

LATIN AMERICAN PROGRAM

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SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION BUILDING WASHINGTON, D.C.

WORKING PAPERS

Number 22

PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND MASS
PARTICIPATION IN THE PERUVIAN ARMED FORCES

by

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Author's note: This paper was presented at the November 2-4, 1978 Workshop on "The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered" organized by the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. 20560. The original research and field work on which this paper is based was generously supported by Canada Council; the York University Research Programme for Latin America and the Caribbean later provided funds for a Research Assistant. The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Tanya Korovkin. In addition, I have benefitted from the assistance provided by Maria Nokano de Souza and Carlos Alberto Afonso. Finally, I owe a special thank you to José Nún and Louis Lefeber. The work on this essay was begun with Professor Nún, and I am indebted to my discussions with him, particularly on questions related to mass mobilization. My perceptions of the developmental process are, to a large extent, the outgrowth of discussions with Professor Lefeber.

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ABSTRACT

Perspectives on Development Policy and Mass Participation in the Peruvian Armed Forces

The paper analyzes the degree and nature of ideological diversity within the Peruvian military government from 1968 to 1976. The primary data base consists of the statements of officers who occupied cabinet-level positions in the government; however, those statements are not treated in isolation from the social context and the civilian political arena. Rather, the paper attempts to relate the officers' orientations to the central socio-political conflicts of contemporary Peru and the manner in which the reforms initiated by the military government, because of its high degree of autonomy, accentuated those conflicts. Thus, the first section of the work presents a brief chronological narration of the reform measures of the Velasco years, stressing the setting of increasing conflict in which both civilian and military actors defined and modified their positions. The narration highlights measures that raised fundamental questions of property relations and popular mobilization. The second section analyzes the statements of the officers, reconstructing their vision of: 1) the process of economic development--the fundamental problems, the desirable forms of organization of production, and the goals; and 2) mass mobilization--its desirability as such, and the organizational forms considered appropriate. The third section deals with the sources of the officers' orientations and their degree of congruence or conflict with politically organized civilian sectors.

PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND MASS PARTICIPATION
IN THE PERUVIAN ARMED FORCES

by Liisa North
York University

Much of the scholarly work on the Peruvian Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces has stressed the political-ideological coherence of the governing military team and, consequently, an underlying continuity in its policy-making. The most compelling analyses of the regime's orientation emphasize a limited nationalism directed toward renegotiating the terms of dependence and substituting for a national bourgeoisie politically and economically too weak to carry out the structural reforms necessary for establishing its hegemony, and thereby creating the bases for national military security. Accordingly, the increasingly conservative policies that followed the coup of August 1975, which deposed General Velasco Alvarado and elevated Morales Bermúdez into the presidency, are changes in appearance and not in substance, for the apparently new policy direction simply represents the logical and historically necessary conclusion to a process of limited reforms set into motion in October 1968. After all, policy post-August 1975 has clearly favoured the interests of a reconstituted national bourgeoisie whose economic power was strengthened by the reforms of the Velasco years. Similarly, foreign capital had not been fundamentally threatened.

This line of analysis is not incorrect, but it is incomplete. It is unsatisfactory to the extent that it does not stress sufficiently the Velasco government's high degree of autonomy with reference to all classes and sectoral interests, or its significant degree of independence from the United States in formulating its foreign policy and defining the role of foreign capital in the Peruvian economy. More importantly, an emphasis on continuity and coherence leads to minimizing the acuteness of political conflict inside the government and the society as a whole. The Velasco years were years of crisis politics, and not of normal procedural advances, precisely because the limits of the reforms were in question inside the government itself. Several excellent recent works have begun to address those points of conflict.¹ However, no one has yet systematically analyzed the extent to and manner in which the prolonged political crisis of the Velasco years was related to the heterogeneity of socio-economic and political policy positions held by the officers in power.

I will here begin this task of systematic deciphering of the shared and divergent political tendencies within the Peruvian military government. Although the focus will be on the officers, the military institution and government will not be treated in isolation from social context and the civilian political arena. For the reform decisions and revisions of the officers, especially during the months surrounding the August 1975 change-over, were not simply defined by military institutional factors. They were fundamentally related to the central socio-political conflicts of contemporary Peru and the manner in which the reforms initiated by the military government accentuated those conflicts. Since that is the case, as the point of reference for the analysis of political orientations, I will first present a brief and necessarily incomplete chronological narration of the reform measures of the Velasco years in order to stress the setting of increasing conflict in which both military and civilian actors defined and modified their positions,

and manoeuvred for power.² The narration will highlight measures that raised fundamental questions of property relations and popular mobilization; issues related to foreign policy will be mentioned incidentally only. The following sections will deal with the ideological orientations of the officers, the sources of those orientations, and finally their degree of congruence or conflict with the claims of politically organized civilian sectors in order to arrive at a preliminary evaluation of the regime's viability for resolving the country's developmental problems. It should also be noted that all sections of the paper rely heavily on direct quotations from the actors in the drama--both individuals and organizations--in an effort to retain and capture the meaning, tone, and subtleties of the political discourse of the period.

The Reforms and Conflicts of the Velasco Years

The Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces entered history as a nationalistic government with the expropriation of the International Petroleum Company (IPC) on October 9, 1968, six days after taking power. The act, later exacerbated by other measures (including the ejection of the United States Military Mission), initiated a series of conflicts with the United States which were only temporarily resolved with the signing of the Mercado-Greene Agreement in August 1973. Following the dramatic gesture of the IPC expropriation, the Revolutionary Government settled down in late 1968 and early 1969 to the reorganization of the public bureaucracy to enhance the regulative capacity of the state in all areas of national society. Then, in another dramatic gesture within a year of coming into power, in June 1969, the government decreed and began enforcement of a radical Agrarian Reform Law which effectively and immediately knocked out the economic base of the dominant sector of Peru's 20th-century ruling coalition: the plantations of the coastal export oligarchy, the "sugar barons," were expropriated and reorganized into worker-owned cooperatives under state tutelage. The compensation offered to the former landowners was not generous; further, the possibilities for exchanging the agrarian reform bonds for stock in state-controlled enterprises and/or receiving credits for industrial investment (conditioned on the landowners' willingness to match those credits with an equivalent cash investment), did not prove themselves attractive options to an oligarchy divested of its economic and political power and distrustful of the government's intentions. Thus the conversion of the landowning oligarchy into an industrial bourgeoisie, predicted by some observers at the time, did not take place.³

By the end of 1970, the basic measures which became the sources of continuing and increasingly intense conflict had been taken. The commercialization of fishmeal, one of the country's major export earners, passed into the hands of the state; a new and moderately nationalistic mining code was decreed; exchange controls were introduced; the state purchased the assets of three major private banks--the Continental, the Popular, and the International, representing both domestic and foreign capital. Although disconcerting to sectors of the politically displaced civilian power structure, these measures had a modernizing and technocratic logic that made them acceptable. The same could not be said of the acceleration of the agrarian reform programme in response to peasant pressure; the promulgation of an Industrial Law which set up an Industrial Community in enterprises employing more than six workers,

with the objective of establishing worker participation in management and eventually a 50 percent workers' share in the stock of the enterprise; and the creation of the Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social (SINAMOS) with the goal of creating "the conditions which will make possible and stimulate the direct, effective and permanent participation of all Peruvians in the development of the Revolution."⁴

It is important to examine the agrarian reform programme, the Industrial Community, and SINAMOS somewhat more extensively for they raised the basic issues of property relations and mass mobilization around which the conflicts of the Velasco years revolved.

One of the loopholes in the Agrarian Reform Law, which quickly provoked the protest of peasants and agricultural workers, was a clause permitting "parcelization by private initiative." In effect, the clause provided an open door to the nominal division of an estate among the relatives and business associates of the owner, or the sale of lands at good market prices to comparatively well-off tenants and small landowners, thereby cutting off the resident labour force from potential reform benefits.⁵ During 1970-71, an extensive mobilization of rural workers on the coast led to the annulment of the offending clause. On the estates which had witnessed the most acute conflicts, the annulment effectively became retroactive. This rural mass mobilization led to a radicalization of an already remarkably progressive piece of legislation.⁶ Eventually it even led to the de facto expropriation of lands in excess of 50 hectares on the coast, although the law set the limit at 150 hectares for that region.⁷ Further, mobilization combined with considerations related to issues of productivity, efficiency, economic viability, and the absorption of labour led to a sustained emphasis on cooperative and collective forms of ownership. Although the government never forcefully addressed itself to critical issues related to income distribution--such as the terms of trade between urban and rural areas, a pricing system patently unfavourable to the agrarian sector producing for the domestic market⁸--its apparent susceptibility to mass pressure and radical critique provoked the united and continuing protest of large, medium, and even some relatively small landowners organized in the Sociedad Nacional Agraria (SNA), who immediately raised the spectres of nation-wide "collectivization" and "Communist infiltration" of the government through their organization and in the national press.⁹

Just as the Agrarian Reform Law as such had moderate objectives related to the modernization of the agrarian sector and increased production, so the law establishing the Industrial Community was certainly intended to conciliate the interests of labour and capital, and to promote industrial growth. However, for the members of the Sociedad Nacional de Industrias (SNI), potential conciliation and growth through the mechanism provided by the Industrial Community were rather academic propositions. This was particularly the case for the industrialists faced with radically militant unions in their enterprises. Private capital perceived the Industrial Community as a threat to its power, and the SNI immediately, publicly, and aggressively demanded substantial modifications in the law while groups of exporters worked more diplomatically behind the scenes to achieve similar objectives. Not achieving speedy modifications, many industrialists proceeded to sabotage its application through

a variety of stratagems.¹⁰ In short, as was the case with the Agrarian Reform Law for landowners, the Industrial Community opened a Pandora's box for the national bourgeoisie, although yet more dangerous issues related to the content of industrial production were not coherently addressed by the government. As industrialists worked to modify, bypass, or simply subvert the law, workers organized to demand its consistent application and more.

SINAMOS, as contradictory as the other creations of the Revolutionary Government, helped promote worker and peasant demands while also being designed with moderate objectives: to control and channel mass participation into appropriately constructive action in support of the government's reforms. Further, SINAMOS was immediately and correctly perceived as a threat by political parties on all points of the left-right spectrum, and by the existing labour and peasant organizations, for it was also proposed as an alternative to the historic class and party organizations in order to permit "the people" to find "their own entirely autonomous mechanisms of action, beyond the reach of the traditional corrupt party leaderships which, invoking the name of the people, only functioned to eternalize the power of the despicable oligarchy."¹¹ Various statements by ministers of the government made it clear that the "immaturity," even "infantilism," of the left had made and continued to make their "pseudo-revolutionary" organizations de facto agents of the oligarchy and counterrevolution.¹² Consequently, for both left and right, SINAMOS came to represent a potential "totalitarian," or at best an authoritarian corporatist, project for controlling the masses. The conflicts concerning forms, mechanisms, and channels for popular participation, particularly with reference to the application of the Industrial and Agrarian laws, were later further exacerbated and complicated by the establishment, with government backing, of the Confederación Nacional de Comunidades Industriales (CONACI) in February 1973 and the Confederación Nacional Agraria (CNA) in September 1974. Neither of these organizations was simply created from the top, as SINAMOS had been; both responded to the demands of their respective constituencies--industrial workers and peasants--for a greater role in the determination of government policy. The organization and role of the CONACI and the CNA provoked a veritable war inside the government: various ministries and government agencies supported either the more autonomous or the controlled mass organizations.¹³ Ultimately, the Movimiento Laboral Revolucionario (MLR), recruiting fishermen, dock workers, and drivers, and led by Minister of Fishing, General Tantaleán, entered the fray, engaging in union breaking and violence against the leaders of labour organizations while "militantly" supporting the government.

The conflicts and popular mobilizations generated by the Agrarian Reform and Industrial laws continued to occupy a central role on the political stage for they raised the basic issues of class and sectoral power--economic and political--and thereby the question of the basic character of the regime. Periodically, however, the agrarian and industrial conflicts receded to the background as the government proceeded to other reforms. To return to the chronological sequence, further measures against foreign capital, such as the nationalization of Cerro de Pasco's copper mines and refineries in the central highlands at the end of December 1973, created relatively little tension; the terms of payment were negotiated in civil fashion while other attractive investment opportunities continued to be offered. The takeover of the fishing

industry by the state in May 1973, however, provoked a veritable storm of protest. The fishing industry was owned primarily and precisely by the "modern" and "progressive" national bourgeoisie that the government avowedly wanted to favour. The measure confirmed the worst fears of the Industrial and Agrarian Societies concerning "Communist infiltration." No amount of government explanation about the exceptional situation created by an economic crisis in the industry, and therefore the exceptional character of the measure, could obviate the simple fact that rather than providing subsidies to the fishing enterprises to tide them over the crisis, the government chose to take over the entire industry. The confusion, fears, and outrage of the entrepreneurial opposition is synthesized in an interview conducted by Enrique Zileri for Caretas with General Javier Tantaleán Vanini, Minister of Fisheries.¹⁴ Caretas is an influential and sophisticated political and cultural weekly which generally reflected enlightened upper-class opinion. General Tantaleán was later recognized as the leader of the "proto fascists" within the government. It is worthwhile to quote extensively from the interview to highlight the galloping socialism perceived in the government's policies by Zileri, an astute political observer and highly respected journalist, and the vision and style of the sector of the military represented by Tantaleán:

Zileri: ¿No es esta una medida de tipo socialista?

Tantaleán: Usted habría oído decir a todos los dirigentes de la Revolución Peruana que nosotros estamos lejos del capitalismo y lejos del socialismo. Si tomamos alguna medida que a usted o a cualquiera le parece socialista, nosotros pensamos de que no es así. Al determinar la medida no la hacemos pensando si es socialista o si es capitalista. Precisamente la ventaja nuestra, al no estar embarcados dentro de un marco rígido, nos da la libertad para tomar la decisión que más creemos conveniente para el pueblo peruano....[Había que] o concentrar la propiedad en pocas manos o concentrar la propiedad en manos del Estado. ¿Cual hubiera elegido usted?

Zileri: Soy yo quien le está entrevistando a usted, pero le voy a dar una opinión. Tengo la impresión que en términos de pesquería el Estado ya era sumamente poderoso. Si el Estado autorizaba o licenciaba cada tonelada de pesca....

Tantaleán: Disculpe, eso lo discutimos después. Estamos hablando de la propiedad. No me repita los argumentos que ya conocemos. Entre elegir un sistema o otro, ¿cual hubiera elegido usted?¹⁵

Zileri finally responds with proposals involving partial nationalization; Tantaleán argues that such partial measures would not have resolved the problem and would have left too much power in the hands of the private sector, concluding his reflections on the matter with:

Quien detenta la propiedad de los medios de producción tiene un poder económico que en algún momento va a devenir en poder político, porque tiene que defender sus intereses. Eso es muy claro.¹⁶

The interview continues in heated debate about the relative merits of state and private enterprise--questions of efficiency, technological innovations, and so forth. Then it returns to Zileri's concern about the status of private enterprise.

Zileri: ¿Usted cree que va a persistir la empresa privada en el Peru, en alguna forma?

Tantaleán: No solo creo. La incentivamos. Deseamos que así sea.

Zileri: ¿La Ley de Propiedad Social no la va a liquidar?

Tantaleán: No sé en este momento cómo será la Ley de Propiedad Social, pero yo le pregunto: ¿no es también propiedad privada?

