LATIN AMERICAN PROGRAM

THE WILSON CENTER

SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION BUILDING WASHINGTON, D.C.

WORKING PAPERS

Number 6.2

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A Rapporteur's Report

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Author's note: This paper is a rapporteur's report for a September 25-26, 1979 Workshop on "Prospects for Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule in Latin America and Latin Europe" organized by the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. 20560.

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Introduction

Recent events in Latin America and Southern Europe have focused scholars' and policy makers' attention on regime transformation as a major issue in the study of political change. During the 1960s and early 1970s, institutional military coups ended civilian democratic regimes and initiated prolonged periods of military authoritarian rule in several South American countries. These developments and the policies subsequently adopted by these regimes prompted widespread debate regarding the relationship between economic and political change in countries such as these. This debate questioned the positive relationship between industrial growth and modernization and the emergence of political democracy that had been hypothesized in earlier theories of modernization, and resulted in a new concern with the origins and consequences of "bureaucratic-authoritarian" regimes. Then, beginning in the late 1970s, several of these same regimes showed increasing signs of political liberalization and/or movement toward more democratic political practices and procedures. These events, and comparable changes in several Central American countries and in Greece, Portugal, and Spain, have once again brought the question of regime transformation to the forefront of scholarly and policy concerns. The origins, characteristics, and outcomes of the transition from authoritarian rule raise a number of important theoretical and conceptual questions. Moreover, a better understanding of the process of regime transformation may highlight the means by which the prospects for a democratic outcome can be improved.

Three sets of questions underlie an analysis of these recent cases of transition from authoritarian rule. First, what are the origins of regime transformations such as these? What factors, forces, and motives push authoritarian regimes toward a political transition? How do factors such as the circumstances under which the incumbent regime came to power, the longevity and sociopolitical bases of the regime, the nature of regime repression, the regime's institutional structure, and the regime's success in achieving its stated goals affect the initiation and direction of the transition process? Do the structure and political dynamics of authoritarian regimes engender particularly characteristic pressures for regime transformation, or are the most important factors in the origins of such transitions specific to the particular case? In what ways do these internal conflicts and contradictions differ from those

experienced by democratic regimes? What impact do the erosion of regime legitimacy and major sociopolitical actors' changing perceptions of their specific interests have on the origin of the transition process? What are the external and internal sources of difficulty for authoritarian regimes? For example, external sources of pressures for regime transformation might include changes in the international political economy or state system which have a major impact on the national economy and domestic sociopolitical actors. The activities of an exiled political opposition may provide resources for internal opponents or undermine the incumbent regime's legitimacy. Alternatively, the most important sources of pressures for regime transformation may arise from within the authoritarian regime itself in the form of unfulfilled economic or political expectations or the differential impact of regime policies on domestic groups. Problems dating from the foundation of the authoritarian regime or originating in the regime's experience may create tensions between elites and counter-elites which push for regime transformation.

Second, what are the characteristics of the transition process itself? What impact does the considerable uncertainty of the transition have on the interaction of various actors and groups during this process? To what extent do political responses to different substantive issues vary across time and among different countries? How do enduring political party loyalties, popular expectations regarding human rights and democratic accountability, actions of international organizations and foreign governments, prevailing world opinion, and learning experiences from other countries affect the transition process? Who are the relevant sociopolitical actors within the authoritarian regime and in opposition to them? The armed forces, national bourgeoisie, organized labor, religious groups and institutions, the state bureaucracy, and factions within the incumbent political elite may all be important parts of evolving coalitions during the transition process. To what extent do different actors' power positions and policy preferences change during the course of the transition? How are their attitudes, goals, and capabilities for action affected by the dynamics of the transition process?

Third, what political outcomes result from this transition process? The outcome may be only some other variant of the authoritarian regime rather than political democracy. In what ways do the subjective evaluations and objective capabilities of the authoritarian regime's supporters and opponents affect the outcomes of the transition process? The outcome may vary considerably depending upon whether the transition is the result of regime-controlled liberalization or a generalized deterioration of the regime as a result of a socioeconomic or political crisis. The degree of control which the incumbent regime exercises over the transition process may depend upon the extent to which certain strategic actors such as the armed forces and national economic elites believe that their fundamental interests will be protected in a more liberalized political context. What specific political conditions and elite choices

are necessary to promote change resulting in the adoption of democratic procedures and institutions?

In September 1979, an international group of scholars gathered at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., to examine questions such as these in the context of recent political changes in Latin America and Southern Europe.* While workshop participants frequently differed in their judgments regarding the overall causes, characteristics, and likely consequences of contemporary transitions from authoritarian rule, they agreed on the importance of these changes and the desirability of conducting investigations which might enhance the prospects for democratic political outcomes. The workshop discussions were principally concerned with examining the transition process itself rather than the dynamics and internal characteristics of established authoritarian regimes. As a preliminary discussion session, the workshop sought to identify major theoretical issues and methodological concerns rather than provide specific answers to these questions. The participants were especially interested in constructing analytical categories which would be broadly useful in examining contemporary and historical cases of regime transformation. While workshop participants frequently referred to specific examples of transitions from authoritarian rule in the course of theoretical discussions, a detailed examination of particular cases of regime transformation will be the subject of a subsequent workshop to be held at the Wilson Center in the fall of 1980. These country studies will focus primarily on cases of contemporary regime change in Latin America and Southern Europe, but for comparative purposes they will also include some historical examples of such transitions. The selection of case studies will also include examples of "bureaucratic," "populist," "sultanistic," and other forms of authoritarian rule. This future workshop will also consider the implications of the conclusions presented in the theoretical analyses and case studies for United States foreign policy.

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*The Workshop on "Prospects for Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule in Latin America and Latin Europe" was held on September 25-26, 1979, at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution, under the direction of Guillermo O'Donnell (Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad [CEDES], Buenos Aires), Philippe C. Schmitter (University of Chicago), Abraham F. Lowenthal (Latin American Program, Wilson Center), and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, (Centro Brasileiro de Análise e Planejamento [CEBRAP], Sao Paulo). A list of workshop participants appears at the end of this report. Revised versions of the papers presented at the workshop are being published by the Wilson Center as part of the Latin American Program's Working Papers series. This rapporteur's report may be usefully read in conjunction with these Workshop papers.

I would like to thank those workshop participants who offered written comments on an earlier version of this report for their observations and suggestions.

This rapporteur's report provides a summary of the general themes and competing interpretations which emerged in the course of discussions during the workshop. While many participants might agree that a variety of factors affect the process of authoritarian regime transformation in contemporary Latin America and Southern Europe, many of the interpretations offered are not easily reconcilable. The same problem is often given a considerably different meaning when viewed through different conceptual lenses. No attempt to reconcile those differences will be made here. On the contrary, the purpose of this report is to highlight the principal areas of agreement and disagreement. The report is neither a critical summary of the papers which provided the basis for workshop discussions nor a review of existing published materials on issues related to contemporary and historical cases of regime change. Instead it attempts to present the arguments offered by workshop participants in cogent and coherent form. Statements made here should be taken only as summaries of the major lines of argument. Different points are frequently identified with their specific proponents, but they were not necessarily endorsed by workshop participants in general.

