Number 25

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND THE REVOLUTION: LESSONS FROM RURAL PERU

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Authors' note: This paper was presented at the November 2-4, 1978 Workshop on "The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered" organized by the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. 20560. The views expressed are those of the authors personally. No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form without the authors' permission.

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ABSTRACT

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This paper assesses the interplay between the military government's strategies for restructuring popular participation and the responses of local citizens to those efforts. The evidence for this analysis is drawn from three marginated sierra districts composed of peasant communities and a stock-raising hacienda (which was transformed into an agrarian cooperative). The authors examine the nature of rural change with particular emphasis on the development of network strategies by local populations to broaden their options in the face of the changing circumstances of rural life. They find that on the one hand the military's reforms were limited by long-term patterns of social and economic change such as increased coastal-sierra contact and migration. On the other hand the military government's implementation efforts, particularly the work of SINAMOS and Ministry of Agriculture extension agents, adversely affected the attempted reforms. The military itself could not replace the network systems, and the agents it selected to provide this linkage were viewed as inadequate by local populations. The authors argue that the success and failure of military efforts at reorganizing local-level participation were directly related to the perceived impact of proposed policies on the network strategies previously formulated by local populations to foster their own development.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND THE REVOLUTION: LESSONS FROM RURAL PERU

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This paper addresses local-level responses to the initiatives of the Peruvian military government from 1968 to 1978 in two rural situations: the campesino community and the traditional highland hacienda. We suggest that in order to come to an understanding of patterns of rural participation, it is important to see peasant agriculturalists and hacienda laborers as active analysts of the political and economic environments they inhabit. Rural populations' analyses and perceptions of national and regional society are culturally shared, though not necessarily unitary or homogeneous. They are products of the internal organization of rural communities, of the histories of rural-urban contact, and of rural experiments in economic development. In the present investigation we attempt to show more precisely which factors shaped peasant political world-views and responses to governmental initiatives during the Peruvian revolution. Our findings may surprise those who would argue that class interests dominate peasants' and rural laborers' political thinking. In this paper we will make a strong case for the interplay of network strategies and economic interests as key factors which jointly shaped political perceptions and strategies for participation.[1]

We argue that changes in local-level participation under the military government are best understood through changing network patterns. Networks increase individuals' access to a broad range of resources in Peru: to agricultural products, education, employment, housing, and child-care. They have become the backbone of sierra-coastal exchange arising from the economic specializations and increasing integration of these two zones.[2] Sierra agricultural products flow to the coast (outside the marketing system of the cash economy) through networks.[3] Staples such as potatoes and cheese are continually sent to coastal kin. The sierra connections also take care of urbanites' homesites, landholdings, and livestock in rural communities. When times are difficult, the sierra outposts offer refuge to urban kin who are between jobs or need someone to take care of their small children. In exchange, urban members of the networks help migrants who need subsidized housing to continue their education on the coast or to look for employment. In some cases, sierra migrants on the coast have built up successful businesses which serve as direct sources of employment for network members who have migrated to the coast.[4]

Present-day networks in rural Peru are most likely the cultural descendants of earlier forms of adaptation to the vertical zonation of Andean ecology. In the past, members of a highland population would systematically disperse themselves throughout a series of ecological niches to maximize the total population's access to crucial resources and optimal regions for agriculture and animal husbandry.[5] Complex traditional patterns of reciprocity and exchange between ecological zones persist from those earlier periods to the present.[6] From one point of view, networks can be seen as an extension

of traditional Andean ecological adaptations to a new niche, the urban mestizo coast. Patterns of 20th-century reciprocity not only integrate ecological zones; they also cross-cut the social divisions of class, ethnicity, and regionality in modern society.[7]

Rural populations have not been the only developers of the network strategy for increasing access to crucial resources in Peru. Coastal and provincial elites have long participated in networks of individuals who stress the interconnections of class, high culture, patronage, and old family ties.[8] Elite ties also have penetrated rural society through sets of ranked patron-client relationships. In the present, rural populations have elaborated the kinship dimension of networks and created variants which in some cases are less hierarchical and more group-oriented than patron-client dyads.[9] Networks are used as an organizational form that allows individuals to broaden their options in the face of economic insecurities characteristic of contemporary peasant life. Network adaptations have been elaborated and transformed through increasing contact with coastal economies and severely limited land resources and employment opportunities in rural communities.

Rural networks are informal organizations which often build on a very flexible and manipulatable sense of kinship. Kin connections are traced through blood relatives, in-laws, and godparent-coparent relationships, and may be defined broadly or narrowly. Definitions of who is a kinsperson may be widened in some contexts and not others; they may be strategically changed over time to recruit additional people into the network. Close affiliates in a particular network point to kinship ties as the underlying justification for an added dimension of "trust" in interpersonal dealings and as a basis for mutual assistance.

