalitarian parties" in the constitution of the German Federal Republic in arguing that a legal ban of Marxist groups would help restore democracy in Chile.⁴⁴ The comparison with Germany is completely inappropriate. The German Communist party never achieved the prominence of its Chilean counterpart. Furthermore, its strength had waned significantly even before the restrictive constitutional measures were adopted. Finally, other factors, including the requirement that small parties retain at least 5% of the electorate in order to survive, coupled with important changes in German society and the partition of the country, were far more important than constitutional prohibitions in influencing the electoral fate of the Communists.⁴⁵

Indeed, had the German Communist party been as strong as the Chilean one, it would have managed to survive despite prohibitions, as in fact the Chilean Communist party did during close to a decade of proscription. During the years the party was outlawed it managed to present candidates under other party banners. Even if such practices were more strictly monitored, today it would be impossible to prevent party militants and supporters from voting for other parties, making their presence known indirectly while placing strains on other parties and movements. At best, the banning of the parties of the Left would lead large segments of the population to question the legitimacy of democratic institutions, undermining their ability to deal with the nation's problems. At worse, it would reinforce currents within those parties which are hostile to democratic procedures and advocate the establishment of a socialist order by force.

While the Chilean Communist party has adopted the view that opposition to the current military regime should not exclude acts of violence, the historic posture of the party has been centered on a rejection of the armed route to power and an acceptance of full participation in the electoral process. This is clearly the position of the vast majority of socialist leaders. To ban the parties of the Left in Chile on the grounds that they are a threat to the social order and the development of "moderate" politics is not only an unrealistic measure doomed to failure, it also runs the risk of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy -- reinforcing the very outcome the measure seeks to avoid.

The attempt to create a two-party system is also unrealistic. To point to the Brazilian case as a successful example of an authoritarian

regime creating two moderate parties is a serious misreading of the prior history of the Brazilian and Chilean party systems.⁴⁶ As Bolivar Lamounier has noted, the Brazilian parties were diffuse and unstructured to begin with, with shallow historical roots and little continuity -- a stark contrast with the Chilean party system.⁴⁷

Students of electoral behavior have supported Duverger's view that single member district systems are associated with two party systems, while proportional representation systems are associated with multiparty systems.⁴⁸ While confirming the validity of this proposition, Arendt Lijphart underlines the point that there is no simple causal relationship between electoral law and party system characteristics. The relationship is in fact a mutual one; over time two party systems see it in their interest to retain the single member district system while multiparty systems choose to retain the proportional representation system.⁴⁹ For this reason, it is not only doubtful that a change in electoral system will affect the party system; more significantly, it is questionable whether the imposition of a single member district system on Chile by an outgoing military government would last very long once democratic politics were reestablished. The vested interests are too great in favor of maintaining the presence of parties in each of Chile's three historic tendencies.

Indeed, the adoption of a single member district system is likely to be opposed the strongest by parties on the Right, whose relative share of the vote declined throughout the 1960s. A simulation of three congressional elections in the 1960s undertaken by Carolina Ferrer and Jorge Russo, shows that under a single member district formula the clear winners would have been the centrist parties.⁵⁰ Thus in 1961, the Radical party, which obtained 26.5% of the seats, would have obtained 50% under the single member district system. And, in 1965 and 1969 the Christian Democrats would have achieved 86% and 76% of all the seats; as opposed to the 55.8% and 37.3% the party garnered in reality. The rightist parties would have disappeared entirely in 1965, and obtained only 3.4% of the seats in 1969, as opposed to the 22% they actually obtained. The parties of the left would have run a comparable fate.

Since it is unlikely that under a single member district system the parties would have run on their own, Ferrer and Russo simulated the result of the elections by right, center and left coalitions. In 1961 the Right would have had practically all the seats; in 1965 the Center parties would have controlled 71% and in 1969 the Marxist left would have obtained 86.2% of the seats (with only 25% of the vote).

While a majority-plurality system such as the one used in the French Fifth Republic would prevent the shifting fortunes of coalitions from sweeping all seats, it seems clear that to introduce a single member district system in the hope of structuring two parties is fraught with uncertainties and would be resisted by all sides. Indeed, it is ironic that sectors on the Right should be thinking of a single member district system since, as Stein Rokkan has convincingly shown, proportional representation systems were instituted historically by upper class and conservative elements as a device to retain their influence in a context of rising mass politics.⁵¹

Still, is it possible that a combination of single-member majority electoral rules, abolition of Marxist parties, and stringent requirements for party registration, along with Chile's winner-take-all presidential system, might encourage the formation of a two-party system?

Certainly, it is not out of the question that these measures could result in the drastic reduction in number of parties. However, the practical result would simply be to force the structure of coalitions which would be parties in name only. This has happened in countries like Israel and France, where parties have been replaced by large blocks or federations.⁵²

Moreover, if the objective is to reduce the degree of conflict and instability, such blocks may actually have the opposite effect. Indeed, Chile provides one of the best examples of the ominous effect of a political dynamic which forces the structuring of such blocks. So as to maximize the chances of obtaining the highest number of seats in the congressional elections of 1973, parties supporting the government and parties supporting the opposition each structured joint lists under the Popular Unity and the Democratic Confederation designations respectively. Rather than moderating the political spectrum, the two-party configuration came to embody the ultimate in polarization, a U shaped curve with a total absence of any center force. The Chilean experience shows that under such circumstances the moderate forces within each coalition are pressured heavily by the extremes, reducing further any centripetal tendencies in the political system. There is no reason to suppose that efforts to force Chilean politics into two party alternatives won't, once again, lead to the creation of coalitions that will polarize the political process. It is incorrect to think that "moderate" politics can be "forced" on a society with clearly defined partisan options. The outlawing of the Left will only reinforce the process by giving center and left parties no choice but to coalesce together.

These observations from the Chilean case support Arendt Lijphart's contention that in sharply divided societies, a two-party majoritarian option may in fact place greater strains on the political system than a multiparty option. Citing the case of Austria as an example, he notes that the two party system in that country constrained the process of cooperation and understanding at the elite level rather than facilitating it. This was the case because the two party structure thwarted the proper representation of important segments of society. According to Lijphart, a multiparty system is better able to reflect societal interests clearly and separately, facilitating elite compromise and accommodation. Mendilow makes a similar point when he argues that the "clustering of parties" as in Israel and France, rather than leading to the stability envisioned by Otto Kirchheimer's "catch all parties," is "liable to render the entire party system unstable."⁵³

V. CONCLUSION: A PROPOSAL FOR PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN CHILE

It follows from this analysis, and the themes of this paper, that redemocratization in Chile will not succeed if it is structured on the premise that the party system needs to be destroyed or dramatically changed. The key to redemocratization is a recognition that Chilean

politics is constituted by several important and polarized political currents with strong party representation. The challenge for redemocratization is not the illusory and counterproductive attempt to destroy that party system. Rather it is the structuring of mechanisms designed to bridge the centrifugal realities of Chilean politics and achieve a minimum consensus on the rules of the game and the policies required to govern the country. This can only be achieved by strengthening the institutional arenas of accomodation capable of providing channels for political expression as well as compromise and effective government.

