

THE LATIN AMERICAN PROGRAM



Number 171

THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE RETURN TO DEMOCRACY
IN THE SOUTHERN CONE:

RAPORTEURS' REPORTS

Felipe Agüero, Charlie Gillespie, and Timothy Scully

WORKING PAPER SERIES



WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS
WASHINGTON, DC 20004-3027

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Rapporteurs' reports of presentations at the September 9-12, 1985 conference, "The Role of Political Parties in the Return to Democracy in the Southern Cone," sponsored by the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. and the World Peace Foundation, Boston.

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This collection of essays is one of a series of Working Papers of the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. The series includes papers by Program Fellows, Guest Scholars, interns, staff, and Academic Council, as well as work from Program seminars, workshops, colloquia, and conferences. The series aims to extend the Program's discussions to a wider community throughout the Americas, and to help authors obtain timely criticism of work in progress. Support to make distribution possible has been provided by the Inter-American Development Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Editor: Louis W. Goodman; Assistant to the Editor: Eric L. Palladini, Jr.

Single copies of Working Papers may be obtained without charge by writing to:

Latin American Program, Working Papers
The Wilson Center
Smithsonian Institution Building
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THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE
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INTRODUCTION

Louis W. Goodman

Since its inception in 1977, the Wilson Center's Latin American Program has most clearly expressed its normative commitment to democracy through support for the scholarly analysis of national political regimes in the region. In 1979 the program began a special focus on this topic by sponsoring a series of meetings and conferences entitled "Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe." The results of this ambitious effort, four volumes of essays co-edited by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, will be published in late 1986 by the Johns Hopkins University Press under the title Transitions from Authoritarian Rule.

In the seven years since the initiation of the "Transitions" project, there has been a momentous change in the character of the political regimes governing countries in Latin America. In 1979, fourteen of the twenty countries on the mainland between the Rio Grande and Tierra del Fuego were ruled by military governments. As of early 1986, only two of those fourteen continue to have military governments, Chile and Paraguay, and the one new military regime, Suriname, has scheduled national elections for 1986.

In part because of democracy's positive impact on national justice and civil rights, citizens throughout the hemisphere have broadly welcomed this change. But there has also been deep-rooted concern, based on the question, "Is the return to democracy permanent or is it part of a cycle of military and civilian regimes?" After all, in the late 1950s South America was largely military ruled; the 1960s saw mainly civilians at the heads of governments; and the 1970s witnessed the widespread military takeovers and abridgements of civil rights, from which the new democracies have emerged.

In an attempt to grapple with this question, and building on the work of the "Transitions" project, The Latin American Program undertook, together with the World Peace Foundation, to examine the role of one set of particularly important institutions in the process of the return to democracy -- political parties. Work on a political parties project began in 1983. It quickly became limited to the Southern Cone because of the complexity of the subject and the richness of the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. To date, the centerpiece of that effort is the conference whose discussion is reported in this Working Paper.*

*"The Role of Political Parties in the Return to Democracy in the Southern Cone," Washington, D.C., Sept. 9-12, 1985, sponsored by the Wilson Center, Latin American Program and the World Peace Foundation. Revised versions of papers based on the presentations summarized here will appear in Louis W. Goodman, ed., The Return to Democracy in South America.

The joint authors of the Working Paper are pursuing doctorates in political science and have served as summer interns for the Latin American Program. Each is engaged in research which promises to make a significant contribution to the comparative understanding of regime transitions. At the time of the publication of this paper, Felipe Agllero is in Spain carrying out field studies for his research on the civil-military relations in transitions to democracy, Charlie Gillespie is in New Haven, Connecticut completing the analysis of his study of the breakdown and return of democracy in Uruguay, and Timothy Scully is in Berkeley, California preparing for fieldwork on Chile's political system. Their conference planning work was invaluable far beyond their joint authorship of the Working Paper

With the publication of this Working Paper, one phase remains for the Wilson Center-World Peace Foundation project on the role of political parties in the return to democracy in the Southern Cone. This is the publication of an edited volume of revised conference essays. It is anticipated that this volume will be ready to go to press in mid-1986.

The substantial investment of Program resources in this project and its predecessor reflects the high value the Wilson Center's Latin American Program has placed, since its inception, on knowledge creation about the democratic political process. It is hoped that dissemination of the proceedings and papers of this conference will advance both the scholarly literature and the conduct of democratic politics in the region.

CREATING STABLE POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEMS:
LESSONS FROM HISTORY¹

Speaker:
David Collier
University of California,
Berkeley

The prospects for a successful restoration and consolidation of democracy in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and, hopefully, Chile, can only be fully appreciated in relation to their prior experiences of authoritarianism, which were, for each, a national tragedy. Current discussions surrounding the return to democracy must not lose sight of the lessons that can be drawn from asking questions about this recent history: Why did democracy breakdown in these four countries? How can authoritarianism be avoided in the future?

This essay is organized around three analytical tasks put forth by David Collier, which need to be addressed within each national context if current efforts at redemocratization are to take advantage of the lessons the tragic authoritarian experiences offer. First, the international political context of the 1980's differs radically from that which characterized the region in the 1960s and 1970s. Collier insisted that such differences are consequential. Second, Collier underlined two sets of contrasts among the countries that serve to highlight themes in all four country papers. On the one hand, a critical distinction must be maintained between political challenges to the dominant system arising within the office of the national executive itself, as opposed to challenges from "outside." On the other hand, it should be seen that differences in the way legal and political incorporation of labor occurred in the various cases appear to set in motion different patterns of political change. Third, national party politics and political competition, both prior to the breakdown of democracy and subsequent to its establishment, require further analysis if political party systems in the four countries are to avoid future breakdown and a return to authoritarianism.

Changed Political Contexts

Collier stressed the difference between the political contexts of the 1960s and 1970s (when the breakdowns occurred), and the 1980s -- both regionally, as well as outside Latin America. Politics in the region during the 1960s experienced a process of "ideological escalation,"² wherein policy alternatives were seen to be necessarily antagonistic and conflictual. In the 1960s and 70s, the Cuban revolution figured prominently in the political agenda of the countries of the region. The search for a "fundamental solution," a revolutionary alternative, was very much

1. Primary responsibility for authorship of this section rests with Timothy Scully.

alive. In the 1980s, this alternative is no longer on the agenda in much of Latin America. Despite Nicaragua's "revolution," it does not represent a serious political alternative for the countries of the Southern Cone.

The world wide political context in the 1960s and 70s, set the stage for dramatic social and political mobilization in the periphery, through the war in Vietnam, the resulting anti-war movement in the United States, widespread urban social protests, the cultural revolution in China, and increasingly polarized political expectations in developing nations. The 1980s, in contrast, present the emerging democracies in Latin America with very different political alternatives. It is important to recognize that this change is not trivial.

The revolutionary alternatives of the 1960s and 70s provided the incentive for Albert O. Hirschman to develop a logic of "reform-mongering" and problem solving describing the pattern of interactions among those who favor reform and those who resist it.³ Perhaps in today's context, in the absence of revolutionary alternatives, the threat of catastrophic national economic decline, the loss of the welfare gains made in past decades, and long-term stagnation might provide the basis for a new kind of reform-mongering logic. Today, it is not the fear of revolution, but the specter of long-term economic decline which confronts the region and expresses itself as a profound "deflation of developmental expectations." What coalitions, Collier asked, can be formed around this major, negative alternative which might transform it into a Hirschmanian "blessing in disguise"? Possible contemporary examples of such coalition forming in the face of economic adversity are the Alfonsín administration's anti-inflation campaign and Alan Garcia's new style of reform-mongering in response to the debt. Will Uruguay and Brazil abandon their cautious stabilization policies to reach for a new logic of reform as a possible exit to economic constraints?

In sum, political opportunities and constraints confronting the emerging democratic regimes of the region are very different today from those of the 1960s and 70s. The international context of the 1980s does not encourage the kind of social and political mobilization which characterized the earlier period. Furthermore, the region is saddled with huge debts and is faced with the possibility of a catastrophic, long-term downward economic spiral.

This changed context has important implications for understanding the role of political parties in the transition to democracy. The wide use of Sartori's analytical tools for understanding Latin American political party systems and the widely held belief that political parties in some countries are essentially the same as those previous to the authoritarian experience must be placed in proper context by specifying very concretely this changed international milieu.

2. For a further development of this notion, see Hirschman, A.O. "The Turn to Authoritarianism in Latin America and the Search for its Economic Determinants," in The New Authoritarianism. Ed. David Collier. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, p. 85.

Two Sets of Contrasts Among the Countries

To highlight important contrasts, which emerged in the country-papers presented at the conference, among the political systems of the four countries, Collier suggested that two sets of contrasts among the four country cases be underlined. Noting that the period of the rise of authoritarianism was one of acute political opposition and polarization in all four cases, a distinction should be made between political challenges to the dominant system, which arose within the national executive itself, and challenges from the "outside." The type of political polarization generated by radical alternatives of the left emanating from the center of the dominant system, as in Brazil (Goulart) or Chile (Allende), was qualitatively different from the type resulting from a threat "outside" the dominant system. In Argentina and Uruguay, where the traditional parties of the center continued to hold power, the revolutionary alternative never captured the power of the state.

The second set of contrasts deals with the differences among the countries in the way in which legal and political incorporation of labor occurred. Authoritarianism in all four cases was preceded by a major episode of labor protest and militancy. Viewing the cases in comparative perspective, however, differences in the type of labor incorporation appear to set in motion different patterns of political development. For example, in Mexico and Venezuela, the major parties of the center remained in control of the national executive as well as being closely tied to organized labor. For better or for worse, this insured regime continuity. Employing a term used by Torcuato di Tella, the party systems of Mexico and Venezuela can be characterized as "multiclass integrative."⁴ These two cases stand in sharp contrast to Brazil and Chile, two countries where labor and the left parties were not closely tied to the center parties and where the center lost control of the national executive. In Uruguay, on the other hand, the traditional parties retained control of the national executive, but developed limited ties to labor. Indeed, the Uruguay case was marked by an acute labor crisis. Finally, in Argentina, labor was connected to the Peronists, yet within the particularly dialectical context of Argentine politics, this major political party was banned, leading to what Guillermo O'Donnell has insightfully called an "impossible game."⁵

3. Hirschman develops his model of reform-mongering extensively in Journeys Toward Progress: Studies of Economic Policy-Making in Latin America. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1965.

4. Di Tella, Torcuato "Populism and Reform in Latin America" in Ed. Claudio Valdez The Politics of Conformity in Latin America. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.

5. O'Donnell, Guillermo "An Impossible Game: Party Competition in Argentina: 1955-1966" in Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism. Berkeley, California: Institute of International Studies, 1973.

The Nature of Party Competition

The third analytical task which Collier identified as critical for understanding the lessons of the past is directed toward a deeper understanding of the nature of the party systems prior to the rise of authoritarianism, an appreciation of the ways in which they have changed, and a realistic appraisal of their capacity to pose new political alternatives. How did the structure of political party competition contribute to the rise of authoritarianism? What kinds of political engineering might structure party behavior in such a way as to prevent a future breakdown?

With a view to a fuller understanding of the structure of political competition, Collier concluded by repeating four counterfactual questions which had been prepared for this session of the conference:

1. How can a political system be created in Argentina that a) represents all important viewpoints and b) effectively mediates between interest groups?
2. How can Brazil's federal politics-state politics schism be controlled so that a breach facilitating the entry of authoritarian rule is not again created?
3. Does healthy, pluralist competition in Chile's multi-party system depend on a change in the nature of the center?
4. Is the continuance of a catch-all, two-party system best for strengthening Uruguayan democracy, or would a more ideological, multi-party system be better?

From Utopias to Political Realism

In the lively discussion that followed Collier's presentation, participants attempted to specify further the nature and meaning of the changed political contexts. In general, the participants reacted against what they felt was an overly pessimistic presentation by Collier of the constraints facing new democratic regimes. One discussant suggested that, while it may be true that the 1960s and 70s presented a structure of political alternatives more favorable to reform than the contemporary context, politicians were incapable of taking advantage of those opportunities. Constraints may be greater, but the lower ideological content of contemporary politics and the common experiences of authoritarianism might enable renewed efforts to succeed. Another participant insisted that the pertinent question is not whether the political context has changed, but rather, given the changed context, what political structures are appropriate to the new situation.

Another participant noted that the most important change in the political context of the region was the rediscovery of the value of formal democracy. This was exemplified in the tone of the debate among the participants. Formal elements of political systems, such as habeas

corpus and the value of political constitutions, are now more appreciated. The discussions among the politicians present at the conference manifested a change from the grand utopias of the 1960s and 70s to a very basic discussion of how to create political systems that last. This changed tone is partly the result of the authoritarian experiences for which all present share the blame.

The real change among the countries of the region, one commentator suggested, has to do with the diminished role of violence as an instrument of political change. The utopias of the 1960s and 70s, both on the right and the left, were exclusionary political regimes based on violence. Now, social conflict is possible without violence. Another discussant added that the political alternatives of the earlier period were almost invariably presented as antagonistic (zero-sum). This created a "winner take all" climate among the competing groups.

One discussant cautioned that, in speaking of political millenarism, it should be remembered that, while the activism of leftist parties did deepen political polarization, the right was also convinced that society could be refashioned according to its designs. The societies of these countries were undone by the utopias of the right as well as the left. Again, it was noted that the tone of the debate is no longer of grand utopianisms, but of democracy as a value in itself.

A Deflation of Developmental Expectations?

Several participants reacted to Collier's notion of a "deflation of developmental expectations." One member of the Brazilian delegation argued that, at least in the case of Brazil, such a description is inaccurate. Brazil of 1985, as a political reality, has very little in common with that of 1964 Brazil. Huge demographic and economic changes have taken place. There is no reason to think that Brazil has experienced such a deflation. Indeed, if anything, the reverse is the case. Contemporary Brazil is characterized by a far more developed civil society than it was in 1964. Furthermore, political mobilization is much more extensive than in pre-coup Brazil. Therefore, the new context actually favors reform.

Unlike the Brazilian participants, the Uruguayans agreed with Collier's assessment of a deflation of developmental expectations. But, they insisted, this deflation is not part of a changed political context. It has formed part of the political landscape since 1956. One member of the delegation insisted upon the preeminent political importance of economic stagnation and said that without economic improvement, long-term political stability is impossible.

The Nature of the Center

Finally, in discussing the nature of party competition, one member of the Chilean delegation observed that the central question facing the future of democracy in that country is, in fact, the nature of the center (Christian Democrat) party. Historically, Chilean democracy depended on the coalition-making ability of the traditional party of the center, the Radical Party. With the capture of the political center by the Christian Democrats, a complete change in the structure of political competition developed.⁶ This explains the extreme political polarization and the ensuing centrifugal competition that characterized the Chilean political system beginning in the middle sixties. The Christian Democratic Party attempted to present itself as a partido único, and to implement profound social changes when they represented no more than a third of the electorate. The cost of this "majoritarian" attitude was democracy itself.

Both David Collier's presentation, as well as the forceful discussion which followed, placed in high relief the changed political contexts confronting the countries of the region as they proceed to attempt to reestablish democracy. The utopias of both the right and the left have receded in three of the countries, with the radical right and left remaining in Chile. How enduring the politics of moderation will be is an unknown. The economic constraints are as apparent as overwhelming. The possibility of catastrophic, long-term decline, while varying in intensity among the cases, could possibly lead to a downward spiral and a reversal of the current trend toward redemocratization. Alternatively, it could provide a starting point for the redefinition of a severely constrained situation leading to new and previously undiscovered possibilities.

6. This hypothesis is discussed at length in Valenzuela, Arturo "Chile" in Ed.s Linz, Juan, and Alfred Stepan The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Johns Hopkins Press: Baltimore, 1978.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SOUND ELECTORAL
AND POLITICAL LEGISLATION¹

Speaker:
Juan Linz
Yale University

Recently, Latin American political scientists, as well as scholars in other regions interested in the political development of Latin America, have not paid particular attention to the importance of Constitutions and formal or de jure institutions in the continent. In part this represents a reaction against the traditional legalistic school of Latin American political science, with the simultaneous advent of Marxist and dependency schools in the South, and behaviorist schools in the North. As these competing schools have abandoned some of their ideological defences, producing increasing degrees of cross-fertilization, and even convergence, a corresponding realization has occurred that the role of electoral and institutional systems has been neglected for too long. Interestingly, this process of academic "self-criticism" neatly parallels the reevaluation of formal democracy by the wider community of Latin American intellectuals, and the varied actors of political society. Renewed concern with creating stable institutions would probably not have occurred, had there not been a reaction to the calamity of 'new' authoritarian regimes which spread across the Southern Cone, and an anguished reappraisal of the transcendent importance of civil and political liberties. From a more academic viewpoint, then, the normative (ideological) shift is accompanied by a methodological one: the re-establishment of the importance of 'the political' as such--and the abandonment of theories which attempt to reduce all political outcomes to the interplay of underlying social and economic formations.

