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THE MAKING OF U.S. POLICIES TOWARD LATIN AMERICA:
SOME SPECULATIVE PROPOSITIONS

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Whether calling its approach a "Good Neighbor Policy," an "Alliance for Progress," a "Mature Partnership" or a "New Dialogue," --or ostentatiously eschewing rhetoric and labels, as President Carter's administration has done--one new administration after another promises to improve United States-Latin American relations. After a period of conflict and tension in hemispheric interaction, Washington characteristically refocuses its attention on Latin America and on altering U.S. policies. Reforms are inevitably announced, promises are made to pay more attention to Latin America, and the U.S. government (more or less flamboyantly, depending on the administration's style) vows its support for Latin America's social and economic development. In earlier days, it was standard for the United States to promise to help secure democracy in Latin America. Nowadays, "human rights" is the key phrase.

After the reports have been filed and the pledges recorded, however, Washington's expressed policy toward Latin America often appears to be contradicted by U.S. government actions. Promises to extend foreign aid are converted into instruments of pressure on behalf of private firms. International agreements to regulate trade in particular commodities are scuttled to suit the convenience of a single corporation. Despite the pretense of consultation and negotiation, tariffs are imposed to protect U.S. producers. Countervailing duties are imposed to protect domestic American firms against competition from manufactured products as soon as Latin American countries begin to enjoy a comparative advantage.¹ Resentment of the United States builds up again in Latin America. The pattern of U.S. relations with Latin America in the 1970s reconfirms this cyclical trend.

It is not surprising, of course, that high-minded expressions of official "policy," uttered at state dinners and other ceremonial occasions, are contradicted by daily actions. It is, after all, in the nature of things for rhetoric to be belied by practice; indeed, rhetoric is often designed to obscure reality. But there is something initially puzzling about this recurring pattern of U.S.-Latin American relations, and particularly about the fact that apparently sincere presidential decisions to improve relations with Latin America are so often contravened by actions of the U.S. government itself. The government repeatedly acts in ways which (top policy-makers themselves believe)

contradict the long-term national interest of the United States. U.S. actions in the case of International Petroleum Company (IPC) in Peru provide but the most blatant example; by supporting that one company, the United States government played no small part in undermining the Belaúnde regime in Peru and assuring its replacement by a nationalistic military government which soon expropriated not only IPC itself but a host of other U.S. investments in Peru.

It is the hypothesis of this paper that the process of U.S. policy-making itself--as distinct from disguised intent, simple incompetence, or accident--might help explain the persistent gap between Presidential decision and governmental practice in the conduct of United States-Latin American relations. Drawing on several case studies and other materials (including the studies done under Lowenthal's direction for the governmental Commission on the Organization of Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy), we present some linked speculative propositions to help account for the repeated patterns of U.S. government actions toward Latin America.² We hope that these notions may help guide additional research, by ourselves and others. We think that they also suggest a basis for discussing both the usefulness and the limits of the "bureaucratic politics perspective" on the study of United States-Latin American relations, as well as for stressing the relevance of a more general interest in the politics of policy-making.

The Context of Policy-Making

(1) Inter-American relations are very asymmetrical, both in fact and, especially, in perception. What is crucial to a Latin American country is often of marginal importance in Washington, and may therefore go unattended or be affected adversely by decisions made for reasons entirely extraneous to Latin American concerns. Moreover, what seems mutually advantageous from Washington's perspective may seem, or actually be, exploitative when considered from Latin America. What seems to the rich consumer nation a "fair" price for a particular resource, for instance, may seem paltry to a country with few other resources. (The case of Panama and the Canal illustrates this point, for instance.) Even were bargaining between the United States and a Latin American country to produce an "objectively" fair result, it would probably be distrusted and resented by the Latin American nation because of the history of previous bargaining, the lingering fear that onerous terms may be imposed by the United States, and the perception of continuing and overwhelming power disparities. Tension in U.S.-Latin American relations seems likely, therefore, as long as major asymmetry exists--and perhaps longer.

All this does not mean that inter-American tension will necessarily decline as individual Latin American States "take charge of their own future," in Luigi Einaudi's phrase.³ On the contrary, as Latin American states perceive increases in their capabilities, they may challenge the United States on one issue or on several.

Nor does the immense disparity of measurable power translate itself fully into usable power.⁴ But neither of these points contradicts the assertion that the main conditioning element of U.S.-Latin American relations is the extreme imbalance of power, actual and perceived, past and still present.