The growing importance of networks in rural society is part of a broader set of changes accompanying increased rural-urban migration, the extension of roads and communications systems, and the integration of the sierra into coastal economies, lifestyles, and values in this century. Inter-regional contact has been fostered through political, economic, and familial/social organizations cross-cutting hundreds of miles and thousands of feet of geographical barriers. Such organizations have had tremendous influence on sierra life. Politically, coastal unions, parties, and the Catholic Church have expanded their recruitment of, and concern for, the peasantry.[10] Economically, sierra farmers have become heavily involved in the production of cash crops and in the consumption of commercial products from the coast. In terms of family organization, rural inhabitants have begun to construct rural-urban kin networks to facilitate education and to enhance social and occupational mobility.

Political, economic, and familial adaptations to increasing coastal contact were well under way before the military came to power and no doubt will continue regardless of a return to civilian government. Nevertheless, the policies of the Revolutionary Government of Peru, both intentionally and obliquely, have had an impact on the formation of these networks. We

will argue that rural citizens have responded to government policies in light of their perceptions of the impact of specific policies on their networking possibilities.[11]

In the Peruvian sierra, both peasant communities and haciendas were the focus of government policy in the Agrarian Reform Law of 1969. The law called for fundamental changes in the economic and political arrangements within each rural situation in line with the government's ideological commitments and its intentions for restructuring Peruvian society. In addition to new land-tenure relations, the government's reforms were designed to realign personal power relations within the rural sector. Fundamental to the realignment was a change in the nature of rural participation. We will concentrate on those aspects of the military government's policies and practices which directly affected the nature of local-level participation in national society--for example, the new organizational forms required by the agrarian reform, the extension of governmental services and institutions such as SINAMOS to rural settlements, and the attempts to eliminate political competitors who had been active in rural life before the 1968 revolution and who were perceived by local populations as important links in the development strategies they had developed.

Our data for this analysis are drawn from three districts--Santa Leonor, Checras, and Pachangara--on the western slopes of the Andes in the rural hinterlands of the department of Lima. Located along the border between the departments of Lima and Cerro de Pasco, this region is a rugged, marginal area of the Peruvian sierra. The region's isolation and valley-mountaintop settlement pattern are typical products of sierra geography, in which small tributaries flow down the western slopes of the Andes through narrow channels until they reach the broad valleys of the Pacific coast. In this case, access roads along the narrow valley bottom (at 2,500 meters) arrived in the 1950's and reached the first high-altitude campesino communities (at 3,200 meters) in the late 1960's. The hacienda's access road, which is continually washed out by flooding along the valley bottom, is still incomplete, and at least five of the 14 campesino communities in the three districts still lack access roads. This is a bilingual area where the 1972 census puts the literacy rate at 62 percent of the population over five years of age. None of the communities has electricity; potable water is available at several points within all the communities, but only very rarely in private homes. There are no sewage facilities. A sanitary post to serve all three districts was constructed in 1977 in one of the central valley towns, but no physician or nurse had been located to staff the facility.

One might expect this region to have fared similarly to other marginal rural sectors--that is, to have received proportionally less attention from the military government, which put its best efforts into the more mobilized areas.[12] Despite its marginal characteristics, however, the Peruvian revolution has influenced life in this region and has been followed closely by its inhabitants. Furthermore, the experiences of these three districts suggest important lessons about the limitations of the government's reforms and development efforts in their conception as well as their implementation. We will begin our case studies of political participation and perception

by examining social change and responses to governmental policy in officially recognized peasant communities in the districts of Checras and Santa Leonor.

Peasant Communities: Conflicting Values of Collectivism and Individualism

In the peasant communities of these rural districts, two fundamental changes appear to have wide-ranging implications for all of community life. The first is a greatly increased individualism and importance of private concerns. Individualism and property ownership have covaried with increasing wealth differences among comuneros. The second change has to do with the nature and growing importance of rural-urban linkages between the communities and urban coastal areas. Both tendencies predate the advent of the military government; neither was a result of its policies.[13] The roots of these changes can be seen in oral historical accounts of these communities at the turn of the century. Individual peasant families are portrayed as having dominated the regional economy and politics by manipulating the provincial judiciary, by defrauding other peasants of their lands, and by maintaining cultural and political ties to the coast. Descendants of those families that consolidated their status and wealth earlier in the century still monopolize the upper levels of the peasantry.

In the 20th century these trends continued. The desire to supplement communal landholdings with clearly bounded private lands planted in cash crops has spread to all segments of the rural population. So too has the concern with maintaining economically advantageous ties with the coast. Through local oral histories, today's comuneros argue that the spread of access to private property and coastal networks resulted from a rejection of the political dominance of regional strongmen by the peasantry. Nevertheless, wealthier peasants have managed to stay on the top of more recent economic changes in the region.

Currently, campesino communities throughout this region are characterized by a great deal of tension between collectivist organization and individual differences in wealth and class position. On the one hand, peasant communities define membership in terms of the duties to collaborate in public works, the cultivation of communal fields, the care of communal dairy herds, and the local administration of the settlement. In return, citizens are given access to inalienable communal lands on which subsistence crops of potatoes are cultivated. Proceeds from communal harvests of special community fields are earmarked for local development projects, such as school buildings, public water fountains, and the repair of irrigation works. In addition, part of the harvest is stored and drawn on by individuals in serious financial need due to crop failure. The collectivist model of community calls on all heads of households to participate in the civil administration of the settlement. In theory, each comunero rotates through all local political offices during his lifetime. Each adult male at some point heads the community as its president.