I. The Origins of the "Transition"

Background, Bases, and Authoritarian Regime Experience. An examination of those factors which affect the initiation of regime liberalization or a "transition to democracy" might be usefully founded on the premise that authoritarian regimes are the product of strategic choices by actors with contradictory and coalescent interests and differing power resources (Schmitter). In contrast to functionalist perspectives (which parallel the analysis of classical dictatorship in their assumption that an authoritarian regime faces certain purposes and goals, the satisfaction of which may encourage a shift toward regime liberalization or a return to democratic political procedures) and culturalist interpretations of political change and regime transformation (which tend to identify particular regimes with certain value systems and thus often assume that this "imbedded" regime form must necessarily recur), one might identify several relevant dimensions of the authoritarian experience which may affect the initiation and the direction of the transition process (Schmitter):

(1) The length of authoritarian experience. The length of authoritarian rule may have differential consequences for sociopolitical actors whose organizational resources and ideological identifications vary (Schmitter), and these effects may in turn shape the forces pushing an authoritarian regime toward liberalization and/or the adoption of more democratic practices and procedures. For example, has the regime been successful in altering mass publics' attitudes toward authority through long-term processes of socialization, indoctrination, and recruitment? However, to the extent to which longevity is an important factor in the origins of the transition process, one must also ask in what ways it is itself an outcome to be explained by other variables (Fishlow).

(2) The circumstances under which the regime came to power. Authoritarian regimes may overemphasize the circumstances under which they came to power as an explanation of their actions. In general, the influence of this factor appears to vary inversely with regime longevity as an explanation of the initiation of regime liberalization; that is, the longer the period of authoritarian rule, the less important are the specific circumstances which surrounded the regime's rise to power (Schmitter). Whether the regime took power as a result of internal factors or external imposition (for example, occupied Norway in World War II) has an important effect on subsequent regime liberalization and the ease with which democratic politics reappears (Schmitter). But one may also wish to ask whether or not the authoritarian regime in some meaningful way held the seeds of its destruction in its founding (Hirschman).

(3) The social bases of power. The heterogeneous social basis of the authoritarian regime is a crucial factor in the transition process (Linz, Stepan) and the origins of internal sources of change. Does the authoritarian regime already have a broad and inclusive structure of interest representation which promotes negotiation and compromise and thus facilitates the transition process? To what extent has the authoritarian regime penetrated the structures and hierarchies of societal groups, compromising these groups' capacity to participate in and shape the transition process? (Schmitter) While the nature of the limited pluralism which characterized the authoritarian regime is very important to the initiation and direction of the transition process, are there also major differences in this process across widely divergent culture areas with different social values? For example, transition experiences may differ significantly between the Islamic and Catholic cultural traditions, in part due to the institutional role of the Catholic Church (Linz). Has the regime resolved the main problems articulated by key sociopolitical groups? Major elements of the ruling coalition may change their evaluation of the authoritarian regime over time. In the case of Nicaragua, national entrepreneurs came to reject the Somoza regime in part because the state proved to be capricious in its policies affecting national businessmen (Stepan).

Among elite actors, the military and the bureaucracy are central structural components in authoritarian regimes and in these transition processes; they merit special emphasis as "constants" in the political system (Lamounier). In terms of mass actors, organized labor is perhaps the most significant group affecting the regime's power position and the transition process. Several different factors have an important impact on labor's role (Collier): (i) the historical pattern of labor's class alliances and new opportunities for political coalitions; (ii) the specific control and cooptation mechanisms affecting the labor sector under bureaucratic-authoritarian rule; and (iii) short- and long-term trends in organized labor's capability to resist regime policies and actions. What lessons has organized labor drawn from periods of intense politicization and extreme repression? What impact does the rise of a multinational sector in Brazil and the contraction of the industrial sector in Chile have on labor activity? What role do labor leaders play in the emergence of new

opportunities for labor militancy? Such factors are highly relevant both to the origins of the "transition" and the likely outcomes of this process (Collier). Here, too, one must be aware of the consequences of regime rule for actors such as organized labor. In Montevideo, for example, there has been a significant reduction in the size of the industrial working class as Uruguay's bureaucratic-authoritarian regime has sought to liberalize and "de-industrialize" the economy. The size of worker concentrations has been reduced, thus undermining the labor movement's capabilities for political and economic resistance. These changes significantly affect the conditions under which regime transition is undertaken (Cavarozzi).

(4) The role of the military. The military generally comprises an important part of the authoritarian system, but it is usually not "the system" itself. To the extent to which the armed forces are closely identified symbolically and substantively with the authoritarian regime's policies, the military may make the transition process more difficult. The international context may play an important role in this regard. National defeat in war, for example, significantly limits the military's influence over regime transition (Schmitter). The internal cohesion and motivation of the military as the principal coercive force are also central variables in the initiation of the transition process (Stepan).

(5) The established regime's institutional format. What is the significance of pseudo-democratic institutions such as elections and the legislature in the authoritarian regime? (Schmitter) These institutional dimensions--whether created by the authoritarian regime or antecedent to it--may be more important to the transition process than previously realized. For example, in Spain the monarchy has played a crucial role by linking a large number of divergent political factions (Linz).

(6) The level and nature of repression under the authoritarian regime. The principal repressive agent, the specific characteristics of repression, and its target are all central features affecting the initiation and direction of the liberalization process (Schmitter). They are especially important in identifying and shaping the regime's political opposition. Likewise, the resistance capacity of "excluded" groups is an important factor affecting the transition process. What is their relative weight and strategic location, and what changes occur over time? (Stepan) For example, how has the political left been affected by repression under authoritarian rule? (Collier) There have been dramatic shifts in this regard in a number of Latin American bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in the last few years. For instance, five years ago the military-bureaucratic strength of these regimes appeared invincible, but perceptions of the civil society's resistance capacity have now changed dramatically in some cases (Cardoso). What alliances do such groups have with elements within the incumbent regime? In Brazil, for example, changes in these excluded groups' alliances have decreased the cohesion of the armed forces and reduced the possibilities for the repression of dissidence. Thus, more broadly, one wishes to examine the impact of such alliances on the possibilities for the creation and utilization of coercive power (Stepan).

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While factors such as these may identify the principal elements which shape the initiation and direction of the transition process, these variables do not operate in linear fashion (Schmitter). Each factor entails certain ambiguities (Hirschman). For example, the impact of regime longevity may well operate in curvilinear fashion (Schmitter). A "successful" (in terms of the regime's accomplishments of perceived goals) authoritarian experience may lay the objective foundation for a return to democratic politics, but an "unsuccessful" experience may make actors seek a return to democratic politics with more conviction and readiness to compromise (Hirschman). Furthermore, the useful application of these variables would require that relevant actors be identified more fully and their relative importance in the initiation and evolution of the transition process be specified more clearly. The analysis must also pay close attention to the extent to which the authoritarian regime's goals and objectives change over time, whether as a result of specific accomplishments or due to changing technical constraints which affect the relationship between "inputs" and "outputs" (Fishlow).

