Number 19

THE NEW UTOPIANISM: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IDEAS IN THE DEPENDENCY LITERATURE

by Robert A. Packenham
Stanford University

Author's note: This paper was presented in a colloquium in the Latin American Program, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. 20560, and it was delivered at the 1978 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, in New York City, August 31 - September 3, 1978.

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ABSTRACT

"THE NEW UTOPIANISM: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IDEAS

IN THE DEPENDENCY LITERATURE"

Robert A. Packenham
Department of Political Science
Stanford University

Where are we in the study of political development? In the seventies, most scholars have rejected the liberal paradigms of the sixties. Two other ways of thinking about political development have become dominant: the "will-and-capacity" approach (e.g., Samuel P. Huntington) and the dependencia perspective (e.g., Fernando Henrique Cardoso). This paper examines and evaluates the contribution of the "dependency way of framing" and answering questions about development in general but particularly political development.

Section I sets the context, defines terms, and gives sources. Section II describes the dependency paradigm as a whole. Section III describes the main political-development ideas in the paradigm. Section IV analyzes the substance and style of this dependency "optic" on political development, with emphasis on five main features: 1) the focus on ideal rather than empirically-based models of development; 2) the premise of benign autonomy and its intellectual foundations; 3) the central role of ambiguous concepts: the concept of interest and the related notion of the "anti-nation inside the nation"; 4) the reduction of all scientific and theoretical questions to normative, emotional, and polemical questions; and 5) the premise of the politicized academy.

Section V concludes by arguing that if the dependency paradigm once aided understanding and promoted development, today it impedes understanding and hinders development. It discusses three main types of problems: scientific, political, and moral.

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Stanford University

Where are we in the study of political modernization and development? It is a good time to ask the question. In the 1960s political development was an attractive and expanding field of comparative political studies. In the 1970s, however, it has been less attractive to young (and not so young) scholars, and the very premises and conceptual apparatus employed in the field have been called seriously into question. This critique has been profound and comprehensive. It came from, and is now widely accepted by, both those who once advocated the original set of political development ideas, and from a new set of writers, especially those influenced by one or another kind of Marxism. It is the profundity, thoroughness, and, in some respects at least, the widely-shared nature of the critiques of the earlier "liberal" developmental ideas that make a reassessment particularly timely and necessary at the present moment. In addition, such a stock-taking enables us to ask the question: Having gone through this exercise, what, if anything, is left to replace the older, now largely demolished or abandoned, conceptions of political development and ways of thinking about it? And, to switch the metaphor, in throwing away the bathwater, how much of the baby are we pitching away as well?

The main burden of this paper is to identify and evaluate the ideas about political development that are contained in the dependencia literature. This literature has been one of the most influential bodies of writing about Latin American and Third World development of the last decade or so. However, the conceptions of political development -- both explicit and implicit -- embedded in this literature (its own ideas, not the ideas it criticizes) have received little attention. Therefore, characterizing and assessing these ideas should be particularly helpful in addressing our question of "where we are" in analyzing political development. Before getting on to this main task, however, we shall briefly describe the context from which these ideas flowed, define some key terms, and set some parameters on our analysis.

I. The Analysis of Ideas About Political Development

During the 1950s and at least the first half of the 1960s, political modernization was defined in terms of such criteria as national integration or nationhood, differentiation of social structures, secularization of political culture, and national administrative capacity or statehood. Political development was defined as all of these plus the competitive politics, due process protection of individuals, and other features of constitutional democracy. There was substantial consensus on these criteria of political modernization and development per se. Scholars tended to disagree more about the explanations for political modernization and development so defined. During the early part of this period, legal-formal and configurative explanations were the most prominent. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, economic, social, and psychological explanations were much more influential. This latter "break with formalism" had a major impact on comparative political studies; it overlapped with, and was broadly comparable to, the so-called "behavioral revolution" in political science generally.[1]

From the mid-1960s on, however, the consensus about the nature of political modernization and development came apart. This is not the place for a detailed account of that process or the nature of the criticisms. Suffice it to say, for present purposes, that two schools of thought, paradigms, perspectives, or approaches to the understanding of political modernization and development became influential from the mid- or late-1960s to the present day. These were the "will and capacity" approach and the dependency perspective.

The "will and capacity" approach to political development took the position that the earlier theories were overly optimistic and ethnocentric. In this view, the earlier theories minimized the costs of development, assumed that many good things could be achieved simultaneously rather than face the necessity for choices, and exaggerated the desirability and feasibility of liberal constitutional democracy in developing countries. The "will and capacity" writers urged that politics be treated more as an independent variable than it had been under the "break with formalism" approach, where it was seen as mainly dependent on vast economic, social, and psychological forces. They counseled greater attention on the will, skill, and capacity of political organizations and leaders to deal with social change and political participation as the key variables in political development. The most influential writer in this group was Samuel P. Huntington, but there were many others, including Albert O. Hirschman, Warren Ilchman, Manfred Halpern, S.N. Eisenstadt, Zbigniew Brzeninski, Karl W. Deutsch, Rubert Emerson, Guy Pauker, Dankwart Rustow, and Howard Wriggens. These writers differed on many points, of course, but their writings

tended to have the common features indicated. By the end of the sixties the central ideas of this approach entered the mainstream of thinking in U.S. scholarship about political modernization and development in the Third World and elsewhere.[2]

The other approach was the dependency perspective. The challenge of the dependencia writers to the earlier modernization and development thinking is much more comprehensive and radical than the will and capacity approach was. At the same time, as we shall see, while the dependency critique is harsh and comprehensive, it has very little to say about alternatives, particularly in the political sphere. The influence of the dependency way of thinking about development and underdevelopment has been massive in the United States, Latin America, and Europe; yet, surprisingly, these ideas have not been subjected to the same degree of critical scrutiny by social scientists as either the break with formalism writings or the will and capacity literature. The dependency literature is, if not the new conventional wisdom in development studies, at least a new orthodoxy in many of these intellectual circles. This is why describing and analyzing its ideas about political development is timely and important.

The analysis that follows, of political development ideas in the dependency literature, is part of a larger study of the dependency paradigm. The most influential contemporary dependency writers are for the most part Latin Americans, but others have also written on the subject. Latin Americans include Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Theotonio dos Santos, Octavio Ianni, Helio Jaquaribe, Luciano Martins, Guillermo O'Donnell, Aníbal Quijano, José A. Silva Michelena, Osvaldo Sunkel, and Francisco Weffort. Contributors to the literature from outside Latin America include Susanne Jonas Bodenheimer, Frank Bonilla, James Cockcroft, Richard Fagen, Andre Gunder Frank, Dale Johnson, James Petras, Philippe Schmitter, A.W. and N.L. Singham, and Stanley and Barbara Stein. My analysis is based on the works of these authors, as well as a few other writers that may be cited.[3]

As indicated, the focus of my study has been theories and theorists of Latin American dependency. I have not tried to deal systematically with writers who have used this framework to analyze Africa (e.g., Samir Amin, Colin Leys) or other Third World areas. Thus I make no claim to demonstrate my points for any but the writers named and cited. However, having read some dependency writers dealing with other areas I believe that much of my analysis applies to these other writers as well, even though I shall not attempt to document this point in this paper.

II. The Dependency Paradigm

Although dependency writers by no means agree on everything, they do agree overwhelmingly on several key propositions. In other words, there is a dependency paradigm which is distinctive when compared to the earlier developmental ideas that the dependency writers rejected or certain other paradigms.[4] This point needs to be stressed because dependency writers have sometimes a) pointed to the differences and argued that b) this means there are no common elements of the dependency position that can be analyzed.[5] The first point is true, the second is not. There are, after all, many differences among the liberal developmentalists, too, but that does not mean there are no similarities. Dependentistas have no trouble seeing the similarities among the liberals; they have more difficulty seeing similarities among themselves. For many years the liberal developmentalists had the same problem about themselves, so this difficulty in self-perception is not unique to the dependencia school. But it is a problem.

The basic ideas of the dependency paradigm may be summarized in terms of the following key propositions:

1) Dependency is a condition in which nations are constrained by the international environment in ways that either create underdevelopment (the "extreme" version of the paradigm) or bring about distorted, inappropriate development (the "moderate" version).

2) Dependency occurs through a two-stage process which links, via the concept of interest, "external" and "internal" exploitation as interactive aspects of a systemic relationship.

3) Dependency is a function of capitalism.

4) Dependency is a condition in which developmental consequences are always on balance negative, even if they may be positive in some respects. Thus, many dependency writers -- by now, most of them -- allow for the possibility of "associated-dependent development," as in Brazil; but no dependency writer allows for the possibility that "associated-dependent development" is or could be a desirable or even an acceptable form of development, as many neoclassical economists, for instance, do argue. Absent this fourth proposition about overall consequences being negative, there is no dependency paradigm.

5) Dependency may only be understood properly in holistic terms, that is, as a situation in which the "internal" and "external" elements of dependency are inextricably linked, interacting parts of a whole that hang together both empirically and definitionally. From this point of view, empirical data may be used to support

the paradigm but never to question its fundamental claims, which are postulated to be true by definition.

Although slightly different language may be used, others who have described the dependency paradigm have made essentially the same points.[6] Despite ambiguities, and conflicts on some issues, the main lines of the dependency paradigm are clear enough. For instance, Andre Gunder Frank and Fernando Henrique Cardoso differ intensely on many issues, and are often taken as the prototypes of the "crude, dogmatic" and the "subtle, sophisticated" versions, respectively, of the dependency paradigm; and so they are. Nevertheless, the ideas of both these writers are fully consistent with the five propositions just indicated.

In this paper, in giving examples I shall cite mainly the ablest and most influential authors. (Influential among social scientists, I mean.) They tend more often to be "moderate" dependency writers than "extremists," although, as I have stressed, the similarities among them are much greater than the differences.[7] Examples of "moderates" are, roughly in order from least to most "moderate," Richard Fagen, Osvaldo Sunkel, Philippe Schmitter, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Peter Evans, Guillermo O'Donnell, and Helio Jaguaribe. Examples of "extremists" are, in no particular order, Susanne Jonas Bodenheimer, Ronald Chilcote, Theotonio dos Santos, Andre Gunder Frank, Octavio Ianni, Jose Ocampo, and Andre Gunder Frank. I emphasize the "moderates" more than the "extremists" for several reasons. Since they are, in my view, generally more able, they deserve more attention on substantive grounds. I believe they have more influence among social scientists and intelligent publics, and therefore are more intellectually and politically significant. Finally, any weaknesses in the "moderates" will almost always be found in the "extremists" as well, whereas the converse is often not so.