On the other hand, peasant communities have been marked by class differences between wealthy landowners and stockraisers, small independent farmers, and workers who must supplement cultivation of communal parcels with wage labor. Differences in class position are defined by access to capital in the

form of land and livestock and by economic roles as employers or part-time laborers. Class differences appear to have increased with growing commercial ties to the coast. Inheritance and marriage patterns have tended to maintain capital within the same range of families from generation to generation.

Increasing class stratification has fostered another model of community and very different ideas about local development in the minds of local residents. Some individuals see neighboring community governments as competing with each other for ties to national organizations that will benefit local development. They believe that those communities with the best connections to the center will benefit economically with new schools and perhaps new farming technology. For these individuals, political participation involves forging effective ties with provincial and national political officials who will give a community an inside track on new programs and opportunities. Local elites realize that not all members of peasant communities are committed to this image of development and that not all comuneros have the literacy skills, articulateness in Spanish, and social confidence to deal with coastal authorities. Elites believe that only those individuals with the appropriate skills should be elected to the office of president of the community. They strongly oppose the communal model of a rotating presidency. Many communities adopted a strategy to balance these claims by electing a personero to represent the community outside its borders. In some instances the personero lived primarily outside the community.

The debate between collectivist and individualistic, class-based notions of political office and community development continues in peasant communities. Some communities resolved it by electing two administrative officers: the personero to specialize in dealings with coastal officials and the president to deal with the internal affairs of the settlement.[14] In other communities there have been continual disagreements over local development strategies, without resolution and with continued antagonism.[15] For instance, members of one peasant community founded a sheep cooperative and argued over whether all members should have equivalent shares in the cooperative or whether individuals with additional sheep might increase their investments and thus receive higher returns. In this particular case the more egalitarian model won, although in another local development project involving the extension of potable water to homesites, the more individualistic, class-oriented segment of the population carried the day. In this instance, the community treasury paid for the installation of tubing to the settlement and individuals paid for connections to their homes. Only those with sufficient money to pay for the homesite connections received the direct benefit of the community's investment in tubing.

Peasant communities in this region have experienced a series of changes that have restructured communities and shaped strategies for dealing with economic uncertainty, for interaction with the national political system, and for local development. Increasing integration into national society has promoted class stratification and networks leading to the coast. One might argue at this point that the crucial variable for explaining rural political values and participation is economic class. An examination of rural responses to military government policy, however, demonstrates that opposition to policies which threatened network solutions came from all strata of the community. In short, impoverished peasants who stood to benefit from reforms resisted them because they ran counter to previously developed solutions to deal with economic marginality and increasing national integration.

The Military Government and Rural Policy

The military government proposed a corporatist model of social organization and participation for the restructuring of Peruvian society, promising that this would bring about a fairer and more equitable social order. By corporatist, they meant a society that stressed the interdependence of hierarchically arranged parts which could be coordinated to operate in a harmonious fashion, avoiding class conflict. In political rhetoric they emphasized the creation of a society grounded in collectivist as opposed to individualist principles. Ideally, it was to be a society based on the solidarity of citizen concerns, particularly citizens within the same sector of the economy, which would in turn be channeled into cooperative organizational forms.[16]

In the agrarian sector, the national government's efforts to apply this formula included a restructuring of the productive bases, substituting a variety of agrarian cooperatives for the contrasting latifundia and minifundia which characterized pre-1968 land tenure. The Peruvian agricultural reform called for the creation of cooperatives based on the joint ownership of land, shared profits, and a participatory decision-making structure to include representatives from all sectors of the agricultural cooperative.[17] The corporate principles and the organizational forms derived from such principles assumed a commonality of interests in the countryside and particularly among the peasantry.

The national government's theoreticians believed that such a set of collective institutions called for the creation of a "new Peruvian man." Peruvian society had been characterized by the government's leading intellectual spokesman as marked by an especially rigid system of social mobility.[18] Delgado argued that the prevailing ethic of arribismo helped to create social systems in which all individuals operated on the assumption that their upward movement in the social order had to be matched by someone's downward movement and vice versa. Moreover, this attitude applied, according to Delgado, to all levels of Peruvian society and was found in the urban and middle class as well as among the peasantry.

Prior to 1968, the prevailing national elites subscribed to this principle while, in theory, being disadvantaged by it in the event of increased mobility by other sectors of the population. Actually they had been able to manipulate arribismo to their own advantage by responding to the desires of new sectors of Peruvian society for greater participation by "segmentary incorporation."[19] This is a process in which new claimants are carefully and separately absorbed into the prevailing system so that they will not cause disruption or detract from the advantages presently enjoyed by the established elites.