Similarly, while these factors may be the most important variables in an examination of a wide variety of authoritarian regime transitions, one must also ask if changes occur for essentially the same reasons in widely divergent cases. That is, despite considerable variation in regimes' origins, is there an overarching reason for regime transition in different cases, or are the features peculiar to the individual case the most important factors? While one must certainly undertake a conjunctural analysis of each specific case, one should also seek to identify the strategic factors which account for the origins of that transition (Lamounier). For example, a hierarchy may exist among these different factors which remains much the same across a wide number of individual cases of regime transition. Some of these factors may tend to move together (Stepan). If so, what is the outcome of the interaction of these different factors on balance? (Hirschman) At what point do generic factors decrease in their relative explanatory value and case-specific factors become more important? Perhaps most likely to be peculiar to the individual case are factors such as timing and personal/personnel considerations which affect actors' perceptions of the continued "indispensability" of the incumbent regime (Schmitter).

Moreover, the relative importance of these different factors may be significantly affected by the transition process itself. The characteristics of the transition process may well be more important than specific factors such as the longevity of the incumbent regime, and the dynamics of this process make it important to compare variables' different weights at different points in time. The uncertainty associated with this process is so great that one must be careful not to over-rationalize the transition by isolating specific factors affecting its initiation and direction. For example, the transition process in Spain has been shaped by actors' highly moment-specific decisions which often defy "rational interest" calculations (Linz).

More generally, an analysis of the origins of authoritarian regime transition should focus on the extent to which the regime itself feels successful in achieving its initial goals. Such elite perceptions are critical in determining the timing of the "transition" decision and significantly affect the internal cohesion of groups such as the military. For example, in Spain and Brazil this decision was a regime action taken in a context in which many incumbents felt that socioeconomic goals had been largely fulfilled. In contrast, elites in Argentina and Chile have felt largely unsuccessful in this regard (O'Donnell). However, while regime performance in some areas may be clear, it may also be true that some of the most important consequences of authoritarian rule are known only retrospectively, after the transition process is well advanced (Schmitter).

This kind of analysis must also ask to what extent a conscious or rational decision was made to move toward increased liberalization, regime transformation, or democratization (Lamounier). While a focus on changing power resources is not incompatible with the regime's rational calculations of its chances of success in such a transition effort (Schmitter), the extent to which a specific decision regarding transition was made by the governing elite is open to empirical investigation. In the case of Brazil, for example, the evidence seems to indicate that earlier changes in the electoral law had consequences that were unexpected at the time. Changes introduced in the electoral law in 1974, especially those provisions affecting the use of television and radio in electoral campaigns, hardly seem understandable outside the context of a conscious decision by the military government to initiate a broader liberalization process (Lamounier). However, there were elements of the transition's origins in Brazil which also suggest that the process was much more dynamic than the identification of a "rational" decision would suggest. Elite attitudes and the regime's social base were undergoing changes during this period. By 1978 these changes in many ways constituted important challenges to regime policies and pushed the governing elite in new directions. Thus, what appears to have been a rational choice by the regime in some regards was also a reaction to changes in the regime's social base (Stepan). The effect of this dynamic interplay between the regime/governing elite and mass sociopolitical actors is especially clear in the case of Peru. While the Peruvian armed forces faced local protests from the beginning of their rule in 1968, these challenges took on serious dimensions only when the regime's internal schisms and weaknesses became widely apparent. The possibility of securing alliances with fractions of the incumbent regime was perceived by mass actors as significantly enhancing their chances for success (Lowenthal).

The Brazilian case in general is instructive in terms of an examination of the origins of the regime transition process. Here it is important to appreciate both the role of conscious, rational decisions and the changing dynamics surrounding the initiation, experience, and transition of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. Significantly, a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime was not "planned" in 1964. Rather, the Brazilian military reacted to what they perceived as a radical, nondemocratic threat. Even as late as 1967 the future bureaucratic-authoritarian outcome was not clear; indeed, the government's

1967 constitution was potentially liberal. But while the liberal tradition was and is strong in Brazil, the military's basic perception of "democracy" was at best oligarchical. The adoption of Institutional Act No. 5 in 1968 was a critical change and the key to the emergence of a clearly identifiable "bureaucratic-authoritarian" regime (Cardoso). Even then, a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime was not created in a linear, orderly fashion, and one might argue that Brazil was never so acutely or purely bureaucratic-authoritarian as the case of Argentina. But while there was no complete coincidence between the military's economic and political measures in the creation of such a regime, the interaction of economic and political factors was crucial. The 1964-1967 economic stabilization policy had a major impact on labor's situation. To the extent to which these years were characterized by "apathy" or a lack of defined opposition, this was largely the result of repression and a lack of specific information regarding the impact of government policies on different sectors (Cardoso). But in terms of the background conditions which affected the later move toward regime liberalization, it is important to realize that there was no great political or ideological consistency over time. Democratic and repressive mechanisms continued to coexist, and even the issue of torture has been politically manipulated in an inconsistent way (Cardoso).

Why did the Brazilian regime undertake regime transition? What were the specific origins of the liberalization process? Significantly, the initial steps in this direction were due to internal opposition within the ruling coalition and not due to pressures from below. Throughout much of the period of authoritarian rule the government's principal "debating opponents" were regime hard-liners (duros), not the opposition political left (Cardoso). External shock and a questioning of the Brazilian economic "miracle" in 1973-1974 were also key factors in this new orientation. Both political and economic "pushes" were necessary. Until then, the governing elite had shown no predisposition to change, largely because things had apparently gone so well (Hirschman). On the political side, the electoral process was the source of important change, for the 1974 elections essentially triggered an internal regime disequilibrium (Lamounier). In 1974 the government did not expect the emergence of a "new" opposition which would challenge the economic miracle per se (Cardoso), an opposition which was the result of vast, diffused dissatisfaction which arose during the early period of rapid economic growth (Lamounier). Civil liberties and wage and salary questions formed essential elements of the Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB) campaign in 1974, and television was a crucial means of bringing this message to a mass public (Cardoso). In this regard, the existence of institutional mechanisms such as a two-party arrangement which directed opposition votes against the government, and the suppression of local elections so as to focus attention and dissatisfaction at the national level, were critical (Lamounier). Thus, after the government's unexpected defeat in the 1974 congressional elections, the government could no longer play a "liberal" political game against duros inside the ruling coalition; rather, it was forced to deal with an emerging popular opposition (Cardoso). And after 1974 civil society had much more capacity to maneuver.

In 1975-1977 a new source of opposition--entrepreneurial groups which opposed elements of the statist economic-development model--emerged as national capitalists and state firms came to compete increasingly for scarce resources. These business pressures were very important in maintaining the drive for further liberalization; specifically, these business groups sought a more liberal economic policy. Business spokesmen were the first to recognize that strikes are to be expected in advanced industrial societies. Labor's resurgence began only in 1977 and took real force only in 1978. Significantly, organized labor had not been a major factor before that; rather, middle-class groups (for example, lawyers and students) and the Church had made the earlier oppositional moves. The post-1973 economic crisis was interpreted through these groups' specific interests (Cardoso). However, one should not overemphasize the importance of pressures from specific groups; rather, the liberalization movement was the result of the generalized problem which arose in the wake of the 1974 elections (Lamounier). Nor was the movement coherent, sequential, or linear. The crisis surrounding Geisel's succession also created tremendous internal pressures and conflicts within the regime. When an army general appeared as an opposition candidate in 1978, the military's institutional concerns were also raised (Cardoso). Thus the particular features of the liberalization process were to some extent the unexpected result of specific decisions (Lamounier). An understanding of the complexities of an individual case such as Brazil requires a close analysis of the zigzag course which the regime has followed in the origins and direction of the transition process (Kaufman). Moreover, one must pay special attention to the various alternative routes open at different points in time (Przeworski).

