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POLITICAL PARTIES AND REPRESENTATIO IN THE POST-AUTHORITARIAN ERA

A Rapporteur's Report
Margaret Daly Hayes

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Preface

The following working paper is a summary of a conference held at the Woodrow Wilson Center on November 8-9, 1991. The idea for the conference was Silvia Raw's, then Senior Program Associate of the Latin American Program. To make the idea a reality, we commissioned a paper from Frances Hagopian of Tufts University, who outlined a series of issues she believed were worthy of serious consideration by a small group of informed students of the political process in Latin America. The group conducted a series of sessions, or panels, built around lead statements by individuals we felt were suited for such a task.

The result was two days of stimulating exchanges and fascinating discussion. As you will see, we did not reach any firm conclusions, but we did hammer out a few items in a broad consensus and made some specific suggestions concerning future work. There were no formal papers; we recorded the sessions. I then asked Margaret Daly Hayes, a private consultant who has written extensively on these issues over the years, to review the transcript and fashion a coherent statement that we might share with our readers.

The following includes an introduction by Dr. Hayes that incorporates some of her own ideas together with a summary of the discussion. It also includes discussion summaries for each of the sessions that focused on specific countries. I am grateful to our former staff member, Silvia Raw, for her efforts, to Fran Hagopian for having gotten the project off the ground, and to Margaret Daly Hayes for producing the final product.

Joseph S. Tulchin
Director
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POLITICAL PARTIES AND REPRESENTATION IN THE POST-AUTHORITARIAN ERA

Prospects for Democracy in Latin America: An Overview

Over the course of the 1980s the Latin American political and economic landscape has been transformed -- by the return to democracy, by the debt-provoked economic crisis of the early 1980s, the reluctant, but necessary, adoption of harsh austerity measures, and by the subsequent gradual adoption of a new economic model emphasizing less state intervention in the economy and greater private sector initiative. Governments have undertaken deregulation of large areas of economic activity and have begun to draft new rules for administering others. Abandoning import substituting industrialization, most countries have established impressive track records in export performance and have begun to open markets to imports. Renewed attention is being given to questions of social justice.

For most countries, however, economic performance has fallen short of expectations. Growth has been slow to start and spotty. Unemployment remains high even in economies that are growing. Per capita incomes are still behind what they were in 1980 in most countries, and social conditions worsened demonstrably as the state ceased spending. Freeing up the market through deregulation has been easier than writing and implementing new rules to govern the changed relationships between state and polity.

Democracy, in contrast, appears to be taking root. Participation in elections is high. Many countries have now experienced transfers of power from one elected civilian government to another. However, even as democratic transfers of government take place, populations have become more alienated from politics. Political leaders in many countries have not been able to capture a vision of their country's future, much less develop a blueprint for how to get there. Corruption is increasingly visible and denounced in countries like Brazil and Venezuela. Drug lords and other "anti-system" elements like Shining Path undermine democratic process in Colombia, Peru and perhaps other countries as well. Social conditions have worsened everywhere.

Remarkably, democratic governments have not fallen under challenges and burdens of economic adjustment and social inequalities,

though many pundits predicted they would. However, it is feared that these same challenges may impede the consolidation and extension of democracy, leaving regimes persistently vulnerable to another cycle of coup-making, party instability, and policy indecision.

In November 1991, the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars held a meeting to assess the evolution of political parties and the state of consolidation of democracy in the region in the wake of profound political and economic changes of the 1980s. Six political profiles were presented covering Mexico, Chile, Venezuela, Uruguay, Peru and Brazil. The wide ranging discussion examined systemic characteristics of the Latin American political process such as corporatism, patronage, the emergence of "new caudillos" on the political scene, and the implications of economic changes for political processes. The country profiles are summarized in separate sections in this working paper. This essay summarizes the major themes covered in the discussion and comments on their implications for Latin America's democratic prospects.

The general assessment of political evolution was somewhat bleak. With the exception of Chile and, perhaps Mexico, Latin American democracies seemed not to be coping well with the dual challenges of democratic expansion and economic liberalization. The region's new economic model seemed to profoundly constrain the consolidation of democracy. Parties and political systems, even Mexico's one-party dominant system, seemed to be in crisis of some degree almost everywhere.

Unlike economies and economic systems, parties and political systems appeared to have changed little as a result of political opening, or even after long periods of proscription under authoritarian regimes. Opinion polls recorded growing public exasperation with government inefficiency and disillusionment with politicians. The collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe was reflected in the deflation of the left in Latin American as well. Everywhere the burdens imposed by economic stabilization programs and the dismantling of statist developmentalism seemed to overwhelm political processes.

Moreover, scholars were disappointed to find considerable continuity in political process, particularly a continuation of vigorous traditions of clientelism, which they viewed as inadequate for meeting contemporary political challenges. In some countries, the impact of the media on political campaigns seemed to be robbing parties of their traditional functions,

making them less important in the selection of government leaders. Manuel Antonio Garretón observed, "the political matrix that evolved over the past 40 years is disappearing. We are in a period of transition without a substitute model."[1]

Three causes of the amorphous but critical state of Latin American political development emerged repeatedly in the discussions:

> The continuation of traditional political patterns and practices, especially of corporatism and clientelism, in spite of dramatically different economic conditions and resource availability;
>
> The effect of economic crisis and structural reform -- particularly the dismantling of the State -- on political processes and socio-economic welfare;
>
> The ineffectiveness of governments.

But the predominant concern was the impact of economic recession and economic restructuring on the capacity of the state to govern and the effect of this phenomenon on the prospects for democratic consolidation in the region.

Parties and Latin American Democracy in the 1990s

In evaluating the progress in the region's democratic consolidation, it is useful to reflect first on the essential attributes of democracy and the roles that parties play in a democracy. In The Third Wave[2], Samuel Huntington cites Schumpeter who called the "democratic method" ... "that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote."

According to Robert Dahl, a defining characteristic of democracy is "the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to all of its citizens." Two essential democratic activities assure such

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[1] Unless otherwise noted, quotations are taken from the transcript of the discussion.

[2] Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, : University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

responsiveness: the contest to conduct government and the right to participate in that contest in which the chief decision makers are selected through fair, honest, periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote.[3]

Political parties are "not a sufficient condition for democracy, but they may be a necessary condition" since no modern democracy exists without parties.[4] A party may be defined as "any group, however loosely organized, seeking to elect governmental office-holders under a given label. Having a label (which may or may not be on the ballot) rather than an organization is the crucial defining element."[5]

Democracy, the idea, in contrast to the process, also means things like equality, brotherhood, accountability. Dahl lists eight institutional guarantees that assure that the contest is open and that participation is inclusive.

Democratic stability is also affected by performance in governance. Conferees agreed that performance -- delivering anticipated results -- has been the key shortcoming of Latin American governments since the return to democracy. Diamond, Linz and Lipset argue that "a primary reason for the instability of democratic and other regimes in the Third World is "the combination of interaction of low legitimacy and low effectiveness. Regimes begin with low legitimacy and find it difficult to be effective and those regimes that lack effectiveness, especially in economic growth, tend to continue to be low in legitimacy."[6]

Huntington argues that stability of democratic regimes depends first on the ability of the principal political elites -- party leaders, military, business leaders -- to work together to deal with the problems confronting their society and to refrain from exploiting those problems for their own immediate material or political advantage, and second, on the ability of publics to distinguish between the democratic regime and particular governments or rulers. The public can be discontented with the government, but still believe in the method of electing that government.

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[3] Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971) p. 4.

[4] Leon Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 8.

[5] Ibid, p. 9.

[6] As cited in Huntington, op. cit., p. 258.