Most observers of the national government argue that the outcome of governmental reforms since 1968 has been to continue the process of segmentary incorporation, rather than to alleviate inequality by creating a new corporate social order.[20] For example, in the case of agrarian reform, the upper levels of the peasantry and the most privileged members of the agricultural sector have benefitted disproportionately despite the reform's emphasis on collective and cooperative forms of ownership.[21] One of a series of reasons for this outcome was the discrepancy between government policy and peasant perceptions

of the appropriate strategies for collective action. This discrepancy is clearly evident in the case of government policy toward the rural sector. Local citizens' ideas about the most effective mechanisms for interaction with the political system, developed under previous regimes, informed the responses of the peasantry to the national government's initiatives.

Initial national policy toward the campesino communities was aimed at emphasizing notions of highland communities as "natural, communistic, and cooperative," linked to a proud Inca past. The government sought to rekindle this ideal as a source of common pride.[22] Yet, this view of the communities had long been challenged in the anthropological literature.[23] The government agency charged with implementing the law knew that it was engaged in an uphill battle with respect to the communities, which had become bastions of private property and individualistic values.

For example, the Statute of Peasant Communities (Supreme Decree No. 37-70A), and specifically Title IV and Article 23 of the law, attempted to restrict membership in the community and the use of land only to official heads of households (called comuneros) exclusively engaged in agriculture. This reform, as an attempt to equalize relations among comuneros, was met with very strong criticism. Opposition was so marked that the law was finally relaxed to allow comuneros with nonagricultural incomes to maintain their rights within the community.[24] Those peasants who were threatened by the law and argued to maintain their rights as comuneros often were the wealthiest members of their communities. They supplemented agricultural incomes with seasonal migration and jobs on the coast, with a local shop or tavern, or with a position in the state bureaucracy--for example, as a local school teacher. These comuneros often held considerable amounts of the best irrigated land and hired land-poor comuneros to work their private holdings as day laborers, thus freeing the wealthiest for additional remunerative pursuits.

Recognition of this inequity had prompted the office of the Agrarian Reform to propose the restriction. Ultimately, governmental officials counted on their position as the final adjudicating agents in such disputes to resolve the question along the lines of the proposed legislation.[25] Thus, if land-poor comuneros decided to use the legislation to oust some of their more powerful members, the Agrarian Reform office would be in a position to support their claims.[26] What officials did not calculate accurately was the level of opposition that would be aroused, even from among the comuneros with limited resources who were to be the beneficiaries of this legislation.

In the peasant communities of these districts, comuneros from all economic levels opposed the law, recognizing that the policy would have deprived both communities and individual peasants of important contacts and linkages to coastal society. These linkages are established and widened through commercial connections to the coast, through kinship networks created to assist those searching for coastal employment, and through local jobs in national bureaucracies. Peasants have observed that success in the political system is based on the contacts and influence which individuals have with strategic members of coastal society. In the past, when individuals or

communities have lacked contacts with coastal power-brokers (such as lawyers, political leaders, and members of the bureaucracy), their cases have been lost. When such ties have been successfully established and exploited, individuals and communities have enjoyed the benefits. The peasants see this as a competitive process: both individuals and communities must compete for the best ties to the center. Thus, when the national policies were perceived as cutting back on such important ties, the communities insisted that the law be changed.

The military government's efforts to emphasize a more communal cooperative organization in the community met with resistance, as did their efforts to redistribute wealth. In the first instance, there was relatively little interest in a socialistic, communal reorganization because experience had led to the development of more individualist strategies. In the second instance, the efforts at increased egalitarianism ran counter to the strategies developed to gain influence in the larger society by all strata of the local communities.[27]

In addition to attempts to restructure the communities, the military government also sought to substitute government participatory institutions for those which had operated prior to 1968.[28] In the three districts under discussion, the most active pre-1968 groups had been Cooperación Popular, the self-help organization instituted under the Belaúnde regime; the Institute of Rural Education, sponsored by the Catholic church; and Aprista politicians and union organizers.

SINAMOS was the military government's answer to the linkages and opportunities provided by these prior organizations. Cooperación Popular died with the Belaúnde government though its functions were to be continued by SINAMOS. Rural comuneros found the new government agency an inadequate substitute for previous opportunities. Both Woy[29] and McClintock[30] have described the internal contradictions which SINAMOS faced. In these rural areas one saw the consequences of such organizational problems writ large. Promotores appeared in the rural communities, gave speeches outlining the reforms, but had no power to implement change. One local resident explained his own and community reactions to the SINAMOS talks:

> They tried to make us change to a more cooperative basis. But we are used to working on the basis of private property and that is what we intend to continue to do. We've always helped out the less fortunate in the community.

Without the organizational ability to remain in a community and insist upon direct change, SINAMOS speeches went unheeded.

In an attempt to engender local support, SINAMOS initiated a road-building project paralleling the previously successful activities of Cooperación Popular. The engineering for the project was disastrous and the project had to be abandoned in midstream. The SINAMOS sign stands at the abandoned work-site and local comuneros point it out as an example of the inadequacy of military government agencies.

The military government also sent an agent of the Ministry of Agriculture to Checras and Santa Leonor. The young man was ill-prepared to work in the rural areas, seldom went to the communities, and dedicated himself to football in the local commercial center. Rural citizens continually pointed out that he drew a steady and substantial (by local standards) salary from the government but brought no benefits to their area. He was too young, too inexperienced, and in their evaluation totally uninterested in his mission.

