Number 60

SPECULATIONS ABOUT THE PROSPECTIVE DEMISE OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES AND ITS POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES

by Philippe C. Schmitter
University of Chicago

Author's note: This is a revised version of "Authoritarian Experiences and the Prospects for Democracy," a paper presented at a September 1979 Workshop on "Transitions from Authoritarianism: Prospects for Democracy" sponsored by the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. 20560. This paper should not be quoted or distributed without the author's permission.

This essay is one of a series of Working Papers of the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Dr. Michael Grow oversees preparation of Working Paper distribution. The series includes papers by Fellows, Guest Scholars, and interns within the Program and by members of the Program staff and of its Academic Council, as well as work presented at, or resulting from seminars, workshops, colloquia, and conferences held under the Program's auspices. The series aims to extend the Program's discussions to a wider community throughout the Americas, and to help authors obtain timely criticism of work in progress. Support to make distribution possible has been provided by the Inter-American Development Bank.

Single copies of Working Papers may be obtained without charge by writing to:

Latin American Program, Working Papers
The Wilson Center
Smithsonian Institution Building
Washington, D. C. 20560

The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars was created by Congress in 1968 as a "living institution expressing the ideals and concerns of Woodrow Wilson . . . symbolizing and strengthening the fruitful relation between the world of learning and the world of public affairs."

The Center's Latin American Program, established in 1977, has two major aims: to support advanced research on Latin America, the Caribbean, and interAmerican affairs by social scientists and humanists, and to help assure that fresh insights on the region are not limited to discussion within the scholarly community but come to the attention of interested persons with a variety of professional perspectives: in governments, international organizations, the media, business, and in the professions. The Program is being supported through 1982 by three-year grants from the Ford, Mellon, Kettering, Rockefeller, and Tinker Foundations, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and the Xerox Corporation.

ABSTRACT

Speculations About the Prospective Demise
of Authoritarian Regimes and Its Possible Consequences

Machiavelli offers a logical and speculative basis for analyzing the conditions, actors, and consequences of transformation from authoritarian (princely) to democratic (republican) rule. Applying, revising, and extending his maxims, this essay attempts to explain how authoritarian regimes are overthrown, why this might happen, who is likely to be involved and, finally, what might be the outcome of such a demise in the context of contemporary Latin America and Southern Europe. No reference is made to, nor is the analysis based on, specific cases. Rather an effort is made to capture the range of possible options and the implication of likely choices, and the reader is invited to fill in the experiences and dilemmas of the country of his/her interest.

SPECULATIONS ABOUT THE PROSPECTIVE DEMISE OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES AND ITS POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES*

by Philippe C. Schmitter
University of Chicago

How and why do authoritarian regimes break down? Who are the agents, and what are the motives involved in such a deterioration and eventual transformation in the mode of political domination? How do past experience with authoritarian rule and the circumstances of its demise affect future democratic performance? What are the processes of democratization which ensue from such a liberation of political forces? Which possible combination of actors and actions will best ensure a viable democratic outcome? What configuration of institutions and pattern of benefits are likely to emerge from such a transformation in regime type?

Not very long ago, the posing of such questions in the context of contemporary Latin America and Southern Europe would have been considered pura fantasia--an imaginative exercise in political science fiction or a naïve expression of wishful thinking. To the extent that scholars were explicitly concerned with regime-level questions at all, their attention was directed elsewhere. Most were preoccupied with delineating the interrelated (and presumably viable) properties of "bureaucratic-authoritarian rule" and/or with demonstrating the ineluctable imperatives for its emergence (and putatively its persistence) in the context of the regions' delayed, dependent, peripheral or semi-peripheral, capitalist development. A few were keeping busy explaining away the survival of rare democratic exceptions due to mitigating circumstances and/or extraordinary conditions.

---

*The present essay is, as the reader will soon become aware, a first draft, and a very speculative and incomplete one at that. It is intended at this stage only to provoke criticism and stimulate a response among Workshop participants which will, hopefully, be reflected in their respective papers. They should feel free to disagree, distend, divert, distort, or otherwise dispose in any way they see fit with the ideas in this essay. In order not to contaminate this possible dialogical exchange, I have not included references to specific cases or particular theorists--except for my somewhat obsessive reliance on Machiavelli.

My rediscovery of Machiavelli I owe in large part to Elissa B. Weaver of the Department of Romance Languages of The University of Chicago. She has gently sought to keep me faithful to the original and is, therefore, in no way responsible for the distortion and extensions I have no doubt forced upon it.

Rather suddenly and quite unexpectedly, the above questions about regime transformation moved up on the agenda of public and elite attention from pura fantasia to, at least, posible relevancia and even, in a few places, to gran actualidad. Scholars, as usual responding belatedly and opportunistically to the demand for their services, found their recently acquired conceptual-cum-theoretical garments ill-fitting, if not ill-suited, to the task of explaining such an unanticipated outcome. Of course, there were hints scattered in the fabric of explanation of authoritarian rule about possible inconsistencies, unresolved dilemmas and eventual contradictions, and a case could be made that enough significant, if unexplained and unexpected, changes had occurred--especially in the structure of the world economy--to account for the possibility of "necessary" regime transformation; nevertheless, the mere prospect of a resurgence of democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe was enough to provoke an "agonizing reappraisal" of assumptions about the nature of the fit between regime type, class structure, economic development, and international context in those parts of the world.[1]

This intriguing combination of practical urgency and theoretical embarrassment, no doubt, motivated the decision of a group of scholars associated with the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars to convoke a working group on the topic of "Transitions from Authoritarianism: Prospects for Democracy." Several of its members had contributed significantly to the discussion on "bureaucratic authoritarian regimes" (and, it is only fair to point out, to the criticism of that paradigm).[2] As a member of that group, I think it accurate to say that all of us felt that a re-examination of these themes required detailed analyses of the forces and factors involved in specific, hopefully analogous, cases (past and present) of regime transformation toward democracy, as well as speculative exploration of the general processes and generic issues raised by such transformations. On the one hand, we recognized that we needed much more information and insight about what had happened and was actually happening; on the other hand, we considered it necessary to attempt, even before the necessary empirical material was available, to identify what such instances and examples might have in common, and why their outcomes might be expected to differ.

We first drafted a loose problématique outlining relevant issues and themes.[3] It was intended to attract attention to our joint endeavor and to elicit comments about its scope, content, and approach. The statement also served to establish a tentative division of labor under which I was assigned the less savory, but more tractable, job of dealing with the "Demise of Authoritarian Rule," while Guillermo O'Donnell and Adam Przeworski would engage in the more appetizing task of speculating about the generic causes and consequences of the "Rise of Democracy."[4] No doubt, our respective and independent efforts will initially overlap and perhaps they will contradict each other, but we hope through successive drafts to work to a more integrated theoretical product and, of course, to revise and expand upon them in the light of the empirical materials on specific countries and sets of critical actors which will be forthcoming from other papers in the project.

* * *

When the above-mentioned problématique was circulated among potential participants and other interested scholars, two critical responses particularly intrigued me: the first accused it of being insufficiently Machiavellian--perhaps for not having put theoretical speculation squarely and aggressively at the service of improving the prospect for a republican-cum-democratic outcome; the second charged that it was excessively Machiavellian--perhaps for its assumption that regimes are not merely given by culture or imposed by circumstance but are willed and chosen into being. Whatever the merit of either or both of these accusations, their paradoxical enunciation sent me scurrying back to the Florentine master, first for curiosity, and then for edification.

For there I not only found considerable inspiration in substantive matters and some reinforcement for my normative preference for republican-democratic rule, but also a sober injunction "to consider carefully how human affairs proceed" (Discourses, II, 29, p. 342)[5] and, therefore, not to flinch from unpleasant conclusions. He also gave me the methodological tip that "one cannot give a definite rule concerning these matters without knowing the particular details of those states wherein one had to take a similar decision" and, therefore, if one did not know those details the only way to proceed was by abstraction and deduction "in as general a manner as the subject matter will allow" (Prince, XX, 146). Finally, I received optimistic support for my implicitly comparative approach in his argument that "in all cities and all peoples there still exist and have always existed, the same desires and passions. Thus it is an easy matter for him who carefully examines past events to foresee future events in a republic, or, if old remedies cannot be found, to devise new ones based upon the similarity of the events" (Discourses, I, 39, 252).

Within the limits imposed by my lesser talents (alas, most manifest in my complete failure at imitating Machiavelli's terse, epigrammatic style) and by the subject matter itself (alas, new desires and passions, or better new ways of satisfying and frustrating ancient desires and passions, seem to have further complicated political life since he wrote in the early 1500s), I will attempt to be properly Machiavellian. I doubt this will satisfy either of the initial critics. I know my reliance on Machiavelli has become obsessive. I only hope it will provide a fruitful point of departure, although I fear it exposes me to an awesome standard of comparison.[6]

I. "There is nothing more difficult to execute, nor more dubious of success, nor more dangerous to administer than to introduce a new system of things. For he who introduces it has all those who profit from the old system as his enemies and he has only lukewarm allies in all those who might profit from the new system."

(Prince, VI, 94)

Regime transformation--in whatever direction--involves a considerable risk to those promoting it and a substantial, if lesser, risk to those defending against it. Not only are "many conspiracies . . . attempted but very few reach their desired goal" (Prince, VI, 94), but

even once successful in seizing power, very few conspirators, Machiavelli suggests, will manage to institute "a new system of things." Of all the acts of political courage and knavery, therefore, efforts aimed at altering the basic structure of authority and not just the occupants of office, at changing the very calculus of public choice and not just the content of policy, at affecting the established distribution of power resources and not just the pattern of political benefits--in other words, attacks on the persistence of a given regime--are likely to be among the most rationally calculated and deliberately willful. However passionate and spontaneous the behavior of rebels may appear and even become in the course of a mobilized, violent seizure of power or other form of regime change, under it lies a "calculus of dissent"--a weighing of costs and benefits to be probabilistically gained from different investments in political action and different resultant configurations of authority.[7] Political action of this nature and import cannot be explained exclusively in terms of either unconscious responses to functional imperatives or instinctual reactions to cultural norms--no matter how much "necessity," as Machiavelli liked to call it, establishes the conditions of choice or "love" determines what actors would prefer to see happen. It is the "calculus of dissent" with respect to regime type that we will attempt to expose below.

So uncertain, however, is the calculus and so momentous may be the consequences for any given individual that most will prefer not to make it. This "rational" indifference to regime questions, coupled with the quasi-instinctual nature of political behavior when the stakes are low and the actions are repetitive, constitutes the strongest barrier to possible regime transformation. Indeed, "a man who is used to acting in one way never changes" (Discourses, III, 9, 382), and if, by changing, he would incur a high risk of political failure (not to mention personal injury), why would regime forms change at all? Why would they not merely perpetuate themselves indefinitely through marginal alterations in policy and occasional circulations in elites?

This question of why regime transformation occurs we will address later. What concerns us now is the implication that the demise of one form and the possible rise of another form of political domination is a relatively rare event, especially when compared to most instances of political behavior which have been "scientifically" observed and analyzed. There can be no question of using effectively the powers of statistical inference or even empirical induction based on a large number of observations. Each case will be too uniquely specified in time, space, and content, not to mention the fact that through diffusion and exemplification, such cases as have occurred in the past will contaminate those occurring in the present--and the future. Purely inductive theory risks becoming a "one to one" mapping of reality, with as many explanations as cases, as many variables as events.[8]

We must, therefore, proceed "in as general a manner as the subject matter will allow," identify a set of generic outcomes, processes, motives, and actors, and seek to expose the politico-logic of their interrelation, knowing full well that the types, specifications, and Gestalt may not fit well with any specific case whose past behavior one is attempting to explain or whose future outcome one is attempting to predict. In this vein, I propose to work backward--from a typology of

how authoritarian regimes are overthrown, to why this might happen, to who might be involved and, finally, to what might be the consequences of such a demise for the possible rise of a democratic replacement.

II. Authoritarian regimes commonly transform themselves or are transformed in one of four ways depending on who leads the struggle and whether actual violence is used.

No regime--authoritarian or other--collapses or is overthrown unless it and its supporters are threatened by violence. No matter how poor the performance, how narrow the circle of beneficiaries, or how weak the moral justification for ruling, those in power will persist in their practices and procedures (but not necessarily in their policies) until sufficiently and plausibly threatened by physical harm or forceful loss of resources.[9] When compelled to act, they may do so out of imperative necessity or impending choice.

For rulers do not always wait to act until forced to do so on the terrain and at the moment of their opponent's choosing. Political actors are capable of projecting the consequences of their actions and predicting those of others. With the aid of "theory" (usually based on examples from cases elsewhere judged to have been analagous in nature), they may anticipate future outcomes and act so as to forestall unwanted outcomes. As Machiavelli put it, "in order not to lose everything, [actors were] forced to concede to [others] their own share" (Prince, II, 181). Therefore, regimes may change in nature (and not just in material benefits or symbolic trappings) without an actual mobilization of their opponents and/or without the actual use of physical force--although its presence is always lurking in the background. In other words, power may be given over (Machtübergabe), and not just seized (Machtergreifung).