The starting point must be a recognition of the failure of the presidential form of government in Chile. As argued earlier, all Chilean presidents who have governed since the party system was configured in the 1920s, including Carlos Ibañez and Jorge Alessandri (who ran as independent "above" party politics candidates), found that it was extraordinarily difficult to govern the country. Presidents were invariably elected by minorities or by coalitions which disintegrated after each election. Most presidents, consequently, faced little support or outright opposition in Congress. What is important to stress is that all parties had little stake in active support for the president. On the contrary, parties stood more to gain by a perception of failure of the president's leadership than by its success. Since a president could not be reelected, he did not have the political authority that comes from the possibility that he could win reelection. Even his own party found it an advantage to distance itself from the president and his problems half way through the term in order to prepare for the next candidacy. The fixed terms for both president and Congress contributed to an atmosphere of stalemate and a feeling of permanent crisis which permeated the country's politics.

Paradoxically, the response to this problem of governance in Chile has been to seek an increase in presidential power. The resolution of the country's pressing social and economic problems, it is argued, requires strong leadership -- a leadership that is thwarted by the narrow partisan interests represented in the legislature. But recent Chilean history has shown that an increase in presidential power has only aggravated the problem by reducing arenas of accomodation and making executive-legislative confrontations more bitter. The reason why an increase in presidential authority is not a solution to the problem of governance stems directly from the fundamental points of this paper.

Chile's multiparty system cannot generate majority support, except through the structuring of broad coalitions. While these often occur before presidential races, there is little incentive in a presidential system to maintain coalition support in the legislature. Indeed, the stronger the power of the presidency as a separate constitutional actor, the greater the disincentives for structuring such support among parties and groups jealous of their autonomy and future electoral prospects. One can argue that in Chile there has been an inverse correlation between the power of the presidency and the success of presidential government. The stronger the president, the weaker the presidential system. For this reason Chile's political elites should establish a parliamentary form of government.

A parliamentary system is characterized by the generation of executive authority through majority support in the parliament and the continued responsibility of the executive to the parliament. Thus, if a parliamentary majority shifts, then the executive must reflect that shift with the selection of a new prime minister and cabinet, or the calling of elections to determine a new parliament. All parliamentary systems have a head of state as well as a head of government. While the president (or monarch) in a parliamentary system has few powers, he/she can play an important role as a symbolic "above politics" leader -- one who can perform an important mediating role in times of crisis.

The establishment of a parliamentary system in Chile would have three distinct advantages. In the first place it would defuse the enormous pressures for structuring high stake coalitions around a winner-take-all presidential option, which by definition encourages polarization in the Chilean context.

In the second place a parliamentary form of government would eliminate the paralyzing stalemate and confrontation which has characterized executive-legislative relations in twentieth century Chile. The country would not have to live with the rigidity of a commitment to a six or eight year administration which no longer enjoys a working majority. As noted in the introduction, had Chile had a parliamentary system there would not have been a breakdown of regime in 1973. The working majority in the Congress of Christian Democrats and Popular Unity parties would have had to continue for Allende to have remained as the head of government. In the absence of that majority, the government would have fallen. Given the subsequent alliance of Christian Democrats with the Right, a new government led by a Christian Democrat would have been formed.

This idea leads to the third point: a parliamentary system would have moderated Chilean politics. Given many of the similarities in the platforms of the parties of the Left and the Christian Democrats in 1970, it is likely that a coalition between Center and Left would have continued had the system been a parliamentary one. But it would have continued with the realization of Allende and his collaborators that change must remain limited, lest the support of the Christian Democrats be withdrawn, and the government fall. At the same time, the executive under a parliamentary framework could not have embarked on a strategy of taking over sectors of the economy solely through executive action -- since all such measures would have required approval of parliamentary majorities. Thus, moderate sectors on both sides of the political divide would have been strengthened -- encouraging a centripetal drive toward coalition and compromise, rather than a centrifugal pattern of conflict in search of maximalist solutions. What Chile needs is precisely a system of governance that encourages the formation of broad center tendencies -- and not one in which the center forces are drowned out by the logic of the extremes. It also needs a system in which working majorities can be structured without a president seeking from a minority position to interpret the national will.

It is somewhat paradoxical that the appropriateness of a presidential system for Chile seems to have such a strong hold on elite public opinion in the country.⁵⁴ It is a myth that parliamentary systems are weaker

than presidential ones. The strength of any regime is measured by its ability to implement policies and programs. In a democracy, these can be enacted only if there is broad popular support. Parliamentary systems function on the basis of majority support, and are thus by definition stronger. Despite his overwhelming reelection victory in 1984, Ronald Reagan in the United States remains a weaker leader than Margaret Thatcher in Britain because, unlike Thatcher, Reagan does not command majority parliamentary support and must exercise to an extraordinary degree the power of persuasion to obtain his basic policies.

While it is true that parliamentary systems such as Italy's may appear to be unstable, it is not the regimes that are unstable per se. A parliamentary system, like any other reflects the underlying societal divisions manifested in party politics. Parliamentary systems with two parties or with moderate multiparty systems may be more stable than ones with polarized multiparty systems, but the crises of parliamentary systems are crises of government, not of regime. Chile, like Italy, would undoubtedly experience frequent government changes as each of the parties in Chile's three political tendencies jockeyed to generate working majorities. But, as in Italy, the parliamentary framework would permit an adjustment of governments without bringing the country to the brink of institutional collapse.

It should be emphasized that with the exception of Latin America, where constitutional governments have been notoriously weak, presidential systems are by far the exception rather than the rule. Only the United States among the first world democracies has a presidential system in the full sense of the word. The only other presidential systems are France (since 1958) and Finland, and both are semi-parliamentary because the prime minister and cabinet are responsible to the legislature. And it must be underscored that the United States' presidential system functions in the context of an extraordinarily diffuse and un-ideological two-party system of the "catch all" variety, a party system which evolved with strikingly different "generative cleavages" than those found in Chile. ⁵⁵

Indeed, the generative cleavages that led to the creation of Chile's multiparty polarized system are far more comparable to those found in Europe than to those found in the exceptional case of the United States. It is not illogical to think that Chile should therefore consider turning to the most widely used system of governance among democratic regimes, a system of governance that has worked well in societies with comparable political cleavages and traditions. With the exception of France, where since 1958 there has been no instance of a president not enjoying a favorable majority in the National Assembly, all of the political systems with polarized multiparty systems are parliamentary regimes. The recent choice of Spain to install a parliamentary regime only helps to reinforce this argument, as does the experience of transition to democracy in Greece.

Nor should the argument that Chile's experience with parliamentary government between 1890 and 1924 failed, deter the prospects for a parliamentary system in the 1980s. While it is true that Chilean parliamentarism has a bad image in Chile, it is not fully deserved. Chile's parliamentary

period in the context of the times was one of the most democratic and stable regimes in the world, even a model for many European countries. Furthermore, Chile never had a parliamentary system in the full sense of the term. The "Parliamentary Republic" was simply a presidential system in which the president deferred to an extraordinary degree to majorities in both houses of parliament, but executive authority was not generated in parliament, nor could parliament be dissolved and elections called in the absence of viable majorities.⁵⁶

Indeed, a real obstacle to the transition to democracy in Chile is the fact that all political forces in Chile expect democracy will lead, sooner or later, to a highly visible and confrontational presidential election -- an expectation which only forces polarization among political groups. Sectors on the Right who may now realize that they will not succeed in changing the underlying complexion of Chilean party politics, legitimately feel that they will be overwhelmed. Sectors on the Left and Center wonder how they will structure a coalition, and maintain the legitimacy of their own program, without falling prey to the centrifugal forces in Chilean politics. Moderate sectors on all sides who believe that democratic institutions must be reestablished soon run the real risk of being outflanked by the logic of the extremes.