These two examples of the military government's efforts to implement its policy through the extension of state agencies suggest the inadequacy of personnel for the task. In both instances, SINAMOS and extension agents were ineffective in furthering the goals of the government, and had an overall negative impact on local citizens' evaluations of governmental policies. Moreover, because the military promoted their own organizations (however inadequately) by restricting the operation of competitive groups, agencies such as the Institute of Rural Education and Apra's FENCAP were less involved. This again signaled to local citizens a cutback in their network system.

We have described a rejection of governmental initiatives in peasant communities. However, this was not the only rural response to the military government's reform policies. We now turn to an examination of political participation and perception on an hacienda in this region. On the hacienda of Huancahuasi, workers were initially attracted to the rhetoric of social change but were subsequently displeased by the implementation of agrarian reform legislation. To understand the resulting patterns of political participation, we will again turn to an examination of broader trends of social and economic change in the sierra.

From an Hacienda to an Agrarian Production Cooperative

The restructuring of campesino communities was a low priority in the list of reforms planned by the military government, despite the government's insistence on the communities' centrality.[31] Most planners did not look forward to dealing with small, isolated communities which produced marginal economic surpluses. They knew that attempts to restructure the administrative organization and restrict community membership would present a new battle in each peasant community. A much higher priority for directed social change was the hacienda, a symbol of the old order that the revolutionary government wanted to transform. In contrast to peasant communities, on the hacienda the exploiter and exploited were clearly demarcated groups. The government aimed to destroy the economic and political dominance of traditional landed elites by expropriating the extensive hacienda landholdings and reorganizing agrarian production into cooperatives. Commercial haciendas on the coast were the first to be affected by agrarian reforms since they were important exporters of sugar cane, cotton, and rice. Later the reform turned to smaller, less productive haciendas such as Huancahuasi in more isolated areas.

Laborers on Huancahuasi favored the military government's agrarian reforms, which they saw as potentially benefiting hacienda laborers. Some workers were politically seasoned by earlier involvements in the formation of an Apra union on the hacienda; others had received leadership-training at a

Church-sponsored development institute in Huacho. All laborers could see the signs of impending change in the early seventies as the owners of the hacienda stopped investment and began to decapitalize Huancahuasi. Workers reacted with increased efforts to bring the agrarian reform to the region. They looked forward to greater involvement in decision-making on the hacienda and to higher earnings after the agrarian reform. Some laborers felt they had developed untapped administrative skills during their years of service to the hacienda. They looked to the reform as a chance for occupational mobility and higher incomes. In short, workers initially felt that the rhetoric of the revolution and the evolving government policy represented positive alternatives to the traditional economic organization of the hacienda.

Despite some similarities, the economic bases of the hacienda and the peasant communities differ remarkably. Most importantly for our discussion, the effect of the hacienda's economic system was to limit laborers' possibilities for establishing networks that cross-cut economic class and sierra-coast distinctions outside of their relationships with the owner's family.[32] In addition, in the peasant communities access to resources for a minimal subsistence is given to heads of households in exchange for participation in communal work projects, communal cultivation, and the administration of the town. On the hacienda, access to crucial resources is dependent on completing wage labor for the owners. Workers were excluded from any but the minimal amount of capital accumulation. The wages paid laborers on the hacienda have always been less than the minimum offered to male day laborers in neighboring peasant communities. Nor could laborers aspire to class mobility as independent farmers or merchants. Workers felt that the agrarian reform would allow them to participate in local decisions and self-government, would broaden the range of jobs open to workers, and would potentially give workers more direct ties to coastal officials in government ministries.

The hacienda Huancahuasi was not expropriated by the Agrarian Reform until 1976. The workers on the hacienda had petitioned for the reform from 1969 on, but the owners and administrators of Huancahuasi had been successful in staving off agrarian reform officials until very late in the process. This afforded the owners sufficient time to decapitalize the hacienda by selling off the most valuable property and animals. The period from 1969 to 1976 witnessed the steady economic deterioration of the hacienda and increased strain in the relations between workers and administrators. From an earlier 4,000 head of sheep the herd dropped to only 1,000, including the lower-quality huaccha of the workers. From 2,000 head of cattle in 1968, the herd declined to only 500 head. By late in 1974, the workers had been able legally to limit the sale of hacienda cattle by the owners. When this occurred the owners countered that they were so strapped for cash that it would be impossible for them to pay workers' wages. Workers without cash incomes turned to their own plots, and production on the hacienda further declined.

Huancahuasi was a relatively productive traditional stock-raising hacienda until the late 1950s, employing some 80 laborers who were housed with their families in a central hacienda settlement. By local reputation, the Brown Swiss dairy cattle were of excellent quality, as were the sheep. The hacienda produced butter and a milk-based sweet, as well as selling cattle to the coast. With the death of the owner in 1960, his widow and sister inherited the property

and left daily operations to distant kin. These administrators had lived on the hacienda and were happy to manage the property. They had distant kin ties with some of the laborers' families and established a network of fictive kin ties with others. One administrator became primarily responsible for the hacienda itself; the other specialized in the administration of the hacienda's small hotel and hot mineral baths located in a lower valley in the commercial settlement of Chiuchin. Favored laborers from the hacienda were trained by the manager of the hotel to work at the rustic tourist hotel as cooks, houseboys, and workers. These jobs were relatively lucrative positions, particularly when combined with land on the hacienda for family use and the right to graze sheep on the hacienda property.