Where actors in power calculate that the benefits to remaining in power clearly exceed the costs (direct and indirect) of repressing their opponents, they will resist the threat of violence with actual violence. In fact, in such circumstances they have an incentive to act pre-emptively and even to provoke violence by their opponents--thereby achieving what Machiavelli constantly strives for, i.e., "an economy of violence."

Where actors in power miscalculate their own resources and/or those of their threatening opponents, or where they perceive no option of exiting from the situation with crucial resources intact, they will also act violently, but without efficiency. Quite the contrary, such miscalculated and desperate violence becomes counterproductive: "the more cruelty [they] employ, the weaker [their regime] becomes" when rulers have the general population as their enemy (Discourses, I, 16, 220). Also Machiavelli sagely warns that once regime proponents and opponents are forced to mobilize themselves and actually to confront each other with insults, insolence, and violence, both the stakes in the conflict and the expectations lodged in its outcome rise dangerously:

"When [false] hope enters men's breasts, it causes them to go beyond their work and, in most cases, to lose the opportunity of possessing a certain good by hoping to obtain a better one that is less certain" (Discourses, II, 27, 339).

Regimes may also change from a sequential combination of reactions to violent mobilization and peaceful transformation. Actors who have been successful in the past at meeting the threat of violence with violence against their opponents may choose to react to the prospect of eventual renewed violence by handing over power (or a portion of it) because their former actions have temporally eliminated their most dangerous opponents or because they are beginning to suffer the weakness brought on by their past cruelties. In this case, regime transformations coincide not with the high point of violent mobilization but with its aftermath, even with periods of considerable quiescence.

The presence of a threat of violence against a given authoritarian regime (and not just against one or more of its policies) differentially affects the political necessity and calculation of two (not always initially clearly distinguishable) groups: those who have benefitted from and/or been included in the regime, and those who have suffered or been excluded from it. As we shall see infra, a great deal hinges on whether this differential impact produces two exclusive and polarized reactions, or whether it has a centripetal influence through its differential effect within the two "camps" of supporters and opponents.

Among regime opponents, those who have suffered direct deprivations will be more likely to advocate and opt for increased mobilization for a violent transformation of regime, but will probably lack the necessary resources for collective action unless they are assisted by some external "prince," e.g., exiles or members of transnational political movements. Those who have been politically excluded by authoritarian rulers but have not suffered specific deprivations may possess the aggregate resources necessary, but their sheer numbers, dispersion, and lesser intensity normally mitigate against collective action on their part.

Among regime supporters, those included with it, benefitting from it, and responsible for it are, of course, most likely to respond violently in its defense, so much so that they may resort to violence even against fellow benefactors who show a willingness to compromise with real or emergent threats.

Finally, regime actors who benefit from it but are not directly dependent on it or responsible for its policies present a real but ambiguous threat to the persistence of authoritarian rule. They are likely to possess significant positive and negative resources, to be small enough in number, concentrated in location, and astute enough in calculation to act collectively out of choice and not necessity--if sufficiently assured about retaining already acquired resources and future benefits under some different form of governance.

FIGURE 1

MODAL TYPES/STRATEGIES FOR THE DEMISE
OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

1. Actors Leading the Transformation in Regime

	A. "Protagonists": Participants & Beneficiaries of Authoritarian Rule	B. "Supporters": Beneficiaries not Participants of Authoritarian Rule	C. "Subjects": Excluded but not Persecuted Opponents	D. "Antagonists": Excluded & Persecuted Opponents
2. Extent of Mobilization for Violence — A. High	SEIZURE OF POWER (Machtfestnahme)			OVERTHROW OF POWER (Machtergreifung)
B. Low		TRANSFER OF POWER (Machtübernahme)	SURRENDER OF POWER (Machtübergabe)	

Those politico-logical distinctions can be juxtaposed to each other to produce a matrix with four modal types or strategies for the demise of authoritarian rule.

In a seizure of power, some segment or faction of those who have participated and benefitted from authoritarian rule react with concerted violence, normally a coup d'etat, to eject, even to eliminate physically, the present occupants from office. They are most likely to attempt to institute a purified and more repressive-exclusive type of regime, even a totalitarian one, although their sheer vulnerability may lead them to broaden the basis of support by appealing to ex-regime opponents.

In a transfer of power, the principal actors guiding regime transformation consist of ex-beneficiaries who are not directly compromised by or deeply involved with regime policies, and who acquire the reins of power and office without a substantial mobilization for violence on their part.

In a surrender of power, the previous authoritarian rulers faced with a greater credible threat from antagonists and/or more aggressive protagonists prudentially agree to withdraw from formal positions of authority in favor of a set of actors not compromised with the now defunct regime but not themselves capable of mobilized violence. A special case of this type consists of situations in which the transformation occurs in the context of impending or actual defeat in war and may be followed by occupation by a foreign power.

In an overthrow of power, the previous authoritarian rulers resist violently but unsuccessfully and are forcibly ousted by the mobilized efforts of their formerly conformist subjects and victimized antagonists. Here, they lose not only formal control over the offices of public authority, but also their informal political resources up to and including both property and life.

* * *

Needless to say, any concrete historical instance of the calculus of dissent's resulting in the downfall of a given authoritarian regime may involve a combination of several or even all of these modal types. One could argue that "pure instances" are not only rare but likely to fail. For example, successful seizures of power usually depend on at least the spectre of an impending overthrow by radical antagonists. The personal sacrifice and mass mobilization involved in an overthrow are unlikely to prevail where preemptive transfer of power or prudential surrender of power offer a much easier and more attractive resolution to the regime crisis--unless such temptations are ruled out by hard-time protagonists.

A recent volume on the breakdown of democracies[10] argues (implicitly) that such strategies should be regarded not as simultaneously but as sequentially available modes for solving the problem of regime transformation. Linz, in his introductory essay, argues that the rise of authoritarian regimes from previously democratic ones

eventually involved either an inadvertent overthrow (Machtergreifung) (through civil war) or, more often, a surrender of power (Machtübergabe), but which followed upon a prior seizure of power by a narrowly based group within the previous democratic regime. Such "pre-transformations" of a factional sort also seem characteristic of the demise of authoritarian rule.

For Machiavelli, mobilized violence was a virtual necessity (he cites with approval Juvenal's maxim that "few tyrants die a bloodless death"--Discourses, III, 6, 360), and he repeatedly poured scorn on those who would seek a negotiated, middle-of-the road compromise to such a vital issue. Certainly the literature on regime transformation, scanty as it is, emphasizes the role of conspiratorial seizure and mass overthrow.

Perhaps it is our normative bias against violence or our empirical conviction that viable democracies have emerged more often historically as "second-best" compromises between stalemated political forces incapable of imposing their preferred mode of governance by regime seizure or overthrow,[11] but we intend to pay special attention to strategies of transfer and surrender in which previous regime beneficiaries and passive opponents, both unable and unwilling to eject forcibly authoritarian rulers from power, are incapable of ruling without each other's resources of power and legitimacy, and agree to establish some form of democracy which excludes the extremes of die-hard supporters and revanchist antagonists of the defunct regime.

The central property usually stressed in the context of a declining regime is vulnerability to overthrow or seizure by centrifugal extremists. We will be looking for dispensability leading to the transfer or surrender of power to centripetal moderates. We are by no means assured of finding the latter, but we have reason to suspect that such an outcome may provide a better basis for viable democracy.

III. "[Because men's*] desire is always greater than their power of acquisition, discontent with what they possess and lack of satisfaction [with how they obtained it] are the result.** From this arise the variations in their fortunes, for since some desire to possess more and others fear to lose what they have acquired, [political enmities will constantly arise and lead to the ruin of one regime and the exaltation of another.]"
(Discourses, I, 37, 247)

---

*Please excuse the sexism, but it stems from my feeble attempt to imitate Machiavelli's style.

**Machiavelli puts it more poetically later in the Discourses: "We are endowed by Nature with the power and wish to desire everything and by Fortune with the ability to obtain little of what we desire. The result is an unending discontent in the minds of men and a weariness with what they possess: this makes men curse the present, praise the past and hope in the future, even though they do this with no reasonable motive." (II, Intro., 290)

Given that "human affairs are always in motion, either rising or declining" (Discourses, II, Intro., 288) and, hence, that "all things of this world have a limit to their existence" (Discourses, III, 1, 351), perhaps one should wonder not why authoritarian regimes collapse or are transformed but why any form of patterned, consensual domination can long endure. Presumably, prudence in the face of the high risks involved in changing the existing order (see supra), combined with a general inability to learn new ways of doing things ("a man who is used to acting in one way never changes"--Discourses, III, 9, 382),[12] prevents political life from becoming completely chaotic in form and random in behavior.

Moreover, whatever the type of regime, its internal order requires some degree of self-limitation and self-abnegation if it is to survive: "Just as the states of princes have endured for a long time so too have the states of republics; both have needed to be regulated by laws, for a prince who is able to do what he wishes is mad, and a people that can do what it wishes is unwise" (Discourses, I, 58, 285). This "legality" is far from the element of "legitimacy" stressed by so many neo-Weberian students of regime persistence in that it refers to self-regulated, prudential behavior by those in power, not to the belief by those out of power that their rulers are rightfully entitled to their positions of domination.

Purely arbitrary, unself-restrained, i.e., "tyrannical," forms of authoritarian rule, then, are intrinsically unstable because they encourage "madness" among their leaders and cannot inculcate predictable and prudential ways of acting in their subjects--not because their "princes" are disliked by the people or their forms illegitimate in the eyes of the citizenry. Hence, "sultanistic," or highly personalistic, authoritarian regimes[13] face rather different problems and must rely on rather different resources (especially physical coercion and fear) to survive. The mode of their demise, the motivation and identity of their opponents and the longer term consequences of their replacement are correspondingly likely to be different than for their more established, impersonal, predictable, "bureaucratic" relatives.

"Since human affairs are constantly changing and never remain fixed, it is necessary that they rise or fall and many things you are not compelled to do by reason, you are impelled to do by necessity" (Prince, VI, 192). Authoritarian regimes fall (or, better, diminish in their viability) from two intersecting and overlapping sets of motives. By necessity people may have to act (be compelled to act) out of fear of losing what they have already acquired or out of need for acquiring what they feel they must have. By reason people may choose to act (be impelled to act) out of calculation of what may happen in the future, unless changes intervene, or out of admiration for what they regard as a better, more just, social-political order. Machiavelli, while acknowledging the force of reasonable anticipation and reasonable admiration in political behavior, was skeptical about the constancy of its effect and the predictability of its outcome: "men always turn out badly for you unless some necessity makes them good" (Prince, XXIII, 137); "men

never do good except out of necessity, but when they have the freedom to choose and can do as they please, everything immediately becomes confused and disorderly" (Discourses, I, 3, 182). Love for a particularly just leader or admiration for good moral principles, "since men are a sorry lot is broken on every occasion in which their own self-interest is concerned; but fear is held together by a dread of punishment which will never abandon you" (Prince, XVII, 131). If one includes in the notion of necessary fear not just the possibility of punishing acts by those in power but also the more "capitalistic" response of depriving actions by those in control of the economy, then one might agree with Machiavelli that satisfaction of immediate self-interest provides a more prominent and predictable motive for opposing or supporting a given regime than reasonable (but more remote) calculation and/or reasonable (but possibly fickle) admiration.[14]

Nevertheless, the subsequent development of instruments of rational calculation in political life (e.g., professional staffs, statistical data analysis and inference, planning techniques, social science theory, etc.) and the growing role of international standards of admirable behavior in political life (e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Charter, innumerable constitutional prologues, international pressure groups, etc.) have enhanced the importance of choice with respect to regime type. Levels of living above mere subsistence and more humane punishments for violations of authority have perhaps diminished the centrality of sheer necessity and survival in the calculus of political action. Opponents and renegade supporters of authoritarian rule may feel sufficiently freed from those narrow and predictable constraints to indulge in their preference for a more legitimate, just type of regime or to take a calculated risk on the longer term benefits to be gleaned from a more rational, better structured form of governance--even when not enticed to do so by the opportunity for immediate benefits or forced to do so by the prospect of unbearable costs.

From these motivational categories of necessity and choice, we can deduce four modal answers to the question of why a given authoritarian regime may be seized and overthrown, forced to transfer or surrender power:

(1) Success. If modern authoritarian regimes are the contemporary (functional) equivalents of classic dictatorship, their demise would be easy to understand, if still difficult to predict. Machiavelli defined the dictator as "[one] created for a circumscribed period of time, and only in order to deal with the problem for which he was chosen. His authority encompassed the power to decide for himself the way in which to deal with this urgent danger, to do everything without consultation, and to punish anyone without appeal, but he could do nothing which would alter the form of government. . . " (Prince, XXXIV, 244). Once the authoritarian rulers had satisfied the necessities of those who placed them in power (including their own), the "unfortunate

historical parenthesis" would come to an end and the polity would return to the form of government it had known previously. The rulers, finding "those who were at first trusted" increasingly hostile to their perpetuation in power and unable to obtain "more loyalty and more utility in those men who, at the beginning of their rule, were considered suspect" (Prince, XX, 148) would (or should) prudentially step aside. Most contemporary "liberal" justifications for authoritarian rule seem to be based on such a functionalist, problem-solving "logic" of the relation between regime type and system imperatives. These apologists tend to discount or ignore the possibility that dictators will succeed in creating or inventing new "necessities" in order to retain the support of their mutual promoters and/or that they will resolve the problems which brought them to power so slowly or in such a manner that would irreversibly alter the pre-existing form of government, making return to it virtually impossible. In Machiavelli's terms, there is a danger that they will "corrupt the society."

