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ABSTRACT

Regime Instability and the State in Peripheral Capitalism:
A General Theory and a Case Study of Greece

This paper stresses two major features of peripheral capitalist formations with relatively long political independence and parliamentary traditions, features which explain the specific structures of these States as well as the endemic regime instability characteristic of them:

(a) the relatively late and dependent development of industrial capitalism, which meant that political modernisation (i.e., State expansion, the development of non-oligarchic political parties, etc.) occurred at a time when the industrial bourgeoisie and proletariat were either non-existent or too weak to have any effective impact on shaping the post-oligarchic political system;

(b) the restricted and uneven development of the capitalist mode of production, which, even in countries which have been industrialised, tends to be seriously incongruent with the horizontal and relatively autonomous organisation of working-class interests.

These two features mean that the kind of political integration of the working classes found in western parliamentary democracies--a political integration characterised by a strong civil society setting limits to State manipulation and repression--is extremely difficult to institutionalise irreversibly in peripheral capitalist formations. What is found there instead is a weak civil society linked to a paternalistic/repressive State through clientelistic or populist modes of integration--or, whenever these fail to cope with the entrance of the masses into active politics, with dictatorial controls which are equally unstable. It is this which explains regime instability in these formations, and the constant alternating between dictatorial and quasi-parliamentary forms of rule.

In Part II of the paper, this general model was applied to the case of Greece, showing how the development of capitalism is related to the structure of the Greek State as well as to the rise and fall of the post-war military dictatorship.

REGIME INSTABILITY AND THE STATE IN PERIPHERAL CAPITALISM: A GENERAL THEORY AND A CASE STUDY OF GREECE

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Introduction

It is the basic thesis of this paper that the problem of the recent demise of dictatorial regimes in some third-world countries can be better understood in the context of certain structural tendencies of the post-oligarchic State in the capitalist periphery--tendencies which inhibit the long-term institutionalisation of both parliamentary/democratic and dictatorial regime forms. Following this general orientation, the paper is divided into two parts: Part I tries in very generalised and abstract fashion to show in what ways certain features of the State and the economy in peripheral capitalist formations are linked with the chronic regime instability which is so characteristic of them. Part II draws on the generalisations of Part I, and attempts to show the linkages between the development of Greek capitalism and the regime instability of the Greek State, by placing particular emphasis on the rise and fall of the post-war (1967-74) military dictatorship.

I. General Tendencies of the State and Capital in the Periphery

At first sight it would appear that, given the complexity and enormous variety of political systems to be found in third-world countries, any attempt to discuss the nature and structure of the State in such social formations must surely be doomed to failure. However, considering that the expansion of western capitalism and its penetration into the third world has established a world economic system within which, to different degrees, all of these countries are incorporated, and remembering that western capitalist penetration has imposed a similar logic of capital accumulation in countries otherwise very dissimilar in their historical and socio-cultural backgrounds, the peripheral capitalist State (by which I simply mean the State in peripheral capitalist social formations) acquires legitimacy as a subject for study.[1]

It seems to me, however, that the only way in which the concept of the peripheral State can have a specific meaning and become analytically useful is in the context of a comparative study of two interdependent but qualitatively different types of capitalist trajectory--that of the West, and that of the third world. To be more

precise: if the neo-Marxist, anti-evolutionist thesis is accepted that the development of capitalism in the third world follows a qualitatively different course from that of the West, and in as far as one can systematically account for these differences, then it is surely legitimate to raise the question of the relevance of such differences for the study of political developments in the two cases. In other words, the problem becomes one of trying to establish systematic linkages between capitalist accumulation and State institutions in the third world, in the light of the different ways in which State and capital are articulated in the "first world."

If the problem is stated in this way, then for the comparison to make sense requires that it be only between capitalist third-world formations--i.e., social formations where the capitalist mode of production is in process of becoming, or has already become, dominant in the sphere of production.[2] (Capitalism here and in the remainder of this paper is defined in its narrow sense: it refers to a mode of production characterised by the use of wage labour, and therefore by the private expropriation of the direct producers from their means of production. Thus the integration of an economy into the world market and/or the commercialisation of some of its sectors do not automatically make this economy capitalist.)

I would like to limit the analysis even further by restricting my focus to those countries which have enjoyed a relatively long period of political independence and which have, more or less intermittently, adopted western, parliamentary-multipartist forms of political rule (e.g., most Latin American countries, pre-war Balkan societies, modern Greece, Turkey).

Even with such limitations, and given the extremely broad scope of comparison, the generalisations which will here be formulated are in no way intended as "iron laws," but simply as indications of structural tendencies which may be reversed or neutralised by other tendencies (e.g., ethnic or racial conflicts) or by a host of conjunctural factors (war, super-power politics, etc.).

Capitalism and the Development of a Strong Civil Society in the West. At the risk of overgeneralisation, one might argue that the development and eventual dominance of the capitalist mode of production (CMP) in West European economies in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was characterised (a) by the large-scale destruction of non-capitalist modes of production as capitalist relations of production expanded very widely both in agriculture and industry; and (b) by the establishment of an organic complementarity between the CMP and the persisting non-capitalist modes (e.g., simple-commodity production).

In fact, as an indigenous and gradual process in social formations politically and economically dominant in the world system, western capitalist development managed to articulate with non-capitalist sectors in such a way that, despite disruptions

and inequalities, the benefits of technological improvements and high productivity in the capitalist sector spread rapidly to the rest of the economy. In the long run, this resulted in the strong development of internal markets, the eventual growth of social welfare, and a relatively broad distribution of the generated wealth to the lower classes.[3]

On the political level, the ascendancy and eventual dominance of the CMP was one of the major factors responsible for a process of large-scale political mobilisation. Gradually, alongside the development of national networks of communication and markets, the bureaucratic State penetrated the periphery, drawing more and more people into the central political process, transforming them from passive "subjects" into "citizens."[4]

Now of course, as has been pointed out by many writers, the process of political development in Western Europe (characterised not only by the expansion of the legal-bureaucratic State, but also by the gradual development of mass parties and of universal suffrage within predominantly parliamentary forms of rule) cannot be explained exclusively in terms of the development of capitalism in industry and agriculture. Indeed, a variety of socioeconomic factors and processes playing their part in the development of western parliamentary democracy pre-dated the dominance of the CMP in the West (e.g., the unique structure of the West European medieval city, or the fine balance of power between aristocracy and monarchy in ancien régime Europe, which contributed considerably to the constitutionalist and pluralistic features of western parliamentary democracy).[5]

Regardless of these qualifications, there is no doubt that not only the way in which the CMP expanded (especially in industry), but also its timing is directly relevant to explaining the development of a strong civil society[6] and the long-term institutionalisation of bourgeois parliamentary institutions in northwestern Europe. Whereas merchant capital, even in its developed forms, could easily be accommodated within feudalism or within the post-feudal institutions of absolutist Europe,[7] this was by no means the case with expanding industrial capital. By its very structure and logic of development, the entrance of capital into the sphere of production had revolutionary consequences: it directly threatened the dominant economic and political interests of the old order. In fact, not only was there marked antagonism on the economic level between the industrial bourgeoisie and non-capitalist landed interests, but on the level of State institutions too the rising bourgeoisie was energetically pushing for radical political reforms to broaden political participation and to rationalise/bureaucratise the patrimonial administration of the absolutist State.[8]

For instance, the demise of such "non-bureaucratic" features of the West European absolutist State as the widespread sale of government posts, or the monopolising by the aristocracy of key administrative positions, are more or less linked with the rise

of a new capitalist class which saw the large-scale corruption and the restrictive/particularistic practices of the ancien régime State administration as serious obstacles to their economic as well as political interests.[9]

With respect to political participation, the rising bourgeoisie was, of course, interested only in some restrictive form of parliamentarism in which it would be included, but which would leave out the newly emerging industrial and rural proletariat. However, once politics had ceased to be the exclusive affair of a handful of aristocratic families, it was rather difficult to stop mid-way and to resist for long the principle of universal male suffrage. Finally, although the adoption of universal suffrage owed less to working-class pressures from below and more to competition among the dominant classes, the fact that it was achieved several decades after the emergence and expansion of industrial capitalism meant that the parliamentary system had to accommodate/integrate a large and well established proletariat ready to fight for its trades-union rights and therefore not easily controllable in paternalistic/corporatistic fashion.

It is for these reasons that the gradual passage from oligarchic to mass politics was characterised by the development of formal organisations (trades unions, political parties) which were relatively strong[10] and independent of State tutelage, and which organised the new entrants into active politics along horizontal/class lines.[11] In the long run, the strong institutionalisation of such organisations meant the irreversible decline of vertical/clientelistic politics and the non-bureaucratic, patrimonial elements of the western State. It meant, in other words, the development of a strong civil society which operated as both a bulwark against State regimentation and arbitrariness, and as an important source of legitimation of the bourgeois order.

In conclusion, any explanation of the relative regime stability of the system of parliamentary democracy in western Europe should, in addition to certain pre-industrial features in these societies which were favorable to democracy, take into account also (a) the mode of expansion of the CMP (especially in industry), and (b) the timing of this expansion, or rather the relations between the development of industrial capitalism and the transition from oligarchic to mass politics. The fact that this transition occurred at a time when industrial capitalism was already well entrenched meant that the two "new" classes played, in very different ways of course, a crucial role in shaping and directing political development towards a type of parliamentary democracy characterised by a strong civil society, by non-clientelistic political parties, and by a legal-bureaucratic State.

Capitalism and the State in the Capitalist Periphery. The development of both capitalism and the State took a very different route in the third world than it had done in the West. If first of all one looks at the pre-independence, pre-capitalist structures of

these societies, hardly any features are discernible which would favour the development of parliamentary institutions. For instance, several writers on Latin America have pointed out the negative impact of the legacy of Iberian despotic rule on the functioning of parliamentary institutions in these societies.[12] An even stronger case can be made for the role that Sultanic rule and the Ottoman legacy generally had on the malfunctioning of parliamentary democracy in the Balkans. It is not by chance that Weber coined the term sultanism when analysing those extreme forms of patrimonial domination where administrative officials are totally subjected to the ruler's absolute will.[13]

In order to understand the structure of the State in the societies under study, however, it is necessary to see how and why authoritarian elements inherited from the pre-independence period could persist, in changing form, until the present day.

A. The demise of oligarchic politics and the development of the capitalist mode of production. In the West, the linkage between the decline of oligarchic politics and the development of industrial capitalism is quite strong and direct, but this is much less the case in the social formations of the capitalist periphery. Given the late and dependent industrialisation in both Latin America and the Balkan peninsula, the demise of oligarchic politics in most of these societies occurred at a time when industrial capitalism was either still weak, or established in such a manner that its impact on the transition can by no means be compared with the revolutionary impact of the western European "industrial" classes on the process of political development.

In fact, contrary to the West, the nineteenth-century Latin American and Balkan societies underwent considerable processes of State expansion and political mobilisation much before the dominance of the CMP, i.e., at a time when their economies were still pre-capitalist. Although western industrial capitalism did not automatically spread to the rest of the world, its dominance in the West had profound repercussions on the social structures of peripheral formations. The intensification by the West of its search for raw materials and new markets, and its dominant position in the international division of labour, meant:

> (a) the destruction of indigenous artisanal industries in the third world, and therefore the elimination of whatever chances these societies had for indigenous industrial growth;
>
> (b) the intensification of processes of commercialisation and of the development of social overhead capital (roads, railways, etc.) in the agricultural and mineral export sectors.

In other words, if the dependent integration of nineteenth-century Latin American and Balkan societies into the world economy did not make these economies capitalist in the strict sense of the term, it did generate processes of commercialisation, urbanisation, and secularisation/"westernisation" which were undermining the basis

of restrictive/oligarchic politics even before the development of industrial capitalism.

Of course, in some cases oligarchic politics survived longer, and their decline was more or less linked with the inter-war import-substitution phase of capitalist industrialisation. But even in these cases, the real significance lies rather in how far these processes differed from, not how they resembled, developments in the West. While the western "conquering bourgeoisie" was able to put its stamp on the post-ancien régime State, or at least participate actively in its construction, the Latin American and Balkan industrial bourgeoisies were passive creations of State economic policies. In view of the difficulties of competing with the industrialised West, it was not only the establishment of these industrial bourgeoisies, but also their continued existence, which depended on State protectionism and heavy subsidisation. Their enormous privileges and profits were much less due to their competitiveness than to the hot-house conditions under which they operated.

Because of the bourgeoisie's dependent position and the crucial importance of political patronage for economic survival, its interest in State reform and rationalisation was naturally quite limited. As long as the nascent bourgeoisie was a political outsider it did have a stake in breaking the oligarchic monopoly of power and in broadening the sphere of political participation. But its reformist zeal stopped there. It had no strong brief for eliminating the patrimonial/clientelistic aspects of the political system, since its own privileged economic position was based on precisely such features. Neither was it acutely antagonistic to non-capitalist landed interests. Once the industrial bourgeoisie had been accepted into the political game, once it had some say concerning political considerations which were of such paramount importance for generating profits, and once it was able to affect the common political interests which are shared by all propertied classes in the face of growing political mobilisation and threats from below, these middle-class industrialists easily accommodated themselves and were quite willing to accept antiquated agrarian structures and a clientelistic, cumbersome State apparatus.