The administrators of the hacienda and hotel saw the agrarian reforms as destructive to employer-employee relations and the hacienda's productivity. They felt that the government was corrupt while claiming morality, that reforms were misleading workers into believing that they would become owners exempt from hard work once the expropriation went through, and that the government uncritically favored workers in formal complaints filed against employers at the Ministry of Labor. The group most responsible for the problems the administrators encountered were the SINAMOS promotores who visited the hacienda to give a series of talks. In the administrators' estimation, the promotores were responsible for convincing the workers that the reform was imminent. In the meantime, to help retard the march of the reform, the administrators entertained officials of the agrarian reform at the tourist hotel and thermal baths in hopes of delaying the inevitable.

The hacienda workers in 1974 were still organized in a union affiliated with FENCAP and the CTP, two Aprista organizations. The Apristas had been helpful to the workers in founding the union in the late fifties and early sixties. Apra and Aprista lawyers are still held in high esteem by the hacienda workers for the role they played. One of the youths of the hacienda had been sent to the United States on a scholarship from the National Farmers Union. This opportunity was also a result of Aprista ties and sponsorship. In addition to the Aprista ties, several workers on the hacienda had attended courses given by the Institute of Rural Education, a Catholic organization committed to the capacitation of peasants. The Institute's courses had given the workers some sense of cooperative organization and a series of ties to highly placed individuals in the Agrarian Reform. The workers tried to use their ties with such individuals to speed the reform to their areas, but by 1974 nothing had yet occurred. The reform was to have been applied in June, but by August of that year there still had been no action. Workers became frustrated at the government's slowness in acting and expressed doubts about the sincerity of the reform.

Finally, in July 1976, the hacienda Huancahuasi was turned over to the workers on a trial basis for a year. The trial expropriation was the result of the persistence of the workers. Early that year the rumor reached workers that there were plans to divide hacienda land among neighboring peasant communities which had claims against the hacienda. The workers feared that they would be left without anything despite their years of working the land. They began renewed pressure on the Office of the Agrarian Reform and eventually

succeeded in having their claims recognized. The tension between hacienda workers and members of peasant communities was one of the great conflicts in the application of the reforms in the sierra, belying the diverse and conflicting interests of the rural peasantries.

In 1977, Huancahuasi became Agrarian Production Cooperative Atahualpa. In July of 1978, after a year of operation as a cooperative, the workers were not ready to say that they were any better off than they had been, but they felt that they were no worse off. The cooperative organization brought with it difficulties and exacerbated the tensions between the workers and the government. Workers had been led to believe by government rhetoric and SINAMOS that they would become the owners of the new cooperative. They resented and resisted the role of the Ministry of Agriculture as proprietor, administrator, and rule-maker. The Ministry's attempts to eliminate family rights to land for private cultivation and the pasturing of privately owned sheep were both protested and resisted. The workers insisted that they had to have these private forms of income to make ends meet. In short, the workers resisted government attempts that would have resulted in their proletarianization. In these two cases their efforts were successful; the Ministry dropped its limitations on workers' access to fields for cultivation and sheep-pasturing.

These attempts to resist proletarianization should not be read as resistance to the concepts of cooperative organization of property. In fact, the workers have made several attempts to reduce differences in wealth among themselves. Workers decided that there should be limits placed on amounts of private livestock owned by individuals working at the cooperative. The four or five workers who had amassed larger private herds were asked to sell excess livestock so that all workers would have roughly comparable private herds. In addition there was an attempt to experiment with rotation in the work of the cooperative, with everyone doing his turn on the administrative board as well as in the more isolated high pastures where sheep and cattle are cared for. Both initiatives were resisted by those groups who stood to lose most. In the case of the rotation of offices, those workers who had held favored jobs on the former hacienda in the hotel and thermal baths were hardest hit. These workers expected to find their enhanced skills recognized by the other workers and rewarded by positions of authority within the new structure. In the first year of the cooperative they often held such jobs, but in the second year, when they were asked to take on some of the less attractive jobs as shepherds, they refused. They argued that such work is inappropriate for men of their training and ability; that pasturing is not hard work, and takes little intelligence or education but considerable physical adjustment to the cold and isolation. Privileged workers in the old order asserted that they were not as adapted to the higher altitudes as the shepherds, but that they did have the specialized skills for administration.

Actually, on the hacienda, both herders and hotel employees had special privileges. High-altitude shepherds often owned extensive private herds which they took care of along with hacienda livestock. Jobs as high-altitude herders became much less attractive with limitations placed on private-herd size. On the other hand, workers at the hotel and baths had access to a higher standard of living, schools for their children, and occasional extra earnings from national tourism. Those workers from the hotel and baths who

looked with interest at administrative positions in the cooperative also favored a limit of individual rights to pasture private cattle on common lands. At the same time, they were very reluctant to take their turn at high-altitude herding as required by the rotation of jobs in the cooperative.