(2) Latin America is of secondary (or perhaps of tertiary) importance to the United States, in both economic and security terms. We intend this as an empirical rather than a normative statement.⁵ Indeed, because of our deep personal interest in the region, we ourselves are probably more likely to overestimate than to downplay the importance of Latin America to the United States.

Only rarely has a security threat in the hemisphere preoccupied many United States policy-makers: before and during the Second World War, when the U.S. worried about fascist influence in South America and sought to organize the Western Hemisphere against a common external enemy, and at the height of the Cold War, when the United States sought to bolster Latin American governments against communist-linked guerrilla movements. By the 1970s, the top American officials still determined to prevent or defeat a Communist government in Chile had to act covertly, in part precisely because they knew that most of the U.S. foreign affairs bureaucracy rejected their exaggerated concern.

In exceptional periods (1938-1945 and 1960-1965, for example), military security considerations, actual or perceived, have predominated. Usually, and certainly recently, the perceived threat to U.S. security from or through Latin America has been extremely low, and traditional security concerns have been insufficient, therefore, to supercede economic ones as criteria for determining U.S. government actions.⁶ (In infrequent but important cases, of course, economic and security considerations have come together when U.S. hegemony appeared to be threatened by the emergence of a socialist state. These cases are unquestionably central to establishing the parameters and the tone of U.S.-Latin American relations, but they do not account for most of hemispheric interaction.)

Now, however, Latin America is no longer as economically important to the United States, relative to the other areas of the world, as it used to be.⁷ A few simple statistics are suggestive. In 1960, 23% of all direct U.S. investment abroad was located in Latin America, while a decade later that proportion had dropped to 16% (against 31% for Western Europe and 29% for Canada). In 1960, 67% of all U.S. investment in so-called less developed countries was in Latin America; in 1970, 57%, and now even less. In 1960, Latin America accounted for 17% of U.S. exports and 24% of its imports; by 1972 the figures were, respectively, 13% and 10%.⁸ That the United States imports much of its bauxite, copper, petroleum, coffee, cocoa, sugar and other products

from Latin America makes the United States somewhat "sensitive" to developments in Latin America, but the United States is by no means dependent in the sense of actually being "vulnerable."⁹

Although Latin America is no longer objectively very important to the United States, there unquestionably continues to be some special feeling for Latin America both in Congress and by the North American public. This feeling, born of an awareness of superficially similar paths to nationhood, of deep historical involvement by the United States in the region, of notions of hemispheric neighborhood, and of hegemonic habits of thought, has had great, if declining, significance.¹⁰ It has been manifest, for instance, in the priority which Congress gave to the Alliance for Progress over foreign aid in general and in the recurring attention paid to Latin America in national electoral politics.

If, however, the "special relationship" has meant some sympathy from north to south, it has implied exceptional liabilities in the opposite direction. If the United States has given somewhat more to Latin America, it has expected much more in return. The "special relationship" has been laced with paternalism. Even when the United States has been frustrated in its attempt to apply its notions of proper behavior elsewhere in the world, it has expected to be able to do so in Latin America. Among the manifestations have been special Congressional restrictions on arms transfers and on the provision of foreign aid and, more recently, exceptional sensitivity to human rights considerations in this hemisphere.

(3) Much of the substance of inter-American relations involves multiplicity of non-governmental entities and processes which affect Latin America at least as much, and sometimes far more, than U.S. governmental decisions and actions.

These entities (multinational corporations, for instance) operate within a structure importantly affected by the past and present actions of the U.S. government, and official U.S. government decisions often influence or constrain their actions.¹¹ Still, what the United States government decides to do to Latin America, or to refrain from doing, cannot by itself necessarily alter the main impact of the United States on a particular Latin American country nor can it assure that U.S. relations with that country will take a desired course. It is much easier, in a sense, for the U.S. government to manage U.S. relations with China or Russia than with Chile or Peru.

(4) Although the interests of the United States as a nation in Latin America are relatively weak, the economic stakes in the region of many of its citizens and corporations are not. Latin American events may have scant effect on the economic well-being of North American society as a whole, but they often are life-or-death matters for Anaconda, Alcoa, or other large U.S.-based companies which do a substantial portion of their business in or with Latin American nations. Questions regarding U.S. investments or trade, sometimes involving only a single corporation,

often constitute the major item in U.S. official dealings with several Latin American countries; equivalent items would be unlikely ever to approach the top of the agenda for discussion between the U.S. government and governments (in Europe, for example) with which the United States has other issues to take up.