Zileri: Ciertamente que no. Responde más bien a un esquema de tipo yugoslavo.

Tantaleán: No creo, pero se lo acepto. Es propiedad privada, sólo que es de varios.

Zileri: ¿Ese tipo de propiedad privada va a liquidar al otro tipo de propiedad privada?

Tantaleán: No lo creo. Creo que debe haber una sana competencia entre ambos tipos de empresa. Le estoy diciendo las cosas que creo, porque en realidad el modelo no está del todo definido. Pero no queremos copiar ni lo yugoslavo. Queremos que de acuerdo con las características de nuestro país, la idiosincrasia de nuestra gente, sus posibilidades y aptitudes, salga una ley de propiedad social que haga justicia a la gente. Ya no pensamos en una propiedad cuya única razón de ser sea el lucro....

Yo creo en la propiedad privada, creo absolutamente en la propiedad privada reformada. Tiene que ser uno de los fundamentos y pilares de desarrollo del país. Hay gente interesada en hacer creer que la estatización de la pesca es un salto hacia el socialismo. Nada más absurdo. No es socialismo. Es una solución a unos problemas que no tenían otra solución.¹⁷

In an editorial in the same issue, the reader is asked to judge for himself whether or not General Tantaleán has clearly and adequately clarified the government's policies and intentions in a situation made all the more alarming by the way in which Expreso, a daily representing the government, promotes:

una cada vez más agresiva beatería sovietizante. Son tales sus cotidianas reverencias hacia cualquier pichiruche que aparece por aquí portando una hoz y un martillo, que ya nadie cree que estos stalinistas de cantina realmente apoyan un camino "no comunista" además de "no capitalista."¹⁸

In the circumstances, it was certainly prudent to attack civilian journalists who supported the government rather than directly confronting the military ministers. However, both Army General Leonidas Rodríguez Figueroa, a progressive, and Air Force General Pedro Sala Orozco, an ally of General Tantaleán, are singled out in the editorial, in more moderate terms, for their disturbing and/or equivocal statements.

In April 1974, the government finally promulgated the Social Property Law which General Tantaleán had described to Zileri in terms of private property of the many. The notion of social property had been a disconcerting occasional topic for official statements since 1971. Velasco, in October of that year had stated in a speech:

The economy of that society will not...[be based] on either private enterprise or on the local bureaucratic domination of the state over the productive apparatus. On the contrary, that economy will be based on enterprises of Social Property directed by those who create the wealth of all Peruvians in them.¹⁹

The Social Property Law elaborated on these notions, assigning a vaguely defined priority character to the development of the new sector. To add to the confusion, different military ministers, before and after the promulgation of the law, assigned the social property sector varying functions that had a variety of implications for the future. For General José Graham Hurtado, a close associate of President Velasco popularly known as one of the radical colonels who entered into the design of the 1968 coup and Head of the Presidential Advisory Committee, the social property sector would essentially soak up the unemployed and underemployed, providing jobs for workers who could not be absorbed by the state, or by private or cooperative enterprises;²⁰ Admiral Alberto Jiménez de Lucio, a conservative technocrat who occupied the Ministry of Industry, also presents social property in terms that make it sound like an elaborate if somewhat unique public works programme;²¹ General Enrique Gallegos Venero, Minister of Agriculture and also a member of the group of radical colonels, on the other hand, is aiming for a redistribute function with significant implications for the organization of production when he proposes structuring social property agro-industrial enterprises to bring together urban and rural labourers with the goal of reversing the drain of capital from the rural areas to the cities.²² For Apra, Peru's best organized and largest political party, Social Property was simply a Yugoslav import that ran the risk of inappropriateness in the Peruvian context.²³ Acción Popular members were equally unfavourably impressed by the measure.

The furor concerning the implications of social property had not yet subsided when President Velasco on May 30 sacked from the Cabinet Admiral Luis Vargas Caballero, the leader of the economically liberal right in the government and an officer of great prestige in the Navy. Admiral Vargas Caballero's dismissal was followed by two more cabinet members from the Navy²⁴ and they were replaced by Naval officers more loyal to the President; in short, Velasco survived a major confrontation with that branch of the armed forces. Unlike General Tantaleán, Admiral Vargas Caballero had never equivocated on matters related to private property, having stated: "without private activity, without private initiative, without private work, without private investment, there is no efficient country."²⁵

These were dramatic and significant events. For the sane and solid middle-class citizenry of the country, represented in the country's major political parties, the expropriation of all the major national newspapers on July 27, 1974 was the final proof of an extreme degree of "red" penetration of the armed forces and the civilian state bureaucracy. While the country's propertied sectors in general consolidated their opposition to the government, the conflicts inside the government itself and the incoherence of policy making reached proportions that make it difficult to understand how it maintained the minimum degree of unity to continue in power. Meanwhile, the left opposition--organizationally fragmented but very active indeed--continued to grow. For the left, as expressed in the journal of the semi-clandestine Partido Vanguardia Revolucionaria on May 1, 1974:

Five years of bourgeois reforms have demonstrated that in spite of the fact that enterprises and branches of enterprises of imperialist capital have passed into the hands of the state, as an expression of the secondary contradiction between the government of a national bourgeoisie and the large landholders and imperialism, the semi-colonial dependence of our country on the economic terrain continues to be maintained and reinforces itself, as the semi-colonial character of the state remains unaltered.

The National Democratic and Popular Revolution which destroys the Semi-Colonial Bourgeois State and replaces it with the National, Democratic, Popular State and Government which confiscates and expels imperialism, breaks the ties of financial, technological, cultural and military domination; expropriates the great bourgeoisie, and the remaining reactionary capitalists; converts land into the property of the entire nation by granting it for the free use of the peasantry, guarantees the broadest political democracy for the masses and the development of a real national culture. This revolution can only be carried out by the people, organized into a worker-peasant alliance under the direction of the proletariat.²⁶

Why was the regime unacceptable to just about all organized civilian groups? What was the meaning of those measures identified by Vanguardia Revolucionaria as mere "bourgeois reforms" and by Apra as Yugoslav imports? What was the impact of the reforms on the economic, social, and political power and perspectives of various classes and sectoral interests?

As has already been indicated, the economic base of the coastal agricultural export oligarchy was knocked out; its traditional landowning allies in the highlands--the so-called gamonales--suffered a serious blow. What has clearly emerged as the dominant sector of the new ruling coalition under General Morales Bermúdez is a modern industrial bourgeoisie; the modernizing and import substituting policies of the government promoted the development of this class as well as of a class of modern, medium-sized landowners.²⁷ Why did the continuing opposition of these sectors to the Velasco government then take place? Precisely because the military rulers were not organically tied to any one set of class interests and were oriented toward national popular interests, however vague and problematic that term may be, the measures promoted by the Velasco government were inconsistent and eminently contradictory. Those measures went a considerable distance beyond the need for economic reorganization that the national bourgeoisie found desirable; for example, the state sector, as Zileri's interview with General Tantaleán so clearly indicates, acquired an undesirable prominence. One could easily proceed to identifying the negative features of all the major reforms from the perspective of private capital. In the very moment of its apparent victory in economic terms, of its ascendancy and consolidation as a class, the freedom of action of the bourgeoisie was being circumscribed by the state, its prerogatives as a directing class were being whittled down.

Worse yet, the reform policies of the Velasco years catalyzed the mobilization and organization of the masses who challenged the possibility for the bourgeoisie of maintaining the considerable, albeit circumscribed, sphere of action enunciated in reform goals. The growth of the left opposition, and even more frightening, the radical militancy of mass organizations

associated with the government, the CNA and CONACI especially and even groups within SINAMOS, posed the threat of a socialist revolution. The potential military leaders for the socialist revolution were also identified by sectors of the bourgeoisie as Generals Leonidas Rodríguez Figueroa and Jorge Fernandez Maldonado, respectively the commander of the most important military region of the country and Minister of Energy and Mines during the critical July 1974-August 1975 period of acute internal conflict within the government.²⁸ These, as well as other officers, were raising the questions that had so far been left off the agenda of the Revolutionary Government.

The conflicts within the government thus were not superficial and the characterizations of it as a government of the national bourgeoisie or as a possible revolutionary "Third Way" are both inadequate, partly because these labels have static implications that divert the analyst from its quintessentially conflictual essence. The fact that a mobilizational extreme right or proto-fascist leadership emerged within the government in the form of General Tantaleán's Movimiento Laboral Revolucionario (MLR) is perhaps the clearest sign of a profound crisis concerning the definition of the government's reform projects. It reflects the fact that normal institutional military channels were not adequate for holding in check the challenge represented by the radical militancy of both government sponsored and independent mass organizations. The extreme right within the military had to enter the arena of mass mobilization to contest the advance of the left inside and outside the government, including sectors of the military institution itself. But the intra-institutional struggles were often conducted in a muted and indirect fashion through civilian aids in the effort to maintain a minimum of apparent unity. Thorndike describes the struggle with inimitable style:

Puesto que las facciones militares rehusaban un enfrentamiento definitivo que podía conducir a la guerra civil, la lucha política se desarrollaba a través de civiles-fusibles que se quemaban o resistían, un poco a la manera de piezas de ajedrez que trasladaban la pugna a un plano casi irreal, olímpico, pero gracias a cuya existencia se evitaba el gran cortocircuito nacional.... Eran precisamente los civiles fusibles quiénes especulaban con las fuerzas superiores a las que servían, dispuestos a carbonizarse por las luchas de tan olímpico castrense. Jugaban auxiliados por el fuego divino. Sus olímpicos propietarios nunca marchaban al exilio o acababan en prisión, no importa lo que hicieran: eran políticamente inmortales. Pero la desgracia fulminaba a los civiles-fusibles a veces más allá de todo lo imaginable y en ellos se enseñaba todo el encono de las batallas superiores. Esta realidad era desconocida para la mayoría de los peruanos: al país se le ocultaba la creciente división en el comando revolucionario. Eran los fusibles quiénes se dividían y guerraban entre sí y ahora parecían dispuestos a enfrentarse en toda la línea de batalla.²⁹

If Thorndike has succeeded in capturing the spirit of a critical phase in the military regime, and the general consensus is that he has done so, it is now necessary to identify the general positions and issues in conflict, and then proceed to analyzing the relationships between military and civilian groups, the "fusibles" as well as others.

Ideological Tendencies Within the Military Government

The significance and extent of ideological heterogeneity within the armed forces was not manifest or clear during the initial years of the Velasco government. In general terms, observers identified traditional conservatives, and a dominant developmentalist institutional centre for which Velasco and a group of "radical colonels" in the COAP provided political leadership. It is therefore useful to make some initial distinctions between the institutional position and the Velasco group. There is a great deal of evidence pointing to a minimal progressive consensus within the Army and the Air Force in 1968. That consensus boiled down to: 1) a highly negative attitude toward civilian politicians and the traditionally dominant sectors for their mismanagement of national affairs; 2) a technocratic/managerial orientation toward issues of economic development and social change; 3) a perception of the necessity of some reforms, particularly in the areas of land tenure relationships and the state's capacity for social and economic planning, in order to guarantee internal security through economic development; and 4) a nationalism fundamentally based on military patriotism. There is nothing particularly radical about this consensus, but it was broadly and firmly enough held to provide institutional support for the moralistically radical orientations of Velasco and his personal supporters.

The group of officers most closely identified with Velasco shared strongly held convictions concerning social justice and the dignity of the common man; they also shared highly voluntaristic, and often simplistic, notions of social, political, and economic change, and an optimistic self-assurance in their capacity to bring about those changes. The depth and, at times, rather brute simplicity of those convictions was expressed in forms which made the officers objects of ridicule in the gossip circuits and the local press. But the expression of moral indignation, by Velasco and others, concerning the unjust organization of Peruvian society and the manner in which vested interests resisted and sabotaged reform efforts were genuine; they must be taken seriously since they provided the attitudinal basis for a phase of radicalization and the strengthening of the role of the state which was not halted until, first, the emergence of the MLR, and subsequently the consolidation of the Morales Bermúdez presidency.

As class conflicts accentuated around the agrarian and industrial reforms and extensive mobilizations of peasants and urban workers occurred, a process of differentiation emerged which left the Velasquistas of the early years in sharply divergent positions: the progressives and the MLRistas led by General Tantaleán in opposed left and right camps, and the majority of officers in an institutional centre shading off into positions more or less sympathetic toward the military left or right. How can these groups be characterized? Rather than beginning with a definition of tendencies based entirely on the conjunctural choices made by officers during the critical year 1974-75, I will attempt to analyze the discourse of all officers occupying ministerial level positions between October 1968 and July 1976. It is important to identify the content of the officers' discourse without an a priori association of particular elements within it to social classes. For the relative autonomy of the military government, its lack of organic ties to specific economic interests, necessarily had to manifest itself as a certain ideological autonomy. Consequently, unless serious attention is paid to what the officers

actually said, an analysis of the internal divisions and the meaning of the government is incomplete and it becomes very difficult to understand why a process of radicalization occurred within it. For the struggle to determine the ultimate ends of the reform process was in significant part determined by the officers' beliefs and attitudes. In this respect, Laclau has argued:

(1) the more separated is a social sector from the dominant relations of production, and the more diffuse are its 'objective interests' and consequently, less developed its 'class instinct'--the more the evolution and resolution of the crisis will tend to take place on the ideological level; 2) the more central is the role of this type of sector in the social formation in question, the more central will be the role of the ideological level in the final resolution of the crisis on the part of the social formation as a whole.³⁰

Although Laclau is focusing on sectors of classes, his proposition may be usefully applied to an institution. Only after examining the concrete discourse of the officers and identifying the unifying themes in the discourse of the various factions will I proceed to relating this discourse to the civilian arena and class projects.

The analysis is based on speeches, public statements, and interviews given by 59 officers to local newspapers and political weeklies. Of the 59, 35 are from the army, 13 from the navy, and 11 from the air force; Velasco is not included among the army officers--he will be considered apart. The number and the length of the statements reviewed for each officer varied considerably,³¹ and the identification of specific officers with one or another political tendency was more frequently than not problematic; it is on the identification of general patterns and ranges of tendencies rather than the "correctness" of the position attributed to any one officer that the argument rests.

Of course, the officers' discourse is liberally peppered with the shared phrases and positions that created the appearance of ideological unity. These included: the rejection of political parties as instruments of manipulation; the characterization of the Peruvian Revolution as unique, neither capitalist nor Communist; a constant stress on "economic pluralism," humanism, and "full participation;" reiteration of themes of fairness to all sectors, social harmony, peace, and order; the identification of opposition with anti-patriotism, selfishness, immaturity, and lack of knowledge; the necessity of patience and sacrifice; and many others. However, even the shared notions acquire different meanings--the stress on uniqueness may be more anti-Communist than anti-capitalist or vice versa. Thus, the identification of an officer's political position was not based on the frequency of certain words, phrases, or themes in his discourse; rather, the emphasis was placed on the internal logic and articulation of the discourse as a totality in order to reconstruct the officer's vision of: 1) the process of economic development--the fundamental problems, the desirable forms of organization of production, and the goals; and 2) mass mobilization--its desirability as such, and the organizational forms considered appropriate.

What were the types of distinctions that were made with reference to visions of economic development and mass mobilization in order to locate officers on a left-right spectrum?