The election of a Congress, even under the 1980 Pinochet constitution, which would serve as a constituent assembly and take seriously a parliamentary option, would help immediately to defuse such fears. It would also encourage the possibility of genuine center options which would result from collegial negotiations.⁵⁷

Viable institutions of representation and accomodation, however, are meaningless if the Chilean military retains a significant veto over the policy process or continues to be a viable "final card" in a moment of crisis. The presence of a "golpista" military establishment is not only anathema to the principles of democracy, it profoundly distorts the political process itself. With a military card available, the temptation is great, particularly for sectors with relatively low popular majorities, to turn to force to advance their objectives and interests. Firm steps need to be taken to bring military institutions under civilian control and diminish the chance that the armed forces' presence can praetorianize the system. This must be done by recognizing the legitimate role of armed forces in the defense of the nation and the importance of professional and institutional integrity.

A structuring of workable democratic institutions can only stem from a broad consensus on the Left, Right and Center that democracy is worth restoring as an end in itself. Renewal movements on the Left and self criticism in Christian Democratic circles have given some assurance that progress has been made in this direction. Splits on the right, with important segments of the "old Right" pressing for a democratic opening, are also positive signs. Clearly short-term political agreements will have to be worked out before a democratic opening, in order to handle pressing policy questions such as the state of the economy, the fate of exiles, and the degree of reversibility of many of the junta policies. It would be a mistake to argue that such agreements should be structured for a long period of time. Chileans have broadly different conceptions

of how the nation's problems should be solved, and they should be able to decide through renewed democratic institutions the country's future.

But any prospect for transition seems to be seriously thwarted by General Pinochet's unwillingness to depart from the rigid timetable spelled out in his constitution of 1980 -- a timetable that does not call for congressional elections until 1989 and open presidential elections until 1997, with every indication that Pinochet intends to try to remain in power until that date. The intransigence of the authorities, vividly illustrated by their unwillingness to follow up on promises of a political opening in the aftermath of the 1983 protests, may have serious repercussions for the future of the party system and the country. In 1984, it is abundantly clear that the regime can only postpone an opening by resorting to increasing levels of repression.

Such measures, rather than assuring the development of centrist tendencies in Chilean politics, are bound to exacerbate further the polarization process and undermine whatever progress has been made in developing a consensus on the legitimacy of democratic institutions. The severity of repression is reinforcing the more extremist elements of the leftist opposition, and has placed moderate political forces in the difficult position of risking a loss of popular support if they hesitate to commit themselves to more dramatic steps in opposing the regime. But such actions constitute a double-edged sword -- they drive a wedge between middle class and working class opponents of the dictatorship.

Perhaps the greatest irony of all is that the Pinochet government, in the name of constituting a new political process of moderation and democratic understanding is making inevitable an outcome where democratic solutions may have to take a back place to armed insurrection. Rather than being a solution to the problems of Chilean politics, the regime itself has become the principal problem.

NOTES

- 1) Parties were originally banned by Decree Law 77 in September, 1973. Restrictions aimed at the Christian Democrats were adopted in Decree Law 1697 of 1977.
- 2) Kalman H. Silvert, Chile: Yesterday and Today (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1965), p. 99.
- 3) Federico Gil, The Political System of Chile (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Co., 1968), p. 244.
- 4) There is a surprising lack of general studies of party systems in Latin America. The notable exception is Ronald McDonald's now dated Party Systems and Elections in Latin America (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971), a book which received little attention by specialists. A useful review, which lists some of the single party monographs, is Mary Jeanne Reid Martz, "Studying Latin American Political Parties: Dimensions Past and Present," Journal of Latin American Studies Vol. 12, No. 1: 139-167. For a comprehensive party-by-party description see Robert J. Alexander, Political Parties in the Americas: Canada, Latin America and West Indies 2 Vols. (Wesport, Ct: Greenwood Press, 1982). Kenneth Janda's massive Political Parties: A Cross National Survey (New York: The Free Press, 1980) includes information on ten Latin American countries, though curiously Costa Rica, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Argentina are among the missing countries. On Chilean parties see the classic study of Alberto Edwards and Eduardo Frei, Historia de los Partidos Políticos Chilenos (Santiago: Editorial del Pacífico, 1949.) Other helpful studies include Germán Urzua Valenzuela, Los Partidos Políticos Chilenos (Santiago: Editorial Jurídica, 1968); Sergio Guillisati Table, Partidos Políticos Chilenos (Santiago: Editorial Nascimento, 1964); Gil, The Political System of Chile. A useful summary reference on Chilean parties which must be used with caution because of frequent errors is Lia Cortes and Jordi Fuentes, Diccionario Político de Chile (Santiago: Editorial Orbe, 1967).
- 5) This account draws substantially on Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Partidos de oposición bajo el régimen autoritario chileno," Revista Mexicana de Sociología XLIV, No. 2 (April-June 1982), reprinted in Manuel Antonio Garretón et.al. Chile 1973-198? (Santiago: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, 1983). The framework is informed by the discussion of the generation of the European party systems found in Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.) Party Systems and Voter Alignment: Cross National Perspectives (New York: The Free Press, 1967). Rokkan's extensive work on the extension of electoral participation and party formation is compiled in part in his Citizens, Elections, Parties (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1970). See in particular "Nation Building, Cleavage Formation and the Structuring of Mass Politics," pp. 72-144. A useful review of the literature on parties with a brief application to the Chilean case is Carlos Huneeus, "Los Partidos Políticos y la Transición a la Democracia en Chile Hoy," Estudios Públicos No. 15 (Winter 1984):57-88.
- 6) The problem of sequence and timing of political crises has received considerable attention in the literature. For a discussion of this phenomenon in relation to parties, see the concluding chapter in Joseph Lapalombara and Myron Weiner (eds.) Political Parties and Political Development

(Princeton: 1966). Historical treatments of European and United States cases from this perspective can be found in Raymond Grew (ed.) Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978). For a valuable critique see Robert T. Bolt and John E. Turner, "Crises and Sequences in Collective Theory Development," American Political Science Review Vol. 69 (September 1975): 969-94.

7) The key role of suffrage and of the Conservative Party in the establishment of democratic institutions is documented in Arturo Valenzuela and Samuel Valenzuela, "Los Orígenes de la Democracia: Reflexiones Teóricas sobre el Caso de Chile," Estudios Públicos No. 12 (Spring 1982):5-39. This article is available in English as a working paper of the Latin America Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars under the title "The Origins of Democracy: Theoretical Reflections on the Chilean Case."

8) See Arturo Valenzuela and Alexander Wilde, "El Congreso y la Redemocratización en Chile," Alternativas No. 3: 5-40. For a revisionary discussion of the period of the Parliamentary Republic see Julio Beise González, Historia de Chile 1861-1925 Vol. I (Santiago: Editorial Andrés Bello 1973); Vol. II (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1982.) See also Arturo Valenzuela, "Politics, Parties and the State in Chile: The Higher Civil Service," in Ezra Suleiman (ed.) The Higher Civil Service (New York: Bolmers and Meier, 1984).