For three decades diagnoses of Latin America's ills have examined a catalogue of problems such as inequality of land tenure, subordinate integration into the world economy based on the export of primary products, the penetration of foreign capital, technological backwardness and/or (paradoxically) in-appropriateness, and the exhaustion of import-substituting industrialization. Every facet of economic development has been probed, and corresponding linkages to social development, uncovered in both directions. Political development, however, has too often been seen as the derived product (or non-product!) of these processes. In essence, the intention of Juan Linz's thought-provoking essay is to return to a politician's perspective on the problem of promoting regime stability, in a region in which even limited developmental achievements seem to merely multiply social problems, and stability has been all too rare.

¹Primary responsibility for authorship of this section lies with Charlie Gillespie.

A. The Rediscovery of Politics

Linz's presentation opened with a general critique of economic reductionism in political analysis, pursuing recent research on the origins of Fascism and the historic struggle for democracy in Europe as a relevant lesson for Latin America. Above all, Linz argued, the stability of a political system when subjected to social and economic "shocks" will depend on its legitimacy --a concept which it is necessary to maintain rigidly distinct from the system's level of performance.² To begin with, the economic crisis which racked the world economy following the Wall Street crash of 1929 had very different impacts in different countries, as Zimmerman has shown.³ Apart from this, however, countries in which the slump was comparably severe--for instance Germany, Holland and the United States--experienced quite different political consequences.⁴ In both the latter countries, democracy was able to weather the storm and undergo a reconsolidation. One of the important distinguishing features between cases of democratic breakdown and survival is the question of who (or what) is blamed for economic crises.

In Weimar Germany, the reparations demanded for alleged 'war-guilt' were used by Chancellor Bruening as a scapegoat in order to avoid responsibility for taking constructive economic measures to lessen the impact of the slump and mass unemployment.⁵ In particular, Bruening wanted to strengthen his position vis-a-vis the allies, with whom he was hoping to renegotiate the terms of the Versailles settlement. Meanwhile, however, nothing was done to alleviate economic suffering. Tragically, however, the Nazis were able to extend the blame for this social and economic catastrophe from the allies to the German leaders who had signed the treaty, and the Weimar Republic which they had built up, following the collapse of the Empire. Simultaneously, the legitimacy of the political system was attacked from the opposite extreme by Communists who blamed the

²On the distinction between performance and legitimacy see Juan Linz's introductory essay, "Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration," Volume 1 of The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, edited By Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

³Ekkart Zimmerman, "The 1930s World Economic Crisis in Six European Countries," in Paul M. Johnson and William R. Thompson eds., Rhythms in Politics and Economics (New York: Praeger, 1985).

⁴The rise of Nazism in Germany, the New Deal in America, Britain's National Government and the French Popular Front are relatively familiar to even the most historically illiterate political scientist. A recent book covers the fascinating and less well-known consequences of the depression for Europe's small states with their more open economies: Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985).

⁵On Bruening's economic policy errors, see Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression: History of the World Economy in the Twentieth Century Vol 4 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

crisis on the natural workings of the capitalist system. Ultimately, delegitimation of the socio-economic order (intentionally or unintentionally) spilled over into delegitimation of the democratic republic. Linz was concerned that the gravity of the debt crisis in Latin America might have a similar effect in terms of destabilizing institutions. Of course, so far, this crisis has been an ally of democracy in the Southern Cone, where it speeded up the demise of authoritarianism. The future prolongation of the crisis, however, could have an equally damaging effect on democratic institutions, just as it may have in other Latin American nations that were able to resist authoritarianism from the 1960s until now. Might political amnesia lead to democracy being unjustly 'blamed' for a problem which was in fact generated by the interaction of the world economy with Latin America's peculiar developmental problems, and vastly exacerbated by authoritarian regimes? The parallel opportunities for Left and Right extremists are unsettling.

The danger of such a pattern merely serves to increase the importance of boosting political legitimacy from other directions. Although democracy had a chequered history in Europe until 1945, since the end of World War II it has been one of the most stably democratic regions of the world, particularly outside the established anglo-saxon democracies. With the exception of France since 1958, and a few other hybrid cases such as Portugal since 1975, European democracies have been parliamentary rather than presidential. In this respect they stand markedly apart from the United States, the oldest democracy in the Western Hemisphere, and the one which provided Latin America with its hegemonic constitutional model. One of the major reasons for the predominance of parliamentarism in Europe was, of course, the survival of Constitutional monarchy in most Northern nations. The monarch (or Governor General on his or her behalf in Commonwealth countries) acts as Head of State, a role otherwise allotted to Presidents. Historically, Parliaments survived as relics of feudal resistance to royal absolutism only later to be adapted as the vehicle of liberal and democratic oppositions. Particularly in France, however, the parliamentary form of government which had developed as executive power came under legislative control was subject to sustained criticism. The major failing of parliamentarism was allegedly a tendency towards executive instability, brought on by the need for coalition government under proportional electoral systems and multipartism. Any shift in the electoral tactics of a minor party might produce a cabinet crisis and force the resignation of the Prime Minister, leaving the country without an executive until a new governing alliance could be reconstructed in the National Assembly.⁶

In fact, however, Linz asserts that even fully presidential systems have more often not been accompanied by political stability. This stems from the fundamental duality of legitimacy between the executive and

⁶A few republics have attempted to strengthen the executive by giving enlarged powers to the presidency, while retaining the office of Prime Minister as well. The resultant semi-presidential hybrid has not had a happy record where it has been attempted (Weimar Germany and contemporary Portugal).

legislature, and the consequent danger of constitutional deadlock. The third independent institutional authority, the Judiciary under the enlightenment doctrine of the separation of powers is often called upon to arbitrate such conflicts. Yet great strains are placed on supposedly "neutral" institutions such as constitutional courts when they are required to arbitrate jurisdictional disputes, producing the constant temptation of politicization. Of course, presidential democracy has survived for more than two centuries in the United States, and thus any account of why such a form of government is inherently unstable must first explain why it has been a success in that especially important case. Linz rests the case for US "exceptionalism" on the unique configuration of social, historical and political variables which one might trace back Tocqueville, later writers such as Sombart, or Lipset, today.⁷ Apart from such structural characteristics, which would presumably have made any form of democracy particularly stable, Linz suggests that Congressional power has been markedly developed in the USA. In other words, fears of an "Imperial Presidency" notwithstanding, the powers of Congress have been more real than those of the White House.

B. Fundamental Problems of Presidentialism

Whatever the specific explanation of the US case, most presidential regimes have not been a success, according to Linz. Several fundamental flaws or "risks" are inherent in the model in his view. The first he refers to as the ambivalence of executive authority. By this he means the conflict between the deliberate creation of a strong leader with concentrated personal powers of decision-making, and the simultaneous hedging around of that power with various constraints, including the ban on re-election. On the one hand, the Presidency is intended to embody the image of the nation united, elections taking on a plebiscitary character; and on the other, the office is entwined in a web of checks and balances. This leads into the second problem, which Linz refers to as double legitimacy. We have already mentioned the potential for executive-legislative conflict, but the formal danger of stalemate is highlighted by the practical workings of elections in Linz's view. In particular, legislators are by nature required to have strong local loyalties, whereas the President's constituency is more national. In Latin America, the parochialism of legislators may be reinforced by traditions of caciquismo and coronelismo (the system of strong local elites found in several variants ranging from traditional rural patrons to urban bosses). The upshot of two sets of elections based on differing constituencies can be the creation of parallel and opposing majorities, leading to dangerous disputes as to which is the more democratically representative institution. To take one example, no one in the United States nowadays questions the fact that all states have just two Senators, whatever their

⁷Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Revised translation by Phillips Bradley, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1945); Werner Sombart, Why Is There No Socialism in the United States? (New York: Pantheon, 1979); Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation (New York: Basic Books, 1963); See also Louis Hartz, The Founding of New Societies (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964).

size or populations. In situations of less developed institutional continuity and legitimacy, however, such questioning may be all too frequent. In Brazil, for example, the heavily urbanized state of São Paulo is particularly under-represented; the backward and rural North-East over-represented. Any future conflict between President and Congress would likely reopen this potentially divisive issue.

The third danger of presidentialism is the "winner take all" nature of direct executive elections, particularly where the Constitution does not require a run-off ballot until a candidate emerges with an overall majority of support. Thus Linz pointed out that Allende became President of Chile with a mere two per cent more votes than Adolfo Suárez in Spain's first parliamentary elections after Franco's death. Allende, however, embarked on a program of radical change for which he considered his election to the executive office gave him a full mandate. Suárez on the other hand pursued a policy of reconciliation with his opponents and a constant search for consensus, necessary if his government was to survive in the Cortes. In short, Utopianism gave way to pragmatism.

Such problems may be held to have both an institutional dimension, and what might be called a behavioral or a psychological one. Thus far we have merely considered the institutional dimension, but the situation of legislators is equally influenced by the latter type of variables. When they take up their seat they feel as if they are entering a community, which leads to physical proximity among fellow members of the political class, and increased opportunities for political communication. Some of these may take place in such informal contexts as the members' bar. What matters is that patterns of political recruitment and elite socialization are far more diverse and fragmentary in presidential systems. The executive becomes both physically and psychically more aloof. This constitutes a fourth problem for presidential systems which is exacerbated by the need for the Head of State to maintain a constant facade of dignity and authority. The latter requirement, indeed, may lead to a fifth difficulty, insofar as the constraints of office clash with his or her other roles, such as that of party leader. The transition from symbolic and ceremonial leader of all citizens to demagogic speaker at a party rally may be both difficult for the individual and damaging to the system itself.

C. The Link Between Flexibility and Stability

The sixth class of problems stems from what Linz identifies as the rigidity of presidentialism, and its major consequence: the serious hindrance of adaptation. In many ways this theme runs through much of what has been said up till now. On the one hand, elections tend to become polarized leading to the imposition of dichotomous choices on voters. This in turn forces the creation of broad electoral coalitions. Far from having a moderating tendency, however, this may paradoxically favor extremism, as the closeness of races requires resort to bargaining with minor (often more radical) parties, which may extract a disproportionate pay-off for their support. To return to the Spanish example: had there been a presidential election in Spain in 1976 or 1977, the Left would have been obliged to reach an electoral agreement uniting the Communists and

Socialists. The center and center-right lead by Suárez would then have faced the unpleasant choice of either a corresponding alliance with the rightist Popular Alliance of Manuel Fraga, whose enthusiasm for democracy was questionable, or risk an almost certain Left victory. Amidst such a polarization, Suárez would have been unlikely to be able to seek the consensus he required for the political reform, or the writing of a new Constitution. In sum, the Spanish case fully demonstrates the contribution of parliamentary flexibility to the creative adaption and evolution of institutions.

Some of the further rigidities of presidentialism emerge from the imposition of a fixed term of office, which we may consider to be the seventh problem. Impeachment of the President is such an extreme and difficult option, that to all intents and purposes in most Latin American countries it is easier to replace the President by military coup than by impeachment. Furthermore, the automatic ascension of the Vice-President to office can lead to some rather accidental results. Often the running mate may have been chosen as an outsider to the political class with few political qualifications and little relevance to the problems of office. One of the most disastrous examples of the irrationality and potential risks of such a system of automatic succession was the accession of Isabel Peron to the Presidency of Argentina in 1974 upon her husband's death. It is a further irony that a major claim for the presidential system in the first place is that it affords voters a direct choice in who will occupy executive office, a choice often denied them by the common practice of vice-presidential succession.⁸ Which reminds us of the eighth difficulty of presidentialism. Insofar as the real choices facing voters may nowadays be based on the difference between parties and programmatic or ideological alternatives, the introduction of a personalist dimension can be disruptive. Political energies are sidetracked into the struggle to become candidate. Of course, this criticism hinges on whether we accept the transcendence of party-centered politics.

The ninth risk of presidentialism stems from the difference in the fundamental nature of coalitions under this system compared to parliamentary democracy. Whereas in the former they are primarily oriented towards elections, in the latter they are oriented towards governing. Once elected, Presidents may abandon their former electoral allies, or vice versa. In both cases, Linz argues the result can be delegitimation of the executive, as the voters may not feel they are 'getting what they originally voted for'. It was argued that presidentialism institutes a form of "zero-sum" politics, though perhaps it would be more accurate to describe the "presidential game" as one in which the "payoff" is

⁸In the subsequent country session on Uruguay, a speaker mentioned that in that country, Vice-presidents had often turned out to be of great political relevance. The death of the President in 1947 led to the inauguration of one of the best leaders Uruguay had known, in his view. The death of another President twenty years later, also produced a very important President who, whatever one's personal opinions of his administration, came close to winning enough popular support for a Constitutional amendment to permit his re-election in 1971.

indivisible. Whoever wins the presidency amasses the entire bundle of state patronage powers, for example. Losers get nothing, and are usually punished by their parties who oust them from their leadership, or demote their faction in the intraparty hierarchy of influence. Where Presidents are limited to a single term of office, there emerges a ninth problem which Albert Hirschman has called la rage de vouloir conclure. By this is simply meant the feeling on the part of the executive that he must seize his one big chance to make his mark, to 'strike while the iron is hot'. If he does not, he will pass into history forgotten. The result is therefore liable to be discontinuity, as policy goes through abrupt lurches and personnel are completely renewed after each election. Paradoxically, parliamentarism may afford greater continuity in this respect. Furthermore, the limitation of Presidents to a single term can quite simply constitute a waste of valuable political talents, as successful leaders are forced to make way for their less distinguished successors. In Venezuela, for example, Linz argues that the capacities and prestige of former President Carlos Andres Perez surpassed those of later Presidents, even to the point of creating dangerous tensions and frictions.

D. Southern Cone Party Systems and Parliamentarism

In conclusion, those who argue that the parliamentary alternative would produce executive instability when coupled with multipartism would do as well look at the post-war stability of the Federal Republic of Germany, as at the instability of the French Fourth Republic. In all parliamentary democracies we see the emergence of trends which are in any case tending to introduce a plebiscitary dimension into parliamentary politics. These may be linked to the impact of television, the decline of parties (and related growth of public finance for their activities), the weakening of voters' party identification, and so on. The type of parliamentarism envisaged by Linz would not be the nineteenth century variety of chronically unstable alliances amongst scarcely organized factions and cadre parties. Nor would it be the rigid parliamentarism of the interwar years in which transformist cadres were more or less replaced by ideological mass parties which did not find coalition-building easy. Rather, what we might refer to as "late democratization" could in fact lead to precisely the kind of flexible parliamentarism, based on modern catch-all parties in which political competition becomes centripetal rather than centrifugal.

Whereas initial reactions to the idea of transplanting parliamentarism to Latin America might be rather skeptical, given the nature of charismatic and personalist leadership in the region, it was pointed out that the renewed search for consensus and the nurturing of democratic institutions referred to at the beginning might create a more innovative climate for reform. Yet comments were heard from those who argued that Latin America had had former experiences with parliamentarism, many of them unhappy. In the Argentine case, for instance, of the past forty years there had only been four in which there was a competitive party system (as opposed to one in which one party was effectively hegemonic; i.e. only liable to be dislodged by military coup, rather than election). It was also suggested that much of Europe's post-war democratic

success might be traced to international and economic factors, particularly the strategic dependence on the USA, and the growth of European Community institutions which circumscribe the powers of national parliaments. Such stabilizing elements were held to be missing in Latin America.

With respect to Uruguay, it was mentioned that many Uruguayans believe their system to embody effective ministerial responsibility, which is one of the cornerstones of the parliamentary system. Article 119 of the Constitution permits the interpellation and censure of Ministers. Since 1967, the President has had the power to over-rule one such vote of censure. If it is repeated, however, the result is a new (presidential and congressional) election. The rationale for ministerial interpellation was the introduction of a "fuse" which can "blow" so that governments, rather than regimes, fall as a result of crises or discontent. Thus it may be that the undeniable benefits of parliamentarism can be integrated into the Latin American presidency in a similar way to the Uruguayan provisions. Yet one of the major arguments for parliamentarism also encloses a potential danger--namely that it forces governments to reflect public opinion more closely and continuously. On the other hand, it may sometimes be the case that this responsiveness may become exaggeratedly immediate. An analogy was made to the dilemma of either buying new clothes or going on a diet, when ones old clothes are found to no longer fit. Often, discipline is the better solution. Similarly, the limiting of elections to every five years is needed to avoid the danger of a permanent campaign, and consequently irresponsible policies by incumbent governments (especially those office-holders, such as legislators, who may seek re-election). If the present situation of Uruguay is again considered, the elections of November 1984 gave the Colorado party a plurality of 100,000 votes, but no overall majority. Prime Ministerial government proper might lead to a temptation to change the government too often. In a healthy democracy, one should not hope for "revenge" before the next scheduled elections. The elected government has a job to do, to govern, and for this reason may in fact benefit from a fixed term in order to implement its program.