Some of the other features of the overall paradigm should be noted before we turn to its ideas specifically about political development. First, the dependency paradigm is a global perspective for thinking about many aspects of development, distorted development, and underdevelopment in the context of center-periphery relations over time and space. It is not focussed mainly on the political aspects of development and underdevelopment; indeed, as we shall see, its treatment of the political dimension of development is very thin compared to its treatment of some other themes. At the same time the paradigm says a bit and implies a great deal about political development. Its proponents without exception affirm its superiority to liberal or other ways of thinking about political development. This is why it is essential to examine what is said and implied about political development in this paradigm. But it is

also important to bear in mind that the paradigm in which these fragmentary notions of political development are embedded is a global one.

Second, the dependency paradigm focusses almost exclusively on situations of dependency; it says next to nothing about situations of non-dependency, how to recognize non-dependency if one saw it, how to get there, etc. For example, one of the basic texts in the dependency literature, Cardoso and Faletto's Dependencia y Desarrollo en América Latina (1969), devotes less than one page to non-dependency, and it is quite typical in this respect. There are now, after a full ten years of dependency writings, the first faint beginnings of an attempt to correct this huge imbalance, but they are just getting started, and there is no assurance they will continue. In general, the idea is that non-dependency is the opposite of dependency, and that, since dependency is associated with capitalism, non-dependency is associated with socialism. These hints and others provide at best a general idea of what non-dependency would look like, but they provide few specifics.

The third feature is related closely to the second. In the dependency paradigm, the effort is much more critical than constructive, much more an indication of what is wrong and why than of what is correct and how to get there. This is true across the whole range of dependency concerns, but it is especially the case with respect to its treatment of political development. The dependency writers have devoted much attention to political underdevelopment, as they see it, but very little attention to political development. For instance, both the influential, "classic" formulations of the dependency paradigm as a whole (e.g., Cardoso and Faletto, Sunkel),[9] and the large, still-growing number of middle-range and empirical studies of "the new authoritarianism" in Latin America, that flow from and elaborate the dependency way of thinking (especially O'Donnell, Collier),[10] deal at enormous length with the authoritarian, negatively-evaluated regimes; but none of them has almost anything to say about what more positively-evaluated alternatives would look like. (One exception is O'Donnell and Linck, but this line of work is not followed up very much in O'Donnell's subsequent, more influential writing.)[11]

In making these observations, no one is calling for detailed blueprints, for determinism, for ignoring "concrete situations of dependency," for closing off future options, for an "anti-dialectical" approach that "ignores contradictions," etc., as Cardoso, Sunkel, and others have charged. These are inaccurate and illogical charges. The problem with the dependency literature is precisely that it is itself undialectical: in focussing entirely on dependency with virtually no attention to possibilities to reduce dependency, these writers -- Cardoso and Sunkel very much included -- have frozen their own "dialectic," their verbal bombast and obfuscations to the contrary

notwithstanding.[12] Some specifications of positive alternatives is essential; otherwise dependency thinking simply opens the door to and justifies any kind of behavior as long as it is done in the name of socialism. It might be good; it might also be bad. In fact, it has been both. Politically, as we shall see below, it has too often been unspeakably bad.

Fourth, to the limited extent that the paradigm does offer alternatives to dependency and underdevelopment, the overwhelming emphasis is on the socioeconomic aspects of development rather than political development. The literature on dependency says and implies much about need for reducing social and economic equality; indeed, it can be argued that this goal is the preeminent value of the socialist vision (or, more properly, the "anti-capitalist" vision) that suffuses and animates the dependency perspective. Moreover, many specific features of socioeconomic equality are mentioned in the areas of health, education, rural development, etc. By contrast, the literature says very little about political equality or political democracy, even under conditions of socioeconomic equality, and there are remarkably few specifics about the political institutions and processes that are appropriate. About all we are told is that these political institutions and processes should be socialist, promote the goals of a socialist revolution, or serve the interests of the people. Beyond these principles there is almost nothing in this literature about political development. We shall return to this point in a moment.

A fifth feature of the paradigm is that it gives very little attention to the feasibility of the values and goals that it specifies or implies as desirable. Nor is there much in the literature about priorities among valuable goals, trade-offs, and conflicts among values.

Sixth, the dependency literature is, of course, much more open to revolution, and less tied to incrementation or reform, than the earlier liberal literature was. Indeed, some sort of revolution, away from capitalism toward socialism, is regarded as necessary by nearly all the dependency writers. Many of them seem to consider that this revolution must be violent; some are more ambiguous or open-ended on the subject; and a very few explicitly allow reform rather than violent revolution as a possible, though improbable, way out of dependency. These fifth and sixth features apply both to the paradigm as a whole and more narrowly to the ideal about political development in it.

Thus, the dependency paradigm is global, holistic, and critical. Insofar as it says or implies anything at all about alternatives to capitalism, it is much more concerned with their desirability than with their feasibility. The paradigm favors socioeconomic equality, the "elimination" of alienation, and community (for

certain groups, classes, and class "fractions," not for others, which must be eliminated), but it says little about the structures, processes, or even the values of political development. All of these features characterize all the main currents in the dependency stream of writing, not just the most extreme and dogmatic writers. In other words, these are the views of a Cardoso or a Sunkel, as well as a Gunder Frank or a Quijano Obregón.

It is essential to bear in mind this broad range of the features of the "dependency way of framing" developmental areas. For our purposes, however, the central question is, what does the dependency paradigm have to say about political development? The paradigm is presented (and largely accepted) as, among other things, a substitute and alternative for the earlier modes of thinking about political development. Yet, as we have just seen, it really has very little to say about this topic.[12a] And insofar as it does speak to political-development questions, it addresses them in the most general terms. This mode of thinking has profound implications that we will want to consider. First we shall describe the mode, then consider these implications.

III. Political-Development Ideas in the Dependency Paradigm

As it is used in this paper, the phrase "political-development ideas" refers to ideas about the nature, conditions, and consequences of desirable and feasible kinds of political systems. The terms used here are carefully chosen. Thus, we are concerned about political systems, not just economic or social systems. Political development deals with the nature of developed or developing political systems, not just with their causes and consequences. Very importantly, in this perspective political development is a normative as well as an empirical notion; it deals not only with political change, but with political change in a desirable direction.[13] At the same time, however, it is concerned with feasible political changes as well as desirable ones.

As noted above, the main idea contained in what little dependency writers tell us about political development (as opposed to political underdevelopment or distorted development) is that political institutions and processes should be socialist, that they should promote the interests of the people. We are told a good deal about the conditions that allegedly cause political development (socialist modes of production, distribution, and exchange and the class configurations tied to these modes); and we are told the socioeconomic and cultural consequences that allegedly will result from these modes of production (equality, community, nonalienation). But we are not told very much about the nature of these political institutions and processes.

There are, I believe, at least three ways in which this approach to political development manifests itself in dependency writings as well as in the broader Marxist, neo-Marxist and quasi-Marxist literatures with which it substantially overlaps.[14] First, the writers sometimes simply articulate the broad verbal formulas I have just mentioned -- political development is "socialist political institutions," "political institutions and processes that serve the interests of the people," etc. -- without any attempt to provide specifics. This is the main practice followed in the literature.

A second related device is to define political development in terms of a political system that does not exist and never has existed but will exist in some future state when complete socialism comes into being. This is, of course, a classic Marxist approach; it is employed widely in the dependency literature. There is no problem of assessing the strengths and weaknesses of such a regime since it is defined in ways that allow no weaknesses, only strengths. Moreover, using this technique criticisms of the model by reference to flaws in existing systems are not admissable since no existing system is said to be an adequate representative of socialism. As in the first approach, the stress is on the alleged causes and consequences of political development rather than on the nature of political development. There is a congenial but extremely vague, utopian vision of political systems without conflict, hierarchy, or tough choices.

The third approach is to make reference to an existing system or systems but to provide an idealized version of that system, again with more emphasis on the socioeconomic than the political. In Latin America, Cuba is of course the country that is cited most often when this approach is used. Among the dependency writers who have adopted this third approach are Chilcote and Edelstein ("extremists") and Richard Fagen ("moderate"). Thus, they use Cuba as an example of an alternative to dependent development; but, true to the approach, they pay much more attention to socioeconomic than to political development. Chilcote and Edelstein, for instance, write that:

> the dependency model does not measure development by per capita GNP or the indices of modernity. Economic development includes the establishment of economic sovereignty (which does not imply isolation) and a level of productivity and a pattern of distribution which adequately provide for the basic (culturally determined) needs of the entire population, generating a surplus for investment in continued national development. Social and political aspects of development are

> less clearly stated, but generally include equality, the elimination of alienation and the provision of meaningful work, and forms of social, economic and political organization which enable all members of society to determine the decisions which affect them.[15]

Fagen writes in detail about "an impressive catalogue of achievements accomplished in less than two decades" in Cuba in the areas of nutrition, health care, literacy, wages, unemployment, class relations, etc.; he then says, in a footnote, "For lack of space I am not attempting to deal with issues of democratic governance as they have arisen in the Cuban development scenario -- or elsewhere for that matter. . . .it is somewhat premature to pass judgment on issues of democratic governance in Cuba."[16]

This approach has been used very little by the dependency writers, however, especially by "moderates." For instance, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Osvaldo Sunkel, perhaps the two most influential dependency writers, seldom if ever adopt this approach. They evidently are reluctant to identify specific features of the Cuban political system with political development.

Unlike ideal, non-existent models, real systems have flaws. One of the features of this third approach, therefore, is that readers may call attention to the negative as well as the positive features of the model. Moreover, the question of which real-world systems are appropriate as models may always be raised. Thus, cases that were once thought to be satisfactory may become suspect. A very few dependency writers use the USSR as an example of a socialist country[17] but most seem unwilling to do this. Even China and Cuba are now thought to be less "safe" as examples of socialism than they once were. And if one eliminates those cases there are not many "usable" real-world socialist cases left. They appear to be some of the reasons why the dependency writers rely mainly on the first and second of these three approaches -- vague verbal formulas or nonexisting future states -- more than this third, more empirical one.