"Democracies become consolidated when people learn that democracy is a solution to the problem of tyranny, but not necessarily to anything else."[7]

Thus, if democratic governments fail to solve problems, they can be replaced by others with a different approach. Anti-incumbent and anti-establishment responses are classic democratic reactions to policy failure and disillusionment. The question to be answered in Latin America is whether publics will remain satisfied with a system that generates governments that fail to solve the pressing problems of countries. Will governments become more effective, or will democracy fail? What role do parties play in the adjustment process?

Recent political experience in the Latin American cases reviewed at the Wilson Center conference showed electors voting against incumbent parties because those parties' government had not solved pressing economic and social problems. In three separate presidential elections in the 1980s, Peruvian voters gave massive support to the opposition candidate; In Uruguay, the Blancos won the presidency for only the second time in the century; in Brazil an outsider won the presidency[8] and established parties lost seats in the legislature.

At the risk of oversimplification, the record seems to show that Latin American polities have done well in bringing about a return to democracy, that political parties have functioned as they are intended to function, contesting and mobilizing participation in elections, but that governments -- and parties in government --have failed in the crucial tests of performance. Does this undermine democratic prospects in the long term? Can process be perfected?

Only Chile and Mexico seemed to have adjusted effectively to both political and economic change. In Chile traditional parties coalesced and adopted an economic program consistent with that of preceding authoritarian government. Mexican authorities have expanded the political system to accommodate challenges and have changed the rules of participation to assure continued PRI domination within a more open system (one can debate how much more open). Elsewhere, in Venezuela, Uruguay, Brazil and Peru, parties are in disarray because they have not yet made adjustments to new political and economic realities.

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[7] Huntington, op cit., p. 263.

[8] Even the runner up was an outsider, and major party presidential candidates placed well down in the list in the first round popular vote count.

One of those realities is an expanded and more demanding electorate. Some of the volatility of Latin American party politics is certainly due to the vastly expanded electorate, mobilized by the recent successful effort to shake off authoritarian rule, and with little prior political experience. In Brazil's 1989 presidential elections, over half of the voting population was under thirty years of age -- too young to have participated in earlier democratic politics. Sixty percent of the population was eligible to vote whereas in 1960 less than 20 percent of the population was eligible to elect the president. Television played an important role in electoral politics for the first time in Brazil, Peru and Uruguay, making it possible for individuals to appeal directly to voters, by-passing parties. Susan Stokes described the political education of Peruvian urban social movements that organized under the military government to demand service delivery and which now look for representation under a political party rubric.

While many voters have participated in Latin American elections, conference participants noted the still pervasive feeling that parties and politicians do not mean what they promise. The electorate has been remarkably tolerant of austerity measures, but increasingly demands results of its governments, or at least signs of concerted effort. Corruption, clientelism and patronage, the traditional currencies of politics, are less tolerable.

Political parties organize principally to win access to public office. Leon Epstein notes that even in "movement" parties -- those organized to promote a given idea or interest --, "there seems to be an unusually large gap between the organization incentives of the leaders and of other members. For it is plain that the leaders (candidates) have strong incentives -- that is to gain office -- which most members cannot share."[9] Latin American parties have evolved essentially as patronage machines in which the party's purpose is to get a job in government or a service from government, a characteristic made clear in presentations on Uruguay, Venezuela, Brazil and Mexico. In developed countries the patronage model has gone out of fashion as mass media give candidates more direct access to voters and as government services become more available without the boss as intermediary. This process of substituting the old organizational rationale for a new one (often less effective in terms of delivering votes) has only begun in Latin America's restored democracies. Thus Argentine political scientist and politician, Jorge Sabato could remark, "our democracies are poor; they seem not prepared to face, to deal with, the serious economic and social problems today. Decisions are made through

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[9] Epstein, op. cit.,pp. 102-104.

corporatist, technocratic, special interest group channels; social issues are not being dealt with."

To understand the pressures on parties, research must begin to focus on how parties relate to the voters as citizen, rather than just the politician's electoral clientele. What kind of attention does the voter get from political institutions, or government? Not much, if one reads Hernando de Soto[10] or studies public opinion polls in Montevideo, Caracas or Brazil. If we take Dahl's definition of democracy, "completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens,"[11] Latin America has far to go in perfecting its system. And what does "responsive" mean to Latin American voters? Fran Hagopian observed that political science has not focused on questions of political culture for some time. With the return of democratic politics, this should become a more important topic in the future.

Institutional Context and Electoral Engineering

Arturo Valenzuela argued emphatically that institutional rules can perfect democratic practice and moreover that the presidential systems commonplace in the region were possibly unsuited to the multi-party political reality of the region. Parliamentary systems might provide better representation to the popular sectors and more effective vehicles for mobilizing support for decision-making. At the same time, Jonathan Hartlyn reminded that an effective parliamentary system requires a dominant party or parties.

But others cautioned that electoral engineering had its downsides, as well. Rules might tend to favor one group or set of groups more than another, worried Francisco Weffort. Political practice is something deeply ingrained in the history and socialization of a country and cannot be easily changed. By the same token, electoral rules can be made to engineer majorities, but parties may continue to recruit candidates and pursue office without regard for broad social questions. A number of participants noted the resilience of patronage politics in Latin America even in the face of sharply depleted government treasuries. In a recent speech to the Inter-American Development Bank, Chilean politician Gabriel Valdez, argued that present circumstances urgently challenge Latin America's

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10 Hernando de Soto, The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World (New York: Harper and Row, 1989).

11 Dahl, op. cit., p. 2.

political classes to "modernize" with a view to building broad consensus about national interests and national priorities and to facilitating implementation of necessary structural changes.[12]

Economic Reform and 'Retreat of the State'

The region's new economic model bore the brunt of blame during the discussion for increased socio-economic hardship and the inability of the state to meet expectations. State intervention in the post-war Latin American economy structured representative politics. Parties organized themselves in relation to incentives created by the state and political demands coalesced around what the state had to offer and distribute. With this model in retreat, how will political representation reorganize? How will the state relate to the governed? What will happen with clientelism and state administered patronage as the state retreats from regulation, distribution and production? Will the economic model and economic crisis create instability that undermines redemocratization?

The new development model adopted by Latin American countries in the 1980s has been provoked by the 1982 debt crisis and its consequences. Only Chile began economic reform prior to the debt crisis. At the same time, the model responds to changes in the international economy -- more market oriented emphasis presaged by the Thatcher reforms in Great Britain, the liberalization undertaken by France, Italy, Spain, strong competition from the developing countries of Asia, and more recently the opening of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

The model has three elements, stabilization, liberalization and privatization. These three components can be broken down into a variety of steps (John Williamson describes 10 basic reforms as comprising the IMF-World Bank "Washington consensus"[13]) but the upshot of the reforms, whatever they are called, is that the state cannot spend more money than it takes in revenues; that prices must reflect real costs; that over-regulation and subsidization of markets has resulted in serious inefficiencies and diversion of resources, and that private sector management of productive operations is more efficient. Pedro Aspe, Finance Minister of Mexico, captures the rationale of the new model:

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[12] Gabriel Valdez, "The New Latin America and its demands on the Political Class," speech to the Inter-American Development Bank, September 29, 1992.
[13] John Williamson, The Progress of Policy Reform (Washington, D.C.: International Institute for Economics, 1991).

"We need to go back to basics in government spending. The Mexican people have never asked for planes, digital equipment for telephones, or programs funded by the public sector. We do not want to have a wealthy public sector in a poor Mexico. The government is going back to basics, to what people want-- infrastructure, water, better police, a better educational system. ...We have to deregulate because if we do not increase productivity, we cannot have sustained growth and a better standard of living for the Mexican population."[14]

In Latin America, with the singular exception of the *Concertación* government in Chile, no political party has adopted the new development model as its platform as did the Conservative party in Great Britain or the Republican party in the United States or the Christian Democrats in Germany. Rather, individual democratically elected leaders adopted the new model for their governments. Some of these leaders were products of the traditional party system --Victor Paz Estenssoro in Bolivia, Michael Manley in Jamaica, Carlos Andrés Pérez in Venezuela, Miguel de la Madrid then Carlos Salinas, in Mexico, for example, but in other cases, they were mavericks within the system -- Carlos Saul Menem in Argentina, even Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil, who had held office under several party labels in his career. Alberto Fujimori of Peru was the only president elected who had no previous significant political experience and no party. Each one of these leaders has had to persuade his political followers of the wisdom of the new model. They have had mixed success.