In sum, the making of United States policy toward Latin America takes place in a special context. Although not necessarily unique to the Latin American region, this context is undeniably different from that which affects policy toward other industrialized or other less developed countries. Its character derives from the confluence of important U.S. economic interests, negligible security preoccupation, and only a few other recognized reasons for immediate U.S. government concern: a general preference for non-hostile relations with foreign countries, a vague desire to establish or maintain especially close ties with the countries of this hemisphere, and an only slightly more specific aim to win Latin American political support in various international organizations. It is affected, as well, by a historic pattern of considerable U.S. official involvement in the area, stemming both from economic entanglements and from earlier periods of greater perceived security concern, and by a legacy of paternalist concern for Latin America's political and economic institutions. (These criteria probably apply as well to the Philippines, by the way, and one would guess that U.S. policy toward that country may share many of the characteristics we are discussing.)

Policy-Making

We turn now from context to process. What is the nature of United States policy-making toward Latin America? And how does the process of policy-making affects its outcome?

(5) Many U.S. government decisions which importantly affect Latin America are not "Latin American policy" decisions at all. Examples are plentiful: the 1971 import surcharge; the Trade Act of 1974; almost any tax or other provisions affecting the operations of multinational corporations; and, more recently, policies regarding nuclear proliferation, energy, sugar, and other commodities, and human rights. Some of these are domestic policy decisions, taken often without consideration of their international effects. Others are recognized as foreign policy decisions but are made outside the forum of Latin American policy-making. In these other arenas, the ramifications for Latin America often are not perceived or faced; when they are, they are generally sacrificed to the priority of a particular domestic aim, to the desire for consistent global policies, to the larger interests of Executive departments other than State--Treasury or Defense, for example--or to a combination of these factors.

(6) The processes for making and implementing policies with respect to issues which are thought of as primarily "Latin American"--usually "routine" issues which are far more important to the Latin American country than to the United States--are especially susceptible to a wide variety of pressures. The fragmented structure of policy-making on Latin America-related issues together with the lack of salience of Latin American issues leave considerable scope--within the limits of shared values and assumptions--for Executive discretion in establishing goals and choosing policy instruments. But they also leave the Executive extremely vulnerable to counter-pressures at many access points in the foreign policy process. The preferences of the State Department's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA) or even of the President are not necessarily determinative on most Latin American policy issues; deciding on specific actions is the stage that really matters.

A combination of factors contributes to the permeability of the policy-making process:

(7) Latin American issues seldom receive Presidential attention, almost never on a sustained basis.

A President will be involved in setting policy when he perceives a threat to U.S. "security" or to American hegemony, in circumstances like those which occasioned the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 or which underlay the much more elaborate and sustained U.S. efforts against Salvador Allende and Unidad Popular in Chile. We do not for a moment underestimate the critical importance of episodes like those for shaping inter-American relations.¹² But, most U.S.-Latin American interaction takes place on economic issues of a fairly routine nature, within the established structure of international relations; on such matters, high level attention is not forthcoming. We would estimate, in fact, that Latin American issues typically are handled at lower levels of Washington foreign policy bureaucracies than is true for other geographical areas, Africa (until 1976) excepted.¹³

(8) U.S. government decisions and actions conceived in Washington as comprising "Latin American policy" are mainly the province of the ARA; on most matters, little continuing attention is paid to regional issues by the Seventh Floor of State, nor by any other Departments. This relative autonomy of ARA is a source of weakness, not of strength, however. For one thing, it reflects the lack of resources available to support Latin American policy. More important, it means that the State Department, and ARA within it, are left to face powerful private interests alone, without the backing of a counter-constituency. What is more, ARA may not be in a position, as members of Congress often are, to choose which among conflicting pressures they wish to heed.¹⁴

Within the Pentagon, those working on Latin America experience generally the same sense of autonomy from the rest of the Defense Department as do the ARA officials in State. The Defense Department is relatively uninterested in Latin America, Panama excepted, and spends comparatively few resources (human or financial) to influence U.S. actions in the region. It does become involved once an issue is perceived to include security considerations, but even the DOD's attention may not become aroused until a departmental interest is threatened. According to various accounts, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were willing to approve the Bay of Pigs invasion, but they quickly balked at the suggestion that it be mounted from Guantanamo. The Pentagon reportedly became concerned about Allende only when it appeared that the Soviet Union might be granted a naval base in Chile, and was not very much interested in Chile once the possibility could be disregarded. In general, the Defense Department's stand on Latin American issues is merely to protect existing assets, and not to jeopardize Congressional support for programs elsewhere in which the Pentagon has much more at stake.