In summary, we see that political-development ideas in the dependency paradigm are profoundly normative, but in a special, one-sided way. They offer a comprehensive view of what is undesirable. The dependency perspective has almost nothing to say about the feasibility of the political changes it advocates and implies; insofar as one can identify them it appears that many of these changes would be extremely difficult if not impossible to achieve. There is a great deal about socioeconomic development, but very little about political development; there is a lot about alleged causes and consequences but little on the nature of political development.

We are, thus, in a curious situation. Other approaches to political development have been challenged, and to a considerable extent supplanted, by a paradigm that is profoundly critical of all that has come before; yet this paradigm says very little, beyond general, elastic, ambiguous, and profoundly utopian general formulas, about what kind of development would be better. In the next sections we shall consider in more detail some of the characteristics and implications of this way of thinking about political development.

IV. Analysis of Political Development Ideas in the Dependency Paradigm

We have just surveyed the main characteristics of the dependency paradigm as a whole and the main features of the dependency way of thinking about political development. We shall now analyze these features in more detail, paying attention to both the substance and the style of thought involved. The objective of the analysis continues to be to answer our opening question: where are we in the study of political development? Or, more precisely, where is the dependency literature taking us?

1. The Emphasis on Ideal Models Rather Than Empirically-Based Models

One of the characteristics that differentiates the dependency literature from the earlier literatues on political development is its emphasis on ideal models rather than empirically-based models.

The earlier literature relied almost excluslively on empirically-based models of development. Some countries were regarded as more developed (politically and/or otherwise) than others. Some abstract criteria were involved, obviously, in making such judgments, but these normative standards were used to divide the universe of cases, say national political systems, into relatively more and less developed cases, rather than serving by themselves, in ideal typical form, as the basis for evaluation and inference. Once the countries were divided up, one could gather data on the characteristics associated with these different types of systems and, with such data, generate and test hypotheses about the conditions and consequences of more or less developed systems. This was essentially the research design used by most of the influential works in both the "break with formalism" and the "will and capacity" schools of research on political development. For instance, works by Lipset, Lerner, Cutright, Almond and Verba, Dahl, Huntington and many others used one or another variation on this basic research design.

This is not the place to discuss the pros and cons normatively, epistemologically, empirically, etc. of this design, although there is much to be said on both sides. The point to be emphasized here is this: that in all these works normative criteria were used in conjunction with empirical data to categorize real cases, and these real cases were then used with more data to make inferences and test hypotheses.

As can be seen from what was said earlier, the dependency approach to political development overwhelmingly repudiates this kind of design. The empirical emphasis is on the cases of underdevelopment or distorted development; the empirical treatment of development is thin, if it exists at all. The comparisons in the earlier studies were between two kinds of real-world cases; the comparisons in the dependency studies are between real-world cases and non-existent cases.[18] When real-world cases are used as models, it is easy to find flaws; when non-existent cases are used, it is easy to eliminate flaws. Thus the dependency writers tell us in great detail about the nature, conditions, and consequences of badly-developed countries -- see, for instance, O'Donnell's Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism (1973) or Cardoso's "Authoritarian-Dependent Development" (1973).[19] Both tell us much about conditions before the revolution, but neither says anything in detail about after the revolution. All we are told is that it will be much better than anything that has come before.

When the flawed real-world cases of the liberal developmentalists are compared to the unflawed nonexistent cases of the dependency writers, it is not surprising that many people prefer the latter. It is a hard game to lose. But one may question whether the comparison is fair, or even meaningful. And we shall, below, wonder whether upon closer inspection the ideal models, though the "best," are necessarily better.

2. The Premise of Benign Autonomy and its Intellectual Foundation

The dependency writings embody the premise that national autonomy necessarily leads to good developmental outcomes. This premise may be challenged on both logical and empirical grounds. Autonomy is freedom, and any freedom worthy of the name is the freedom to fail as well as to succeed. Thus logically autonomy need not necessarily produce good developmental outcomes. Empirically there are many cases that do not fit the dependency premises. Uganda, South Africa, Brazil, Burma, the Central African Republic (whose ruler recently declared himself emperor "in the name of socialism"), Ethiopia, Haiti, and Cambodia are just a few examples of countries where it is at a minimum arguable that national

dependency on the external environment decreased at the same time as internal outcomes worsened -- sometimes in horrifying ways.[20]

Autonomy can rightly be considered a value in its own right (though not, I would argue, an absolute value). And surely autonomy is often associated with good development outcomes. But this association is neither logically nor empirically necessary. Yet the premise that it is necessary is pervasive in the dependency literature.

Dependency writers have not confronted this premise. If they do, it is safe to say their response will be analogous to their response to parallel criticisms about the definitional and empirical association between national dependency (or dependence) and negative or distorted developmental outcomes. Namely, advance ad hominem arguments, deny the facts, change the criteria, claim to be misunderstood, and invoke socialist symbols.

Thus a key argument of the dependency perspective for years has been that, in the context of world capitalism, structural dependence -- such things as trade, investment, aid constraints -- is linked to negative and distorted development outcomes in Latin American countries. To take just one piece of this argument, it was argued that monocultural economies -- economies strongly reliant on one primary product for export -- were aspects of structural dependence which was in turn linked to internal problems of dependency, politics, etc. This line of thinking is a major theme of the classic dependency literature. This was not the only form of dependency, of course, but it was an important aspect of it.

In recent years some analysts have noticed facts that run counter to this line of thought. For one thing, in some cases, notably Brazil and possibly also Mexico, both capitalist countries, structural dependence in general and monoculture in particular have begun to decline, at the same time that the internal problems remain much the same, if not worse. On the other hand, in socialist Cuba internal outcomes have changed toward much less, and very different kinds of, social inequality, yet the pattern of general structural dependence and monoculture remain much the same, if not worse.[21] How can this be so?

Easy, under the dependency perspective. First, deny the facts. Second, use ad hominem arguments to avoid the substantive issues and to try to discredit those who state the facts: say they are positivists, ethnocentrists, North Americans, and Cold Warriors. Third, when the facts can no longer be avoided, deny that anyone ever made such an argument, even though it was made for years, is still made by many, and will be made again by others if the facts

change again in ways that fit it. Fourth, change and obscure the terms of the debate, and repeat that the critics missed the point.[22]

Thus, the most recent fashionable argument among the cognoscenti of dependency (some of whom are remarkably recent arrivals and/or converts, and whose durability in the struggle has yet to be shown) is that the dependency perspective is not at all about dependence (understood as a national phenomenon) but only about dependency (negative internal outcomes).[22a] What is novel here is not the distinction between national dependence and holistic dependency; that is an obvious distinction, apparent to anyone at all familiar with the dependency literature. What is novel is the assertion that national dependence is completely irrelevant for holistic dependence. Thus, what is now argued is that it does not matter whether Brazil reduces its national dependency as long as internal inequality worsens. (Recent studies indicate that internal inequalities in Brazil have been reduced somewhat in the seventies; therefore we may expect the basis of the dependency writers' claims to shift once more.) At first defenders of the dependency outlook denied that Cuba was economically dependent on the USSR; now they readily admit this but say it is not important because what really counts is internal changes in a socialist direction.

However, having insisted on the complete separation of dependence and dependency, they also repeatedly contradict themselves by including dependence as part of dependency.[22b] Ambiguity on this point is carefully maintained; it is necessary because it is the only way to save the hypothesis no matter what the facts show. All in all, a nice instance of the tactic, "change and obscure the terms of the debate; insist that it is the critics who miss the point." And also of the axiom that evidence is relevant when it supports the paradigm and irrelevant when it does not.

Although these arguments are contradictory and can be confusing, they have the merit of revealing what is really at issue in the dependency perspective. What is really at issue is not national dependence or autonomy but rather "socialism." Reduced to its essentials, the dependency perspective is a massive prescription for "socialism." National dependency or autonomy is a secondary concern; arguably it is not a concern at all.[23] Dependencia was a misnomer. (Perhaps North American "consumers of dependency theories," with "a little help from their Latin American Friends" -- the "anti-nation inside the nation" -- were responsible.) The dependency writers are willing to use arguments about national dependency as long as the facts fit their preconceptions; but when the facts diverge they readily jettison national autonomy as a pertinent criterion. Far and away the most important value -- arguably the only value -- in the dependency perspective is Marxist socialism.

Yet even this conclusion, accurate so far as it goes and essential, is misleading, because socialism is less a value or even constellation of values than a symbol. The content of socialism is extremely vague and open-ended before it comes into being; its content after it comes into being remains a matter of acrimonious dispute among socialists as well as non-socialists. Often, as we know, these disputes are profound and violent. From the point of view of political development, however, one can say that there have been no cases of democratic Marxist socialism. All "socialist" political systems based on Marxist intellectual foundations have been either hierarchical, mobilization, totalitarian or mixed totalitarian-authoritarian regimes, or they have been regimes with a powerful dynamic moving them in this direction. China, the Soviet Union, and Cuba are examples of the former; Allende's Chile is an example of the latter. Regimes that are genuinely more democratic have their intellectual foundations less in Marx than in the English Fabians or other non-Marxists.[24]

Because socialism is less a clear value or set of values than a symbol appealing to justice around which to mobilize political support (in the broadest sense of "political"), there is no agreement among socialists about which systems are genuinely socialist or not. Obviously the Chinese divide bitterly on this question within their own country. At one time those who favored the Cultural Revolution were true socialists and opponents of it were bourgeois revisionists; now it is the reverse.[25] Both of these groups have since the late 1960s regarded the Cubans as deviationists allied with the Soviet revisionists. So do many others around the world, and even within Cuba itself, who call themselves socialists. The Cuban leaders and their defenders abroad, by contrast, see Cuba as the best representative of genuine socialism in the Third World, especially in the socioeconomic sphere, and they believe this is made possible by Cuba's massive dependence on the U.S.S.R.