The progressive position is identified with a primary concern for the eradication of the worst forms of mass poverty, reflected in a focus on policies of income redistribution, including the importance of reversing the concentration of income and resources in the urban sector,³² reorienting the content of production in response to mass needs, and promoting full employment. In short, the position is defined with reference to the necessity of reform to meet popular needs, and an awareness of the social and economic structural factors that perpetuate mass poverty. When this orientation dominates, the question of the organization of production and proprietorship of the means of production is subordinated to it; that is, officers whose point of departure for economic policy making is the eradication of mass poverty manifest an open-minded and questioning attitude concerning the appropriate organizational means for achieving that primary end, and in that sense they are not committed to a capitalist system. The centrist position is identified with the types of concerns that World Bank economist Mahbub ul Haq identifies as the erroneous point of departure of contemporary development planning: "the pursuit of certain high levels of per capita income" without paying sufficient attention to "what is produced and how it is distributed."³³ This position then also presumes that the existing orientation of production is basically sound and the fundamental problems of development can be resolved primarily through the expansion of that existing base. In concrete terms, and following from this logic, the centrists wind up supporting an accelerated policy of import substituting industrialization on a national and regional (the Andean Pact) level. At the right end of the spectrum, an adamant defence of capitalist institutions is combined with import substitution under the aegis of a strong state, and even the rhetoric of "general welfare" ("bienestar general"), practically a regime slogan, tends to disappear.

Attitudes toward mass mobilization and popular participation vary similarly. On the left end of the spectrum, officers take a positive attitude toward autonomous mass organizations, even arguing that participation begins with a critical questioning of the society and the government's actions. In the centre, themes of functional participation--in civic action programmes and on the job, under the paternalistic guidance of the government's técnicos--predominate. On the right, law and order themes, the necessity of uncritical support for the government, and condemnation of strikes and of left militancy, become the central themes.

The distribution of the officers into these three basic tendencies and two variations from the centre is summarized in Table I: the centre shades off into identifiable left and right tendencies. It must also be pointed out that very few officers made statements that clearly refer to all the issues raised above. Consequently, the assignment of an officer to one or another group is based on "partial responses," and in some cases the by-now-known political role of the officer in the government--i.e., the policies for which they opted but concerning which public statements on their part were not available. Finally, off-the-cuff remarks, statements made in interviews, and responses to journalists' probes were considered more reliable indicators of attitudes than prepared speeches.³⁴

TABLE 1

DISTRIBUTION OF OFFICERS BY POLITICAL TENDENCY

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Total</u>	
Progressives	6	0	1	7	(12%)
Centre Left	5	2	1	8	(14%)
Centre	12	6	2	20	(34%)
Centre Right	8	2	8	18	(30%)
Extreme Right	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>(10%)</u>
Total	35	11	13	59	(100%)

Orientations toward issues of economic development. Seven of the 59 officers, or 12 percent, were identified as progressives, three almost exclusively on the basis of their statements concerning economic development, another three primarily on the basis of political statements, and the seventh on the basis of his conjunctural choices and his foreign policy statements with definite internal implications for the "Peruvian model."³⁵

For both Generals Marco del Pont, head of the National Planning Institute from April 1969 to January 1974, and Enrique Gallegos Venero, one of the original group of "radical colonels" and Minister of Agriculture from November 1974 to July 1976, the fundamental social and economic problems of the country inhere in the maldistribution of income and resources between the urban and the rural sectors. Gallegos argues that rural development is the essential first step to national development and that the point of departure for development planning becomes the reversal of the mechanisms through which the rural surplus is extracted by the urban sector. In a more political tone, Gallegos adds that the "campesinado" or peasantry makes up the "vanguard" of the new society being created by the Revolution,³⁶ and, on another occasion, concludes that:

[E]l agricultor es el hombre que trabaja fuera de la ciudad, pero para la ciudad.... El campesino es doblemente explotado: cuando compra y cuando vende.³⁷

In a similar manner, Marco del Pont argues that the structural crisis of the Peruvian economy circa 1968 arose from the way in which the historic pattern of its development

favorecía al sector urbano más moderno, creando beneficios a muy pocos y reforzando el poder y los hábitos de consumo de esas minorías; se cerraba de este modo el círculo vicioso de la opulencia, en torno al cual y sin poder romperlo se iba extendiendo el círculo vicioso de la pobreza y subempleo.³⁸

Growth of a certain type took place, but, if poverty and underemployment become the central concerns of development planning, "there are more important aspects than maximizing the possible growth rate, such as asking: growth for what and for whom?" He concludes by quoting Velasco: "'As much and more than economic development as such, we are interested in how the wealth produced is distributed.'"³⁹ Fernandez Maldonado's discourse on economic planning and sectoral conflicts expresses the same concerns; in addition, he emphasizes Peru's subordination to a world capitalist system.

Without specifically addressing the relationships between urban and rural sectors, Rear Admiral Dellepiane, Minister of Industries and Tourism from October 1969 to April 1971, reiterates the importance of examining the content and distribution of production to respond to the needs of the majority. In a magnificently quixotic and often confused discourse, Dellepiane rails against "fictitious industries" which contribute to growth rates but not to real development, observes that automobile production involves "a problem of luxury production that the country can't afford," and proposes the creation of "a really democratic market for the majorities."⁴⁰ Thus modern entrepreneurs interested in cooperating with the government and contributing to real national development should seek out the mechanisms for "the democratization of consumption and the structuring of industry on real foundations, slogans such as 'Let's produce what Peru consumes' which from now on we should respect."⁴¹

Although Generals Rodríguez, Meneses, and de la Flor Valle do not address economic issues as specifically, their general political discourse and identification of the Revolution's objectives have implications for economic policy making. For Rodríguez, "the central, profound, permanent and substantive goal" of the revolutionary reforms is raising mass living standards.⁴² Meneses' specification of his reasons for rejecting communism leaves open the possibility of a socialist organization of the economy. He rejects a concentration of power in a bureaucratic state apparatus, emphasizes that his rejection is based only on that reason, and then turns an interviewer's question which would have provoked a broad anti-communist response on the part of many another officer into an attack on anti-communists: communism is not "un sistema al que hay que 'tenerlo miedo' como pretenden la beatería política y el macartismo criollos a través de los organos de prensa reaccionarios."⁴³ Accordingly, when asked to identify the most important measure enacted by the government, he chooses the priority to be given to the Social Property sector, a response with strong if unrealized potential for the reorganization of the productive apparatus.⁴⁴ Both Rodríguez's and de la Flor Valle's positive visions of the Cuban Revolution imply the relevance of that process for Peru and Latin America generally. Rodríguez's declarations about the way in which the leaders of Peru's government-supported mass organizations should learn about Cuba directly and "bring the experience of this brother revolutionary people...to Peru and transmit it to their bases" in fact has profound implications for both economic policy and the role of popular organizations and, as might be expected, it provoked a major scandal in the press.⁴⁵ Finally, the progressives share a gutsy nationalism and a willingness to confront the United States.⁴⁶

Summarizing the perspective of the progressive officers, issues of poverty, redistribution, unemployment, and misery rooted in the organization and orientation of production occupy a prominent space. Of course, the themes

and phrases normally associated with the government's orientation (e.g., economic pluralism, the uniqueness of the Peruvian model), also appear prominently in their discourse. However, the meaning of those themes and phrases shifts as it is placed into a general structure of perceptions and arguments which are distinctive, and from which these officers' willingness to specify the problems left off the agenda of the government's concrete measures and willingness to listen to radical civilian groups arose. In fact, of course, they only asked the questions and posed the problems; they did not articulate an alternative economic development project that attempted to come to grips with those problems. But in that respect, little guidance was available from civilian economic planning wisdom, a question to be dealt with later.⁴⁷

Twenty officers, 34 percent of the total, occupy the centre. They include such prominent Revolutionary figures as Generals Ernesto Montagne Sánchez, Minister of War from October 1968 to January 1973, José Graham Hurtado, head of the Presidential Advisory Committee (COAP) for six years, Rafael Hoyos Rubio, one of the "radical colonels," and the current head of state, Morales Bermúdez. They also include a majority of the air force officers, six out of the 11 in the total. A substantial shift in emphasis and orientation toward economic development vis-à-vis the position of the progressive officers takes place among the centrists. Rather than injustice and poverty structured into the existing organization and relations of production, their point of departure for identifying necessary reforms is a situation of underdevelopment and dependency, often very vaguely defined. Rather than questioning the content of production, they emphasize the necessity of growth and increased production. For Hoyos, in sharp contrast to the statements made by Gallegos within eight days of one another,

Lo único cierto [en el sector agrario] es que hay que producir, ahí radica el problema medular y espero que nuestra gente lo atienda. Si hay que vencer obstáculos, venzamoslos.⁴⁸

These officers wind up relying on cepalista propositions of import substituting industrialization, filtered through the language of the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM). The emphasis on the role and cooperation of the private sector becomes very strong. A preoccupation with efficiency, productivity, and technological advance, often related to the importance of improving Peru's competitive position in the Andean Pact, is coupled with a naive faith in the expert and the technician. Thus a Minister of Labour, Air Force General Luis Galindo Chapman, asserts that "En la vida todo depende de los técnicos. Es la verdad."⁴⁹ It is this set of orientations that makes the centrist officers de facto defenders of foreign capital, despite their nationalistic rhetoric, rather than any concrete alliance with multinational capital.

A highly voluntaristic notion of social and economic transformation is inherent in this centrist perspective, forming a logical component of the faith in technology and the unwillingness or incapacity⁵⁰ to address the fundamental character of sectoral clashes and class conflicts. Instead of fundamental clashes of interest, they concentrate on the egotistical or misled actions of small groups. Montagne is probably the most eloquent

exponent of these views, convinced that reforms within enterprises, the Industrial Community specifically,

borra diferencias sociales y termina con la honda separación clasista de otras épocas y cuya manifestación formal fue siempre motivo de conflictos y resentimientos.⁵¹

Thus the Revolution is creating an "industrial society with dignity, which consolidates human values."⁵² And the Revolution becomes irreversible when people understand the harmonizing and welfare goals of the military government, when a "new mentality" and a spirit of cooperation have permeated into the entire population--workers, peasants, and capitalist. For progressives, on the other hand, the irreversibility of the Revolution is conditioned by the completion of structural reforms⁵³ which, moreover, are related by Rodríguez to a progressively increasing separation from "the capitalist system."⁵⁴

However, the centrists' moderate and technocratic vision of economic change does concern itself with popular welfare--"bienestar general" and "bienestar de todos los peruanos" are the reiterated phrases. As has already been suggested, they do not identify the fundamental class and sectoral conflicts to be overcome for the achievement of this goal or the interests at stake, as the progressives at least begin to do. Nevertheless, the genuine concern with improving living standards provides the conceptual bridge to their recognition of merit in the progressives' orientation and in critiques of the shortcomings of the reforms on raising popular welfare. Concretely, it permits centrist officers to support, up to a point, or at least tolerate, the radicalization of the agrarian reform, to defend collective forms of ownership in the agrarian sector, and to defend the Industrial Community. Precisely because of the strength of the concern with "bienestar general" and the identification of opposition with the selfish and egotistical motivations of small groups, the aggressiveness of the Sociedad Nacional de Industrias' attack on the Industrial Community was momentarily counter-productive for the industrialists' capacity to influence the government. The vociferous opposition of landowners' and industrialists' associations to reforms initially simply confirmed these officers' views on the corruption and lack of national vision of the dominant classes. Thus the genuine concern with "bienestar general," coupled with the nature of the opposition from propertied sectors, formed the ideological bases on which a process of radicalization could take place.

Montagne's statements to entrepreneurs synthesize this position:

queremos que la gente comprenda [las reformas], porque sabemos que estas medidas no son de carácter impositivo, no tiene nada de restrictivo, nada de amenazante. Son mas bien medidas de beneficio para las grandes mayorías.

[T]odas esas transformaciones, que estan destinadas al bienestar de las mayorías nacionales, indudablemente que, en una u otra forma, afectan los intereses de pequeños grupos; y los afectan yo diría en una forma no muy grave. Ellos exageran las consecuencias de tales medidas porque indudablemente han estado acostumbrados a no perder nada y a conseguir todo lo que querían.... A nadie le hemos quitado su fortuna. Siempre hay ricos en el Peru.⁵⁵

But as class conflicts became increasingly bitter and widespread, as the beneficiaries of the reforms struck and demonstrated for higher wages and the strict enforcement of the new laws, and for a greater role in the determination of future measures, the centrists were highly susceptible to turning against peasants' and workers' demands, blaming them for their lack of understanding and good will. By 1973, Montagne stated that "strikes without a reason" represented the most serious problems that the government had had to confront.⁵⁶ Similarly, General Luis La Vera Velarde, Minister of Energy and Mines from September 1975 to January 1976, with the annoyance of a man convinced that he and the government have intended and acted well, asked a group of labour leaders from the Communist Party-affiliated Confederación General de Trabajadores del Peru (CGTP): "¿Hasta ahora, alguna organización sindical ha ofrecido una hora más de trabajo a esta Revolución?"⁵⁷

The centre shades off into more progressive positions on the left, and a combination of more statist/technocratic and neo-classical liberal economic positions on the right.

On the centre left, there are eight officers, 13 percent of the total. Their discourse, to the extent that they address economic issues, adds up to a mixture of the typical themes of the centre combined with some strong statements about the necessity of redistribution, voiced in terms other than the reiteration of the necessity of achieving "bienestar general." For example, General Jorge Barandarian Pagador, Minister of Agriculture from June 1969 to May 1971, argues that:

El principal problema del Perú y de algunos países latino americanos... es la pobreza y la extrema desigualdad en la distribución de ingresos.

De nada sirve aumentar la producción cuando reina la injusticia social. De nada sirve la abundancia cuando esta es sólo utilizada para que unos consuman en exceso, mientras a otros les falta lo indispensable.⁵⁸

However, issues related to distribution do not form the articulating principle of the discourse of the officers on the centre left, as they do among the progressives.