In part because politics in the region was structured to take advantage of the centralized state and its concentration of resources, the political classes have lagged behind economists in coming to grips with the implications of the new consensus. Even in countries with long authoritarian interludes, political relationships were structured essentially as they had been prior to the authoritarian period. The world changed, the parties stayed much the same, perhaps even more dependent on patronage and clientelism because they had not had an opportunity to represent ideas and had no experience in the practice of government. The collapse of

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[14] Pedro Aspe, "New Ideas for Progress: From Debt to Renewed Growth," in Latin America: How New Administrations will Meet the Challenges, Proceedings of the IDB-International Herald Tribune Third Biennial Conference, London, February 22-23, 1990 (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 1990).

socialism removed one worldview from the political debate; the remaining players have no substitute to offer. A conference participant observed that the entire Latin American continent is searching for political organization and a way to manage power. It is a system in search of a future without a blueprint.

Stabilization, the sine qua non of the new economic model, requires governments to curtail spending sharply while allowing previously controlled prices to seek their market level. Most countries undergoing stabilization experienced recession before they began to reap the rewards of sounder finances.[15] Recession and austerity have taken a heavy toll from the lower classes and even middle classes and businesses. But it is well to remember that such hardships are precipitated but not necessarily caused by the new economic policies, but rather by inefficiencies and mismanagement of the headier days of earlier decades.

The more important elements of the new economic model are the restructuring of relations between government and the public through deregulation and new rules. Joan Nelson remarked on the frequent use of the term "retreat of the state" in the conference discussion and noted that the state that is to emerge from this reform process is not a minimalist state, but one that is able to raise revenues; build infrastructure; deliver social services; and assure the rule of law. This must be a relatively strong state that is doing things differently than in the past. Maria do Carmo Campello de Souza reiterated this notion: "The redefinition of the state does not translate to a shrinking of the state, but to changes in arenas of jurisdiction; a reshuffling of public and private power around issues."

Reorganizing the state is the task in which Latin America is engaged today. In an analysis of Venezuelan restructuring efforts, Moisés Naím observed it is easy to decree stabilization -- this can be done "with a sweep of the presidential pen" -- but changing the rules and relationships whereby society functions is much more difficult and requires time, consensus, patience and leadership.[16] In countries where the economic model has been widely accepted -- Chile, Mexico, Argentina -- leaders made this clear to their followers. Perhaps other leaders have been less

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[15] The reward for change is not assured. Of more that a dozen countries studied by John Williamson, relatively few countries saw significant change. But data suggest that "you're damned if you don't reform; your're not guaranteed results if you do."

[16] Moisés Naím, "The Launching of Radical Policy Changes, 1989-91," in Joseph S. Tulchin with Gary Bland, eds., Venezuela in the Wake of Radical Reform, forthcoming.

effective in explaining the long term nature of the new model. In a democracy, the legislative branch is critical in the restructuring phase, and if parties are not committed to the program, negotiations over the fine points of legislation can be interminable.

Austerity has certainly limited the resources available to spend on social welfare and has constrained the goods, services and patronage positions available to politicians, but the notion that the neo-liberal state will simply not have power or resources, once the adjustments are sorted out, is mistaken. Moreover, several participants, citing the Italian literature, noted that patronage systems have functioned well under conditions of scarcity.

In a different vein, the restructuring of relationships may also have a positive impact on the opening up and expanding of the political system. The economic model urges devolution of decision powers to local governments, to the private sector and other interest organizations, often non-governmental organizations with a specific orientation to the previously disenfranchised. Decentralization already has opened up political opportunities for former guerrilla groups in Colombia; elections at the municipal and department level in Mexico have created opportunities for minority party candidates. State and municipal government have more resources at their disposal in Brazil, the central government less.

Failures of Government and Governance

A persistent criticism of government performance was that democratic governments have not begun to address adequately the social problems of the region. As these problems were many years in developing, it should not be surprising that they are not yet solved, but more importantly, democracy -- a system of choosing office holders -- does not of itself bring about social change. That is a result of effective management, appropriate rules, and luck.

Naím observes that building the institutional framework to regulate economic life, to curb political and economic excesses, to control corruption and assure quality service delivery are "not tasks for a weak state." Yet, particularly in those countries most beset by political "unraveling," as Marcelo Cavarozzi described, the Latin American state appears weak and inefficient.

Governance is a new preoccupation in the development world. The focus results from the concern of lending agencies and governments that

well-conceived projects may not yield results for reasons connected with quality of government action. In its first statement on this issue, the World Bank noted that "Good government is central to creating and sustaining an environment which fosters strong and equitable development, and it is an essential complement to sound economic policies."[17]

The Bank also notes that governments must establish rules that make markets work efficiently and, more problematically, they must try to correct for market failure. In order to play this role, they need revenues, and agents to collect revenues and produce the public goods. This in turn requires systems of accountability, adequate and reliable information, and efficiency in resource management and the delivery of public services.

Growth, particularly during the heady, debt-fueled days of the 1970s, obscured many of the problems of governance and management in Latin America and other developing countries. The debt crisis, itself a consequence of earlier mismanagement as well as of the developed world recession in the early 1980s, bared these inefficiencies in a particularly unmerciful way.

Many of the failures of Latin American political systems are more correctly problems of governance than problems of politics. World Bank refers to the "capture" of government agencies by special interests, made worse by monopoly and the public's limited capacity to demand and monitor good performance in public institutions. Political scientists describe the colonization of specialized agencies by corporatist interests (e.g., Brazil), or a particular party (e.g., Uruguay or Venezuela)and patronage systems for job distribution (Mexico, Venezuela, Uruguay, Brazil) and they are addressing the same phenomenon of ineffective government management.

There is an important distinction between parties in campaign for office and party or parties in government. The party's task in the campaign is to win the right to govern; the task in government is management. Management is more difficult in a democracy when no consensus exists as to future goals and targets, or, when, as Gabriel Valdez lamented, parties approach decision-making as a zero-sum game -- "We <u>or</u> they, rather than we <u>and</u> they."

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[17] <u>Governance and Development</u> (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1992) p. 1.

Political parties may or may not address these issues in their platforms. Conference participants frequently noted the absence of a "national project" in contemporary party discourse. Increased social inequality seems to have accompanied redemocratization and political institutions seem to have responded with paralysis. Gabriel Valdez, president of the Senate in Chile, has lamented that parties have not begun to cope with the political obligations inherent in economic reform, that is, to assure the benefits of growth for the lower classes in society.[18]

Prospects for Latin American Democracy

The party chapters that follow indicate that voters are increasingly frustrated with politicians and parties that do not address these issues. They do not, however, seem frustrated with the form of government that gives them a voice in choosing their leaders. Increasingly, parties may have to address the relevant issues as voters demand results from those they send to govern. Becoming more responsible in government may be the price exacted to continue to win office. But delivering results will require a major reorganization of the rules governing social, political and economic behavior. These rules in turn will only evolve over a long period of time, perhaps the full course of the present decade. Crafting the new political system will require tremendous wisdom in writing rules and inordinate commitment on the part of politicians and parties to work together for common good rather than for party interest. This is a daunting challenge in any society, even more in fractious democracies.