(2) Failure. If the authoritarian regime persistently and manifestly fails to resolve the problems which occasioned its rise or which were occasioned by its rise, its benefactors and expectant beneficiaries will come to fear it and regard its transformation as necessary. Its initial enemies and subsequent victims will, understandably, find their opposition reinforced. An extreme instance of this--indeed, the most common cause of the demise of such regimes--has been defeat in war. Machiavelli notes that unsuccessful republics/democracies may be more threatened by "internal emergencies" because they tolerate the expression of dissent in reaction to failures not even of their own making (Prince, XXXIII, 241); unsuccessful principalities/authoritarian regimes by inverted reasoning may be more vulnerable to "external emergencies," if only because they provoke failure by engaging in more adventurous and aggressive foreign policies.

In the simplest but least likely of circumstances, the failure of authoritarian rule is so complete and convincing that it provokes what Machiavelli called "universal hatred" uniting both the common people and the notables against it. Only defeat in war seems capable of bringing about such a "catastrophic" consensus. More likely is the situation in which a broad, but diffuse, assessment of failure pervades "the general populace" while a small, privileged set of supporters continued to judge the regime successful (and yet indispensable). Such relative failures in authoritarian governance may persist for some time either because the extent of malperformance has not yet reached "the realm of necessity" where vital interests are threatened, or because the sheer diffuseness of its impact encourages opponents to "free-ride," hoping that someone else will take the risks and pay the costs of seizing or overthrowing the regime.

In discussing "the causes of conspiracy against Princes" (Discourses, III, 6, 358), Machiavelli downplays the importance of general unpopularity-cum-hatred. It becomes crucial, he suggests elsewhere, only "in times of adversity" when the prince will be

unable to call upon "the friendship of the common people" to overcome a more focused challenge to his authority and office (Prince, IX, 109). The specific type of failure which is most likely to provoke these challenges lies in "offenses against individuals"--acts of deprivation, interpreted as unjust or arbitrary, against specifically designated persons (or, by extension, small groups) who, as a consequence, come to fear for their survival. Since the certain fact of losing what one has already acquired (or the eminent prospect of such a loss) is a stronger and more predictable basis for action than the uncertain opportunity for obtaining what one does not yet have (or has lost some time ago), and since those who lose some property, privilege, or honor are more likely still to have more disposable political resources at hand than those who have never had them (or have long since been deprived of them), it is the failures of authoritarian rulers which affect discrete groups or individuals among their own supporters and past beneficiaries that are most conducive to "causing a conspiracy" against their perpetuation in power. If a failed regime can manage to distribute its deprivations in a diffuse and proportional manner--not only across the population but among its own supporters--it can survive periods of very poor performance, even if it is not admired or loved on other grounds.

* * *

Most authoritarian regimes are neither marked successes nor manifest failures.[15] Their mixed performance, confounded by the emergence of new problems in addition to those which brought them into existence (some of their own creation; some thrust upon them), sustains them in power much longer than would be expected if regime change were a mere instrumental-functionalist response to what liberals call "the problems of transition" and Marxists call "the imperative contradictions of delayed-dependent capitalist development." No doubt, instances can be found of "salvationist" dictatorships which withdraw after successfully managing a particular crisis, and of "catastrophic" autocracies which collapse from threats to the survival of the general populace and strategic supporters, but most transformations of authoritarian regimes are not motivated strictly by necessity ("clear and present dangers" as the phrase goes). They involve complex elements of choice--of willful political action based on reasonable anticipation and admiration.

(3) Decay.* Authoritarian rulers "used to acting in one way never [change; they] must come to ruin when the times, in changing,

---

*Actually the label "decay" is not very appropriate. What I had in mind is a situation in which a regime (or its leaders) come to be regarded by key supporters and opponents as lacking Virtù: the capacity to assess changing situations, to recognize the ironic, unintended consequences of one's acts, and to modify one's potential response accordingly. A growing rigidity in behavior, a sclerotic incapacity to learn, a tendency to maximize short-run returns without regard for their eventual impact--all these are the properties of a decadent or decayed regime in the sense I wish to use it here.

no longer are in harmony with [their] ways" (Discourses, III, 9, 382). Whatever the causes-cum-motives of their accession to power, whatever their success or failure in meeting these causes, those who rule for any length of time will have to adjust to a shifting panoply of new circumstances; some of which (Machiavelli reckoned about one half) are occasioned by unforeseeable and unavoidable events of fortune; others of which are the unintentional product of past actions: "one can never remove one inconvenience without causing another to arise" (Discourses, I, 6, 190), or the unavoidable consequence of faulty calculation: "shortsightedness in human nature will begin a policy that seems good but does not notice the poison that is underneath" (Prince, XXX, 123).

All regimes, therefore, must be periodically revived and restructured. Machiavelli suggested that ten years was a maximum interval "because after that amount of time has elapsed men begin to change their habits and to break the laws . . . if nothing arises that recalls the penalty to their minds and renews the fear in their hearts" (Discourses, III, 1, 353). Princes or authoritarian rulers might be expected to be less capable of such acts of re-establishment of authority and revision of policies because by their nature they must draw on a narrower variety of experience than democracies (Discourses, III, 9, 382), and because their internal procedures will restrict (through strict rules of cooptation) or prohibit (through lifetime perpetuation) the succession to higher office of those capable of understanding and responding to new challenges and issues in creatively novel ways. Whether by rotation of parties in and out of power or by realignment of parliamentary alliances in response to shifts in electoral fortune, democratic regimes possess a functional substitute for overcoming the fixity of individual human natures and the sclerosis induced in institutions by previously successful policies.[16] The inability of a given authoritarian regime to use predictably the dilemma of succession as an opportunity to re-establish the foundations of public policy and order--more than any other factor--contributes to strategically calculated behavior on the part of its supporters as well as its opponents. Moreover, it orients this behavior toward changes in the nature of the regime itself and not just modifications in its policies.

Even actors freed from the compulsion of sheer necessity, benefitting from the regime itself and not fearful of losing what they have, may begin to calculate that their best, longer term interest lies with another Prince or, alternatively, in a Republic "ready to turn itself according to the way the winds of Fortune and the changeability of affairs require" (Prince, XVIII, 135).

This strategic "indifference" to the form of political domination on the part of those near to power, coupled with the growing expectation that those in office will prove incapable of coping with the "crooked and unknown roads" of fortune or with the perverse and unexpected outcomes of previous policies, is particularly subversive of the viability of authoritarian regimes. Not only is it difficult to spot beforehand, it is difficult to attribute to any specific, immediately present, material factor and, hence, virtually impossible to

buy off in any reliable fashion. Efforts to react by "recalling penalties and renewing fears" are only likely to precipitate action out of necessity. What is worse, those most inclined to react to decay have important resources to deny the regime and/or supply its opponents. Authoritarian regimes in such a dilemma are neither clear functional successes or failures according to their stated objectives or objective states. They have sown the "seeds of their own destruction" all right, but these have come up, not in the predictable plots of fearful necessity, but in the fallow soil of anticipated reaction.

(4) Delegitimation. Of all the motives Machiavelli considered might lead citizens to change rulers, the least reliable he thought was "love"--either the loss of it on the part of those in power or the "desire to free one's city" on the part of those excluded by princely power. Doses of fear, judiciously and economically applied, would suffice--he thought--to overcome such momentary losses of popularity and to disperse such higher moral purpose.

Contemporary students of politics attribute a good deal more significance to the normative basis for political action--in other words, to the need for legitimate grounds for political obligation and consent in order for regimes to persist. Presumably, this is a joint product of the diffusion and inculcation of standards of proper behavior within cultural areas, and of changes in the content of state actions which demand greater voluntary compliance on the part of citizens if they are to be efficiently and effectively implemented. Fear of sanctions alone is no longer sufficient to induce people to serve or to prevent them from disserving the interests of the state. New and more complex linkages between a mobilized, literate, popular community and an expanded providential state make it more imperative that rulers be loved and respected--even when they are not being held accountable through the mechanisms of electoral competition and representative government to the wishes and whims of the public.

Demonstrating that delegitimation (or illegitimacy) is a plausible motive for the demise of any given authoritarian regime (or of such regimes in general) may be logically as well as empirically more difficult than attributing downfall to dissatisfaction of immediate needs, threat to acquired goods, or frustration of eventual opportunities. First, actors must be shown not only to possess values antithetic to authoritarian rule with sufficient conviction and intensity,[17] but these preferences about the form of political domination must be proven independent of the content of policies expected from a regime change. Citizens should demonstrably value how politics is conducted separately from who benefits from political action. Regardless of whether it is perceived as a success or a failure, regardless of whether or not it seems capable of coping with emergent issues, the regime will be opposed--even when its demise may leave the opponent in a less favorable, objective circumstance. If not, such "normatively" phrased motives for opposition can safely be reduced to the more mundane (and predictable) category of self-regarding necessity or to the more ethereal (but reliable) category

of calculated anticipation. They become merely a language in which political struggle takes place and through which actors with divergent needs and calculations can ally for a common, if fleeting, purpose.

Second, the existing regime must be shown to "need" legitimation for its survival. The values must not only clearly identify existing authorities as unworthy of respect and voluntary compliance--something these actors may make difficult by disguising themselves behind democratic façades or by themselves promising eventual conformity to democratic practices--but they must also be linked to depriving authorities of key strategic resources acquired for the perpetuation of governance. If the regime can get the compliance it needs by merely "recalling the penalty" to the mind of its subjects and "renewing the fear" in the hearts of its citizenry without seriously diverting scarce resources or upsetting future calculations, then no matter how deeply inculcated and sharply focused, discordant values about the form of domination may be of little consequence.

One serious problem affecting the legitimacy of regimes which persist for some time in power is the inherent decay involved in the transmission of political values across generations. Just as respect for authority and identity with party may increase at compounding rates once a new regime is founded, so has a secular process of decline and disillusionment set in "once the generation that organized it [passes] away" (Discourses, I, 2, 179).

Inversely, the protractedness with which some authoritarian regimes persist--despite intergenerational decay in normative support--suggests another problem. Machiavelli observes that, because some polities had long suffered princely rule, their societies had become so corrupted that no manner of republican self-government could be expected to take hold. If such a regime could isolate its citizenry from the contrary influences of a democratic Zeitgeist either by censoring its sources of information or by convincing it of its peculiar "political culture," and if it could inculcate such a respect for hierarchy of office and privilege and inequality of access and acquisition,[18] it could confine questions of legitimacy to the holders of specific positions without jeopardizing the survival of the regime itself.

* * *

Our discussion of why the demise of a given authoritarian regime might occur has been expressed in quite generic and abstract terms. Success, Failure, Decay, and Delegitimation are categories obviously capable of encompassing a vast variety of much more specific interests, fears, projections, and aspirations. It is precisely because historical-existent instances of efforts to remove and to defend entrenched authoritarian rulers are likely to involve such a varied menu of specific motives that we have sought to structure our speculations initially at a general level. Once we have obtained enough descriptive material and once we have identified groups of

analogous experiences, then we may pass to more discriminating statements about the kinds of interests affected by regime success, the types of fear generated by failure, the range of anticipated reactions inspired by decay, and the sorts of normative aspirations which trigger delegitimation. At present all we have are fragmentary, anecdotal illustrations of why classes, sectors, statuses, ethnies, regions, generations, institutions, or even individuals came to oppose, became indifferent to, or stayed to support given authoritarian regimes under specific (often quite unique) circumstances--in the past.

We also have more than a hint, let us say a persistent suspicion, that few instances of the demise of authoritarian regimes correspond exclusively and exhaustively to a single category of our already quite simplified motivational set. Such regimes are often simultaneously perceived as successful (therefore, dispensable in the eyes of their initial proponents), failures (therefore, obstructive to the realization of the interests of some of their frustrated supporters and almost all of their opponents), decadent (therefore, probably unfavorable to the future opportunities of many of their present supporters), and illegitimate (therefore, offensive to the values of various publics). If consensus is even rarer at the demise of a regime than at its founding, what we may be looking for is some optimal mix of motives for support, indifference, and opposition. That mix of "whys" may be crucial both to identifying the "whos" responsible for regime seizure, overthrow, transfer, or surrender, and to specifying "what consequences" such a transformation might eventually have for the viability of any ensuing democratic regime.

IV. Because men* are capable of colliding and coaligning with each other for a wide range of purposes and issues and because they exhibit differing propensities for taking risks and for discounting time, no single group of them or alliance of groups will predictably and reliably cause the demise of authoritarian rule. At some point in time, in some context of action, any group or individual may support, tolerate, or oppose the persistence of an authoritarian regime.