"Legitimacy," "Interests," and Regime Transition. Whether authoritarian regimes' moves toward increased liberalization and regime transformation are due to an erosion of regime legitimacy, changing evaluations of the principal actors' interests, or some combination of these two factors, has been a central issue in the discussion of different transition experiences. In this discussion it is important to define the concept of "legitimacy" clearly (Przeworski). Legitimacy, used in a restrictive sense, is not merely coterminous with the overall process and practical effectiveness of any particular regime; rather, it involves broader, normative questions of forms of political behavior and the procedural norms which govern a regime (Schmitter). To the extent to which legitimacy is an important dimension of the governing process, one must ask what its sufficient conditions are. Is legitimacy limited to particular groups in the sense that their interests are best served by it? What specific events and developments are related to either the creation or erosion of legitimacy in authoritarian regimes? (Przeworski)

The issue of legitimacy is a particularly acute problem for Latin American bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. In part this is due to the fact that these countries are on the periphery of a system which strongly values representative institutions (Lamounier), and democratic norms and values continue to enjoy widespread acceptance

throughout Latin America (Linz). What is the basis of regime legitimacy once the impact of an economic miracle begins to fade? In Spain and Argentina, the emergence of middle- and upper-class groups' moral outrage was a fundamental factor in the erosion of regime legitimacy. In the cases of Argentina and Chile, regime legitimacy appears to rest increasingly on national chauvinism and regime-cultivated xenophobia (O'Donnell). In the case of Brazil, permanent legitimacy for an authoritarian regime appears impossible. Liberal sectors remain strong in Brazil. Their influence should not be underestimated even within the armed forces, although military "liberalism" often has a paradoxically authoritarian origin: the armed forces' strict adherence to non-mobilizing political models leads them to cherish clear boundaries between state and society. The importance of this tradition and its link to the liberal idea of the rule of law have become clear only in recent years (Lamounier). Although its precise causes are unknown, the erosion of regime legitimacy was a major factor in the emergence of a liberalization or transition process in Brazil in 1974-1978. Before 1974, there was a generalized consensus among observers that the regime faced no threat so long as the economy remained healthy. But the 1974 elections were a clear signal to all actors that the military regime's legitimacy had been severely undermined (Lamounier). However, the question remains to what extent "legitimacy" per se was an issue in 1974. How does the broad problem of legitimacy explain what has happened in the post-1974 period in Brazil? (Przeworski) Somewhat ironically, the 1974 elections appear to have been a decisive moment in the regime's broader search for legitimacy. The appeal to elections was important even though the government lost; that is, Geisel could argue that the regime was legitimated by popular participation in the electoral process, even though the government party was defeated at the polls (Lamounier).

Yet legitimacy is a concept which does not fully explain important questions such as the timing of liberalization initiatives and efforts at regime transformation (Schmitter). Alternatively, one might examine regime supporters' changing perceptions of their identifiable interests. The focus here is on internal regime desgaste and the perceived cost for different sociopolitical groups, especially the military. How do different groups and classes come to view the "indispensability" of the regime as their perceptions of their own interests change over time? (Schmitter) Regime supporters' evaluations of their own interests are, of course, closely related to their perceptions of the authoritarian regime's success in resolving major socioeconomic and political problems. Some of the problems which motivated the regime's rise to power may be linked to specific societal interests, while other regime goals may be more generalized issues requiring long-term regime attention. In some cases bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes seek to solve specifically conjunctural crises--political threats, guerrilla violence, rising inflation, balance-of-payments problems, and so forth. Other regimes may also seek to solve structural economic crises through the creation of new economic alliances. Significantly, in terms of the regime's support base and major actors' evaluations of regime performance, those bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes which are confronted with a concrete "revolutionary threat" are more likely to have a broad support base than if the regime's problem-solving focus is on specific economic problems (Kaufman).

It is possible that the failure to resolve major problems may prevent the reestablishment of a democratic regime (Kaufman). On the other hand, there may be some particularly intractable problems which are not resolved by the authoritarian regime (Collier, Przeworski, O'Donnell), and a return to democracy may occur precisely in order to address problems which the "problem-solving" authoritarian regime failed to resolve (Linz). Thus analysis must identify both the principal problems which motivated the emergence of the authoritarian regime (and which may recur) (Linz, Collier) and the new "unsolvable" problems which may have emerged during the course of authoritarian rule (Linz). One must also evaluate the extent to which the solution of problems such as inflation does create "breathing space" for the regime and may facilitate a return to democracy (Hirschman). Then, too, as in Brazil, the regime's problem-solving agenda may change over time (Collier, Cardoso). The nature of the problems facing the authoritarian regime and the extent to which they are resolvable may well be determined by the way in which they are defined (Collier). Likewise, success depends primarily upon the regime supporters' perceptions of the way problems have been handled. The regime's effort to shape supporters' perceptions of successful performance is principally determined by the regime's interest in receiving satisfactory historical treatment once the transition has occurred (Schmitter).

This analysis, however, may overstate the distinction between "legitimacy" and "interests." Legitimation--perhaps a more useful term than "legitimacy" because it captures the dynamic element of an on-going process--might be usefully defined as "the process by which one's subjective values become objective parameters for others." If one is concerned with the process through which one actor's values become other actors' yardsticks, and if one focuses on actors' contingent calculations of their own interests, there is no conflict between "interests" and "legitimacy" (Lamounier). And even if the issues of "legitimacy" and "interests" are analytically distinct, in practice they may be closely related parts of a broader process. Both interpretations concern perceptions of events and different groups' behavior (Dahl). Sociopolitical actors' evaluations of regime legitimacy and their own interests may well occur together. For example, an authoritarian regime's legitimacy may be closely related to its effectiveness in controlling disruptions by the political opposition (Linz). While different elements may receive greater attention than others at different points in the transition process, "legitimacy" and "interests" are linked throughout (Fagen). The distinction between the two is less apparent in the course of the authoritarian experience. In part this is because interests are often not calculated according to criteria of strict rationality; instead, much depends upon situational factors. Moreover, interests can be calculated only at a societal level, not merely at the level of elites. To the extent that actors' interests are the subject of analysis, the focus should be on the societal perceptions of those interests (Linz).