The centre right is more populated than the centre left. It is occupied by 18 officers, 30 percent of the total, and includes a majority of the navy--eight out of the 13 officers from that branch of the armed forces. There are two variants in the centre right position. One is a strongly statist technocratic orientation, with a very heavy emphasis on increased production per se; this position is also related to the post-Velasco political and economic conjuncture and the associated shift in government line--officers who might have articulated the centrist line before August 1975 adopt a more conservative stance after that date. The other variant involves an explicit defense of free enterprise capitalism within the parameters of some state planning and control. For these officers, the country's economic problems inhere in an irrational use of resources, a fact which is not associated at all with issues of distribution, content, or organization of production. Rear Admiral Ramón Arrospide Mejía, Minister of Housing and Construction from January 1972 to June 1974, describing the fundamental structural characteristics of the society in relation to the work of his ministry, identifies:

1. Una inorgánica e irracional ocupación de territorio que implica un desequilibrado desarrollo urbano.
2. La reducida capacidad económica de la población.
3. La reducida capacidad real del país para producir el volumen de demanda nominal de vivienda adecuada y sus servicios conexos.⁵⁹

Since the availability of housing is ultimately a question of supply and demand, it is clear to the Rear Admiral that "[f]rente a la grave situación de la vivienda, fácil es ver que se requiere incentivar la construcción privada."⁶⁰ Similarly Air Force General Rolando Caro Constantini, Minister of Health from January 1970 to April 1971, asks rhetorically: "and who can do this great work of solving the country's major problems? The Revolutionary Government?" He answers himself: "No. No, the Revolutionary Government promotes, but it is private activity that has to do it."⁶¹

The extreme right is composed of two sharply diverging tendencies: The most vocal exponent of limiting the state's role to leave the direction of the economy clearly in the hands of private capital, Admiral Luis Vargas Caballero, Minister of Housing and Construction from April 1969 to January 1972 and Minister of the Navy from January 1972 to the end of May 1974; and the mobilizational right which glorifies the state. When Vargas Caballero was sacked by Velasco on May 30, 1974, the supporters of free enterprise capitalism lost their most forceful and daring advocate within the government. With this loss of leadership, the centre of obvious conflict shifted to: progressives vs. the mobilizational and statist right. The centre was uncomfortable with both options for reasons that will become clearer after the discussion of orientations toward mass mobilization and participation. For the mobilizational right does not formulate an economic project which is distinctive vis-à-vis the centrist position, except for the heavy stress on the creative and controlling role of the state. General Tantaleán is, of course, the most articulate officer in this respect:

a veces el pueblo mismo no comprende esta importante necesidad y atacan cuando el Estado se fortalece: "¿Noves, la burocracia esta aumentando? La burocracia! Es necesario que aumente, ciertamente, porque el ejerce el control, la vigilancia, la tecnificación, el desarrollo acelerado y racional del país para que los ricos no atenten contra nuestras reservas."⁶²

The grounds for private sector distrust of this government should be becoming clearer. Even looking at the extreme right, although Tantaleán clearly stated that his option for "the consolidation of a state sector" did not imply its development to the "prejudice of normal private activity," he was an unreliable partner--in word and action. The state takeover of the fishing industry, as far as the private sector was concerned, was prejudicial to normal private activity, and the fact that "an enormous arena for private investment existed in 'metal mecánica'"⁶³ was simply beside the point when the industrial bourgeoisie could not determine when, where, how, and with what degree of security it could invest. Despite the fact that Tantaleán in 1974-75 came to be perceived as the leader of a possible last-ditch defense against a socialist revolution, he was not the natural ally of private capital because of the role he assigned to the state. Tantaleán, as Minister

of Fisheries, does not escape culpability in the accusation of the Chirinos cousins, both well-known journalists and one a former senator of the Apra party, that the military government was morally responsible for the murder of Luis Banchemo Rossi, the magnate of the fishing sector:

Cuando se había creado en el Perú, con hechos y palabras, el clima de odio exacerbado y violento contra el hombre de empresa, presentándolo como implacable y despiadado explotador, como egoísta y malvado usufructuario del dolor y del trabajo ajeno, como enemigo del país y de su desarrollo y progreso, fue salvajemente asesinado...el primero de nuestros hombres de empresa.⁶⁴

The arena of security for local private capital was considerably more threatened by the statements of the progressive officers, and the centre's concern with "bienestar general" made it look unpredictable; they had their hearts in the wrong place as far as the Sociedad Nacional de Industrias and the Asociación de Exportadores (ADEX) were concerned. In short, except for the clear defenders of private capital, particularly in the navy, Peru's propertied classes were hard put to identify stable allies in the Velasco government; the logic of these officers' economic policy discourse tended to escape from the logic of private capital.

Orientations toward mass mobilization and popular participation. The principal spokesman for mass mobilization within the Revolutionary Government was, of course, General Leonidas Rodríguez Figueroa, one of the "radical colonels" of the 1968 coup and head of SINAMOS from July 1971 to January 1974. Since the progressive position on mass mobilization was associated with him, it will be summarized primarily with reference to his statements, drawing briefly on General Meneses and Fernandez Maldonado, who most clearly share his perspective. The generals whose statements were used for explicating the progressive position on economic policy generally steered clear of statements on mobilization and participation, and therefore will not be considered in this section.⁶⁵

Needless to say, Rodríguez defends the government's "no-party of the revolution" line as well as the government-created participatory organizations. However, his attitude toward autonomous popular organizations is genuinely democratic. It bears little relationship to the notions of proper and improper channels for action, participation on the job or in community work programmes and the like which dominate the discourse of the centre, and none at all to the authoritarian law and order themes of the centre right. For Rodríguez, mobilization begins with a critical examination by the marginated of their role in the society:

el concepto de movilización social implica fundamentalmente dos cosas: En primer lugar, el cuestionamiento que los integrantes de grupos sociales marginados dentro de una sociedad hace del papel que en ella tiene.... Y en segundo lugar, una alteración sustantiva de las estructuras de poder....⁶⁶

Since the goal of mobilization is the "assumption of economic, political, and social power by the marginated majorities, "the social mobilization should be generated and conducted by the men and women of the people itself."⁶⁷ And

since the participant citizen is a critical and responsible individual, Rodríguez asks him to approach the government with that spirit: "Participar no es...aceptar sumisamente y sin crítica lo que hace y dice el Gobierno Revolucionario."⁶⁸ This is particularly important since Rodríguez, quoting Velasco, argues that "a great sector of the counterrevolution is in the hands of bad government functionaries"⁶⁹ and therefore it is necessary that the people denounce these individuals,⁷⁰ thereby controlling and not simply accepting the conduct of the representatives of the state. The people organized become the defense of the Revolution in Rodríguez's discourse, and a call to the people "to go out into the streets" in defense of the 200-mile offshore limit against United States pressure stands in sharp contrast to the centre's calls for peace and order, and the center right's "peace and order will prevail no matter what the cost."⁷²

Instead of simply criticizing the country's traditional party, labour, and student movements (a strong tendency among the officers), Rodríguez reserves words of praise for the historical struggles of students and workers who first questioned the capitalist system:

corresponde al movimiento sindical el mérito de haber denunciado y combatido permanentemente las injusticias sociales...el mérito de haber sido, sobre todo en sus inicios, el vehículo de las ideas revolucionarias y libertarias del pasado y el presente siglo....⁷³

Fernandez Maldonado is perhaps even more controversial in his defense of popular struggles when he identifies the positive interaction between 19th-century guerrilla movements and the armed forces in an article that seems to be primarily addressed to military personnel:

la savia de nuestros bravos montoneros nutrió salvadoramente las filas de nuestro ejército.... Se estableció pues un punto vital y directo entre el pueblo y su Fuerza Armada en cada definitivo instante de crisis.⁷⁴

In a similar vein, Meneses states that "all grades of leftism are respectable" to the extent that they are based on "realistic criteria," for he dismisses the notion of the absolute necessity of violence, associating it with a "pseudo-left."⁷⁵ From this perspective, it follows that official government action alone cannot control opposition; the people will have to act to choose their own leaders and it will be up to them to reject the leadership of the existing popular organizations when they do not serve their interests:

Cuando los obreros y estudiantes comprenderan que sus dirigencias deben surgir efectivamente de sus propias filas...esas dirigencias seran seguramente puestos de lado.⁷⁶

And the people, argues Rodríguez, ultimately will have to arrest the counter-revolution:

creo que la prensa contrarevolucionaria está condenada a desaparecer, ya que es inconcebible en un proceso revolucionario tener al enemigo haciendo contra-revolución a través de los periódicos que circulan dentro del país.... Está condenada a desaparecer por acción del mismo pueblo peruano....⁷⁷

El pueblo tendrá que salirle al paso a la provocación criminal de los reaccionarios y ultras primero con las armas de la razón, pero si esos grupos insisten en la violencia tendremos que cerrarles el paso con sus mismas armas.⁷⁸

Although moderation is also evident in these statements,⁷⁹ they display a profound trust in the people and their capacity; that is, the progressive vision is articulated around a positive attitude toward the autonomous action of the masses. Consequently, the mass militancy of the Cuban Revolution produces a strongly favourable impression on Rodríguez, and similar to the earlier cited answers given by Meneses to interviewers, Rodríguez refuses to be led into a general condemnation of communism by journalists' probes.⁸⁰

Among the centrist officers, government slogans of "full participation" and "autonomous popular organizations" punctuate public statements. But they remain abstract, devoid of the specificity and concrete examples advanced by the progressives. A voluntarism and moralism associated with a "new mental outlook" ("nueva mentalidad") shifts the discourse on the means for achieving the goals of the revolution away from the role of organized popular action toward individual ethics and personal will, from the social organizational level to the psychological. Air Force General Jorge Tamayo de la Flor, Minister of Public Health from October 1975 maintains that "all is possible when there is a will to work, sincerity, effort and honesty."⁸¹ Another Minister of Public Health (April 1971 to October 1975) from the Air Force, General Fernando Miro Quesada Bahamonde, announced that the first step in his ministerial action was "the operation change of mentality."⁸² Since in the centre's socioeconomic vision, there are no fundamental, structurally determined sources of social conflict and inequality which cannot be resolved by tinkering with the distribution of profit within the enterprises and promoting rapid per capita growth rates, the revolution for them is essentially finished with the promulgation of the Agrarian Reform and Industrial Community laws; thus Graham Hurtado can complain:

Se han dado las leyes de Reforma Agraria y de Comunidad Industrial, por ejemplo, pero muchos campesinos y obreros siguen comportandose como proletarios. Más de un campesino quiere volver a su antigua situación y no tener que tomar decisiones.⁸³

Organized mass action therefore is unnecessary to complete or guard the revolution; for the revolution is not the outgrowth of a process which is also determined by the people. What is needed is simply peasant and worker participation in the enterprise, decision making to promote increased production since the fundamental questions related to property and distribution have been settled. Accordingly, Montagne asks "the people to participate with consciousness in the acts of the government,"⁸⁴ and certainly not to criticize. The same attitude is reflected in a somewhat premature statement by General Alfredo Becerra, Minister of Education from April 1971 to January 1975:

Nosotros estamos cumpliendo con los postulados de la Revolución y el pueblo ya ha comprendido que todo lo que hacemos es para su beneficio.⁸⁵

In other words, the governors legislate and the people genuflect. The condemnation of strikes by Montagne and La Vera, cited earlier, follows naturally from this gestalt of perceptions and attitudes. So do Galindo's faith in "técnicos" and the widespread notion that the necessary participation has taken place when the government has consulted functional sectors--businessmen, educators, or labour lawyers--prior to the final formulation of a piece of legislation.⁸⁶ Popular action and political debate are perceived to be intrinsically disruptive; during the search for a new constitutional formula for representation following the transition from Velasco to Morales Bermúdez, General Luis Federico Cisneros Vizquerra, Minister of Interior, explains in May 1976:

Los cambios no consistirían en eliminar el aspecto político, pues siempre seran políticos, sino buscar en enfoque más técnico, más profesional y social dentro de esa representatividad.⁸⁷

A substantial dosage of military institutional values enters into these statements, and even more clearly into General Artemio Garcia Vargas'⁸⁸ response to journalists' questions about the civilian opposition's call to the military to return to their barracks:

En la Fuerza Armada, no aceptaremos ninguna retirada; por el contrario, nuestro objetivo es la victoria, lo que supone seguir adelante con los fundamentos que dieron origen al actual proceso revolucionario.⁸⁹

From the centrist perspective, the organization and actions of the Confederación Nacional Agraria (CNA) and the Confederación Nacional de Comunidades Industriales (CONACI) were always on the borderline of acceptability. Although specific references by the centrist officers to these organizations were not obtained, on the basis of their general outlook on popular participation, it is safe to argue that the CNA and CONACI were viewed with a great deal of distrust. The officers on the centre left were probably more positively ambivalent toward these organizations, for their political statements at times approximate those of the progressives. There is no doubt about the centre right--law and order themes form the organizing principle of their political discourse.

The extreme right, with the exception of Admiral Vargas Caballero, is strongly oriented toward mass mobilization, but in a manner that contrasts sharply with the progressive position. The discourse of these officers consists of supremely rabble-raising and insistent demands for participation to support the Revolution through the appropriate hierarchically organized channels, combined with a eulogy of the state and a compulsive anti-left rhetoric. They can sound like progressives at times, this being particularly evident in the speeches of General Rudecino Zavaleta, Rodríguez's successor as head of SINAMOS during 1974. Most likely, Zavaleta was also seriously constrained by the institution he inherited when he states:

La obra de liberación de los trabajadores debe ser obra de ellos mismos, en el Perú la Fuerza Armada solo had dado el impulso inicial, nada y nadie puede reemplazar el esfuerzo, la capacidad y responsabilidad del trabajador.⁹⁰

But even in his speech, the adjectives that qualify left opposition are dramatically different from the progressives' careful distinctions among types of left opposition. In fact, sounding very much like Velasco, Zavaleta declares:

SINAMOS es objeto de una campaña sistemática de desprestigio y hasta de ataques criminales por parte de los testafierros del imperialismo capitalista, de la ultra-izquierda delirante y los partidos políticos pre-revolucionarios que quieren seguir siendo los intermediarios entre el poder y el pueblo.⁹¹

But he does not appeal to the peoples' critical consciousness a la Rodríguez, nor does he ask for their organized action to control the representatives of the government, instead emphasizing dialogue between government and people--the dominant phrasing of the post-Velasco period.

Respect for hierarchy, with few equivocations, is the transparent articulating principle on questions of participation in the discourse of Tantaleán and Air Force General Pedro Sala Orozco, Minister of Labour from October 1970 to December 1974. According to Tantaleán, in the new society of justice being created by the revolution, the worker can struggle to compete on the hierarchy of natural inequality:

No hay que mirar con envidia al que está mas alto teóricamente...y nadie debe tener envidia al gerente, porque ustedes deben pelear porque todos sus hijos puedan ser gerentes; desgraciadamente la vida no es así, hay una selección natural que se va produciendo, pero todos deben tener la misma oportunidad y la misma justicia.⁹²

It is in this context that Tantaleán advises Peru to "learn from other countries by making workers who are capable of increasing production into heroes"⁹³ and Sala Orozco complains of "infiltrated agents" in the Aprista- and Communist Party-affiliated labour federations, arguing:

Los aumentos salariales deben hacerse en función directa de los incrementos de productividad y producción, a fin de garantizar la empresa.⁹⁴

This also involves the creation of a new kind of labour movement which:

tiene que asumir un nuevo caracter e imprimir sus actividades a una nueva orientación, canalizando la acción organizada de los trabajadores para participar responsablemente en la realidad incuestionable que estamos viviendo, en la que no juegan y tienden a desaparecer slogans tradicionales como la lucha de clases.⁹⁵

It follows that the revolution is made with work and sacrifice, and the people have to be prepared for both. Tantaleán emphasizes the importance of the seminars and forums he has organized in the fishing sector, for the emancipatory goals of the revolution are not being reached because:

la gente NO está preparada para hacer sacrificios.... La revolución se hace con trabajo y sacrificio y 14 millones de peruanos tienen que entenderlo.⁹⁶

The successful and exemplary mixture of participation, work, and government leadership, with attendant material benefits for the workers, has been achieved, naturally enough, in Tantaleán's own sector:

Hemos peleado junto con los pescadores. Y nadie habra escuchado hasta ahora una queja de estos trabajadores. Por eso es que los quiero; por eso es que me entiendo con ellos. Y ellos se entienden conmigo porque sabían con certeza que estabamos luchando juntos. Y ellos trabajan ahora en todos los niveles del ministerio y de "Pesca Peru," participando activamente.⁹⁷

While the workers are the "bulwark of the revolution," "its vanguard and shaft point," they must "accept the Revolution with all its rights and wrongs and criticize through proper channels."⁹⁸ They must be guarded against infiltrators in the lower levels of government organizations such as SINAMOS.⁹⁹ Finally, in genuine perplexity, Tantaleán can't understand why the people welcomed for their support of his Movimiento Laboral Revolucionario (MLR) "should be called fascists."¹⁰⁰

While the position of the progressive officers, and occasionally the centre left, was anathema to the propertied classes and the traditional parties of the "democratic centre," their ambivalence toward Tantaleán was also real, even after the MLR opened war on "infiltrators" in the state bureaucracy and other government-sponsored popular organizations, on Communist labour federation affiliated unions, and on all enemies of the true revolution. In fact, private capital needed more respectable, less erratic allies; after all, "bad entrepreneurs" were also enemies of the MLR-sponsored revolution. The mobilizational aspects of the extreme right, its self-identification with the claims of the workers, were double-edged. The MLR's militancy had a dynamic logic of its own that could become uncontrollable and "slip towards an effective anti-capitalism."¹⁰¹ For the MLR was a fascist movement in germ and it shared the radical ideological elements of fascism; Laclau argues that

fascism, far from being the typical ideological expression of the most conservative and reactionary sectors of the dominant classes was, on the contrary, one of the possible ways of articulating the popular-democratic interpellations into political discourse.¹⁰²

The potential for coordination of progressive officers supporting the more autonomous government-sponsored popular organizations with sectors of the left opposition appeared real to the civilian and military right. The extreme right within the military understood that the revolutionary left in germination had to be contested in the mass arena. To contest the growing power of that left, this counterrevolution, whether or not it is called fascist tout court, had to incorporate popular demands, borrowing "its central ideas, objectives, styles and methods from the revolution"¹⁰³ in

the making. It was "mimetic" and precisely because it necessarily has to be that, "the counterrevolution acquires a project and thrust that transcend the mere restoration of order and the status quo ante."¹⁰⁴ Thus, the counterrevolution in the form of the MLR was a potentially dangerous option for the civilian right wing opposition also because it did not involve a return to 1968. Its will to monopolize the political arena was not perceived favourably by the traditional parties. Its statist economic project has already been discussed. The civilian political right and the propertied classes preferred to count on the good sense of the military centre.