Here we part company rather dramatically with Machiavelli. As he saw it, the polities of his time were divided into two mutually exclusive social groups: the "nobles" and the "people," each composed of different persons and interests, each with clear and incompatible regime preferences. Since the former wished only "to be free to command" and the latter "to be free from command," the identity of those supporting princely rule and those supporting republican rule was easy to establish with the social structure and was relatively fixed across time. This tradition of associating dichotomously defined groups, their interests, and their regime preferences has, of course, prevailed--e.g., Lord-Peasant, Bourgeois-Proletarian, Master-Slave, Creditor-Debtor, Producer-Consumer, Center-Periphery, and so forth--without, however, producing a convincing explanation or description

*Again, my excuses for the sexism.

of who provokes either the rise or the demise of authoritarian rule. Some of those who "should" have resisted oppression, exploitation, enslavement, dependency, etc. by struggling for "freedom from command" have turned up on the wrong side of the barricades (or, more often, chosen to remain indifferent until others had taken the risk and paid the cost of a "beneficial" regime change). Inversely, the ranks of those assaulting authoritarian regimes have often been swelled (if not led) by those who had formerly been "free to command." More often than not, regime preference and tolerance have divided categories of actors and rarely brought together groups of economic or social homogeneity. One could go so far as to claim that part of the process undermining regime viability involves the fragmentation of previously coherent economic and social interests and their recombination into unprecedented alliances oriented around alternative strategies for regime defense and demise. Hence, even if one could analytically identify and empirically isolate two warring coalitions[19]--one of privileged, defensive, commanding "nobles" and another of aspiring, aggressive, freedom-loving "plebes"--it is by no means clear that the two "camps" would be composed of distinctive and mutually exclusive economic classes, social statuses, geographic locuses, productive sectors, or institutional situses, not even to mention the thorny issue of ethnic identities and national loyalties.

Given this social heterogeneity in the contemporary basis of both support for and opposition to authoritarian rule, the best one can expect is to specify the generic relevant features of actors with respect to such regimes--and then, in efforts aimed at explaining distinctive historical instances of their transformation, to fill in these categories with the class, sectoral, locational, generational units specifically appropriate to the case and time period at hand.

The most obvious and elementary categorization of positional actors with respect to existing regimes involves whether they are in or out of power. Those "in power" can be further subdivided, as we have argued above, into (i) those directly involved in and responsible for the acts of the regime (protagonists), i.e., those whose office or status is primarily dependent upon the regime, and (ii) those whose support is courted, whose opinions are solicited, and whose actions are encouraged and subsidized by the regime but whose position and property are independent of it (supporters). Actors "out of power" can also be usefully dichotomised into (i) those who are ignored, acted upon, or controlled by the regime but whose existence is tolerated provided they do not act collectively to thwart its purposes or challenge its existence (subjects), and (ii) those who are actually and deliberately deprived or persecuted by it (antagonists). While the latter two categories constitute the great bulk of the population under authoritarian rule, except for "populist" varieties which seek to fuse the passive categories of supporter and subject, policies of paternalistic concession and benign neglect may be sufficient to contain most of it within the realm of passive obedience and successfully isolate potential antagonists. These opponents, in turn, are likely to be subdivided into those driven

into exile by persecution[20] and those who continue to reside precariously within the country.

The second generic factor of differentiation is strategic in nature and is furnished to us by Machiavelli. He suggested that actors responded to political choice with one of two dispositions: (1) they could seek to minimize losses and protect what they had already acquired; or (2) they could be driven by the desire to expand their resources and benefits further, thereby exhibiting a much greater propensity for taking risks in the prospect of maximizing gains.

Figure II displays these two dimensions of political position/disposition in a matrix which generates six generic types of actors--each with a presumed different propensity for acting with respect to the authoritarian regime in power. The examples of social, political, and economic groups at the bottom of each cell are merely illustrative since, as we noted above, the mix of those supporting or opposing authoritarian rule varies considerably from one case to another and over time with a single case.

1. In one of his most appropriate passages, Machiavelli argues rather counterintuitively that defensive or conservative actors may be more dangerous to regime persistence than acquisitive or aggressive ones, for in most cases:

> . . . disturbances are caused by those who possess for the fear of losing generates in them the same desires that those who desire to acquire possess. . . . Furthermore, those who possess more can with greater force and speed effect changes. And what is more serious, their unchecked and ambitious behavior kindles the desire for possession in the minds of those who do not possess.
>
> (Discourses, I, 5, 187-8)

Presumably, actors oriented toward acquiring resources, positions, and benefices they do not presently have are easier to deal with. Their chosen goals are less certain, and perhaps less tangible (honor, freedom, and future property instead of security, command, and present property). Their available resources are less substantial, and perhaps less concentrated. Their disturbances are less likely to become contagious. Most important, defensively motivated actions against regime persistence can be more difficult to predict and recognize than acquisitive ones, since they may represent rapid reversals of position and/or since they may come disguised as supportive in intent.

2. Machiavelli also warns authoritarian rulers-cum-princes that they can rarely rule by themselves but must rule through or with others, and that they should, therefore, be more wary of those in or near power than those subjected to it or far removed from it. As with the defensive actors, protagonists and supporters typically have more opportunity and resources to act. The distribution of offices

FIGURE II

GENERIC TYPES OF POLITICAL ACTORS

I. Position with Respect to / II. Basic Disposition for Acting in Politics	1. Those in Power		2. Those Out of Power	
	A. Those Directly Involved in and Responsible for Regime Policies	B. Those Consulted by Regime Policy-Makers & Associated Indirectly with Regime Policies	A. Those Ignored by Regime Policy-Makers but Tolerated by Regime Policies	B. Those Persecuted by Regime Policy-Makers & Deprived Deliberately by Regime Policies
1. Those Who Primarily Desire to Protect What They Have Already Acquired by Political Action (or Inaction)	CONSERVATIVE PROTAGONISTS Examples: upper-level executive personnel; technocrats, military & police officers; foreign advisors(?); dependents & family members.	CONSERVATIVE SUPPORTERS Examples: subsidized & protected bourgeois; some large landowners; privileged "leaders" of middle-class & working class associations; technocrats; civil servants; foreign capitalists(?).	DEFENSIVE SUBJECTS Examples: peripheral landed notables & provincial elites; old middle class; petty bourgeoisie; small landholders & peasants; some skilled workers.	DEFENSIVE ANTAGONISTS Examples: Leaders & militants of traditional parties; rival technocrats; skilled workers; domesticated CP; leaders-followers of liberal professions; assimilated exiles; emigrants.
2. Those Who Primarily Desire to Acquire More Than They Presently Have Through Political Action	AGGRESSIVE PROTAGONISTS Examples: leaders of dissident factions; displaced rivals; interservice competitors; lower-ranking officers and technocrats; "state capitalists."	ACQUISITIVE SUPPORTERS Examples: emergent, competitive bourgeois; middle-level civilian bureaucrats; new agrarian capitalists; new middle class.	ACQUISITIVE SUBJECTS Examples: bulk of urban working class; landless rural workers and sharecroppers; urban "marginals."	AGGRESSIVE ANTAGONISTS Examples: students; underground leaders and militants; union leaders; peasant militants; some intellectuals; exiled leaders; foreign-sponsored militants.

and favors to those in power or supportive of it tends to create new and further obligations; gratitude for benefits received is quickly forgotten or discounted in favor of expanded expectations (Prince, X, 112).[21] "All conspiracies have been formed by those closest to the prince"--because those farther removed are too weak individually and too numerous collectively to organize a successful challenge. Subjects and antagonists, he suggested, "when they are tired of a prince, they turn to cursing him and wait for others who have greater power than they possess to avenge them." Although Machiavelli might marvel at the disruptive power and dedicated effort of small groups of intense antagonists in modern, interdependent, and ideologically mobilized polities, he probably would conclude, as he did in the early 1500s, that such quixotic attempts deserved to be praised for their intentions, but not for their prudence or intelligence.

3. Just as modern princes can rarely rule alone, modern conspirators can rarely activate their calculus of dissent without allies. Heroic, individualistic action--say tyrannicide by lone assassin or small band--may still suffice against highly personalistic and patrimonial dictators (although replacement by family or friend without regime change is the usual outcome), but the removal of established, bureaucratized, and impersonal, authoritarian rulers invariably involves coalitional behavior, frequently over a protracted period of time. It may be possible to locate after the event, even to predict before its occurrence, which category of actor will attempt to build a dissenting coalition. The success of the effort will depend on the choice of allies, which will in turn vary according to whether the strategy chosen aims at seizure, overthrow, transfer, or surrender of power and whether the motivational incentives of success, failure, decay, or delegitimation are sufficiently and appropriately distributed across the conspiratorial alliance. The fact that different types of actors are likely to prefer different strategies and possess different motives for regime transformation may prevent the demise of even the most unsuccessful, decadent, and delegitimated of authoritarian regimes for some time, especially if, to the inevitable difficulties of putting together a heterogeneous coalition of dissent, one adds the deliberate tactics of the regime itself at differential repression, and selective concessions aimed at divide-et. impera, along with the efforts of its agents provocateurs intended to discredit specific groups and actions.

4. One specific institutional actor occupies a unique position within the generic categories we have identified, simply because under normal circumstances, it possesses sufficient resources if applied concertedly, to countermand, if not suppress outright, all threats to regime persistence. Machiavelli observes that because of the existence of a sizable standing army, in the Roman Empire[22] "it was then necessary to satisfy the soldiers more than the common people [since] the soldiers could do more than the common people" and no regime change was likely to occur without their connivance or tolerance. Since then, the situation had altered, he thought, and it had become more imperative to satisfy the common people "since [they] can do more than the soldiers" (Prince, XIX, 145). No doubt the perpetuation of this imbalance of

forces and the implications of this for republican governance lay behind Machiavelli's firm advocacy of a popular militia. In the more recent period, however, with rare exceptions, modern armies are permanently standing, more-or-less professionally organized, hierarchically directed, and usually superior in their capacity for exercising violence than the common people or aroused elites. "Soldiers" (or more explicitly, their officers) have to be satisfied or be rendered prudentially fearful not only before potential opponents but also before other actual supporters, if any given authoritarian regime is to survive.

If this is the case--if the armed forces have not become so decadent, venal, fragmented, and/or infiltrated that they can plausibly be defeated in a violent confrontation--then the calculus for transforming or overthrowing authoritarian rule must always include a military component if it is to be successful. The military, or some strategically significant component of it, must be part of the dissenting alliance.

The safest appeal is to convince the military that, as conservative protagonists, they can best defend their existing corporate interests by supporting or remaining neutral during a transfer or surrender of power. To act otherwise in the face of regime success, failure, decay, or delegitimation would be to risk becoming so internally politicized, so ethically compromised, or so functionally denatured as to risk losing their effective monopoly over organized violence and, ultimately, to be displaced or disbanded by a violent overthrow of the regime.

Much more risky--both in the likelihood that it will lead to a change in regime and to eventual democratic rule--is to appeal to dissident factions, interservice rivals, or frustrated cliques of officers with blocked promotions to act as "aggressive protagonists" and to seize power in anticipation: "For when the nobles see that they cannot resist the populace, they begin to support one among them and make him prince in order to be able, under his shadow, to satisfy their appetites" (Prince, IX, 108). Such an alliance of conservative supporters and aggressive protagonists is, of course, most likely simply to perpetuate authoritarian rule, although with a different basis of support. Particularly interesting are those situations where preemptive coups of this sort induce those who have seized power to consolidate their position by incorporating previous subjects and even antagonists within their ranks.

More promising but much less frequent are seizures of power from an authoritarian regime by an isolated group of aggressive protagonists (usually a military clique) whose vulnerability, if they are momentarily successful, may induce a spontaneous overthrow of power through the massive mobilization of an alliance of previous subjects and repressed antagonists--a spilling of power into the streets, so to speak, in which not merely the regime is transformed but the state structure itself is threatened.

V. Because men* are fearful of established power and uncertain** about their preference for some future configuration of power, changes in regime require the intervention of some independent, unexpected, or uncalculable circumstance*** of sufficient magnitude--inspiring sufficient fear--to compel them to reaffirm or revise their prevailing strategies of regime protagonism, support, conformity, or antagonism.

So far, the demise of an authoritarian regime has been treated as the product of willful, calculated actions in its defense and a preponderance of similar actions against its survival. The logic both of the struggle and its outcome is political and, therefore, not determined (much less "overdetermined") by objective social or economic conditions.[23] Such changes in the context of political choice must be mediated by the structural possibilities for collective action, the Koalitionsfähigkeit of different political partners, variations in consciousness, motivation and dispositions of individuals for action, perceived feasible modes for regime transformation--in short by the "how," "why," and "who" variables we have been exploring--before they can lead to regime transformation. If this assumption is correct, no amount of statistical data collection and manipulation which seeks merely to associate such an outcome with macro-economic performance, literacy, urbanization, social mobilization, "J. curves" of social psychological frustration, imperatives of capital accumulation, stages of import substitution, crises of external dependency, and so forth is likely to produce compelling empirical findings, or even highly probabilistic numerical correlations.[24]

The function of crisis-induced constraints and opportunities is to focus attention on the regime-level of political action and to compel citizens and subjects to become actors with explicit preferences for and against the survival of the regime. Few may actually take part physically in the seizure, transfer, surrender, or overthrow of power--or in its defense--but the compelling presence of these "independent, unexpected, or uncalculable circumstances" will have forced the bystanders explicitly not to help in the defense of the existing order or not to hinder its replacement by another type of regime.