In other words, by strictly pursuing its own interests, the nineteenth-century European industrial bourgeoisie managed to combat the clientelistic/patrimonial features of the State and created a legal-rational State administration which favoured further expansion of the CMP. In the peripheral capitalist formations it is neither in the interests nor in the power of the State-created bourgeoisie to go beyond a very limited type of State reforms, with the result that patrimonial/non-bureaucratic features persist to a degree which inhibits the further development of capitalism.[14] While the dominance of political entrepreneurship and patronage in the economies of these countries is of enormous help to individual capitalists, it certainly does not provide a favourable framework for the development of capitalism.

The industrial bourgeoisie in the capitalist periphery did not, then, bring about the type of transformation of State institutions its western counterparts had achieved, and neither was the role of the proletariat comparable to that of western Europe. In view of both the numerical insignificance of the industrial work force (cf. below) and the timing of its appearance, its subjugation to the State was a foregone conclusion.

In the peripheral capitalist formations, the industrial working classes appeared at a time when the State apparatus had already acquired impressive dimensions (both in terms of personnel and in terms of its ability to extract resources) and had considerably developed its capacity for intervention and repression. Moreover, within the context of the massive importation of West European culture and institutions, western codes of trade-union organisation and social legislation were adopted even before the growth of a numerically substantial industrial proletariat. Thus, when the industrial proletariat did emerge, it did not have to battle for its basic rights--the formal codes existed already.

Since, however, these codes had been imposed from above rather than won by working-class action, they were applied much more as instruments of paternalistic State control than as means for enhancing the autonomy of the workers. It is not surprising, therefore, that in many peripheral capitalist formations, trade-union organisations tend to be an administrative extension of the labour ministries. Neither is it surprising that, with all-pervasive State tutelage and the weak collective organisation of both the working class and the bourgeoisie, none of these countries has the type of strong civil society which is the mainstay of stable parliamentary rule in the West. Instead of a balanced articulation between State and civil society, most third-world formations manifest simply the incorporation of civil society into the State.

On a more theoretical level, the above considerations may throw some light on the notion of the relative autonomy of the third-world State, a concept much discussed in the literature on the post-colonial State.[15] In view of the weak organisation of class interests, and the facility with which formal organisations can be manipulated from above, it is justifiable to see State institutions as relatively free of the pressures emanating from horizontally organised interest groups.

Stressing the relative autonomy of the State vis-à-vis horizontally organised class interests does not, however, imply State omnipotence. On the contrary, the atrophy of civil society only emphasises the relative weakness and precarious character of the State in peripheral capitalism. Looking at the State-capital articulation not in terms of group relationships (i.e., not at the relation between the State personnel and associations representing working-class or capitalist interests) but in more structural terms makes it quite clear that the State, as the general coordinator of the whole social formation, has to operate within a framework of extremely limiting structural constraints. These constraints are

imposed on the State both by its dependent and peripheral position within the world capitalist system, and by the fact that capital, even without any strong collective organisation, can very easily limit the State's room for maneuvre by threatening investment boycotts or flight abroad. This combination of autonomy set against poorly organised class interests, and extreme structural dependence set against the national and international capitalist system, is actually one of the typical features of the peripheral State.

B. The mode of expansion of capitalism: restricted and uneven development. Of course, it is not only the timing of the emergence of industrial capitalism which explains the specific features of the State and politics in peripheral formations. Another crucial element is the specific course that capitalism has taken in these societies since its initial establishment there. Whether or not imposed by colonial powers, third-world capitalism had and continues to have a more restricted and unequal character.[16] Even in social formations where the CMP has become dominant, there is large-scale persistence of non-capitalist modes of production, as well as severe disarticulations within the overall economy which generate huge inequalities and a misallocation of resources.

Since capital accumulation in the third world was not as indigenous a process as in the West, and in view of the timing of capitalist penetration as well as the weak/peripheral position of third-world formations, it is not surprising that the development of third-world capitalist sectors seems to be geared less to the reproductive requirements of the indigenous economies and labour forces, and more to those of the metropolitan/developed capitalist economies. Formulated differently, this is to say that, compared to the western case, there is much greater heterogeneity and disarticulation between the various economic sectors. The lack of complementarity (i.e., the predominance of "negative" linkages) within the capitalist sectors (where there are huge gaps in productivity between technologically advanced and backward enterprises),[17] as well as between capitalist and non-capitalist sectors, means that the benefits of the spectacular productivity of the technologically advanced and often foreign-controlled sectors are not spreading to the rest of the economy. Instead, there is a tendency for the systematic transfer of resources (through price mechanisms, taxation, State grants, and privileges for attracting foreign capital, etc.) from the non-capitalist to the dynamic capitalist subsectors, and from there abroad.[18]

A very striking indication of this relative lack of complementarity between sectors is the widespread unemployment and underemployment which are such typical features of third-world capitalist formations. Given the capital-intensive character of the dynamic capitalist sector and the relative stagnation of the rest of the economy, as labour becomes redundant in agriculture (due to population growth and improved agricultural techniques) it cannot be absorbed into the industrial capitalist sector and goes to swell the ranks of the unemployed or underemployed in agriculture and in the service sectors.

The concept of the marginalised labour force seems to me, despite the criticism it has received, very useful for pinpointing the specificity of the unemployment problem in the third world--i.e., the qualitative differences in the effective employment of human resources in western versus third-world capitalism. Calculations for the first phase of the Industrial Revolution in West Europe show that the growing industrial sector managed to absorb 30-40 percent of the labour having become redundant in agriclture. By around 1890, this figure was up to 80 percent. In contrast, from 1950 to 1970 the industrial sector of third-world formations was able to absorb only 10 percent of redundant labour from agriculture, and the situation seems to be getting increasingly worse.[19]

If this fundamental, qualitative difference between western and third-world capitalism is properly taken into account, it becomes clear why in the latter case the type of articulation or rather disarticulation of capitalist with non-capitalist modes creates enormous productivity differentials between sectors, and results in huge inequalities which foreign-led industrialisation seems to aggravate further. So it is not surprising that even those few third-world countries which, with the help of foreign capital, have managed to achieve impressive industrialisation rates (Brazil, Chile) have not in any effective manner solved the twin problems of large-scale poverty and mass unemployment/underemployment.

In what way is the comparatively restricted and uneven character of third-world capitalism relevant for understanding the State and politics in these formations? The first point to be made is that the integration of third-world social formations into the world capitalist system, and the gradual ascent and dominance of the CMP in their internal production structures, inevitably generates processes of large-scale political mobilisation as the self-containment of the traditional village communities is drastically reduced and, with State and market expansion, the majority of the population is drawn into national politics. As a consequence of the belated, restricted, and uneven nature of capitalist development, however, the modes of political integration are very different in third-world formations from what they have been in the West.

To begin with, third-world capitalist expansion being so restricted means that the majority of the labour force operates in contexts which are not conducive to the development of class consciousness by means of horizontal types of political and trade-union organisations.[20]

In addition to both this obvious point and also to the above-mentioned relatively early expansion and paternalistic character of the third-world State, there is another fundamental reason which helps to explain the weakness of civil society in third-world formations. This arises from the basic incongruity between such relatively strong horizontal organisations of the working force as do manage to emerge, versus the restricted and unequal character of third-world capitalism. As mentioned already, in the West the more gradual/indigenous and extensive development of the CMP eventually

brought about the economic and social integration of the working population. Despite the enormous price the working classes have had to pay during the early period of West European industrialisation, in the long run the expansion of capitalist productive structures came to use human and non-human resources in such a way that large-scale unemployment and extreme forms of poverty were kept relatively low. It is precisely this relatively successful social and economic integration of the work force which permitted a mode of political integration where the political organisation of the working classes along horizontal and relatively autonomous lines could be developed without causing any serious threat to the established bourgeois parliamentary order. An inherent consequence of this development has been the irreversible institutionalisation of non-personalistic organisations independent from strict State tutelage.

In third-world formations, on the other hand, the economic and social integration of the work force into the overall economy and society not only has yet to be achieved, but the chances are that continuing capitalist industrialisation and "development" will further hinder, rather than facilitate, integrative mechanisms. There is no denying, of course, that during the last two decades the Gross National Product has dramatically increased in those third-world countries where industrialisation is based on attracting multinational capital on a large scale (e.g., Brazil).[21] But not even the most optimistic champions of the status quo could pretend that this type of foreign-led industrialisation has to any appreciable extent solved the massive umemployment and underemployment in the countries concerned. Nor can it be seriously argued that unemployment and underemployment levels could be markedly affected by further capital accumulation along the same lines. If anything, given the staggering rates of population growth and the capital-intensive character of foreign-led industrialisation, all indicators point to an aggravation of the present situation.[22]

The CMP in the third world, therefore, tends to operate like some powerful and formidable machine which, however, leaves the bulk of the labour force untouched by the benefits it has to bestow. In terms of production, a large segment of the labour force has become redundant--and could be eliminated altogether without this having any disruptive effect on the functioning of the capitalist system (hence the necessity of distinguishing sharply between Marx's concept of a labour "reserve army" and the concept of the marginalised labour force).[23] In terms of distribution, the gains derived from capitalist growth are shared out so unevenly that extreme forms of poverty persist on a massive scale, despite spectacular growth rates and a constantly rising per-capita income. True enough, in a few cases some crumbs of the wealth do trickle down to the bottom of the social pyramid, to the marginalised masses in the urban centres or the countryside. But given the persistent and deteriorating unemployment problem, such minor benefits or improvements are hardly capable of

advancing the economic and social integration of the underprivileged. In fact, they usually have the opposite effect. A slight move above absolute poverty levels, and the exposure, through developing communications and mass media, to the consumerist and secular values of the dominant classes, merely make the huge and still growing inequalities ever more visible, and accentuate feelings of relative deprivation and exclusion.

In view of the present failure of economic and social integration, and the small possibility of such integration being achieved in the future, it becomes obvious why the modes of political integration that had operated in western Europe have very few chances of success in third-world politics. No rural and urban working class organised politically along horizontal, non-corporatist lines could possibly accommodate itself to accepting a thriving overall capitalist framework, the dynamism of which is based on the exclusion of a huge sector of the labour forces from the process of production, as well as from the benefits of economic growth.

A strong civil society and effective bourgeois hegemony is not, therefore, possible in a situation where a large part of the working population is excluded from the productive process. Or, to put it differently, there is fundamental incompatibility between the restricted and unequal capitalist development witnessed in most third-world countries, and the type of political integration of the working classes found in most western parliamentary democracies.

Typical Modes of Political Integration in Peripheral Formations. As already mentioned, both the integration of third-world formations into the world market, as well as the rise and eventual dominance of the CMP within their economies, inevitably creates processes of political mobilisation which undermine the restrictive/oligarchic politics of the pre-capitalist period, bringing the majority of the population into active politics. Given, therefore, the shift from "subject" to "participant" status, and given the small chances of success of the western pattern of political integration, what other modes of integration are possible? Oversimplifying somewhat, one could name two other modes which play a very prominent role in structuring the third-world State and politics: clientelism and populism.

Before examining such modes, it is necessary to briefly make a methodological point. At the generalised level of this paper, populism and clientelism--like the western mode of integration examined above--will be presented as highly abstract analytical constructs never found in their pure form in any actual social formation. Any actual specific political system or organisation will always contain elements of all three modes, albeit articulated in such a way that one of them is dominant. When it was argued, therefore, that in the West the horizontal/non-populistic mode of political integration has become dominant in irreversible fashion, this does not mean that clientelistic or populist elements have completely disappeared from

the West European political parties; it simply means that they have become peripheral.

A. Clientelism. A distinct and, from the point of view of the maintenance of the bourgeois order, rather safe solution to the problems created by political mobilisation and enlarged political participation in third-world formations is the use of vertical networks of patron-client relationships for integrating the dominated classes into national politics. Of course, extensive clientelist networks, cutting across and hindering the direct producers' horizontal organisation along class lines, were a typical form of organisation in oligarchic politics.