Soldiers and Civilians

Who were these officers? What were their social backgrounds and career experiences, their contacts with civilian political and business worlds? I will begin by looking at the Velasquistas, those officers who in the first four to five years were identified as the supporters of the president's strongly reformistic and moralistic position, and who appeared to share a relatively uniform orientation toward issues of economic development and political participation. As indicated earlier, these officers later distributed themselves over the entire range of tendencies identified in this essay; however, five of the seven progressives are among them. Ten army officers have been included in the group, along with two from the air force and one from the navy. Most of the discussion, for obvious reasons, will focus on the army. (Table 2 summarizes the backgrounds of the officers.)¹⁰⁵

The Velasquistas were the sons of the modest provincial middle class. In some cases, the childhood was spent on the borderline of poverty; this was certainly true of Velasco and Graham.¹⁰⁶ In addition to the available information on family socio-economic background, their modest origins are corroborated by the choice of specialization in the military career and the frequency with which that career was begun by enlisting as a soldier. In other words, the data suggest that these men had not completed the secondary education necessary for directly entering the Military Academy or competing for the more technical specializations. Once embarked on the military career, they were likely to go abroad for additional training (eight out of the ten army officers did so), but much less likely to study or teach at the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM). Only three of the army officers in the Velasquista group had had an association with CAEM, often described as the institutional cradle of the "new military mentality."

How do the Velasquistas compare with the other army officers? (See Table 3.) Similar to the Velasquistas in their predominantly modest provincial origins, there are nevertheless some interesting differences. Ten of the 26 (38 percent) were born in Lima. There is a sprinkling of individuals with upper-class backgrounds. Only six of them (23 percent) are infantry officers. And while the extent of foreign training is about the same, only two out of the 26 studied in Europe; one of them is Marco del Pont, who spent some time at an Italian war college and was included among the progressives on the basis of his position on economic development policy. In strong contrast with the Velasquistas, at least 14 of the other officers (54 percent) had had some association with CAEM.

TABLE 2

BACKGROUNDS OF VELASQUISTAS

<u>Officer and the tendency he ultimately represented</u>	<u>Place of Birth</u>	<u>Family Background</u>	<u>Mode of entrance to military career</u>	<u>Special- ization</u>	<u>Foreign Military Training</u>	<u>CAEM Experi- ence</u>
<u>Army</u>						
1. Velasco (Arbiter)	Piura	Urban L.M.C.	Tropa	Infantry	None	No
2. Barandarian (C-L)	Chiclayo	Small farmer	Escuela Militar	Infantry	U.S.	Yes
3. Fernandez M. (P)	Ilo	Urban M.C.	Escuela Militar	Infantry	Panama	No
4. De La Flor (P)	Ferrenafe	Small merchant	Escuela Militar	Infantry	France	No
5. Gallegos (P)	Cuzco	N. I.	N. I.	Infantry	France	No
6. Graham (C)	Mollendo	Urban L.M.C.	Tropa	Infantry	None	Yes
7. Hoyos (C)	Lima	Rural M. C.	N. I.	Infantry	U.S.	No
8. Mesa Cuadra (C-L)	La Libertad	N. I.	N. I.	Artillery	U.S.	Yes
9. Rodríguez (P)	Cuzco	Rural M. C.	Tropa	Infantry	None	No
10. Tantaleán (MLR)	Cajamarca	N. I.	Tropa	Artillery	U.S.	Yes
<u>Air Force</u>						
11. Gilardi (C-L)	Arequipa	N. I.	-	-	U.S.	No
12. Sala O. (MLR)	Huarochoiri	N. I.	-	-	England	N. I.
<u>Navy</u>						
13. Dellepiane (P)	Ica	N. I.	-	-	U.S.	Yes
Summary for army officers only	Provincial - 9 Lima - 1		Tropa - 4 Escuela Militar - 3 N. I. - 4	Infantry - 8 Artillery - 2	Yes - 8 No - 2	Yes - 3 No - 6 N.I. - 1

TABLE 3

BACKGROUNDS OF VELASQUISTAS AND OTHER ARMY OFFICERS

	<u>Place of birth</u>		<u>Family Background</u>		<u>Specialization</u>		<u>Foreign military training</u>		<u>CAEM experience</u>	
Velasquistas	Southern sierra*	- 2	Urban upper	- 0	Artillery	- 2	Yes	- 8	Yes	- 3
	Southern coast	- 2	Rural upper	- 0	Cavalry	- 0	No	- 2	No	- 6
	Central sierra	- 0	Urban middle	- 2	Engineering	- 0	N.I.	- 0	N.I.	- 1
	Central coast	- 1	Rural middle	- 2	Infantry	- 8				
	(Lima - 1)		Popular	- 3	N. I.	- 0				
	Northern sierra	- 1	N. I.	- 3						
	Northern coast	- 4								
	Selva	- 0								
	N. I.	- 0								
Total		10		10		10		10		10

Others	Southern sierra *	- 10	Urban upper	- 6	Artillery	- 7	Yes	- 17	Yes	- 14
	Southern coast	- 2	Rural upper	- 1	Cavalry	- 9	No	- 3	No	- 8
	Central sierra	1	Urban middle	- 5	Engineering	- 3	N.I.	- 6	N.I.	- 4
	Central coast	- 10	Rural middle	- 2	Infantry	- 6				
	(Lima - 10)		Popular	- 1	N. I.	- 0				
	Northern sierra	- 0	N. I.	- 11						
	Northern coast	- 2								
	Selva	- 0								
	N. I.	- 1								
Total		26		26		26		26		26

*Includes Arequipa; eight of the "others" were born in Arequipa.

Both the initial creative political leadership and the base of the later progressive position, as well as the leader par excellence of the mobilizing extreme right, are thus found among a group of officers who distinguish themselves in comparison to their comrades in arms for their more marginal backgrounds and a career pattern which tended not to include an experience with the country's technocratic military "think tank," the CAEM. And interestingly, three out of the four European-trained officers among the 35 army officers appear among the progressives. It's difficult to know what to make of that datum. Did the broader spectrum of respectable political debate to be found in France and Italy than in the United States influence these officers, sensitizing them to issues and alternatives that would not be seriously discussed by officers in Peruvian and U.S. military training institutions? This is, of course, pure speculation but it relates to the often debated issue of the impact of foreign military training. In that regard, the civilian right in Peru was very alarmed by the Velasco government's military equipment purchases from the Soviet Union because of the obvious necessity for Soviet training in the use of the new hardware. Needless to say, neither did the United States look with favour on those shopping and training tours. Returning to the social backgrounds of the officers, there is nothing to suggest good connections between the Velasquistas and the Peruvian upper-class society or business worlds; these are definitely officers making their way up the social ladder after often bitter experiences in their youth. It was on this basis that the civilian right opposition drummed the facile theme that Velasco and his military supporters were "resentidos sociales" out to revenge past insult, and as a consequence necessarily warped in their judgment of all issues. The other military officers as a group appear to be more solidly anchored in Peruvian middle and upper middle class society, although officers similar in background to the Velasquistas are also present. In describing the family of a school mate who later followed a military career, one informant declared that "they were so unfortunate that when the father decided to become a hat maker children were born without heads."

How do the backgrounds of army officers compare with the backgrounds of air force and navy officers? (See Table 4.) First, it must be pointed out that there is less data available on these two services. What is available suggests that there are no dramatic differences in place of birth. Of the 13 navy officers, two were born in Lima and eight in the provinces, with no information on three. There is a greater proportion of limeños in the air force: four out of the nine on whom information is available were born there. As for foreign training, all nine of the air force officers with complete vitae had attended military schools in the United States (eight) or England (one). The curriculum vitae of naval officers are even more incomplete than those of the air force and only three officers appear as having acquired foreign training, all three in the United States. The information on social background is too scanty to merit tabular summary, but the little that is available does merit consideration. Three of the four navy officers on whose family backgrounds information was obtained originate from prestigious upper class families involved in real estate operations, commercial agriculture on the coast, and industry. The fourth was simply identified as a family with a tradition of naval careers. There is also an entrance fee for admission into the Navy academy, along with letters of recommendation--requirements that would tend to the exclusion of candidates of modest origin. Of the four air force officers on whom information was available, two came from urban middle class backgrounds and two from military families.

TABLE 4

BACKGROUNDS OF NAVY AND AIR FORCE OFFICERS

	<u>Place of birth</u>	<u>Foreign military training</u>	<u>Association with CAEM</u>
Navy			
	Lima - 2	Yes - 3	Yes - 7
	Provinces - 8	No - 0	No - 0
	N.I. - 3	N.I. - 10	N.I. - 6
	Total - 13	Total - 13	Total - 13
Air Force			
	Lima - 4	Yes - 9	Yes - 2
	Provinces - 5	No - 0	No - 0
	N.I. - 2	N.I. - 2	N.I. - 9
	Total - 11	Total - 11	Total - 11

But there is one indicator of family background yet to be considered which can be deduced from family names--that is, immigrant background. Peru received a considerable number of European immigrants in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. These immigrant families were successfully mobile in the modern professions and played an important entrepreneurial role in urban commerce and industry.¹⁰⁷ Examining the family names of the officers in the armed forces, 23 percent of the navy, 31 percent of the army, and an amazing 64 percent in the air force have either one or two foreign names, mostly Italian of course. (See Table 5.) Not all these names necessarily originate from the period of most extensive immigration at the turn of the century; Peru, and especially Lima, from the beginning of the republican era received a small trickle of European immigrants. However, in view of the ups and downs of the immigrant flow into Peru, most of the names probably do originate from the 1895-1914 period. Whatever the period, these immigrant families came to form an important sector of the urban upper and upper middle classes.

TABLE 5

FOREIGN FAMILY NAMES AMONG PERUVIAN OFFICERS

	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Air Force</u>
Father's family name	1	5	3
Mother's family name	0	6	2
Both family names	2	0	2
None	<u>10</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>4</u>
Total	13	36	11

Quickly summarizing the social origins (and thereby half the family contacts of the officers¹⁰⁸), the army includes a significant number of officers from very modest circumstances but with the majority from a middle class background or higher. The navy recruits its officers from the upper classes while the air force officers seem to be particularly related to the enterprising immigrant community. It is difficult to imagine that the majority of these officers' family members would favour the increasingly radical tendencies within the Velasco government. Rather, the contrary might be expected with officers under heavy critical pressure to introduce some "sanity and moderation" into the process, and in the case of navy officers, to act more forcefully on their conservative convictions.

The relationship between class position and socio-economic and political orientations among the navy officers is quite clear: class position and ideological orientation congrue in this branch of the armed forces with aristocratic traditions and a strong esprit de corps. The location of a majority of the air force officers in the centre also makes sense in social class and institutional value terms. They are members both of an entrepreneurial and modern middle class and of a technically highly sophisticated branch of the armed forces. Their technocratic orientation toward economic development, and their favourable attitude toward moderate social innovation to open up opportunities for the capable, congrue with their personal social and institutional experiences. The army officers present more complex issues about the relationship between class position and ideological orientation.

The army officers represent the whole range of middle-class experiences in Peruvian society, from the most frustrating provincial modesty to the comfortable life of a successful limeño professional. They also represent almost the entire range of Peruvian middle-class political orientations, the exception being the "revolutionary left." There is a heterogeneity of social experiences reflected at the level of ideological orientations.¹⁰⁹ Further, as Laclau argues,

[i]f we consider the social ensembles that have in capitalist society generally been included in the category 'middle classes,' 'intermediata strata,' etc., we notice that despite the variety of their insertion in the sphere of economic relations, they do present a feature in common: their separation from the dominant relations of production in that society. This means that their contradictions with the dominant bloc are posed, not at the level of dominant relations of production, but at the level of political and ideological relations which make up the system of domination in that social formation. But...this is not a class contradiction. This means that in these sectors, the identity as the people plays a much more important role than the identity as class.¹¹⁰

Continuing with Laclau's argument,

the periods of greatest revolutionary confrontation are not those when class ideology presents itself in its maximum purity but when socialist ideology has fused completely with popular and democratic ideology,

when proletarian ideology has succeeded in absorbing all national traditions and presenting the anti-capitalist struggle as the culmination of democratic struggles and socialism as the common denominator in a total offensive against the dominant bloc.¹¹¹

Peru in 1968 was certainly not confronted with an imminent socialist revolution, but it was confronted with a generalized systemic crisis which I have discussed elsewhere.¹¹² Furthermore, the army was called upon to play a central role in the management of that crisis, most dramatically and traumatically through the repression first of a local armed peasant movement in the La Convención valley of Cuzco (1958-1963), then a wave of land invasions that spread through the highlands of the country (1963-1964), and finally a series of guerrilla fronts (1965). Meanwhile, an anti-oligarchic and nationalistic ideology, including the necessity of agrarian reform, had in fact permeated all the middle class parties and political organizations, minor ones and major ones, while their political leaderships equivocated and compromised on action and enforcement of concrete measures.