The specific acts of Fortuna which have precipitated, or at least encouraged, the demise of authoritarian rulers seem extraordinarily varied. It would violate the theoretical spirit of this essay simply to list them; it would offend good sense to reduce them to one fatal flaw or inevitable contradiction.

The first generic class of circumstances consists of acts that lie beyond the influence of those in power. Human mortality, whether by unexpected cause or within actuarial prediction, places a limit on

---

*Again, apologies for the stylistic (!) sexism.

**Machiavelli preferred the term "fickle" when it came to preferences for future states based on "love," "reason," or lack of experience.

***Machiavelli, of course, referred to this as "fortuna."

the tenure of even "Life Presidents." It may also interrupt that of "Term Dictators." International vulnerability to acts and opinions of foreign governments, publics, suppliers, and customers can disrupt the capacity of authoritarian regimes, especially in dependent, peripheral economies, to satisfy crucial interests or to meet normative expectations.

Circumstances that presumably lie within the calculus and control of authoritarian actors can also precipitate disturbing responses because they lead to "accidental" or unexpected results. Defeat in war, especially in wars which have been aggressively launched by authoritarian rulers themselves, is among the most frequent of misfortunes which have led to regime change. Accumulated inequity in the distribution of policy benefits and burdens, involving such dramatic events as disruptions of supply, urban riots, crime waves, revelations of corruption, tax revolts, interracial violence, and so forth may be sufficient to precipitate a renversement des alliances against the prevailing regime, although usually such manifestations of internal violence, disobedience, and scandal can be focused on specific agents and agencies, not on the nature of the regime itself, or their occurrence can be successfully attributed to "natural causes" unconnected with regime policies.

Condensing these external and internal circumstances even further, the demise of an authoritarian regime can be traced to two types of crises (one, or the other, or both) which are subsequently responsible for changes in the motives and strategies of actors and eventually for the mode of transformation of the regime. The first involves crises of leadership succession in which mortality, disablement, venality, disgrace, or just plain approaching of the end of one's term precipitate a conflict of uncertain outcome over the identity of individuals occupying key roles within the authoritarian regime. The second consists of crises of policy adaptation in which some new event or the accumulation of past mistakes makes it imperative not merely to change personnel or form, but to change the substance of policy to the benefit and burden of groups other than those which were previously part of the regime as protagonists or supporters.

Succession crises have their primary impact upon regime protagonists themselves and often take the form of a confrontation between "conservatives" and "aggressives" which indirectly involves the mobilization of regime supporters and even, in the extreme cases, appeals to acquisitively-minded subjects or outright antagonists. Policy crises involve a wider set of actors, but focus on the ranks of supporters. "Conservative" supporters are compelled to assess the prospects of their keeping what they have acquired if the regime fails to adapt to the crisis or if the regime does adapt by reforming its policies. "Acquisitive" supporters are likely to see opportunities for obtaining enlarged benefits in material and/or positional terms, and may seek alliances with groups of subjects which have also become more disposed to take new risks. Should the adaptation crisis upset significantly the pay-offs and restraints which have sufficed to ensure conformity, actors in this categoric disposition, especially

the defensively inclined ones, may become potential regime antagonists--leading to the sort of polarization that authoritarian regimes seek to avoid through their conscious cultivation of depoliticized indifference and resignation. Regimes simultaneously facing succession and adaptation crises are obviously most vulnerable to an unpredictable and dangerous realignment of actors and dispositions to take the risk of political action.

Democracies, of course, face these same generic crises regularly as well as unpredictably, but they have institutionalized procedures for dealing with them: competitive elections, contested primaries, parliamentary responsibility, checks and balances between powers, shifting legislative coalitions, even public-opinion polling and freedom of assembly. However imperfect (and different) the procedures are from democracy to democracy, they normally provide the necessary information about events and intensities, and the required flexibility of response in terms of both personnel and policy, to survive such crises without endangering the regime itself. This is not to argue that democracies are invulnerable, only that they are vulnerable to crises of a different nature and through processes involving different combinations of actors than authoritarian regimes.[25]

Needless to say, not all crises of leadership succession and of policy adaptation will bring about the downfall of an authoritarian regime. Some may--with considerable difficulty--manage to institutionalize a system of factional and rotational succession; some will survive even dramatic reversals of policy through scapegoating and cooptation.[26] In most cases, the "crises" themselves will prove to be of insufficient intensity to provoke a necessary reassessment[27] of actor strategies with respect to regime type--buried, as they are, under a patina of custom, indifference, and prudence which grows with longevity in power. Nevertheless, the potentiality is there. Succession and adaptation crises may affect differing combinations of defensively and acquisitively inclined actors--the former protagonists, supporters, subjects, and antagonists of the regime--with their differing assessments of success, failure, decay, and delegitimation, and eventually lead them to transform the authoritarian <u>status quo</u> through a seizure, transfer, surrender, or overthrow of power.

VI. <u>Crises, actors, motives, and strategies combine in a limited number of predictable patterns to produce the demise of authoritarian regimes</u>.

Not only does the bewildering variety of circumstances surrounding the demise of such regimes in the real world seem to belie the above-stated theoretical optimism, but even when this variety has been validly and reliably contained and condensed into types and categories, the logically possible number of combinations is awesome: two types of crises affecting four kinds of actors with four possible categories of motives to engage in one of four possible modal strategies. This produces 128 simple combinations, not to mention the enormous number of potential permutations within each set which might be capable of influencing the outcome.

"Forget it!" one is tempted to respond. Let us just try to use these categories and their attached hypotheses (actually they are more like rules of prudence or tendency than testable propositions) as a means for condensed, hopefully comparable, descriptions of the sequence of events, identity of actors, and menu of motives involved in concrete instances of regime change. Perhaps from a sufficient quantity (and quality) of such efforts, one may be able to induce "typical" syndromes of demise, or viable calculuses of dissent in which generically similar crises, actors, motives, and strategies combined to produce a (retrospectively) given (and desired) outcome: the demise of an authoritarian regime.

Not expecting, or wishing to wait for, such a lengthy and complicated empirical effort, perhaps we could specify in the terms of this ersatz-model what a few of these "typical" syndromes might look like:

1. Adaptation Crisis → Alliance of Acquisitive and Conservative Supporters → Evaluation of Previous Success → Transfer of Power

The "model" which seems to lie behind various liberal apologies for dictatorship and "exceptional rule" probably resembles this first syndrome. An authoritarian regime called into power to resolve "pressing national problems" has been successful (at least in the eyes of its protagonists and supporters), but now faces new problems (ideally not of its own making, but externally thrust upon it). An alliance forms between acquisitive supporters who perceive new opportunities in the changed parameters of policy-making and conservative supporters who wish to retain what they have before it is threatened by a further extension of the crisis. With an assurance to defensive protagonists that their vital interests will be protected (military rank, budget support, protection for property, etc.), they engineer a transfer of power to themselves, perhaps widening the scope of representation and tolerating competition among parties observing strict rules of procedure. In other words, they revert to something approximating the status quo ante.

2. Succession Crisis → Alliance of Aggressive Protagonists and Acquisitive or Conservative Supporters → Evaluation of Failure → Seizure of Power

Here the "model" ends in a golpe by some subgroup of former protagonists. Prevented from realizing their objectives/ambitions by the control other protagonists have over the regime, this dissident "aggressive" faction seizes upon the succession crisis as a pretext for stressing the regime's failure to attain its initial objectives--either because the regime has become excessively dictablanda through compromise with supporters and toleration of antagonists, or too dictadura to retain the needed conformity of most of the population. They ally with either acquisitive or conservative ex-supporters and seize power violently, although without extensive mobilization. Normally, one might expect this mode of demise to result only in the eventual reestablishment of authoritarian rule, but it may eventuate, often unintentionally, in something else when the isolated position of the

golpistas forces them into wider alliances, even a surrender of power, in order to retain some portion of it (in which case, the crisis which provoked the regime change is more likely to be of policy orientation than of succession).

3. Succession Crisis (perhaps coupled with Adaptation Crisis) → Alliance of Aggressive Antagonists & Acquisitive Subjects → Evaluation of Delegitimation & Failure → Overthrow of Power

Here the crisis, calculus, and sequence of responses end in a protracted, mass insurrection (e.g., civil war) and the victory of an alliance untainted by complicity with the defunct regime. The succession crisis is especially important in this scenario when coupled with extensive absence of legitimacy since that may both disorient the protagonists and galvanize the subjects out of their usual indifference to regime form. A calculus of dissent following this pattern may have to contend with scenario No. 2 above in which a subset of protagonists will be seeking to exploit the same succession crisis and gaining supporters precisely due to the prospect of a mass insurrection.

4. Adaptation Crisis (perhaps coupled with Succession Crisis) → Acquisitive Supporters & Acquisitive Subjects (perhaps even Defensive Antagonists) → Evaluation of Decay & Delegitimation → Surrender of Power

Here the core of the scenario lies with an alliance of moderates--ex-supporters of the regime who regard it as neither a clear success nor an obvious failure but who came to question its capacity to reward them in the future, and ex-subjects who, by generational changes and international diffusion, become increasingly susceptible to a normative rejection of the regime and who see in its present policy discomfiture a possibility for acting at less cost than in the past. Their preferred strategy is likely to involve a negotiated solution in which control over the political process is shared between those who supported (despite the frustration of their acquisitive instincts) and those who conformed (despite the dislike) to the defunct regime, coming either in the form of programmed alternation in office or proportional sharing of positions in power. Such an outcome must contend with the less costly temptation of merely transferring power among subgroups of ex-supporters of the regime, and may emerge once that has been tried and proven incapable of commanding voluntary compliance, i.e., once that has been delegitimated.

The above "scenarios of demise" have been excessively schematic in nature and restricted in number. Presumably the function of empirical research--to the extent that those conducting it find these categories and assumptions valuable--will be two-fold: (1) to demonstrate the existence of other possible modal combinations, or for that matter the political "illogic" of those proposed; (2) to flesh out the schema with a factual illustration of the ranges of possible variation in the specific nature of relevant crises, actors, motives, and strategies.

VII. The demise of an authoritarian prince may be assured by one or more combinations of actors and strategies for action, but the rise of democracy is not predictably ensured by the same combination or strategy.

The mere fact that an authoritarian regime has fallen provides no guarantee that it will be replaced by a democratic regime. The event itself, and above all its aftermath, is likely to let loose a flood of new political processes: the founding of new civil institutions, the mobilizing of diverse constituencies, the articulating of new ideologies and expectations, the discovering of new interests, the reshuffling of levels of governance, the jockeying for electoral advantage--not to mention the more obvious, mundane, and immediate tasks of negotiating international recognition and support, drafting a constitution, recruiting government (and party) personnel, and dealing with diehard protagonists of the defunct regime. All these alone would be sufficient to place a sizeable strain on the victorious alliance, but they also serve to bring enormous numbers of new actors into the political arena--citizen-actors whom democracy in principle is committed to bringing within the polity on some equal basis. In short, the "calculus of dissent" which successfully brought down an authoritarian regime cannot be easily and simply transformed into a "calculus of consent" sufficient to support a democratic one.

A vast number of factors--political, economic, social--are likely to influence the outcome of these democratization processes, and they will be dealt with extensively in other papers in this workshop. The concluding remarks in this essay will be devoted to exploring the probable long-run impact of the nature of "the authoritarian experience" upon the viability of a democratic instauration or restoration.

1. The Mode of Demise of the Authoritarian Regime. When identifying the four strategies of regime transformation, we suggested that the literature, beginning with Machiavelli, has stressed the notion of vulnerability and the need for concerted violent action to achieve such ends (hence, the greater likelihood that democracy would be restored after seizures or overthrows of power). Machiavelli went even further and argued that the successful founding of a new republican order demanded that "one man provide the means and be the only one from whose mind any such organization originates." Even his most extraordinary actions would be excusable, "for one should reproach a man who is violent in order to destroy, not one who is violent in order to mend things" (Discourses, I, 9, 200-201). Such a lonely "lawgiver" or "charismatic leader" is less likely to emerge from the compromises and mutual guarantees that characterize the other two modal strategies of demise.