9) See Samuel Valenzuela, "Labor Movement Formation and Politics: the Chilean and French Cases in Comparative Perspective, 1850-1950," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1979.

10) The classic distinction was made by Maurice Duverger in his Parties Politiques (Paris: Armand Colin, 1951.)

11) Lipset and Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments," in Lipset and Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments, p. 51.

12) The electoral weakness of the German and French Right which led to an assymetry towards the Center and Left is noted by Lipset and Rokkan.

13) All data in this article was compiled by the author from raw electoral data in the Dirección del Registro Electoral, Santiago, Chile.

14) Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 313. The actual average fractionalization scores for the period 1945-73 are as follows: Finland .804, Switzerland .801, Chile .796, France IV .790, Switzerland .801, Netherlands .787, Israel .784. Denmark had a score of .755, while Italy's was .721. For an intelligent study which calculates the fractionalization index while testing Douglas Rae's findings for the Chilean case see M. Teresa Miranda H. "El Sistema Electoral y el Multipartidismo en Chile," Revista de Ciencia Política Vol. 4, No. 1 (1982):59-69, 130-138.

15) For an elaboration of this point see Arturo Valenzuela, "The Scope of the Chilean Party System," Comparative Politics Vol. 4, No. 2 (January, 1972). Further, examination of the socio-economic correlates of party competition supports the findings reported in Table 4 with fractionalization. In Chile smaller and more socio-economically backward communities were as likely to be competitive as larger and more modernized ones -- strongly suggesting that party system variables were not closely linked to socio-economic determinants. These findings refute an influential body of literature in the social sciences which has sought to establish that relation and suggests that political phenomena were independent variables in their own right. See for example S.N. Eisenstadt, "Social Change, Differentiation and Evolution," American Sociological Review Vol. 29, No. 3 (June 1964):375-87. This theme will emerge again later in discussing the support for particular parties.

16) See Sartori, pp. 310-315.

17) Several studies of varying quality have been undertaken examining the socio-economic correlates of party voting in Chile. For a sampling see Glaucio Ary Dillon Soares and Robert L. Hamblin, "Socio-economic Variables and Voting for the Radical Left in Chile, 1952," American Political Science Review Vol. 61 (December 1967): 1053-65, Maurice Zeitlin and James Petras, "The Working-class vote in Chile: Christian Democracy versus Marxism," in British Journal of Sociology Vol. XXI, No. 1 (1970): 16-29; Steven Sinding, "The Evolution of Chilean Voting Patterns: A Reexamination of Some Old Assumptions," The Journal of Politics Vol. 34 (August 1972):774-96; Robert Ayres, "Electoral Constraints and the Chilean Way to Socialism," in Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela, Chile: Politics and Society (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, Inc., 1975), pp. 30-66; Arturo Valenzuela, "Political Participation, Agriculture and Literacy: Communal versus Provincial Voting Patterns in Chile," Latin American Research Review Vol. 12, No. 1 (1977):105-114; Daniel Hellinger, "Electoral Change in the Chilean Countryside: The Presidential Elections of 1958 and 1970," The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. XXXI, No. 2 (June 1978): 253-273. The classic study in the Siegfried tradition remains Eduardo Cruz Coke, Geografía Electoral de Chile (Santiago: Editorial del Pacífico S.A., 1952). See Andre Siegfried, Tableau Politique de la France de L'Ouest sous la Troisieme Republique (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, (1913).

18) See James Prothro and Patricio Chaparro, "Public Opinion and the Movement of the Chilean Government to the Left," in Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela (eds.), Chile: Politics and Society (New Brunswick, N.J., 1976).

19) There is some research on women and the religious dimension of the vote in Chile. See Patricia Kyle and Michael Francis, "Women at the Polls: The Case of Chile, 1970-71," in Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3 (October 1978); Kenneth P. Langton and Ronald Rapoport, "Religion and Leftist Mobilization in Chile," Comparative Political Studies Vol. 9, No. 3 (October 1976); Lucy C. Behrman, "Political Development and Secularization in Two Chilean Urban Communities," Comparative Politics Vol. 4, No. 2 (January 1972); Steven M. Neuse, "Voting in Chile: The Feminine Response," in John Booth and Mitchell Seligson, Political Participation in Latin America (New York, 1978).

20) The interplay of cultural and ideological dimensions as they relate to generative cleavages over time is an area that requires research. In fact we have few good studies of Chilean parties. Most focus either on a chronology of events or shifts in party positions, or are semi-political and ideological tracts by party leaders. No studies focus in a systematic way on organizational variables and on the crucial dimension of relations between leaders, middle level officials, militants and voters. No studies have been conducted on the historicity of party alternatives, such as those done for Scandinavia by authors like Rokkan or Valen. Standard studies for Chilean parties include for the left: Julio Cesar Jobet, El Partido Socialista de Chile 2nd edition, 2 vols. (Santiago: Ediciones Prensa Latinoamericana, 1971); Alejandro Chelen Rojas, Trayectoria del Socialismo (Buenos Aires: Editorial Austral, 1967); Hernan Ramirez Necochea, Origen y Formación del Partido Comunista de Chile (Santiago: Editorial Austral, 1965); Erns Balperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965); Paul Drake, Socialism and Populism in Chile (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1978. For parties on the Right, see Ignacio Arteaga Alemparte, Partido Conservador XVI-Convención Nacional-1947 (Santiago: Imprenta Chile, 1947); Marcial Sanfuentes Carrion, El Partido Conservador (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1957); Jose Miguel Prado Valdes, Reseña Histórica del Partido Liberal (Santiago: Imprenta Andina, 1963.) There are no good studies of the National Party. A very insightful study into the Chilean Right is Robert Kaufman, The Politics of Land Reform in Chile, 1950-1970 (Cambridge: Barvard University Press, 1972). For the Radical Party, see Luis Palma Zuñiga, Historia del Partido Radical (Santiago: Editorial Andrés Bello, 1967); Florencio Duran Bernales, El Partido Radical (Santiago: Editorial Nacimiento, 1958). On the Christian Democratic party see Leonard Gross, The Last Best Hope: Eduardo Frei and Chilean Christian Democracy (New York: Random House, 1967); George Grayson, El Partido Demócrata Cristiano Chileno (Buenos Aires: Editorial Francisco de Aguirre, 1968); Jaime Castillo Velasco, Las Fuentes de la Democracia Cristiana (Santiago: Editorial del Pacífico, 1968). There is no good study of the Ibañez phenomenon or of Agrario Laborismo. An excellent book of essays reviewing the evolution of Chilean politics and party politics is Tomás Moulian, Democracia y Socialismo en Chile (Santiago: FLACSO, 1983)

21) The following paragraphs in slightly revised form are from Arturo Valenzuela, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile (Baltimore: 1978), pp. 6-7.

22) See Sartori, "European Political parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," in Lapalombara and Weiner (eds). Political Parties and Political Development and Parties and Party Systems.

23) Sartori in Lapalombara and Weiner, pp. 156, 164.

24) This point is made in Arturo Valenzuela "Politics, Parties and the State in Chile: The Role of the Higher Civil Service."