Contrary to the belief of neo-evolutionist political scientists, however, "modernisation" does not eliminate clientelism; patronage networks tend to persist in a modified, less traditional form even after the CMP has achieved dominance and after the decline of oligarchic politics. As many empirical studies have demonstrated, the entrance of third-world masses into politics is perfectly compatible with the continuation of vertical/clientelistic forms of organisation in many third-world capitalist formations.[24]

Of course, capitalist penetration and the advent of mass politics considerably change the traditional forms of patronage which characterise pre-capitalist formations. The rising dominance of the CMP, State expansion, the emergence and political activation of new middle classes eager to break the oligarchy's restrictive political control--all these are instrumental in weakening the exclusive patronage monopoly which local potentates had exercised over the rural populations; they are changes contributing to the multiplication and diversification of patrons at the local level, the centralisation of clientelistic parties, and the more direct involvement of clients with party and State bureaucrats at all administrative levels. In other words, they bring about what A. Weingrod has called a shift from oligarchic/traditional to State/bureaucratic forms of patronage.[25]

Still, however significant these changes, they do not alter the basic effect of clientelistic politics on the maintenance of the bourgeois status quo: even in its modern/diversified form, clientelism continues to operate as a means for the vertical entrance of the working population into active politics. If it successfully cuts across and weakens horizontal modes of political integration, it safeguards the bourgeois social order against any serious threat from below, and draws the new political entrants into types of conflict where fundamental class issues are systematically displaced by personalistic politics and by particularistic squabbles over the distribution of spoils.[26]

B. Populism. The other mode of political integration prevalent in third-world capitalist formations is populism. Given the huge disruptions in the third world generated by the process of capital accumulation and the relatively abrupt[27] entrance of the masses into politics, clientelistic networks often fail to accommodate the new political participants in their vertical structures. In the

absence of strongly institutionalised horizontal organisations of the western type, populism can provide another convenient framework for relatively "safe" political integration. The populist mode--whether in the form of distinct organisations like parties, or in the more diffuse form of movements occurring as part of or outside non-populist organisations--always involves a specific type of political mobilisation of the masses and their involvement in politics: a type of mobilisation/integration quite distinct from the clientelistic mode.

Of course, as far as the transition from oligarchic to mass politics in third-world quasi-parliamentary regimes is concerned, the passage from "traditional" to "bureaucratic" clientelism and the rise of populist movements can be seen as two different ways of undermining oligarchic politics and of bringing about less restrictive forms of political participation. In both cases the end result is the break-up of the political monopoly of a small number of powerful families, the entrance of "new men" into the power game, and the transition from the political clubs of coteries of notables to more centralised political organisations.

But despite such similarities, there are fundamental differences between clientelistic transformation and populist mobilisation as modes of political integration. In the clientelistic case, the new men of power manage to break the oligarchic stranglehold by activating, extending, and reorganising to their own benefit patronage networks which, despite their closer integration into a centralised political machine, still retain their vertical/clientelistic character. In the populist case, on the other hand, the new men achieve their entrance into the corridors of power through a type of mobilisation which, both in ideological and structural/organisational terms, makes a more radical break with ancien régime politics.

A good example illustrating this difference is the contrasting ways in which the backbone of oligarchic parliamentary politics[28] was broken in Greece and Bulgaria respectively at the beginning of this century. In the case of Greece, the demise of oligarchic rule (of the paleokommatismos) was marked by a military coup in 1909 which opened the way for the rise of the great bourgeois moderniser Venizelos and his Liberal Party--a political development which clearly heralded the end of the traditional patronage monopoly of the oligarchy (the tzakia), both by bringing new men into parliament,[29] and by effectuating a series of reforms (rationalisation and reorganisation of the State administration, social and labour legislation, greater State intervention in economic management, etc.). But during all this process of "bourgeois" transformation and political reorganisation, the peasants (i.e., the majority of the voting population) were firmly kept within a vertical/clientelistic mode of mobilisation/integration. They were firmly kept within the confines of the two major bourgeois clientelistic parties, the major disagreement among which--the question of the monarchy--succeeded in drawing the peasantry into an intra-bourgeois political issue which had nothing to do with peasant-class interests.[30]

In Bulgaria, by contrast, the old political order was broken by the rise of a strong peasant movement which, under the charismatic leadership of Alexander Stamboliiski, managed to radically dislodge the hold of traditional bourgeois clientelism over the peasantry. It managed to mobilise the rural population along agrarian populist lines, and to create a political cleavage (rural masses versus urban bourgeoisie) which, by comparison with the Greek situation, constituted a much more decisive breakaway from ancien régime politics, both in ideological and in structural/organisational terms.[31]

Speaking more generally, an attempt to differentiate in ideal typical terms between the populist and the clientelistic modes of integration shows as one obvious difference the fact that populist integration is horizontal rather than vertical, i.e., that the ideological themes of the populist discourse focus predominantly on the antagonism between the "people" and the "establishment," the poor versus the rich, etc.--themes which, as a rule, play only a very minor role in clientelistic ideologies.[32]

On the organisational level, given the mobilisation-from-above element and the relatively abrupt entrance of the masses into politics, it is plebiscitarian leadership rather than intricate patronage networks or well-articulated multi-level administrative structures which provides the basic framework for political incorporation. As a rule populist leaders are hostile to strongly institutionalised intermediary levels, whether of clientelistic or the more bureaucratic type found in West European political parties or trade unions. The emphasis on the leader's charisma, on the necessity for direct, non-mediated rapport between the leader and "his people," as well as the relative abruptness of the process of political incorporation, all lead to organisational forms of a fluid, gelatinous character. Even in cases of populist movements with strong grass-root organisation, insofar as the rank and file's allegiance is centred on the person of the leader, local or intermediary cadres are left without a structural basis for establishing some degree of political autonomy vis-à-vis the leader: all the power and legitimation they have derives directly from the leader's charisma.

In contrast, the power position and autonomy of local patrons in clientelist political organisations can be considerable. One need only think of the well-documented cases of "captive voters," cases where local clients owe personal allegiance to the local patron rather than to the national party leadership--to such an extent that the patron can even change parties without losing his political clientele. Although this type of extreme localism is generally more prevalent at the stage of oligarchic politics, given the particularistic ties between clients and local patrons, the latter do retain some power and autonomy even in modern, more centralised, clientelistic parties.

Of course, in concrete situations the distinction between clientelistic and populist modes of integration is not as clear-cut as outlined above. For instance, concrete populist organisations

or movements not only have clientelistic elements but, given the fluid character of their organisational structure, "clientelisation processes"[33] can frequently be so strong as to lead to an eventual metamorphosis from a populist organisation to a clientelistic one--i.e., to a situation where clientelistic features overshadow populist ones. Such processes are more likely to occur once a populist movement has been consolidated, or when its leaders have managed to achieve governmental power.

However, such cases do not invalidate attempts at differentiating as clearly as possible between the basic structures and "logic" of the clientelistic and populist modes of political integration, provided it is remembered that any clear-cut typologies established in the process will refer simply to mere structural tendencies, tendencies which are subject to greater or lesser accentuation in concrete situations. If nothing else, such typological differentiation is useful for enquiring as to precisely what conditions are conducive to populist movements maintaining their typical ideological and organisational features, and what conditions are not.

Moving back now to the basic features and tendencies of the populist mode of integration, since populism implies a type of intense mobilisation generated and sustained by the leader's charisma, the often corporatistic manner[34] in which populist parties are linked to the State is quite understandable. Not only is it easier for the State to exercise control from above over movements or organisations the basic impetus of which depends on their leader's person; but populist leaders, once in power and having to face the broader task of coordinating the reproduction of the entire social formation, also tend to impose corporatistic controls by trading off the political autonomy of their movement against various pay-offs (e.g., pro-peasant or pro-labour legislation, etc.).

As has been pointed out by many writers, the populist type of political integration of the masses into the State within a capitalist formation[35] is never more than unstable and transitional. Apart from the inherent instability and fragility of populist organisations and their clientelistic tendencies, the present stage of capitalist accumulation--characterised by the direct investment of multinational capital in key sectors of the industries of major third-world countries--is particularly inimical to the long-term institutionalisation of populist regimes. This becomes perfectly obvious if the present phase of third-world industrialisation is compared with the previous one of import substitution.

Let us look at Latin America as an example. Although populist movements in South America pre-date the phase of import-substitution industrialisation, there has been an intensification of such movements since the 1929 world crisis, as populist leaders in several countries were able to rely on and mobilise the urban and/or rural populations against U.S. domination and the indigenous export-oriented oligarchies associated with it. By adopting an anti-imperialist policy (e.g., nationalisation of foreign firms) and a

programme of domestic social reforms, these populist leaders could marshal the active support of a significant part of the popular masses, as well as of those fractions of the economically privileged classes which were excluded from the oligarchic political game.[36] With the definite demise of oligarchic politics and the eventual exhaustion of the possibilities of the relatively "easy" import-substitution phase of industrialisation, however, the long-term institutionalisation of the populist mode of integration became difficult. Not only did the break-up of oligarchic politics and the accommodation of the new men within the political establishment mean that populist movements lost their momentum; but also, given that State and indigenous capital was unwilling or unable to direct itself into such crucial sectors as metallurgy and chemicals, capitalism's only recourse for further industrialisation lay in attracting massive foreign capital into the industrial sector. This was the more feasible at this time as the big multinational corporations had begun to adopt a world-wide policy of direct industrial investments in the third world.

This new model of capital accumulation tends to provide a less favourable ground for the consolidation of populist modes of integration. The growing difficulties of sustaining further industrial growth, the greater emphasis on the need to control inflation and to attract foreign capital have made the maintenance of anti-imperial ideologies and of welfaristic orientations towards the working classes more difficult.[37]

Although I do not agree with writers who see too direct a link between import substitution and populism, or between the multinational phase and bureaucratic authoritarianism,[38] there can be no doubt that populist mobilisation and policies cannot easily take root during the present multinational phase of third-world industrialisation. This does not mean, of course, that as a mode of political integration populism is going to disappear, or that the new bureaucratic authoritarianism which seems to prevail in several major Latin American countries is going to be institutionalised irreversibly.

Regime Instability. If populist modes of political incorporation are difficult to institutionalise and, as a dominant form, are becoming increasingly incongruent with the present multinational penetration of western imperialism, clientelistic modes of incorporation are no less unstable and fragile. The strong institutionalisation of vertical/patronage forms of political incorporation is relatively easy in a context where active politics is the prerogative of a mere handful of influential patrons. With the dominance of the CMP and the advent of mass politics, however--as I shall show for Greece--clientelistic mechanisms of political organisation become more and more problematical and unreliable, especially in large urban areas.

The functionalist/neo-evolutionist theory of political development notwithstanding, it is a simple fact that third-world capitalist development does not destroy but merely transforms clientelistic networks. What present theories of patronage politics ignore or pay too little attention to, however, is that in many third-world

formations clientelism not only changes its complexion on the way from pre-capitalist to capitalist forms of economic organisation, it also becomes more fragile and precarious. In the rapid processes of urbanisation, commercialisation, and industrialisation, patronage networks are constantly disrupted by the emergence of non-clientelistic organisations (whether populist or not) which, as already argued, are inherently equally unstable and precarious.[39]

My major argument in this context, therefore, is that in third-world politics none of the three modes of political integration discussed are capable of establishing a clear and irreversible dominance. Not only strongly institutionalised, non-personalistic, horizontal organisations are incompatible with dependent capitalist development, but clientelistic and populist modes of political incorporation also are precarious and incapable of providing long-term political solutions. Hence we witness the coexistence and weak institutionalisation of both horizontal and vertical, both populist and non-populist, forms of political integration as one of the major features of the peripheral State.[40]

In contrast to the West, where horizontal non-populist modes of political organisation have managed to become irreversibly dominant (thus contributing to a strong civil society), in third-world capitalist formations such emerging horizontal non-populist organisations, although constantly disrupting vertical modes of integration, are not succeeding in establishing themselves as a dominant mode of political integration.

Now the uneasy balance between vertical and horizontal modes of integration means, of course, permanent regime instability, leading to the imposition of dictatorial or quasi-dictatorial solutions whenever:

(a) the dominant relations of political domination are threatened--i.e., whenever the paternalistic incorporative controls that the politically dominant groups exercise via the State apparatus over civil society is endangered by the development of organisations or movements (political parties, trade unions) trying to reject State tutelage and the overall political status quo;

(b) whenever not only political relations of domination, but also the dominant relations of production are threatened in the countryside or in urban areas. Whenever the working classes can no longer be contained or safely integrated within the overall bourgeois order--i.e., whenever strong left-wing populist organisations escape State incorporation, or whenever non-populist horizontal organisations or movements pose a serious threat to major economic interests or to the overall process of capital accumulation, then dictatorial mechanisms of control are activated with the aim of excluding the masses from active political participation. This "threat" does not necessarily have to take the form of a revolutionary movement challenging the capitalist relations of production in a direct, frontal manner. It can just as well, and usually does, take a more

indirect form, as for instance a strong trade-union movement paralysing the economy through strikes, or when by refusing wage controls it contributes decisively to investment strikes or to rates of inflation which disrupt the whole fabric of bourgeois society.

What form the dictatorial reaction will take depends very much on the type of challenge or threat posed by the socio-political mobilisation. As will be argued below for the case of Greece, if the threat is limited to the political status quo--i.e., when the economically dominant classes do not feel their interests directly affected by the popular unrest--they may give some lukewarm support to the dictatorship, though certain dominant economic interests may be hostile to the imposition of dictatorial rule. Those, for instance, whose wealth depends directly on political patrons of the pre-dictatorship parliamentary order will oppose the imposition of a new regime which, even if it is pro-capitalist, will eliminate their own source of profit.