The Treasury Department is involved to a somewhat greater extent than Defense on issues of policy toward Latin America, but its participation, too, is limited. It becomes a much more central actor when general, world-wide economic issues are at stake, or when general principles of U.S. economic policy are threatened.

Evidences of CIA activity in the region are obvious. Nevertheless, those activities have been closely tied to national security considerations and probably have diminished over time with Washington's reduced perception of a security threat. CIA activity in Latin America may continue to be greater than in other Third World regions, however, owing in part to the network inherited by the intelligence establishment from wartime FBI concern over fascist agents in Latin America.

(9) U.S. government actions toward Latin America are often influenced by Congress, and by individual Senators or Representatives, perhaps more often than is policy toward other geographic regions.¹⁵ The Executive's "policy" is often changed by Congressional influence, either through general legislation (the effects of which on Latin American policy may not be specifically considered), or with reference to particular Latin American issues. Members of Congress may exert more influence on Latin American issues than on other foreign policy matters because:

- a) It is relatively easy and legitimate (in the eyes of constituents) for a member of Congress to express interest in Latin America;
- b) Members of Congress, like business executives, perceive that the United States has more leverage in Latin America than in other regions, and they are willing to try to press that advantage on behalf of constituents or causes;

c) The stakes which Executive departments perceive they have in Latin American issues are rarely significant enough to cause them to resist the strenuously-argued position of a member of Congress or of several members whose support is desired on other issues;

d) Congress has (relatively) considerable scope to affect military policies and budgets in the Western Hemisphere, essentially because the Defense Department cares little about anything in Latin America except the Panama Canal; and

e) The issues which comprise much of inter-American relations are economic matters on which Congress normally plays a major role.

(10) The specific and immediate interests of United States companies operating in Latin America are often the main influence on the process of making and implementing U.S. policy. The process is generally permeable; it is most often permeated, however, by business interests. The sum of U.S. business interests in Latin America is large, not in relation to business interests in other regions but in relation to other U.S. involvements in Latin America. Equally important, the interests of specific businesses in Latin America frequently are large compared to the firms' interests anywhere else, which accounts for the particular aggressiveness of some corporations as they defend interests in the region.¹⁶

United States companies operating in Latin America are exceptionally active in attempting to influence American policy. The regional business group--The Council of the Americas--has no counterpart with respect to other areas of the world, for instance.¹⁷ This high level of business lobbying activity, by now customary, probably derives originally from a sense that the United States government is more likely to respond to pressures on Latin American issues than on questions presented in other regions. And this belief probably derives, in turn, from the perception that the United States has more leverage over countries in Latin America than elsewhere, coupled with the realization that the U.S. government has little other substantial concern in the hemisphere. The intensity of business pressure results, in part, from the nature and experience of the particular firms (for example, whether they depend primarily on their Latin American activities or not) and perhaps on the nature of the businesses (for instance, natural resource extraction or other high capital investments with slowly changing technology and undifferentiated products may act very differently from manufacturing firms).¹⁸

(11) While U.S. business interests are actively influencing the making and implementation of U.S. policy toward Latin America at many different access points, Latin American governments and U.S. non-business groups also interested in affecting American policy are generally

less diligent, less sophisticated, and certainly less successful. Non-governmental groups in the United States which do not have specific economic interests at stake show little sense of where decision-making power lies within the U.S. government or of what the motives and incentives are for the groups and individuals involved in making policy. They frequently fail to devise strategies for pinpointing those who can influence specific decisions and for taking into account their motives and incentives; they are apt to rely instead on generalized arguments about what is "just" and "right."¹⁹ Latin American governments, similarly, limit their own effectiveness in Washington. By and large, they tend to focus on the goal-setting phase of foreign policy rather than on implementation, to exaggerate the importance of the State Department (and the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs within State) in making U.S. policies toward Latin America, to miss opportunities for systematic dealings with other executive departments, to underestimate the role of Congress in U.S. policy-making, and to leave too much of their diplomatic work to unprofessional or semi-professional personnel.²⁰ Latin American countries which pay more systematic attention to the politics of U.S. policy-making are likely to do better in securing favorable outcomes from that process, at least as long as they operate within the confines of general sympathy with a U.S.-dominated economic and political order.²¹