II. The Transition Process

General Characteristics of the "Transition." The preceding section serves as background to an examination of the transition process itself. It provides a basis for considering the differential ways in which various factors affect the origin of the liberalization or regime transformation process, and it suggests the importance of the principal sociopolitical actors' characteristics and the alliances they have formed as a result of the often tremendous socioeconomic changes which occur during the period of authoritarian rule. But the central characteristic of the transition process itself is its velocity and its fluidity; change occurs much more rapidly than under the previous period of authoritarian rule, and the process is characterized by shifting coalitions and changing options (O'Donnell). This change reshapes the balance of sociopolitical forces and may substantially increase the bases and significance of the opposition. This occurs as sector-specific opposition against the authoritarian regime emerges, and as the political arena widens beyond "bureaucratic rings" and state institutions. This process is very important in determining what shades of opposition emerge and the extent to which pre-authoritarian political alignments resurface. For example, the depth of party loyalties (as in Spain and Chile) may be a central element in this political reawakening and the reestablishment of democratic politics (O'Donnell). The insecurity felt by actors in the incumbent authoritarian coalition may be highest when the transition is imposed by the opposition. These sectors may favor a planned liberalization process in which the assumption is that regime elements can control the process of change and halt it if desired. But the actual degree of control over this process varies considerably.

The examination of this transition process in different national contexts must focus on the ideological and political forces which push the transition process forward and keep it open-ended (O'Donnell). In this analysis it is important to consider that the process may not be linear. The initial enactment of liberalizing measures may occur in the context of other specific issues, and a broader regime transformation may not be contemplated. But once this process is started it may be impossible to reverse. Indeed, the regime's tolerance of change may increase once change begins and the process acquires its own momentum (Linz). In part this is because different actors' perceptions of their opportunities for successfully achieving their own goals change rapidly in this process (Przeworski). It is frequently the lack of clarity regarding different actors' distinct goals which permits the flexibility and compromise so important to the transition process (Lowenthal).

These characteristics of the transition process are strongly influenced by the composition of the established authoritarian regime. The heterogeneity of actors and interests in the authoritarian regime is reflected in the uncertainty surrounding the process of liberalization or regime transition. Indeed, because the transition is not so much a concrete decision or project as a process of trial and error, the "decision" to liberalize may itself have only limited impact. The actors and the interests involved may not be so important as the

process of which they are a part and the various factors which shape their behavior (Cardoso). In an important sense it may be true that "The movement is everything; the goal is nothing"(Hirschman).

Similarly, the transition process is shaped by the specific experience and accomplishments of the authoritarian regime (Kaufman). For example, the "economic space" which exists at the beginning of the transition process is often a key to successful regime liberalization (Fishlow). In contemporary Brazil, the magnitude of the existing economic surplus and the state's ability to control it is a major difference in comparison with earlier historical periods (Fishlow, Cardoso). The increased role of the state has blurred traditional distinctions between socialism and capitalism, and the large number of technocrats is a new resource which expands Brazil's planning capacity. Given that organized labor's emerging demands focus primarily on wages and salaries and the conduct of labor-management relations without state intervention (Cardoso), the ability to make rational arguments regarding the potential inflationary consequences of wage increases is extremely important in designing the economic context in which regime liberalization occurs. This is especially true to the extent to which important problems have gone unresolved under authoritarian rule and political and economic tradeoffs may be necessary (Fishlow). Finally, given the long-standing historical relationship between socioeconomic crisis and regime change in Latin America, what new developments and characteristics of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes shape the current transition process in different Latin American countries and distinguish these contemporary processes from earlier cases of regime transition? (Collier)

A focus on the political economy of regime transformation should not overlook the specifically political dimensions of the transition process. This is especially important if the study of past and contemporary transitions is in any way to be useful in avoiding errors in future transformation efforts (Linz). The internal dimensions of authoritarian regimes and class coalitions' political reference points should not be oversimplified (Collier). Similarly, much of the transition process would be impossible without political parties, electoral channels, and other institutional arenas which provide the opposition with a means of pushing for continued change (O'Donnell, Fagen). These specifically political developments are closely related to the broader process of the "resurrection of civil society" which occurs as part of the transition process (O'Donnell). This political focus within the broader context of an examination of the transition process also involves attention to the social coalitions of interests and the constitutional engineering which are necessary, complementary factors in a successful transition (Kaufman, Linz, Cardoso). In the contemporary Brazilian experience, for example, "political engineering" is a key element in the context of a strong bureaucratic-authoritarian regime which has not successfully satisfied demands from either regime opponents or those in power (for example, on the question of succession). Moreover, democratic reconstruction in Brazil depends upon an opposition which, despite electoral victories and a certain power base in the two-party electoral arena, remains weak and uncertain of its goals (Cardoso).

Actors and Coalitions in the Transition Process. The principal actors in the transition process can be divided analytically into two groups: (1) blandos (soft-liners), moderates, and duros (hard-liners) within the governing coalition, and (2) "opportunists," moderates, and maximalistas (maximalists) within the opposition (O'Donnell). There are significant conflicts among the members of each coalition, and no single group is entirely homogeneous (O'Donnell, Cavarozzi). Within the authoritarian coalition, the blandos seek some degree of liberalization and an end to a specifically bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, although their objective may still be some form of authoritarianism. The blandos must convince those who remain in favor of the existing regime that some degree of liberalization is the best available solution to emerging problems, and that the coalition members' fundamental interests (for example, the armed forces' disciplinary hierarchy or the bourgeoisie's control over the organization of the work process) can be protected in a more liberalized setting. Among opposition elements, the moderates are both willing to engage in negotiation and compromise with ruling groups and are the most committed to the construction of political democracy (which, unlike the maximalists, they distinguish from social and economic democracy). The transition process is likely to be most dynamic and open-ended when moderate elements lead the opposition, effectively control their followers so as to be able to implement agreed-upon arrangements, and succeed in establishing a coalition with democratic blandos so as to extract real concessions from the ruling authoritarian coalition which substantially expand participatory opportunities. Which faction or group gains dominance within the opposition, especially whether it is moderate or maximalist, is a key factor in shaping the ultimate outcome of the transition process (O'Donnell). A principal goal of the identification of these different positions is to suggest a simple and useful spectrum which might provide a basis to examine cases of authoritarian regime transformation both in Latin America and elsewhere (Collier).

The dynamic and flexible nature of the transition process is crucial to these actors' behavior and the possible coalitions they may form. The "resurrection of civil society" means that new options, opportunities, and goals are available (O'Donnell). The various positions identified here (maximalists, blandos, and so forth) might well be regarded as social roles rather than as specific groups or institutions (Linz, O'Donnell), since actors' interests may change throughout the transition process and their relative positions may shift as a result of changing issues and bargaining among different groups (Linz). Indeed, the successive repetition of the "game" with different actors playing the same roles may be of central importance to the final outcome of the transition process (Linz). In some cases, actors' changing perceptions of opportunities for success in realizing their interests may determine the timing of their intervention in the transition process even though their real interests may not have changed (Przeworski). There may also be considerable change over time in different actors' relative weights and importance to the transition process (Lowenthal). An appreciation of the characteristics of the transition process in different specific contexts might be enhanced by identifying and weighting the different political

actors involved and tracing the process through which essential interests are redefined (O'Donnell, Przeworski, Cavarozzi). To the extent to which the armed forces are a constant in different cases of authoritarian regime transition (Cardoso), how is their role as moderator related to "shrinkage" in their own fundamental interests and those of the bourgeoisie? (O'Donnell) To what extent is the recomposition of potential alliances linked to economic opportunities? (O'Donnell) Are there special insights which a class analysis of groups and factions at a particular time might provide? Is there a possible class-based explanation of these evolving coalitions, alliances, and transitions? (Fagen)

This said, however, it may be difficult in the course of empirical investigations to specify and weight different actors and their changing objectives in the transition process (Schmitter, Fishlow). The actors and processes become increasingly specific during the transition, and groups' social bases may narrow as the moment of "transition" approaches. Thus the identification of generic factors affecting groups' interactions and coalition formation may be difficult from case to case (Schmitter). What can be highlighted in all such processes is the critical role played by political leadership. The political learning which occurs under authoritarian rule and during the transition process and the linkages forged among different actors are at the heart of this issue (O'Donnell).