In longer historical perspective, the crisis and the military's central role as crisis managers dated back to the early thirties, the violent years of the Depression. Between the Depression and the late sixties, the country did not even find its way into import substituting industrialization or a modernization of the state apparatus--the near ubiquitous development elsewhere in Latin America. It is through this complex process of historical determinations, social and institutional experiences including military concern about national security, that a group of officers, the Velasquistas whose personal experiences reinforced their notions about the injustice of Peruvian society and the incapacity of its politically and economically dominant sectors, came to identify with the "national and popular" cause. They were far from being socialists, although some later opted for socialism. They were, however, generally receptive to listening to the ideological discourse of the system's critics, even some of those left opponents who denied their support to the government's reform projects. And they were initially backed by prestigious members of the military institutional centre who, more technocratic in their vision, were still convinced that there existed a historical accumulation of social conflicts and economic problems which Peru's dominant classes had failed disgracefully to resolve, and demonstrated little capacity for doing so in the future. The "national and popular" orientations were further reinforced by the new social philosophy of the Catholic Church, as the ideas of Vatican II became firmly rooted among perhaps even a majority of the Peruvian clergy. It is not without cause that the political right railed and continues to rail against "el lavado cerebral que pusieron en marcha los curas católicos cursillistas y comprometidos con la izquierda."¹¹³

Statements concerning the incapacity of the dominant classes to confront the country's developmental problems abound in the army officers' discourse. Graham and others frankly admit the effect of the guerrilla on their thinking:

admitió que "las guerillas fueron el timbre que dio lugar a que los militares despertáramos a la realidad del país...." Agregó que en el momento en que surgen los focos guerrilleros fue el Ejército quien dijo que este problema no se podía resolver con balas. Y que por ello presentó el plan de desarrollo del Valle de la Convención.¹¹⁴

The better-than-cordial relationship between an innovative Church leadership and officers who played a central role in the Velasco years is well known; the Ministry of War even published progressive Church statements. Thus, two of the institutional pillars of the traditional social order, the Army and the Church together, were formulating a position that was disarticulating itself from the logic of the capitalist system, from the dominant ideological discourse of the society.

In this context, and adding to it the impact of the reform measures described earlier, it is not surprising that the propaganda offensive of the civilian right--including Apra, the Belaundista sector of Acción Popular, the conservative Bedoyista sector of Christian Democracy, the entrepreneurial and landowners' associations, and the country's major newspapers--should have reached hysterical proportions. They hammered on every imaginable theme, founded or unfounded, simultaneously arousing fear and appealing to common sense: Communist infiltration, corruption, the misplaced and distorted, even pathological and racist, attitudes of their particular bête noirs among the officers, the fact that many of the government's civilian advisers from the independent left groups had never won or, better yet, had lost an election--an obvious indicator of the fact that they and what they represented and therefore what the government was doing were repudiated by the people. The catalog of specific and general accusations is endless; however, a good portion of it may be found summarized in El Poder Invisible, El Septenato, and La Verdadera Realidad Peruana.¹¹⁵ All are very well written and often well focused in their arguments, and certainly cogent if the reader shares a part of the general conceptual and value structure of the authors. Each is also full of those little tidbits that the Lima gossip mill passes on as information, particularly in times of crisis when it is difficult for the ordinary citizen to know or understand what is happening.¹¹⁶

It is important to examine some of the argumentative logic of these works, particularly their appeal to common sense in economic policy and their attempt to capture the mantle of democratic popular representativeness for the political right. The authors represent positions expounded in the two major national newspapers, El Comercio and La Prensa; after the July 1974 expropriation, they passed to organize and work for El Tiempo and Opinión Libre--political weeklies. They also have played prominent political roles, Enrique Chirinos Soto in Apra and Pedro Beltrán in the cabinet of the Prado government (1956-1962). The arguments they forwarded had a very strong impact on the urban middle sectors, already predisposed to accept them, threatened by the mass mobilizations of workers and peasants, the growth of the non-government controlled left, the reforms themselves, and the fears they themselves created. These arguments, moreover, could not fail to reach in some form those sectors of the officer corps--in fact, the majority--whose vision of necessary change was not imbedded in an understanding of the structural class and sectoral relationships which blocked national development.

El Septenato hammers on the fact that the military government represents at best only itself, and at worst also civilian left sectors whose positions have never been supported by the electorate, viz. election returns. The considerable arsenal of legal and constitutional law erudition of the two

authors is then brought to bear on every major piece of government legislation, indicating the ways in which they violate the laws that have emanated from the collective and representative wisdom of Peru's republican experience. The qualifications of military personnel for economic policy making are carefully scrutinized in contrast to those of the business community, the creative entrepreneurs of the Belaúnde years who were opening up one area of industrial and commercial expansion after another and therefore generating productive employment opportunities instead of a wasteful and incentive-destroying state bureaucracy.¹¹⁷ The government's policies violate, point by point, the economic knowledge of Pedro Beltrán, the confirmation of the correctness of his position demonstrated by its agreement with none other than Milton Friedman, whose qualifications in turn are proven by the fact that he won a Nobel Prize in economics.

What does Beltrán propose? In very careful and measured tones, he demonstrates the necessity of creative innovation in industry, a role that can hardly be played successfully by an officer who, because of the nature of his military profession, has to learn a "rigid discipline." Beltrán shows with historical examples how economic problems were resolved by producing more and not through precipitous measures based on wild theories. Thus,

The fundamental preoccupation of the Agrarian Reform should have been an increase in food production, a problem which is worsening day by day for all Peruvians, and especially for those in greatest need. But the Revolution which is being carried out hardly appears to take this substantive aspect into consideration. The rapidity with which parcelizations proceed seizes the entire interest of the reformers, as if the issue were the establishment of a new record in athletic competition. But the real race--against the threat of hunger--is not even begun.¹¹⁸

Increases in production, of course, can only be achieved through the utilization of the most advanced technical and scientific knowledge available in the world. And the place where it is most available is the United States. Who can possibly disagree?

The campaign of the political right operated very effectively in both promoting fear (infiltration, totalitarianism) and appealing to reason, through the utilization of scientific and historical examples, and appealing to the "obvious" (e.g., rigid discipline inhibits innovation). Like all good propaganda, it appealed to "common sense" and thereby was accessible to a mass audience. The intelligence and impact of this campaign itself on the middle classes and on the officer corps should not be underestimated, for in the arena of political ideological debate the right dominated with its alternatively fear-provoking and reasonable discourse. The left opposition was never able to match it, tied as it was to a defense of proletarian and/or peasant vanguardism, without the incorporation of those national, popular, and democratic themes that made sense to at least a significant number of officers and to many in that very heterogeneous Peruvian middle class. And the military government itself could not match it, torn as it was between

conflicting tendencies, beset with acute economic problems by 1974, and committed to a "no-party of the revolution" position. In short, the outcome of the process, in the form of the Morales presidency and everything it has signified, was not simply determined by factors internal to the military institution; it was fundamentally determined by the interaction between military and society, the class and ideological struggles provoked by the basic reforms of the early years.

Any serious effort of socio-economic reform, particularly if redistributive policies are pursued, unleashes severe class and sectoral conflicts, for the relative social, political, and economic power of all classes and class sectors is necessarily transformed. To carry out such reforms, a government must have, or build, the necessary political power to carry out the transformation. A government firmly united in goals, including a willingness to engage in extensive coercion against those class sectors most seriously affected by a reduction of their power and prestige, could hypothetically conduct the process without mass support. This involves a prior understanding of the resistance to reform on the part of the dominant sectors, and the strength of the organized social and political power they can bring to bear to halt any serious reform process. Neither the unity of goal, nor the coercive will, nor that understanding of political power existed within the Peruvian Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces. Especially the Velasquistas, however, quickly developed a sense of the need for organized mass support as its reform enforcement was countered by the increasing opposition of the affected sectors.

The policy response to the problem was the organization of the Sistema Nacional de Apoyo para la Movilización Social (SINAMOS). Its emphasis on functional participation in the work place in the resolution of local community problems certainly congrued with task-oriented military attitudes; it was a participatory organization acceptable to the military institution as a whole, although many officers found even such an organization of dubious value. Its civilian defenders, followed by the military advocates, argued that political parties were necessarily oligarchic and manipulative,¹¹⁹ effectively summarizing all the arguments of Michels, and updating them with rich examples from contemporary world and Peruvian history. By contrast, Peru was setting up an example for a new, autonomous, humanistic, and authentically democratic form of revolutionary and socialist political participation in the Third World:

En el Perú actual se están creando microsociedades políticas: SAIS, cooperativas, ligas agrarias, comunidades laborales. En ellas, se realice este socialismo participacionista.¹²⁰

It was precisely the micro-societal character of these organizations, formally integrated by the bureaucratic apparatus of SINAMOS, that prohibited their conversion into an effective mass base for the government, into a mechanism for simultaneously disciplining mass action and unleashing the united creative energy of the masses in the definition and enforcement of the reforms. Whether or not we like it, all contemporary revolutions, fundamental transformations of power and property structures, have shared this mass character in some form. Without such united organization, including its unifying myths and militancy,

the "micro-societies" of the Peruvian Revolution tended to settle down to fighting for their limited economic sectoral and even enterprise interests defined in narrow terms. And they were left open to the proselytizing and potentially unifying action of the parties which already competed in the popular arena.

This was certainly perceived by both the left and the right political opposition. Because of the unsettling impact of the reforms, the opening up of the consciousness of workers and peasants to the new possibilities that the government itself proposed through the Agrarian Reform and Industrial Community legislation, those workers and peasants were receptive to the left. This is confirmed by the results of the June 1968 elections to the Constituent Assembly--the small parties of the "extreme left" garnered approximately 30 percent of the popular vote. And that left grew and organized itself into a national force through the openings created by the reform measures of the military government. As an industrialist commented: "Peru will never be the same again. We're confronted by an aggressive union in the shop."

The Constituent Assembly elections also confirmed the popular strength of the traditional democratic parties which carried out the right opposition in the mass arena; they called in the remaining 70 percent of the vote. The margin of their electoral security is clear enough--a further confirmation of their arguments concerning the non-representativeness of the military government and its civilian allies, leaving aside the fact that the government did not present a slate for the elections. But the fears of the right prior to August 1975 were not unfounded. The necessity of bringing the "revolutionary process" to a halt was clear to them: it was increasingly polarized between an unpredictable fascist option and the possibility of a socialist option based on a reshuffling of alliances among military progressives, the left opposition, and government-sponsored or tolerated mass organizations such as the CNA and CONACI.

In fact, the progressive officers as a group had never seriously contemplated that alternative, although some were beginning to question the no-party position on political organization. Furthermore, if they had made efforts in that direction it was extremely doubtful that a large enough proportion of the military centre would have been willing to follow to make a socialist option even a remote possibility. By mid-1975, the progressives and the centre technocrats also had two related common enemies within their midst: large scale and embarrassing corruption, and the supremely corrupt Tantaleán-led MLR, for whom a very ill Velasco had opted as his successors, thereby giving up his mediating role among the military factions. Of course, in theory, Morales Bermúdez could have maintained the radical thrust of the reforms of the Velasco years. In fact, the military institutional centre, its economic development logic imbedded in import-substitution policy and advanced technology, was persuaded by the private sector and the political right opposition concerning the impracticality of the reforms and the dangers of socialist revolution. But only after the class conflict generated by the reform measures had thoroughly permeated all levels of the military government and institution did the moment of remarkable autonomy vis-à-vis the private sector dissolve, with the reabsorption of the centre's concern for "bienestar general" into the logic of capitalist development: welfare goals

can only be reached through increased production under the control and direction of individual entrepreneurs. Of course, the expanded role of the state remains, and so do the agricultural cooperatives, but subordinated in their role to the logic of private enterprise. As well, many in that military centre are unwilling and hesitant partners in the new turn of events precisely because of that vague concern for the "bienestar general" which their policies failed to achieve, doubting the capacity of the private sector and the civilian political leadership to do any better, but without an alternative set of policies to propose.

Concluding Notes

The civilian political right quite correctly argues that the current economic policy choices basically represent the original reformist military institutional consensus of 1968, that the dynamic of the Velasco years escaped from the logic of the consensus. Nevertheless, the centrist officers tolerated that dynamic considerably longer than might be expected on the basis of their class recruitment, the civilian social networks to which they related, and their military professionalism. Specifically they tolerated policies addressing the redistributive issues constantly brought up by the progressive officers and their civilian advisors as well as their questioning of the appropriate organization of production for achieving distributive mass welfare goals. What would the logical pursuit of the progressives' developmental priorities have involved?

They correctly identified problems related to the orientation of production and the drain of resources from the rural to the urban sector as the roots of the problem of mass poverty. I will quote extensively from the work of one of the radical civilians incorporated into the government, excombatant in the 1965 guerrilla offensive, Hector Bejar. He expresses both the eloquent awareness of the basic problems and the government's incapacity to respond to them:

the agrarian reform has benefitted only a part of the total number of peasants in Peru; for example, on the sugar cooperatives containing the most profitable lands and crops, a minority of peasants enjoy the best incomes from which the majority are marginated. The cooperatives wind up being a form of private group property on which the workers continue responding to the reflexes created by a society based on the egotistical consumption of individual goods. The worker demands and gets higher salaries. His acquisitive power increases. He can now buy those things that his employers used and were out of his reach. Those things he wanted and which were out of his reach. And who can deny that he also has a right to enjoy the things that the urban middle classes were using? But in the meanwhile, the capitalist merchant has found a new market and with a thirst for consumption. Before there are adequate houses, schools, hospitals and social services, there are television sets, radios, the consumption of alcoholic beverages, hard ringing money. The workers want to earn more and consume more. Often, the pressure for higher salaries leads to the neglect of long term investment in the enterprises. A sort of a long contained thirst, mixed with a certain insecurity about the future, carries them to consume this very day without thinking about tomorrow. And in this manner, a good portion of the profit generated by the enterprise returns again

to the merchants, who enrich themselves rapidly. Through this road, the profit generated does not go to the social whole but to the legally surviving capitalist sectors, contributing to their enrichment and strengthening, while new relationships of dependency are progressively established in the countryside, between large and small cooperatives, or between all of them and the peasants without land who have to sell their labor....¹²¹

Meanwhile, due to a whole set of historical reasons associated with a neglect of the agrarian sector,

Peru had to import ever greater quantities of beef, wheat, milk, rice, etc.... Every time we produce a lower percentage of what we consume and for food we have to pay also a high price to the great powers.

If Peruvian families would have paid the real cost of the international price, food would have been converted into a luxury item already some time ago in Peru, especially since 1973, when the wheat producer countries decided to increase the price of the cereal by 200 percent. In the hope of solving the critical situation in the medium term and conscious that placing the imported food on the local market at its real price would have signified a wave of popular protests which could have been used by its enemies in an attempt to overthrow it, the revolutionary government opted for a policy of subsidies and price controls....

But the control and subsidy policy had doubly unfavourable repercussions on the process. Price controls obliged peasant enterprises to continue selling their products frequently at levels lower than the cost of production. Thus the new peasant enterprises not only had to confront the complex problems of production, but they also would up subsidizing the cost of living of the urban population.... The problem is, nevertheless, even more complex. It arises, among other causes, from the fact that during its first years, the revolutionary process dislodged the owners but left the campesinos in the condition of taxpayers to the city.¹²²

In the urban industrial sector,

We have an industry that only produces for the minority with the highest incomes, not for the majority which requires a massive production that reduces the costs of the goods that satisfy their fundamental necessities.

This type of industry, inherited from the oligarchic governments which recommended a parody of industrialization, utilises imported primary materials and inputs in increasing proportions....