Given the fragmentation and vulnerability of the processes of making and implementing U.S. policies, it should not be surprising, therefore, that U.S. corporations with high stakes in Latin America often come to exert very substantial influence on specific U.S. government actions in and toward that region. The reasons, to recapitulate, are clear: specific U.S. interest groups (primarily business) work hard to influence policy at a variety of access points; Latin American states and public interest groups in this country show little sophistication and diligence in dealing with the U.S. policy-making process; and there is no sustained high level attention to these issues in Washington in the absence of a tangible, continuing, and overriding U.S. national security interest in the region.

Lest readers protest that they have read so far only to be told the very obvious--that business plays a major role in affecting U.S. policy toward Latin America--we would make two further points.

First, what is obvious to some is not always clear to all. In a major essay published in 1977, for example, Jerome Slater asserts that "no serious scholarship on the foreign policy making process in the U.S. government supports the notion that it is controlled or in most cases even substantially influenced by the desires of 'big business.'"²² Interestingly, the discussions of our five cases in meetings at the Council on Foreign Relations suggested that business leaders themselves often feel that they do not get their way on questions of Latin American policy. Our own review concludes that business

does not easily and automatically control policy outcomes, but that business gets its way more often and more systematically than any other group.

Second, we do not assert in simple-minded fashion that the U.S. government is the agent of big business in Latin America, and that U.S. policy can therefore be counted on to accord with business interests. On the contrary, our cases suggest that U.S. government officials perceive and exercise a certain degree of "autonomy" in making their decisions, and that they can and do make use of opportunities to shape policy in accord with longer term national interests, not simply in response to the immediate pressures of particular firms. What we want to emphasize, however, is that this scope for policy-makers is strictly limited, and that the specific pressures of interest groups, business or others, have many points of access from which to shape what the U.S. government does in and toward Latin America.

Our reasoning about the nature of U.S. policy-making toward Latin America is supported, indirectly, by two classic articles in the literature on U.S. foreign policy-making, articles which generally minimize the influence of special interest groups. Although Lester Milbrath argues that usually "interest groups' influence on foreign policy is slight," his definition of the exceptional cases when interest group influence is high describes much of Latin American policy: "decisions . . . that involved direct, visible (usually economic) rewards and/or punishments to different sectors of the society generally tend to be shared by Congress and the President, to be social rather than intellectual in process, and to stimulate more lobby by groups at many points of access."²³ Bernard Cohen, too, argues that "interest groups seem to have considerably less effect on foreign policy than they do in the domestic realm," but he goes on to point out that the most influential groups are economic groups with specific interests at stake. These business interests, Cohen argues, have considerable influence over a "relatively narrow range of economic issues which comprise only a small portion of the fundamental issues of American foreign policy."²⁴ But what is a relatively narrow range in the overall spectrum of U.S. foreign policy may very well dominate the spectrum of hemispheric interaction, at least most of the time.

Our argument regarding the nature of much of U.S.-Latin American relations also parallels that offered by Donald Hellmann as an exception to his general statement, in the case of making the U.S. peace settlement with Japan, that U.S. business was not much involved in that process. With respect to the one issue, fishing rights, where there were special and tangible benefits to be gained by a particular group, fishing interests participated actively and successfully in the policy-making process; on the other issues, of a more general strategic and political nature, U.S. business interests were largely passive.²⁵

Our essential argument that the character and consequences of U.S. policy-making toward Latin America relates to and derives from the nature of the issues involved closely follows the broader theoretical argument first advanced by Theodore Lowi and more recently refined by William Zimmerman.²⁶ Because so much of the United States-Latin American interaction takes place over tangible questions--of dollars and cents, in whatever currency--it is understandable that the process of policy-making reflects the participation of those with a particular, asymmetric stake in its outcome. In the case of Latin American policy, many of the routine issues elicit the participation of special interests, operating much as they would on an issue of domestic "distributive" policy-making, in Lowi's phrase.