25) The impasse of Chilean politics would very likely be duplicated in France, the other polarized party system under presidential government, should a President in that country lose majority support in the legislature. However, as Aron notes, there would be a more clear alternation to a

"parliamentary" pattern because of the constitutional provision for a prime minister responsible to the National Assembly. See Raymond Aron, "Alternation in Government in the Industrialized Countries," Government and Opposition Vol. 17, no. 1 (Winter 1982).

26) See Mario Bernaschina G. Cartilla electoral (Santiago, 1958) and Alejandro Silva Bascunan, Tratado de Derecho Constitucional Vol. 1 (Santiago: 1963). For the 1962 electoral law and 1965 and 1968 modifications see Antonio Vodanovic, ed. Ley General de Elecciones (Santiago: Editorial Nascimento, 1969). The 1970 reforms are discussed in Guillermo Piedrabuena Richards, La Reforma Constitucional (Santiago: Ediciones Encina, 1970).

27) Wright distinguishes the "rational efficient" from the "party democracy model," the former oriented to winning elections, the latter to attaining ideological purity. See William E. Wright, "Comparative Party Models: Rational Efficient and Party Democracy," in William E. Wright (ed.) Comparative Study of Party Organization (Columbus Ohio: 1971). For the now classic distinctions along these lines see those of Duverger, Les Parties Politiques and Otto Kirchheimer "The Transformation of the Western European Party System," in Lapalombara and Weiner. An excellent study which stresses the dual objectives of electoral success and ideological objectives is Samuel Barnes, Party Democracy: Politics in an Italian Socialist Federation (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1963).

28) This position has been advanced by government officials including Interior Minister Sergio Onofre Jarpa. The parties law was sent by the executive for consideration by the Junta as the legislative arm of government on June 5, 1984 and registered in the Oficina de Partes of the Junta de Gobierno as Bol. 496-06. As General Pinochet noted in his covering letter, the purpose of the proposed law is to foster "solid and important parties, well organized who would provide stability to the system" adding that it also should ensure that parties not engage in activities "foreign to their nature" and receive support that would tie them to "foreign interests." As of this writing (December 1984), the Junta has delayed approval of the law, and these are strong indications that Pinochet is in no hurry to have it approved. For academic articles which pick up on the theme of party legislation as a vehicle for creating a moderate party system see Hernan Larraín, "Democracia, Partidos Politicos y Transición, el Caso Chileno," Estudios Públicos No. 15 (Winter, 1984), esp. pp. 111-115; and Juan Irarrazaval, "Democracia, Partidos Políticos y Transición," Estudios Públicos No. 15 (Winter, 1984), p. 51. However, Irarrazaval, unlike Larraín, does not provide suggestions for policy measures aimed at transforming the party system. Valuable articles dealing with the juridical basis for party legislation include Francisco Cumplido, "El Estatuto Jurídico de los Partidos," and Enrique Barros, "Aspectos Jurídicos del Estatuto de partidos," both published in Estudios Publicos, No. 14 (Fall 1984).

29) See Arendt Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven, 1984), p. 111. See also Lawrence C. Dodd, Coalitions in Parliamentary Governments (Princeton: 1976).

30) It should be noted that while Sartori does not directly say that polarized party systems are more likely to breakdown -- he implies that.

However, he does not demonstrate this proposition either with comparative analysis with non-polarized cases or with the sample of polarized cases. It is not clear why Italy or Finland has not suffered this fate. More seriously, Sartori does not include other cases of political systems of a non-polarized nature which have consistently broken down. If the Chilean case is to be included, then other Latin American cases which were excluded because they had higher incidents of breakdown cannot be so excluded. See Sartori, Parties and Party Systems.

31) For the argument that multiparty systems may have higher levels of cabinet or government instability see Dodd Coalitions; G. Bingham Powell, "Party Systems and Political System Performance," American Political Science Review, Vol 75 (1981), pp. 861-879; Michael Taylor and Valentine M. Herman, "Party Systems and Government Stability," American Political Science Review Vol 65 (1981) 28-37. Lijphart, Democracies also makes this point, see p. 110. It is crucial to stress, however, the difference between government instability and regime instability.

32) Powell, "Party Systems," p. 868.

33) On parties in various Latin American countries see McDonald. On Argentina, see the paper by Marcello Cavarozzi, "Los Partidos Argentinos: Subculturas Fuertes, Sistema Debil," Paper prepared for the workshop on "Political Parties and Redemocratization in the Southern Cone," Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 16-17 November, 1984.

34) See the paper prepared by Luis González, "Political Parties and Redemocratization in Uruguay," prepared for the workshop on "Political Parties in the Southern Cone," Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 16-17 November, 1984. See also the mimeo paper by Juan Rial, "Los Partidos Tradicionales del Uruguay ante la Transición Democrática."

35) This section draws extensively on Arturo Valenzuela, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes.

36) See Valenzuela and Wilde, "El Congreso y la Redemocratización en Chile."

37) Neutral powers is a term used by Juan Linz. See his path-breaking study, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978) which emphasizes the dimension of choice as opposed to socio-economic determinants.

38) Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1968).

39) This section draws on Valenzuela and Valenzuela, "Partidos Políticos." For a different emphasis see the excellent study by Manuel Antonio Garretón, El Proceso Político Chileno (Santiago: FLACSO, 1983).

40) See Alejandro Portes, "Occupation and Lower Class Political Orientations in Chile," in Valenzuela and Valenzuela, Chile: Politics and Society. See also his "Status Inconsistency and Lower-Class Leftist Radicalism," The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 13 (Summer 1972):361-382, and "Political

Primitivism, Differential Socialization, and Lower-Class Leftist Radicalism," American Sociological Review Vol. 36 (October 1971): 820-835, both of which are based on his Chilean study. For comparative evidence supporting this point, see Portes, "Urbanization and Politics in Latin America," Social Science Quarterly Vol. 52, No. 3 (December 1971).

41) See Karen Remmer, "Public Policy and Regime Consolidation: The First Five Years of the Chilean Junta," The Journal of Developing Areas Vol 13 (July 1979).

42) Jose Maravall, Dictatorship and Political Dissent (London: Tavistock, 1978), p. 166.

43) The banning of Marxist parties is contemplated in Article 8 of the Constitution. See note 45 below. The parties law sent by Pinochet to the executive, and noted in footnote 28 would require 150,000 members in order to register as a party -- an extraordinary number for a small country. The law designing the electoral system had not been sent to the President from the Council of State as of December 1984. It seems clear, from interviews conducted by the author with staff members of the Council of State, that the proportional representation system will be discarded in favor of a majority system with the deliberate intent of changing the party system. Rather than single member districts, however, it is possible that a two member district system will be adopted. The entire package of constitutional laws is very tenuous, however, as General Pinochet gives little clear indication that he is willing to accelerate the transition process before the 1989 deadline of the 1980 Constitution.

44) See the argument of Jaime Guzman at a round table of the Centro de Estudios Públicos, published as "Pluralismo y Proscripción de Partidos Anti-democraticos," Estudios Públicos No. 13 (Summer 1984): 10-15. The restrictions on Chilean parties are found in Article 8 of the Constitution which notes that "Todo acto de persona o grupo destinado a propagar doctrinas que antienten contra la familia, propugnen la violencia o una concepción de la sociedad, del Estado o del orden jurídico, de carácter totalitario o fundada en la lucha de clases, es ilícito y contrario al ordenamiento de la República. Las organizaciones y los movimientos o partidos políticos que por sus fines o por la actividad de sus adherentes tiendan a esos objetivos, son inconstitucionales." Article 19 adds, "Prohíbense las asociaciones contrarias a la moral, al orden público y a la seguridad del estado." See Textos Comparados de la Constitución Política de la República de Chile 1980- Constitución Política de la República de Chile- 1925 (Santiago: Instituto de Estudios Generales, 1980). Citations are from pages 19 and 30 respectively. For a contrary view see Francisco Cumplido's contribution to the roundtable mentioned above and published in Estudios Públicos, No. 13 (Summer 1984).