In response from the floor, the need was pointed out to distinguish between parliamentary systems in Europe and Latin America, as well as the difference between the two systems of parliamentarism and presidentialism in abstract terms, and as practical systems for periods of transition from authoritarian regimes. Hence it was no mere accident that it should be the writer on Chile, Arturo Valenzuela, who favors a parliamentary system for the reconstruction of democracy. Chile was precisely the country which exhibited the most fragmented party system (and thus where the danger was greatest of a minority President being elected, but also of parliamentarism producing unstable cabinet coalitions). The Argentine record of the past two years was mentioned as a factor in the cautious response to the idea of introducing parliamentary government by some participants. Already there are cases of legislative irresponsibility, conflicts with the executive, sterile opposition tactics, and so on. In one respect, Uruguay does appear to be different than other countries under consideration, insofar as historically, leaders have emerged from the Parliament, which is consequently more important and prestigious than

elsewhere. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of the emergence of Alfonsín in Argentina, of Sanguinetti in Uruguay, and perhaps García in Peru, seems to be symptomatic of a desire for leadership and strong government among the people. In many cases, the impression may be present that it was Parliaments that fueled the situations of crisis that resulted in military coups, whereas the strong presidency is the natural corollary of the current desire for leadership.

From a different perspective, one speaker questioned whether or not discussions until this point in both Collier and Linz's panels had not fallen into the trap of conflating the separate issues of political processes and party systems. Broader problems of political development and their role in political stability should not be neglected. On the simplest level, one should look at the varying rates of franchise extension in the different countries, prior to the advent of the "new" authoritarianism. Whereas the extent of political mobilization had been rather delayed in both Chile and Brazil, it was subsequently very rapid in Chile after 1958, while in Brazil the widening of political participation was smoother and rather more progressive. A similar contrast might be made between Argentina and Uruguay. In the former case, matters were made more complex by the proscription of the Peronists after 1955. In Uruguay the long history of party system stability was based on clientelism, with a fundamental result that the country was more exposed to damaging downturns in the world economy that reduce the available surplus to be distributed.

This kind of simple Huntingtonian analysis may be summed up by the great transformation of this century in Latin America--namely that political alternatives now had to address the masses rather than oligarchies and camarillas.⁹ If we look at the actual course of Brazil's transition, we see that it has escaped from the confines of an more or less engineered party system, leading to social polarization and street politics. The impact of the military regime has been the creation of a broader and more plastic society as industrialization and mobilization have increased. Whatever the residual local importance of the politics of patronage and clientelism, it is no longer viable at the national level. This has led to a loss of hegemony by traditional parties, and the introduction of "the people" as a constant reference in political discourse. In the current wave of redemocratization, the agenda consists not just of the question of political enfranchisement, but also the broader concerns of civil society, although this may even mean a more consensual political style is possible.

⁹Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

E. "Late Democratization": Learning from Mistakes¹⁰

Mention was already made of the importance of behavioral factors as well as institutional ones in making parliamentary systems more successful. One participant pointed out that there is little reason why some parliamentary patterns of behavior and attitudes could not be introduced into presidential institutions, with very beneficial results. By counterexample, Spain appears to have been adopting various rather presidentialist characteristics in recent times, though government remains formally in the hands of a Prime Minister. In France, on the other hand, the incorporation of the Communists into Mitterrand's first Administration permitted greater legislative coordination, although it was not needed to ensure a government majority. Initial changes in Latin America might most fruitfully, therefore, begin by the introduction of parliamentary elements into presidential systems, for example by Chile moving towards the Uruguayan system.

Emphasis was laid on the need to remember that the importance of institutions is such that reforms must be made with an eye to the next decades, not merely the next five years. The precarious capacity of political organization in Brazil, for instance, suggests that with specific regard to this country, Linz's proposals are valid, given the fluidity and amorphism of political society. Brazil's major need is not governments which "govern" in the sense of "ruling", but governments which negotiate, and proceed pragmatically.

With reference to the Argentine case, it was suggested that the urgent needs were for: stability; participation; and, government action. The death of Peron left a serious gap in leadership which (heaven forbid!) could equally reoccur today. Thus the presidential system does not

¹⁰Use of the expression "late democratization" is intended to reflect the fact that the Southern Cone countries are currently attempting to stabilize democracy in a particular epoch in which democracy is assured in advanced capitalist nations. The appeal of fascism as a non-democratic system of political legitimation has been destroyed, while state-socialist models seem to exercise their most fundamental attractions only in the context of extremely underdeveloped and unequal societies. On the one hand a certain amount of experience and political "capital" has thus been accumulated; some of which will be available to those willing to borrow it, or submit to demonstration effects, and processes of diffusion. On the other hand, technological, social and political change imply that modern parties have continued to evolve from the classic model of, for instance, the German Social Democratic Party in the first third of this century. The forward march of political mobilization, international economic interdependence and the growth of the state as an agent of social welfare and motor of development and accumulation, fundamentally transforms the demands placed on the political system, and thus the challenges facing democracies. Our use of the term, however, does not of course imply any historical ignorance of the fact that the struggle for liberal democracy in the region began at the beginning of the last century, at about the same time as in Europe, and only shortly after the United States.

necessarily produce stability if the requisite leadership is not present. The problem of participation and responsiveness does not require automatically getting rid of those in office so much as plasticity in policy-making and implementation. Finally, the nature of Argentine parties is such that they have grown up in the image of the presidential system, fundamentally reflecting it, and making an abrupt transition to parliamentarism risky. The introduction of parliamentary elements as an escape valve might, however, be possible.

In the Chilean case, a fellow speaker argued that all the worst possible mistakes had been made prior to the 1973 coup. A President was elected on a plurality rather than a majority shortly after the powers of the executive had been deliberately augmented. Nevertheless, it was suggested that Linz's portrayal of the dangers of presidential inflexibility should not necessarily lead to the conclusion that such rigidity is inevitable. On the contrary, much can be done to improve presidentialism. Finally, it is not so clear that Latin American democracies are in fact so presidential, given the influence of parties (sometimes leading to a situation known in Italian as partitocrazia). The weakness of Presidents vis-a-vis their own parties has often forced them to engage in long negotiations over cabinet formation, and subsequent efforts to coax support for their policies.¹¹

Responding to these points Linz stressed that the use of ideal types in his argument was merely convenient for the sake of exposition. Clearly the tendencies and patterns are not so clear cut in real life. On the other hand, those who believe that parliamentary systems cannot produce strong leadership are simply mistaken. Weber long ago pointed out the remarkable difference in the calibre of parliamentary politicians in late nineteenth century Britain and Germany. Where Westminster was able to produce such leaders as Gladstone, the Wilhelmine Federal Chamber was a far less politically powerful or salient institution, and its members were correspondingly less illustrious. To this extent, there may be a self-fulfilling prophecy, by which the calibre of legislative leadership under a presidential system is a poor guide as to the potential for parliamentary leadership were the presidency to be abolished. Responsible conduct is, in fact, a consequence of experience with parliamentarism.

The need for leadership is undeniable in the present conjuncture, but there is no reason why leaders of parties should not also lead the nation under a parliamentary scheme of government. The creation of a parliamentary "fuse" may or may not be beneficial, but Uruguay's situation is viable precisely so long as carisma and personalism are filtered by a strong political class. This has produced a leadership style which is by no means typical of populism, and removed the plebiscitary dimension. In broader terms, the danger of populism as a leadership style fostered by Latin American presidentialism is that social dualities are undervalued. Whether by the attenuation of territorial representation or the cooptation

¹¹With respect to this point, Linz's subsequent rejoinder was that the solution to the crisis might equally have been that the President acquire even more power, or failing that, less ambition.

of functional representation, leadership becomes divorced from the complexities of social formations, and a falsely homogenous image of the masses ensues. Clearly, populist tendencies are by definition restrained in parliamentary systems, while political representation reproduces the full fabric of the nation and its varied interest.

EMPOWERING CIVILIANS THROUGH
SOUND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS¹

Speaker:
Alfred C. Stepan
Columbia University

Alfred Stepan's opening remarks focused on the lack of civilian expertise on military affairs and on how this might imperil the prospects for democratic control.² The discussion that followed gave additional support to this view as participants described civilian weaknesses vis-a-vis the military in their respective countries.

If democracy is about the allocation and control of power, Stepan argued, then any significant wielder of public power should be the object of scrutiny in democratic politics. The military are a permanent power factor in almost any polity and more so in Latin America. The need for oversight of the military is therefore an apparently obvious corollary. However, an important condition to meet if this aspect of democratic politics is to be taken seriously is that civilian society, by revaluing democracy as a permanent end in itself, refrain itself from the habit of "knocking on the doors" of the barracks. Military leaders could not have garnered enough internal consensus for intervention without significant pressure civilians. Although this aspect of civilian restraint is a necessary condition for democratic politics, it is certainly not sufficient. Control and oversight of the military require knowledge and expertise in military affairs, something that is appallingly scarce in Latin American civil societies.

Military closure to social science investigation and blatant repression have certainly played a part in the scarcity. But the absence of studies on the military also has deep roots in some of the prevailing theories of society and politics. A "liberal bias" has doomed the military as an irrelevant research topic. Groups in civil society appear much more interesting and state-centered reducts are thus normatively downgraded. On the other hand, influential Marxist approaches have made it very difficult to focus on the military. The whole array of state institutions has been conceptualized within the functionalist assumption of their responsiveness to the requirements of capitalist domination. Even when

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1. Primary responsibility for authorship of this section rests with Felipe Agüero.
 2. See the conference paper, Stepan, Alfred and Fitzpatrick, Michael "Civil-Military Relations and Democracy: The Role of the Military in the Polity"; see especially the second part, "Democratic Control of the Military and Intelligence Systems."

the scheme grants some measure of autonomy to state institutions, this autonomy is viewed as a requirement for capitalist domination. Complex state bureaucracies are then rendered void of interest for research, since the real locus of power is seen to rest within the dynamics of class confrontation. A bureaucracy as complex as the military is obviously affected by the overall balance of class power. But this should not deny the fact that such organizations have interests of their own as well as special capacities to advance them. To know about this organization is inescapable if civilian control over it will be attempted.

The military has been a central power and a major allocator of resources in most Latin American societies. Yet, Stepan asserted that the study of the military has been largely neglected. It is hard to find articles on the military in social science journals in the region. If social scientists or members of the democratic movements do not concern themselves with the military or military-related issues, then matters that hinge upon the military are left entirely for the armed forces to decide. This represents an abdication on the part of civilians from day to day decision-making on crucial aspects regarding power in society. This prevents civilians from offering alternatives to much-criticised military-originated national security doctrines.

Furthermore, Stepan added, it is not only a question of social science analysis on the role of the military. It is also a question of developing technical capacities and expertise in fields that range from weapons systems, military budgets, military and draft organization, to geopolitics, international military politics, strategy, and territorial disputes. Civilian self-empowerment requires dropping the notion that military matters should be left to the military. And this implies developing the expertise and capacity for routine guidance.

Stepan pointed out that most advanced democratic societies have civilian research institutes that concentrate on the study of military-related issues. Developing this kind of institute in Latin America should be high on the agenda of civil society. They could work as the breeding ground for promoting civilian expertise on military matters. Otherwise the press will be unable to forcefully put these matters on the agenda as a mechanism for oversight and a means for bridging the gap between civilians and the military on matters of common concern. Furthermore, research institutes would help the executive and legislative branches in the exercise of their directive functions. A review of the emerging parliaments in the new South American democracies shows that not even in the specialized committees that deal with military, defense and security affairs is there any expertise that could support effective control, let alone formulation of military policy.

In the sphere of political society, Stepan argued, there is need for a deliberate strategy for the empowerment of legislatures for their routine guidance function. Most of all this requires a legislature supported by a cadre of professional staff members with expert knowledge of the field in its various dimensions. The oversight function by specialized standing committees ought to be routinized in such a way as to help reduce mutual fears and ignorance between military and civilian leaders.

At the level of the state, Stepan urged that the restructuring of military and intelligence systems in a manner more consistent with the normal checks and balances of democratic regimes should be sought, just as legislative and executive branch oversight mechanisms have been successfully established in many other countries. Participation of military officers in government cabinets does not provide an adequate means for the government to conduct military policy just as it does not serve the purpose of voicing the professional concerns of the military.

If military matters are deemed important and if the armed forces remain powerful, then a standing national security council might prove to be a good civil-military liason system. A civilian-led national security council with important military representation would provide the means for voicing institutional concerns. Giving the military statutory advisory capacity on such a council could in fact strengthen democracy. The "cybernetics" of democratic control requires that civilians have information about the sources of military anxiety. Such a council would be a good mechanism for the transmission of this information. In addition, the military are sensitive to, and frustrated by, the aforementioned civilian abdication and rightly perceive it as a lack of interest. Military leaders complain that when out of power, no one talks to them. Permanent military participation in an advisory body would solve this problem.

Stepan concluded that civilian self-empowerment means increasing civilian capacity for control in various spheres. Civilians should empower themselves and should do so with the knowledge that many initiatives might even present some advantage for the military as an institution and therefore gain adherents among them.

One participant questioned the wisdom of Stepan's proposals by examining the Brazilian case, paradoxically the same case with which Stepan dealt most deeply. In the view of this participant, Brazil is, of all Latin American nations, the polity where arenas for civil-military relations have developed most broadly. Civilian and military leaders have been interacting systematically in areas as diverse as public sector industries, computers, electronics, research and development, the Superior War College, and the civilian-dominated National Security Council. In the latter organization, he argued, civilians have been widely involved in the analysis of military matters. Yet, despite these day-to-day contacts between the military and civilians, there is no guarantee that the military will reduce their degree of involvement in the political affairs of Brazilian society. Indeed, it may well be that this involvement stems precisely from the intensity of civilian-military interaction. What one finds in Brazil is an attempt on the part of the military to tighten their control in several areas. They retain direction of the intelligence system, which is undergoing expansion, and they are requesting a special status in the institution. Military officers in the cabinet seem reluctant to accept ideological pluralism and claim that the national security doctrine should remain unchanged. In placing a note of pessimism on the efficacy of Stepan's proposal, this participant argued that decreasing the level of military participation in civilian activities ought to be the first step in the attempt to weaken the threat of political intervention by the military.

Stepan insisted that those arguments did not undermine his. In his view, mere civil-military interaction will not, in and of itself, lead to intervention or democracy. What is needed is an enhancement of the capacity of civilians to rethink military institutions, which means more expertise on the part of civilians.

Another participant from Brazil noted that the committee for national security in the Chamber of Deputies had no preparation whatsoever to deal with military matters. There is need to improve the technical capacity of the legislature in order to advance toward civilian political control.

Participants from Uruguay pointed to the change that has taken place in the sociological origins and the political "alignment" of military officers, and the positive impact this has had in terms of a new proximity between officers and governments. Until 1980, officers aligned themselves with the Colorados, but for the last fifteen years most generals have come from Blanco ranks though not necessarily in an ideological sense. Despite these alignment patterns there was always a plotting faction, as there will always be. The co-existence of past good civil-military relations with plotting tendencies did not end well, as was evidenced by the years of military intervention.

Another participant suggested that a serious effort should be made in the area of military education. Military schools that are separate from the rest of the educational system should be dismantled and officers should share part of their formation with civilian students in civilian institutes of higher education. Ideas of this kind are aimed at terminating the feudalization of power in several spheres, and certainly not exclusively in the military. Admittedly, however, civilians need to enhance their expertise on military matters. It was argued that in the short run, the immediate task confronting democrats is to ensure and consolidate the return to democracy. But the return to civilian life must be done in a way that does not threaten military life. In the long run, the military should be incorporated into the habits and fullness of democratic life. Areas for civil-military encounter should be found and nurtured. The crucial aspect here is the ability to draw these two sectors closer together. Confrontation will not work. It should be clear to all that the fight is not against the military, but with them. Education may play the important role of drawing together conceptual worlds otherwise too far apart.

Argentine participants referred to the corporatization trend in which the military were increasingly enmeshed since the 1960s. This trend ultimately worked to the benefit of the right, which, lacking votes, could not make itself heard without resorting to military conspiracy. All parties along the political spectrum, however, have denied in practice the importance of this military theme. Parties did not even seriously debate the military issue prior to Alfonsín's victory. Although the military issue did occupy much of Alfonsín's campaign agenda, and the pre-election climate witnessed mutual party accusations regarding the extent of their military links, parties never agreed on a common platform toward the armed forces.