It remains to be asked whether the "bureaucratic politics" perspective earlier outlined by Lowenthal and others is particularly helpful for analyzing the policy-making process on issues of Latin American policy, or whether there are other, more useful tools.

Our main conclusion is that the more traditional, and inclusive "first wave" notions of interest group politics in the pluralist tradition are often more appropriate than the relatively narrower "second wave" concepts of "bureaucratic politics" for explaining how U.S. policies affecting Latin America are made, and with what effects.²⁷ We accept, in other words, the helpful criticism Richard Bloomfield offers, that the essence of Lowenthal's earlier argument is sounder than some of its more restrictive formulations.²⁸

"Bureaucratic politics" in the narrowest sense of intra-governmental clash based on organizational interests and routines may not account for very much of importance in U.S.-Latin American relations. Most elements of the U.S. government do not appear to be concerned enough about Latin American policy issues to clash often or intensely, except on matters--like the 1972 presidential statement on expropriations--which engage the diverse global and regional interests of several parts of the executive branch. Even in those cases, assumptions and images shared by policy-makers across departments usually mean more than organizational missions or procedures. Most important, the stakes of any of the agencies of the U.S. government on most Latin American policy issues are likely to be less than those of private U.S. groups, easily able to exert their influence on the policy-making process directly, through Congress, or through executive departments.

A narrow focus on "bureaucratic politics" may be more fruitful in explaining U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union than toward Latin America. The propositions suggest why. With respect to most elements of context and process, statements made about the nature of policy-making toward the Soviet Union would be the obverse of those we have set out for Latin America. U.S. government concern with policy toward Soviet

Russia is always high. (Secretary Vance probably sees the Ambassador from the Soviet Union more frequently than he sees those from Latin America and the Caribbean combined, for instance.) Security interests dwarf economic ones. All the major foreign policy-making agencies are engaged in the process of policy-making, at high levels; often they clash, as in the strategic arms limitation talks.²⁹ Congress was not relevant to most major decisions affecting U.S. relations with Russia until recently, and even now its role is widely perceived as exceptional. Private U.S. interests, while they may play a larger role in affecting U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union than is generally recognized, are usually less influential than are the top executives of the major executive departments of government. Under these conditions, much can be understood about U.S.-USSR relations by focusing attention on the relations among the governmental agencies which mainly shape American policy.

In explaining the actions of the United States government in and toward Latin America, attention focused on intra-governmental pulling and hauling will usually be insufficient, however. The "bureaucratic politics" perspective may be extremely illuminating in those cases where the turf of different agencies is in dispute--as it was in the expropriation policy controversy discussed by Einhorn.³⁰ It may also account for outcomes affected by organizational routines, on matters dealt with at low levels and without outside influence. For most of Latin American policy, however, one must be equally or more concerned with the role of Congress and the domestic interests to which both Congress and the executive are responsive.

In these cases, the old but fine wine of "pluralist" or interest-group theory may be most helpful. The propositions we advance fall within this familiar tradition of political analysis, for they draw attention to the interaction and struggle for influence of varied private and public actors within an overall structure.

Some readers, Latin Americans or others, may ask, at this point, "So what?" Why should one be at all concerned with the differences of nuance partially accounted for by analyzing the politics of U.S. policy-making, when the broad contours of U.S. relations with Latin America seem so clear? Where hegemony is the basic fact, what difference does detail make?

Our answer to these fair questions is simple: it all depends what one is interested in explaining, and why. If one is concerned mainly to analyze or to document the asymmetry of all sorts of power between the United States and Latin America--a condition we take for granted--the approach we take probably makes little sense. If one wants to predict whether Panama or the United States will emerge victorious from a direct clash over a specific issue, for instance, one would probably do better counting ships and Marine divisions than interviewing bureaucrats and members of Congress.

If one is primarily interested not so much in describing (or lamenting) the structure of United States-Latin American relations but rather in analyzing the changing rules, allocations, and outcomes within the overall structure, then the kinds of propositions we have advanced may be pertinent. If one wants to predict, staying with the same example, how Panama and the United States will fare in dealing with a specific problem, one ought certainly to analyze the international power relations involved, but one should also assess how private and bureaucratic groups interact with Congress and with various parts of the executive in the making of U.S. policy.