I am not implying here that political patronage disappears with the imposition of military rule. It does, however, definitely change form[41] and necessitates new political investments (i.e., more bribery) on the part of the entrepreneurial classes to ensure the cultivation of new political friends. A large section of the bourgeois parliamentary forces will be opposed to dictatorial rule for the same reason; for them, a regime change will mean not only the loss of extremely lucrative brokerage roles, but also a direct loss of political power.

The situation is quite different when popular mobilisation not only threatens the incorporative character of the State or limited economic interests (specific monopolies, big landed property), but jeopardises capitalism itself. In that case, the economically dominant classes will be much less divided, and a military dictatorship, when not actually initiated by them, will receive their active support and not merely their halfhearted approval. Even then, however, the reaction of the dominant classes to dictatorial rule will not be uniform. The large section of the bourgeois parliamentary forces which is going to lose its dominant political position within the State will react negatively to a dictatorial solution, even if this would serve the interests they are supposed to represent.[42]

Speaking more generally, right-wing dictatorships--whether set up in reaction to strictly political threats, or as attempts to safeguard capitalism per se, given the "relative autonomy" of the peripheral State--often lack coordination between the politically and economically dominant groups. The economically dominant classes may either acquiesce in a dictatorship or give it their active support, while their alleged representatives in parliament or other politically dominant groups (e.g., army factions) may oppose it; or, as in Greece, groups occupying key positions within the State may be able to impose a dictatorial solution and present the economically dominant classes with a fait accompli.

A last point to be made about regime instability in the third world is that, if quasi-parliamentary forms of politics are inherently unstable (because there is neither dominance nor long-term institutionalisation of any single mode of political integration), the dictatorial/military forms of political control are as well--at least at the present stage of imperialist penetration. In contrast to the inter-war period, for instance, when lower levels of industrialisation and the realistic possibilities of adopting more isolationist/autarchic policies made possible the long-term consolidation of Franco's and Salazar's authoritarian regimes, the present phase of multinational industrialisation and the general international context present obstacles to a similar consolidation. For present-day dictators not only have to face much higher levels of social discontent and unrest (as concomitants of the inequalities and disruptions created by dependent capitalist industrialisation); they have also to cope with a hostile world opinion, at a time when isolationist policies within a capitalist trajectory are no longer possible.[43] Given that the typical bureaucratic-military authoritarian regime, at the present stage of capitalist dependent development, is based on a rather incoherent and ineffective ideology and on party organisations which are virtually non-existent or incapable of large-scale popular mobilisation,[44] the long-term consolidation of such a regime requires going beyond the type of social control that the repressive State apparatuses provide. This can be done either by creating some sort of organic/corporatistic type of representation within which various institutional interests are allowed very limited representation under strict State "guidance," a type of control which excludes active popular mobilisation; or/and by building up a mass party through which the people are mobilised and brought into politics in a fascist or quasi-fascist manner.[45]

Neither way of going beyond the typical military-bureaucratic authoritarianism has much chance of success at the present stage of world capitalism, however. The external obstacles to such solutions are related to the fact that fascist and organic/corporatistic models have been discredited as an alternative to free party representation after the defeat of the Axis forces; and to the fact that the present-day heavy reliance by peripheral capitalist formations on foreign capital excludes all possibility of drumming up popular support and legitimation by means of xenophobic, chauvinistic nationalism or by adopting isolationist/autarchic policies of capitalist growth. Moreover, internally, the necessity of controlling inflation and keeping down wages does not make it any easier to gain the support of large sections of the rural and urban working classes; nor are the huge inequalities and the systematic exclusion of a sizeable part of the labour force from the productive process conducive to building up mass organisations capable of providing widespread grass-roots support for authoritarian rule. It is not surprising, therefore, that in contrast to the inter-war period--when both "organic democracy" and reactionary "mobilisational authoritarianism" managed to take strong roots (the former in Portugal, the latter in Germany, and a combination of the two in Spain and Italy)--the post-war era does not present many examples of the successful consolidation of these types of authoritarian regimes.

Certain military-bureaucratic regimes are, of course, more successful than others in establishing a firm organisational base. If the military intervention--such as that in Greece (see below)--has been in reaction to power struggles and rearrangements within the State--i.e., when the relations of production are in no serious danger and the economically dominant classes do not, therefore, give their active support to the new dictatorial order--then it is much more difficult for a dictatorship to build up a strong organisational foundation. But when the dominant classes not merely acquiesce in dictatorial rule but are actively involved in bringing it about, then organisational consolidation is easier to obtain. This is especially so if the dictatorship succeeds in winning the support of considerable numbers of pre-dictatorship regime politicians. Still, even then the long-term institutionalisation of a dictatorial regime is extremely problematical under the present conditions of multinational capitalism.

Short of a process of full-scale and successful right-wing mobilisation, dictatorial regimes in peripheral capitalist formations which have attained the level of mass politics are brittle and precarious, whatever their means of coercion. Once the majority of the adult population is drawn into the political process, and given that the typical capitalist growth in such formations favours only a tiny fraction of this population, the long-term consolidation of widespread popular support is extremely difficult, if not impossible.

Whether dictatorial repression takes a more or a less exclusionist form (as in Chile and Brazil respectively), the lack of popular mass support not only aggravates the problem of legitimacy, it also makes it extremely difficult for any rearrangement to occur within the power bloc without this leading to the collapse of the regime. A successful mass organisation has enough room to accommodate and handle divisions among the ruling groups; if such room is lacking, fractional divisions are bound, sooner or later, to result in regime change. Needless to say, such fractional divisions are exacerbated and the stability of the dictatorial regime suffers whenever there is a crisis, especially an economic crisis. Since the imposition of a dictatorship meant a restructuring of the power bloc and the relative marginalisation of that part of the ruling class which was directly linked with parliamentary institutions, any economic downturn provides excellent opportunities for the displaced ruling groups to mobilise the masses in an effort to regain their previous dominant power position.[46]

It is not surprising, therefore, that at the present time there are strong trends toward a return to parliamentary rule in several Latin American countries.[47] In most of these countries the permanent consolidation of dictatorial rule has proved as difficult as that of parliamentary democracy: hence the regular opening up and closing of the political system, and the alternation of quasi-parliamentary and dictatorial forms of control as the dominant classes try to cope more or less haphazardly with the huge disruptions and inequalities generated by third-world capitalism.

It might be argued, moreover, that the very pendulation between dictatorial and parliamentary regime forms can in itself constitute a mechanism helping to safeguard the bourgeois order. Since it is a fact that people have rather short political memories, then in times of open, quasi-parliamentary politics the dominant classes can always explain the disruptions of peripheral capitalism as the consequence of repression and mismanagement in the preceding dictatorial period; and during a dictatorship, all difficulties can be ascribed to the corruption and demagogy of professional politicians. In this way the fact that neither dictatorial nor parliamentary regimes can solve the basic dilemmas of peripheral capitalism can be systematically concealed.

In conclusion, it seems to me that the type of regime instability which is a periodic fluctuation back and forth between open/parliamentary and closed dictatorial modes of political control in fact constitutes a specific characteristic of the peripheral capitalist State,[48] a characteristic differentiating it sharply from both the western capitalist State and the non-capitalist State of collectivist regimes. In the western State, the broader and less dependent expansion of capitalism, the irreversible decline of clientelism, and the consolidation of a strong civil society provide the basis for the stable long-term functioning of parliamentary institutions. In non-capitalist, collectivist States, regime stability is due to the feebleness or total abolition of capitalist relations of production, as well as to the virtual non-existence of civil society. In these latter formations, the imposition of quasi-totalitarian forms of political control, in combination with enforced egalitarian policies, make up a mixture of repression and legitimation which is very difficult to challenge.[49]

A Final Methodological Note. Before terminating the theoretical part of this paper, I should like to stress once more that the general trends established above do not constitute a theory which is automatically applicable to specific situations to yield ready-made explanations and exact predictions.

For example, the distinction drawn above between types of dictatorial regime, in terms of the reaction by politically and/or economically dominant groups to different kinds of threat from below, is obviously an ideal-typical construction. Not only is it not always easy in concrete situations to differentiate clearly the strictly political threats from overall threats to the capitalist order, but this distinction between economically and politically dominant groups is rather too vague for an adequate analysis explaining the imposition (or, for that matter, the demise) of a dictatorial regime. It is necessary to know in detail how the various interests diverge and are articulated on the level of:

(a) the economy (e.g., differentiation due to objective divergence of interests between types of capital, types of peasantry, between the industrial proletariat and the marginalised labour force, etc.);

(b) the civil society (e.g., organisational divisions within the trade-union movement, antagonisms between various pressure groups, divisions à la Michels between the organisers and the organised, etc.);

(c) the State (divisions between the judiciary, the legislative and executive branches, between various State apparatuses, divisions within the army, etc.).

It is only by constructing a detailed map showing the differentiation of forces on each of the three levels, the intricate ways in which the three levels articulate with each other, as well as the extremely complicated strategies and counter-strategies adopted by the various collective actors, that full light can be shed on the rise and fall of a specific dictatorial regime. It is unlikely that the above desiderata can be achieved on the level of general theory. It is only by applying theoretical concepts to the analysis of concrete case studies that it is possible to go beyond the formulation of general trends and take into account the dialectical, self-monitoring aspects of collective action.

In more general terms, it may be objected that by focusing on a few overall trends related to the development of capitalism and to modes of political integration, the above analysis ignores a host of other variables (economic crises, wars, superpower politics, inadequate political leadership, etc.) which often play a major role in regime changes in third-world formations.50

By way of reply I would point out that an attempt to take all possible factors into consideration, especially conjunctural ones, tends to result in the construction of an ad hoc list of disconnected items which is of very little help for understanding the phenomena involved. I would say that conjunctural factors (e.g., defeat in war) do not invalidate, but simply complement, the broad macro-structural tendencies identified in this paper. They are pertinent to showing why in certain cases these broad structural tendencies became accentuated, whereas in others their impact was minimal.

Those who think that a conceptual framework like that tentatively outlined above must be "tested" in strictly positivistic manner can, of course, easily find cases which "disprove" the present analysis. But for those who believe that general theories in the social sciences cannot be anything more than sensitising conceptual frameworks providing tools for the analysis of specific cases, the present attempt to establish tentative links between peripheral capitalism and the State may shed some light on the structure and functioning of politics in third-world formations. It could, for instance, help to explain on a global level why changes in State forms during the post-war period were insignificant in countries like Canada or the Netherlands, and also in North Korea or Rumania, while in Brazil or Turkey, for example, they were strongly marked. In other words, the more general phenomenon of regime instability in the peripheral capitalist State (in comparison with the capitalist

metropolitan State, or the non-capitalist State) is explicable neither by purely conjunctural factors, nor by reference to superpower politics. An explanation must be sought primarily in the way in which capitalism disrupts or dislocates the economies of these formations, and the way in which, as a consequence, people are brought into the central political process.

II. The Case of Greece

The Ottoman Legacy. It is generally acknowledged that the Ottoman patrimonial system of power was organised with a view to preventing the creation of a strong landed aristocracy which could have challenged the absolute authority of the Sultan. In contrast to West European attitudes toward land ownership, the Ottoman empire saw all land as belonging, in theory at least, to Allah and his representative on earth, the Sultan. Despite the de facto existence of private lands, generally speaking all cultivated land came under the timar landholding system--a system resembling the Carolingian benefice more than the medieval fief. Timar holders (the spahis) held no ownership rights over the land. They simply had a non-hereditary right to a portion of the produce, in exchange for which they were obliged to provide both administrative and military services to the Porte. During periods of decline or weak central rule, officials would of course manage to acquire de facto ownership of their timars, but such ownership was never legalised.

When the State was strong, therefore, as it was in the fifteenth century, it held complete sway over the aristocracy. Sultanic despotism severely kept in check not only the aristocracy's aspirations to land ownership, but equally so any designs it might have had on controlling the State apparatus. The appointment of slaves, eunuchs, Jews, Christians, Greeks, etc. (instead of nobles) to key administrative posts ensured total subservience to the Sultan's wishes. Thus the weakening of the sultanic authority (after the middle of the sixteenth century) did not result in a strengthening of aristocratic influence within the State, but in the more or less total autonomy of local pashas, and hence in the ultimate disintegration of the imperial polity.

In other words, the Ottoman empire had none of the organic articulation between the State and the dominant classes known in the West, and this structural characteristic undermined the rule of law and fostered general insecurity and arbitrariness--the latter emanating from the imperial centre in the heyday of the empire, and from the local potentates when State power had declined.[51]

Even a cursory acquaintance with modern Greek politics makes it obvious that elements of this despotic type of articulation between the dominant classes and the State have been carried over into post-independence Greece, and are still to be found in the present system of political rule. Of course, arguments of "historical legacy" provide an anything-but-satisfactory explanation of this, since they

give no reason at all why such a feature should have persisted and survived until today. To account for this phenomenon requires an examination of the development of both the State and the capitalist mode of production in modern Greece.