45) No serious study of West German politics attributes the low Communist vote to the provisions in the Constitution. For the definitive study see Juan Linz, "The Social Bases of West German Politics," 2 volumes, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1959. An article that reports some of the findings is Juan Linz, "Cleavage and Consensus in West German Politics: The Early Fifties," in Lipset and Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments, pp. 283-321. As Linz notes, the Communist party in

Germany had already been reduced to an "insignificant minority," even before being outlawed. See p. 285. For a useful summary treatment of the German party system see Gerhard Loewenberg, "The Development of the German Party System, in Karl H. Cerny (ed.) Germany at the Polls (Washington: 1978), reprinted in Estudios Públicos No. 13 (Summer 1984):155-82.

46) See Larrain, "Democracia, Partidos Políticos y Transición," p. 115

47) See the paper by Bolivar Lamounier, "Partidos Politicos e Consolidacao Democratica: Algumas Indicações sobre o Caso Brasileiro," prepared for the workshop "Political Parties in the Southern Cone," Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., November 16-17, 1984. It is also quite apparent that the dual party system in Brazil will not survive a genuine democratic opening. The formation of the Liberal Party and the continued viability of the Workers Party, suggests the development of a multi-party system, which if anything may have more similarities to Chile's historical system than to the pre-1964 party system in Brazil.

48) See Duverger, Parties Politiques and Douglas Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (New Haven: 1967), pp. 93-95. For an early and somewhat extreme proposition relating electoral systems to party systems see F.A. Hermens, Democracy or Anarchy: A Study of Proportional Representation (South Bend, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press 1941).

49) Lijphart, Democracies, p. 158. In a study of the emergence of new parties in the Western European context, Charles Bauss and David Rayside show that the electoral system had little consequence. New parties prospered under both proportional representation and single member majority systems. See Bauss and Rayside, "The Development of New Parties in Western Democracies since 1945." In examining the Chilean case, Teresa Miranda also emphasizes that the electoral system as such was not a determinative factor. Indeed, she notes that the decline of fractionalization in the 1960s occurred despite the fact that a similar electoral system was used throughout. See Miranda, "El Sistema Electoral," 68-69. Electoral systems may reenforce certain party patterns over time -- but they are not determinative.

50) Carolina Ferrer and Jorge Russo, "Sistemas Electorales Parlamentarios Alternativos: Un Análisis para Chile," Estudios Públicos No. 13 (Summer 1984).

51) See Stein Rokkan, "Electoral Systems," in Rokkan, Citizens, Elections, Parties, pp. 157-58.

52) See Jonathan Mendilow, "Party Cluster Formations in Multi-Party Systems," Political Studies Vol. XXX, No. 4:485-503.

53) See Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven: 1971), pp. 62-64. See Mendilow, "Party Cluster Formations," p. 486.

54) A good example of this view, which is presented with no analysis or citation to the scholarly literature, is the text submitted by the Chilean Council of State together with the draft of the 1980 Constitution. See Textos Comparados de la Constitución p. 116.

55) See Lijphart's treatment of twenty one western democracies in Democracies.

56) On the Chilean Parliamentary Republic, in addition to the study by Julio Heise González mentioned in note 8, see the classic three volume work by Manuel Rivas Vicuña, Historia Política y Parlamentaria de Chile (Santiago: Editorial Nascimento, 1964). For a revisionary treatment see Arturo Valenzuela, Political Brokers in Chile: Local Government in a Centralized Polity (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1977), Chapter 8.

57) To further defuse conflict, several additional measures could be taken to build mechanisms of "consociational" accomodation, though they cannot be effectively substituted for the representational mechanism embodied in a "parliamentary" system. On this question see the studies by Eric Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Studies in International Affairs, No. 29, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1972), and Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accomodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1975). An excellent review of these ideas with suggestions for their application to the Chilean case is found in the work of Alberto Van Klaveren, "Instituciones Consociativas: Alternativa para la Estabilidad Democratica en Chile?" Documento de Trabajo, No.12, Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo, Abril, 1984.

TABLE 1

ELECTIONS OF DEPUTIES: RESULTS BY PARTY*

Party	1932			1937			1941		
	#votes	%vote total	#dep.s elected	#votes	%vote total	#dep.s elected	#votes	%vote total	#dep.s elected
Conservador	55,260	16.9	34	87,845	21.3	35	77,243	17.2	32
Conserv. Unido									
Liberal	32,645	10.0	18	85,515	20.7	35	63,118	14.0	22
Nacional									
Others	22,214	8.1	9						
RIGHT	110,119	35.0	61	173,360	42.0	70	140,361	31.2	54
Radical	59,413	18.2	34	76,941	18.7	29	98,269	21.9	44
Falange Nac./ Democracia Crist.									
Agrario Laborista									
Others	45,040	13.7	20	38,702	9.4	12	41,144	9.1	11
CENTER	104,453	31.9	54	115,643	28.1	41	139,413	31.0	55
Socialista de Chile				46,050	11.2	19	75,500	16.8	15
Socialista Popular									
Progresista Nac./ Comunista							53,144	11.88	16
Others				17,162	4.2	6	23,702	5.3	3
LEFT				63,212	15.4	25	152,346	33.9	34

*Parties that received more than 5% of the total vote in more than one parliamentary election.

Source: Data compiled from the Direccion del Registro Electoral, Santiago, Chile

TABLE 1 (cont.)

ELECTIONS OF DEPUTIES: RESULTS BY PARTY*

Party	1945			1949			1953		
	#votes	%vote total	#dep.s elected	#votes	%vote total	#dep.s elected	#votes	%vote total	#dep.s elected
Conservador	106,254	23.6	36	98,118	21.1	31	111,715**	14.4	18
Liberal	80,597	17.9	31	83,582	17.9	33	84,924	10.9	23
Nacional									
Others	9,849 ¹	2.2	3	13,916 ²	3.0	4	21,381 ³	2.7	4
RIGHT	196,700	43.7	70	195,562	42.0	68	218,020	28.0	45
Radical	89,922	19.9	39	100,869	21.7	34	103,650	13.3	18
Falange Nac./ Democracia Nac.	11,565	2.6	3	18,221	3.9	3	22,353	2.9	3
Agrario Laborista				38,742	8.3	14	118,483	15.2	26
Others	39,075 ⁴	8.7	11	60,869 ⁵	13.2	16	137,747 ⁶	17.6	21
CENTER	140,562	31.2	53	376,553	47.1	67	382,233	49.0	68
Socialista de Chile	32,314	7.2	6	15,676	3.4	5	41,679	5.4	9
Socialista Popular				22,631	4.9	6	68,218	8.8	20
Progres. Nac./ Comunista	46,133	10.3	15						
Others	25,104 ⁷	5.6	3	5,125 ⁸	1.1	1			
LEFT	103,551	23.1	24	43,427	9.4	12	109,893	14.2	29

*Parties that received more than 5% of the total vote in more than one election.