The assembly of cooperative members stood firm on one issue: members of the cooperative who enjoyed land privileges could not also work at the hotel and baths. These commercial enterprises had remained in the hands of the former hacienda owners, and the choice between forms of employment was very difficult for workers. Not surprisingly, individuals made different decisions. The majority of those who had worked in the tourist enterprises elected in 1976 to stay with the former administrator and their jobs at the hotel and baths. Those who made this decision now point to difficulties in the present cooperative operation as support for the choice they made. They criticize the cooperative as being more repressive than the former hacienda. They note that the owners of the hacienda had lived in Lima and the old administrators were less demanding and rigid than the Ministry of Agriculture. They lament the passing of hacienda customs such as offers of coca, alcohol, and cigarettes on days of work for the cooperative. More serious is the tighter control instituted by the Ministry of Agriculture. In the old days, one never had to account for lost sheep, so that it was possible to eat, sell, or lose an animal every now and then. The situation was informally regulated and, as former workers now retell their situation, no one felt terribly abused. Under the Ministry of Agriculture, the peasants must make a much more careful accounting for missing sheep, paying fines or replacing animals which are lost or die. For such reasons many former hacienda workers who had alternative employment opportuntiies elected to give up their option to join the cooperative.

Those who elected to stay often shared many of these assessments. They particularly resented the role played by the Ministry of Agriculture. The workers had been led to believe, through government rhetoric and SINAMOS promotores, that they would run the property once it had been expropriated. They deeply resented the Ministry's demand that the cooperative pay the salary of a young university-trained veterinarian as their chief administrator. The young man, a graduate of La Molina, the national agricultural university, was no stranger to the sierra. But he was young, and had adopted all the trappings of a Lima bureaucrat complete with sunglasses. His most serious drawback was the salary he could command: over $150 per month. This represents 110 percent of what each member of the cooperative hoped to be able to make as a bonus above minimum wages at the end of the year. The workers have protested this arrangement, but the young man still maintains his position. Cooperative members resent not only his salary, but also his position as the Ministry's representative, that is, the individual charged with overseeing the cooperative and imposing the Ministry's rules.

Despite the reservations that those who opted for the cooperative shared with those who remained outside it, they had ultimately decided to try the cooperative arrangement. One man with excellent relations to the former hacienda owners and administrators and with a very responsible position administering the baths opted for the cooperative. He explained his decision by pointing out that the bosses of private businesses such as the hotel and

baths might die or move away, and that a new manager might not like a particular worker, or might not like him as much as the old boss. He concluded that work on the cooperative is more secure and that disagreements are more openly aired in general meetings. Moreover, this man felt that eventually the cooperative would try to recoup the land which it had lost to the former owners in the private parcelizations. When and if that occurred, he did not want to be left without the resulting land resources. This individual still maintains good relations with the hotel administrator, who occasionally gives him extra work and allows him to live on land which belongs to the owners.

The cooperative itself is managing well, although in its decapitalized state it will be some time before economic success is assured. The workers claim that their present condition is no better, but that at least it is no worse, than on the hacienda. They still produce a milk-based sweet and butter for sale, and the depleted herd is slowly being replenished. They are building fences between their new borders and those of the campesino communities which surround them. Disputes with the communities, long the hacienda owners' headache, are now a problem for the cooperative.

Laborers on the hacienda Huancahuasi had traditionally concentrated their networking activities on ties to owners and administrators. With increasing national integration, workers began to establish connections to those coastal organizations (such as Apra and the Institute for Rural Education) which expressed concrete concerns with the economic and political problems of hacienda workers. Thus, the Aprista union was well established on the hacienda before the 1968 military government came to power. Since 1968, military government reforms stemming from the corporatist model have limited rather than widened workers' networking possibilities. SINAMOS did not provide workers with effective ties to the center, as they discovered when they attempted to speed the agrarian reform by working through this government-sponsored organization. In addition, the possibility of establishing ties with alternative organizations such as political parties, unions, or concientización groups was diminished by the military government's policy of banning or neutralizing its political competitors in Peru. Finally, the reorganization of agrarian production into cooperatives did not facilitate workers' access to the Ministry of Agriculture. Instead, workers found that outside professionals who occupied key positions as administrators and power-brokers blocked the development of new ties to the center.

On Huancahuasi, all workers responded positively to the ideology of expropriation and reorganization of production as initially promulgated by the military government. It was during the process of the implementation of the agrarian reforms that differences in workers' responses began to emerge. As the agricultural cooperative moved through the initial stages of organization, workers saw new implications of the reform and collectively rejected changes which would lead to their proletarianization. They also protested changes which undercut varying privileges given to different segments of the laboring population on the former hacienda. Those workers who stood to lose ties which cross-cut class and regionality by joining the cooperative often opted to continue working for the former hacienda administrators. Others who

had few ties outside thesettlement and no employment options have maintained membership in the cooperative. The few workers who are able to maintain ties in both camps have attempted to maximize their options until the long-term implications of the choice between economic forms is clarified.