Economic change and political change are a seamless web - one affects the other. Political relationships structured economic relations in the past, perhaps, but today, economic change has the initiative. Maria do Carmo Campello de Souza observed, once the boundaries of political institutions are changed, those institutions will have to adjust. Political parties will have to adjust to new demands on them, or risk losing the opportunity to compete for and win office. Manuel Antonio Garretón offered the example of Chile in the 1960s when the right "failed and fragmented, forcing people to vote for the Christian Democrats. The Christian Democrat program of 1964 did not exist two years earlier. Rather, a group outside the party appropriated the party to move their program and made the party that we know today."

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[18] Loc.cit.

Against the vast imperfections in the region's economic performance and institutional efficiency, it is important to note the continuing commitment to democratic government by all sectors of societies. Voters are expressing their disgruntlement with the lack of performance by parties and government institutions by voting against incumbents, opting for "new caudillos." But, Robert Kaufman noted, such disgruntlement with government performance is not confined to Latin America, but rather characterizes most democracies. The Latin American democratic system is working in that the voters are able to "throw the bums out." To that extent, democracy is consolidating in the region. For it to be fully realized will require time. As Thomas Jefferson reportedly observed, "Democracy is cumbersome, slow and inefficient, but in due time, the voice of the people will be heard and their latent wisdom will prevail."[19]

Agenda for Research

Research into Latin American political party organization and behavior has not been prolific for obvious reasons. The transformation now taking place reflects the collapse of relationships that prevailed between state and socio-economic actors, and between interest groups since the 1930s and invites a new look at the region's practical politics. Marcelo Cavarozzi observed that for the past two decades scholars have focused more often than not on issues of bureaucratic authoritarianism, or, more recently, on transitions to democratic government. Today's democracies must generate a new political-economic matrix with new roles for political parties and new economic rules.[20] With this process underway, there is an urgent need to return to the study of political organization, culture and behavior.

Earlier political party analyses tended to focus on the party as organization, assuming that the organization performed in expected ways. Newly available data, such as the local level elections data examined by Barry Ames, or public opinion polls, and political decentralization which has stimulated greater political activity at more and lower levels of government, make it feasible to study political party organization, political culture and political practice with degrees of detail never before possible.

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[19] Cited in Respectfullly Quoted: A Dictionary of Quotations Requested from the Congressional Reserch Service (Washington, D.C. Library of Congress, 1989).

[20] These points paraphrase Marcelo Cavarozzi, "Beyond Transition in Latin America," paper presented to the XVI Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, April 4-6, 1991, Washington, D.C.

New scholarship must look at how parties are actually operating and performing in different countries. Issues such as political recruitment, grassroots political activity, political machine organization, relations between local, state and national level party organizations, campaign financing, platform development and implementation, as well as the behavior of parties in the executive and legislative branches are topics for research. In addition, modes of representation of constituents -- the linkages between politics, parties and politicians on the one hand, and citizens on the other -- must be examined. Given the voters' disenchantment with parties in recent elections, what can be learned about Latin American voters' expectations of government and political representatives in each country, and how do parties adjust their own organization and behaviors to respond to those expectations? How do voters' perceptions of individual parties, politics in general and of democracy evolve over time? The answers to these many questions will give the measure of the consolidation of democracies in the region.

The following profiles of political parties are based on oral presentations and participant commentary during the Wilson Center conference. The profiles reflect three distinct tendencies in political-economic adjustment in Latin America. In both Chile and Mexico one sees an accommodation of political organization and practice to new political-economic realities. Chile has succeeded in holding together a coalition of parties in support of an economic program. Mexico, sui generis, has modified and expanded its one-party dominant system to accommodate new ideas. In Venezuela and Uruguay, two party dominant systems are splintering into factions and historically dominant parties are losing control over political processes. In Brazil and Peru parties appear to be in serious disarray and increasingly dysfunctional.

Two themes permeate the analysis of every party system -- (1) the parties' quality of representation of citizens or voters, which is generally viewed to be low, and (2) the parties' capacity to govern once in office, also generally seen to be deficient.

BRAZIL

On any measure, any scale, Brazilian parties are extremely weak. With the return to democracy in 1985, the parties have experienced profound changes, but their deficiencies have left them in a state of intense crisis. The Brazilian political system has failed in the task of governance.

For the most part, Brazilian parties are only labels that have multiplied over time, but which have few roots in the body politic, little party organization and only weak ties to the state. With few exceptions, they are devoid of platforms. They are simply vehicles to elect office holders and to mobilize patronage.

Survey data shows that only about 30 percent of Brazilians have a party preference. More importantly, they have little confidence in parties or politicians. In one survey, 91.3 percent of respondents said that politicians always or usually lie.

One measure of party roots is the number of seats that change party from one election to the next. In the Weimar Republic, on average, about 19 percent of seats change hands. In Brazil, 43 percent of congressional seats changed party between 1982 and 1986, and 39 percent changed between 1986 and 1990.

In 1989, the parties lost control of the presidential race. Parties that won 83 percent of the seats in Congress in 1986 won only 6 percent of the first round of the presidential vote in 1989, but returned to take 59 percent of seats in 1990. The presidential candidates of the two largest parties in the legislature received five and one-quarter percent of the vote and their nominees came in seventh and ninth in the list of 21 candidates. The parties of the front runners held 51 seats out of 570 in the federal congress. In 1989 the voters clearly did not choose the president on the basis of party affiliation.

Internal Party Organization

One of the most distinctive features of Brazilian parties is politicians' limited allegiance to their own parties. Of 559 politicians who took office in March 1987, at least 197 changed party affiliation during the 3 1/2 year legislative session. There were no national elections, politicians just

switched allegiance. The biggest party, the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), shrank from 305 to 153.

Brazil's parties also lack resources. With the exception of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), there are no real national party headquarters in Brazil. Indeed the locus of party organization is at the state level where powerful political bosses control the party machinery. Parties arrange none of the financing for campaigns and individual politicians must finance their campaigns themselves. Moreover, campaigns are not coordinated by the party. A candidate's primary adversary may be a fellow party member.

Party discipline in the legislature is very low, again with the exception of the parties of the left. The PT, for example, has strong party discipline. Moreover, the Brazilian party constellation is one of the most "dispersed" in the world, more than any other country in Latin America and more than any country in Western Europe. There are more than 19 parties in the national legislature with no party controlling more that 20 percent of the seats. This makes it extremely difficult for presidents to organize support for legislative programs.

Corporatism and the Problems of Coalition-building[21]

Brazil's history of corporatism contributes to the crisis of parties today. As in other Latin American countries, Brazil's political system has been characterized by a strong executive and weak representation. The Brazilian corporatist variant provided for vertical linkages of interest groups to the state, or, more precisely, to a proliferation of agencies that responded to increasingly diverse elite sectors, but did not encourage negotiation among interests. This dynamic generated a highly fragmented system, penetrated by special interests and isolated from outside pressures. The system favored neither social integration no inter-class agreement.

Political parties had little importance under this system. They didn't represent interests with a stake in policy output. Parties could influence the decision-making process, but had no rights in terms of formulating the policy agenda.

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[21] This section is based on the presentation by Eli Diniz.

Brazil's elite favored the state-led model of industrialization, but with the crises of the 1980s -- the economic crisis, the return to democracy, the collapse of socialism, the evident exhaustion of the state-led development model and the heritage of social injustices -- they have endorsed a new development model.

Brazil's problem today is that no party articulates this new model politically. This has contributed to the decision-making paralysis. These problems have become so a cute, that Brazilians are now talking about major institutional changes -- electoral reform, parliamentarism -- to reverse social fragmentation and the state's ineffectiveness.