In this way, the dollars we obtain from the exterior through the difficult sale of our raw materials in a process of devaluation, we squander on unnecessary technology and non-essential goods.¹²³

Only by forcefully addressing these issues could the military government have achieved the goals of "bienestar general." But it was only the progressive minority, and perhaps some members of the centre left who manifested an understanding, and often only a partial one, of the basic structural issues

involved. In order to deal with a reorientation of production, and begin reversing the terms of trade between the urban and rural sectors, the government would have had to create a political organization strong enough to simultaneously confront urban industrial and commercial capital, the urban middle class, and relatively privileged sectors of urban and rural labour. For these policies would have necessarily reduced their standard of consumption, and in the case of private capital, destroyed their control over the means of production. It would have involved a reduced standard of living for the either struggling or established middle class from which the army and air force recruited its officers. Very few of the officers were willing to confront the economic and political implications of such a choice. But their failure or unwillingness to do so did not simply arise from their character as a military institution but from the character of the democratic leadership of politically organized Peruvian society and the forces they could marshal. After all, the military government went too far from their perspective, and they did their best to make sure that the hard choice would not be made.

¹ See especially, Henry Pease García, El Ocaso del Poder Oligarquico; Lucha Política en la Escena Oficial, 1968-1975 (Lima: Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo, 1977); Jorge Alberti, Jorge Santistevan, and Luis Pásara, Estado y Clase: la Comunidad Industrial en el Perú (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1977); Henry Pease García, Diego García-Sayán, Fernando Eguren Lopez, and Marcial Rubio Correa, Estado y Política Agraria (Lima: Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo, 1977). As well, the political journals Marka and Punto de Vista provide much insightful commentary on the general lines of conflict inside and outside the government.

² The description of the reforms and conflicts is based on the analyses and political positions presented in the works mentioned earlier, and also on: Henry Pease García and Olga Verme Isua, Perú 1968-1975: Cronología Política, 4 vols. (Lima: Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo, 1974-1977); Hector Bejar, La Revolución en la Trampa (Lima: Ediciones Socialismo y Participación, 1976); Guillermo Thorndike, No, Mi General (Lima, Mosca Azul Editores, 1976); Alfonso Baella Tuesta, El Poder Invisible (Lima: private publication, 1976); Guido Chirinos Lizares and Enrique Chirinos Soto, El Septenato: 1968-1975 (Lima: Editorial 'Alfa,' 1977); in addition, the political journals El Tiempo and Opinion Libre are invaluable for understanding the perspectives and fears of right-wing opponents of the government, including members of the country's major parties.

³ See Diego García-Sayán, "La Reforma Agraria Hoy," in Pease, García-Sayán, Eguren, and Rubio, op. cit., pp. 206-213.

⁴ From a speech by Velasco cited in Pease and Verme, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 279. All the translations are mine; when the specific choice of words and tone in a statement by a member of the government is particularly significant in implications, I have left the Spanish quotation in the text and provided a translation in a footnote.

⁵ Of course, this did not apply to the lands of the sugar estates which the government intervened quickly after the promulgation of the law, and where, in any case, the unit of production had to be maintained intact.

⁶ It was described as such by, among others, Ricardo Letts, a leader of Vanguardia Revolucionaria, at a seminar on the agrarian reform law held at the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú in 1969.

⁷ See Henry Pease García, "La Reforma Agraria Peruana en la Crisis del Estado Oligarquico," in Pease, García-Sayán, Eguren, and Rubio, op. cit., pp. 78, 101, 118, and 192.

⁸ See Richard Webb, "Government Policy and Distribution of Income in Peru, 1963-1973," in Abraham F. Lowenthal (ed.), The Peruvian Experiment: Continuity and Change under Military Rule (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

⁹ Henry Pease García, "La Reforma Agraria Peruana en la Crisis del Estado Oligarquico," in Pease, García-Sayán, Eguren, and Rubio, op. cit., pp. 104-107.

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- ¹⁰ See Alberti, Santistevan, and Pásara, op. cit., passim.
- ¹¹ Statement by Velasco cited by Pease and Verme, op. cit., pp. 279-280. See Juan Velasco Alvarado, La Revolución Peruana (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1973) for a collection of his key speeches.
- ¹² Despite these attitudes toward the left, the government, for the first time in Peruvian history, officially recognized the Communist Party-affiliated labour federation, the Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú (CGTP) in 1971.
- ¹³ See Bejar, op. cit., pp. 37-134, passim. The government had already created an alternative labour confederation in 1972; this was the Confederación de Trabajadores de la Revolución Peruana (CTRP), designed to compete with the Aprista (CTP), Communist (CGTP), and Christian Democratic Party (CNT) affiliated confederations. It also created an alternative teacher's federation, the Sindicato de Educadores de la Revolución Peruana (SERP) to displace the Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores de la Educación Peruana (SUTEP) in 1973. Finally, sectors of the government aimed at controlling CONACI by supporting a Comité Reorganizador de CONACI (CR-CONACI).
- ¹⁴ "Tole Tole con Tantaleán," Caretas (21 May 1973).
- ¹⁵ Zileri: Isn't this a typically socialist measure?
 Tantaleán: You have heard all the leaders of the Peruvian Revolution say that we're far from capitalism and far from socialism. If we take a measure that for you or anyone else appears socialist, we think that it is not so. When deciding on a measure, we don't do it thinking whether it is socialist or capitalist. It's precisely there that our advantage lies; by not being enclosed inside a rigid framework we are free to make the decision we consider most desirable for the Peruvian people...the choice was between concentrating property in a few hands or concentrating property in the hands of the state. Which choice would you have made?
 Zileri: I'm the one who's interviewing you, but I'll give you an opinion. I have the impression that as far as the fishing industry is concerned, the state was already extremely powerful. If the state authorized or licensed every ton of fish...
 Tantaleán: Excuse me, we'll discuss that afterwards. We're talking about property. Don't repeat the arguments we already know. Between the choice of one or the other system, which choice would you have made?
- ¹⁶ Whoever holds the property of the means of production has an economic power which at some moment will be transformed into political power because he has to defend his interests. That's very clear.
- ¹⁷ Zileri: Do you believe that private property will continue to exist in Peru in some form?
 Tantaleán: I don't only believe it. We promote it. We want it to be like that.
 Zileri: Isn't the Law of Social Property going to liquidate it?
 Tantaleán: At this moment, I don't know what the Social Property Law will be like; but I ask you, isn't it also private property?

REFERENCES

Zileri: Certainly not. Rather, it corresponds to a Yugoslav type schema.

Tantaleán: I don't believe so, but I'll accept it. It's private property but of the many.

Zileri: Will that type of private property liquidate the other type of private property?

Tantaleán: I don't believe so. I think that there has to be a healthy competition between both types of enterprise. I'm telling you what I believe, because in fact the model is not entirely defined. But we don't want to copy even the Yugoslavs. In accord with the characteristics of our country and the idiosyncracies of our people, we want a social property law which will be just for our people. We are no longer thinking of property whose only rationale is profit....

I believe in private property; I believe absolutely in reformed private property. It has to be one of the bases and pillars of the development of the country. There are people interested in promoting the belief that the take-over of the fishing industry by the state is a leap toward socialism. Nothing more absurd. It's not socialism. It's a solution to some problems that had no other solution.

¹⁸ a constantly increasing sovietizing bigotry. Its daily reverences to any proselytizing clown who appears here carrying a hammer and sickle have reached such proportions that by now no one believes that these canteen stalinists really support a "non communist" in addition to the "non capitalist" way.

It must be emphasized that Caretas is a highly prestigious journal which had generally supported the reformist platform of Fernando Belaunde Terry, leader of Acción Popular, whose successful presidential campaign in 1963 was supported by the military.

¹⁹ Cited in Pease, op. cit., p. 109

²⁰ Expreso (22 August 1972).

²¹ Oiga (1 June 1973).

²² Expreso (29 November 1975).

²³ Pease and Verme, op. cit., vol. III, p. 851.

²⁴ Ramón Arrospide Mejía and Alberto Indacochea. Pease and Verme, op. cit., vol. III, p. 851.

²⁵ La Crónica (28 May 1973).

²⁶ Cited in Pease and Verme, op. cit., vol. III, 833-844.

²⁷ See Pease, op. cit., pp. 191-203.

²⁸ See Liisa North, "Political Conjunctures, Military Government and Agrarian Reform in Peru," (Ottawa: Institute for International Cooperation "The Latin American Research Workshop" Working Papers No. 8, February 1977), pp. 29-38.

REFERENCES

Whether or not this perception of a possible socialist revolution with a military leadership was "correct" (as a real possibility) it was firmly believed. Even though the possibility of its success, a prominent businessman explained it to me in June of 1976, was one in a hundred, the same could be said for that small group of guerrillas in the Cuban Sierra Maestra. "I'm just glad that Leonidas wasn't a Lion," he concluded.

²⁹ Given that the military factions turned down a definitive confrontation that could lead to a civil war, the political struggle developed through disposable civilians who burned themselves or resisted, a little bit in the manner of chess pieces which transferred the fight to an olympic, almost unreal level, but thanks to whose existence the great national short circuit was avoided.... It was precisely the disposable civilians who speculated with the superior forces they served, willing to carbonize themselves for the struggles of the military Olympus. They played with the aid of divine fire. Its olympic proprietors never walked out into exile or ended up in prison, no matter what they did: they were politically immortal. But disgrace rained down on the disposable civilians, sometimes beyond all expectation, and all the bitterness of the battles on high was tested out on them. This reality was not known by the majority of Peruvians: the growing division in the revolutionary command was hidden from them. It was the disposables who were divided and conducted wars among themselves, now appearing disposed to confront each other along the length of the entire battle line. Thorndike, *op. cit.*, pp. 289-290.

³⁰ Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism-Fascism-Populism (London: New Left Books, 1977), p. 99.

³¹ See Sources at the end of the paper.

³² For an analysis of issues related to the role of the agricultural sector in the development of third world economies, see Louis Lefebvre, "On the Paradigm for Economic Development," World Development 2:1 (1974) and "Spatial Population Distribution: Urban and Rural Development," unpublished paper presented at a "Seminar on the Spatial Redistribution of the Population," Centro Latinoamericano de Demografia (CELADE), Santiago, August 1978.

³³ Mahbub ul Haq, "Employment in the 1970's: A New Perspective," in Charles K. Wilber (ed.), The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 269. Ul Haq then argues for a reorientation of development planning in the following terms:

First, the problem of development must be defined as a selective attack on the worst forms of poverty. Development goals must be defined in terms of progressive reduction and eventual elimination of malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, squalor, unemployment and inequalities. Second,...the developing countries should define minimum (or threshold) consumption standards that they must reach.... Consumption planning should move to the centre stage; production planning should be geared to it. Third, the concerns for more production and better distribution should be brought together in defining the pattern of development. Fourth, employment should become a primary objective of planning.... *Ibid.*, pp. 270-271.

REFERENCES

³⁴ Many speeches, after all, were prepared by civilian advisory teams; the military minister, however, also put in his views and he could choose his advisors. Thus speeches should not be dismissed, but they have to be treated with a certain amount of care, case by case. In a few instances, the disparity between speeches and remarks delivered in response to questions is so great that the speeches were given very little weight in determining the officer's position.

³⁵ They are Generals Guillermo Marco del Pont and Enrique Gallegos Venero, and Rear Admiral Jorge Dellepiane with reference to the statements on economic development, Generals Leonidas Rodríguez Figueroa, Jorge Fernandez Maldonado Solari and Raúl Meneses Arata with reference to political statements, and General Angel de la Flor Valle on foreign policy issues. See Sources for more information.

³⁶ El Peruano (25 June 1975).

³⁷ The farmer is the man who works outside the city but for the city. The peasant is doubly exploited: when he buys and when he sells. Expreso (29 November 1975).

³⁸ favored the more modern urban sector, creating profits for the very few and reinforcing the power and consumption habits of these minorities; in this manner, the vicious circle of opulence was closed, around which and without being able to break it, the vicious circle of poverty and under-employment continued to extend itself. Jorge Marco del Pont, "Desarrollo Revolucionario - 1968-1973," Oiga (11 January 1974).

³⁹ Ibid. Tanto y más que el crecimiento económico, interesa como se distribuye la riqueza producida.

⁴⁰ Oiga (19 December 1969). The original Spanish goes "un problema de lujo que el país no puede darse" and "un mercado realmente democrático de las mayorías."

⁴¹ Ibid., lemas que busquen la democratización del consumo y la estructuración de la industria sobre bases reales, lemas como el que ahora en adelante debemos respetar: "Produzcan lo que el Peru consume."

⁴² Expreso (21 May 1972): Elevar a superiores niveles de vida a las mayorías nacionales.

⁴³ Expreso (3 October 1973): a system that one should fear as criollo political bigotry and McCarthyism propose through the reactionary press.

⁴⁴ La Crónica (17 February 1973).

⁴⁵ La Crónica (15 April 1973): Quiero que ellos vayan a ver y dialogar con el pueblo cubano, para que traigan la experiencia del hermano pueblo revolucionario de Cuba y la trasmitan a sus bases.

REFERENCES

⁴⁶For example, while the government was negotiating with the United States, Rodríguez declared: "Si no nos ayudan, aunque sea, sacaremos con las unas el cobre: pero seremos independientes." (Expreso, 21 May 1972)

⁴⁷Interestingly enough, during my stay in Lima from May to September 1976, it was an army officer in active service who posed the "wastefulness" of the automobile industry as an example of unnecessary production in an interview; on the other hand, the automobile industry and Lima's transportation system (a catastrophe from the perspective of urban planning and resource use) was adamantly defended by a businessman as more than adequate for the city's needs.

⁴⁸7 Días (21 November 1975): The only thing we can know for certain [in the agrarian sector] is that we must produce; that's where the essential problem lies and I hope our people will attend to it. If there are obstacles to be vanquished, let's vanquish them.

⁴⁹La Prensa (13 July 1976): Everything in life depends on technicians. That's the truth.

Another Labour Minister, extreme right-winger Air Force General Pedro Sala Orozco, confronted with a question related to the relationship between employment and technology choices, responded that his Ministry was waiting for the arrival of an ILO mission "to help us and to outline a plan that will permit us to resolve the problem." La Nueva Cronica (27 April 1974).

⁵⁰Graham Hurtado, asked about the existence of class conflicts, responded: Ese es un problema muy difícil. A ver, sugieran alguna solución. Yo no soy marxista. Marx decia que la lucha de clases sobrevenia porque había pocos que tenían todo; y muchos que no tenían nada. Pero ese esquema ha desaparecido aquí. Ahora todos tienen algo. Es diferente de la empresa que conocí el marxismo. El Comercio (22 October 1972). And on another occasion, "Se han dado las leyes de Reforma Agraria y Comunidad Industrial, por ejemplo, pero muchos campesinos y obreros siguen comportandose como proletarios. La Crónica (28 December 1972).

⁵¹El Peruano (13 November 1970): eliminates social differences and ends the profound class separation of other epochs whose formal manifestation was always the motivation of conflicts and resentments.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Rodríguez. Caretas (4 November 1972).

⁵⁴Rodríguez, La Crónica (24 February 1973): "alejando del sistema capitalista" is the phrase he uses.

⁵⁵La Crónica (4 November 1972): we want people to understand the reforms, because we know that these measures are not of a taxing character, they do not contain anything restrictive or menacing. Rather, they are measures for the benefit of the great majorities.

[A]ll these transformations, which are designed for the welfare of the national majorities, undoubtedly, in one form or another, affect the interests of small groups; and they affect them, I would say, in a form which is not very serious. They exaggerate the consequences of such measures because they have been accustomed to not lose anything and to get everything they want.... We haven't taken anyone's fortune away. There are still rich men in Peru.

⁵⁶Correo (3 February 1973).

⁵⁷El Comercio (21 September 1975): "Has any labour organization offered an extra hour of work for this Revolution up to date?" It should be recalled that the CGTP was officially recognized for the first time in its history by the military government.