The problem with this scenario was already noted by Machiavelli himself in a famous paradox:

> But since the reforming of a city into a body politic presupposes a good man, and becoming prince of a republic through the use of violence presupposes an evil man--because of this fact we discover that it happens only very rarely that a good man wishes to become prince through evil means, even though his goal may be a good one; while, on the other hand, we discover that it is equally rare for an evil man who has become prince to act correctly, for it would never ever enter his mind to employ that authority for a good which he has acquired by evil means. (Discourses, I, 18, 227-228)[28]

One problem, then, with seizures and overthrows of power is their tendency to result in concentrations of personal power and to reward forms of behavior hardly conducive to law-abiding, popularly accountable forms of government.[29]

Above, we have argued that ensuing changes in the organizational and motivational structure of politics since Machiavelli's time have made dispensability, regime demise from choice not necessity, an increasingly likely possibility. Transfers and surrenders of power which leave many previous practices and privileges intact (at least for the moment) and which deliberately incorporate a "diversity of opinion" within their ranks may lack the singularity of will and the clean slate for operation that Machiavelli thought so essential to the founding of a new order.[30] Nevertheless, their very inconclusiveness and the resultant need to institutionalize some sort of compromise which respects not only mutual rapports de force but also locks out militant antagonists advocating more extensive democratization and protagonists of the defunct regime advocating an authoritarian reaction[31] may provide the most favorable, if less heroic, grounds for establishing democratic order.

At this very general point, speculation about the probable relationship between the mode of demise and the outcome of transition to democracy should come to a halt. The problem lies in the "singular" definition of democracy as if it were some unitary-identical structure of practices and institutions. Machiavelli could assume that "republican" rule was sufficiently similar in nature that one could generalize about its genesis and maintenance.[32] We cannot make that assumption about democracy in our time. The outcome of any given democratic transformation will depend to a significant degree on the type of democracy which actors aim to establish, or better, the type of democracy they are forced to compromise upon. "Democrats" usually have very different institutional arrangements and political practices in mind in their struggle against authoritarian rule--arrangements and practices which not incidentally correspond to the structure of power which they consider will best guarantee the defense of their established interests or the acquisition of their coveted ones.

Unfortunately, the systematic discussion of types of democratic rule is in its infancy and tends to confuse the structure of governance with the social and cultural preconditions for its emergence.[33]

FIGURE III

TYPES OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES

Rights & Practices / Types of Democracy	Recognized Rights to Public Contestation of Policy & Personnel: Freedoms of Assembly, Speech, Press; Legal Equality.	Regular Elections with Uncertain Outcome under Restricted Conditions of Participation and Candidacy.	Regular Elections with Uncertain Outcome and without Restrictions on Participation and Candidacy.	Accountability of Executive Power before Elected Representatives or General Electorate.	←Political Form: Governance by Stable Alliance of Minorities or by Fixed Rotation of Parties in Office.	Governance by Uncertain Rotation of Parties in Control of Parliament or Presidency.	Policy Substance→ Pursuit of Policies Designed to Redistribute Benefits More Equally.	Pursuit of Policies Designed to Equalize Control Over Resources.
. Liberalized Authoritarian Rule	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
. Oligarchic Democracy	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-
. Populist Democracy	+	+	+	-	-	-	?	-
. Parliamentary or Presidential Democracy	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-
. Proportional Democracy	+	+	+	?	+	-	-	-
. Majoritarian Democracy	+	+	+	+	-	+	?	-
. Social Democracy	+	+	+	+	-	?	+	-
. Radical Democracy	?	?	?	?	?	?	+	+

For the purpose of opening a discussion of this topic, Figure III is offered, in which six formal aspects and two substantive goals of democracy are arranged in a quasi-scalogram to derive eight modal types. Like all static scalograms, this one should not be read as a historical-cumulative sequence in which the less frequent attributes are necessarily acquired later or in which prior "steps" must be taken before moving on to the next. For example, parliamentary accountability was often acquired long before regular elections of uncertain outcome with universal (male) enfranchisement, e.g., Great Britain; while elsewhere, e.g., the German Second Reich, widespread suffrage anteceded any form of executive accountability.

In terms of the categories and scenarios of demise suggested infra, we can offer the following hypotheses about the likely type of democracy leading actors will prefer: (1) Where there has been a seizure of power, actors are likely to be divided between those in favor of a mere liberalization of authoritarian rule and those in favor of some type of populist democracy with plebiscitary consultations but no effective executive accountability; (2) after a transfer of power, conservatively included ex-supporters will prefer oligarchic democracy with indirect elections, restricted franchise, partisan exclusions, and/or invulnerable executives, but their alliance with ex-subjects may make some form of parliamentary or presidential outcome a necessary compromise (hence, the contemporary appeal of the ambiguously designed Gaullist "monarchie presidentielle"); (3) in the event of a surrender of power with its wider and more heterogeneous basis of support, the choice is most likely to lie between a proportional formula with fixed quotas for the sharing of offices and benefits, or for rotation in and out of office; or a majoritarian arrangement in which potential rotation is left to the uncertainty of acquiring majoritarian electoral support;[34] (4) the overthrow of power through mass insurrection led by ex-antagonists opens up new possibilities for the substance of democratization and renders quite ambiguous the form that democratic institutions may take. Here populist democracy under a loosely organized, weakly constraining, dominant party will be difficult due to the high level of mobilization and autonomy of action of insurrectionist-cum-revolutionaries. Proportionality will be impossible (and unnecessary) to establish in the aftermath of the destruction of so many pre-existing institutions; rotation in office will appear at best wasteful, at worst subversive of the high-risk effort successfully accomplished. Social democracy with its policy redistributions and ameliorations may look attractive if a stable dominant majoritarian alliance can be forged, but most likely is the emergence of some type of radical democracy which will not respect the restricted rights, procedures, and organizational forms of "bourgeois" democracy.

2. The Longevity of the Defunct Regime. One patent difference among authoritarian regimes is the length of time they have endured or survived. At one extreme, we find cases in which no living person is likely to remember, or to have participated in, any other type of regime. Virtually the entire political personnel and citizenry has

been socialized, indoctrinated, recruited, or repressed under authoritarian auspices. At the other extreme, countries have had such a fleeting (or episodic) experience that the defunct regime never really managed to institutionalize or consolidate itself in power, and most prospective actors have vivid memories of, and commitments to, competitive political parties, free associational life, civic liberties, etc.

Clearly, the former case rules out any simple "parenthetic" outcome--that is, restoring the previous form of democracy by recalling its practices, personnel, and parties. Machiavelli's urging that "changes are healthy which bring bodies back to their beginning" (Discourses, III, Intro., 351) has become simply impossible. Lengthy, "non-democratic interludes" also have a skewed impact on the nature of regime antagonists, diminishing the survival chances of loosely organized, moderate ones, and leaving the field to highly organized, clandestine organizations. Even after a very long "lapse," however, seemingly defunct labels and loyalties can be resurrected[35] and hard-core para-military organizations do not necessarily gain an inordinate advantage.

The latter case--that of episodic, unconsolidated authoritarian experiences--makes a negotiated transition more difficult due to the relative absence of coherent, well-organized interlocutors who know and can guarantee the protection of minimal institutional interests. Here the problem is that democratic leaders and policies are too "resurrectable" and their likely, resentful, behavior too threatening, while authoritarian practices appear (to their protagonists) not to have had a chance to perform their assigned function or satisfy their preferred interests.

A more difficult issue to resolve is the impact of protracted--i.e., several generational--authoritarian rule upon popular values, images of authority, expectations of performance, habits of interaction, etc. The question is not whether the defunct regime was congruent with some transcendent, supra-historical "national character" or "political culture," but whether it was successful in inculcating in the populous and/or in significant elites a set of supportive values shaping the ends and means of political action. Deliberate efforts at "civic and moral education" have usually been farcical and contributed more to a political culture of cynicism than to one directly and self-consciously supportive of authoritarian rule, but might this "non-enthusiastic," alienated political culture of Realpolitik, dissimulation, and disgust not pose a formidable obstacle to the spontaneity, loyalty, and trust necessary for the informal, give-and-take negotiations of a democracy? Machiavelli thought not--unless the long-reigning prince had completely eradicated all "ancient institutions" and thereby corrupted the society. He might not be surprised that mass publics respond with astonishing civic maturity, revive rather quickly their enthusiasm for politics, establish strong loyalties even to new and untested leaders, and even learn to trust uncertain allies and unknown opponents, when given the opportunity during a transition to democracy. He certainly hoped that this would happen in his beloved Florence if so liberated.

3. The Circumstances of Access to Power. Just as authoritarian regimes meet their demise in several modes, so they come to power in a wide variety of ways and in contexts of quite different political intensity. Quasi-legal Machtergreifung, external imposition, and armed civil conflict illustrate some of the range, although coup d'etat represents the modal route to that acquisition of power. Some such transformations are relatively peaceful and low in threat perception; others leave a bloody trail of victims and a fearful set of victors. All forms of governance receive some "generic imprint" from the circumstances of their instauration. Authoritarian ones perhaps receive a peculiar heritage since they are often subsequently required to stress the "revolutionary" nature of their extraordinary-unconstitutional founding and to overdramatize the magnitude of the crisis which motivated their seizure of power. They do so without, however, either the consequent large-scale social, economic, and political changes which might consolidate a new "historical bloc" in power, or the subsequent systematic-categoric repression of "counter-revolutionaries" which would physically remove such prospective antagonists from contention for power in the future.

Violent resolutions of crises perceived as threatening the very existence of political actors--civil war over the nature of national identity represents the extreme instance; class struggle over the ownership of the means of production is a somewhat less intensive context--leave the sort of birthmark that is likely to make a negotiated transfer or surrender of power more difficult, although this structural determinant clearly varies inversely with that of longevity in power since subsequent social and economic transformation is likely to erode some of the bases of the genetic conflict and since revanchiste motives may be expected to diminish through intergenerational transfer. Perhaps the most favorable context for democratic restoration occurs when the defunct regime has the genetic imprint of "external imposition." Blaming foreign aggressors (or their domestic collaborators) will not always suffice, however, since it may serve to raise the delicate issue of the configuration of internal political forces which tolerated or proved incapable of preventing such an imposition.

4. The Social Basis of Prior Authoritarian Rule. Observing that prototype of modern authoritarian rule, the Second Empire of Napoleon III, Marx concluded that its social basis was both complex and contradictory. He described its historical evolution during the short period of his observation as one of an iterative narrowing of support whereby the allies used to expel or exclude yesterday's participants in power become today's victims, and so forth--until its executive power stood completely independent from civil society and isolated from political support, based only on physical intimidation ("the rifle butt"). Ergo, authoritarian regimes have social support, albeit of a varied and shifting nature, i.e., they are not simply tyrannies, and their historical evolution tends toward a progressive narrowing and homogenization of that support base, i.e., they have difficulty recuperating supporters once they have been excluded, and attracting new supporters from the ranks of subjects and antagonists.

What seems crucial to the eventual prospects for democracy, as well as for the type of democracy, is that authoritarian regimes backed by a more heterogeneous coalition of social forces are likely to have been ruled by negotiation and compromise. Marx was convinced that Napoleon III's efforts to please such a variety of interests while not being uniquely accountable to any of them would result in contradictory policies, stalemated outcomes, growing disaffection, and regime demise in the near future. The Second Empire proved more resilient than he imagined. Nevertheless, the fact that it at one time or another appealed to, and was supported by, such "constituencies" no doubt facilitated the successful transition to oligarchic parliamentary democracy both because so many had been compromised with it that it was difficult to draw a sharp distinction between "insiders" and "outsiders," and because its policy processes already contained the sort of interest exchanges, procedural arrangements, and substantive compromises conducive to viable democracy. Where an authoritarian regime becomes more narrowly based by successive purges and defections of previous supporters/beneficiaries, the behavior of its hardcore conservative and frustrated aggressive protagonists will add disturbing elements to the delicate transition period. Conversely, where authoritarian rule has been the more consistent product of a narrow band of institutional, ethnic, regional, and/or class interests, it will be easier to identify and isolate its supporters, to brand them as mere usurpers, and to banish them from the political life of the successor regime.

Also important is the institutional autonomy of the supporters and subjects of the defunct authoritarian regime. In those cases where it has managed successfully to penetrate the leadership structures of such relatively autonomous and pre-existing hierarchies as the Church, the Civil Service (to the extent it exists), the business community, the military, local notables, provincial elites, etc., the process of transition will be hindered by the compromised nature of these institutions. Democratization will be contingent upon their fragmentation and reorganization, and in the short run will not be able to take advantage of their member loyalties and institutional resources. Where the authoritarian regime left such hierarchies alone as subjects provided they either tolerated or did not oppose it, or where it encapsulated and repressed them as antagonists--these institutions are likely to become important sources of leadership and "followership" in any ensuing democratic political process.

What seems crucial in assessing the likely impact of the differing social bases of authoritarian rule upon the transition to democracy can be summed up in the concept introduced above of dispensability. Not in this case, that famous verselbständige Macht der Executivgewalt whereby the previous regime in its relative autonomy could presumably dispense with any particular element or configuration of class support, but its obverse: the extent to which a given class (or institution, ethnic group, regional elite, etc.) can dispense with a particular configuration of political power and still survive with its perceived vital interests intact. Just as the relation

between the Roman Catholic Church and the state in Western Europe was significantly altered in the latter part of the 19th century by the Church's discovery that it could afford to be "indifferent" to parliamentary democracy, so it seems of considerable importance to the prospects for democracy in the present period, that classes, sectors, professions, éthnies, etc., learn that their very survival does not depend on a perpetuation of authoritarian rule. This perception of dispensability, more crucial to contemporary outcomes than that of vulnerability, is encouraged by two dramatically different social configurations: one in which the defunct regime was based from the start on a rather broad spectrum of interests and made only weak efforts at infiltrating or penetrating the institutional apparatuses defending those interests; the other in which the regime had a quite narrow, exclusivistic base and sought concertedly and continually to control and subordinate the pre-existing autonomous institutions of civil society.