Electoral politics and Clientelism[22]

While the Brazilian political system has many deficiencies, it is a fairly well developed example of clientelism and patronage politics. It is a system intended to elect office holders and to deliver services to those office holders' supporters. The Brazilian electoral system is one of open list, proportional representation with very large districts that coincide with state political boundaries. Since deputies cannot campaign across the state, they cultivate mini-districts (redutos eleitorais) or bailiwicks -- one or several municipalities in which they concentrate their votes.

The bailiwick can be contiguous municipalities and concentrated, or be spread randomly across the state, but municipal level election returns will show that one or another candidate dominated the vote in the municipality or at least led his party list in the municipality. The choice of bailiwick varies from state to state. In some states -- Bahia under governor Antonio Carlos Magalhaes, for example, -- the governor tells people where to campaign, but elsewhere the candidate may choose his own municipalities or make deals with other party members to secure his base.

Bailiwicks are more concentrated in the southeast -- Minas Gerais, São Paulo, Parana, Santa Catarina -- and scattered in the Northeast. In the latter, because of the smaller populations and capital city dominance -- often more than half the state's population --, you can't win a seat without getting a large share of votes in the capital. Candidates spend less time cultivating municipalities outside the capital city and votes become more

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22 This section is based on the presentation by Barry Ames and is based on on-going research into electoral politics at the state and municipal level using municipal level election statistics.

scattered in outlying municipalities. In the south, the capital cities contain a smaller percentage of all electors and it is possible to win an election state-wide without having votes in the capital.

Deputies appear to serve their bailiwicks by delivering goods and services -- pork barrel projects, favors and government jobs -- to build their support machine. We can track this by examining the convenios -- federal-state transfers signed by individual ministries.

The data show that a deputy gets pork barrel projects for the municipalities in which he gets his campaign financing. Interestingly, deputies who dominate their party list in a municipality, but whose party does not dominate the municipalities, are very active on behalf of the municipality. Deputies who dominate whole municipality -- who get all the votes -- are inactive. Thus, it appears that if you have a safe seat and get all the votes, you can be inactive. This speaks to the question of accountability of elected officials. In large urban areas, pork barrel projects don't matter as much, because a deputy can't get personal credit for them since under the list system he shares the base with lots of other candidates. In this case he uses nominations to government jobs to build his machine.

Brazil's New Party on the Left[23]

The Brazilian Workers' Party (PT) is very different from Brazil's other major parties. The PT developed out of the redemocratization process. First it was a social movement, then a vehicle for registering dissatisfaction with the status quo in the 1982, 1985, and 1988 elections. After the 1988 elections (in which the PT gained control of three major urban governments, including the city of São Paulo, and 29 other cities) and the 1989 election in which the PT candidate was runner-up for the presidency, the party sees itself as a real alternative for Brazil. Now it feels obliged to articulate a vision and a program. Debate over what that vision is divides the party today.

The PT has always called itself socialist, but it has never defined what that meant. The party has embraced tendencies from orthodox Marxism, Trotskyism, syndicalism and Catholic base community activists.

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[23] This discussion of the PT was led by Margaret Keck. See Margaret E. Keck, The Workers' Party and Democratization in Brazil (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

The PT's organizational impetus included elements of class struggle and citizen incorporation. Thus it could represent the new unionists (shop oriented unionism), white collar unions, and promote incorporation of landless peasants and rural workers. This made sense as the party sought to represent those it viewed as the majority.

The party's view of the state is ambiguous. The new unionists and Catholic base communities mistrust the state for being capitalist, hierarchical and antithetical to self organization. The party also recognizes the need for Brazil to integrate with the world economy, but is not clear how to accomplish this.

To date the PT has only been successful in winning executive positions at the municipal level and the record is mixed. Nevertheless the experience with local administration and the difficulties in conceptualizing and implementing the party's initial proposals for direct representative democracy are being reflected in the party's debate.

For a majority of the party, the collapse of the socialist block reinforces the tendency to view socialism as a radical form of democracy which will require a long process of accumulating power in civil society. Other elements believe that socialism was able to raise the standards of living of populations, provide full employment, educational opportunity, health care and so forth and still represents an idea to be fought for. A defining characteristic of PT thinking is the notion that growth of equality is a prior condition and spur to development rather than development spurring equality.

Maintaining the democratic idea of what socialism is all about is extremely dependent upon finding an arena in which meaningful debate over the policies entailed in the PT's view of the future can take place. Unfortunately, these issues do not seem to be serious concerns on the current Brazilian political agenda.

Conclusions

None of these observations is new. People have been talking about the weakness of Brazilian parties for many years. What is alarming is that under democratic government, they have become even weaker. Successively, the PDS and the PMDB have been badly discredited and have lost votes because of the poor performance of PDS and PMDB governments.

Thus, the economic crisis has had a devastating impact on party strength and stability.

At the same time, the polity is polarized. The 1989 presidential campaign, a populist campaign, showed the country clearly split on important ideological issues. Veja magazine called it the election to decide which vision of Brazil would predominate in the future[24].

The party problem contributes to the problem of governance. Brazil's large district, open list proportional representation system almost guarantees weak, fragmented parties. Parties of the left and of the right both have strong ties to corporatist institutions. The proliferation of parties, their ideological differences (and in most cases, lack of ideology) make coalition-building difficult and governing problematic.

Because presidents have difficulty organizing support in the legislature, they bypass the congress and rule by decree. This weakens both the legislature and its political parties. Presidents are driven to organize support through clientelism, purchasing deputies' and governors' support to get measures through the legislature.

Finally, with the exception of the Partido dos Trabalhadores, the popular sectors are not represented. The result is an over-representation of elites in a society in which 80 percent of voters in the most recent election fell below the poverty line. For all of these reasons, Brazilians are giving serious thought to major institutional reform -- electoral reform, party reform, regime reform. They have begun to realize that the present institutional rules are not adequate to provide governments capable of coping with the development challenges the country faces now and for the future. The 1992 impeachment of president Fernando Collor de Mello, orchestrated in large part by the political parties, further underscored the problems of the Brazilian political system and the need for profound reforms. The constitutional timetable requires that a number of the reforms -- parliamentarism or presidentialism, electoral reform, be addressed in 1993.

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24 See Veja, December 13, 1989.

CHILE

Whether discussing Brazil, with its extraordinarily fluid party system, or Chile, at the other end of the spectrum, it remains difficult to escape the proposition that parties and party systems in post-authoritarian setting in Latin America are remarkably similar to their pre-authoritarian antecedents. Though we are looking for discontinuities, it seems that whether the state is reformed or not, whether the country adopts neo-liberal economic policies or not, countries that had an institutionalized party system prior to redemocratization or neo-liberal reforms are likely to continue to have them. Party reorganization and patterns of representation are unlikely to change abruptly.

From the earliest days in the nineteenth century, Chilean parties have been intrusive and penetrating institutions. As social and political groups became mobilized at different points over the life of the republic, parties have always played a role in changing and shaping emerging interests. Whether operating through the church or unions, student or professional organizations, neighborhood organizations, or at the local or national level, parties have been active participants in the extension of citizenship. Indeed Manuel Antonio Garretón calls the parties the "backbone of the Chilean political process."

Chile is the only country in Latin America where parties have clearly and distinctively aligned in three large ideological blocks -- parties located at the opposite ends of the political spectrum and one party in between. The Chilean party system is the best example of the European model multi-party system in Latin America. Over 12 decades of nearly uninterrupted political competition, each of the three political blocks have invariably won between one-quarter and one-third of the electorate and no single party has held a majority of the electorate.

In 1973, under conditions of extreme polarization and mobilization, the three traditionally competing blocks became warring camps characterized by an increasingly authoritarian right, a steadily more Leninist left and an increasingly rigid and dogmatic center party whose electoral strategy pushed both poles further out.

Pinochet did not single out parties and party leaders as the basic cause of Chile's social and economic ills. Instead, he sought to transform the state with a radical privatization program, cuts in public spending and

employment, and shifting of traditional state functions such as health care, education and pension programs to the private sector.