The latter belief poses a dilemma for logical analysis of the Cuban case within the premises of dependency paradigm. If Cuba's internal socialism -- its elimination of internal dependency -- is made possible by dependence on the Soviet Union, then either a) the Soviet Union is a valid representative of the socialist tradition, and it is this qualitative feature internally whose "benign" external effects make it possible for Cuba also to have a socialist revolution, or b) the Soviet Union is not a valid representative of the socialist tradition but it is an alternative source of national support which enables Cuba to reduce its dependency by diversifying and thus reducing its national dependence. The dilemma is that a) says that the Soviet Union is an adequate representative of the socialist tradition, which many dependency writers are (understandably) unwilling to do; but b) says that

reducing national dependency is related to a reduction in national dependence, at the same time that dependency writers have been trying to deny the importance of national dependence to the dependency paradigm.[26] Either way they face implications they would rather avoid. The only other possibility (c) is to deny the importance of the Soviet Union's support for the nature and success of the Cuban revolution, which is of course both unrealistic in the extreme and flatly in contradiction to much that dependency writers and their supporters have written.

Unfortunately, little or none of this is of any interest to, or can be debated with, most dependency writers. For them, the dependency paradigm cannot be evaluated empirically. In particular, it cannot be evaluated empirically and logically by anyone who is not a "believer" in "the dependency way of framing" development questions. In this perspective it can only be evaluated by its supporters. These features of the paradigm and the social system which powerfully sustains it are of great significance and will be discussed further.

3. The "Anti-Nation Inside the Nation" and the Concept of Interest

In the previous section I suggested that increasing national autonomy is not necessarily associated with good developmental outcomes, and I gave several examples. The dependency writers respond to such arguments and examples in various ways, all of which in their eyes maintain the dependency paradigm unchallenged. One response is to deny the facts. When facts that apparently run contrary to the paradigm cannot be avoided, the most common response is to say that the leaders (or goals or institutions or whatever) of countries that are apparently becoming less dependent -- e.g., Brazil since 1964, Uganda under Amin, etc. -- are not really national leaders at all. Rather, they are "the anti-nation inside the nation."[27]

Thus, in this view the leaders of Brazil since 1964 (or since the late 1950s, when heavy foreign investment in the auto industry began in Brazil) have not <u>really</u> been Brazilians, even though they think of themselves as Brazilians, carry Brazilian passports, occupy formal positions in the Brazilian government, etc. They are not really Brazilians because they do not represent the interests of Brazilians. Rather they represent foreign interests. Thus, the pejorative sobriquet "anti-nation inside the nation." They also represent the wrong <u>class</u> interests. They are the interests of the bourgeois class and class "fractions" inside Brazil, linked to the bourgeoisie and its interests outside Brazil. These interests are seen as opposed to the interests of socialism and its goals, classes and/or class fractions; and these latter interests

are seen as coincident with the true interests of Brazil as a national unit.

The idea of the "anti-nation inside the nation" is the central feature of the entire dependency paradigm. This idea rests on one crucial concept: the concept of interest. Every dependency writer, whatever his views on other matters, argues that dependency is maintained not just by external actors and institutions influencing the dependent country, but also by internal representatives of foreign interests. There is no exception. However much Quijano Obregón and Ianni and Jaguaribe and Sunkel and Cardoso and Chilcote and Gunder Frank and Bodenheimer and all the others may disagree about a number of issues, they all agree on this point.[28]

The concept of interest is central not only because it is universal in this literature, but also, and even more importantly, because it is the concept that by its elasticity and ambiguity enables the dependency paradigm to sustain any empirical data and withstand any logical criticism. How are the interests of various groups, classes, and nations determined in the dependency paradigm? By the dependency analysts themselves. What criteria do they use to make this determination? The criterion of whether they agree with the values, goals, and activities of the actors, processes and institutions or not! There is no other red thread that gives content to the concept of interest in this literature besides the criterion of whether the individual dependency analyst agrees or not with the policies, goals, and/or values of whatever group, institution, or process is under discussion. Thus, if the analyst agrees, they are in the interests of socialism and the people. If the analyst does not agree, they are in the interests of capitalism and the enemies of the people; they are revisionist, bourgeois, anti-national, etc. It is, literally, as simple as that.

Since dependency analysts have in the very broadest sense a common outlook most of the time, as long as the discourse is at a very high level of abstraction conflicts do not arise over the use of the concept of interest. However, as soon as there are any specific applications, disputes are pervasive. This is the explanation for the bitter conflicts among dependency writers in particular and "socialists" more generally. Socialists have as much difficulty agreeing on the content of interests in concrete situations as others do. This would not be a serious problem for the paradigm if judgments about interests were not so central to it. But these judgments are the very foundation of what purports to be a scientific way of coming to grips with social realities. The dependency writers claim they are only interested in objective interests, not subjective interests. But the interests they characterize as objective are in fact nothing more than the subjective judgments of the dependency analysts. Thus the entire dependency

edifice is based on a foundation of subjective judgments of analysts who do not and who cannot in the nature of things agree on what these allegedly "objective" interests are.

The scientific, political, and moral implications of these features of the paradigm are profoundly disturbing, as we shall see in the remainder of this paper.

4. The Reduction of Scientific and Theoretical Questions to Normative, Emotional, and Polemical Questions

The previous discussion of the concept of interest -- its centrality in the dependency paradigm and its totally elastic quality -- brings us to some characteristics of the style of thought embedded inextricably in the "dependency way of framing" development questions. This style reduces all theoretical/intellectual issues to normative, emotional, and polemical issues. It leaves no independent role for a social science that seeks to generate and test hypotheses in a reasonably open-ended, dispassionate fashion on the basis of reason and evidence. That kind of activity is, in the dependency perspective, disparaged as bourgeois social science; both the reality and the ideal of objectivity in bourgeois social science are treated as "mystifications" and repressive capitalist ideology. The dependency writers themselves have no doubt that they can identify the "objective interests" of all participants in the historical drama; but "bourgeois" social scientists who claim only to strive for a measure of objectivity, never to attain it, are nonetheless treated in this perspective as idealists, formalists, "positivists," "cultural imperialists," unwitting or witting reactionaries, etc. The strategies and tactics employed to this end are more those of caricature, stereotyping and (too often) political smears than those of careful and reasoned argument.

As we shall see, these are with few exceptions characteristics of even the most "subtle" and "sophisticated" of the dependency writings and writers, not just the most "extreme" ones.

Since the main issues are not intellectual but political, the boundary between truth and power, often difficult to identify precisely in the social sciences, is intentionally blurred by dependency writers. Questions of what is true are subordinated to and made a function of questions of power. This is justified by claims to justice and political and social virtue. Competing claims of justice and virtue are not admissable, let alone weighed; and the independent value of truth through social science is minimized or denied.

Let us examine these phenomena in slightly more detail, even though a full treatment is impossible here.

When large numbers of social scientists began to take dependency ideas seriously in the late 1960s and early 1970s, they naturally had some criticisms to make. This is, of course, an inherent and inevitable tendency in all intellectual work. The response by the dependency writers has been overwhelmingly polemical rather than intellectual. The refrains are by now familiar: "There isn't any dependency paradigm." "The 'moderates' and the 'extremists' have nothing in common." "Dependency is not a theory; it deals only with concrete situations of dependency," no matter how much it is used as a theory. "You do not understand it," no matter how well it is understood. "You have not seen the latest (as yet unpublished) study." No matter how many studies one has seen, there are always more studies that one should have seen, usually unpublished. "All the important literature is in Spanish or Portuguese," even though essentially the same problems characterize that literature as the other English-language literature. "You are not sufficiently dialectical," even though their "dialectic" is frozen solid. "You are a positivist." "You are a liberal." (These last two are epithets.) "National dependence is not part of the dependency paradigm," except when it is. "You are focusing on the crude dependency writers rather than the sophisticated ones," even though the essential features of the paradigm are the same in both sets of writers. "You are not sufficiently historical," even when one is historical and many dependency writers are not. "You do not understand dialectical materialism" and "you do not understand the notion of contradiction," even though these notions are never specified precisely and used rigorously. And so on.

Obviously any or all of these comments could have some substance to them. Sometimes they actually do. But it is now equally obvious that the main content of these responses is not substantive but emotional and political. If there is some substance to the charges the dependency writers stick by them; if not they stick by them anyway, meantime searching around for more polemical devices.

Throughout all this a <u>double standard</u> is at work. If non-dependency writers were as dogmatic as dependency writers are, they would be roundly condemned. But there is something approaching a taboo -- a powerful social norm in most of this intellectual community -- against criticizing dependency writers. Dependency writers can talk about and identify "objective interests" easily and without criticism, whereas any non-dependency writer who speaks of objectivity (of striving for it, never of attaining it) is attacked, called a positivist, etc. The dependency paradigm is profoundly interventionalist; it calls for the imposition of socialist values on societies that throughout their histories have in varying degrees been profoundly anti-socialist. Yet it is

virtually unheard of to criticize or even mention this interventionism, whereas it is automatic to criticize intervention for other objectives of other kinds. Authoritarianism and violations of human rights in capitalist systems are constantly criticized; totalitarianism and violations of human rights in socialist systems may not be criticized. In analyzing capitalism more generally it is permissable to assess the costs but not the benefits; in analyzing socialism it is permissable to assess the benefits but not the costs. "Contradictions" can be analyzed in capitalism but not in socialism.

Dependency writers are endlessly vituperative against "liberals" (everyone who disagrees with anything in the dependency paradigm) for not being "dialectical." Yet dependency writers are themselves profoundly non-dialectical in their one-sided treatment of many issues, especially their failure to consider opportunities as well as constraints within the context of dependency. They have, in effect, frozen their own dialectic, and they will neither "unfreeze" it themselves nor allow anyone outside the faithful to do so. Here as so often an ostensibly substantive point ("liberals" are nondialectical) is in fact a polemical point, a club with which to bludgeon rather than a tool with which to analyze.

In Cuba, two decades are time enough to evaluate social gains but not sufficient time to evaluate political and economic performance. In Brazil, however, less than two decades is plenty of time to evaluate social and political failures but it is not sufficient time to assess economic gains.