**Combined votes from the Conservative and United Conservative parties.

(1) Liberal Progresista party (2) Includes the Conservador Tradicionalista and the Liberal Progresista parties (3) Nacional Cristiano party (4) Includes the Agrario, Alianza Popular Lib., Democratico de Chile, Dem(0) de Chile parties. (5) Includes Radical Doctrinario, Radical Demo., Dem. de Chile, Dem(0) de Chile, Dem. del Pueblo Accion Renov. de Chile., Mov. Soc. Cristiano parties (6) Includes Agrario, Mov. Nac. Pueb., Unidad Popular, Acc. Ren. de Chile, Laborista parties (7) Socialista Autentico party (8) Socialista Autentico

TABLE 1 (cont.)

ELECTION OF DEPUTIES: RESULTS BY PARTY

Party	1957			1961			1965		
	#votes	%vote total	#dep.s elected	#votes	%votes total	#dep.s elected	#votes	%vote total	#dep.s elected
Cons. Unido	154,877 ¹	17.6	23	198,260 ²	14.3	17	121,822	5.2	3
Liberal	134,741	15.4	30	222,485	16.1	28	171,979	7.3	6
Nacional									
Others	47,060 ³	5.9	7						
RIGHT	336,678	38.9	60	420,745	38.4	45	293,801	12.5	9
Radical	188,526	21.5	36	296,828	21.4	39	312,912	13.3	20
Falange Nac./ Democracia Crist.	82,710	9.4	17	213,468	16.1	28	995,187	42.3	82
Agrario Laborista	68,602	7.8	10						
Others	87,320 ⁴	9.9	10	95,179 ⁵	6.9	12	111,275 ⁶	4.7	3
CENTER	427,158	48.6	73	605,475	44.4	79	1,419,374	60.3	105
Socialista de Chile	38,783	4.4	7	149,122	10.7	12	241,593	10.3	15
Socialista Popular	55,004	6.3	5						
Progresista Nac./ Comunista				157,572	11.4	16	290,635	12.4	18
Others									
LEFT	93,787	10.7	12	306,694	22.1	28	532,228	22.7	33

(1) Combined voting of the Conservador and Conservador Unido parties (2) Conservador Unido (3) Includes Nacional and Nacional Cristiano parties (4) Includes Radical Doctr., Democratico, Mov. Repub., Mov. Rep. de Pueblo, Laborista and Del Trabajo parties (5) Democratico Nac. (6) Democratico, Democratico Nac. and Accion Nacional parties

TABLE 1 (cont.)

ELECTIONS OF DEPUTIES: RESULTS BY PARTY

Party	1969			1973		
	#votes	%vote total	#dep.s elected	#votes	%vote total	#dep.s elected
Conservador						
Liberal						
Nacional	480,523	20.0	33	777,084	21.1	
Others						
RIGHT	480,523	20.0	33	777,084	21.1	
<hr/>						
Radical	313,559	13.0	24	133,751	3.6	
Falange Nac./ Democracia Crist.	716,547	29.8	56	1,049,676	28.5	
PAL						
Others						
CENTER	1,030,113	42.8	80	1,183,427	32.1	
<hr/>						
Socialista de Chile	294,448	12.3	15	678,674	18.4	
Socialista Popular						
Prog. Nac./ Comunista	383,049	15.9	22	595,829	16.2	
Others						
LEFT	971,945	28.2	37	1,274,503	34.6	
<hr/>						

TABLE 2

GAINS AND LOSSES OF CHILEAN PARTIES BY COMMUNE FROM 1961-1973

	Communes where parties lost		Communes where parties gained percentage		Communes where parties had high gains*		Average gain or loss in all communes	
	No.	Percentage	No.	Percentage	No.	Percentage	No.	Percentage
Communist	70	-5.5	216	10.9	89	18.9	287	6.9
Socialist	65	-7.6	221	11.6	86	20.4	287	7.3
Christian Democrats	24	-9.2	262	16.3	112	25.0	287	14.2
Radicals	268	-17.8	18	7.6	8	12.9	287	-16.2
Nationals	263	-16.7	23	7.1	9	15.4	287	-14.8
Others	82	-11.5	204	8.4	149	11.0	287	2.7

Source: Data compiled from the Dirección del Registro Electoral, Santiago, Chile

*Note: High gaining communes are those in which the party exceeded its national average

TABLE 3

FRACTIONALIZATION, INDEX, NUMBER OF PARTIES AND RELATIVE WEIGHT OF THE FIVE
LARGEST PARTIES IN CHILEAN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS FROM 1932-1973

	<u>1932</u>	<u>1937</u>	<u>1941</u>	<u>1945</u>	<u>1949</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1957</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1973</u>
Rae Index	.903	.865	.861	.854	.870	.929	.890	.860	.770	.815	.815
No. of Parties w/ Seats in Congress	17	11	12	12	14	18	13	7	7	5	
Percentage of the Vote Obtained by the 5 Largest Parties	58.8	76.8	81.7	78.6	74.0	58.3	52.5	78.6	85.6	90.9	87.8
Percentage of the Seats Obtained by the 5 Largest Parties	74.6	76.8	87.7	86.4	81.6	70.5	77.5	83.6	95.9	100	100
Laakso and Taagera Index	10.03	7.4	7.2	6.8	7.7	13.2	9.1	7.1	4.3	5.4	5.4

Source: Data compiled from the Dirección del Registro Electoral, Santiago, Chile

TABLE 4

PERCENTAGE OF THE VARIANCE (R^2) IN THE FRAGMENTATION INDEX EXPLAINED BY VARIOUS SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN SELECTED CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

	Urbanization	Commune Size	Percentage Population in Mining
Frg. 61	.07	.11	.006
Frg. 65	-.003	-.003	.01
Frg. 69	.08	.03	-.001
Frg. 73	.02	.04	.07

	Percent Population in Agric.	Percentage Population in Working Class Occupations	Percentage Population in Middle Class Occupations
Frg. 61	.14	.006	.002
Frg. 65	.01	.006	-.007
Frg. 69	.05	.002	.007
Frg. 73	-.003	.002	.0006

n=287 all Chilean Communes

Source: Data compiled from the Dirección del Registro Electoral, Santiago, Chile

TABLE 5

PARTY COMPETITION INDICES FOR FRANCE AND CHILE
AND FOR CHILEAN REGIONS IN A CONGRESSIONAL AND A MUNICIPAL ELECTION

	<u>France</u>	<u>Chile</u>	<u>Region I</u>	<u>Region II</u>	<u>Region III</u>
Congressional Election	3.37	3.95	3.86	3.86	4.05
Municipal Election	1.64	3.83	3.89	3.95	3.73

	Region IV	Region V	Region VI	Region VII	Region VIII
Congressional Election	4.0	4.12	3.92	4.08	3.25
Municipal Election	3.84	3.79	4.10	3.53	3.61

n=all Communes

Source: Data compiled from the Dirección del Registro Electoral, Santiago, Chile

TABLE 6

PERCENTAGE OF POLARIZED COMMUNES AND AVERAGE VOTE
 IN POLARIZED COMMUNES
 BY TENDENCY IN 1961, 1969, and 1973*

	1961	1969	1973
Percentage Polarized Communes	35% (102)	27% (77)	55% (158)
Percentage Left	30.0%	29.4%	34.7%
Percentage Center	33.1%	40.7%	33.1%
Percentage Right	33.8%	25%	25.6%