Moreover, the 1980 Constitution provides for the shifting of power and responsibilities from the legislative to the executive branch of government, reducing the jurisdiction of congress. In this way, the military government sought to emasculate the institutional arena that was the historical base for strong parties in Chile. In addition to prohibiting any parties embracing Marxist-inspired ideology, Article 18 of the 1980 Constitution declared that parties could no longer "monopolize political representation" and sought to encourage the emergence of "independent political candidates."

In spite of these efforts, beginning with the outbreak of nationally organized protests in 1983 and subsequently with the plebiscite of October 5, 1988, parties resumed their historic role as the backbone of the Chilean political process.

Repressive policies targeting opposition parties during the dictatorship, combined with parallel processes of renewal within parties of the left and the center produced critically important changes in the political landscape. The massive involvement of social organizations in opposition to Pinochet resulted in a network of cross-party alliances that, over time, overcame the historic enmity between Socialists and Christian Democrats, in particular. The collaboration of the major parties of the center and left and the resulting center-left political alliance is the single most important transformation of the post-Pinochet party system.

Parties had their first opportunity to re-establish their historical links to groups in civil society when, after regaining official status in March 1987, they took advantage of massive registration drives to encourage high -- unprecedented -- levels of voter participation in the 1988 plebiscite. Since Marxist parties were proscribed by the constitution at the time, parties of the left were forced to either forego registration or register under new party labels like the Party for Democracy (PPD) of moderate socialists.

The result was that in February 1988, 13 parties opposing Pinochet, (soon to become 17), coalesced to form an alliance, the *Concertación* of parties for the "NO", for the purpose of coordinating efforts to defeat Pinochet. The core of the alliance was made up of Christian Democrats and the two major groups within the socialist tradition. This continues to be the core political alliance in Chile today. A record 92 percent of the

eligible population was registered to vote in the contest and participated in record numbers. The abstention rate was only 2.4 percent. The Chilean people voted to reject Pinochet by 54.7 percent to 43 percent.

After several months of intense negotiations, the same 17 parties agreed to continue the alliance formula, including backing a single candidate for the presidency, a common slate of candidates for congress and a commitment to develop a common program. Moreover, the center-left coalition reaffirmed its intention not to reverse Pinochet's economic liberalization.

The *Concertación*'s candidate, Patricio Aylwin, won 55.2 percent of the popular vote, replicating almost exactly the margin obtained by the "NO" in the plebiscite.

The electoral strategies of all the parties in the December 1989 elections were shaped by new electoral laws dictated by the military regime. Aware that in the 1988 plebiscite, opposition party electoral support rarely rose above 2/3 in any single voting unit, the regime adopted an electoral formula tailored to protect its former supporters on the right.

Forces favoring large electoral blocs (in this case pro- and anti-Pinochet) were already at work within the parties, but the electoral changes greatly reinforced those tendencies and two large coalitions and several smaller alliances emerged. The two large coalitions captured approximately 90 percent of the popular votes cast in the senate and deputy elections -- all but two of the contested seats in both the Senate and the House.

The electoral coalitions make it difficult to ascertain the exact level of support for any single party, but to understand continuity and change in this new institutional context, we have to try. The emergence of an electorally strong and ideologically coherent right in the post-Pinochet party arena is one of the major discontinuities with the previous system. In the 1960s and 1970s, parties of the right suffered a steady electoral drain to the center and to the left. This was reflected in the defection of key sectors of the Church, the Christian Democrats, and peasant sectors, along with the seemingly irresistible advance of revolutionary socialism.

Today, the Chilean right has experienced a political rebirth.

The collapse of Communism and the resurgence of economic and political liberalism has reinforced its position as a strong political actor. Electorally, the reconstituted party of the right enjoys approximately double the support it did in the 1973 elections. Perhaps more than the military itself, the right has tied its star to the free market political economy.

On the left, shifts in party composition have been no less significant. It is clear that changes in platform and ideology among the socialists and the near devastation of the Communist Party, with one of the longest and strongest traditions in Latin America, constitutes a major change from the past. Electoral support for parties of the left is considerably reduced, perhaps by slightly less than half. June 1992 municipal elections should clarify its position for the future[25].

Of all the party actors that returned to the arena in the 1980s, the Christian Democrats, the principal party of the center, emerged as the most organizationally coherent. Nevertheless, the party continues to experience internal dissension of the type that plagued it prior to the selection of Patricio Aylwin as its candidate. Today the Christian Democrats and the parties of the center enjoy approximately the same electoral support that they enjoyed in 1973. They are familiar political actors who have changed significantly, adapting to both new political and new economic circumstances.

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[25] In June 1992 the Concertación parties won 53.35 percent of municipal votes, while parties of the right took 37.4 percent and parties of the left 24.2 percent. See Latin America Weekly Report (London) 9 July 1992, pp. 1, 12.

PERU

Peru is one of the oldest democracies in the region and has experienced three consecutive, open, competitive elections -- in 1980, 1985, and 1990 -- since its return to democratic government. Peru's electoral democracy is also extensive. There are elections for mayors and at the department level. The system is open. The Marxist left was very active throughout the 1980s and was able to participate freely.

At the same time Peru has a dismal record of governance. The formal processes of government are deficient and in the highlands and remote parts of the country, procedures do not mean much because the military is in de facto control. Peru is also the only country in the region with an "anti-system threat." Shining Path has made especially broad advances during the last year.[26]

With two exceptions, Peru's political parties are weak. APRA has been and continues to be the most important political party, the only really institutionalized political party. But in some ways, APRA behaves like a sect. Sendero may also be a sect in this sense. Sendero sees itself as a political party and there are more people today who adhere to Sendero than in the past.

Other parties are all weak. Generally there are three or four that have significant showing in elections. There is not a lot of shifting of allegiance among parties. Peruvian political leaders try to articulate a program or platform. But there is a strong sense that though the parties preach a message to the voters during campaigns, once in office they fail to deliver.

In the 1985 and 1990 elections, voters rejected incumbent parties in part, at least, because of failed economic performance. Acción Popular (AP) support declined by 39 percent in 1985 and APRA dropped 26 percent in 1990. Both times, the party that won promised an end to economic hardship.

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[26] The capture of Abimael Guzman Reynoso, Sendero's founder and leader, and several other senior Sendero commanders on September 12, 1992, may significantly change or ultimately end Sendero's activity. According to Hernando de Soto, there are signs that the organization enjoys strong political support within Lima's shantytowns.

The Marxist left is weak today. During the 1980s the United Left, an agglomeration of parties, was considered the second most important political force in the country. Today it is fourth in representation in the legislature and because of internal divisions, the parties of the left are weaker than at any time since the return of democracy. The collapse of international socialism certainly contributed to this decline of the left, exacerbating existing internal divisions.

The 1990 election was a campaign of party outsiders, and today the president governs without the parties. Mario Vargas Llosa, backed by the weak parties of center and right won the first round of the election with 33 percent of the popular vote. Alberto Fujimori, an independent, anti-system candidate backed by the evangelical protestant community, a group representing some five percent of the population, but with some 25 percent of the legislative seats, took 37 percent of the vote in the first round of the presidential election. Fujimori won the second round with both APRA and United Left support, votes that reflected rejection of Vargas Llosa's promised economic austerity. Television made this come-from-behind victory possible. Some 95 percent of Peruvian households have access to television, and Fujimori could not have won without television.

After the elections, Fujimori effectively abandoned his evangelical supporters to govern without a party. He named only one political party member to his first cabinet. His chief advisor was Hernando de Soto who does not have a political affiliation. Moreover, he immediately abandoned his economic program and adopted essentially Vargas Llosa's program.