The Early Demise of Oligarchic Politics. Greece is a good illustration of the demise of oligarchic politics before industrial capitalism has had time to develop--i.e., in the absence of an industrial bourgeoisie and proletariat. The first point to be emphasised in this context is the early date at which western parliamentary institutions were imported into post-independence Greece. Even the first constitutions, drafted during the early nineteenth-century revolutionary struggles against Ottoman domination, were the most democratic and liberal in all of Europe. Although they were never seriously implemented, after a short period of absolutist rule (1828-1843) western parliamentarianism took strong roots in Greece and, despite its obvious and continuing malfunctioning, it showed remarkable resilience: from that time until 1909 the parliamentary regime functioned uninterruptedly. Moreover, in 1864 Greece adopted universal male suffrage, several years earlier than England.

It may well be argued that, universal suffrage notwithstanding, late nineteenth-century Greece was clearly under oligarchic rule. It is true that the dominant classes of that time found the parliamentary form very effective for not only maintaining but even furthering their interests. In fact the famous tzakia--i.e., the handful of notable families which dominated the various regions of Greece--used the system of representative government as a means for protecting their privilege from inroads made against it from both above and below. At the local level, they employed the traditional/monopolistic forms of patronage to easily acquire control of the voting process, and so safeguarded their representation in parliament; at the national level, their controlling position in parliament acted as an effective brake on the absolutist tendencies of the Greek throne.[52]

All the same, universal suffrage was no mere façade. Despite the operation of the system of "captive clienteles" during this early period of Greek parliamentary history, the beginnings of competition for votes by the major oligarchic parties initiated a process of political mobilisation which eroded the self-containment of the local rural communities and very gradually drew the peasants into the political centre.

Other important structural changes too strengthened the processes of socio-political mobilisation during this period. If at the beginning of the nineteenth century western industrial capitalism had effectively eliminated the textile and shipbuilding industries previously flourishing on Greek territory,[53] the last quarter of the century saw an influx of foreign and diaspora capital which, despite its extremely exploitative character, contributed significantly to the development of Greece's social overhead capital (railroads, ports, etc.). Combined with territorial expansion and demographic growth, this inflow of capital accelerated processes of

agricultural commercialisation, rapid urbanisation, and occupational differentiation. This in turn meant that, although late nineteenth-century Greece still had a pre-capitalist economy (capital proper not yet having entered the sphere of industrial or even agricultural production),[54] the integration of this economy into the world market resulted in the early expansion of the State and the gradual loosening of oligarchic rule.

In fact, it could be said that in terms of several indices of mobilisation, late pre-industrial Greece was a more "modernised" society than late pre-industrial England or France. For instance, during the 1870s the number of civil servants per 10,000 population was approximately seven times higher in Greece than in the United Kingdom.[55] And these figures would be much more striking still with respect to the English State a few decades before the Industrial Revolution. The point could be equally well illustrated in terms of the sphere of public education, for instance.[56]

In view of all the above, it is not surprising that the final demise of oligarchic rule in Greece occurred in 1909, two decades before the effective development of industrial capitalism in the country and before the emergence of industrial classes.[57] In fact, the 1909 military intervention marked the end of oligarchic parliamentarianism (paleokommatism) in Greece. It broadened the system of political participation by throwing the gates open to active politics for new rising social strata which had been generated by the structural changes mentioned above. These "new men" were not industrial capitalists, and in this respect Greek Marxist historians are wrong when they draw parallels between the West European bourgeois revolutions of the nineteenth century and the Greek bourgeois revolution of 1909.[58] This cannot be done in terms of either the main actors involved, or with regard to the reforms initiated. Although the ascending new Liberal Party, under the charismatic leadership of Venizelos, initiated a series of very popular reforms in the political and socio-economic spheres (educational and State administrative reforms, introduction of social legislation, agrarian reform, development of the banking system, creation of economic ministries, etc.), as far as State institutions are concerned, none of these measures are comparable to the great bourgeois transformations experienced by the West European State in the nineteenth century.

For instance, despite limited rationalisation of the State apparatus, the Greek State to a great extent retained its strong patrimonial incorporative character; and, despite important changes in the structure of the post-oligarchic political parties, clientelism of a less traditional type persisted both in inter-war and post-war Greece.[59] Since the post-oligarchic State and political system had acquired its decisive features before the dominance of the CMP, and given the State-induced initiation of the industrialisation process, neither the industrial bourgeoisie nor the proletariat were able to push the reforms any further. They came on the scene too late, they were too dependent on the State, and they had to operate in a national and international context which precluded their playing a role similar to the role played by their western counterparts.[60]

The Constitution of the Post-War Anti-Communist State. The 1936 Metaxas dictatorship and the subsequent German occupation of Greece seriously affected the parliamentary institutions and the all-pervasive party clientelism associated with them. As a result of the large-scale disruption of vertical/clientelistic modes of incorporation, the majority of the population, urban as well as rural, was available for mobilisation by the Communist Party, the major political force which had both the will to resist the German occupation and the organisational skills to survive and thrive in conditions of clandestinity.

However, although the Left was the main resistance force during the World War II German occupation and controlled most of Greece's territory when the occupying troops began to withdraw, for a variety of reasons which cannot be developed here, it suffered complete military defeat at the end of a protracted civil war.

Having won its victory, the Right quickly instituted a quasi-parliamentary regime which systematically excluded all who had been on the losing side in the civil war. The Communist Party was outlawed, and all left-wing elements were kept out of the State apparatus and out of active politics by means of an intricate network of legal and illegal mechanisms of repression.

The army, immediate victor of the civil war, played the major part in constituting this new State. During the war, the bulk of the armed forces, the King, and the government had been in Egypt. There, internal disputes between republican and monarchist officers reached such a point that the British were obliged to intervene, and the Greek army was purged of all left-wing and republican elements. It was this ideologically irreproachable army which in December 1944 played a decisive role alongside the British forces in the battle of Athens, the first round of the civil war. It was this same army again which managed in 1949, with American help this time, to deal the final blow to the communist forces and establish the new system of repressive parliamentarianism--a system where power was supposed to rest with parliament but in effect was wielded by the army, and more specifically by a group of anti-communist officers (the notorious secret organisation IDEA) which held key positions within all the repressive apparatuses of the State.[61]

The civil war, therefore, added its own dead weight to the so-called Ottoman legacy and to the post-oligarchic inter-war "incorporative" character of the State, thus pushing the Greek political system ever further away from the kind of balance between State and civil society which characterises the western democracies. For the savagery of the civil war and the total defeat of the Left contributed to the further atrophy of civil society, to the flourishing of clientelistic politics, and to the strengthening of the despotic/patrimonial features of the Greek State.

Moreover, it was not only the degree of State repression which was intensifying in comparison with the inter-war period; there were also qualitative changes in the balance of forces within the State.

Within the throne, army, and parliamentary-forces triarchy it was the army rather than the monarchy which became the dominant force. What has already been said about the system of repressive parliamentarianism makes the diminished role of parliament in the immediate post-civil-war period too obvious to need further elaboration. A few things should, however, be said about the changing power position of the other two forces within the State: the throne and the army.

The shift in the power balance between throne and army did not, of course, come about overnight. The Greek throne, which had held an extremely powerful position within the State throughout the period of oligarchic parliamentarianism (1864-1909), followed the typical declining course that traditional monarchies face with the demise of oligarchic rule and the gradual advent of mass politics. After the 1909 military coup, and with the rise of Venizelos' Liberal Party, the new political forces proved less willing than the old political oligarchy (the paleokommatikoi) to see military and foreign affairs as an exclusive royal prerogative. In fact, it was discontent with the King's management of army affairs which was one of the immediate causes of the 1909 military coup, and it was disagreement between King Constantine and Venizelos over foreign policy (concerning the role Greece should play in World War I) which initiated the dichasmos: the profound schism between royalists and Venizelists which provided a fertile ground for continual army interventions during the inter-war period. The abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of a short-lived Greek republic (1924-35), the restoration of the throne after a fraudulent plebiscite in November 1935, and its subsequent identification with the Metaxas dictatorship, further weakened the power base of the throne and its hold over the State apparatus.

While the monarchy became more and more enfeebled, the power position of the army went from strength to strength. To begin with, after the Balkan Wars and World War I, the armed forces increased spectacularly in size.[62] At the same time, as more middle-class men were accepted into the Military Academy and with mobility up the military ladder becoming easier, the officer corps began to lose its aristocratic orientation. It acquired a more middle-class character[63] and emerged, for the first time ever, as a pressure group anxious to promote its professional interests.

The fact that these changes took place during the dichasmos--i.e., at a time when the constitutional balance between the throne and parliamentary forces was shattered for good--meant also the increasing politicisation of the army as well as its increasing power as an arbiter between political factions fighting over the issue of the throne. It is true, of course, that despite the army's strategic position it never managed during the inter-war period to constitute itself as an autonomous political force in the manner of Kemal Atatürk's army in Turkey, for instance.[64] But after its radical reshaping in Egypt and its decisive civil-war role, its post-war power position changed dramatically: from a mere arbiter between warring politicians to guardian of the bourgeois order against the threat from below--a

new role which endowed it with new civil "responsibilities" and greater political power.

This brief historical sketch of the respective power positions of throne and army should make it quite obvious why it was the army rather than the throne which came to hold the dominant place within the post-war anti-communist State in Greece. It also shows clearly why the officers who controlled the repressive post-war State apparatus were, for all their royalism, no mere instruments of the King.[65]

Given this structure of the State during the long period of uninterrupted right-wing rule from 1952 to 1963 when the system of "guided democracy" and the revived clientelist networks of the Right were operating smoothly, the differences among the three forces within the ruling bloc were at a minimum. During this time the IDEA group, once it had put its anti-communist stamp on all branches of the State, entered a period of inactivity. The differences, however, were to emerge again as soon as repressive parliamentarianism could no longer cope with the effects of massive social changes and the popular dissatisfaction created by the post-war development of capitalism. It is precisely this development which provides the key to an understanding of the structure and dynamics of the post-war Greek State.

The Development of Capitalism in Post-War Greece. The large-scale destruction caused by the German occupation and the civil war notwithstanding, the Greek economy, with the help of Marshall aid and in the context of the general post-war European economic expansion, managed quite soon to start functioning again more or less along the pattern set in the 1930s. With an average growth rate of around 6 percent in the mid 1950s, pre-war levels of output were reached again. By 1959 the volume of industrial production was double that of 1938, and by 1964 it had tripled. Production of electrical power, which in 1938 had been 270,000 kwh, was ten times greater in 1961. The growth of tourism and the merchant marine were the most remarkable. In 1938, only 100,000 tourists had visited the country annually, but by 1961 the number had multiplied five-fold, and by the end of the 1960s twenty-fold. When the merchant marine resumed operations in 1945, it had a mere one hundred 10,000-ton American Liberty ships; two decades later it was one of the largest merchant fleets in the world.

With respect to relations of production, there was a trend towards rapid concentration of capital, while a series of complicated mergers put banking capital into a monopolistic position in which two giants (the National Bank of Greece and the Commercial Bank) between them controlled the bulk of all financial transactions.[66]

As far as the State was concerned, the interventionist pattern adopted in the inter-war period not only continued, but was reinforced to such an extent that one can speak of a qualitative difference. First of all, the remarkable concentration of banking capital and its tight hold over the economy is a clear indication of

increased State control. The bigger of the two huge banks, the National Bank, is owned by various public corporations through which the State exercises majority control, and the commercial Bank has quite recently come under State control also.

Finally the State, in a way and on a scale unthinkable in the inter-war period, also influences economic life through its massive investment programme. In 1959, as much as 34 percent of the total fixed capital of industrial enterprises was State-owned (at a time when the percentage was 32 in England, approximately 27 in Italy and Austria, and 25 in France).[67]

Despite impressive growth rates and increasing State interventionism, however, the Greek economy by the late 1950s had not managed to overcome a major feature of its underdevelopment: its weak manufacturing sector. Regardless of the numerous State incentives, Greek capital was unwilling or unable to direct itself into those key manufacturing sectors (metallurgy, chemicals) where growth has great transformative power and serious multiplying effects on the economy as a whole.[68] By the end of the first post-civil-war decade, therefore, Greece still exhibited the by-now familiar features of an underdeveloped economy: an over-inflated, rapidly expanding tertiary sector, a badly organised and inefficient agriculture still employing more than half of the labour force, and a feeble, stagnating manufacturing sector. The contribution of the industrial sector to the GNP was only around 25 percent, and manufacturing was the slowest growing sector in industry. (Its contribution to the total industrial output was in fact decreasing, whereas that of construction, transport, and public utilities was going up.)[69]

In these circumstances, and given the State commitment to the principle of free enterprise, the only solution for the further development of Greek capitalism lay in help from foreign capital--which, through the spectacular post-war development of the multinationals, had begun to invade peripheral societies in novel and ingenious ways.