Some progress has been made on the issue of civilian control since Alfonsín's inauguration. A new defense law has introduced organizational changes - a single Defense Ministry - and clarified military subordination to the president. The court trial of former commanders accused of human rights violations signaled the willingness to impose a new civil-military balance. However, participants maintained, the resistance of the military structure to outside control poses an enormous challenge to the pretense of civilian supremacy. For instance, the existence of more than ten different intelligence organizations among the services makes it virtually impossible for the government to exercise control. The government lacks the assistance of trained civilian personnel to accomplish an effective directive function and must rely on information totally controlled and produced by the services. A permanent commission for intelligence activities lacks any effectiveness. A permanent committee in parliament exists only formally. In addition, military academies remain intellectual ghettos, in which the topics of internal conflict and of Western/Marxist confrontation still prevail.

The Argentine participants concluded that they face severe difficulties for democratic transition and consolidation. Parties have neglected their role in civilian empowerment vis-a-vis the military. They will need to garner much expertise in areas such as the budget and more technologically sophisticated areas now controlled by the military.

Chilean participants added to the general impression of party backwardness with regard to military issues by admitting that these issues had never been on the agenda of inter-party discussion. This was true in the past, when military issues had no political salience, but also today, when approaching the topic seems inescapable. In the past the lack of a military policy by civilian governments clearly manifested itself in the staffing of the defense ministry with people who knew nothing about the field. Military grievances, on the other hand, found no channels for proper expression as civilians took military subordination for granted.

Looking to the future, participants from Chile pointed to some of the areas that democratic forces will have to confront with regard to the military. Institutional reorganization and the eventual role of a national security council will need much attention. Also, the political rights of members of the armed forces need clear treatment to establish consistent democratization of society. Broader issues linking domestic and international factors, such as the question of disarmament and military spending, will need much thought with the support of research centers. The complexity of these issues demands strong support from academic and policy-oriented research centers.

Another problem in Chile is that the authoritarian military culture has been strengthened during the Pinochet regime. The next democratic regime will have to expend serious effort to promote a culture within the ranks consistent with democratic politics. One participant mentioned as an example the publication in Spanish of books such as Huntington's The Soldier and the State, which, however outmoded in other contexts, might widen the cultural horizons of the Chilean military by using non-authoritarian intellectual treatments of military topics. This idea was

very much in line with the point raised by another participant who indicated that the democratic opposition must find ways to make military issues legitimate topics for open debate.

If the Chilean military leaders' world-view is resistant to outside cultural influences, in the words of one participant, they will be much more so in regard to socialist ideas. Furthermore, it is conceivable that the military will not easily tolerate the spread of these ideas. This poses a severe problem to civil society as a whole. Socialist ideas, especially in Chile, are quite extended and assumed by a large sector of the population. In a democratic context the military are forced to accept the cultural diversity in civil society, even if reluctantly. Socialists can not silence their world-view in the name of military retreat. However, civil society must tolerate its own cultural diversity in the first place. This participant raised the question as to whether all sectors in civil society have indeed accepted this, or whether some maintain the pretense of keeping the armed forces from an even exposure to all currents of cultural pluralism.

This participant also noted that most of the conditions that Stepan found favorable for achieving and enhancing civilian control in Brazil were not found in Chile.³ Budgetary trends in the military sector cannot continue to increase in Chile after the demise of authoritarianism; there is no comparable military-industrial complex in Chile to which the military could confidently retreat for alternative professional roles. Nor will they find there a domestic constituency and back-up for armamentist claims, and so on. All of which leads to conclude that the Chilean case seems the hardest in terms of the prospects for accomplishing satisfactory levels of civilian control consistent with the overall features of an eventual democratic arrangement.

Stepan joined the discussion at this point to conclude that Chile is certainly the most difficult case. One lesson from other cases he said is that accords for unity among civilian groups are critical. Agreement about the transition and the basic features of the future democratic order, plus ideas of what the role of the military will be in that order, help civilians augment their power vis-a-vis the military.

Such agreements should express a revaluation of democracy as an end in itself. Civilian groups should commit themselves to a sort of "vow of chastity" in not resorting to the military for their failure to get public support. Knocking on the doors of the barracks has proved to be risky business. That the military is a complex institution with interests of its own, means that critical moments may turn, as they did in "praetorian" decades in unexpected results for the groups initially supportive of military intervention.

This committment should be followed by the attempt to make the military force a legitimate, routine, and normal discussion as it should be in any democracy. The military needs to be shown that they are not the only ones

3. See footnote 2.

who care about national security. However, submitting military force to public discussion and exercising oversight functions require upgrading expertise on the matter on the part of civilians.

Stepan added that Argentina - where an extraordinary experiment in civilian control is being undertaken - dramatically exemplifies the difficulties that result from the lack of civilian expertise. An unprecedented reduction in military expenditure, cutting the budget in more than half, has been accomplished by the new administration. But despite budgetary reductions, not a single unit has been demobilized. Civilians lack the expertise to transform global policies, such as budget cuts, into the specific measures required to reach policy objectives. Civilians' upper hand vis-a-vis the military has been partly helped by military self-criticism after the Malvinas/Falklands defeat. A major part of the criticism revolves around the lack of joint service training that was behind the poor performance of Argentine forces. Civilians could make a favorable contribution of their own to military affairs by supporting joint military operations among the services through budgetary allocations. Again, lack of expertise prevents civilians from substantial leadership in such defense and military affairs.

A general impression from this session was that while there has been progress in the work of social scientists in the field of civil-military relations, practical approaches to this issue from civil society are still lacking. The influence of notions such as 'objective control of the military' developed by Huntington, or other works that relied on an objective structural balance between military and civilian power as a formula for democratic stability, have proved ill-suited to demands for restructuring civil-military relations for the purpose of strengthening the emerging democracies. Stepan's work places emphasis on the active role the civilian leadership plays in strengthening society's ability to deal with the military. While earlier works led to the conclusion that military matters should be left to the armed forces, Stepan stressed the dangers of civilian abdication in an area as essential to democracy as this one.

However, this session also showed that it will take time and effort before enough awareness develops among civilian leadership about their role in the much neglected field of military and defense policies, assuming a desire to refrain from exploiting "Brumairean moments."*

*For a definition of Brumairean moment, see La Grande Encyclopédie Larousse, vol. 7 (Librairie Larousse, 1973), p. 3898.

THE INTERPLAY OF
POLITICS AND ECONOMICS¹

Speaker:
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From the outset of his remarks, Albert Fishlow warned that his message would necessarily complicate, rather than simplify, the discussions surrounding the transition to democracy. Several important economic constraints are common to all the countries of the Southern Cone. All have fallen victim to the reversal of international conditions after 1979, the rise in the price of oil and interest rates, the recession, and uncertain recovery in the industrialized countries. They also show significant internal disequilibria, of which the inflation rate dramatically reflects the inconsistency of public policy and private claims on income. All find themselves in the midst of stabilization programs and negotiations with the IMF and foreign banks. Finally, all except Chile are in the midst of opening their political systems to a broader range of economic interests, resulting in unavoidable conflict. The present circumstances in these countries raise two critically important issues about the relationship of economics and politics. First, what is the "right" model to employ to confront these seemingly similar circumstances? Second, how do policy makers determine and implement these "right" policies? Fishlow's presentation to the conference, and the intense discussion that ensued, was organized around these two critical issues.

In Search of the "Right" Model

The many apparent similarities in the economic problems confronting the countries of the region tempt policy-makers, particularly those connected with international lending agencies, to search for a single economic model, an abstract entity, to pose the solution. In recent years, there has been a tendency to define the "discovered" model in terms of a two-fold prescription: first, in the short term, an insistence on an orthodox stabilization policy, tight money, and high interest rates; second, a scolding that Latin Americans wake up and undertake the export-led growth strategies as south-east Asia has done. Fishlow's message was that this attempt to find the successful model is bound to fail.

Recent debates in economic policy making have been marked by two characteristics. The first is a tendency to put forward economic models that are too universalistic. The second is an excessive certainty with which conflicting technical positions are maintained. It is as if,

¹. Primary responsibility for authorship of this section rests with Timothy Scully

given the correct data, it were simply a matter of discovering the relevant underlying economic relationships.

There is far too little differentiation among the diverse circumstances confronted by different countries. Although the debt problem pervades Latin America, there are important differences in how individual countries got into trouble, and correspondingly, in how they can be expected to get out of it. Among the countries of the region the timing and motivation for indebtedness were quite different. In Brazil, it was an early decision to sustain the inflow of external capital to finance the expansion of the public sector and prevent a collapse of the miracle. Argentina and Chile, in contrast, entered into major accumulations of debt later, when interest rates were already high, in order to underwrite a strategy of international monetarism to control inflation.

The consequences of indebtedness were equally distinct. In Brazil capital accumulation was tied to a development strategy setting the basis for future economic growth. In Argentina, capital flight of perhaps \$25 billion or more than one-half external liabilities occurred. A useful distinction can be made between the productive effects of the speculative construction boom in Chile at the end of the 1970s and, for example, the building of the Itaipú power complex in Brazil.

Nor do the differences end there. The impact of external effects after 1979, such as the increase of oil prices or the recession and the consequent deterioration in the terms of trade varied from country to country. Domestic policy errors were responsible, in some cases, for an overvaluation of exchange rates which in turn produced a different mix of adverse effects.

The fact that each country indebted itself at different times for different reasons, which resulted in very different outcomes, implies that a potential solution cannot be universally applicable to all, but needs to be designed case by case. This is as true of longer term policies as short term stabilization programs. To propose an export-led growth model similar to the newly industrialized countries (NIC) for the Southern Cone countries ignores huge differences among the various economies.

Such universalism is related to the second point: the continuing espousal of contradictory economic models. Fishlow asserted that there is no objective, technical set of economic relationships that can adequately be inferred from the past and that only by applying an ideological filter can data be "undertood" in any sense. Therefore, and ultimately, he argued, the strategy selected for economic policy implementation involves political considerations and not just pure economic consistency.

This characterization contradicts the still popular theory of economic policy pioneered by Jan Tinbergen, which posits a strong separation between economics and politics. In that formulation, economic theory and econometrics yield to a single underlying model specifying the interaction of economic variables. The task of politics is to choose a preferred solution among feasible outcomes by giving the appropriate value-weighting to goals such as growth, price stability, income distribution, etc.

Reality, Fishlow argued, is very different from the above abstraction. In fact, one starts with politics, not economics. Whereas economic relationships are never known with absolute certainty, an a priori model is. Politicians choose the economists they want on the basis of political value judgements. Economists will defend and rationalize the policies the politicians want. Thus, all economic choices are embedded in a particular ideological world view.

Values shape the choice of economic policies. This is further complicated by the differential capacity of different groups not only to be heard, but to defend themselves. There is an asymmetry in the ability to enforce one's preferred position. Whatever the values, it may be impossible to implement them, save by changing the underlying structure of economic relationships through a radical reallocation of power. This is what contemporary Nicaragua and Pinochet's Chile share: the direct use of intervention to accomplish what is otherwise not feasible.

There is no single, technically determined, "right" economic model. Politics is always an integral part of its determination, as well as its implementation. Yet, this is not to say that economics does not matter. Economics matters some of the time. Economic "laws" hold some of the time. It is because they can be apparently evaded that irresponsible policies have such attraction. Short-term disasters can be avoided with sound economic policies. Economics should appear, not in the form of some invariable and reliable economic model, but in order to introduce a degree of consistency to policies. A contemporary example of the irresponsible use of economics, Fishlow asserted, is the United States, where excessive government expenditures financed by a massive inflow of external capital has caused an overvaluation of the exchange rate. Similar to Argentina and Chile in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the industrial sector of the United States is losing its competitiveness. As long as the United States enjoys a certain degree of prosperity, no one wants to hear about the problems connected to such tactics. In short, politics and economics compenetrates.

In Search of the Right Policies

In the conventional framework, the "right" policies follow directly from the "right" model and social preferences. Politics is seen as a nuisance, an intruder. If an economic policy undertaken meets with failure, it is almost invariably blamed upon inadequate implementation, or a lack of a long enough time for policies to work. Clearly, however, the choice of appropriate policies is much more complicated. There is no way that politics can be held off to one side while undertaking new policies. Indeed, the experience of authoritarian governments serves to remind us that the attempt to circumvent politics runs into trouble.

In the more open political climate that now characterizes Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay (and even in Chile), the orthodox stabilization model has been, and continues to be, subject to considerable criticism. As Robert Kaufman has recently emphasized, this opposition is rooted in the

rationality of zero-sum reactions by individual groups bent on defending their position. To overcome opposition, Kaufman outlines three strategies that have been tried from time to time within open political circumstances: containment, social pact, and an alternative policy package.² Success, however, has been very difficult to achieve.

Nevertheless, the circumstances of open politics may hold out renewed hope. Open politics encourages a greater degree of debate, exposing a broader range of alternatives from which to choose. A competitive political situation exposes political parties to electoral rewards and punishments, wherein politicians are rewarded for successful economic policies and thrown out of office in the event of failure. Such a system works, of course, provided that particular parties stand for specific economic policies. Unfortunately, one sees in the evolving politics of the region a lack of coherence in a political party's economic policies.

Under the current circumstances of civilian government, the legitimacy of authoritarian, technocratic solutions has been undermined by recent experience. There is less a threat of military intervention when civilians make a false step. In the absence of an outside arbitrator, the need arises for compromise, rather than relying on a deus ex machina (e.g., a coup) to rescue the country from, for example, the grips of inflation. This is especially clear in the recent experience of Argentina, when inflation rates were over 1,000 percent and, with the military "solution" unavailable, the country embarked on a risky stabilization policy.

There is a new degree of freedom in the present crisis. Countries are transferring in excess of 5 percent of their gross products in official interest payments, surpluses that can be mobilized on behalf of recovery under more favorable international conditions. The countries of the region have demonstrated an adjustment potential that many doubted.

Elements of a New Stabilization Model

The appeal to an alternative stabilization model is a potential exit to the current situation. Its essential characteristics are three-fold. The first is an attack on inflation that incorporates some kind of incomes policy, one that may fall short of a "social pact," but that recognizes the need for restraint on profits as well as wages. Inflation rates of three digits or even over 40 percent introduce intolerable inefficiencies. The second is a conservative fiscal policy that trims the size of the public sector, still bloated from the infusion of external capital. The third is the reduction of net transfers abroad, with a consequent capacity to: lower real interest rates and brake the deterioration in income redistribution that has occurred in recent years; stimulate higher

2. Kaufman, Robert "Democratic and Authoritarian Responses to the Debt Issue: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico." International Organization 39: 3 (Summer 1985): 473-503.

levels of capital formation with the resources kept in the country; lower the public sector deficit resulting from interest payments, thereby permitting its most important stimulative functions to be sustained.

Stabilization must be seen as a politico-economic project. It must also be understood in its domestic and international dimensions. With regard to the latter, countries of the region cannot be expected to make net transfers of resources of recent magnitudes much longer. It is well to remember that German reparations following World War I, fixed at around 2.5 percent of gross product, were feared to be intolerable.

The other side of the coin is domestic political capability in arbitrating competing claims. The failure to acquire the requisite level of consensus has meant the death of many efforts at stabilization. Where demands for higher wages have their origin in long periods of deprivation, and in circumstances that contribute to greater class consciousness, if not polarization, the problem is more severe. In the last analysis, the capacity to impose these policies is a political, not an economic, task. Regardless of how "right" the model, without popular support, economic policy cannot succeed.

Political Realities and the IMF

One participant responded to the presentation by agreeing completely with the theoretical framework presented, but lamented, the fact that the realities of international monetary institutions are very different. Even though it is widely accepted that the causes and consequences of the debt are specific to each national context, the IMF holds stubbornly in practice to the notion that there exists a single, 'correct' model. This practice of the IMF causes huge economic and political disruptions in developing countries. In a sense, the United States government is ignoring the political nature of the debt by hiding behind these supposedly "technocratic" international agencies. Only by insisting on the political nature of the problem, by approaching the U.S. departments of State and Treasury directly, was Argentina able to arrive at a possible solution.

"Can the IMF be expected to change, or must it simply be bypassed?" asked one discussant. Fishlow responded emphatically that it is a tactical error to go first to the IMF and then to the banks in renegotiating the debt. The IMF is a technocratic organization. The commercial banks, in contrast, are more permeable to political forces. As a strategy for debt renegotiation, the first step should be to deal with the IMF and the banks simultaneously, not sequentially. If the banks are dealt with at the same time as the IMF, the technical elements of the negotiation are not as likely to dominate the discussions. The banks are concerned with their assets and the longer-term investment climate. The recent experience of Argentina demonstrates that it is also helpful to bring the U.S. government into the negotiations directly as was done to Argentina's advantage during President Raúl Alfonsín's visit to Washington last year.