The party base remains strong in the legislature, but the executive and the legislative branches historically have had a conflictual relationship. During Fujimori's first year there was no conflict between the president and the legislature. The president governed by decree and the legislature was consumed with allegations against former president Alan Garcia. The legislature didn't debate economic policies or the insurgency. That has changed, and in April 1992, Fujimori dissolved the congress and formed an "emergency government of national reconstruction."

Why has the system failed? On the one hand, the right in Peru has historically been weak, perhaps because Peru has not had a strong commercial enclave around which the right could coalesce. On the other hand, public opinion is left-leaning -- perhaps a legacy of the Velasco period, or the result of the extent of inequality. In addition, the Peruvian state never developed a clientelist or corporatist network. Velasco was

feared to be doing this in the 1960s and 1970s, but the state had neither the organizational capability nor the resources with which to coopt and maintain a clientelist network. It has even fewer resources today.

In short, today the parties are in eclipse. No party presented a strong candidate in the 1990 elections, and popular opinion has sided with Fujimori on the proscription of the legislature.

URUGUAY[27]

Uruguay is a small country with a population of three million. The average age of citizens is 42 years and more than two million people -- 88.66 percent of the eligible electorate -- voted in the 1989 elections.

The political landscape reflects both continuity and change. The political parties that appeared in 1984 with the return to civilian government were the same parties proscribed in 1973 -- the Colorado Party, the National Party or Blancos, the left-leaning Broad Front or Frente Amplia, and several smaller parties.

Voting patterns have begun to change, however. The National Party's victory in the 1989 presidential elections marks only the third time that the Nationals (Blancos) have won that office. Two leftist parties, the Broad Front and New Space (*Nuevo Espacio*) won 47 percent of the vote in Montevideo where half of the population lives. The Broad Front mayor of Montevideo, Tabaré Vasquez, will be a key presidential candidate in 1994.

Parties of the left have gained votes at the expense of the traditional parties, which now control only 69 of the 99 seats in the Chamber of Deputies as compared with 76 in 1985. This margin is sufficient to pass critical legislation, but factional differences within the parties make it increasingly less likely that they will vote together.

Governability in Uruguay has always required that the factions of the major parties form coalitions that must be renewed by ad hoc agreements on every major theme to be dealt with. It is increasingly difficult to assure a sufficient coalition and negotiations among factions are increasingly costly, politically.

Beyond the tendency to multipartism, the political parties are in disarray in search for new organizing rationale (platforms) and new relationships with their constituents.

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[27] This section draws heavily on Carina Perelli and Juan Rial, "Partidos polítticos y democracia y el cono sur," (Montevideo: PEITHO, September 1991); Ibid., "Las elecciones uruguayas de noviembre de 1989," (Montevideo: PEITHO, undated), and the chapter on Uruguay in Ronald H. McDonald and J. Mark Ruhl, Party Politics and Elections in Latin America, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989).

Dissatisfaction with the results of the Sanguinetti administration's political and economic program explains some of the changes. The president committed his government to paying interest on its debt and to containing government spending, both policies crucial to working Uruguay's economic problems out with international lending institutions. Lacalle has continued with this program. But fiscal austerity cut the parties off from the state resources they were accustomed to using to build and maintain their clientelist networks. The cut in public spending eliminated a crucial link between parties and society -- patronage. As a result, parties have lost some of their influence in government. They cannot use the state as they did in the days of populism. The vice president of Uruguay made this point clearly when he recently lamented that "we haven't been able to fulfill our commitments with the people that helped us, who have legitimate aspirations and the right to positions in the government."

In addition, there is considerable nostalgia in Uruguay for the "golden days" of the 1950s when we were the "Switzerland of the Americas" and the state assured equality for its citizens. This is a country with 600,000 retired persons and 300,000 government workers out of a population of three million.

At the same time, party factionalism, a characteristic of the Uruguayan system which provided stability through the first 60 years of the century, now is causing instability. The Colorados have been divided in a fratricidal battle between Jorge Battle, who strongly endorsed a neo-liberal platform adopted by Sanguinetti, and former president Jorge Pacheco, who adopted a position halfway between liberalism and social democracy. Moreover, the party has not generated young leaders who might either assume leadership of the party, or overcome the divisions between the dueling factions. The Pacheco faction seems to be dying of old age while the younger faction led by Pablo Millor has not succeeded in establishing itself.

The National Party is also divided. The Herrerista faction now in government won only 22.6 percent of votes in the presidential elections. President Lacalle is backed by other National Party factions, but their support is not assured. The Rocha National Movement faction is divided between supporters of the president and those to his left.

Within the left coalition, the Broad Front, the fall of Communism has provoked an identity crisis within the Communist party. There are efforts among the left to build a party based on a moderate left without the

Communists and other radical elements, and with allies closer to the center, some of whom would come from the Colorados and Nationals. Within the New Space Party, the Party for Government of the People, which includes the Christian Democrats and other small groups, is debating its future platform. Some elements may return to the Sanguinetti faction of the Colorados; others may be attracted to a moderate left party.

Another consequence of the crisis of multipartism in Latin America is the growing lack of prestige for the legislative function. The public sees the parliament as obstructionist, inefficient, an institution that doesn't defend the interests of the citizens that it represents.

This leads to increasing focus on the president as a "savior," and nurtures the prospects for candidates from outside the established system, or candidates who use the parties for their personal advancement. The new savior rarely is successful beyond his election, but given the lack of prestige of traditional political classes, having been a senator or representative has become a disadvantage to a candidate for the presidency. This does not favor consolidation of political parties.

This phenomenon of the extra-party "savior" is appearing to a greater or lesser degree all over Latin America, perhaps with least intensity in Chile. Electoral engineering will not resolve this problem. Electoral reforms tend to favor one or another established faction.

In the end, the economy will be the key for the parties in the next elections. If the National Party government can control inflation, it might win in 1994. If not, there is the possibility of an open fight between the factions of the left and factions of the established parties. Other issues to be debated will be electoral reform, regime change and constitutional reforms. Will we alter the voting scheme to assure a two party system, or allow the trend to multipartism? Will we amend the constitution to facilitate economic reforms? Will we change to a parliamentary system as some elements of the Broad Front would like? Two years ago all political leaders rejected the parliamentary option. Today two support it.

MEXICO

Mexico is different. There is only one party in the history of the world, the Communist party of the Soviet Union, that has ruled continuously longer than the PRI. There are only a pair of countries in the world -- the United States is one -- that have sustained a longer string of uninterrupted multi-party elections. The PRI has been able to adapt itself to profound changes in the course of more than 70 years governing Mexico.

It is well to remember that though Mexico has been ruled by a single party, every election has been contested. The elections of 1988 served as a watershed in Mexico's on-going political transition. For the first time the total vote for the PRI's presidential candidate fell below 50 percent of the turnout. But at the same time, the PRI won 260 of 500 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, 60 of 64 senators.

By any standard that is a landslide, but for Mexico, it represented a system crisis -- most importantly because for the first time the ruling party would not be able to amend the constitution without the support of at least one opposition party. This in a country where constitutional amendment is an important instrument of policy-making. As of 1989, the Mexican constitution has been amended 300 times.

The transition that began in 1988, has brought the system from a quasi single-party system to a one-and-a-half party system. The one-half party has to consent to the privileged instrument of policy-making, the constitutional amendment.

After the 1988 election shock, the PRI bounced back with 61.5 percent of the vote in 1991 elections. The PAN held its 18.5 percent and the party that was the spoiler in 1988, Cárdenas' party, suffered a huge set back, falling from 30 percent to 8.5 percent in the popular vote. If we add the vote for all the parties that formed the 1988 opposition coalition, they drop from 30 to 15 percent of the vote.