The double standard is apparent also in the attitude toward criticism. The dependency writers are "allowed" to generalize about "liberal" theories of development, to treat them as "theories," or paradigms, and to criticize them both from within and without the liberal premises. However, nondependency writers are not "allowed" to generalize about ("formalize") the dependency theory or paradigm, to treat it as a "theory," or paradigm, most particularly to criticize the paradigm from without its holistic premises. Similarly, socialists can criticize capitalist countries, but capitalists may not criticize "socialist" countries.[29]

Thus, socialists who critize capitalist countries are exercizing the "necessary function" of the intellectual to be critical; nonsocialists who criticize socialist countries or ideas are branded as Cold Warriors. In the subculture of intellectuals dealing with Latin America, to criticize Cuba at all seriously is to challenge the new orthodoxy and almost certainly to be labeled

a Cold Warrior. These criticisms are simply not considered on the merits; they are taboos, penalized by the new McCarthyism of the fashionable left.

As noted earlier, among social scientists studying Latin America and much of the rest of the Third World, Marxist views and taboos are, if not the new conventional wisdom, at least a new orthodoxy; their influence is massive and intense.[30] At the same time those who share these views act, and are perceived, as a beleaguered, courageous minority. It is a hard game to lose. They accept and benefit from the protections of a due process polity and libertarian culture, but they have contempt for the principles which sustain those protections and do nothing to assure such protections to those with whom they disagree. In other words, they claim rights for themselves that they will not extend to others.

All of this poses significant moral issues. The style of thought just described is not confined to the most "extreme" dependency writers, even though they are usually more openly anti-intellectual than the "moderates." It is also found much more often than it should be in the works of the most celebrated and "sophisticated" dependency writers, both Latin American and North American. It shows up increasingly in many other parts of intellectual life in the United States and elsewhere. The reasons for these trends have to do less with the personal characteristics of the individuals involved, although these factors frequently play a part, than with the inherent logic and thrust of the dependency way and related ways of framing intellectual and political problems. The social systems that support this paradigm, and other factors, also play a part. "Inherent logic and thrust" refers both to the substantive nature of the dependency paradigm itself, described in Sections II and III of this paper, and with the intellectual styles employed by dependency writers that are described in the present section. While the "extremists" and the "moderates" differ on a variety of issues most of them do not differ significantly on these fundamental substantive and stylistic issues.

5. The Premise of the Politicized Academy

The use of the utterly elastic concept of interest as the intellectual cornerstone of the paradigm, and the reduction of scientific and theoretical questions to normative, emotional, and polemical issues, are part of a broad tendency in the dependency literature to deprecate and abandon the idea of a relatively autonomous scientific community relatively isolated from political pressures, and to treat all scientific questions as essentially political questions. This perspective destroys the boundary between truth and power. It makes knowledge a function of power. It does this "for the best of reasons," in the name of justice and virtue; it fails to consider the scientific, political and moral costs of

this course both to the values it ostensibly advances and to other worthwhile values.

Closely related to the premise of the politicized academy is the powerful impulse among dependency writers to abandon the ideal of a transnational scientific community. National and class loyalities (which themselves often conflict -- but that is another story) take precedence over scientific loyalties not only in personal and political activities, where this may be an appropriate ordering of values, but also in scientific work, where it is much less appropriate. Thus, in the name of justice and progressivism the most reactionary and regressive attitude of all has subtly and powerfully suffused the entire field of dependency studies, as well as many other fields of scholarship: the notion that an idea should be evaluated not for what it says but who says it and what his politics are.

These premises are inherent in a Marxist perspective. Marxists differ about many things, but they all agree that fundamentally ideas are superstructural epiphenomena which respond to material forces. This is the root of the tendency to reduce scientific and theoretical questions to political issues and the depreciation of the norm of autonomous status and integrity for scientific work. These views create a fundamental contradiction for Marxist intellectuals. How can their ideas escape the material forces which they say are controlling? There is no satisfactory answer to this question, despite many attempts to find one.[31] The contradiction is embedded firmly in the Marxist and hence the dependency mode of analysis.

The phrase "the Marxist and hence the dependency mode of analysis" is carefully chosen. It is a fundamental point which needs explication and this is a good place to do it.

As noted earlier, at bottom the dependency mode of analysis is a Marxist framework. Other intellectual traditions are also drawn upon by several of the dependency writers; but the fundamental starting point, and the logic which dominates and must dominate the dependency paradigm as it is presently constituted, is unmistakably Marxist. The focus on class, the stress on exploitative rather than complementary relations between classes and nations, the emphasis on dichotomies, the centrality of the concept of interest, the focus on ideal rather than actual development models, the politicization of scientific issues, the holistic mode of analysis -- not to mention the undergirding of all this in Marxist categories of capitalist economic process and structure -- all these and more index the massive overlap between Marxist and dependency modes of analysis. It is this common Marxism of nearly all dependency writers that, more than anything else, gives unity to the dependency paradigm.

Moreover, given the premise of the politicization of all theoretical work, authors in the dependency tradition who stray from the norms, the social system, and the sacred texts of Marxism are subject to negative sanctions. They may be ostracized or otherwise punished. These sanctions are powerful. The social system of Marxist-dependency writers, overlapping as it does with political values and groupings, is a very important explanation for behavior among dependency writers that would otherwise be hard to account for. Precisely because these networks and values are so powerful they have created some serious dilemmas for a number of dependency writers in recent years. In nearly every case the dependency writers have resolved the dilemma more in the direction of Marxism than non-Marxism.

The dilemma is the following. In a variety of ways, many dependency writers have been exposed to and have incorporated into their work ideas from other intellectual traditions besides Marxism. Both during their early intellectual formation and subsequently, these writers have been influenced by Latin American non-Marxist traditions; drawn on the theoretical writings of Weber, Durkheim, Dilthey, and many other non-Marxist Europeans; have experimented with North American ideas and techniques for gathering data; and in other ways have made heterogeneous the theoretical, conceptual, epistemological, and empirical composition of their writings. This eclecticism has been well received among non-Marxist academics. Since the non-Marxists have been an increasing audience for many dependency writers, and since they have also been important points of contact, support, and influence, as well as for strictly intellectual/scientific reasons, the dependency authors have in many ways been drawn to these non-Marxist schools of thought and their premises. At times dependency writers have even stressed in their writings the eclecticism of the intellectual influences on them and downplayed the centrality of Marxist ideas in their work.

However, while this eclecticism has been generally well received among non-Marxists, it has had a very different reception in Marxist circles. The global, holistic epistemology of the dependency paradigm simply does not allow easily for eclecticism. For example, the holistic view regards many relationships to be true by definition that other traditions would consider to be testable and potentially rejectable with evidence. The holistic view uses evidence when it supports a position and ignores it when it does not. More empirical traditions reject hypotheses when data are disconfirming. These views are simply not compatible.

Moreover, a dependency writer who becomes too enamored of non-Marxist approaches has very soon to demonstrate that he has not lost his Marxist foundations. Since in this perspective all social science is viewed as part of a political struggle, the dependency writer who strays too far from the basic premises has to answer

charges not only that he is scientifically in error but also that he is an ideological and political deviationist. There is simply no room in the dependency perspective for the concept of the autonomous scholar insulated from political pressures who will "call'em as he sees 'em" no matter how unpopular his views may be. There are some justifications and benefits -- too complex to analyze here -- for such pressures. There are also complex moral, political, and scientific costs.

For many dependency writers -- the abler ones, in my judgment -- the dilemma is painfully real. One attempt to resolve it is to say somewhat different things to different audiences: prove ideological purity to Marxists, deny being a Marxist to bourgeois audiences. I can think of at least one case where this tactic has been carried out brilliantly. However, it subordinates the search for truth to political considerations; outside the Marxist/dependency framework this is both a distasteful and an unfruitful tactic. Further, the inconsistencies between these two positions can be hidden for a while but not indefinitely.

Another way to resolve the dilemma is to avoid the most intensely controversial aspects of either mode of analysis and try to carry on fruitful research and writing in other areas. One of the ablest writers has followed essentially this approach. There is perhaps much, under current conditions in Latin America, to be said for it. A third approach is to state one's conclusions forthrightly even on the most controversial topics. This will likely produce condemnation and isolation from all quarters. It is also a sad option because it means that the intellectual work of honest and able scholars is simply not used in either community. One can think of examples here too, though not many.

Still another way to deal with the dilemma is by purposive ambiguity. Many "moderates" are highly ambiguous, contradictory, and elusive on key points. They tell you which analytic approaches are bad but not which are good, except that they know how to do it. They chastise anyone who is rigorous and clear (and who criticizes those who are not) as a "positivist" who does not understand the contradictory nature of social reality. The Marxist notion of dialectic is often invoked in this context as well, but it is a vulgarized notion. The emphasis is less on illuminating reality than obscuring it; the dialectic is used simply as an excuse for maintaining untenable contradictions, rather than as a genuine analytic tool. This device is often used in combination with one or more of the other techniques.

These skills are well suited to politics but not to social science. In politics the heart of the enterprise is to allocate values, to exercise power. The ability to maintain ambiguity is a

vital skill in this enterprise. It meets important needs. In social science, however, the heart of the enterprise -- not all of it, but the most important part -- is to understand social reality, to learn the nature of things, and to follow wherever facts, logic, and reason lead. Ambiguity has its uses here, too, and at times it is necessary, but in general these uses are fewer and less important in social science than in politics. Ambiguity has on balance many political benefits and many scientific costs.

The inherent logic of the dependency paradigm and the pressures and tactics just described are in combination more than sufficient to maintain nearly all the dependency writers within the limits of a common Marxist framework. Only a very few dependency writers have consistently challenged some of these premises. Precisely for this reason some analysts and many other dependency writers refuse to classify them as genuine dependentistas. That is why I insist in this paper that, while there are differences among dependency writers, there is unity on the fundamental points. There is a paradigm and it has the features indicated, one of which is the premise of the politicized academy and the intentional subordination of truth to power.

V. The Contribution of Dependency Analysis to Political Development Studies

In a recent survey of the political-development literature, Huntington and Domínguez deal briefly with dependency ideas, and write:

> A situation thus existed in which, to oversimplify, establishment political science ignored a phenomenon, while radical political theory exaggerated it. . . . Subtle psychological factors may have been at work on both sides. American political science may have avoided external influences because they themselves were, in some measure, one of those influences. Third World theorists may have exaggerated the role of external influences, on the other hand, in order to rationalize and justify their own failures to develop their societies.[32]

We agree with Huntington and Domínguez, but we now can and must go further. Today it must be said that, even though the dependency paradigm has some assets, the liabilities are greater. Once it may have aided our understanding and promoted development. Today it impedes understanding and hinders development.