The identification of certain positions or social roles in the transition process may still leave unanswered several other important questions. How are actors defined from within the ruling and opposition camps? How is the opposition able to introduce specifically political factors so as to identify such different positions? (Cavarozzi) Are there political views which correspond in a stable way to different factions of the bourgeoisie? (Lamounier) How does a split develop between duros and blandos? (Hirschman) Who are those within the authoritarian regime who push for liberalization? (Linz) What specific factors shape different groups' changing evaluations of the political environment and the incumbent regime? For example, do business groups which have benefitted from the authoritarian regime find the suppression of union activities dysfunctional in some way and thus decide that the regime has become "dispensable"? (Hirschman) Is there a sequence in which different issues of this kind are raised? (Fishlow) What impact do generational cleavages, internal regime heterogeneity, and differential political experiences among the authoritarian regime's political personnel have on this process? (Linz) "Social role" differentiation occurs within all major institutions, including unions, political parties, and religious organizations. Is this a mechanism which enhances these institutions' adaptability to the transition process and their ability to influence it? (Lamounier) What defines maximalistas as a separate category? Are they maximalists in style, substance, or both? Are they only potentially uncompromising gameplayers (Fagen) who may play the important but underestimated role of specters (Schmitter), or are they identified with maximalist substantive positions? (Fagen) If

conduct and content are different in the case of maximalistas, should they be so closely identified in general terms (even though they may be in fact in a case such as Argentina)? Similarly, who are the moderates in this process? Must they necessarily be "true democrats"? With regard to what issues do these terms "moderate" and "extremist" apply? What specific issues and institutional arrangements create the basis for this distinction? (Kaufman) For example, the maximalista position could apply with regard to both political and socioeconomic democracy. Even within the parameter established by these different general positions, the specific identities of actors and their different positions should not be dismissed (Przeworski). In a more practical sense, does a better understanding of the special dynamics of the transition process make it a "game" which can only be played once? (Hirschman)

Economic Dimensions of the Transition. While the importance of economic factors has been indicated at several points, the specifically economic dimensions of the process of political liberalization and regime transformation require special attention (O'Donnell). Economics and politics have been very closely related under Latin American authoritarian regimes due to the specific economic content of ruling political coalitions and their policies. The bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes' economic models, which constitute the economic context in which several of the contemporary transition processes take place, share several important characteristics: (1) they are open economies in which profit-oriented growth/development models predominate and in which market signals regulate important areas of the economy; (2) economic decision making is highly nonparticipatory; and (3) a public surplus has been generated through improvements in the state's revenue-gathering capacity (Fishlow).

The economic characteristics of these regimes may also include elements which undermine the authoritarian regime and contribute to pressures for regime transition. For example, highly technocratic, centralized, nonparticipatory decision making in many ways conflicts with the broader economy's decentralization and reliance upon market signals. The economic growth process frequently generates new social pressures and demands which challenge the predominant profit-oriented rules of the regime, and changing international situations may give external echo to these internal pressures. For example, international institutions such as the World Bank no longer accept "growth" as the only criterion on which to judge the regime's economic achievements. Furthermore, the biases which characterize bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes' economic models constitute both external and internal constraints on regime behavior. Externally, a large and growing foreign debt requires both higher export levels and a higher rate of internal savings. The future of these regimes may thus be "mortgaged," and the burden imposed by foreign debt may result in reduced domestic consumption. The economy continues to have major import requirements, and the regime's behavior is strongly influenced by the need to maintain foreign investors' confidence. This is especially true in the case of foreign banks due to a major increase in the role of loan capital in national economic growth. Internally, difficult allocation decisions

often involve real trade-offs between increased wages or higher profits, or between policies which benefit skilled or unskilled workers (Fishlow).

Given the nature of such constraints, the success of the transition process often depends upon the availability of "economic space" (Fishlow). The key here is the relationship between economic results and regime legitimacy (Fishlow, Stepan). Two principal issues are the ways in which popular-support coalitions can be generated through wage policies (given the uncertainty which this implies for investment decisions) and the veto which certain socioeconomic and political groups may exercise over such issues (Fishlow). Moreover, the growing capacity of the working class to affect the direction of the accumulation process, the new importance of the "internationalized" bourgeoisie, and the alliance between this bourgeoisie and state elites in a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime may complicate this process (Kaufman).

The Brazilian case reflects a number of these issues. The tension between technocratic decision making and market signals appears to have operated in syncopation there (Hirschman). Although all factions in the Brazilian opposition, including maximalistas, are aware of some limitations on the economic demands which can be made (Cardoso), the general assumption is that the authoritarian regime has produced "success" in terms of an available surplus to be distributed (O'Donnell). (In contrast, this question remains open in Argentina, and there is considerable variation in different groups' evaluations, economic positions, and demands.) There is also considerable agreement among different groups in Brazil regarding the role which the technocracy can play (O'Donnell), thus giving the technocratic group there a different "flavor" (Cardoso). National technical problem-solving capacity is now quite generalized, and although political leadership remains the key to the transition process, this capacity will play a central role in the successful evolution of the liberalization process there (Cardoso).

While these specific factors are especially relevant in the case of Brazil (O'Donnell), to the extent to which economic factors operate in the Latin American context to push for regime change (Lamounier) they are probably quite generalizable as constraints on authoritarian rule and influences on the transition process (Cardoso). The explication of these factors also raises a number of other specific questions and issues. For example, if the characteristics of bureaucratic-authoritarian rule convert economic allocation decisions into political decisions, and if this mixture of economics and politics is a typical trait of such systems (Fishlow), what is the specific dynamic by which economic problems are translated into political problems, and vice versa? (Lamounier) Does long-term bureaucratic-authoritarian rule in some sense delegitimize market mechanisms and private accumulation and to some extent make capitalism "illegitimate" in these Latin American countries? If this has occurred at a broad level, then the process of regime transformation involves fundamental issues affecting all areas of national life (Schmitter). Or is the issue the relative prestige of entrepreneurs and industrialists in Latin America? (Hirschman)

III. Outcomes of the Transition Process

The demise of authoritarian rule is obviously by no means equivalent to the emergence of political democracy (Schmitter, O'Donnell, Kaufman, Przeworski). The destruction of an authoritarian regime and the subsequent construction of a democratic political order may be asymmetrical processes in which the characteristics of the authoritarian regime may have a significant impact on the shape of the democratic regime which follows it (Fishlow). Thus a balanced examination of the transition process also requires a discussion of the kinds of democratic arrangements which may be created--whether two-party, consociational, oligarchical, or some other form (Schmitter). These different democratic alternatives imply different social bases, different implementing strategies and designs, and different conceptions of "democracy." The end result of the transition process may well be a compromise, second-best arrangement (Schmitter). The range of possible democratic alternatives or available models, and whether or not the opposition successfully proposes an alternative political formula (reforma pactada) in addition to the end of authoritarian rule (ruptura pactada) are important elements in the coalescence of different political coalitions in the transition process (Schmitter, Linz). In the Latin American bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, liberalization may well be more likely than democratization, but those institutional steps which are taken are also likely to result in further political change. Thus an examination of the outcomes of this transition process requires an analysis of the factors and actors which are likely to push for a more lasting transformation (Schmitter).