Although Greece had initiated legislation for attracting foreign capital as early as 1953, it was only in the early 1960s that foreign capital really started coming to Greece in the form of direct investments. In 1960 the annual inflow of foreign capital was about $11.5 million, but by 1963 this had increased to $50 million, and by 1966 to $157.5 million.[70] Its relatively modest extent at the beginning of the decade was more than offset by its entrance into those key sectors where Greek capital was reluctant to invest, and it therefore gave a great boost to Greek manufacturing and the industrial sector generally.

As a result, industry not only expanded at a faster rate (after 1962 the industrial share of the GNP exceeded that of agriculture), but there was also a strong investment shift from light consumer to durable and capital goods.[71] A parallel change took place in the composition of Greek exports, where the ratio of agricultural products and raw materials decreased considerably against industrial goods.

There is no doubt at all that the post-1960 influx of foreign capital gave an important push to capitalist industrialisation in Greece, even though this type of dependent, foreign-induced industrialisation did not eliminate the peripheral, underdeveloped character of the Greek economy, but rather simply changed its form. In Greece, just as in many other countries (especially in Latin America), the foreign-dominated, dynamic, technologically advanced sector of industry was much better integrated with the requirements of the developed capitalist economies than with the technologically still-backward but persistent simple-commodity sectors of agriculture and artisanal industry at home.

Contrary to what happened in Western Europe, Greek industrial capitalism has taken a restricted and unequal path. It has neither destroyed non-capitalist modes of production (i.e., the simple-commodity family unit which still prevails heavily in agriculture and small industry), nor has it become articulated with them in any organic, positive manner. This lack of complementarity--i.e., this disarticulation of simple-commodity and capitalist modes of production--is nowhere better illustrated than in the incapacity of the technologically advanced sector to absorb the labour force leaving the countryside (hence the massive migration to Western Europe), and in the low value-added of Greek industrial production. This in turn means that further industrialisation can only generate higher capital-goods imports which far outstrip the import-substitution currency gains from additional indigenous production.

The persistence/marginalisation of simple-commodity production explains to a large extent why inequalities in Greece are not only greater than in Western Europe, but also why they are growing at a faster rate. It has been estimated that, after deduction of taxes and social-security benefits, 9.5 percent of national income goes to 40 percent of the lowest income groups, whereas 58 percent is channelled to the 17 percent in the top income brackets.[72] Between 1954 and 1966, the national income nearly doubled and profits tripled, while between 1960 and 1971 profits quadrupled.[73]

Under the legislation of 1953, foreign capital is the most privileged in terms of cheap energy supplies, credits, taxation, re-exportation of profits, etc.,[74] and it may be argued that industrial expenses and risks are socialised, while the profits from successful industrial ventures accrue to private/foreign interests. In other words, State revenue from taxation on low incomes is used chiefly for the consolidation and development of big capital. This is quite obvious from the fact that indirect taxation not only provides more than half of the enormous State revenues, but also tends to continue increasing in relation to direct taxes; and that, furthermore, even direct taxation for one reason or another hits small and medium incomes much harder than large ones.[75]

To put the above analysis in balanced perspective, it should finally be stressed that despite huge inequalities and restricted capitalist development, Greece from the 1960s onwards did not have the staggering problems of large-scale poverty and unemployment experienced by countries such as Brazil and Turkey.[76]

How is this to be explained? A full elucidation would have to take into account the historical development of the Greek bourgeoisie from Ottoman times onwards, but the following factors are especially pertinent to the situation as it is today:

- the relatively small size of the Greek population and its exceptionally low birth rate;
- massive migrations of the Greek labour force to Western Europe;
- the fact that the Greek diaspora bourgeoisie owns one of the largest merchant fleets in the world and as far as possible employs Greek crews;
- considerable invisible earnings (tourism, shipping, migrants' remittances);
- Greece's geographical position which, especially since the crisis in Lebanon, has made Athens the financial and business centre of the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

All of these factors together have helped to make it possible for Greece, despite its underdevelopment, to eliminate the usual concomitants of underdevelopment: mass poverty and unemployment. It is this which to some extent explains why, in spite of the advent of mass politics and huge disruptions created by Greek capitalism, there was no serious challenge in pre-dictatorial Greece to the dominant relations of production either in the cities or in the countryside--where, since the inter-war agrarian reforms, the small family holding has been the dominant form of ownership.

Political Mobilisation and the Challenge to Repressive Parliamentarianism. If there has been no serious challenge to the dominant relations of production, the situation was otherwise with regard to relations of political domination--i.e., the system of repressive parliamentarianism. The inequalities of Greece's capitalist growth--whether in terms of income and wealth differentials, geographical imbalance, or disarticulation between modes of production--have unavoidably created severe disruptions and acute social unrest which, given the overall structural situation, has been directed against the political status quo.

To illustrate this point, let us take a closer look at the huge rural exodus of the 1950s and 1960s. During the last two decades, 1.5 million people, out of a total population of 9 million, have had to leave the countryside. Since Greek industry was unable to absorb this redundant labour force, those among the rural unemployed who could not find parasitic jobs in the tertiary sector were virtually forced into emigration to the industrial countries of the West. On the positive side, this massive emigration operated as a safety valve by keeping down urban unemployment, and through the migrants' financial remittances helped both their families at home and the country's balance of payments. On the negative side, it

disrupted thousands of families and thus created discontent both among the migrants themselves who felt themselves pushed into a kind of exile, and among their families whom they had to leave behind. In addition, emigration accentuated an already-emerging geographic mobility which was eroding traditional loyalties and attitudes, expanding villagers' mental horizons, and making the growing social inequalities both more visible and less tolerable.

All of these changes, in concert with a series of political developments to be discussed below, steadily undermined the political controls established after the civil war.

In this basic socioeconomic context, the late 1950s saw increased political mobilisation and the gradual decline of the power of the Right in both towns and countryside.[77] In 1958 the non-clientelist left-wing EDA party was able to register quite spectacular election gains, and with the continuing fragmentation of the centre parties, EDA became, for a time, the main opposition in parliament. This immediately sounded the alert for the repressive apparatus of the Right, and the IDEA organisation promptly came out of hibernation. It participated in the elaboration of the notorious "Pericles" contingency plan which, devised for the purpose of neutralising the communists in case of war, was used instead to "monitor" the voting process and to achieve victory in the 1961 elections.

This crude State intervention gave birth to Anendotos, George Papandreou's fight against right-wing oppression. He succeeded in bringing the centre parties together again, and in the 1963 elections he triumphed over the traditional right-wing forces, consolidating his gain in 1964 with an unprecedented 53 percent of the votes.

Meanwhile his son, Andreas Papandreou, emerged as the leader of a strong left wing in his father's Centre Union. The successful left-wing populist ideology of this faction (the majority of whose members now form the core of Andreas Papandreou's post-dictatorial populist PASOK party) enjoyed a rising popularity and, despite the hesitation and apprehensions of its leader and of the party's traditional/clientelistic old guard, rapidly moved the Centre Union away from purely clientelistic orientations and principles of organisation.

When George Papandreou became prime minister, he made a half-hearted attempt to purge the IDEA organisation by sending the future dictator George Papadopoulos and some of his close associates to frontier posts. But he was not prepared to make really decisive changes in the power bloc, and delivered no serious challenge to either the army or the para-State. Pressured by his party's left wing and general social unrest, he did slightly ease the political repression and intimidation which had ruled in the countryside since the civil war, and he put minor checks on economic inequalities by loosening wage controls and allocating larger State funds for education and welfare. These lukewarm efforts, however, just like his feeble attempts at gaining control of the military, only served to irritate the army officers without effectively curtailing their powers.

For all the inadequacy of his moves, Papandreou's actions and the growing political unrest from which they stemmed, were nevertheless sufficient to pose a threat to the balance of power between throne, army, and parliament. By the mid-1960s the Greek model of capital accumulation had resulted in conditions which were incongruent with the existing system of political domination. By favouring large capital (indigenous, foreign, and mixed) at the expense of the rural population, workers, and important sections of the old and new middle classes, it had created a level of discontent which, articulated and channeled in a political direction, posed a serious threat to the system of repressive parliamentarianism. To meet this threat, the system had to be either reinforced by the total abolition of parliamentary rule or thoroughly rearticulated and "opened up."

The Dictatorial Reaction. The "open" solution implied that, through pressure from the mobilised masses, the parliamentary forces would establish a less subordinate role for themselves, and that therefore the army's dominant position within the State would be weakened. This was indeed quite acceptable to an important part of the bourgeoisie which, despite its apprehension at the growing number of strikes and George Papandreou's liberalisation policies, was not sufficiently alarmed to opt for a dictatorial solution. The parliamentary Right under the leadership of Kanellopoulos therefore accepted the risk of the electoral confrontation set for April 1967, and came to a secret agreement with Papandreou on post-electoral arrangements.

The reaction of the army, potentially the main loser of an eventual opening up of the system, was very different. If the formation of a strong parliamentary regime posed no substantial danger for the bourgeoisie, it was likely to bring a noticeable curtailment of the army's dominant power position within the State, and particularly the power of those in key posts in the repressive police, army, and secret-service apparatuses. Given the degree of popular support for the parliamentary forces of the Left and Centre, the army had no hope of retaining its hold over parliament by intervening on the hustings again as it had done so successfully in the 1950s. To ensure its dominance, the army was obliged to intervene unilaterally and directly.

The third force in the hierarchy--the throne--stood to lose either way, by an opening up of the parliamentary system as well as by the imposition of a dictatorship. Because of the gradual changes in the position of the throne as outlined earlier, and also due to the fact that with the growing advent of mass politics the "issue of the monarchy" was fast losing ground to more direct social issues, the effective power of the throne depended more and more on how much influence it could exert in the conflict between army and parliament. Since the King was military commander-in-chief and also had the ultimate say in who was to be appointed prime minister, royal influence was at its acme when army and parliament were locked in hostile stalemate. When the politicians shied back from a real purge of their military opponents, and the army was unwilling to assume direct rule, then the monarch was free to make history. It is not to be wondered at,

therefore, that the King behaved ambivalently, and prevaricated when faced with a clear-cut choice. Independence of either the parliament or the army could only spell his own future impotence.

The army was quite determined to take the initiative and to strike pre-emptively to prevent the elections, but was divided on details of strategy. While a group known as the "big junta" was planning its coup for 24 April, another group, the "little junta," decided to present the King (and its military rivals) with a fait accompli a few days earlier.[78]

To understand this split between two groups of officers with fundamentally the same aims, one must look at the post-war promotion structure in the military. The civil war had necessitated a hurried expansion of the army, which meant lower standards for cadet recruits and shorter training periods if officers were to be turned out in sufficient numbers.[79] Once the civil war was over, this overabundance of officers meant a serious bottleneck in promotions. A reliable report[80] indicates that there were 2,000 captains in the Greek armed forces before the 1967 coup. Since only 100-150 were promoted each year, those with the lowest seniority would have to wait fifteen years before it was their turn. (For the higher ranks the problem was similar, if not quite so acute.) In these circumstances, 200 captains had formed an association for the advancement of their professional interests. Moreover, apart from the promotional difficulties, there was also a distinct social gulf between the older, higher-ranking and the lower officers.[81]

Given this general atmosphere of discontent and frustration, therefore, the existence of two juntas side by side becomes more understandable, as does the ease with which George Papadopoulos could manipulate the grievances of the junior officers and become their leader in conspiracy.

The Establishment and Demise of Dictatorial Rule. The events of April 1967 were primarily a reflection of the struggle between groups within the State trying to cope with the growing social unrest arising from the development of Greek capitalism. Because of the chronic weakness of the Greek bourgeois parties and the dominant position of the army within the enormous State apparatus, this struggle was settled by the military through a straightforward dictatorial solution. The way in which this solution was imposed, however, already indicated the basic structural weaknesses of the military dictatorship.

First of all, the "little junta's" pre-emptive coup had seriously divided the armed forces. It was not only the throne and the right-wing bourgeois forces which were presented with a fait accompli, but also the army establishment in the persons of top generals closely linked with the King and various foreign agencies. The fact that low- and high-ranking officers had similar dictatorial objectives did nothing to reduce the seriousness of the split, since by breaking all hierarchical precedent, the junior officers had undermined the prestige and legitimation of their superiors and of the throne.

The royal attempt to overthrow the colonels in December 1967 and the navy coup attempt of May 1973--although both were abortive--show the extent to which the colonels had alienated the military establishment of post-war Greece, thus creating a severe split within the Right. There is no doubt that this split explains to a large extent the regime's precarious character. Had it been the "big junta" that carried out the coup, the chances of the consolidation of the dictatorial solution would have been much greater.

A popular explanation in Greece, which contradicts the above analysis, is that the CIA had decided to support the coup of the lower-ranking officers because their inferior status would make them more pliable instruments of U.S. policy.[82] I find this explanation unconvincing and superficial. It is unconvincing because nobody has yet shown what interest the CIA or any other foreign agency could have had in taking the enormous risk of withdrawing its support from the right-wing establishment in favour of a clique of obscure, lower-ranking officers. It is superficial because such a deus ex machina explanation distracts attention from the underlying structural reasons within Greek society and the army itself, which can throw so much more light on this fundamental issue.