Fears of Protectionism

Among the participants from Latin America there was a widespread concern with growing protectionism in the United States. United States' domestic policy of importing huge quantities of external capital to finance the public deficit, combined with Japanese international policy of exporting capital rather than allowing goods to enter its markets, come together in a disastrous way for developing countries. For its part, the European market, in terms of the variety of controls which exist, has been a closed market for the last ten years. The problem facing the debt-burdened economies of the Southern Cone is dramatic. Both future economic growth and the ability to make payments on the debt depend on increased trade. While the capacity of the countries of the region to adjust to interest payments of five and six percent of GNP might be impressive, noted one participant, it is absolutely unrealistic to think that such transfers can continue at the present rate. The level of debt payments are essentially de-industrializing the economies of the region in the medium-term. The specter of raised trade barriers makes the situation impossible.

Open Politics and Economic Policy-Making

One participant observed that Fishlow's presentation of the way economic policy-making should take place in an open political market does not conform to current experience in Argentina, Uruguay, or Brazil. While it seems logical to expect that political parties would assume many of the economic policy-making roles previously filled by technocrats in authoritarian regimes, this transition has not occurred. In fact, something of the opposite has taken place. Political parties face certain challenges, but are incapable of arriving at clear economic policies. In reality, it is the President, not the party, who sells the economic program to the people and works directly with technocrats to resolve the problems. In Argentina, for example, it is clearly president Alfonsín working directly with a technocratic team. Technocrats have not become less important in economic policy-making.

Fishlow responded by saying that this comes to the heart of the matter and cautioned that he did not mean to imply that economists are unimportant! Rather, he argued, technocrats are important, but that their relationship to the executive is clearly different in an open political market. To understand the difference, it is important to appreciate the relation between political parties, personal charisma, and the nature of the economic challenge in each national context. The economic challenges currently facing the countries of the region are more severe than any since the great depression.

Furthermore, a new relationship between the executive and the technocrats needs to develop. Obviously, such a change cannot occur overnight. In Argentina the interaction between political parties and the economic challenge has provided space for political maneuvering, which was not

possible previously. Brazilian parties, in contrast, because of the economic difficulties confronting them are so politically explosive, have been unable to respond effectively to the challenges.

One member of the Brazilian delegation suggested that political democracy cannot succeed in that country without being accompanied by some type of economic democracy. What is essential about the changed political context is that efforts toward redistribution must occur if democracy is to survive. Redistribution, however, is tricky politically and perhaps dangerous economically. What is the worst possible scenario that might occur in this unstable context?

A Chilean delegate expressed concern that, given a democratic opening in that country, the explosion of expectations from the popular sector might be unmanageable. What does the experience of Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil teach? Is there such an explosion? Can the increased demand be handled with a social pact?

Another participant maintained that, underlying all these issues is a prior question which largely has been ignored by the conference: What is the role of the state? Are key economic decisions to be made in the public or the private sector?

Conclusion

Summing up his remarks, Fishlow emphasized that blaming the IMF for mismanaging the debt crisis is too easy. The IMF is performing the mission which it understands itself as having, i.e., enforcing adjustment to a prior change in the accounts disequilibrium in the balance of payments of the countries in the region. The tragedy is that the IMF has been given full responsibility to deal with a crisis that clearly exceeds its capacity. This leads to the larger, macro-economic issue: What is the appropriate institution or set of institutions which can deal with the implications of the massive redistribution of world income since 1973-1974? Where can the liquidity which developing nations require be generated?

Clearly, the current protectionism in the United States is very dangerous. Not only does it jeopardize the region's ability to pay back the debt, but it deprives the developing countries of the richest market in the world. Trade is necessary for growth to take place. However, it is not enough simply to export more. A carefully thought out development strategy should accompany increased exports. The danger with the tactics of Alan Garcia's administration, for example, is that it is not dealing with the underlying structural problems of the Peruvian economy.

In the end, is it possible to design a politically feasible economic policy based on austerity? The Brazilian case, at least, offers one degree of freedom: economic growth. It would be a mistake to emphasize austerity alone on the one hand, or redistribution on the other. Growth allows an escape from political choices which are merely zero-sum. It is possible to design a feasible stabilization policy which incorporates

the three elements already alluded to: an attack on inflation, more conservative fiscal policies, and a reduction of net transfers abroad, as an integral part of the transition to democracy. Neither austerity nor redistribution, but growth should form the centerpiece of the Southern Cone's return to democracy.

COUNTRY DISCUSSION: ARGENTINA¹

Speaker:
Marcelo Cavarozzi
CEDES, Buenos Aires

The session began with Marcelo Cavarozzi's summary of his paper.² This was followed by an analysis by Roberto Frenkel of current economic policies in Argentina. Discussion later centered on the politics of economic measures and the question of corporatist trends and party strengthening in Argentina.

Whereas the 1973 coup in Chile and Uruguay attempted to dismantle strong standing party systems, the 1976 coup in Argentina faced a very weak party system. Although Argentina's political parties were clearly identified, they did not conform to a system proper. This was especially true for the strong century-old Radical party and the deeply rooted Peronist party.

The party scenario presented three major problems at the beginning of the 1980s: 1) a fractured political system in which the Peronist and non-Peronist parties functioned apart; 2) an unbalanced party situation in which the strength of Peronism left hardly any room for alternatives; and 3) for various reasons, not the least being the succession of coups, a lack of governing strategies of the parties. Radicals conceived of themselves as part of a party system but not as a government party. Peronists, on the other hand, were great articulators of social protest, but were unable to transform this asset into cohesive government.

The first problem was due in part to early and massive political inclusion, in which opposition parties were unable to offer themselves as real alternatives and yet remain as formal opposition. This problem was first solved with the "Hora del Pueblo" agreement in 1970. However, integration of the party structure was achieved at the cost of reinforcing its unbalanced nature.

The second problem was solved partly by the weakening of Peronism that resulted from President Alfonsín's transition strategies, which conceived the transition agenda in terms of future, not past, issues. Peronism was skillfully portrayed as the voice of the past. However, the success of this strategy, in terms of balancing Peronism with a strengthened, power-oriented Radical party, has created a new problem, namely whether Peronism as a party structure will accept a position as runner-up.

¹Primary responsibility for authorship of this section rests with Felipe Agüero

²"Peronism and Radicalism: Argentinas's Transitions in Perspective," Working Paper no. 170, prepared for this conference.

The third problem -- the governing capability of parties -- remains open. President Alfonsín has been able to maintain political initiative, and has introduced technocracy as a governing aid. The positive symbolic and operational connotations of this strategy are, unfortunately, somewhat balanced by seemingly secretive political practices. Another risk is that Alfonsín's success may pose the risk of creating a new personalized leadership in the Radical Party structure.

Roberto Frenkel raised the issue of articulating a stable party system in the context of a profound economic crisis. Frenkel pointed out that the Argentine economy has stagnated for a decade. The GNP was 15 percent lower in 1984 than in 1974, and was accompanied by chronic inflation, which reached such heights as to disarticulate the traditional mode of functioning of the economy. The external debt went from \$7 billion in 1976 to \$32 billion in 1980, mostly reflecting speculative borrowing, as opposed to the productive uses of Brazilian foreign borrowing. During its last stages the military regime was forced to arrange all economic endeavours around the debt question. Economic adjustment, however, was accompanied with high inflation --reaching a 20 percent monthly rate --and a drop in the rate of investment, barely 12 percent of GNP, whereby the public sector deficit acted as a refueling mechanism.

The new government attempted to subordinate domestic politics to the needs of international negotiation. Its initial outlook was, however, highly utopian and naive. Apparent toughness with the IMF ended by giving in to its demands. Anti-inflationary policies, which unleashed a recession, were unable to cut down inflation, and monetary and fiscal targets were not met. While servicing the debt, inflation remained high and the IMF claimed that stabilization objectives were not being met. The government then decided to react against IMF-type policies arguing that inflation would not be cut back and that the resulting recession would be politically intolerable.

In June 1985, the government submitted a new program to the public, with notable changes in strategy. A novel element was the fact that the program was presented by the president himself. Furthermore, it had been negotiated with economic authorities of the United States government before it was presented to the IMF. The program consisted of the following: 1) monetary reform, with the creation of a new unit, the "Austral"; 2) a price and salary freeze, and an exchange rate adjusted to the new monetary unit; 3) a commitment not to create new money to finance the public deficit; 4) measures including action over interest rates and taxation, aimed at preventing negative redistribution, and 5) tax and fiscal reform. The fiscal deficit was financed with a massive increase in surpluses of public sector firms instead of resorting to traditional inflationary measures. The objective of reducing inflation was very successful: inflation after the first month was nil and only 3 1/2 percent during the second month, mainly due to seasonal factors. The program succeeded because of the high credibility it had with low income and productive sectors. The least acceptance was found among financiers, basically due to their dissatisfaction with high interest rates.

The discussion centered on two sets of issues: the relation between economics and politics in the context of the measures taken by the Alfonsín government, and the weaknesses and dilemmas confronted by political parties in the present conjuncture.

As regards the first issue, participants observed that Argentina proved that deep economic crisis is not an insurmountable obstacle for democratic transition and, at least in the Argentine case, had not threatened the stability of the first democratic government. Yet the question remains of how threatening the explosion of expectations may be for democratic consolidation in an environment of heavy international economic constraints. Respondents emphasized that the perception of collective crisis among the public is a critical factor in understanding the current Argentine process: tolerance is facilitated after an experience of shared suffering. Furthermore, they saw a need for rationality on the part of the public, some of which has already been exercised in other spheres (such as the referendum on the Beagle Channel treaty with Chile). In this case, people realized that inflation had become the single most important national problem and demanded leadership for its solution. The government responded to this demand with a new sense of realism.

Public support for such measures was recognized as vital to the success of the program. The economic plan was designed to capture maximum support from all sectors (and its success depended upon its credibility among the public). For the first time an anti-inflationary package became a plan of society and not of government alone (although union leaders rejected it at first). In so doing, the plan has signalled a recuperation of the state's capacity to lead the economy, and has shown that a strong state is not incompatible with fiscal discipline.

However, there is an enormous array of contradictory demands on the government. Without the veil of inflation, all distributive contradictions lay bare. The government has to seek solutions for these in a manner compatible with democracy, negotiation, and compromise. In the end, much will depend upon the government's capacity for leadership.

Discussion then turned to political parties and the party system. One participant noted that the lack of past party system competitiveness and balance has resulted in the radiation of the problems of Peronism out to society as a whole. The problems of Peronism had become the problems of society. After the coup of 1976, however, Peronist opposition was disputed by an assertive Radical party, willing to compete with Peronism at all levels. The "multipartidaria" diminished Peronism's traditional central opposition position. A novel element since then has been the personal leadership of President Alfonsín, but the party has been unable to develop a structure separate from this personal factor. Other participants agreed on this point. Nonetheless, Alfonsín's leadership has proved, especially after issuing the June economic plan, that parties are able to display governing capacities. On the Peronist side, the possibilities for developing a true party structure are still gloomy, since the movement is enmeshed in internal struggle. To transform Peronism into an "ordered" party, able to play as a loyal opposition and to reorient its power vocation the renovated side of the party must succeed over its traditional sector. The full recovery of Peronism as a political party is essential for democracy.

Party transformation, however, must not overlook the need for adequate articulation between unions and parties. The high levels of awareness and organization of social sectors -- what some call corporatist trends in Argentina -- require the evolution of new social mechanisms that guarantee the political participation of the people. Otherwise, these sectors will remain open to non-democratic forms of exerting pressure. Other participants emphasized the need to strengthen parties in order to counterbalance the power achieved by organized social sectors. The maintenance of strong social fiefdoms alien to the interest-channelling possibilities that parties make available will continue to undermine democracy in the long run. Where in the past, corporatist practices relied on a framework of repression, terrorism, and inflation for reinforcement, presently, parties ought to be strengthened for interest-channelling.

With a view to strengthening political parties, participants mentioned the need for constitutional reforms. One reform, mentioned by some, was the reelection of the president. They argued that Alfonsín has come to fill a leadership vacuum which is essential to the prospects of strengthening democratic politics. The Alfonsín "phenomenon" is the result of the resurgence of basic ethical levels in society and politics, in reaction to the degrading practices of terrorism, repression and inflation, and of the vacuum left by Perón. Alfonsín's leadership represents an asset for democracy today, which should be well cared for. Constitutional reform ought also to include "fuse" mechanisms aimed at strengthening the role of parties and parliament.

One participant expressed a concern with the dangers of an unincorporated right and the lack of a "healthy conservatism," into the political process. It should be an interest of both Peronists and Radicals, as well as democracy as a whole, that the provincial and oligarchic right be fully incorporated into the system. Another respondent argued further that the right --Conservatives and Nationalists -- never relied on democratic procedures in the past, and that today there are no structures and no leaders willing to channel the Right's participation in the democratic process. Right-wing leaders overtly opt for anti-democratic solutions. Another participant observed that when this aspect is taken into account, the task facing Argentine politics today is one of democratic building and not of "returning" to democracy. Building democracy includes tackling the question of a conservative sector with a strong anti-democratic past.

Finally, the conceptual question of how to categorize the post-authoritarian stages in each of the Southern Cone countries was raised. Some countries are in a pre-democratization stage, while others are in transition from redemocratization to consolidation. Argentina, in particular, has gone through an abrupt transition from authoritarianism to a stage which other democratizing countries have reached gradually. In Spain, for instance, the transition gradually went from dismantling certain aspects of the old regime under 'old' authorities, to approving a political reform program, to electing a constituent assembly, to issuing a new constitution and democratically electing a new government. In the Southern Cone one observes transitions that set out to consolidate before the transition had properly ended before issuing new constitutions. These

transitions raise a number of problems that require further conceptual clarification, especially for comparative analysis. The compound character of the Argentine transition would suggest the notion of "transolidation." Other participants used this observation to add that indeed the Argentine transition has been quite abrupt and that, more generally, the collapse of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes has resulted in very rapid transitions. In Argentina, in particular, there have not been transitions proper. Rather, the military have merely collapsed each time. The rapidity of the transition may in fact hide the need for specific measures aimed at consolidation.

Discussants: Marcelo Cavarozzi, CEDES, Buenos Aires; Juan Manuel Casella, Unión Cívica Radical; Roberto Frenkel, CEDES, Buenos Aires; José Luis Manzano, Partido Justicialista; Jesús Rodríguez, Unión Cívica Radical.

COUNTRY DISCUSSION: BRAZIL¹

Speaker:
Amaury De Souza
IUPERJ, Rio de Janeiro
and Duke University

In the absence of Bolivar Lamounier due to unforeseen circumstances, Amaury de Souza was asked to chair the session on Brazil and summarize some of the main points in Lamounier's paper. The latter opens by stressing the centrality of parties in processes of democratic consolidation.

A. The Historical Underdevelopment of Brazilian Parties

The starting point for any understanding of the Brazilian party system must be a recognition of its extreme instability when compared to, for example, those of Uruguay or Chile. In a sense, Brazil has had no less than six different party systems since its independence from Portugal. The first paralleled a system of de facto federalism during the Empire (1837-1889) in which national parties were still absent. Despite the recognizable Conservative and Liberal factions, local elites were articulated with the center in a dependent manner, thus it was not possible to say that real parties yet existed. In the period of the Old Republic (1889-1930) a federalization of parties took place not unlike the previous party system, except for the development of state-level Republican parties in many areas. The Revolution of 1930 represented a reaction against exclusion by less-privileged sections of the elite, and therefore introduced a minimum degree of elite circulation, or rotation, accompanied by the emergence of a certain number of newer parties. The decade of the 1930s produced an increasingly severe political polarization in urban areas between the Right, in the form of nationalist, corporatist and fascist Integralists; and the Left, which included the Communists, grouped in what was known as "The Alliance". In 1937, however, President Vargas introduced his Estado Novo, banning parties until 1945.

The effect of Vargas' policies during the Second World War was to lay the foundations for industrialization in Brazil under the aegis of the first public enterprises. Sensing the changing geopolitical balance and climate of international opinion, Vargas abolished his corporatist state in 1945, and introduced a more liberal democratic Constitution. In particular, he founded two new parties so to speak "from above": the Brazilian Labor Party, and the Social Democratic Party. The former was to be a vehicle for rallying his support amongst urban voters, and represented a typical case of populism, rather than a really working-class party. The Social Democratic Party drew together traditional state-level

¹Primary responsibility for authorship of this section rests with Charlie Gillespie

oligarchic elites (both rural landowners and small-town bosses) and incorporated them into a system of clientage, vis-a-vis the center. However, structural conditions in Brazil were still to prevent stability in the party system. The adoption of proportional representation for elections in 1946 led the number of parties to multiply to fourteen. Apart from the Communists (who were legalized for only two years) the only serious rival to Vargas' two parties was the National Democratic Union (UDN) representing Liberal urban elites. The latter had emerged from the Left, but was to become increasingly embittered by electoral failure. When Vargas was re-elected to the presidency in 1950, there was widespread fear among such sectors that electoral alternation would be completely blocked. In fact, it was his suicide four years later which produced political paralysis.