Understood in certain ways, the dependency literature has made positive contributions to our understandings of development. This was especially so in the late sixties and early seventies. Then, the emphasis on the external sources of national development patterns, the illumination of class linkages across national boundaries, the focus on equality more than productivity, the merging of politics and economics into political economy, and other ideas were needed and seemed to flow from the dependency perspective.

However, these ideas are no longer novel or exclusive to the dependency paradigm (some of them never were). Many of them have been carried much too far. And the holistic, all-or-nothing features of the paradigm reduce, outweigh, and sometimes even destroy the benefits it seemed to bring to the analysis of development, especially political development.

A good example is the idea that internal development is conditioned significantly by external factors. This seemed to be one of the innovations of the dependency way of thinking that was valuable, and it is still cited frequently (e.g., Huntington and Domínguez) as one of its contributions. However, this insight is, to say the least, no longer fresh. Frequently it is carried much too far, as in many dependency and Marxist analyses of the Allende years in Chile. Finally, and most importantly, the distinction between external and internal employed in the dependency paradigm is not at all the one Huntington and Domínguez use. It is not an empirical distinction at all. As we have seen, in the dependency paradigm the heart (and sometimes the entire body and soul as well -- there is ambiguity on this point)[33] of the "external" is not the external forces that Huntington and Domínguez refer to but rather "the anti-nation inside the nation."

Thus in the dependency paradigm as in the liberal frameworks the main action is within the boundaries of the country.[34] However, in the dependency perspective the nominally "internal" factors are actually "external" if they are doing the wrong ("capitalist") kinds of things and genuinely "internal" only if they are doing the right ("socialist") kinds of things. None of these distinctions between external and internal, national and anti-national, capitalist and socialist, is empirical; all of them are distinctions based on the judgment of the dependency theorist: whether he likes the pattern of events in question.

In other words, <u>dependence</u> (external factors based on Huntington and Domínguez's criteria) is irrelevant; all that matters is <u>dependency</u> (capitalism and its malevolent concomitants) which is by definition external and <u>non-dependency</u> (socialism and its benign concomitants) which is by definition internal.[35] Data are irrelevant to making these distinctions. Interests cannot be

identified empirically, either in theory or in practice. In principle they can be identified by the analysts, but in practice they cannot agree: acceptable socialism to one is revisionist capitalism to another, and vice versa.

This is not a fruitful way to advance either knowledge or justice. There are three main types of problems with this dependency "optic" on political (and other) development: scientific, political, and moral.

Scientific Costs

We begin with scientific costs. At best dependency analysis is structural-functionalism turned on its head. At worst it is a form of Lysenkoism. In both cases its utility for scientific analysis is very low. These conclusions are strong but they flow unavoidably from the material and need to be faced.

The crucial feature of dependency analysis from a social-scientific point of view is its holistic, tautological character. It simply does not allow for the possibility of data rejecting or even revising fundamental premises. It accepts data that confirm its premises and hypotheses but rejects as irrelevant data that are disconfirming. Hence it is never self-correcting. It is always self-confirming. The dependency paradigm is really not a social science paradigm at all but a normative paradigm. It is a massive prescription for some open-ended thing called "socialism."

Dependency analysis is structural-functionalism turned on its head because it uses the same epistemological principles with a completely different set of values. Both dependency analysis and structural-functionalism posit a set of "needs" and "interests" that must be served in society. Unless these needs are met the societies will not survive. In both kinds of analysis it is the analyst who determines what these needs and interests are, and it is he who determines whether the "data" confirm or disconfirm the hypotheses. In both cases the paradigm is always preserved, no matter what the data are.[36] Structural-functionalism tends to value stability, equilibrium, and preservation of the system; dependency analysis favors (for capitalist systems) instability, conflict, and the destruction of the system. Structural-functionalism says that there are certain "functional requisites" in all societies which, if not performed, will result in the destruction of the society; dependency analysis says that certain capitalist groups, classes, "class-fractions," etc., have certain interests that must be protected or their social order will be destroyed. In both paradigms deductions are made from those basic premises. In both paradigms the deductions may be tested and revised in light of evidence, but the premises can never be. In short, the

social values of the two paradigms are very different, but the essential scientific methodology is the same.

Defenders of dependency analysis contend that all social science paradigms have premises that are not rejectable with data. This claim is false. The claim is true for much of structural-functional analysis but not for most of the other liberal development theories.[37] The theories of such writers as Lerner, Lipset, and Cutright, for example, were rejected not only because of their values but also and powerfully because they did not square with empirical evidence. So was Rostow's "take-off" theory. So were many other "liberal" theories. And in order for this to happen, empirical criteria had to exist. They did. The liberal paradigm produced theories that are sooner or later correctable or rejectable with data. The dependency paradigm does not.

The difference between these two types of theories is enormous and profoundly significant. The liberal theories can be rejected with data. The dependency theories can be rejected only by emotion and force. The liberal theories, when they are wrong, can be discarded. The other kind of theories, when they are wrong, have no mechanism for telling us they are wrong except political power. The first kind of theory produces many types of scientific failure and a few successes. The second kind of theory may produce a scientific success, but there is no way to know; it also produces Lysenkoism, or worse.

Political Costs

The second major problem in the dependency paradigm is political. The open-endedness and utopianism of the paradigm with regard to political development opens the door to the most serious abuses of political power. Utopianism is often pernicious; nowhere is this truth more clearly illustrated than in the dependency perspective and related "optics" on development.

The country where the dependency optic has been most fully and directly implemented is Cambodia. According to Jean Lacouture, Cambodia is

> the most tightly locked up country in the world, where the bloodiest revolution in history is now taking place. What Oriental despots or medieval inquisitors ever boasted of having eliminated, in a single year, one quarter of their own population? Ordinary genocide (if one can ever call it ordinary) usually has been carried out against a foreign population or an internal minority. The new masters of Phnom Penh have invented something

> original, auto-genocide. After Auschwitz and the Gulag, we might have thought this century had produced the ultimate in horror, but we are now seeing the suicide of a people in the name of revolution; worse: in the name of socialism.[38]

That the Cambodian situation follows directly from the theory of political development employed in the dependency paradigm, there can be little doubt. It is the limiting, almost pure case. Lacouture tells us:

> A group of modern intellectuals, formed by Western thought, primarily Marxist thought, claim to seek to return to a rustic Golden Age, to an ideal rural and national civilization. And proclaiming these ideals, they are systematically massacring, isolating, and starving city and village populations whose crime was to have been born when they were, the inheritors of a century of historical contradictions during which Cambodia passed from paternalistic feudalism, through colonization, to a kind of precapitalism manipulated by foreigners.[39]

It is all there: the "anti-nation inside the nation" that must be exterminated; the self-righteousness and intolerance; the contempt for "liberal" standards of responsibility, guilt, and innocence; the clarity about what is evil, the murky utopianism about what is good.

Lacouture says this goes beyond barbarism to madness, and that it "betrays the principles of socialism and assassinates human hope itself."[40] But if this is so, why is it that Auschwitz and the Gulag and now Cambodia have always been committed in the name of socialism? We may at the very least wonder, as many have before us, including some socialists, whether these horrors are not a direct outcome precisely of "the principles of socialism," at least Marxist socialism.[41] I myself am persuaded that they are.

Although he does not develop it analytically, Lacouture makes an important distinction. He writes: "Of course it is horrible when Pinochet tortures his prisoners, Amin strangles his enemies, and the extreme Franco-ist guerrillas massacre theirs. . . . /But/ what has taken place in Cambodia during the last two years is of a different historical order. Here the leaders of a popular resistance movement, having defeated a regime whose corruption by compradors and foreign agents had reached the point of caricature, are killing people in the name of a vision of a green paradise."[42] So they are. Nor is it surprising given the

categories employed in this body of "thought." Lacouture is here making the distinction that many scholars have made between authoritarianism and totalitarianism.[43] The totalitarian regimes are not only vastly more thorough and systematic in their repression and control; they also have invariably been established and maintained in the name of socialism. It is intellectually indefensible to ignore the possibility that the two are related.

Marxist socialist categories of thought (not Fabian socialism) have an inherent logic and symbolic and emotional thrust toward totalitarianism. They dichotomize interests. Positive-sum relations between these interests are impossible by definition.[44] This means the only possibility for justice and development is elimination of the capitalist interests, groups, and classes or class fractions. This leads to the qualities of intolerance and total control that have been noted. It leads to the rhetoric, symbolism, and psychology of struggle, conflict, and hatred that so pervade Marxist oratory and even analytic writing. It is why Marxist socialist regimes disdain competition and individual rights and freedoms. It is why Salvador Allende said "I am not President of all Chileans." It is why some authoritarian regimes can and have become democratic, while (short of losing a war) no totalitarian regime has ever become democratic. It is why to suppose that Cuba is or will become politically democratic under Marxist socialism is to believe in the Easter Bunny.

Moral Costs

The third and final problem associated with the dependency paradigm I am calling a moral problem. It is related to the politicization of social science work that was described earlier, but it includes other elements as well.

The idea of an intellectual community implies a shared ethic of open discussion based on mutual respect, trust, and candor. It assumes that despite social distortions and pressures social science can be relatively independent from politics. It implies the ideal of objectivity and dispassionate analysis is worth striving for even if it is never achieved. It implies that all parties in the community play by these rules, tell the truth, and confront conflicting logic and data openly and respectfully. Perhaps most of all, it values the very idea of an intellectual, social-scientific community that, while never free of cultural, national, political, and social influences and demands, nevertheless seeks to transcend those pressures in some measure.

To put it mildly, the last ten or fifteen years have not been kind to that idea. Up to a point, criticism of the more traditional social science model has been appropriate.[45] But the

criticisms, and the counter-proposals and counter-ethics to supplant the earlier model, have gone too far -- in some cases much too far. Nowhere is this more true than in the intellectual subcultures that deal with Third-World, particularly Latin American, politics and development.

Today, instead of trying to promote a community of scholars dealing with these problems, many leading figures try to keep it fragmented or polarized.[46] The idea of autonomous social science is now disparaged as not even a worthy ideal or myth but as a mystification and disguised form of repression. Social science is explicitly and zealously politicized. The idea of balanced social science presenting both supporting and conflicting arguments and data is rejected in favor of an adversary or forensic model in which only one type of argument should be made and only supporting data should be presented.