It seems to me that the colonels made their move without first ensuring the active and unconditional support of any foreign agency.[83] This, and the fact that the international context and world opinion were, on the whole, hostile to the junta, was a major reason explaining the failure of the long-term dictatorial consolidation. This lack of external support was coupled, of course, with the fact that, internally, the colonels had alienated the royal/military establishment without at the same time gaining any support from the masses.

The latter point is of crucial importance. In contrast to what happened in Chile, for instance, where the generals managed to organise a massive social campaign and had the support of sizeable sections of the population in their overthrow of Allende, the Greek colonels intervened strictly from above. Or rather, they intervened from one side, supported neither from below nor from above. They not only lacked any popular base in April 1967, but they were also incapable of developing one after they had seized power. Although they tried to build up their own party, as well as to promote the organisation of quasi-fascist youth groups along the lines of the Metaxas tradition, both efforts failed miserably and were finally abandoned.

Because of this failure, the junta had to operate more or less in a social vacuum. Without a mass base, without strong roots among either the urban or rural population, and in the face of ever growing social discontent, the colonels' position became increasingly untenable. They did not know how to deal with pressures from below which fell short of any serious armed resistance. They could not step up their repressive measures since they had no mass organisation for wholesale totalitarian mobilisation. They were

equally incapable of meeting social unrest with a genuine opening up of the system, since their fanatic anti-communism and their belief in disciplined politics under army supervision permitted only the merest gesture of representation.

Still, in order to put the above analysis into its proper perspective, it must be stressed that opposition to the junta was passive rather than active. To start with, there was no popular base for armed resistance because of the overwhelming power position of the pre-dictatorship State and the catastrophic civil-war defeat and decimation of the working-class movement. In any case, the working class was not prepared for organised civil opposition; their past mobilisation by the Centre Union had been strictly party-political. Lastly, though bourgeois parliamentarians and journalists were unhappy with the Papadopoulos coup, they could not fault its economic policies, which were identical with their own.

For the colonels adopted the existing model and logic of capital accumulation, and in fact did their best to develop it to the fullest possible extent. In their efforts to remove all obstacles to this end, they set up a political superstructure to deal more effectively with growing social unrest, intending by this means to create a highly favourable climate for the growth of both indigenous and foreign capital to which they gave their wholehearted support. They made sure that capital would not be frightened away by strikes, and ruthlessly suppressed any protests against the ever-growing inequalities which ensued.

Their policies paid off quickly, and once the colonels' credentials were established, foreign investment resumed its flow into the Greek economy, and private investment also rose again. In fact, the rate of growth soon exceeded its pre-dictatorship level and continued to accelerate impressively. Also, by the colonels' unswerving adherence to the process of dependent industrialisation they had inherited, the standard of living grew steadily under their rule, inequalities notwithstanding.

Although the expansion of the productive forces may have contributed to keeping the regime in power, it could not do so forever. Negative factors operating at the level of relations of production continued and even accelerated: increasing concentration of capital, growing inequalities, scandalous concessions to private capital, etc. Discontent continued to rise as social injustice was coupled with large-scale repression. If this discontent did not take a very acute form when the economy was functioning well, it became more visible and stronger with the 1972-73 economic crisis. It could be said that the Greek junta was the first victim of the world recession, since the halt in the expansion of the Greek economy meant that the dictatorship was deprived of the economic momentum it needed to survive. The masses, which had always refused to endow the junta with political legitimacy, certainly were not motivated to do so once their living standards were threatened.

This passive resistance of the masses and the refusal of the major pre-1967 parliamentary forces to cooperate were chiefly responsible for the failure of Papadopoulos' 1973 attempt at some political liberalisation. When the economic crisis and Papadopoulos' failure were succeeded by the junta's brutal and bloody suppression of the Athens Polytechnic students' uprising (followed by infighting within the junta and Papadopoulos' replacement by the hard core under the leadership of Brigadier Ioannides), the regime became ever more rickety and cut off from popular support. Its isolation meant that, increasingly, there was no correspondence between developments in civil society and the growing infighting between army cliques within the State; the base of the regime, already narrow, kept shrinking further.

From the point of view of this internal dynamic, the Cyprus adventure can be seen as a desperate last-ditch effort by the Ioannides government to secure popular support by engineering a "national triumph." Badly miscalculated, and neither materially nor politically properly prepared, this foolish move only alienated the army, which was not ready to enter a disastrous war with Turkey, and prompted the General Staff to dissociate itself from the junta. Even if such a war had terminated in nothing worse than stalemate, the mass conscription of a disenchanted people might have ended with a threat to army dominance and even to bourgeois rule as such. The armed forces leadership, therefore, turned to veteran conservative leader of the Right Constantine Karamanlis, in an attempt to safeguard at least a part of the army's dominance within the State.

The return to democracy was not, therefore, effectuated by popular action, but through a direct transfer of power by army factions wanting to dissociate themselves from the disastrous foreign policy of the Ioannides regime and opting in favour of Karamanlis' conservative leadership. In this way the civil-war anti-communist legacy, and the dominant position of the army within the State, persist in post-dictatorial Greece--regardless of the legalisation of the Communist Party and other liberal measures adopted since 1974. Not only has the post-junta Greek State the "incorporative" character found in most States of peripheral capitalism (tutelage of the trade unions, of the universities, of the mass media, etc.), but to a large extent it also retains its strongly anti-communist flavour in all branches concerned with State security. (Hence the constant protests of the opposition that "dejuntification" of the State apparatuses has never been seriously attempted.)

Finally, the most significant development since the fall of the junta has been the emergence in the 1977 elections of a well-organised socialist/populist party (under the leadership of Andreas Papandreou) as the main opposition party in parliament. Thus Greek populism has finally, if somewhat belatedly, made a large-scale appearance in Greek politics.[84] This means that, for the first time in Greek parliamentary history, the liberal-conservative intra-bourgeois split over the monarchy issue, which had managed by predominantly clientelistic means the vertical organisation of the

working classes in politics, has been replaced by a political split more directly linked with the underlying structures of economic exploitation.

It also means that, sooner or later, this new mode of political integration of the Greek urban and rural working classes will have its impact on the existing army-parliament balance of power within the State. It remains to be seen--if and when Papandreou challenges the present structures of State controls--how the military will react to such a threat to its dominance within the State.

What seems certain is that, within the present structure of the Greek State and economy, neither parliamentary nor dictatorial forms of rule seem able to cope in permanent fashion with mass mobilisation and the disruptions created by dependent and unbalanced capitalist growth. On the other hand, and to finish on an optimistic note, the fact that present-day Greece does not have to face the mass poverty and unemployment of most peripheral capitalist formations is a factor which enhances the survival chances of a parliamentary regime. So also is Greece's recent entrance into the EEC. Even if joining the EEC cannot automatically affect the incorporative character of the Greek State or the underdeveloped character of Greek capitalism, it will make the imposition of a new military dictatorship much more difficult.

III. Conclusions

This paper has stressed two major features of peripheral capitalist formations with relatively long political independence and parliamentary traditions, features which explain the specific structure of these States as well as the endemic regime instability characteristic of them:

(a) the relatively late and dependent development of industrial capitalism, which meant that political modernisation (i.e., State expansion, the development of non-oligarchic political parties, etc.) occurred at a time when the industrial bourgeoisie and proletariat were either non-existent or too weak to have any effective impact on shaping the post-oligarchic political system;

(b) the restricted and uneven development of the capitalist mode of production, which even in countries which have been industrialised tends to be seriously incongruent with the horizontal and relatively autonomous organisation of working-class interests.

These two features mean that the kind of political integration of the working classes found in western parliamentary democracies--a political integration characterised by a strong civil society setting limits to State manipulation and repression--is extremely difficult to institutionalise irreversibly in peripheral capitalist formations. What is found there instead is a weak civil society linked to a paternalistic/repressive State through clientelistic or

populist modes of integration--or, whenever these fail to cope with the entrance of the masses into active politics, with dictatorial controls which are equally unstable. It is this which is the reason for regime instability in these formations, and for the constant alternating between dictatorial and quasi-parliamentary forms of rule.

In Part II of the paper, this general model was applied to the case of Greece, showing how the development of capitalism is related to the structure of the Greek State as well as to the rise and fall of the post-war military dictatorship. In this connection, more contextual aspects of collective action were stressed, as well as two specific characteristics of the Greek case which point in opposite directions as far as the functioning of parliamentary democracy is concerned:

(a) on the political level, the legacy of the civil war has accentuated the incorporative/repressive characteristics of the Greek State;

(b) on the economic level, despite the restricted and uneven development of Greek capitalism, post-1960 Greece has none of the large-scale poverty and unemployment which are so characteristic a feature of the economies of most peripheral capitalist formations.

APPENDIX

Appendix: Theoretical Implications

The main concern of this paper being to explain the regime instability of the peripheral capitalist State in terms of the relationship between the development of the CMP and the processes of political mobilisation/integration, it will be useful to compare this analysis with other theoretical attempts in this direction. Leaving aside theories which simply present an ad hoc list of "factors" or "variables" which are supposed to explain regime instability, there are two basic theoretical frameworks which try to deal with the problem in theoretically rigorous fashion.

In the functionalist, neo-evolutionist tradition, many writers have set out to explain the failure of parliamentary institutions in third-world countries in terms of an incompatibility, or "lack of fit," between imported western political institutions and the pre-existing indigenous ones.[85] Although this incompatibility is incontestable, the crux of the matter is how to explain it. Since the Parsonian functionalist framework does not lend itself to a serious consideration of relations of production or of classes, this incompatibility has been accounted for either in idealistic/cultural terms, or not at all.

Thus, for instance, writers who try to explain the recurrent failures of institutionalising bourgeois parliamentarianism in Latin America often quote the Hispanic cultural legacy of authoritarianism/corporatism as still shaping the attitudes of both leaders and led.[86] An influential writer like Huntington, on the other hand, explains this regime instability in modernising polities in terms of the weak institutionalisation of political organisations at a time of growing political mobilisation and the participation of the masses in politics.[87] Although Huntington avoids the naive evolutionism of early modernisation theories which optimistically linked modernisation/industrialisation with parliamentary democracy, he does not adequately explain anywhere why political institutions are weak in the third world, whereas they are not so in the "first," "second," or "fourth" worlds. (By "second" world, I mean the Soviet Union and its East European satellites; and by "fourth" those economically backward countries which have adopted either the USSR model of political and economic organisation--e.g., Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea--or other non-capitalist forms--e.g., Algeria.)

If studies of the third-world State by functionalist theorists pay no serious attention to relations of production or to classes, Marxist theorists often err at the other extreme: they put such emphasis on class cleavages and struggles that they quite neglect the specifically political aspects of the problem--i.e., the processes of political mobilisation and growing popular participation in politics, modes of integration, types of political parties, the phenomenon of clientelism, etc. Hence there is a marked tendency to explain third-world politics either by portraying classes (particularly the dominant classes) as anthropomorphic entities regulating all and everything

on the political scene, or by teleological references to the "laws" or reproduction requirements of indigenous or international capital.[88] Both of these interpretations--although frequently accompanied by avowals of respect for the "relative autonomy of the political formula"--are fundamentally reductionist: they fail to elaborate conceptual tools specific to the political level.

I would go further and argue that a regional Marxist theory of third-world politics does not exist. For example, Marxist theory has very little to say about the crucial problem of political clientelism in third-world countries, except to dismiss it cavalierly as an epiphenomenon merely "reflecting" class antagonisms.[89] While functionalist anthropologists and sociologists fail to give due consideration to class in their examination of clientelism, Marxists dismiss it altogether in favour of a class-reductionist approach which attempts to define direct one-to-one linkages between class locations and political practices. In doing so, Marxists of course eliminate the all-important problem of the intricate and shifting relationships between vertical/clientelistic and horizontal/class organisations during the process of capital accumulation.

If there is no serious attempt to theorise the phenomenon of clientelistic politics, neither has Marxist theory much to say about the problem of political mobilisation, or about the types of political parties or of State administrative structures in capitalist social formations. In the absence of such preoccupations, the typical Marxist analysis jumps straight from classes and class struggles (nebulously defined) to forms of State or regime (e.g., "normal" or "exceptional" forms, the "liberal" or "interventionist" State, the "authoritarian" State, etc.). In doing so--i.e., in going directly from the level of class struggles to that of State forms--it omits any serious consideration of the complex organisational and institutional realities which lie between. However, neglecting this crucial problem area (which mediates and gives substance to the concepts of both class struggles and State forms) leaves the analysis suspended in a vacuum; it deprives the student of any conceptual tools which could lead him beyond reductionist or teleological conceptions of State and politics.