Despite the dynamism of the Kubitschek years during the 1950s, the opposition tactics of the Democratic National Union increasingly relied on running against parties, in order to try and win elections. The anti-party independent, Jânio Quadros was able to sweep to power in 1960 in precisely the same unhealthy way. The following year he resigned, alleging he was unable to govern, but presumably in order to try and strengthen his position for a subsequent return to power as national savior, much in the manner of France's General De Gaulle. The fact that the Vice-president who was to succeed him was a leader of the Labor Party, and former Minister of Labor, João Goulart, precipitated a political crisis, in which the army began to intervene. Finally, Goulart was only permitted to take office at the price of a shift to a parliamentary regime. This maneuver, however, was rejected by the voters in the 1963 plebiscite (by a majority of 90 per cent) yet again creating political paralysis. The following year Brazil's military authoritarian regime was inaugurated. It lasted twenty-one years: longer than any other in the region.

After a period of suspension of party activity, the military created a new twoparty system, once again "from above", in 1965. ARENA (The National Alliance for Renewal) and the Brazilian Democratic Movement, which included the entire opposition, were the only parties permitted. The military's aim, however, was not to produce a liberal democratic twoparty system, but something closer to the hegemonic de facto control of Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party. Under the weight of a variety of forms of repression, the Brazilian Democratic Movement came close to extinction in the early 1970s. However, the advent of the more moderate presidency of Ernesto Geisel in 1974 led to a number of significant reforms. First, the government took the decision to establish centralized control over the military and paramilitary apparatuses. A certain liberalization of the media took place, while renewed emphasis was placed on the electoral arena as the axis of legitimation of the regime. Unlike other authoritarian regimes, Brazil had never completely suspended the holding of legislative elections, but merely interfered with them. Consequently, the Democratic Movement experienced a massive jump in support in 1974 from 28 per cent to 44 per cent. For the first time there seemed hope of a possibly peaceful process of democratic transition.

B. From Political Engineering to Democratic Dynamic

The intricacies of this process of transition over the following decade revolved around repeated attempts at "political engineering" by the regime in order to assure that the opposition not win outright. In what became known as the "April Package" of 1979 abolition of the twoparty system was decreed, in the hope of dividing regime opponents.² Arena was renamed the Democratic Social Party (PDS) while a number of independent groups began to work outside the united opposition which added the word "party" to its name to become the PMDB. If one looks at the secular trend in elections since 1950, a striking shift of votes away from traditional conservative parties has been at work, in parallel with the urbanization and industrialization of Brazil. In spite of the attempts at "stacking the dice" one way or another, opposition victory became inevitable.

Under the latest party legislation, parties must obtain 5 per cent of votes nationally, and 3 per cent in at least nine states in order to legally continue to run. This has limited the number of new parties, but four are worthy of note: the Brazilian Labor Party was refounded, but its more important offspring is now the Democratic Labor Party, lead by the Governor of Rio de Janeiro, Leonel Brizola. Meanwhile, to the left of the PMDB, with backing from radical church members and São metalworkers' leader, Lula, the Workers' Party has been founded. Finally, an attempt was made to found a Popular Party under Tancredo Neves, which would have formed the centerpiece of the military's transition strategy by building a bridge between regime and opposition. It would have articulated a centrist and liberal ideology aimed at business interests. However, its success would have required the extension of the "sublegendas" electoral system (similar to Uruguay's DSV) from legislative to gubernatorial elections. In the absence of this reform, which failed to pass through Congress, it was impossible for Neves to weld together the various factions which he envisaged would form the new party. In protest, he joined the PMDB, thereby dealing a major blow to the pro-regime PDS.

To some extent these setbacks for the regime were caused by the absence of President Figueredo in the United States, where he had gone for heart surgery. The subsequent November package (1981) introduced yet another Uruguayan practice, called the "linked vote" in Brazil, which meant a ban on ticket splitting. One impact of this attempt to penalize small breakaway parties, especially those without very strong ideologies, was to limit the number of states with fully multiparty systems to just four: Acre, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul. Elsewhere, the twoparty tendency has remained very marked. In fact, the PMDB wins elections in almost all regions, except for Rio de Janeiro (currently controlled by the Democratic Labor Party of Leonel Brizola) and the North-East, which has remained loyal to the conservative PDS.

²The package also decreed the creation of a new corpus of Senators appointed by the Executive, equal to one third of the membership of the Upper House. This was designed to ensure that no unwelcome Constitutional Amendments might be enacted, as this process requires a two-thirds majority in each chamber.

Still resolutely determined to postpone their judgment day, the leaders of the regime strongly resisted the popular campaign for direct elections to the Presidency which peaked with massive demonstrations across Brazil during March of 1984. Nevertheless, the "diretas" amendment was defeated in Congress in April. Thus the election of the President in March 1985 was scheduled to be made by a large and complicated Electoral College, including federal legislators and state delegations. This should have guaranteed an automatic victory to whoever became the candidate of the officialist PDS. In the event, however, the popularity of the man chosen, Paulo Maluf, was so low within his own party that a rebellion took place. Sections of the PDS broke away to form the Liberal Front, and supported the moderate compromise candidacy of Tancredo Neves in the Electoral College. With PMDB and Liberal support, Neves was overwhelmingly elected only to die tragically before taking office. By an ironic twist of fate, his running mate, Jose Sarney, and the current President of Brazil, is a former President of the PDS.

C. The Overall Balance Sheet: How Far Have Parties Come?

Lamounier's paradoxical conclusion is that the highly coercive implementation of an "artificial" twoparty system between 1965 and 1979 may have had beneficial strengthening effects on party development, even though it was subsequently abandoned. This was because it reduced anti-party elements in the political culture, and brought civil society, intellectuals and professionals close to militant party politics. Simultaneously, both the regime's claims of an "economic miracle", and the appeal of revolutionary leftists collapsed, both to the good of democracy. The survival of political spaces for the opposition, enhanced by the maintenance of federalism, kept open the channels of political recruitment and acquisition of experience by party leaders. Machinery aimed at consolidating a government party, such as the system of "sublegendas" was equally useful to the opposition. The broader social and political processes of modernization and mobilization have equally helped to strengthen the party system, and make the future of the old political bosses (caudilhos) uncertain.

The process of continuing this further construction and empowerment of parties requires restoration of the former prerogatives of the legislature, many of which were stripped by the military's Institutional Acts. Pressure has grown for the repeal of the Organic Law of Political Parties, which was seen as "an authoritarian shackle", and an obstacle to the authenticity of parties. The consensus among all elements of political society is clearly that Brazil needs a pluralistic multiparty system, and a form of government somewhat similar to the model Lijphart has called "consociational".³ How far such a permissive party system is compatible with Brazil's historically pronounced tendency towards executive pre-eminence and bureaucratic autonomy, is a question Lamounier leaves open. In the final analysis, he argues, though parties may never

³Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy", World Politics 1969. See also his books, Democracy in Plural Societies, (Yale University Press, 1977); and, Democracies (Yale University Press, 1984).

take on characteristics fully akin to those of European democracies, much can be done to further strengthen them. It is not clear that the comparative weakness of parties as socially penetrative and cohesive "subsystems" is necessarily a bad thing, in the final analysis, for democratic consolidation in the modern world.

D. The Future: Instability or New Foundations?

Immediately following the inauguration of President Sarney, important political reforms have been adopted. These include the enfranchisement of illiterates for the first time in Brazilian history, and the abandonment of laws limiting party-registration, thereby allowing the Brazilian Communist Party to operate legally. Mayoral elections in state capitals are scheduled for November 1985, while Governors and Parliament are up for election the following year. In November 1988, Brazil is likely to hold direct presidential elections for the first time in almost three decades.

Panelists opened the discussion of Lamounier's paper by stressing the historic opportunities that will emerge with the summoning of a democratically elected Constituent Assembly. Brazilians for the first time in many years will be able to go back to debating fundamental questions such as: Should Federalism be retained? Should Presidentialism be modified? What type of parties does Brazil need? What type of unions will be appropriate? The need was not to impose further organizational restrictions but, on the contrary, choose which new possibilities to open up. Brazil continues to be marked by strong regional contrasts, most visible recently when the collapse of a bank in the Southern state of Rio Grande do Sul led to all local politicians closing ranks and demanding federal action to save the 25,000 jobs that were at stake.

According to the same participant, Brazil's very diversity makes a multiparty system appropriate, and for that reason the "linked vote" and "sublegendas" should not be retained.⁴ A multiplication of parties allows for a healthy mix between ideological and pragmatic groups. Nevertheless, the habits of opposition are too persistent in Brazil, which must be the only country in the world, according to the same speaker, where parties continue to "oppose" after being elected to govern! The imperative now was for those in power to govern. Even those in the real opposition, who may never win power, feel that this is the country's most pressing need, and that a period of more defined partisan identities would be healthy.

The following speaker wondered what the future for Brazilian parties would be in the short term. Neves was elected by an almost overwhelming majority of votes in the Electoral College, demonstrating a very broadly-based willingness for change. Yet, in the forthcoming November elections for state capital Mayors, the alliance of PMDB and Liberals had

⁴It is particularly interesting to compare this argument to that put forward by Luis González in the country discussion on Uruguay. He essentially sees the ban on ticket-splitting as the crucial mechanism preserving interest-aggregation by maintaining a check on the multiplication of parties in Uruguay.

Broken down everywhere except in Recife. At this rate, this will mean the emergence of a seventh party system in Brazil. Brazilian parties have always been eminently personalist, embodying certain pronounced images of their individual leaders. Their very lack of solidity makes democratic destabilization an ever-present danger, and their future in the next elections of some concern.

On a more positive final note, the dual roles of participation by the people and the participation of the press were emphasized in the Brazilian transition. Both of them had played a vital role in the return to democracy. However, the capacity of the media to peacefully put forward arguments and to inform public opinion was of particular importance to this process. In the end, it is this capacity to transmit political ideas, without exaggerating them, upon which democracy must be consolidated.

Discussants: Amaury G. de Souza, Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro (IUPERJ), and Duke University; Oscar Dias Corrêa, Frente Liberal; Francisco Weffort, Partido Trabalhista.

Speaker:
Arturo Valenzuela
Duke University

This report is structured as follows: the introductory section briefly presents the main arguments of the paper prepared for this session, combined with the moderator's initial remarks.² Since most of the discussion revolved around the impact and significance of the agreement that Chilean parties had reached a few weeks before this meeting, a brief summary of this agreement follows.³ Finally, the main issues raised in the discussion are summarized and arranged under the following categories: impact and significance of the agreement; social and political mobilization; the Communist Party; international aspects.

Introduction

The paper prepared for this discussion argues that the characteristics of the Chilean party system -- a high degree of competitiveness and polarization -- and the institutional context in which it operated inhibited the development of centripetal drives that would have helped prevent the breakdown of 1973. In a context where none of the highly ideological parties could hold a stable majority, the dynamics of the presidential system contributed to a continuous erosion of coalitions. Presidents were invariably elected by minorities or by coalitions, which disintegrated after each election. The system had nevertheless proven capable of establishing working arrangements and a pattern of political give-and-take due to the imperatives of electoral politics, the existence of a pragmatic center, and the viability of representative institutional arenas for decision-making. However, several developments eroded the system of accommodation. Among them were reforms that weakened the Congress and the rise of a new center -- the Christian Democratic Party, which rejected

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1. The primary responsibility for authorship of this paper rests with Felipe Agüero.
 2. Arturo Valenzuela, "Origins and Characteristics of the Chilean Party System: a Proposal for a Parliamentary form of Government," Working Paper No. 164, Latin American Program, The Wilson Center.
 3. "Acuerdo Nacional para la Transición a la Plena Democracia," August, 1985, which included all political groups except the Communists and MIR to the left, and small right-wing groups that support the Pinochet regime. A complete version of the agreement can be found in *El Mercurio*, Santiago, Chile, Tuesday, August 27, 1985.

the traditional give-and-take pattern of Chilean politics. The Chilean breakdown was thus a complex process, in which time-tested patterns of accommodation were eroded by the rise of a center unable to bridge the gap between extremes, accentuated by the decline of institutional arenas of accommodation.

Given a party system with such characteristics and the dynamics of an increasingly rigidified presidential system, prospective engineering for a future stable democratic system would have to face either a change in party structure or a change in the form of government. The paper argued strongly for the latter. Theoretically, the argument emphasized, there is little if any direct relationship between the number of parties per se and the incidence of regime breakdown. Despite Chile's distinctiveness because of its ideologically polarized parties, its democracy proved to be more stable in the past than most of the other countries in the region. On the practical side, the argument stressed that the breakdown of democracy and the following profound changes in Chile's institutional structure did not result in the destruction of the party system. On the contrary, parties managed to establish an important presence in a host of institutions of civil society. The military regime could only "freeze" into place the enduring continuity of Chile's "political landscape."⁴

The key to redemocratization is the recognition of the existence of enduring political currents with strong party representation. The challenge, then, is to structure mechanisms bridging the centrifugal realities of Chilean politics. This can only be achieved by strengthening channels for political expression, compromise, and effective government. The establishment of a parliamentary system in Chile would eliminate the stalemate in executive-legislative relations and would encourage a centripetal drive toward coalition and compromise.

In the initial presentation of this country discussion, Valenzuela suggested that parliamentarism would make the transition to democracy easier by defusing the enormous pressures for structuring high-stake coalitions around a winner-take-all presidential option. Presidential elections would lead to a recreation of the rigid left, center, and right-wing coalitions with the resulting tendencies toward polarization. A similar argument was made in the preceding session with regard to the transition in Spain.⁵

The discussion, however, did not center on the proposal for a parliamentary form of government. Most of the pros and cons of such a proposal had been discussed in the preceding session. While the participants in

4. The argument about the continuity of the party system under the authoritarian regime is presented in more detail in Arturo Valenzuela and Samuel Valenzuela "Partidos de Oposición bajo el Régimen Autoritario Chileno," Revista Mexicana de Sociología XLIV, No. 2 (April-June 1982), reprinted in Manuel Antonio Garretón et al., Chile 1973-198? (Santiago: FLACSO, 1983).

5. See Linz, Juan "Democracy: Presidential or Parliamentary, Does it make a Difference?", paper presented at this conference.

the former session had valued the contributions that parliamentarism could make to democratic stability, most of them -- especially the politicians -- argued that culture and tradition prevented moves toward a drastic shift in the form of government. It was suggested that a flexible approach would allow the introduction of elements of one system into the other. The one reference to this issue in the country discussion on Chile recognized that, although earlier Chilean experience with parliamentarism should not be considered a failure, the authoritarian regime had successfully exploited presidentialist feelings, making a turn to parliamentarism highly unlikely.

On the other hand, the argument about the ability of Chilean parties to resist the decade-long attack from the authoritarian regime, was vividly supported by the presence among the discussants of party representatives of the major Chilean political currents. Given the landmark importance of the agreement that this broad spectrum of parties had recently achieved, the discussion centered around the parties and the agreement vis-a-vis the prospects for a democratic transition. In the following section a basic outline of the main aspects of this agreement is presented.

The "National Agreement for the Transition to Full Democracy"

Under the initiative and sponsorship of Juan Francisco Cardinal Fresno, Archbishop of Santiago, all major Chilean political parties, with the exclusion of the Communist Party, signed an agreement on the basic constitutional and socio-economic guidelines for the transition to a democratic government. This accord provides, for the first time since the military takeover in 1973, a credible alternative for the official "transition" path offered by the regime with the promulgation of the 1980 Constitution and its transitory dispositions.⁶

The document calls for an ordered transfer of power to democratic authorities, for a political, economic, and social framework that guarantees governability, and for a return of the armed forces to its permanent functions in a manner that respects its values, dignity, and institutional requirements. The required national reconciliation demands full observance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and an investigation of the crimes that have shaken the country. However, the demands for justice must be made compatible with the requirements of reconciliation, which means that collective trials on cases of human rights violations should be avoided. This introductory part is clearly aimed at appeasing the military with regard to the transition alternative offered.

6. The very existence of this agreement responded to one of the questions for orienting discussion that had been provided to conference participants: "What is a pragmatic range for democratic engineering given the 1980 Constitution?"