So what kind of transition is taking place? There are four elements. A political realignment occurred between 1985 and 1987. An electoral realignment occurred in 1988 and is still occurring. The distribution of power has changed in significant ways, but is still dominated by a single party, and finally, party leaders have changed their strategies.

Political realignment here means changes in position of party leaders, in this case, on economic policy and electoral realignment refers to changes in the distribution of party constituencies. Since the mid-1970s there has been a policy struggle within the government over Mexico's development model. The debate has focused on questions of egalitarianism versus liberalism and state intervention versus free market economics, on the state's role in education, the regulation of relations between labor and capital, and relations with the church. This policy struggle was intensified by the 1982 fiscal crisis and later by the shock of 1985 (exchange rate liberalization). In 1986 the Salinas faction won the internal struggle.

In the midst of these changes, parties altered their election strategies. Some of Mexico's parties and factions have preferred anti-system politics and others have preferred to work within the system. In the 1980s, the Salinas coalition moved to the right along every single important dimension of Mexican politics. Cárdenas stood where the PRI has stood historically and Salinas moved farther to the right. At the same time, between 1985 and 1988 the electoral struggle prompted parties to adopt coalition strategies. The distances between PAN on the right and Cárdenas on the left were greater in the policy arena than in the strategic arena and as a consequence they began to form alliances in electoral settings. These alliances gave them leverage, increasing their likelihood of success and their ability to "blackmail" the system to obtain concessions that would otherwise be impossible. This tactical electoral realignment remains viable. Today, the PRI and the PAN are cooperating because the PAN is getting what it wants.

The Mexican electorate reads what is happening at the elite level with remarkable precision and voters see that the elite reshaped their constituencies in 1988. The PRI faced strong opposition in rural settings and was losing its grip in the economically dynamic areas where the PAN, the party of "modern" Mexico, represented success. Preliminary data from the 1991 election suggest that the electoral realignment of 1988 is, for the most part, still intact.

How does one explain the PRI's bouncing back between 1988 and 1991? The PRI has simply changed the rules, changed the Constitution, the electoral rules and the party system. They have done this 15 times since 1946 when they have faced significant opposition, and they did it again.

In brief, they assured that there will not be divided government by requiring that the party that controls the majority in the Chamber of Deputies also controls the Presidency. In addition, they introduced rules to

control party proliferation. Finally, President Salinas, knowing that the dismantling of the state-centered model was hurting the poor and working classes, launched his Solidarity campaign, a huge, well-targeted and clientelist program that has poured some $2 billion into rural Mexico.

VENEZUELA

In spite of being one of the most "established" party systems in Latin America, with strong, well-organized parties and high voter identification, Venezuelan parties are experiencing their worst crisis since 1967[28], or even perhaps since *Acción Democratica* (AD) and the Social Christian Party, COPEI, were founded in 1941 and 1946.

COPEI and AD have shared 80-90 percent of the popular vote since 1973 and have alternated regularly in the presidency since 1958. Both parties are built around labor, peasant and middle-class organizations, infiltrating and coopting to extend their control throughout society, using state resources to pay their way. Most unions were founded by party entities, and parties organized rural governments and unions on the basis of clientelist relations, personal connections and favors. Party bosses in urban barrios have perpetuated themselves in office by manipulating local junta elections with party backing and mobilizing their constituents for party rallies and elections in return. The line between government and governing party becomes increasingly blurred as one descends from national to the local level. Both parties subject their members to tight party discipline.[29]

The Venezuelan public has expressed increasing disillusionment with their political parties over the last several years. Electoral abstention reached record levels in the 1988 national elections. A survey asking people to identify the party whose ideas of governing were most like their own reported 18 percent replying "none of the above" in 1988, and 45 percent in September 1991. Polls show unprecedented support for a hypothetical "independence" party, or even a party led by retired military officers.

Today both parties are deeply divided by bitter intra-party factions. Independent candidacies threatened party solidarity in each party. AD's November 1991 convention was preceded by bitter internal battles between factions called the Renewalists (*Renovadores*) and the Orthodox. The Orthodox won and installed a skilled internal political manipulator,

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28 When conflict between two aspirants to the party's presidential nomination split Accion Democratica and cost it the 1968 elections.

29 This paragraph draws on Michael Coppedge, "Parties and society in Mexico and Venezuela: Why competition matters," forthcoming in Comparative Politics.

Luis Alfaro Ucero, in the seat of secretary general of the party. The defeated faction was led by President Carlos Andrés Pérez's own protegé, Héctor Alonso López.

COPEI has been divided into two camps since it left government in 1984. One faction backs party founder Rafael Caldera, and one backs Eduardo Fernandez, secretary general of the party and its presidential candidate in 1988. Fernández defeated Caldera for the 1987 party presidential nomination and would like Caldera to step aside for a new generation of party leadership. Caldera is bitter that his protegé has turned against him. There are policy differences as well. Fernandez embraces the neo-liberal economic policies of the Pérez government, in principal, at least, while Caldera remains an unreconstructed populist.

Caldera has announced his intention to run as an independent, courting support from the *Movimiento al Socialismo* (MAS), if necessary. This is particularly ironic given COPEI's roots as a conservative party. Luis Pinerua Ordaz, part of the AD Renewalist faction, has also threatened to run an independent candidacy. Such threats have not occurred in Venezuelan politics since 1967 when AD also split over its presidential candidate.

It is tempting to suggest that the party crisis and popular disaffection from the parties is a reaction to the government's economic program. However, this is not a backlash against economic policies, but rather disillusionment with parties' failure to provide leadership at the time of economic crisis. The economic situation has magnified the consequences of the parties' failures, but the parties have been unable to lead because they are consumed by the internal personal power struggles. Factionalism, more than economic policy, has explained Venezuelan elections for more than 30 years.

Indeed, there may not be many differences between the factions on economic policy. In a 1985 survey of AD leaders when AD was divided between supporters of Lusinchi and backers of Carlos Andrés Pérez, the two factions were indistinguishable on economic policy issues. Policy positions have nothing to do with support for one faction or another, but rather with control of the party machinery so that it can control the presidential nomination in 1993. The faction that wins the presidency gains control over patronage of the federal government. This pattern of internal conflict has repeated itself in every AD government since 1958, and it would be shortsighted to blame it on the current economic situation.

Causes of factional conflict can be explained by institutional factors, characteristics of the parties, party discipline, the trauma of party disunity and the fact that a president cannot be eligible for reelection for 10 years. These factors combine to create an automatic succession crisis every time a party gets into government.

Venezuela remains an established party system. There is still a high level of identification with the parties, though it has declined in recent years. The system will change slowly, not suddenly. It has been ripe for reform for some time. Demands for "democratization" (read accountability) of the system have been brewing for some time. President Jaime Lusinchi created a Presidential Commission for the Reform of the State (COPRE) in 1984, to fulfill a minor campaign promise. The Commission's report proposed far-reaching government reforms and was seized upon by COPEI presidential candidate Eduardo Fernández who needed a unique issue with which to campaign. Carlos Andrés Pérez also adopted the reform issue in his campaign. Consensus on the need for reform was and continues to be strong. Some of the changes brought about by reform affect the parties. Direct elections were held for governors in 1991; a mayoral position was created at the municipal level and the electoral law has been modified to make legislators more accountable to their home districts.

In the short run, things may get worse. COPEI may split. Neither of AD's pre-candidates has much support, and both belong to the faction that lost the internal election. The orthodox faction's candidates have not been able to get more that one or two percent recognition in the polls. Moreover, state and local elections in December 1992 will permit the parties to postpone resolution of their internal conflicts until the elections decide who can win votes.[30]

Eventually AD and COPEI will regroup. AD will have to lose the government and return to opposition where factions will recognize they have a common interest in uniting behind a single candidate. Caldera will have to leave the COPEI scene.

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30 And signal the impact of February 1992's attempted coup, as well.