And if one is interested in political action, in affecting the relations between Latin America and the United States, one will almost certainly want to consider the kinds of points we discuss. For those like ourselves (or the Panamanian government, for that matter) who would like to help change the pattern of relations we and others have analyzed, focusing on the politics of policy-making is one fruitful way to begin. The kind of "structural exploration of the possible" for which Richard Fagen has appealed--"prying into every corner and crevice of the policy-making process and the configurations of power to clarify what changes are possible given existing or foreseeable short-run realities in the United States"--requires careful work along the lines we suggest.³⁰

Another way to affect policy, of course, is to challenge the accepted premises of U.S. policy--the "mind-sets" of relevant officials--which influence which "facts" will be noticed, how they will be understood, and what actions will be considered legitimate responses to perceived problems. The experience and apparent influence of the Commission on United States-Latin American Relations (the "Linowitz Commission") illustrates this point, for example. But that is the subject for another essay.

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¹See Donald Wyman, "U.S.-Latin American Relations and the Cases of the Countervailing Duty," in Abraham Lowenthal, et al., The Making of U.S. Policies Toward Latin America: the Conduct of 'Routine' Relations, Appendix I, Volume 3 of the Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policies (Washington, 1975), 234-242.

²See also Lowenthal et al., ibid.

³Luigi Einaudi (ed.), Beyond Cuba: Latin America Takes Charge of Its Own Future (New York, 1973).

⁴This point is a familiar one in the theory of contemporary international relations. For an insightful recent discussion, see Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston, 1977), 27-29.

⁵It is not, however, as self-evident a proposition as it might seem to some. See, for example, Edwin Lieuwen's contrary assertion that "the enormous importance of Latin America to the United States is so obvious today that the point hardly needs emphasizing." See Edwin Lieuwen, U.S. Policy in Latin America: A Short History (New York, 1965), vi-vii.

⁶Several statistical tests which bear on this proposition have been conducted. See for example, John Eley and John Petersen, "Economic Interests and American Foreign Aid Allocations, 1960-69," in Patrick J. McGowan (ed.), Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies (Beverly Hills, 1973), 161-187. Eley and Petersen found that, within the set of less developed countries, U.S. foreign policy varied with the size of the U.S. economic interest in the country. The adequacy of their choice of both foreign policy variables--provision of economic aid and allocation of diplomatic personnel--and of measures of economic interest--trade and investment--can be questioned, however.

⁷To say that the sum of economic interests U.S. citizens have in Latin America is small does not mean that the interest of any particular individual or group is unimportant. In fact, that is one of our main points, to be turned to under the fourth proposition.

⁸These calculations are based on statistics in U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstracts of the United States, 1973 (Washington, 1973), 769, 780-82. Such aggregate data may obscure the importance of particular items and individual countries, but our general point holds up. For a stimulating discussion of the political implications of these trends, see Anibal Pinto, "Economic Relations Between Latin America and the United States: Some Implications and Perspectives" in Julio Cotler and Richard Fagen, Latin America and the United States: The Changing Political Realities (Stanford, 1974), 100-116.

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⁹The distinction between "sensitivity" and "vulnerability" interdependence is developed by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations," World Politics XXVII (October 1974), 39-63.

¹⁰For an elaboration of this point, see Abraham F. Lowenthal, "The United States and Latin America: Ending the Hegemonic Presumption," Foreign Affairs 55 (October 1976), 199-213.

¹¹Cf. Stephen Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," World Politics (April 1976).

¹²One of us has written a book on the Dominican intervention, in fact, and the other participated actively in drafting the Chile Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. We recognize the significance of these hegemonic assertions, but we think it is also important to focus more analytical effort on the kinds of decisions and actions that comprise most of United States-Latin American relations, most of the time.

¹³Measures of high-level attention might include cable traffic reaching Cabinet and top sub-Cabinet officials and acted on by them; meetings attended by these officials; action items passing between State and other departments and the White House; and selections made for the evening reading of the President and the Secretary of State. A preliminary survey of the easily available evidence, the memoirs of presidents and presidential advisors since World War II, supports this proposition. See Marie Jones, "Results of Memoirs Study," Unpublished memorandum, Princeton University (July 27, 1974), available from Lowenthal. For material on Africa, generally relevant to several of these propositions, see Richard C. Giardina, "Southern Africa and the United Nations: the State Department Responds," paper presented at the Convention of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 29-May 1, 1971. Cf. William B. Quandt, "Domestic Influences on United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East: the View from Washington," in Willard Beling (ed.), The Middle East: Quest for an American Policy (Albany, 1973), 263-285.