In its first section, the document contains agreements on the following constitutional issues: 1) a popularly elected Congress with clear legislative, oversight, and constituent attributes; 2) a procedure for constitutional reform with a plebiscite in case of disagreement between the executive and the legislative; 3) direct elections for president, with absolute majority required; 4) a Constitutional Court with representation of the executive, legislative, and judiciary; 5) parties or groups whose objectives or conduct do not respect the basic democratic procedures or reject violence to be declared unconstitutional by the constitutional court; 6) regulation of constitutional exceptions that restrict individual liberties. Under no circumstances may human rights be violated.⁷

The second section is devoted to the social-economic order, which prescribes stability in the basic norms that rule the functioning of the economy. The signatories commit their support to the following principles: 1) priority objectives will be the elimination of extreme poverty, the creation of job opportunities and the achievement of a steady rate of growth, for which domestic savings should be fostered in order to sustain investment; 2) sacrifices and rewards should be shared equitably, for which austerity in consumption, solidarity and social discipline are necessary; 3) private property rights, including those over the means of production are to be observed; 4) the state should have an active function in the determination of the national objectives, in the framework of a mixed economy in which the state and private enterprise cooperate in a division of roles, and in which the market, concertación (social pacts), and state action are some of the means for resource allocation; 5) both business and labor are to be heard and considered in the formulation of development strategies; 6) conflict should be handled through social participation, state decentralization and social intermediation; 7) conflict should be regulated through negotiated agreements; 8) labor organizations and their right to strike should be strengthened.

The final section calls for immediate measures aimed at devolving rights of citizenship to Chileans and to provide the political process with the necessary elements for an effective evolution to a full democracy. These measures are: 1) the reestablishment of public liberties, university autonomy and constitutional guarantees, and the government's commitment not to resort to Transitory Article 24 of the 1980 Constitution; an end

7. A full understanding of the significance of these constitutional dispositions in the framework of the Chilean authoritarian regime would require comparison with the 1980 Constitution, and its transitory dispositions, promulgated by president Pinochet. This we can not do here. We refer the reader to Chile, by Albert P. Blaustein, Fortuna Calvo Roth and Robert J. Luther (November, 1980), in Ed. Blaustein, Albert P. and Flanz, Gilbert H. Constitutions of the Countries of the World, Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications. For the military dimension, see Felipe Agüero, "The Military in the Constitutions of the Southern Cone Countries and Spain," paper presented to this conference; and for a general critical assessment, Genaro Arriagada, "El Sistema Político Chileno (una exploración del futuro)," Colección Estudios CIEPLAN, No. 15, December 1984.

to exile, a devolution of nationality to those that were deprived of it and an end to the states of exception; 2) formation of electoral records; 3) end to political recess and derogation of the norms that prohibit party activity; 4) approval of an electoral law for election of president, senators, and deputies by informed, secret, free, personal, direct vote, guaranteeing free and equitable access to means of communication. 5) The plebiscite that legitimates these dispositions should follow the norms contemplated in point 4 above.

Discussion

The parties' accord has introduced a novel element in Chilean politics. Groups that have been in constant opposition for more than a decade have finally agreed on a global framework for a transition to democracy. However, there still is distrust across the political divide and different views prevail about the ways in which the agreement ought to be transformed into a policy instrument aimed at terminating the military regime.⁸ One sensitive issue is, for instance, the question of social and political mobilization behind the agreement, and the way it hinges upon the role of the Communist party. Participants stated that the continuation of vast protests might frighten the right and the business community, but, that some kind of protest seems necessary to show the depth of opposition to the government.

The discussion initiated by the political representatives of Chilean parties can be grouped in four major categories: 1) the assessment of the impact and significance of the agreement; 2) the role of social and political mobilization; 3) the position toward the communist party; and 4) international aspects.

1. Impact and Significance of the Agreement

A starting point on which discussants agreed was the diagnosis of the strength of the Pinochet regime. It is the strongest dictatorship that has ever existed in twentieth-century South America. A democratic movement that seeks to succeed has, therefore, to achieve the broadest possible level of national unity. Pinochet had a new constitution approved at the climax of his power, when the economy seemed to be taking off. With it, the regime sought to impose its own vision of the future, and to freeze the political situation in the meantime until some controlled change could take place at the end of the decade. For the past two years, however, the situation has been one of stalemate. The government has lacked the strength necessary to impose its project over society, and the opposition has not been strong enough to overthrow the government. It is in the context of this stalemate that the significance of the agreement can be fully appreciated.

8. A good indicator of the diversity within the groups that reached the agreement is that the National Union Party, for example, does not consider itself to be part of "the opposition."

The agreement has had an important psychological impact on the population. After the recent failure of mass mobilizations to gain significant concessions from the government, a sense of hopelessness had begun to develop among Chileans. The agreement, insofar as it provides a political instrument for the channeling of widespread discontent, has had the effect of raising new hopes and expectations.

In one discussant's view, four major actors, the military government, the Democratic Alliance,⁹ the right, and the Communist Party, have held different notions of the transition. The government's view of the transition is merely that of a deadline, which disguises the attempt of self-perpetuation in power. The Democratic Alliance has sought a transition consisting of the resignation of the president, the establishment of a provisional government and a constituent assembly, all of which would lead to a more obvious abdication than to a transition proper. The right has lacked a specific transition proposal, since it abdicated from its responsibilities by dissolving its parties, having to pay today a high price for reorganization. For the Communist Party, transition seems to be nothing other than the preparation of pre-revolutionary conditions.

The agreement means that for the first time "transition" begins to have a common meaning for at least two of those actors. It has set a limit to the range of differences within the opposition. The deadlock has been broken, and a transition formula of the "ruptura pactada" type is being offered. The agreement commits the signatories to reform the constitutional order, showing that the government's major asset -- the constitution -- is rejected by the vast majority of Chileans.

Another discussant offered a slightly different view of the alternatives that the agreement has left out. To the left, the Communist Party has sought its own isolation by pursuing today what it calls an advanced democracy in the direction of socialism. On the other side, the right has maintained a position of tolerance toward an undemocratic government, and has pushed for a formula of "protected democracy." At the most, it has pressed the government for a statute to transition and remained satisfied at first with the official plan. In between these two positions, the alternative offered by the Agreement is much more attractive.

This discussant pointed out some of the concessions that most of the signatories had to make. In his view, the guarantee given to private property rights represented a concession for the left. Legalization of the Communist Party meant a concession from the right. However, exclusion of the Communist Party is still a possibility. From the viewpoint of the center and the left, the constitution is given practical validity -- a formal shift from their previous position -- but the question of its legitimacy is avoided

9. The Alianza Democrática, a coalition formed by the Christian Democrats, the Radical Party, one of the Socialist parties and the Republican Right. See the document prepared by Tim Scully for this conference, "Major Political Parties in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay."

altogether. But the Agreement goes beyond the implicit admission of validity insofar as it substitutes a competitive election for the 1989 plebiscite and contemplates constitutional reform.

The Agreement is not in itself an alternative and cannot therefore be understood as an end-point. It must be seen, instead, as a starting point. Chile is the only South American country in which a debate about the future institutional order is a requirement of the transition itself. Argentina and, to some extent, Uruguay had clear ideas of the type of institutional order to which they were returning. In the case of Brazil, the transition had a clear institutional horizon, regardless of the reforms that might be pursued once democracy was attained. Chileans, on the other hand, know they will neither "return" to a democracy of the 1925 Constitution nor are they headed toward the system envisaged in the authoritarian constitution of 1980. Agreement of some sort about the institutional order was needed to make progress in broadening the coalition for a transition.

Awareness of the depth of the economic and institutional crisis is necessary. Overcoming the crisis requires solutions and leadership of national dimensions. A successful transition demands a national solution. The exclusion of important groups, such as the Communists, precludes such a solution. An effort to include these groups would confront both the resistance of those who want to exclude the Communists and the Communists' own self-exclusion.

The parties sustaining the agreement must be aware of the enormous efforts that will be exerted to introduce divisions among them. Mechanisms should be found for the maintenance of this agreement and for its progress toward new areas. Also, parties will have to learn how to maintain their unity while simultaneously disagreeing as they respond to their different constituencies.

Finally, one discussant noted that the agreement provided the norms for future party behavior and introduced a major shift in the regime/opposition dynamics: it has definitely transformed what was perceived as a conflict between the opposition and the armed forces into an opposition between democracy and dictatorship.

A general impression from this part of the discussion is the similar assessment of the impact and significance of the agreement between the party representatives. This is not a negligible fact given their radically different experiences and standpoints during the years of military rule. Members of the signatory parties have had official responsibilities in the military government, others have been -- or still are -- forced into exile, and still others remain subject to various forms of repression.

2. Social and Political Mobilization

Participants differed regarding the question of mobilization, or how to express the new strength acquired. Most argued that for the agreement to succeed, there has to be a show of opposition and mobilization, but

without fostering the image of chaos. All agreed that debate and an accord on forms of mobilization are essential.

One discussant saw the opposition caught in the middle of contradictory demands. On the one hand, the opposition is expected to lead mobilization aimed at overthrowing the government. On the other, it is expected to exhibit disciplined self-control while working to solve current problems to agree on future institutional and economic questions. This discussant argued that everything must be subordinated to the gradual opening of more and more space for the opposition movement. In terms of strategy, and under the assumption that Pinochet will make no uncoerced concessions, a very high social mobilization should be promoted in order to reach a good bargaining position. Issue-specific mobilization around economic demands of specific social sectors is to be part of this strategy. And, there ought to be a timetable for the change sought in the agreement, which must be legitimated in a plebiscite.

Another discussant insisted that negotiation should prevail over unstructured social mobilization, in order to initiate the transition as soon as possible. According to their specific nature, parties should develop their "comparative advantages." Some parties are closer to social sectors more prone to high mobilization, while other parties, like the right-wing parties, are in a better position to work with the military. The argument hinted at a sort of division of labor between the signatory parties, each pushing from its own sources of strength, but remaining within the limits of the agreement.

Two other issues appeared related to this discussion. One consists of the problems and opportunities that the Communist Party presents for mobilization. Some insisted that the type of mobilization the agreement contemplates is incompatible with the strategy of the Communist Party. Others added that some sort of understanding with the Communist Party is necessary in order to prevent mobilization from taking unexpected directions.

A final issue focused on the expectations regarding the 1989 deadline. According to the 1980 Constitution, in March 1989 the military junta is to install the person who will occupy the office of President of the Republic for the next eight years. This nomination is subject to ratification by plebiscite. Beginning in 1990, all of the institutions contemplated in the Constitution should be in place. The National Agreement for the Transition to Full Democracy proposes competitive elections (not a plebiscite) for president, competitive elections for congress, reform of the constitution, and derogation of many of its transitory articles now in force. But it does not explicitly offer an alternative timetable. It would appear from the text and from the discussion that there is a tacit acceptance of the 1989 deadline -- that is, that Pinochet would continue to head the government until 1989.

One of the Uruguayan participants expressed concern with the consensus among Chileans over the difficulties of major change expected before 1989. Chile was likened to an experiment; the way it evolves will have an impact on the rest of the continent, especially on the countries currently undergoing a democratizing process. The ability of the Chilean

Armed Forces to impose their terms on the timing of the transition and to hold on for four more years would have a demonstration effect for their counterparts in the continent. It would give the impression that the military can impose their terms and get away with it. It is in Chile's and Latin America's interest that the opposition not abandon the will to change the government before 1989.

One of the Chilean discussants suggested that conditions should be created so that change could take place before 1989. But, it was argued, this very much depends on the evolution that follows from the starting point that the agreement represents. Another discussant agreed that democrats can not wait until 1989 under the same stagnated conditions prevailing in 1985. But 1989 can be accepted as a landmark for change if the transition is initiated soon --that is, if measures are taken today (i.e., in party legislation and electoral legislation with the participation of broad sectors of the population and the restoration of civil liberties) that will prepare the country for a full turn to democracy in the years to come.

3. On the Communist Party

The size and strength of the Communist Party (CP) is distinctive of the Chilean case when compared to its South American counterparts. The insurrectional strategy it adopted is also distinctive of this party. In view of these characteristics, an Argentine participant asked about the effects of excluding the Communists from the Agreement and about the conditions for their eventual inclusion.

The left argued that the CP should incorporate itself and accept the rules of the majority. The CP was not invited to the negotiating table that produced the agreement, and later refused to sign it. This certainly represents a negative trend, but the CP would not be a "problem" if there were a political solution to the demand for democracy. If such a solution could be reached soon, the CP would garner less than 15 percent of the votes in an election. The CP will become more and more of an issue if a solution is not reached soon. The left will be obliged to show results to its constituency once it has joined other parties in the agreement. If these results are delayed, the CP will benefit and become more of a "problem." Another participant observed that the weight of the CP will also depend on the success of renovated socialist postures.

One participant argued that the CP issue has been overstated and the party benefits from this. In order to remain a hot issue the CP prefers to stay out of the agreement. This issue does not deserve much attention, however, especially when the agreement has been careful not to proscribe explicitly the party. Only anti-democratic behavior will be sanctioned.

Another discussant argued emphatically that democracy has a right to proscribe the anti-system opposition. The only solution for the CP is not to expect more permissiveness on the side of democratic institutions, but to demand democratic behaviour from the party.

In response, one commentator suggested that proscription is possible in theory, but the real weight of the CP in Chile makes it impossible in practical terms. The experience of Spain is illuminating in this regard. The legalization of the Spanish CP was essential for the success of the transition. Suárez understood this and struggled against resistance from both the left and the right for inclusion of the Communists in the system and have them participate openly in the elections. He was reciprocated by the constructive stance adopted by the Spanish Communist Party. In this case, the inclusion of the CP in Spain lessened the impact of the social and labor groups controlled by the Communists and enhanced the dominant role of parties: when Suárez legalized the CP in 1977, nobody thought it would achieve such meager electoral results. Another important factor is the timing of reforms. In the Spanish case the timetable and its objectives were clear less than a year after Suarez assumed office. When this happened, uncertainty decreased and actors were forced to take positions within the rules of the game. The Spanish experience should help illuminate the manner of dealing with the CP in Chile.

There are various strategies of dealing with the CP issue and these vary from case to case. The interaction of the "Junta Democrática" and the CP in Spain provided some room for maneuver. A Chilean discussant added that the Agreement would be a political instrument binding political parties. Labor unions cannot receive political directives regarding their own alliance strategies.

4. International Aspects

Discussants were asked to address the position of the United States government with regard to the prospects for transition. They indicated that there seemed to be a change in the position of the United States government. Initially the Reagan administration supported the Pinochet regime. This support has diminished gradually since 1983. The dominant view the U.S. initially took was that Pinochet should be helped and supported in his attempt to remain in office until 1989. Langhorne Motley had explicitly supported the terms of the Constitution of 1980 which meant --in the words of some discussants --support for dictatorship. Today there seems to be support for the Agreement and pressure on the regime so that 1989 may be effectively the year of change.

In response to a question from a non-Chilean participant about the measures parties and governments of Latin America could take to bring about change in Chile, one discussant stated that nothing should be done that could appear as intervention in domestic affairs. Rather, sharing transition experiences would be of great help. Other discussants, however, insisted that the Agreement could gain recognition if parties, parliaments and governments in the region made statements in support of the agreement.

Finally, in response to another question, it was argued that the East-West dimension had no relevance in the Chilean scenario, and that the Communist Party had no realistic policy of promoting its insurrection strategies throughout the region.

Discussants: Arturo Valenzuela, Duke University; Andrés Allamand, Partido Unión Nacional; Genaro Arriagada, Partido Demócrata Cristiano; Sergio Bitar, Partido Cristiano Izquierdista; Ricardo Lagos, Partido Socialista; Mario Papi, Partido Radical; Germán Riesco, Partido Nacional.

COUNTRY DISCUSSION: URUGUAY¹

Speaker:
Luis González
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Uruguay's transition to democracy is a political process that began as early as 1980, when the military regime lost the plebiscite it had called on a new Constitution. Events began to move faster two years later with the holding of primary elections, but the form of military extrication was only finally resolved in July and August of 1984 with the Naval Club accords. Elections went ahead in November without the participation of certain candidates, most notably the Blanco leader Wilson Ferreira and admitted Communists, but almost all parties were permitted to take part de facto. The transition period can be said to have given away on 1 March 1985, to a period of democratic reconsolidation with the inauguration of President Julio María Sanguinetti, Uruguay's first democratically elected President since 1971.