Lessons from the Rural Sector

In this paper we have argued that rural responses to reforms planned and implemented by the revolutionary military government were shaped by (1) the long-term patterns of social and economic change which have increased coastal-sierra integration and rates of migration in the 20th century, (2) the development strategies and forms of political participation that rural populations had already formulated to respond to increasing contact with coastal society, and (3) the ways in which the military government implemented change through SINAMOS, extension agents, and professional administrators.

Adaptations to change in peasant communities have concentrated on individualized networks which have grown in importance with increasing migration to coastal society. Family networks are often in competition with each other on the local level. The same competitive process occurs when communities attempt to establish networks to alleviate local problems or to promote local development. In short, the network strategy tends to inhibit collective identification and joint action by rural dwellers from similarly situated groups or communities. This strategy, combined with a lack of collective identification, appears to mask both the mechanisms that increase economic stratification within the community and the collective nature of subordination. As a result, the full range of economic strata in peasant communities in the Checras and Santa Leonor districts rejected reforms aimed at weakening stratification. Land-poor peasants, who were the objects of reforms and were to benefit from restrictions in community membership and a more equitable distribution of lands, joined more privileged peasants in opposing local reforms.

In peasant communities the social forces which reinforce individualistic strategies remain strong. An idealized communalistic Andean society probably never existed in this region of the sierra. Certainly the "new Peruvian man" with a collectivist perspective and a corporativist solution to inequality never emerged in the peasant communities. Whether the military government might have been able to counter the broad trends of social change and local adaptations is difficult to judge. Its strategy to eliminate groups which it perceived as competitors for rural loyalties was undoubtedly a mistake. Such groups might have contributed to the formulation by the impoverished peasants of a more collective analysis of inequality. On the other hand, the strategy of permitting concientización by nonmilitary groups had its drawbacks. It is important to note that in the pueblos jóvenes of Lima where various Church and political groups as well as SINAMOS helped create local-level participatory groups the result was a dramatic increase in collective identification and joint action. Collective identification and action, however, did not lead to support for the military government. Rather, it led to active opposition, as was amply demonstrated in the support from the pueblos jóvenes for the general strikes in July 1977 and May 1978.

On the hacienda Huancahuasi, adaptations to change included strengthened ties to hacienda administrators and increased involvement with political groups organizing in the rural sector. Workers on the hacienda have not created as many rural-coastal kinship networks as have members of peasant communities. Rather, we have argued that kinship networks which were mobilized for economic assistance on the hacienda focused on the administrators. In contrast, the greater differences in class stratification and production in peasant and commercial settlements seem to promote a broader range of networks along which economic goods and access to resources are exchanged. Undoubtedly, the former hacienda owners and administrators consciously limited the formation of independent networks as well. They had little interest in the successful education, migration, or class mobility of their workers, since these changes might decrease their labor pool. In the process, they may have indirectly fomented the somewhat greater collective sentiment of the hacienda workers.

Currently, some former hacienda workers are caught between holding on to their few network ties to the former administrators, or experimenting with the agrarian production cooperative. The more disadvantaged hacienda workers (among others) have remained with the cooperative and have an increased sense of possibilities for their futures. All hacienda workers were disappointed by the delay in expropriating the hacienda and by the administrative requirements imposed on them afterward by the new administrators from the Agrarian Reform. Yet the greatest source of concern for former hacienda workers is the uncertain fate of their agrarian production cooperative in the increasingly conservative Peruvian climate.

Our analysis leads us to suggest that rural participation in the reforms of the military government varied significantly from one sector of the peasantry to another. The success of these reforms was related to this variation, to the perceived advantages and disadvantages of the reforms as analyzed by rural citizens, and to the speed and effectiveness of implementation.

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[3]This pattern of coastal-sierra exchange co-exists with intra-Andean trade routes, extensively described in Giorgio Alberti and Enrique Mayer, eds., Reciprocidad e intercambio en los Andes Peruanos (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1974). Highland llama and burro packs still follow the trade routes connecting Santa Leonor, Checras, and Pachangara districts with neighboring highland communities and Cerro de Pasco.

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[27]Given the limited nature of resources available to Peruvian peasants, it is difficult to assess whether a strategy based on collective identification and action would have dealt with subordination more effectively than the network strategy. The military government, while anxious to promote greater egalitarianism and a return to communal ownership of land in the peasant communities, was hesitant about peasant political action other than that which the military itself sponsored and controlled. From this perspective it is possible to interpret the military government's attempts to reorganize the peasant communities as an effort to cut the communities off from their ties to political parties and union organizations. Assuming this to be correct, the peasants' insistence on the maintenance of their networks is an astute calculation of the best strategy open to them.

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[32]Huancahuasi operated like a peasant community in some respects. Laborers had a sense of loyalty to and identification with the hacienda. The hacienda settlement had a patron saint and communal fiestas were celebrated. Workers were given access to land on which to grow potatoes and small irrigated patches on which to cultivate garden crops for sale and family consumption. Most laborers held private livestock which they grazed on the hacienda's high pastures.