The issue of what the outcome of the transition process will be raises several important questions. How does the process of creating democracy come about? (Przeworski) What specific tasks--writing a constitution, organizing political parties, and so forth--are involved in the creation of a political democracy following authoritarian rule? (Schmitter) What specific groups are involved, what are their interests, and how do different groups' interests and power to affect the transition process vary? (Przeworski) How do specific decisions affect actors' options and choices? How do actors' varying perceptions of success in achieving their specific goals--especially the possibility of "missed opportunities"--affect different groups' actions? What is the general structure of conflict inherent in such cases of "transitions to democracy"? What factors are specific to different situations and cases? For example, it may be that the more "mistakes" made once the transition process has begun, the more inflexible bureaucratic elements of the ruling authoritarian regime become in their belief that a true solution to existing political problems is not possible (Przeworski).

A central problem in the construction of political democracy is the need to elaborate guarantees within a democratic arrangement in which uncertainty is a major factor. Any given institutional arrangement is associated with a certain probability that political outcomes will maximize some interests rather than others. In the context of a capitalist democracy, this issue takes the form of a paradox: how does one gain mass political support for a system of

capital accumulation in which the economic surplus is distributed unequally? Thus, assumptions regarding the degree of working-class docility and the extent of socioeconomic change affect the structure of the democratic solution. Likewise, whether or not economic policy emphasizes an increased role for the state is also significantly influenced by the particular characteristics of the post-authoritarian political arrangement. While different institutional formulae have different probability expectations attached to them (in terms of probable political and socioeconomic outcomes), these arrangements also involve relative uncertainty. For example, unexpected outcomes such as Allende's election in Chile are possible (Przeworski).

Because the probabilities involved and the subsequent insecurities faced by different actors depend very much upon the final form which democratic political arrangements take, the transition process may well involve tensions and instabilities. The alternative outcomes envisaged for this process are thus important factors in determining the success of the transition itself (Dahl). This is in good measure due to the contrast which the introduction of relative uncertainty creates in the context of the authoritarian regime. For example, while the economic rules of the game may have been clearly established under authoritarian rule, the failure to offer parallel securities under democratic political arrangements can result in tremendous pressures, such as inflation (Fishlow). Moreover, to the extent to which political liberalization or democratization appears quite likely to result in more populist economic policies (Collier), these tensions are increased.

The construction of a political democracy often involves compromise in the elaboration of institutional arrangements. At times this process occurs incrementally, and the final compromise is the accumulation of small, seemingly modest changes. But it is uncertain to what extent truly democratizing measures such as elections with universal suffrage can be hidden or disguised as "liberalizing minutiae" (Linz). The actors themselves may perceive small institutional changes as critical in their ability to advance their own interests (Schmitter). In the case of countries such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile, which have had previous experience with mass political participation, both the ruling authoritarian regime and the political opposition clearly understand what such incremental changes mean due to the learning process which these societies have experienced (Cavarozzi). In bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes such as Brazil, decisions regarding such institutional details are centralized, and thus any change in them is easily perceived (Lamounier). And in Nicaragua, changes in local and regional institutions involving outcomes which threaten the interests of the national bourgeoisie by encouraging peasants' socioeconomic and political demands are clearly seen as having a major impact on the viability of the national anti-somocista alliance and its socioeconomic program during the transition period. The pursuit of democratic political arrangements on one (local) level may involve contradictions with goals and programs at another (national) level. Thus these specific institutional arrangements are crucial to the overall political economy of regime transformation (Fagen).

The form which emerging democratic political arrangements take is influenced by the availability of specific support bases, interest groups, and sociopolitical alliances. Different social alliances appear to be built around different forms of capital accumulation. For example, under national populism the state and the national bourgeoisie ally to direct the accumulation process, while in social democratic systems the central actors are unions and internationally oriented business. In "trickle-down" economic models, the dominant alliance is among the internationalized bourgeoisie, middle sectors, and the top (unionized) strata of the working class. These different alliances have different political dimensions. For example, redistributive payoffs result only gradually in the social democratic model and thus involve major political uncertainties. These different forms of capital accumulation and different social alliances also influence the different political/constitutional arrangements which are likely to emerge from the transition process. For example, a consociational formula eventually may result in Chile and Uruguay, while the political outcome in Brazil may be a dominant center-right party with a permanent social democratic opposition. Of course, the consociational outcome depends upon a preexisting strong party system. Where no such parties exist, as in Brazil, the success of a center-right party may be highly dependent upon innovative constitutional maneuvering (Kaufman).

The outcome of the transition is also subject to a variety of other international and national influences. In international terms, the existence of a liberal-democratic "imperial center" (especially the United States) is an important factor in the existence and continued force of liberal values and tendencies in Latin American countries (Hirschman, Cardoso). An end to overt anti-communist subversive efforts by the United States may also be an important factor in the current cultivation of such liberal tendencies in the "periphery" (Fishlow). Nationally, a principal danger to the emergence of political democracies from the regime transition process lies in the possibility that the available "political space" may be too narrow. However, this possible constraint need not lead to a failure of the transition process. Phenomena such as inflation may at once be a source of tension and an outlet for social conflict. This appears to be the case in contemporary Spain and Brazil (Hirschman).

Leadership is thus a key factor in controlling these processes, managing issues and potential crises, and focusing national attention on political democracy as a specific goal. The identity of these democratic leaders and the nature of their goals are central elements of the transition process in terms of determining what democratic alternatives are available and their possibility of success (Linz). The linkages which are established between social forces and political institutions are essential to moving progressively toward political democracy (O'Donnell), and innovative leadership is the key to the construction of such linkages. The sum-total of changes in a variety of institutional details must result in a workable democratic system (Schmitter). A principal challenge facing movement in this direction

is the possibility of "revolutionary" popular mobilizations which threaten the democratization process (Linz). Paradoxically, the deeper and more decentralized the participatory structures, the more potentially democratic the system is, but the more threatened central elites feel (Fagen). Thus, both constraints and opportunities must be emphasized in an examination of the transition process (Collier), and the distinctive stages involved in the breakdown of the authoritarian regime, the transition to and installation of alternative political arrangements, and the consolidation of new democratic possibilities must all be clearly distinguished (Linz). Problems of governance--critical decision-making points and the substantive content of different decisions--must be specified (Fagen). The examination of specific cases of regime transformation should also distinguish sequences in past political transitions in an effort to identify a workable "design for democracy" (Schmitter).