The essence of González's presentation to the meeting was to argue that the chances for democratic stability would be improved in Uruguay, were it possible to go beyond the present situation of wholesale restoration of democracy along the exact same lines as before, and move towards a more creative and foundational process of democratic re-equilibration. To some extent, the often crude attempts by the military to remodel Uruguay's democratic institutions in order to allegedly strengthen them, created a climate of resistance to what might be seen as "tinkering" with one of the oldest and most successful democracies in Latin America. The complete and unequivocal return to the 1967 Constitution was for many a major demand of the opposition during the transition--and one which they were very largely successful in achieving. Nevertheless, the very fact that Uruguay's legitimate democratic Constitution is not yet two decades old suggest that it need not necessarily be viewed as sacrosanct. No less than five Constitutions were enacted between 1918 and 1967--an average of one per decade. This has led to the natural argument that too much time and political energy has been wasted on institutional reforms, and not enough on substantive social and economic change. To this, González's reply would presumably be that while the form of the executive has been repeatedly changed in Uruguay (from unipersonal to semi-collegial, to unipersonal, to fully collegial, and finally back to unipersonal again) the country's somewhat unique electoral law has been in essence unchanged throughout the period.

¹Primary responsibility for authorship of this section lies with Charlie Gillespie.

To foreigners, the so called "Double Simultaneous Vote" (DSV) is at first a difficult practice to understand. It is used in both legislative and executive elections, as well as local elections, all of which are held on the same day. Briefly, voters choose not only a party (known as a "Lema") but also a faction within that party, each of which runs its own list. Occasionally two or more lists may form an alliance known as a "Sublema", which is merely a method for improving their chances of winning representation within the party. The overall number of seats a party wins is determined by the number of votes it obtains, but within the party seats are apportioned first by sublemas (if any exist) and finally by list. In the presidential election, the corollary of this system is easier to understand. Parties may choose to run more than one candidate, and the winning ticket is simply the one with the most votes from the party with most votes.

Now, the DSV electoral system has come under sustained criticism from many sides, most commonly from those who argue that it encourages factionalism, that it confuses voters and that it may even lead them to help elect candidates they do not support.² Others have argued that it gave an unfair advantage to the Colorados and Blancos, Uruguay's traditional parties which date more or less from independence in 1828. Recently, however, the Left have found a way of forming their own alliance, the Broad Front, which simply presents all its candidates as lists under the banner of the Christian Democratic party, getting round the problem that the Electoral Court only permits established "Lemas" (parties) to run more than one list. As will become clear below, many of these common criticisms of the DSV are in fact sustained by González, though he admits party "fractions" (a term he prefers with Sartori) were formerly positive vehicles of pluralism and internal party democracy.

On the other hand, his criticism of the electoral system stops short of denouncing the current practice by which voters may not "split their tickets". Currently, legislators and presidential candidates must be chosen from the same party, a system known in Uruguay as the "closed ballot". In fact, the pre-printed lists of candidates amongst which voters must pick, already have a given candidate for President at the top. The only slight element of flexibility allowed to voters is that they may choose different lists for national and local elections, but only so long as they are from the same party. Anyone who for instance might vote for the Left in the Montevideo mayoral race and the Blancos in the national contest (strategically believing each group to have the better chance of defeating the Colorados) would have their vote annulled.³

²Further details on DSV may be found in Alberto Pérez Pérez, La ley de lemas (Montevideo: FCU, 1971).

³A few voters who really do not want to vote for the same party for national and local office occasionally register their preferences by not voting at all for one or other election. Their voter's envelope is found to contain just one ballot when the votes are counted, rather than two.

González's argument, then, is that Uruguay should retain the tendency towards a two-party system, as a vehicle for needed political integration and interest aggregation. One method to ensure that this pattern survives would be by the continuation of the closed-ballot, that is: maintenance of the ban on ticket-splitting. On the other hand, the DSV system of proportional representation and multiple lists within each party must be curtailed or even abolished. Only then will the internal incoherence and indiscipline of Uruguayan parties be overcome, and meaningful programmatic alternatives emerge.

A. Primary Characteristics of Uruguay's Party System

For González, democratic restoration leads to the emergence of two kinds of political problems: those concerned with substantive policy issues, and those related to styles of decisional processes and institutional forms. In the short run, such "issues" as civil-military relations or the debt-crisis may seem more pressing, while established features of the political system such as the number of parties, their ideologies and structures, may not seem modifiable at all. In the long run, however, González argues that such modification is indeed feasible. In this sense he concurs with many of Linz's arguments in favor of parliamentarism, and goes so far as to suggest that his own discussion of the virtues of twopartism versus multipartism, is in many ways parallel.

From a comparative perspective, the most remarkable characteristic of the Uruguayan party system has been its stability over time. The emergence of the Broad Front in 1971 as a challenge to the two-party hegemony of Colorados and Blancos required the creation of a coalition far more ideologically diverse than, for example, Chile's Popular Unity alliance. In fact, not only are the so-called 'traditional' parties catch-all and multiclass by nature, but the Broad Front is as well. Furthermore, all three groups exhibit a high level of internal fragmentation or fractionalism.

For the sake of argument, one may adduce two rather caricatural models of the genesis and development of Uruguay's unique party system. Both would admit a large degree of historical "accident" with respect to the birth of the traditional parties, but the first would go on to argue that this gave way to a process of accumulating political experience. Uruguay's civil society is without regional, ethnic, linguistic or even pronounced stratificational cleavages, unlike most of Latin America. The Colorados and Blancos, were therefore well adapted to the fluidity and amorphousness of Uruguayan political society. The second view is more negative: whereas the genesis of the Colorado and Blanco parties was largely accidental, their survival has only been possible by the manipulation of a series of political and electoral mechanisms, such as the practices of patronage and clientelism. If democracy survived, it was despite (rather than thanks to) a party system which poorly articulated the conflicting interests present in Uruguayan society.

Put in these terms, González finds himself forced to reject the latter view. Manipulation can scarcely explain the fact that the 1984 elections produced results strikingly similar to those of 1971, despite

over a decade of interruptions of normal political processes and patron-client relations. Nor can they explain the massive fluctuations in voting during the 1950s and 1960s which lead to no government being re-elected to a second term until 1971.⁴

According to González, the ban on "ticket splitting" since the beginning of this century has had the peculiar effect of recreating a "winner take all" contest, much as in the United States or Britain. Thus the presidential contest, surprisingly enough, well illustrates Maurice Duverger's famous law that simple majority voting produces a twoparty system, whereas proportional representation produces a multiparty system. Because presidential elections are held without a "run-off" ballot, whatever party obtains a plurality controls the executive. This tends to concentrate the minds of voters and leads them to exclude minor parties for which they might otherwise have voted, had their chances of winning the presidency not been very slim. Such a tendency was probably a major explanation for the fact that the small Civic Union party did less well in 1984 than the polls had predicted. Put bluntly, its voters preferred to vote Colorado in order to lessen the chance of a Blanco victory, feeling the presidential contest to be the most salient. As a result, however, they were unable to vote for the Civic Union in the legislative race either.

One of the reasons that the Colorados were able to maintain uninterrupted control of the executive until 1958 (albeit with varying factions at the helm) was their greater success in maintaining party unity prior to elections. Their larger reserves of patience paid off by nudging their "lema" ahead of the Blancos in successive very narrow contests. One of the results of this process according to González, was the promotion of internal party democracy, and the absence of any developing party apparatus or machinery.⁵

⁴Though Colorados won in both 1950 and 1954, the second time around a more progressive faction ousted a more conservative one. A similar thing happened in 1962, when the Blanco victory nevertheless led to a complete change in the administration, due to the shift in voter preferences towards the party's more progressive wing. While the 1982 primaries probably gave a misleading view of the degree of shift in party identifications amongst voters (due to the low turnout) the stability of the Colorado vote in 1984 compared to 1971 again masked the massive shift from the right of the party towards moderate and progressive factions.

⁵In making this point, González in many ways echoes the famous dictum of Roberto Michels' classic work Political Parties: whosoever says "organization" says "oligarchy"! A counter-argument might suggest that the influence of minor factions due to their "blackmail" powers, especially prior to elections, was hardly democratic at all. Indeed, structured institutions for expressing members' and voters' participation were, by the same token, nonexistent. The only chance available for expressing their preferences was participation in the parties' internal elections, normally held in the form of "simultaneous primaries" on the same day as general elections. Again (perhaps logically) ticket-splitting

Despite its original rationale, the value of the Double Simultaneous Vote has declined over the course of this century according to González. Policy coherence declined dangerously on both left and right, contributing to a form of political blockage. Opposing ideologies might be found at each extreme of a given party, while the reconciliation of actual social needs failed to occur. The costs of this irrationality were very high, and were visible in the increasingly absurd numbers of candidate lists presented in each election, some of which could hope to attain only a few hundred votes, or less.

B. Electoral Reform

In sum, the need is to preserve a small number of "catch-all" parties, rather than allowing the emergence of a multiparty system with the consequent dangers of ideological polarization. Compared to Chile, for example, Uruguay has successfully shown the possibility of a natural dialog between the center and the right. The vice-presidential running mate of the right-wing Colorado candidate was made a minister in the current Administration. His mentor and former President, Jorge Pacheco Areco, was made an Ambassador. However, retention of such a "moderate" party system, requires a complementary reduction in intraparty factionalism, as well. The abolition of DSV must be applied not merely to the presidential race (as some have argued) but to legislative elections as well, otherwise the number of party fractions will not be reduced. In practice, it should not be hard to find substitute mechanisms to the DSV which allow the maintenance of pluralism, and prevent the emergence of an undemocratic, or bureaucratic apparatus from coming to dominate the parties. One such solution might be the present mixed electoral system of the Federal Republic of Germany, which combines proportionality with territoriality. Half the parliamentary seats are elected as in the USA or Britain by "winner takes all" elections in single-member seats. Voters, however, also cast a second vote for party lists, and the overall composition of the Parliament is adjusted accordingly to ensure strict proportionality. The effect of the single-member districts is to force the integration of center and right, or center with left, producing the kind of centripetal competition González argued will strengthen democracy.

Given that the Uruguayan legislators present were the distinguished products of the DSV electoral system, it was perhaps surprising that a high level of agreement was expressed with González's major theses. It was noted that Uruguay had traditionally been a country governed by coalitions, and that in this way it had weathered many storms and crises. The fundamental aim of politics must be to defend those things which all Uruguayans hold in common, and this had been achieved during the transition to democracy, for example in the all-party declaration of a

was not permitted. Many have argued that even when the internal elections to party conventions fell into disuse, voters still were able to participate in a form of simultaneous primary via the choice of list under DSV. This does not, however, answer the objection that minorities were often unfairly favored over majorities.

joint policy statement of the principles which should underlie the economic policies of any government. One of the major values of holding all elections simultaneously as a "packet", however, was to prevent any tendency for leaders to woo voters too often or continuously, and also avoid weakening the parties through fragmentation.

C. The Survival and Evolution of Uruguayan Parties

Another spokesman reminded the audience that politicians had, above all, to be practical men, rather than theoreticians, and so one could not expect objectivity from them. For his own part, however, Uruguay's traditional parties were a kind of reinforced pillar, or vertical slice through society, bringing together the poor and the rich, the educated and the less educated, all within the same parties. It was surely telling that the military regime had chosen to oust the civilian President (Juan Maria Bordaberry) in 1976, for having dared to propose the permanent abolition of political parties and the implementation of a corporatist system. At the time, the reply of the Minister of the Economy, Ing. Alejandro Végh Villegas, was one of severe criticism of the ousted President's memorandum. In particular, he emphasized the absurdity of one of Bordaberry's accusations: that the traditional parties were in any case too similar to really represent alternatives, and thus represented an "artificial" divide. On the contrary, two-party competition must by nature always lead to convergence in the center. In a sense the Left, united in the Broad Front under the leadership of Gen. Seregni, were showing signs of becoming "traditionalized". Seregni's leadership was to be particularly commended in this respect, for having integrated the Left into the party system as a loyal opposition force.

One of the tragic misconceptions about the Tupamaros guerrillas active during the years prior to the 1973 military coup is that they in some way constituted a response to a blockage of the political channels of representation. On the contrary, it was asserted, their very resort to violence was an act of intellectual arrogance and refusal to accept their inability to attract voters to their revolutionary doctrines. Although many young people had been unable to vote for over a decade, and were first able to exercise that right in 1984, there were grounds for confidence in predicting democratic consolidation, based on a process of renewed political socialization into tolerance.

The next speaker echoed the pride of politicians in their 'metier', fuelled by their persecution as a class under the military regime. Their claim to recognition rests on the simple qualification of having received the votes of the people, though they would deny any 'scientific' knowledge of politics. Rather their values might be said to be profoundly human. While the theme of Uruguay's electoral law might fruitfully occupy an entire conference, discussion was clearly valuable. The emergence of the Broad Front represented a real and concrete convergence on the Left, which subsequently suffered the worst repression under the authoritarian regime. In the 1984 elections, the Broad Front was the only political force to grow, although the gain (three per cent of the national vote) was not an enormous one. Nevertheless, there could be absolutely no doubt that Uruguay's twoparty system was dead. Consequently, majority government would never again be possible, either.

D. The Re-emergence of Democracy and the Incorporation of the Left

The results of the 1984 elections represented a multitudinous pronouncement in favor of democratic institutions by the people. Even members of the Left now felt better with the restoration of a bourgeois Parliament, secure in the knowledge that their rights were safeguarded. This was truly part of the much commented revaluing of democracy. Furthermore voters both rejected extremes and clearly expressed support for change. The proponents of change now predominated within both the Colorado and National (Blanco) parties.

The next speaker suggested that it was wrong to assume that two party systems were by definition always devoid of ideology. In some ways, Uruguay might be entering a period of "three party twopartism", in other words, a party system which maintained its previous moderate dynamic, although three major parties now existed. At the same time, it is important not to assume that the masses are devoid of "ideas", or lack an understanding of their actions and political realities. In this respect the messianic Leninism of the 1960s must be buried forever. Those who emphasize 'clientelism' continually would do better to define it more precisely as a practice, and then produce the evidence for its existence. The sophistication of the traditional parties could hardly be explained with such simplistic models. Furthermore, although the twoparty monopoly has undeniably been broken, it should be remembered that the leading candidate of both Colorado and Blanco parties, each outpolled the entire Broad Front.

The traditional parties have undergone a process of modernization, while the impact of the authoritarian regime has been to imbue all parties with a renewed respect for democracy. At the same time, the need to stop thinking in utopian terms was increasingly recognized. The fundamental polarization in Uruguayan politics today is between liberalism, representative democracy and republicanism on the one hand, corporatism on the other. While the traditional parties are able to transcend corporatist forms, the axis of conflicts over social democracy is secondary.

One of the younger speakers referred to Wilson Ferreira's speech calling for the maintenance of "governability" in Uruguay upon his release from detention after the elections. Speaking as a representative of what might be called a silent generation (youth) it seemed fair to say that before March of 1985 (the date upon which Sanguinetti assumed the Presidency) Uruguay's party system had afforded creative opportunities for political participation. The question, nevertheless, was whether Uruguay's electoral system allowed the adoption of policies and reforms that the country needs. On this point, he felt the answer was "no". The danger of "immediatism", of short term horizons in politics was a difficult one to avoid. However, one proposal for reform would be the introduction of ballotage along the French model.⁶

⁶Where no candidate obtains an overall majority in presidential elections, a run-off ballot is held two weeks later in which only the two leading candidates take part.

The last speaker, concurred with the arguments set forth by González entirely, and also with the re-emphasis of politics per se--but only so long as this did not lead to an unrealistic neglect of economics. In particular, the present debt crisis in Latin America is putting serious limits on redemocratization. The danger was that although the system might manage to survive, the democratic substance or content of that system might be threatened. Naturally, all agree that democratic liberties are desirable, but this places all the more onus upon us to ensure that the conditions for their nourishment will, in future, hold. This include the satisfaction of basic needs and aspirations.

On the problem of political forms, a leading Uruguayan political scientist, César Aguiar, has described Uruguay's party system as one of "fragmented twopartism". This affords the capacity to win elections but not to govern. The possibility for continuation of political coalitions was therefore important, as were the efforts towards "concerted action" among parties and interest groups.

Perhaps a fitting epitaph for the meeting, as well as for the self-criticism which the authoritarian experience had induced in all Uruguayans who had allowed their commitment to change to come before their commitment to democracy is provided in a reflection made by Uruguay's acclaimed author and leftist, Mario Benedetti: "Some of us seemed to think that the worst was the best, as it turned out, the worst was merely the worst".

Discussants: Luis González, Centro de Informaciones y Estudios del Uruguay (CIESU); Jorge Batlle, Partido Colorado; Yamandú Fau, Frente Amplio; Manuel Flores Silva, Partido Colorado; Luis Alberto Lacalle, Partido Nacional; Héctor Lezcano, Frente Amplio.