In analyzing the dependency paradigm and dependency with its defenders and sympathizers, there is simply no such thing as free and open discussion. This is so not only in political circles, but also in academic circles. This is the heart of the moral problem to which I refer. It is a decline in the ethic of free and open discussion based upon mutual respect, trust, and candor. These are essential conditions for intellectual exchange and community. These conditions are badly eroded in the United States and in the trans-national community of scholars dealing with problems of development in Latin America and the Third World. That "community" is now a highly politicized and polarized one. Moreover, many of its members defend this and call for more.

The idea of an intellectual community implies that an individual within that community may pursue an idea wherever reason, logic, and evidence lead him, no matter how unpopular or unfashionable this journey may be politically. However, most dependency writers and many others today contend that it is <u>illegitimate</u> even to <u>analyze</u> the dependency paradigm <u>unless one accepts fully and unquestionably its basic premises</u>. Thus a debate or discussion between believers and non-believers is rendered impossible. Moreover, according to this view the problem is not with those who refuse to enter the dialogue, but rather with those who want a dialogue but refuse to agree beforehand on answers to the important questions.[47]

The degree to which this cast of mind has suffused the subculture of social scientists and writers who deal with development problems in Latin America and other parts of the Third World is remarkable. Pressures within the academic community for conformity to these norms are powerful. The invocation of political criteria and claims to justice as justifications for these

violations of basic standards of academic freedom has occurred with a remarkably small amount of resistance.

This is truly a phenomenon that calls for explanation. Surely the Vietnam War and its aftermath are factors. So are revulsion over various U.S. policies in Latin America during this century. The general climate of disenchantment with liberalism is obviously a factor, as is the cultural and ethical uncertainty of the west. North American propensities for conformity and for fads and fashions are, I suspect, more powerful mechanisms than most people realize. There are doubtless other factors, none of which can be explored here.

But explanations are not justifications. The swing of the pendulum away from the traditional model was valuable for a while, but it has gone too far and gotten stuck. It is time to unfreeze the dialectic. But beyond that, and much more important, it is also time to confront and challenge just as strongly as possible the fashionable notion that all paradigms are equal in quality scientifically and equally intolerant of dissenting views and data.[48] With such an assumption it is not surprising that the criteria for evaluating theories have become political.

I will state my position flatly: the dependency paradigm is anti-scientific and intolerant of dissenting views and data to a significantly greater extent than the social-scientific tradition that it seeks to replace. The problem is not mainly the failure to understand different "language communities";[49] the major problem is that one of these "scholarly traditions" uses evidence to test ideas and the other refuses to do so both in practice and in principle. The difference is deep and significant. It has serious moral and political as well as scientific implications.[50]

A scientific community that freely, candidly, and rigorously explores ideas is a good thing in its own right. In addition, it has instrumental values for the quality of life, of politics, and so on. Much of the prohibition on critical analysis of dependency writings seems to be partly based upon a desire to show respect and esteem for a group of innovative social scientists. One can honor this value but question whether the means serve the end.

Many were drawn to the study of dependency writings as a way to learn and to grow. The dependency "way of framing" development issues was seen, in other words, as a way of solving important intellectual and political problems. And so it appeared to be for a time. But its utility in that sense is now exhausted.

Dependency analysis was once part of the solution; it is now part of the problem. Any approach to knowledge that claims it has something to teach but nothing to learn is no path either to enlightenment or a humane social order.

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[1]For a survey and analysis of these trends, see Robert A. Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), chapter 5.

[2]See Packenham, Liberal America, chapter 5.

[3]Details, and an extensive bibliography of sources in English, Portuguese, and Spanish, are given in Robert A. Packenham, "Latin American Dependency Theories," in process.

[4]For a sketch of three main paradigms (liberal, radical/dependency, and corporatist/"organic-statist"), see Alfred Stepan, The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), chapter 1.

[5]For this argument, see, among many other sources, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "The Consumption of Dependency Theories in the United States," Latin American Research Review, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1977), 7-24; Guillermo O'Donnell, "Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State," Latin American Research Review, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1978), 3-38.

[6]Rather than cite all the recent surveys, let me just quote a succinct and very accurate recent summary by one writer of the main ideas of the paradigm: "Dependency perspectives, if fully developed--and the larger Marxist literature from which they derive and to which they return--argue that although peripheral capitalism may, under certain circumstances, be relatively successful in accumulating capital, it cannot solve the linked problems of national disintergration, widening socio-economic gaps, relative and even absolute poverty, and the continuing penetration and distortion of national economies and societies. In short, the dependency way of framing the question of development leads one to ask not only why and in what fashion the global capitalist system disadvantages the economies of the periphery in their dealings with the center, but why and in what fashion peripheral capitalism, as a system of production and distribution, makes difficult to the point of impossibility the resolution of critical economic-social problems that are everywhere evident in the less developed world." Richard R. Fagen, "A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Market: Thoughts on Extending Dependency Ideas," International Organization, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Winter 1978), "Special Issue: Dependence and Dependency in the Global System," p. 291, emphasis in original. Notice that Fagen (quite properly) anchors these writings in Marxism; stresses the linked and unsolvable (as they see it) nature of the problems,

both empirically and definitionally, under capitalism; and inquires "why" and "in what fashion" but never whether these disadvantageous relations occur (that question is answered a priori in the paradigm). All this faithfully represents the main ideas of dependency writers.

[7]My distinction is similar to, though not quite the same as, Jorge Domínguez's distinction between "orthodox" and "unorthodox" dependency perspectives in his valuable survey "Consensus and Divergence: The State of the Literature on Inter-American Relations in the 1970s," Latin American Research Review, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1978), pp. 87-126. My analysis is completely consistent with his finding that "The two dependency perspectives clearly derive from the same intellectual sources and continue to have common methods and concerns; their differences are similar to a family quarrel, not a divorce." (p. 117) Curiously, despite this finding his concluding "hierarchy of commendable approaches" stresses the differences rather than the similarities between the orthodox and unorthodox perspectives.

[8]Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependencia y Desarrollo en América Latina (México: Siglo Veintiuno, 1969). A Portuguese translation was published in 1970 (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar), and an American edition is supposed to be published in 1978 (Berkeley: University of California Press).

[9]Cardoso and Faletto, Dependencia y Desarrollo en América Latina; Osvaldo Sunkel, "Capitalismo transnacional y desintegración nacional en América Latina," El Trimestre Económico, Vol. 38, No. 2 (April-June 1971), pp. 571-628.

[10]Especially Cardoso, "Associated-Dependent Development," in Alfred Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 142-176; Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1973). See also David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming), which is a little richer, though not much, on alternatives.

[11]Guillermo O'Donnell and Delfina Linck, Dependencia y Autonomía: Formas de Dependencia y Estrategias de Liberación (Buenos Aires: Amorrortu Editores, 1973).

[12]The bombast and obfuscations are pervasive in the literature; for example, Cardoso, "Consumption of Dependency Theories," passim. For criticisms of dependency writers for freezing their own dialectic, see, inter alia, Albert O. Hirschman, "Beyond Asymmetry,"

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in the special issue of International Organization (see note 6 above); Robert A. Packenham, "Latin American Dependency Theories: Strengths and Weaknesses," paper presented before the Harvard-M.I.T. Joint Seminar on Political Development, Cambridge, Mass., 6 February 1974; Robert A. Packenham, "Trends in Brazilian National Dependency Since 1964," in Riordan Roett, ed., Brazil in the Seventies (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976), pp. 87-115; and David Ray, "The Dependency Model of Latin American Underdevelopment: Three Basic Fallacies," Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 1 (February, 1973), pp. 4-20.

[12a]At the same time, political scientists have probably paid more attention to the dependency literature than other social scientists. It might be worthwhile for someone to try to explain this apparent paradox.

[13]Samuel P. Huntington made a similar distinction between studying development and studying change in his article, "The Change to Change," Comparative Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3 (April, 1971), 238-322. However, as the title implies he argued then (and subsequently) for studying political change rather than political development, whereas my view is that it is possible, worthwhile, and in a sense inevitable to analyze both political change and desirable types of political change, i.e., political development. In my view attempts to avoid dealing with political development are parallel in certain respects to attempts to avoid the concept of power, and about as successful.

In this paper the term political modernization refers to certain kinds of political change -- political integration, differentiation, secularization, etc. -- that need not necessarily be democratic and that may or may not be regarded as desirable, depending on the context, the values of the observer, and other factors.

[14]Dependency writers, particularly Cardoso, have at times minimized their Marxist origins; at other times they have emphasized them. Marxism is not the only intellectual influence on dependency writers, but it is, in varying degrees, the dominant one in almost every case.

[15]Ronald Chilcote and Joel Edelstein, eds., Latin America: The Struggle With Dependency and Beyond (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1974), p. 28.

[16]Fagen, "A Funny Thing," p. 299.

[17]For example, Fagen, "A Funny Thing," pp. 296-300, and Guy J. Gilbert, "Socialism and Dependency," Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring, 1974), pp. 107-23. See also Fagen, "Cuba and the Soviet Union," Wilson Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Winter, 1978).

[18]The dependency writers make a lot of empirical comparisons, to be sure. But these are comparisons of types of underdevelopment or distorted-development. They make few if any empirical comparisons of cases of development.

[19]See note 10 above.

[20]For a related discussion, see Peter Bauer, "Western Guilt and Third-World Poverty," Commentary (January 1976), pp. 31-38. Bauer is somewhat one-sided but still very informative. At the very least he presents what the dependency writers leave out. The reverse also applies, but to a lesser extent, I believe.

[21]On Brazil, see Packenham, "Trends in Brazilian National Dependency." On Cuba, see David Ray, "The Dependency Model"; Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Cuba in the Seventies (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1974).