¹⁴See Lewis Dexter, The Sociology and Politics of Congress (Chicago, 1969).

¹⁵See Robert Pastor, "Congress' Impact on Latin America: Is There a Madness in the Method," in Lowenthal et al., The Making of U.S. Policies Toward Latin America, 259-272.

¹⁶This conclusion parallels that of Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis Anthony Dexter, in their American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade (New York, 1968). They found that heads of large firms were more likely to be informed about and interested in tariff questions; yet those companies were likely to have conflicting interests in various sectors. Heads of small firms

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were unlikely to be interested in tariff legislations, but when they had an interest, it could be "a life-or-death matter," hence a powerful incentive to seek to influence policy.

¹⁷See Marie Thourston Jones, "The Council of the Americas and the Formation of American Foreign Policy," in Lowenthal et al., The Making of U.S. Policies Toward Latin America, 248-249. See also "Powerful Adviser to the Government," National Journal (January 15, 1972), 101.

¹⁸On this last point, see Theodore Moran, "The Impact of U.S. Private Investment on Inter-American Relations," Unpublished paper prepared for the Commission on U.S.-Latin American Relations, June, 1974.

¹⁹These generalizations draw in part on Harry Weiner, "U.S.-Brazil Relations: Non-Governmental Organizations and the Fifth Institutional Act," in Lowenthal et al., The Making of U.S. Policies Toward Latin America, 250-255.

²⁰See Roger E. Sack and Donald L. Wyman, "Latin American Diplomats and the United States Foreign Policy-Making Process," in Lowenthal et al., The Making of U.S. Policies Toward Latin America, 243-247.

²¹The implicit advice we advance here would do much more good for a Belaúnde than for an Allende, in other words, though Castro's Cuba is showing the usefulness of paying systematic attention to U.S. policy-making. Cf. Robert O. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," Foreign Policy (Spring 1971), 161-182.

²²Jerome Slater, "The United States and Latin America: The New Radical Orthodoxy," Economic Development and Cultural Change 25 (4) (July, 1977), 752. Emphasis added.

²³See Lester Milbrath, "Interest Groups and Foreign Policy," in James Rosenau (ed.), Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York, 1967).

²⁴See Bernard C. Cohen, "The Influence of Non-Governmental Groups on Foreign Policy-Making," Studies on Citizen Participation in International Relations (Boston, 1959). Cf. Robert H. Trice, Jr., "Domestic Political Interests and American Policy in the Middle East: Pro-Israel, Pro-Arabs, and Corporate Non-Governmental Actors and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1966-1971," unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin (1974).

²⁵Donald C. Hellmann, Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: The Peace Agreement with the Soviet Union (Berkeley, 1969).

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²⁶See Theodore Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory," World Politics (July 1964), 677-715; Theodore Low, "Making Democracy Safe for the World," in James N. Rosenau (ed.), Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York, 1967); and William Zimmerman, "Issue Area and Foreign Policy Process: A Research Note in Search of a General Theory," American Political Science Review LXVII (December 1973), 1204-1212.

²⁷The distinction between "first wave" and "second wave" theorists is drawn by Robert Art in his useful essay, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique," Policy Sciences 4 (1973), 467-490. We have also profited from Stephen Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important (or Allison Wonderland)?" Foreign Policy (Summer 1972), 159-178; Ronald Steel, "Cooling It," The New York Review of Books (October 19, 1973); and Amos Perlmutter, "The Presidential Political Center and American Foreign Policy: A Critique of the Revisionist and Bureaucratic-Political Orientations," World Politics 17 (October 1974), 97-106.

²⁸Cf. the comparable argument, made available to us after this essay was drafted, by Jorge Dominguez in "Consensus and Divergence: the State of the Literature on Inter-American Relations in the 1970s," draft essay prepared for the Organization of American States (April 1976) and soon to be published in the Latin American Research Review.

²⁹See John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York, 1973) and news articles on the 1977 SALT talks, especially those by Richard Burt in The New York Times.

³⁰See Jessica Pernitz Einhorn, "The Nixon Administration's Expropriation Statement of January 19, 1972: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics," Chapter to appear in forthcoming volume edited by Lowenthal and Ernest R. May.

³¹Richard R. Fagen, "Commentary on Einaudi," Cotler and Fagen, op.cit., 264.