5. The Role of the Military Under the Previous Regime. While the collaboration or complicity of those most immediately in control of the instruments of organized violence is pivotal to the survival of any type of regime, one could argue for its even greater significance in authoritarian ones. So much so that they are frequently (and often misleadingly) labelled "military dictatorships."

Again, one can easily observe a rather wide range of "situations" in the relationship between the armed forces and authoritarian rule which interest us. Their role in the instauration of such regimes varies from facilitative and passive complicity to exclusive and active responsibility, with all matter of civil-military alliances in between. Their occupancy of formal executive and administrative roles varies from confinement to positions in their own corporate hierarchy to usurpation of all positions of decisional importance. Their identification with the policy goals of the regime ranges from episodic intervention to ensure corporate self-interest to systematic responsibility for the direction and implementation of virtually all policy choices. Their mode of political action runs from individual and peaceful expressions of personal and/or professional opinion to corporate and coercive assertions of sovereign authority, with a wide "menu" of strategic and tactical alternatives lying between these extremes.

The special significance of the role of the military in transitions to democracy stems, on one hand, from the close symbolic association (in their own eyes and those of the general public) between this set of institutions and the defunct regime and, on the other, from its varying degrees of responsibility for substantive policy actions of that regime. Where the situation resembles the "heavy end" of the above range of variance--i.e., the more it approaches outright military dictatorship--the more difficult it will be for the military as a corporation to adopt a stance of dispensability with respect to the outgoing regime and to accept a transfer or surrender of power without armed resistance. It is unlikely to accept, with passive or benign indifference, its replacement by a democratic regime. In all instances, there will be a sensitive "military question," but the lesser the symbolic and substantive associations, the easier it will be to resolve by negotiation and compromise.

The entire situation may, of course, be vastly complicated or simplified by the context of national and international security in which the regime transformation occurs. Militaries which have been defeated in war and countries which have been occupied by foreign powers are not likely to be in a position to make and enforce decisions about the nature and policies of an ensuing regime. Inverse situations in which the security context is perceived as so favorable that an incumbent regime might conceivably disband the existing armed forces altogether or transform them into a mere police force are, of course, rare, but their mere possibility is likely to strengthen military resistance to any form of regime transformation. Normally, however, the military as a distinctive, semi-autonomous, hierarchic corporation can expect to survive the demise of authoritarian rule and to accommodate itself to various forms of democracy. The issues at stake, therefore, revolve around the fate of individual officers, special units, established professional practices, existing levels of budgetary support, and so forth. While always sensitive, these issues seem most tractable, and the prospects for a transition to democracy best, where the armed forces have maintained a relatively high degree of corporate unity and professional consciousness, where their policy role and command over resources have not expanded greatly, where their symbolic identification with the outgoing regime has been low (or buried in the past), and where their allotted tasks in the provision of national security are modest and attainable, but respectable and significant.

6. The Institutional Format of the Defunct Regime. Because so many institutions of authoritarian rule bear the same labels: parties, elections, legislatures, local governments, unions, plebiscites, etc.--but perform quite differently than their democratic counterparts, there is a tendency to dismiss them as out-of-hand charades or façades, and to overlook their potential significance in the process of transition to democracy. Students of authoritarian rule may be vaguely aware of these ritualistic and formalistic practices, but they typically and justifiably have inquired into less visible mechanisms of power and influence in their efforts at explaining the policies of such regimes. I remember my amusement at discovering that Portugal had held more national elections than any other European country between 1932 and 1974, and my surprise once I delved into the conduct of these elections at their often latent, and to a degree unintended, consequence for the regime's perpetuation in power.[36]

Consider again the substantial range of variation across authoritarian experiences and across time within any given experience. Elections for legislative and/or executive office may be simply abolished, held and then cancelled, tolerated at one level and suppressed at another, made indirect in some areas or at some levels and left direct elsewhere, held unpredictably with uncertain rules and fraudulent practices, and/or conducted regularly under highly institutionalized (if unequal) procedures. Enfranchisement may disappear, decrease, remain constant, and/or even increase. Enrollment may be cancelled, discouraged, manipulated, and/or made obligatory. Parties may be actively suppressed, passively tolerated, extensively purged, replaced

by an official movement, reformed and manipulated in number and performance, allowed to form under restrictive conditions, and/or allotted a fixed quota of seats. Legislatures may be shut down, periodically recessed, packed with appointees, shifted to a functional basis, and/or rendered impotent. Workers' organizations may be abolished, purged, discouraged, controlled, subsidized, and/or corporatized. Employers' and professional associations may be intervened, reformed, encouraged, ignored, corporatized, and/or brought into the high circles of power. Local governments may be eliminated, intervened, appointed, suborned, subsidized, and/or just left alone.

As the prospect of even a liberalization of practices emerges or the spectre of a regime transition appears, one may belatedly applaud the existence of arrangements and institutions previously scorned as "pseudo-democratic." On the one hand, they can be a significant source of leaders for the transition who are both recognizable to wider publics and acceptable to authoritarian rulers by virtue of their previous, "responsible" behavior. However manipulated and fraudulent, the parties, interest associations, civic groups, legislatures, local governments, etc., of an authoritarian regime do possess some physical resources--if only a building, mimeo machine, and address book--and human skills--knowledge of parliamentary procedure, familiarity with local conditions, ability to staff an organization--which can otherwise be in short supply, especially in those cases where most of the potential replacement personnel are in jail or exile.

On the other hand, the very existence of such anomalous practices within an authoritarian regime is indirect evidence of the persistence of democratic values and aspirations in civil society and of the regime's efforts to gain some legitimation from their invocation and manipulation. Popular sovereignty, citizen equality, electoral enfranchisement, constituent accountability, partisan representation, mass participation, voluntary associability, even majority rule, are not merely kept alive as symbols by such pseudo-democratic gestures as acclamatory plebiscites, rigged elections, impotent assemblies, and officialized interest representation, but can serve as standards against which actual performance is evaluated and future behavior can be projected.

Before simply concluding that the greater the pseudo-democratic component in a given authoritarian experience, the greater the prospects for a successful democratic re- or instauration, we should express some reservations. It is not impossible that some of the pretensions of the defunct regime to representing a superior form of democracy--"authoritarian," "corporatist," "organic," "presidential," "authentically national," "incorruptible," "orderly," etc.--will draw support from some classes or segments of the population and will eventually be used in attempts to discredit the "disorderly," "inauthentic," "foreign-inspired," "partisan" efforts of succeeding democratic politicians. Paradoxically, while such labels and practices proved ineffective in legitimating the performance of authoritarian regimes in power, they can provide the basis for a certain nostalgia and popular aura once these "fathers of the

people" have been removed from power--and once the population has been exposed to the intrinsic uncertainty and division of authentically democratic forms of politics.

Also, one should not overlook the fact that "pseudo-democracy" has had the effect of co-opting institutions and drawing a substantial number of individuals into a network of at least implicit complicity with the defunct authoritarian regime. In situations where there emerges due to internal exclusion or external banishment a clearly untainted and manifestly heroic set of antagonists, they are likely to interpret the complicity of individuals and institutions as evidence of opportunism and insincerity, and to use it as the basis for exclusion from the process of democratic instauration. If successful in this effort, the transition would lose not only the human and material resources specifically created by "pseudo-democracy," but such preemption would drastically narrow the pool of potential recruits to leadership positions, as well as alienate substantial potential followerships.

Another feature of "pseudo-democratic" practices is their tendency to affect differentially the levels of governance. Some authoritarian regimes eliminated as far as possible all tendencies and pretensions to autonomous participation and competition at the local level, but tolerated a limited and episodic degree of rival organizational effort and often dissension at the national level. Others organized their pseudo-democratic practices in a more-or-less inverse manner allowing much more competition, participation, and autonomy in municipal politics than in successive layers of state and national government. Taking a "bottom-up" perspective on building democracy, the latter seems a more favorable context for a successful transition. Whatever the direction, the unevenness of experience with pseudo-democratic practices will contribute to some amount of disarticulation in the future as the rules of the political game become more congruent across levels of government.

7. The Previous Mode of Repression. All authoritarian regimes are taxed with the heavy label "repressive," and rightly so, for if they do not resort more frequently and concertedly to exclusion, intimidation, censorship, arrest, exile, etc., than the democratic regimes they succeed, one might well question whether they deserve the classification "authoritarian."

Nevertheless, the means employed to repress opponents and the targets of that effort are by no means identical across such regimes, nor are they constant over time within the same authoritarian experience. The means can range from fines to assassination, from periodic harassment to lengthy imprisonment, from voluntary exile to forced internment, from economic reprisal to political deprivation, from legal arbitrariness to loss of all civic rights, from the indignity of castor oil to excruciating torture. The targets of repression may vary from active individual opponents to their families and associates, from actual members of specified opposition organizations to all believers in vaguely delineated subversive doctrines, from particular expressions of opinion and literature to

all non-conformist acts of artistic creativity, from those self-consciously active in political struggle to entire categories of people based on class, religious, regional, ethnic identity.

Variations in the patterns of repression employed by authoritarian regimes would seem to affect the prospects for eventual democratization in two principal ways. Most directly, they condition (if not establish) the nature of the opposition, parts of which might be expected to collaborate in a negotiated transition, other parts of which are likely to persist in their intransigent efforts to bring about a ruptura and, hence, to obtain the sort of victory which will vindicate their suffering and enable them to extract revenge upon their tormentors. Repression which has been sharply and deliberately discriminatory among types of categories of political opponents is likely to widen the gap between those willing to compromise and those dedicated to holding out for maximalist results. Where repression has been widespread, indiscriminate, and even arbitrary, it may not lead to such a clear demarcation among opponents--although where aimed at a whole ethnic, linguistic, regional group it may lead that group into a distinctive strategy of opposition.

A rather special problem emerges when repression produces a large exile community. If its members emigrated voluntarily out of a calculus of fear, self-interest, and anticipated reaction, their eventual return may pose delicate problems of adjustment and alliance with similarly minded, usually moderate, opponents who remained (and who are often implicated in the authoritarian regimes' pseudo-democratic institutions). Involuntary expellees, especially when their stay abroad was sponsored or subsidized by an external power, raise different issues. They may find themselves excluded by law or by political isolation from participating in a democratic reconstruction. In all cases, repression which has involved formal loss of citizenship and property involves the issues of amnesty (its timing, comprehensiveness, etc.), indemnification for, and/or recuperation of, losses, often of goods appropriated by individual and institutional supporters of the outgoing regime. Dictablandas which have utilized more selective, individualistic, and episodic forms of repression, which have not so much exiled as encapsulated their antagonists, and which have deprived them more of opportunities than of possessions do not leave such a difficult heritage in their wake.

The principal indirect impact of differing patterns of repression affects, not the victims, but the beneficiaries of authoritarian rule and involves the specific agents and agencies responsible for such policies. Where the means have been moderate, especially relative to those prevailing before the authoritarian experience, and the targets have been selective, and therefore have not involved large numbers of innocents, subjects, etc., cosmetic changes in the law, judicial system, and legal profession, coupled with purges of individual police and military officials and the dismantlement of particular agencies, may suffice. But where extreme measures of physical coercion were used and widespread victimization occurred,

then the transition to democracy will inevitably raise the demand for effective institutional guarantees against future recurrence and for exemplary punishment of those responsible. Anticipating such a likelihood, those protagonists involved in the administration of repression form the hard-core of resistance to a democratic transition, and they usually have at their disposition the means to disrupt it by agents provocateurs, terrorist acts, etc. Perhaps the strongest argument against a lengthy transfer or surrender of power in such contexts is the time it gives to this group to act in defense of its interests.

VIII. Conclusion

This essay has been written in a "Machiavellian Mood" for what may be a "Machiavellian Moment" in the history of Southern Europe and Latin America. The mood was set at first almost by accident--by the contrary critical reactions of two commentators on our initial proposal, the timely suggestions of a friend who happens to specialize in Italian renaissance literature, and a lengthy visit to Florence last summer for other reasons. It was subsequently reinforced by my growing conviction that, more than any theorist and certainly more than any contemporary theorist of "political development," Machiavelli provides a substantive and methodological basis for understanding the issues involved in regime change. He focuses concertedly and relentlessly on two alternative forms of governance, princely and republican rule, remarkably isomorphic to the authoritarian/democratic choice facing some contemporary polities in Southern Europe and Latin America. Moreover, he does so by delineating generic categories of motivation and action, and by tracing their logical consequence in a manner which is neither spatially nor temporally restricted. With appropriate adjustments in the characteristics of actors and modernizations in the vocabulary of analysis, it is not difficult to transpose his thought to the present age. Most appealing to me was the way he avoids the simplistic and misleading reductionism prevalent in so much recent theorizing on the subject of regime change by recognizing both the constraints imposed by necessity and custom and the opportunities available to choice and audacity.