*Note: Polarized communes are defined as those in which the Right and Left each obtained more than 25% of the vote

Source: Data compiled from the Dirección del Registro Electoral, Santiago, Chile

TABLE 7

PERCENTAGE OF THE VARIANCE IN PARTY VOTE (R^2) EXPLAINED BY VARIOUS
OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES IN THE 1969 AND 1971 CONGRESSIONAL AND MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

	1969	1971
Nationals	.17	.16
Communists	.33	.32
Socialists	.08	.09
Christian Democrats	.08	.07
Radicals	.07	.05

n=287

Source: Data compiled from the Dirección del Registro Electoral, Santiago, Chile

TABLE 8

CROSS TABULATION OF SELF IDENTIFICATIONS OF POLITICAL PREFERENCE AND SOCIAL CLASS
 Respondents Classify Themselves on Political Tendency and Social Class

	<u>Social Class</u>											
	Upper		Upper Middle		Lower Middle		Working		No Answer		Total	
	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
<u>Right</u>	11	78.6	67	33.0	98	32.8	60	29.4	17	54.8	253	31.4
<u>Center</u>	3	21.4	63	31.0	59	19.7	19	9.6	0	0.0	144	17.8
<u>Left</u>	0	0.0	37	18.2	58	19.4	100	31.1	3	9.7	198	24.5
<u>Other</u>	0	0.0	4	2.0	4	1.3	3	0.7	1	3.2	12	1.5
<u>No Answer</u>	0	0.0	32	15.8	80	26.8	78	29.2	10	32.3	200	24.8
<u>Total in Sample</u>	14		203		299		250		31		807	

Source: International Data Library and Reference Service, Survey Research Center, University of California, Berkeley, 1958 Presidential Election Survey in Santiago, Chile.

TABLE 9

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE VOTE FOR MAJOR CHILEAN PARTIES
IN THE 1963 AND 1971 MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS BY
COMMUNE, FOR THE NATION, MAJOR URBAN CENTERS, AND EIGHT REGIONS

	Communist	Socialist	Radical	Christian Democrat	National
Nation	.84	.53	.45	.27	.72
Major Urban Centers	.85	.39	.82	.49	.71
Region I Tarapaca-Coquimbo	.83	.60	.43	.47	.65
Region II Aconcagua-Valparaiso	.80	.60	.67	.27	.73
Region III Santiago	.83	.22	.55	.23	.64
Region IV O'Higgins-Nuble	.74	.60	.42	.12	.73
Region V Concepcion-Arauco	.72	.59	.47	.69	.70
Region VI Bio-Bio-Cautin	.86	.28	.33	.03	.35
Region VII Valdivia-Chiloe	.57	.43	.05	.12	.60
Region VIII Aysen-Magallanes	.67	.60	.24	.93	.93

N=287

Note: The vote for the Conservative and Liberal parties was added for the 1963 election. Major urban centers are those with a population of over 50,000, a total of 40 communes.

Source: Electoral results available at the Dirección del Registro Electoral, Santiago, Chile.

TABLE 10

RECENT PRESIDENTS AND APPROXIMATE STATUS OF COALITION AND CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT

President	Years	Presidential Coalition Parties	Majority/Minority Status	Core Support
G. González Videla 1946-1952	1946-1949	Radical Communist Falange Nacional	Minority	Radical
	1949-1952	Traditional-Conserv.s Liberal Radical	Minority	Radical
Carlos Ibañez 1952-1958	1952-1955	Agrarian-Labor Popular Socialist Other Left and Right Fragments	Minority	Agrarian-Labor
	1955-1958	Agrarian-Labor Other shifting support	Minority	Agrarian-Labor
Jorge Alessandri 1958-1964	1958-1960	Liberal (informally) Conservative (informally) Independent	Minority	
	1961-1963	Radical Liberal Conservative	Majority in Chamber Majority in Senate	Liberal Conservative
	1963-1964	Conservative Liberal	Minority in Chamber Minority in Senate	Liberal Conservative
Eduardo Frei 1964-1970	1964-1965	Christian Democrat	Minority	Christian Demo.
	1965-1969	Christian Democrat	Minority in Senate Majority in Chamber	Christian Demo.
	1969-1970	Christian Democrat	Minority	Christian Demo.
Salvador Allende 1970-1973	1969-1973	Socialist Communist Radical	Minority	Socialist Communist

Source: The most useful source in compiling this table was Lia Cortes and Jordi Fuentes, Diccionario Político de Chile (Santiago: Editorial Orbe, 1967). Many other secondary works were also consulted. It should be noted that the table is only approximate. It does not include more complex yearly variations, or variations on specific issues.


TABLE 11

CABINET CHANGES AND MINISTERIAL TURNOVERS IN CHILEAN PRESIDENCIES


Presidents	No. of Interior Ministers	No. of Partial Cabinet Changes	No. of Major Cabinet Changes	Total No. of Ministers	Average Length of Cabinets	Average Length of Ministerial Service
Arturo Alessandri 1932-1938	6	2	3	59	10 months	12 months
Pedro Aguirre Cerda 1938-1942	7	2	2	44	9 months	11 months
Juan Antonio Ríos 1942-1946	8	3	5	84	6 1/2 months	6 months
G. González Videla 1946-1952	4	2	2	73	7 months	11 months
Carlos Ibañez 1952-1958	8	3	5	75	7 months	12 months
Jorge Alessandri 1958-1964	2	1	1	20	29 months	43 months
Eduardo Frei 1964-1970	3	2	1	22	31 months	40 months
Salvador Allende 1970-1973	9	1	5	65	5 5/6 months	7 months

Source: For the first four administrations data drawn from information available in Luís Valencia A. Anales de la república, 2 Volumes (Santiago: Imprenta Universitaria, 1951). For the rest, the Hispanic American Reports, Facts on File, and the Mercurio Edición Internacional were consulted.


CHART 1: SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNES WHERE CHILEAN PARTIES RECEIVED HIGHEST 25% OF THE VOTE




Chile, Dirección Nacional de Estadísticas, Censo de Población, 1970; Chile, Dirección del Registro Electoral. Para 1961 y 1965 se combinaron los partidos Conservador y Liberal.




Chile, Dirección Nacional de Estadísticas, Censo de Población, 1970; Chile, Dirección del Registro Electoral. Para 1961 y 1965 se combinaron los partidos Conservador y Liberal.




Chile, Dirección Nacional de Estadísticas, Censo de Población, 1970; Chile, Dirección del Registro Electoral. Para 1961 y 1965 se combinaron los partidos Conservador y Liberal.



Chile, Dirección Nacional de Estadísticas, Censo de Población, 1970; Chile, Dirección del Registro Electoral. Para 1961 y 1965 se combinaron los partidos Conservador y Liberal.



Chile, Dirección Nacional de Estadísticas, Censo de Población, 1970; Chile, Dirección del Registro Electoral. Para 1961 y 1965 se combinaron los partidos Conservador y Liberal.



Chile, Dirección Nacional de Estadísticas, Censo de Población, 1970; Chile, Dirección del Registro Electoral. Para 1961 y 1965 se combinaron los partidos Conservador y Liberal.