[22]For written sources using one or more of these techniques, see: (on Brazil) Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Um Cientista do Ar," Folha de São Paulo, January 7, 1977), p. 3; (on Cuba) Richard Fagen, "Studying Latin American Politics: Some Implications of a Dependencia Approach," Latin American Research Review, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1977), particularly p. 24, note 9; (in general) Cardoso, "The Consumption of Dependency Theory," passim; and the essays by James A. Caporaso, Raymond D. Duvall, and Richard Fagen in International Organization, "Special Issue: Dependence and Dependency in the Global System," Vol. 32, No. 1 (Winter 1978). Not all of these writers use all of these tactics, but all of them use at least one of the tactics, usually several, and all the tactics mentioned and others are used by at least one of the authors cited. Cardoso's essay in the Folha de São Paulo is particularly notable because of its hysterical tone and large number of serious factual errors.

[22a]Caporaso, Duvall, and Fagen make this the theme of the special issue of International Organization, "Dependence and Dependency in the Global System" as the title indicates. Cf. the essays by Hirschman, Moran, Mytelka, Hopmann, McGowan and Smith, and Gereffi.

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[22b]This contradiction is pervasive in the dependency literature; it is only more explicit in the recent essays of Caporaso, Duvall, and Fagen in International Organization.

[23]Interestingly, and very significantly, Duvall, and following him Caporaso, miss this essential point entirely in their essays in International Organization. Fagen, who agrees with them on other issues, does not miss this point at all. He is well aware what really is at issue.

[24]See J. Daniel O'Flaherty, "Finding Jamaica's Way," Foreign Policy, No. 31 (Summer, 1978), pp. 141-142.

[25]On how far the reversal has gone, see Lucian Pye, "The Puzzles of Chinese Pragmatism," Foreign Policy, No. 31 (Summer, 1978), esp. pp. 121-122. In passing, note that Cuba and China, supposedly the two outstanding cases of Third World socialism, accuse each other of being perversions of genuine socialism in both foreign policy and domestic development. These attitudes have not been fleeting; they date from at least the late 1960s. By contrast, of course, Cuba and the Soviet Union are closely allied in foreign policy and largely in agreement on domestic affairs. It will be interesting to watch whether these patterns change or remain constant over time.

[26]See note 22a above and the accompanying text.

[27]The phrase is from Fernando Henrique Cardoso, O Modelo Politico Brasileiro e Outros Ensaios (São Paulo: Difusão Europeia do Livro, 1973), p. 200, but the concept which the phrase embodies is used by every dependency writer. There is no exception.

[28]Several writers have criticized other, un-named authors who allegedly employ a simplistic, "one-stage" model of dependency in which there is no "anti-nation inside the nation" and hence no central reliance on the concept of interest. For example, Cardoso, "'Teoria de Dependencia' ou Analyses Concretas de Situacoes de Dependencia?" Estudos I. CEBRAP, Sao Paulo, 1971, p. 29; Marcos Kaplan, "The Power Structure in International Relations," International Social Science Journal, Vol. 26, No. 1 (1974), pp. 96-97; and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Paths to Political Development in Latin America," in Douglas A. Chalmers, ed., Changing Latin America: New Interpretations of Its Politics and Society, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol. 30, No. 4 (New York: Columbia University, The Academy of Political Science, 1972), 99-100. However, none of these critics gives any examples of the authors or

or studies he criticizes, and so far as I can tell there are none. Everyone -- from Bodenheimer and Frank to Cardoso, O'Donnell, and Jaguaribe -- uses the two-stage model.

[29]No footnote.

[30]This is a complex point which deserves, and I hope will receive, considerable attention in subsequent work. Here let me just give one example. At the Joint Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association and the African Studies Association in Houston, Texas, November 2-5, 1977, the best attended session was on "Marxist Perspectives on the Political Economy of Africa and Latin America." It drew more than 1,000 persons. (See the Report by Program Co-Chairperson Wayne Cornelius in the LASA Newsletter, March 1978, p. 10,) The speakers were all Marxists. Three of them said nothing -- not one sentence -- about socialism after the revolution; they talked exclusively about capitalism and its evils. Their remarks were met with resounding applause. (In the question period, one brave soul asked the Cuban speaker to define socialism. He replied, "We do not have to define socialism; we know what it is." Everyone cheered.) The fourth speaker was the only one to speak of socialism after the revolution. A learned, courageous, unconventional Marxist, he made a lengthy and thoughtful case for liberty as an indispensable criterion of development under socialism. (See Richard L. Sklar, "Socialism at Bay: Class Domination in Africa," mimeo., 1977.) His remarks elicited some support but nothing like the others and also some open hostility. The episode illustrates the influence of anti-libertarian Marxist ideas, the strong strain of conformism and faddism among U.S. intellectuals, and the appeal of utopian rather than realistic conceptions of development.

[31]Martin Seliger, The Marxist Conception of Ideology: A Critical Essay (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

[32]Samuel P. Huntington and Jorge Domínguez, "Political Development," in Nelson W. Polsby and Fred I. Greenstein, eds., Handbood of Political Science, Vol. 3 (Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1974), pp. 93-94.

[33]See note 22b above and the accompanying text.

[34]Richard Fagen writes, ". . .once the domestic political economy has been restructured, then a relatively wide range of international ties is compatible with accelerated development. This, of course, is what some conventional developmentalists have been arguing

for a long time. What was always missing from the argument was an understanding of how profound that restructuring would have to be." "A Funny Thing," p. 300.

[35]As has been indicated, this argument is advanced, albeit with many contradictions, throughout the dependency literature. For a relatively clear exposition of it, see Fagen, "A Funny Thing," passim.

In the dependency paradigm, the criteria for dependency are mainly normative. For an essay that specifies and employs empirical rather than normative criteria for both dependence and dependency, see Packenham, "Trends in Brazilian National Dependency Since 1964." In these terms, pp. 94-103 of "Trends" deals with dependence (which I call "national dependency") and pp. 103-110 deal with dependency. Empirically. And without making any of the concepts involved ahistorical, one-dimensional, or anti-dialectical. Quite the contrary.

[36]Talcott Parsons' recent historical studies, ranging from antiquity to the present, are perhaps an exception. The work of Immanuel Wallerstein and others on the emergence of global capitalism in the sixteenth century and earlier may also be an exception; I do not know it well enough to be sure. It may be that both structural-functionalist and Marxist ideas can be tested with these kinds of studies; if so, in the case of Marxist-dependency ideas the sixteenth century is precisely the setting where this could be done. The dependency writers themselves, however, have not done this sort of work. They have worked mainly in the contemporary period, and their historical work tends to treat much later periods -- e.g., in Cardoso and Faletto, from 1750 to the present. In any event they apply ideas rather than test them; given the nature of their paradigm, this is all they can do. See, for example, Stanley J. and Barbara H. Stein, The Colonial Heritage of Latin America: Essays on Economic Dependence in Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).

[37]On the whole, dependency writers seem unaware of this distinction. For instance, Cardoso refers disparagingly to something he calls "empiricist structural-functionalism," which in turn is equated with both rigorous multidimensional description and with factor analysis used as an explanatory device. "The Consumption of Dependency Theory in the United States," p. 21. It is not a polemical point to note that this misconceives, simplifies, and blurs together a number of very different things.

[38]Jean Lacouture, "The Bloodiest Revolution," New York Review of Books, March 31, 1977, p. 9. M. Lacouture's source is Francois Ponchaud, Cambodge, annee zero (Paris: Julliard, 1977?).

[39]Lacouture, p. 9.

[40]Lacouture, p. 10.

[41]See especially Leszek Kolakowski and Stuart Hampshire, eds., The Socialist Idea: A Reappraisal (New York: Basic Books, 1974).

[42]Lacouture, p. 9.

[43]For a survey of the literature, see the essay by Juan Linz in the Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 3.

[44]Isaac Balbus, "The Concept of Interest in Marxian and Pluralist Analysis," Politics and Society, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1971), esp. pp. 170-171.

[45]For one set of criticisms, see Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World, esp. Part II. But see also pp. 353-358.

[46]There is a great deal of evidence of this by both North and South Americans. I will cite just one recent example. In "The Consumption of Dependency Theory in the United States," Cardoso argues that extremist and ethnocentric dependency writers are North Americans whereas the moderate and sophisticated ones are Latin Americans. Every effort is made to divide the intellectual community along national lines. There are authors who fit his characterizations, of course, but there are also extremist Latin Americans and sophisticated North Americans, in his own terms, as examples throughout this paper will attest. There are also a lot of Latin American moderates who are deeply troubled by the dependency school and its implications.

[47]For instance, this is explicitly the position taken by Cardoso, passim, and by Caporaso, Duvall, and Fagen. Thus, according to Duvall, "Dialogue between systematic empiricism and dependencia theory is possible is empiricists recognize the fundamentally historical and historicist character of the particular substance of dependencia theory." (p. 51) He is right that dependency theory is historicist (in his sense), but he is very wrong to imply that knowing this will necessarily make a dialogue impossible. Late in his paper he alludes to this problem in a footnote (p. 68n):

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"Meaningful dialogue will not occur if dependencia theorists are adamantly opposed to rigorous empiricism in principle, as there is no indicated that some of them may be. See, for example, Cardoso and Faletto. All that can be done is to provide the possibility of dialogue." (emphasis in original) But he never develops this point or allows it to inform his basic argument. Since "Cardoso and Faletto" is the locus classicus of the dependency literature, if there is one, this would seem to be quite an important omission.

On all this, compare Caporaso, Duvall and Fagen to the other essays in the volume, especially those by Hirshman, Moran, Mytelka, and Gereffi. I myself am not persuaded that the dialogue fails mainly because Albert Hirschman does not understand the dependency "language community" as well as Duvall, Caporaso, and Fagen do.

[48]For example, Caporaso, "Introduction" to International Organization, p. 7.

[49]Cf. Caporaso and Duvall. By "language communities," Caporaso and Duvall do not mean Spanish/Portuguese compared to English; indeed, judging from their footnotes, neither Caporaso nor Duvall reads Spanish and Portuguese, at least not well enough to do his own translations. The phrase refers instead to different "scholarly traditions."

[50]The precise nature of these implications for this particular subject matter remains to be spelled out. A valuable introduction, even though it is set in a different context, is Charles Frankel, "The Autonomy of the Social Sciences," in Charles Frankel, ed., Controversies and Decisions: The Social Sciences and Public Policy (New York: Russell Sage, 1976), 9-30. See also Robert A. Packenham, "Social Science and Public Policy," in Sidney Verba and Lucian Pye, ed., The Citizen and Politics (Stamford, Conn.: Greylock Publishers, 1978), 237-257.