⁵⁸La Prensa (11 April 1970): The principal problem of Peru and some Latin American countries...is poverty and extreme inequality in the distribution of income.

Increasing production does not help at all when social injustice prevails. Abundance is of no use when it is only available to those who consume in excess while the indispensable is not available to others.

⁵⁹Correo (2 July 1972):

1. An inorganic and irrational occupation of national territory which implies an unbalanced urban development.
2. The reduced economic capacity of the population.
3. The reduced real capacity of the country to produce the nominal demand of volume for adequate housing and its associated services.

⁶⁰La Crónica (21 February 1973): In the face of this serious situation in housing, it's easy to see that incentives for private construction are required.

⁶¹La Prensa (16 March 1970): ¿y quien puede hacer todo esta obra grande? El Gobierno Revolucionario? No. No, el Gobierno Revolucionario promueve, pero es la actividad privada que debe hacerlo.

To provide another example, Vice-Admiral Isaias Paredes Arana, Minister of Housing and Construction since June 1975, states:

Para poder satisfacer a la gran demanda de plazas, el Sector (Vivienda) deberá incentivar decididamente la actividad constructora del sector NoPúblico....en el Ministeriode Vivienda y construcción se pondrá especial énfasis a esta política de incentivación. El Peruano (18 October 1975).

⁶²Oiga (28 June 1974): at times even the people fail to understand this important necessity and attack when the state strengthens itself. "Don't you see, the bureaucracy is growing?" The bureaucracy! Certainly it has to grow, because it performs functions of control, vigilance, technification, rational and accelerated development for the country so that the rich won't rob our reserves.

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⁶³Caretas (21 May 1973): consolidación de un sector estatal, pero no en desmedro de la actividad privada normal. En este momento, por ejemplo, hay un campo enorme para la metal mecánica.

⁶⁴Chirinos and Chirinos, op. cit., p. 381. When with acts and words, a climate of exacerbated and violent hatred against the man of enterprise had been created in Peru, presenting him as a relentless and revengeful exploiter, as an egotistical and wicked usufructuary of another's pain and work, as an enemy of the country and its development and progress, the first of our men of enterprise was savagely assassinated.

⁶⁵It must be emphasized again that this analysis attempts to identify general ranges of tendencies in the discourse of the officers and not the actual concrete alliances among them. Thus the economic and political progressives identified here did not constitute a unified group in the conduct of policy. In the case of General Marco del Pont, for example, the progressive position on economic policy was not coupled with a favorable attitude toward mass mobilization; in practice this meant that Marco del Pont did not form part of the progressive "alliance" of officers identified by Pease and Thorndike, for example. But his position on economic policy making was nevertheless significant for the regime's conduct, giving it a progressive thrust.

⁶⁶Correo (25 July 1971): the concept of social mobilization fundamentally implies two things: In the first place, the questioning that the members of marginated social groups make of the role they play in it.... And in the second place, a substantive alteration of the structure of power.

⁶⁷Ibid., la movilización social debe ser generada y conducida por los propios hombres y mujeres de nuestro pueblo.

⁶⁸El Peruano (16 December 1972): Participation is not submissive and uncritical acceptance of what the Revolutionary Government says and does.

⁶⁹La Crónica (5 November 1972).

⁷⁰La Crónica (12 June 1972).

⁷¹La Crónica (5 November 1972).

⁷²General Pedro Richter Prada, Minister of Interior from May 1971 to August 1975. Ultima Hora (20 December 1974).

⁷³El Peruano (16 December 1972): the merit of having permanently denounced and combatted social injustices corresponds to the labour movement...the merit of having been, above all in its beginnings, the vehicle of the revolutionary and libertarian ideas of the past and present centuries.

⁷⁴Jorge Fernandez Maldonado, "Fuerza Armada, Cristianismo y Revolución en el Perú," Oiga (7 September 1973): the vitality of our brave guerrillas

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beneficially nourished the ranks of our army.... A vital and direct point of contact was thus established between the people and its armed forces in every definitive instance of crisis.

⁷⁵Expreso (3 October 1973).

⁷⁶Rodríguez, Oiga (9 July 1971): When the workers and students understand that their leaders will have to effectively come out of their own ranks, those old leaderships will surely be set aside. And in a similar vein, "Las organizaciones populares tarde o temprano pedirán cuentas a la Universidad." Expreso (4 December 1973).

⁷⁷La Crónica (15 April 1973): I believe that the counterrevolutionary press is condemned to disappear, for it's inconceivable, in a revolutionary process, to have the enemy making counter-revolution through the newspapers that circulate in the country.... It is condemned to disappear through the actions of the Peruvian people themselves.

⁷⁸Expreso (3 December 1973): The people will have to check the criminal provocation of the reactionaries and ultras first with the arms of reason but if these groups insist on violence we will have to block them with their own choice of arms.

⁷⁹For example, Rodríguez states: "entender la movilización social como lucha política de masas constituye un craso error de interpretación." Oiga (9 July 1971). Of course, this statement was made during the initial years of the regime, and it can be argued that it is significantly qualified by later statements cited in the text. The logic of a vision in which the people played a determining role led these officers to a more radical position as the conflicts generated by reforms evolved.

⁸⁰He says he rejects "el sistema que impera en los países gobernados por partidos comunistas." Caretas (28 March and April 6, 1972). A year later, he stresses the "fines y metas semejantes" of the Cuban and Peruvian revolutions. Expreso (15 April 1973).

⁸¹La Prensa (20 March 1976).

⁸²La Crónica (2 December 1972).

⁸³La Crónica (28 December 1972): The Agrarian Reform and Industrial Community laws have been promulgated, but many peasants and workers continue behaving like proletarians. More than one peasant wants to return to his former situation and not have to make decisions.

⁸⁴Correo (3 February 1973).

⁸⁵La Prensa (22 August 1971): We are carrying out the postulates of the Revolution, and the people have already understood that everything we do is for their benefit.

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- ⁸⁶ See Montagne, El Peruano (21 November 1970).
- ⁸⁷ La Prensa (21 May 1976): The changes will not consist in eliminating the political aspect, for there will always be politicians, but in searching for a more technical, professional, and social focus within that representativity.
- ⁸⁸ Minister of Transportation and Communications from September 1975 to August 1976.
- ⁸⁹ La Crónica (27 June 1976): In the Armed Forces, we will not accept any retreat; on the contrary, our objective is victory, which entails forging ahead with the fundamental principles which gave origin to the present revolutionary process.
- ⁹⁰ El Peruano (14 December 1974): The work of liberating the workers has to be their own work; in Peru, the armed forces have only given the initial impulse--nothing and no one can replace the effort, skill and responsibility of the worker.
- ⁹¹ La Crónica (9 March 1974): SINAMOS is the object of a systematic campaign of discreditation and even of criminal attacks on the part of the front men of capitalist imperialism, of the delirious ultra-left and the pre-revolutionary political parties that continue wanting to act as the intermediaries between power and the people.
- ⁹² Oiga (26 November 197): One must not look with envy on he who is theoretically higher...and no one should envy the boss, because you have to struggle to make sure that all your sons can be bosses; unfortunately life is not like that, there's a natural selection that takes place little by little, but everyone has to have the same opportunity and the same justice.
- ⁹³ Ibid.
- ⁹⁴ La Crónica (5 August 1972): Salary increases have to be made in direct relation to increases in productivity and production, in order to guarantee the enterprise.
- ⁹⁵ La Crónica (1 May 1973): has to take on a new character and stamp its activities with a new orientation, channeling the organized action of the workers to the unquestionable reality through which we are living, in which traditional slogans like the class struggle will play no part and tend to disappear.
- ⁹⁶ La Crónica (22 November 1972): people are NOT ready to make sacrifices....The revolution is made with work and sacrifice and 14 million Peruvians have to understand that.

⁹⁷ Oiga (28 June 1974): We have struggled together with the fishermen. And no one to date has heard a complaint from these workers. That is why I love them; that's why I get along well with them. And they get along with me because they knew for sure that we were struggling together. And they now work at all levels in the ministry and in Pesca Peru, participating actively.

⁹⁸ Tantaleán, La Crónica (20 August 1975): debe aceptar la Revolución con todos sus aciertos y errores y criticarle por canales debidos.

⁹⁹ Sala Orozco, Ultima Hora (31 December 1974).

¹⁰⁰ La Crónica (31 January 1975): A la gente que apoya la acogemos, seguramente tienen errores, pero francamente no me explico por que los califican de fascistas.

¹⁰¹ Laclau, with reference to "jacobin interpellations" in European fascist movements, op. cit., p. 121.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 111.

¹⁰³ Arno J. Mayer, Dynamics of Counterrevolution in Europe, 1870-1956: An Analytic Framework (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 45.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ The information was obtained from the curriculum vitae of the officers (they are published in the official government paper, El Peruano, upon the officer's appointment to a ministerial-level position), from newspaper stories about them, and from interviews with knowledgeable civilians.

¹⁰⁶ See Thorndike for a lively description of Velasco's family background. Op. cit., pp. 43-45.

¹⁰⁷ See Janet E. Worrall, "Italian Immigration to Peru: 1860-1914" (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Indiana, 1972). The dissertation includes a discussion of immigrant communities of other nationalities and an analysis of their role in Peruvian society after the First World War halted new arrivals in substantial numbers.

¹⁰⁸ The wives' families should also be analyzed; the information I obtained is too sketchy to warrant discussion.

¹⁰⁹ See Jose Nún, "The Middle-Class Military Coup Revisited," in Abraham F. Lowenthal (ed.), Armies and Politics in Latin America (New York, Holmes & Meier, 1976).

¹¹⁰ Laclau, op. cit., pp. 113-114, emphasis in the original. See also Liisa North and Jose Nún, "A Military Coup is a Military Coup...or is it?" Canadian Journal of Political Science XI:1 (March 1978). We argue there:

REFERENCES

"in a capitalist formation, the orientations of officers are determined simultaneously, but in different degrees depending on the context, by: (a) class origin; (b) class position; (c) their existence as a specific social category; and (d) their specific position within the state apparatuses. That is why the analysis becomes so difficult and generalizations without contextual and historical foundations are misleading." Further, "even during 'normal times' (that is, when the dominant ideology is most firmly rooted), officers may identify their interests in different ways precisely because of the complexity of causal factors and sequences suggested above; the problem is aggravated considerably in moments of crisis when the cracks in the ideological cement expand." p. 172.

¹¹¹Op. cit., p. 117.

¹¹²Liisa North, op. cit., pp. 3-18.

¹¹³Baella Tuesta, op. cit., p. 82: "the brain wash which the cursillista catholic priests who were compromised with the left put together." Cursillista refers to the organization of short courses on Christian morality and philosophy. Baella Tuesta continues: los curas cursillistas y comprometidos con el marxismo, deformados sus esquemas políticos con una mala interpretación de la Iglesia Post Conciliar se lanzaron, con rabia, a la destrucción del sistema sin ofrecer sino frases vacias en sustitución, abriendo de este modo el camino para el triunfo comunista." Priests deformed in their thinking run through the pages of Chirinos and Chirinos (op. cit.) also. The Chirinos cousins have already been identified; Baella Tuesta occupied an important position on the staff of El Comercio, ran on an Acción Popular list for Senator from Amazonas, and later became the director of El Tiempo, an independent political journal of the extreme right.

¹¹⁴Expreso (22 August 1972): he admitted that "it was the guerrillas who rang the bell that awakened the military to the reality of the country...." He added that at the moment that the guerrilla focus appeared, it was the Army that said that this problem was not going to be resolved with bullets. And that is why it presented the development plan for La Convención Valley.

¹¹⁵The references to the first two have already been given. The third is Pedro G. Beltrán, La Verdadera Realidad Peruana (Madrid: Libreria Editorial San Martín, 1976). Beltrán was the owner and editor of La Prensa before its expropriation by the government in July 1976.

¹¹⁶The precise role of gossip in the political process is a difficult problem but it is certainly significant. A conservative Acción Popular-affiliated journalist once explained to me that the best place to plant a rumour was with an Apra party leader; because the party maintained a good organization, the rumour would quickly spread, becoming common knowledge to which a newspaper could later refer as fact.

¹¹⁷Baella Tuesta tells us that Velasco was a man "sin curriculum, nada elegante and sin cultura." Op. cit., p. 21.

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- 118 Beltran, op. cit., p. 142.
- 119 See Carlos Delgado, Revolución Peruana: Autonomía y Deslindes (Lima: Editorial Universo, 1975).
- 120 Hugo Neira, "Prologue" to Delgado, op. cit., p. 13: In Peru today, political micro-societies are being created: SAIS, cooperatives, agrarian leagues, labour communities. In them, this participatory socialism is being carried out.
- 121 Bejar, op. cit., p. 127.
- 122 Ibid., pp. 177-178.
- 123 Ibid., pp. 182-183. For a critique of excessive import substituting industrialization from a surprising source, see Raúl Prebisch, "Crítica al capitalismo periférico," Revista de la Cepal (Primer semestre de 1976). For an analysis of the role of the agrarian sector in the development of the Third World countries, see the earlier-cited works of Louis Lefebvre.

Sources

I went to Lima in May 1976 to interview members of the military government on their attitudes toward mass mobilization and socio-economic development, on their perceptions of the military institution, and to acquire information on their social backgrounds and career experiences. The acute political and economic crisis of the country, and the still-raging conflicts inside the armed forces, made officers decidedly unreceptive to interviews by a foreign political scientist; the generals had more important matters to take care of. During my four months in Lima, I finally did manage to obtain lengthy interviews with six officers and hold discussions with a large number of civilians--businessmen, former and continuing civilian advisers to the military government, academics, left opponents of the military. They shall remain unnamed, but I thank them all for patiently explaining their views on the "Peruvian process." The arguments presented in the paper owe a great deal to these interviews, but the primary sources cited come from the clippings archive of La Prensa. I owe a special thanks to the archive staff for helping me track down the statements of officers unwilling to say "yes" to my pestering request for an interview.

The primary sources for the paper are listed below, grouped according to the five tendencies identified in the paper. Within each tendency, army officers are listed first, followed by the air force and the navy, with the officers appearing in alphabetical order. Items are identified as an "interview," or "speech;" items which are not identified in this way are stories about the minister, often including extensive quotation. For 31 of the 59 officers (53 percent of the total), extensive interviews with journalists were found in the archive of La Prensa.

Progressives

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Air Force

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Navy

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Extreme Right

Army

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Eduardo Segura Gutierrez: Head, National System of Information (Jan. 1972-Aug. 1975). El Peruano (10 Oct. 1972), speech; La Crónica (10 Oct. 1973), speech.

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Air Force

Pedro Sala Orozco: Minister of Labor (Oct. 1970-Dec. 1974). La Crónica (5 Aug. 1972), interview; La Crónica (1 May 1973), interview; La Crónica (27 Apr. 1974), interview; La Prensa (1 May 1974); La Prensa (9 May 1974); La Prensa (16 Nov. 1974); Correo (16 Nov. 1974); Ultima Hora (31 Dec. 1974); Correo (7 Jan. 1975); Ultima Hora (21 Jan. 1975); La Crónica (23 Jan. 1975); Expreso (25 Jan. 1975); Expreso (8 Apr. 1975); Expreso (24 Aug. 1975).

Navy

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Velasco's speeches up to 1973 may be found collected in: Gral. Juan Velasco Alvarado, La Revolución Peruana (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1973).