Both the specific dimensions of contemporary Latin American authoritarian regimes and the characteristics of the pre-authoritarian political systems have an important impact on the final outcome of the transition process. To some extent, the alternative outcomes are the result of the kind of authoritarian regime in power, whether bureaucratic-authoritarian or sultanistic as in the case of Nicaragua under Somoza (O'Donnell). Established sociopolitical alliances tied to different models of capital accumulation and the predominant role of the executive in many Latin American political systems may also pose challenges to democratic institutions and associational patterns (Linz). This concern with the kinds of economic proyectos which underlie the transition phase (Przeworski) thus requires a close analysis of possible coalitions and political responses (Collier). Moreover, it is significant that many of the contemporary Latin American authoritarian regimes have been built without political parties. This is but one of the severe obstacles which must be overcome in the search for democratic options and outcomes. Thus, legitimacy is not an abstract question, but one which is tied to the particular institutional mechanisms which are developed (Cardoso). While the strength of previously established political party structures in Chile may facilitate democratization, this underlying structure is absent in Argentina (Fagen). In the case of Brazil, the political party system desired by the opposition is unclear, and the current discussion regarding political parties is closed and imprecise. Working-class pressures for change on this dimension remain extremely weak. It may well be that the heterogeneous, non-ideologically consistent MDB is closer to Brazil's future party reality than models drawn from nineteenth-century Europe. But these patterns are likely to emerge slowly and incrementally (Cardoso) along a zigzag path. Leftist revolutionary action is unlikely in Brazil, and the left's current commitment to proportional representation may actually keep elections from playing a more important role in the transition process (Lamounier).

IV. Methodological Considerations and the Selection of Case Studies

The methodological focus brought to the study of regime transition should highlight both the project's theoretical concerns and the specific details of the various case studies. The elaboration of precise, complex hypotheses may not be possible (Schmitter), but the general theoretical essays which introduce the project should raise the major issues concerning the importance of comparing different time periods (Schmitter, O'Donnell), crucial "historical moments" in terms of groups' interests and important situational factors, and possible alternatives which arise in the course of the transition process. These essays should identify the principal regime opponents, the sequence and timing of their emergence in the origin of the transition process, and the extent to which political leadership can exercise choice at different points in the process. The analysis should also emphasize the diversity of democratization processes (including the central role which parties and elections can play) and possible forms of democratic political arrangements which might emerge. Both the intended and unintended consequences of political organization and party formation should be examined (Schmitter). In doing so, specific attention should be given to the dynamic nature of the transition process (O'Donnell), the sharp changes which characterize the evolution of different actors' positions and goals (Kaufman), and the tensions and contradictions which accompany this process (Lamounier). The study needs to examine not only past and contemporary examples of successful regime liberalization or transformation (including factors both favorable and unfavorable to the transition process) (Hirschman), but also cases in which such a transition either was not attempted or did not succeed, despite predictions to the contrary (O'Donnell). Analysis should focus on the interaction of groups' interests and situational factors in all of these cases (Kaufman, Schmitter). For example, in the specific case of contemporary Brazil, why did earlier periods of unrest result in the repressive Institutional Act No. 5 rather than liberalization efforts at that point in time? (Kaufman) The goal of the study should be to use these different approaches to develop "mental maps" of the process of post-authoritarian transition and transformation by drawing upon the various different perspectives and interpretations discussed in earlier sections of this report (Lowenthal).

While this methodological approach is thus one which focuses attention on the broader elements, patterns, and dynamics of the transition process, it should also establish overall parameters and guidelines to direct the examination of specific countries' experiences (Przeworski) by emphasizing the importance of certain factors and questions over others (O'Donnell). These issues should be the basis for the formulation of more refined hypotheses. The case studies should, in turn, focus on those concerns which require specific elaboration and articulation (O'Donnell). One means by which to do this is to couch research hypotheses more fully in terms of central issues highlighted by work previously done on bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, generating middle-level hypotheses which lie

between more abstract theoretical considerations and the particular details of a single case study (Kaufman). This approach assumes that definitions and theoretical constructs may not emerge from case studies in a completely inductive examination of the transition process (Kaufman). Also, historical materials should be used to guide the analysis and evaluation of the likely success of current transition efforts (Przeworski).

In this sense, a more deductive approach might be useful in which a more coherent model is used to understand the process and progression of events involved in previous transition experiences (Przeworski). Some of the specific issues which the case studies might examine include: (1) the conditions under which the authoritarian regime's legitimation efforts fail and internal conflicts develop, as well as the impact which external events may have on such internal developments; (2) what actions are necessary to prevent the re-entry of the military into politics; (3) the criteria needed to identify the central actors and coalitions in the transition process; and (4) what democratic institutional arrangements both protect the essential interests of the incumbent regime so as to guarantee the success of the transition and at the same time leave open the possibility of a further transformation to socioeconomic democracy (Przeworski).

This said, however, both the overall nature of the project and its specific aims and assumptions may well require the adaptive use of case-study materials to evaluate broader generalizations and hypotheses. For example, one might use the "That's not the way it is in Zanzibar" test to illuminate theoretical issues (Dahl). That is, while there are enough available case studies to evaluate general theoretical concepts, they may not be sufficient to build theoretical generalizations through a purely inductive approach (Linz). While a broad, inclusive theory may not result from this approach, it may clarify the meaning of different theoretical alternatives within the context of specific countries (Dahl). This approach allows the analysis to focus on the richness and detail of individual cases rather than focusing the analysis to address a predetermined set of questions and formulations (Fishlow). Here the question is not one of theory versus case study; rather, the effort is to use theory to explain the case studies and at the same time use specific cases to further illuminate theory (Cardoso, Fishlow, Hirschman).

The actual selection of case studies must consider the significant differences which exist among different kinds of authoritarian regimes (Linz, Fishlow, Stepan). "Sultanistic" regimes (Haiti, Cuba under Batista, Nicaragua under Somoza, Uganda under Amin) are less relevant to the project's central theoretical questions and might be excluded from consideration (Linz). Those cases which are selected should be chosen to highlight certain issues. For example, the roles of the executive and the military have been significantly different in cases of transition such as Venezuela (1945-1948, 1958) and contemporary Spain. Mexico represents a hegemonic party-state in which the liberalization process is substantially different (Stepan). The case studies might also reflect

differences between "old" and "new" military dictatorships (Cardoso). With these kinds of important variations in mind, the project might be organized so as to consider bureaucratic-authoritarian cases and other kinds of authoritarian regimes separately (Stepan). More than one geographical area or cultural context might also be considered in the final selection of cases (O'Donnell). To the extent to which there is ambiguity in the elaboration of central conceptual issues, the number of case studies might be increased and their geographical scope expanded so as to provide greater range and diversity in the issues under discussion (Schmitter).

Both the more general theoretical contributions to the project and the specific case studies should give additional attention to issues which have received relatively little emphasis in the discussions so far (O'Donnell). The possible causative role of economic factors in the evolution of regimes away from authoritarianism should be explored just as was done previously for the movement in the opposite direction (Hirschman). The international context should also be the subject of detailed analysis (Cavarozzi). For example, what impact does the prevalence of democratic norms within the imperial power (that is, the United States) have on liberalization or democratization efforts in Latin American countries? To what extent are the values of national elites shaped by this international context, and under what circumstances do such influences act as stabilizing or destabilizing factors? (Hirschman)

"Prospects for Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule
in Latin America and Latin Europe"
Workshop, September 1979

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