After exploiting, perhaps obsessively, this "discovery," my attention was drawn to the possibility that it was not purely coincidental that I had found Machiavelli so appropriate. A recent book by J.G.A. Pocock suggests that there are "Machiavellian Moments" during which the set of issues and manner of theorizing created by Machiavelli become uniquely appropriate to analyzing politics.[37] Could it be that contemporary Southern Europe and Latin America are in such a moment?

By Pocock's account, the answer would appear to be negative, for he identifies the Machiavellian Moment with "the time in which the republic is seen as confronting its own temporal finitude, as attempting to remain morally and politically stable in a stream of irrational events conceived as destructive of all systems of secular

stability" (p. viii). Here the problem is posed as that of a waning in republican virtù, of a decline of faith in the active, popular, civic life in the face of the corrupting influence of unbridled power-seekers and self-regarding interests, and the uncertain effect of international competition and economic cupidity.

If anything, the "moment" in Southern Europe and Latin America is the inverse. The problem is (re)founding, not preserving, a republican-cum-democratic order. How can these polities regenerate a vita activa and vivere civile out of an "unlegitimated world governed by fortuna" in which naked power, unreflective custom, and pure improvisation have ruled for so long and so undermined the republican vision of a civic humanism and the democratic aspiration for a social justice? That is the question.

And it is not one for which Machiavelli has a convincing answer: "Princes are superior to the people in instituting laws, founding civic communities, and establishing statutes and new institutions . . . , the people are so much more superior in maintaining the things thus established that they attain, without a doubt, the same glory as those who established them" (Discourses, I, 58, 285). The quality needed to found a virtuous order is individual, not civic, in nature, and, as we have seen, it will take evil acts[38] and an evil man to accomplish such a difficult task, and who can realistically expect such an actor to step aside once he has accomplished that?[39] Innovative political action, precisely because it disturbs prevailing custom and ingrained corrupt practices, requires exceptional "leadership" properties, but those individuals who are likely to have them are the least likely to hand them over to a reestablished citizenry for their future maintenance.

The problem for the polities of Southern Europe and Latin America which are undergoing a prospective regime transformation, then, lies in a different kind of Machiavellian Moment. They cannot simply rely on the preservation or resuscitation of republican virtues and democratic ideals. They must forge new ones--and on the way, Machiavelli warns us, they will be dangerously exposed to the whims of fortune and the temptations of corruption. The answer, hopefully, lies in the emergence of some new "collective prince" with the audacity (virtù) of the singular variety and goodness (bontà) of the people.

Antonio Gramsci had, of course, arrived at this conclusion some time ago: "The modern prince, the myth-prince, cannot be a real person, a concrete individual, it can only be an organism; a complex element of society in which the cementing of a collective will, recognized and partially asserted in action, has already begun."[40] Providentially, historical development was producing such a collective agent: the cohesive, centralizing, and disciplined mass political party, for which the Jacobins were the prototype and the Communist Party, hopefully, the archetype. Unfortunately for contemporary Southern Europe and Latin America, such well-organized, socially penetrative, and programatically coherent "hegemonic" parties (whether communist or not) have rarely emerged as agents

of the demise of authoritarian rule or even as the byproducts of transition toward democracy. Actors in these contexts must face the cruel paradox that what may be necessary for the successful *founding* of a viable civic polity can only emerge from its prolonged *functioning*.

FOOTNOTES

[1]One is tempted to regard all this as a confirmation of the malicious accusation (of unknown authorship) that social scientists only manage to explain something to their collective satisfaction once it has already disappeared or changed into something else. Marx asserted that societies only pose those problems to themselves they stand some chance of resolving. Social scientists, par contre, only seem to answer satisfactorily those questions which no longer exist.

[2]See the essays in David Collier (ed.), The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Albert Hirschman, and Guillermo O'Donnell, all members of the Academic Advisory Committee of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Latin American Program.

[3]Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter with the assistance of Abraham F. Lowenthal and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Prospects for Democracy: Transition from Authoritarian Rule--a Proposal for a Series of Discussions at the Wilson Center," Washington, D.C., April 1979.

[4]While in part the product of convenience and personal inclination, this division of labor is based on an important theoretical assumption--that the demise of established authoritarian rule and the emergence of viable democracy are two different occurrences. Fritz Stern may have been the first to defend this premise openly: "the implicit thesis of the book [is that] the disintegration of the Weimar Republic and the rise of Nazism were two distinct if obviously overlapping historical processes. By 1932, the collapse of Weimar had become inevitable; Hitler's triumph had not." Inverting the direction of regime transformation, we would assert that, beyond some point, the collapse or displacement of a given authoritarian regime becomes unavoidable, but the prospect of a democratic outcome has not therefore become inevitable.

[5]All the direct citations of Machiavelli are taken from a new translation, and the page references are to Peter Bondanella and Mark Musa (eds. and transl.), The Portable Machiavelli (New York: Penguin Books, 1979).

[6]Machiavelli, himself, however provides me with an excuse for so proceeding: "a prudent man should always enter those paths taken by great men and imitate those who have been most excellent, so that if one's own skill does not match theirs, at least it will have the smell of it." (Prince, VI, 92)

[7]This should not be read so as to exclude the possibility of an unintended, "accidental," regime change in which actors thinking they are merely "purifying" or "recasting" a given regime make demands and pursue policies which irrevocably undermine the regime's viability. While this would seem to be a rare occurrence, any realistic theory of regime transformation should incorporate the possibility that crucial actors may be unaware of what is at stake.

FOOTNOTES

[8]Machiavelli, although he relied heavily on illustrations from the past (and a few from the present) to support his assertions, did not use them as the basis for deriving them. He was also skeptical about the quality of his "data base": "I believe we do not know the complete truth about antiquity; most often the facts that would discredit those times are hidden and other matters which bestow glory upon them are reported magnificently and most thoroughly" (Discourses, II, Intro. 28F). Modern authoritarian regimes possess greater means to hide "discrediting" events and amplify "magnificent" ones, but their efforts are at least partially cancelled out by a much greater variety of sources for data. Nevertheless, the sullen persistence of most authoritarian regimes contrasts with the noisy travails of almost any democracy.

[9]The threat of violence must be sufficiently credible and salient, not only to those in power to command their concern, but also to those out of power so that the rulers cannot "keep the populace occupied with festivals and spectacles." (Prince, XXI, 153)

[10]J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (eds.), The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 3-124.

[11]Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward A Dynamic Model," Comparative Politics II, 3 (April 1970), pp. 337-364.

[12]But nota bene, elsewhere Machiavelli states that "men desire novelty to such an extent that those who are doing well wish for change as much as those who are doing badly." (Discourses, III, 11, 392) Presumably these fickle, change-minded actors have never tried, or been denied, the opportunity to learn established ways of acting.

[13]For a discussion of sultanistic and caudillistic rule, see J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Handbook of Political Science, Vol. III (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 259-264.

[14]Machiavelli lived "in a universe hushed in moral stillness," to use Sheldon Wolin's expressive phrase. Machiavelli, himself, said of his times, "it looks as if the world were become effeminate [i.e., fickle] and as if Heaven were powerless." Politics and Vision (1960).

[15]For an analysis of Latin American military and civilian, competitive and non-competitive regimes which demonstrates empirically their "unexceptional" performance in meeting key economic and social goals, see my "Military Intervention, Political Competitiveness, and Public Policy in Latin America: 1950-1967" as excerpted in A.F. Lowenthal (ed.), Armies and Politics in Latin America (New York & London: Holmes and Meier, 1976), pp. 113-164.

FOOTNOTES

[16]"There are two reasons why we cannot change ourselves: first, because we cannot oppose the ways in which nature inclines us; second, because once a man [and especially, an agency] has truly prospered by means of one method of procedure it is impossible to convince him that he can benefit by acting otherwise." (Discourses, III, 9, 383)

[17]While it seems to be the presupposition of numerous analysts-observers that the present period not only has none of the "moral stillness" that so plagued Machiavelli's time, but that "non-democratic" forms of governance are eo ipso incapable of legitimating themselves in such a democratic age--as contrasted with, say, the interwar period--this has never (to my knowledge) been empirically demonstrated. The fact, however, that so many authoritarian rulers (in Latin America, if not in Southern Europe) promise (or have promised) an eventual return to democratic practices could be taken as indirect evidence for the existence and strength of such values. Otherwise, why bother?

[18]In his discussion of the "goodness" of German society and, hence, its appropriateness for republican rule, Machiavelli stressed that "[the Germans] do not have many dealings with their neighbors . . . [hence] have had no opportunity to acquire the custom of France, Spain or Italy--nations which taken together represent the corruption of the world," and that they "do not allow any of their citizens to be or to live in the style of a gentleman; indeed, they maintain among themselves a complete equality." (Discourses, III, 6, 326)

[19]Setting aside for the moment the probable existence of a large, intermediary coalition of indifferents and attentistes who merely wish to be free from politics and will conform to whatever regime emerges provided it leaves them more-or-less alone.

[20]Machiavelli, himself an exile, called attention to "how dangerous it is to believe those who have been driven from their native city. . . " (Discourses, III, 30, 348). Perhaps fortunately, exiles rarely have played a significant role in authoritarian regime transformation, but they have been a factor complicating the politics of successor regimes.

[21]"Many are led to conspire as a result of too many favors rather than too many injuries." (Discourses, III, 6, 361)

[22]"Where in other principalities one has only to contend with the ambition of the nobles and the arrogance of the people, the Roman emperors had a third problem: they had to endure the cruelty and the avarice of soldiers." (Prince, XIX, p. 140)

FOOTNOTES

[23]Hence, the approach is similar to that taken by Juan Linz in his essay in Linz and Stepan (eds.), Breakdown of Democracy, pp. 3-124.

[24]The static cross-sectional, cross-national, correlations between regime type and imagined "structural requisites" look impressive. The dynamic, infra-national analyses aimed at explaining the specific timing and direction of regime transformation are a lot less convincing--if at all.

[25]Cf. the abundant speculation and documentation in Linz and Stepan, op. cit.

[26]Machiavelli saw little chance for purely incremental reformist solutions to regime-level problems: "for it takes a prudent man who can see defects from far off and in their initial stages in order to reform them gradually and it is not common to find a man like this in a city and when one is found, he may never be able to persuade others to follow." (Discourses, I, 18, 227)

[27]"Anyone who is threatened and is forced by necessity either to act or to suffer becomes a very dangerous man to the Prince." (Discourses, III, 6, 359)

[28]Nota bene that this passage, when read alongside the previous one, considerably mitigates against Machiavelli's undeserved reputation for unqualifyingly asserting that "the ends justify the means"--which, incidentally, he never said.

[29]"If one forms the habit of breaking laws for a good reason, later on they can be broken for bad reasons under the pretext of doing good." (Discourses, I, 24, 25)

[30]So much so that he advised taking very ruthless action against surviving opponents to wipe the slate clean where the struggle for power had not already done so. (Prince, VII, 102) It is doubtful whether any modern ruler could act in this manner, pace Stalin and Hitler, and still successfully establish the grounds for a consensual democratic order.

[31]Cf. Rustow, op. cit.

[32]Although Machiavelli frequently "explains away" deviant cases by references to the peculiarities of their republican arrangements. For example, Venice often gets special treatment as a different (and unique) type of regime.

[33]Cf. Arendt Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," Comparative Political Studies 1, 1 (April 1968), pp. 3-44.

[34]Where the emergent party system is highly fragmented (and where the chosen electoral system "ratifies" this multiplicity), majoritarian rotation may well be ruled out.

[35]Machiavelli had great faith in the resurrective powers of political forces in "a city used to living in liberty . . . because such a city always has as a refuge, in any rebellion, the name of liberty and its ancient institutions, neither of which are ever forgotten either because of the passing of time or because of the bestowal of benefits." (Prince, V, 91-92)

[36]"The Impact and Meaning of 'Non-Competitive, Non-Free and Insignificant' Elections in Authoritarian Portugal, 1933-1974," in G. Hermet, R. Rose, and A. Rouquie (eds.), Elections Without Choice (London: Macmillan, 1978), pp. 145-168.

[37]J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

[38]Up to and including the violent elimination of specially privileged and propertied groups. "Anyone wishing to set up a republic where there are many gentlemen cannot do so unless he first does away with all of them. . . ." (Discourses, I, 55, 278)

[39]Ibid., pp. 51-53.

[40]The Modern Prince and Other Writings (New York: International Publishers, 1957), p. 137. Gramsci's reasons for stressing the need for a collective-organized agent of transformation were slightly different than Machiavelli. It was the need for a capacity for "long drawn out" action (as opposed to Machiavelli's emphasis on immediacy and singular purposiveness) and for "organic" linkages to followers (as opposed to autonomy of movement) that appealed to Gramsci. Individual effort, the latter thought, could only result in "restoration and reorganization" of the previous mode of domination.