Moreover, not only is Marxist theory extremely poor in these areas, but any attempt to break out from the class reductionist or teleological straightjacket and attempt to incorporate such concepts as political mobilisation/integration or clientelism within the Marxist discourse is immediately denounced as eclectic and an unacceptable "contamination" of Marxism by bourgeois concepts. It is not surprising, therefore, that the only attempts at theorising such phenomena come from functionalist political scientists who, influenced by Parsonian sociology, deal with them in a neutral, "classless" manner.[90]

APPENDIX

Although it lies beyond the proper scope of this paper to tackle the complex task of theoretical elaboration, on a more practical level the present analysis does suggest that the concepts of clientelism, political mobilisation, and integration can be fruitfully articulated with a mode-of-production discourse for explaining the regime instability of the peripheral State. Being very tentative and impressionistic, the present formulation should be seen as merely a first step towards a more complex theory which would have to pay detailed attention to (a) the various phases of capital accumulation (e.g., the enclave export economy, import substitution, the multinational phase); and (b) to the complex processes of political mobilisation and integration as oligarchic politics give way to broader forms of political participation and finally to mass politics. Since in fact there is no one-to-one correspondence between the economic and the political phases, the focus would have to be on the intricate and varied interrelationships between these two levels. Alternatively, one might say that some effort should be made to specify in greater depth the conditions in which the general trends examined above come into being, as well as the conditions in which they do not or do so only in attenuated or altered forms. And insofar as some of these latter conditions are not purely conjunctural, it would be necessary to construct sub-types and sub-theories on the State in peripheral capitalism.

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[1]Some representative works on this subject are: H. Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh," New Left Review, July-August 1972; Colin Leys, "The 'Overdeveloped' Post-Colonial State: A Re-evaluation," Review of African Political Economy, January-April 1976; John Saul, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies," Socialist Register, 1974; W. Ziemann and M. Lanzendörfer, "The State in Peripheral Societies," Socialist Register, 1977; J. Saul, The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa (London: Heinemann, 1979); H. Goulbourne (ed.), Politics and the State in the Third World (London: Macmillan, 1979); R. Muck, "State and Capital in Dependent Social Formations: The Brazilian Case," Capital and Class, 8 (Summer 1979).

[2]Moreover, since in all social formations there is more than one mode of production, a social formation is defined as capitalist only when its economy is dominated by the capitalist mode of production (CMP). (Cf. M. Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism [New York: International Publishers, 1968], pp. 1-32.) Although the problem of deciding at exactly what point the CMP can be said to have become dominant in a social formation has yet to be solved on the theoretical level, for the purposes of this paper an economy will be considered as capitalist if (a) capitalist relations of production dominate in the key sectors of the economy; (b) the State intervenes in the economy rarely or not at all to replace, but usually or exclusively to safeguard and develop, market/capitalist principles of organisation; and (c) if the dynamism and further expansion of the whole economy is based primarily on private investments (indigenous or foreign).

Given the above definition of a capitalist social formation, several African countries south of the Sahara cannot be called capitalist and are, therefore, excluded from the present study. Also excluded are cases which, although not following the Soviet model of economic and political organisation, have on the whole rejected the capitalist model of development (e.g., Algeria, Iraq).

Finally, it seems to me that since most of the literature on the "post-colonial" State is based on a more or less explicit comparison with the metropolitan State in western capitalist formations (cf., for instance, the point about the relative autonomy of the post-colonial State), it becomes senseless when made to refer to all States in the third world, irrespective of their specific economies or polities. Neither does it make sense to focus the debate, as most writers do, on African social formations, since many of these cannot be called capitalist in the narrow sense of the word. It is only by comparing variations in State structure of formations where the CMP has become dominant (albeit in qualitatively different manner) that the exercise becomes interesting, and that the concept of the peripheral State (i.e., the State in peripheral capitalist formations) acquires specificity and analytical utility.

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[3]According to G. Therborn, given the extensive development of the forces of production and the spectacular growth of productivity in the West, capital managed both to increase the relative exploitation of labour and to improve the living standards of the workers. ("The Role of Capital and the Rise of Democracy," New Left Review, No. 103.)

[4]Cf. M. Weber, The City (London: Macmillan, 1958).

[5]Cf. P. Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: New Left Publications, 1974), pp. 397 ff; Otto Hintze, Historical Essays (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1975).

[6]Here and in the rest of this paper, the term "civil society" is used in the Gramscian sense. Although the concept changes meaning in different parts of Gramsci's work, it is taken here to refer to all voluntary, "secondary" organisations which are situated between the State (i.e., the public sphere) and the economy.

[7]Cf. M. Dobb, op. cit., ch. 1.

[8]The term "patrimonial" is here used in the way in which it has been developed by Weber in his typology of modes of domination.

[9]On the decline of the non-bureaucratic aspects (commercialisation and "aristocratisation" of officers) of the West European State, cf. N. Mouzelis, Organisation and Bureaucracy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), introduction to the 2nd edition.

[10]According to Poulantzas, the fundamental precondition for the reproduction of capitalism is the political fragmentation of the working class (cf. Political Power and Social Classes [London: New Left Books, 1973]). Even if, generally speaking, this has indeed been the case for both developed and underdeveloped capitalist formations, it must be strongly emphasised that this fragmentation is more noticeable in underdeveloped capitalism. The fact that political fragmentation and a reformist orientation are characteristic of the West European working classes should not be allowed to obscure the very marked differences in terms of political autonomy and power that exist between them and their counterparts in underdeveloped countries.

[11]For the concepts of "horizontal" and "vertical" organisation, cf. E. Wolf, Peasants (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1968), pp. 81-86.

[12]Cf., for instance, R.M. Morse, "The Heritage of Latin America," in H.J. Wiarda (ed.), Politics and Social Change in Latin America: The Distinct Tradition (Amherst: Massachusetts Univ. Press, 1973).

[13]M. Weber, Economy and Society, vol. I, edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich (Univ. of California Press, 1978), pp. 231-32.

[14]For the persistence of large-scale political "corruption" and of clientelistic elements in third-world States, cf. F.W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964).

[15]Cf. articles by Alavi, Leys, and Saul, cited in note 1.

[16]For the terms restricted and unequal capitalism, and for a more general analysis of third-world capitalism and of its modes of production, cf. John Taylor, From Modernisation to Modes of Production (London: Macmillan, 1978). For a qualified critique of the concept of restricted and uneven development, cf. N. Mouzelis, "Modernisation, Underdevelopment, Unequal Development: Towards a Theory of Third-World Formations," Journal of Peasant Studies, June-July 1980.

[17]Using a more strictly Marxist terminology, there are in third-world formations, even within the capitalist sector, large areas where the forces of production are only formally subsumed to the capitalist relations of production. Cf. Taylor, op. cit., p. 215 ff.

[18]Cf. G. Kay, Development and Underdevelopment: A Marxist Analysis (Harvester Press, 1978).

[19]Cf. Paul Bairoch, Le tiers monde dans l'impasse (Gallimard, 1971), pp. 176-77; also his Diagnosis de l'évolution économique du tiers monde 1900-1968 (Paris: Gauthier-Villars, 1967).

[20]Thus even in countries with relatively strong trade-union movements such as the Latin American ones, only a small fraction (approx. 19 percent) of the labour force is unionised. Cf. Maurice-Pierre Roy, Les régimes politiques du tiers monde (Paris: Librairie Générale du Driot et de Jurisprudence, 1977), pp. 361 ff.

[21]Cf., for instance, B. Warren, "Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialisation," New Left Review, No. 81.

[22]Cf. P. Bairoch, op. cit., pp. 257 ff. It is only in very few and exceptional cases that foreign-led industrialisation--in combination with other favourable factors--has led to a substantial improvement concerning the problems of poverty and large-scale unemployment. Such a case is Greece, as I shall argue in Part II below.

[23]Cf. Anibal Quijano Obregón, "The Marginal Role of the Economy and the Marginalised Labour Force," Economy and Society, III: 4.

[24]Cf. E. Gellner and J. Waterbury (eds.), Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies (London: Duckworth, 1977).

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[25]Cf. A. Weingrod, "Patrons, Patronage and Parties," Comparative Studies in Society and History, X (1968), pp. 377-400.

[26]For a case illustrating this point, see N. Mouzelis, Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment (Macmillan, 1979), pp. 14-17 and 89-104.

[27]For the link between populism and relatively abrupt entrance of the masses into politics, cf. Di Tella, "Populism and Reform in Latin America," in Claudio Veliz (ed.), Obstacles to Change in Latin America (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1965).

[28]By oligarchic parliamentary politics I mean a situation where, despite the existence of universal male suffrage (in both countries universal suffrage was introduced in the nineteenth century), active politics is the business of a handful of influential families which, more or less automatically, control or rather "own" the votes of their constituents.

[29]On the change in composition of the parliamentary forces after 1909 in Greece, cf. K. Legg, Politics in Modern Greece (Stanford, Calif., 1969), ch. 5; and D. Kitsikis, "L'évolution de l'élite politique Grèque," in M.B. Kiray (ed.), Social Stratification and Development in the Mediterranean Basin (Paris, 1973).

[30]Cf. N. Mouzelis, "Greek and Bulgarian Peasants: Aspects of Their Socio-Political Situation During the Inter-war Period," Comparative Studies in Society and History, Jan. 1975.

[31]Thus Venizelos' "modernising" programme and ideology were not very different from the dominant ideologies of the oligarchic period. (Many Greek historians view Venizelos' reforms as the continuation or culmination of the ideas and reforms initiated by the great bourgeois statesman Trikoupis in the nineteenth century.) On the other hand, Stambuliiski's peasant populism and his vehemently anti-establishment and anti-town ideology constitute a much clearer break with the ideologies prevalent during the oligarchic period. Of course, the differences are not limited to the ideological level. The emergence of a strong agrarian party in Bulgaria not only created a completely different type of cleavage, but also disrupted more fundamentally the vertical modes of political integration of nineteenth-century Bulgaria. Cf. J.D. Bell, "The Agrarian Movement in Bulgaria" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, 1970).

[32]On the antagonistic character of populist ideologies, see E. Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (New Left Books, 1977).

[33]Not only populist organisations, but even highly organised communist parties tend to be clientelised once they try to operate in contexts of economic underdevelopment. Cf., for instance, S. Tarrow, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy (New Haven, 1967).

[34]By corporatistic State control I mean more than the type of control some western States are able to exercise over trade unions and owners' associations (e.g., the Swiss Conventions collectives which put a time limit on strikes and lock-outs). In western corporatism these organisations enjoy much more autonomy than their corporatistically controlled counterparts in the third world. It is unfortunate that the same term serves to describe two qualitatively different types of State control.

[35]Populist authoritarian regimes, in a context where the CMP is peripheral or its dominance has been undermined, have more chances of consolidation--or at least their transformation would not lead to a return to competitive parliamentary politics but to more "left-wing" authoritarian or totalitarian modes of rule. For instance, such non-capitalist mobilisational authoritarian regimes as those of Ethiopia or Angola are more likely to move in an anti-capitalist totalitarian direction than towards democratic/pluralistic regime forms. (On the definition of a mobilisational authoritarian regime and its totalitarian tendencies, cf. J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in F. Greenspine, and N. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political Science [Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975], vol. 3, pp. 173-411.)

[36]Cf. J. Malloy, "Authoritarianism and Populism in Latin America: The Modal Pattern," in J. Malloy (ed.), Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America (Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1977).

[37]It is not, therefore, surprising that during the severe crisis which marked the end of the phase of import-substitution industrialisation around 1950, the more industrially advanced countries with a more open system of government which could not easily control populist demands (i.e., Chile, Uruguay) experienced greater economic bottlenecks and slower growth rates than countries (e.g., Mexico) which could more easily suppress or contain populist demands. Cf. R. Kaufman, "Industrial Change and Authoritarian Rule in Latin America: A Concrete Review of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model," in D. Collier (ed.), The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton Univ. Press, 1979), pp. 196 ff.

[38]For the original thesis which links import-substitution industrialisation with populism, and multinational industrialisation with bureaucratic authoritarianism, cf. G. O'Donnell, Modernisation and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism (Univ. of California, Institute of International Studies, 1973). For a critical assessment of O'Donnell's thesis, see D. Collier (ed.), op. cit.

Import-substitution industrialisation did not, of course, create populism; it simply provided a favourable climate for populist movements to develop. What is much more important for the understanding of Latin American populism is the attempt of the rising middle classes to break the political monopoly of the traditional oligarchies by resorting to the mobilisation of the masses. In several

peripheral formations, such a mobilisation occurred before the import-substitution phase. Similarly, the present multinational phase of industrialisation in Brazil, Argentina, or Chile does not automatically generate authoritarianism, and neither does it automatically exclude populist movements. The fact that military dictatorships are rather more compatible with the current requirements of capital accumulation does not mean that these requirements in themselves can fully explain the emergence of such regimes.

[39]Cf. N. Mouzelis, "Class and Clientelist Politics: The Case of Greece," Sociological Review, November 1978.

[40]In those formations, of course, in which there are parliamentary or quasi-parliamentary forms of rule.

[41]In the absence of parliamentary politics, pyramidal/vertical types of clienteles often become less important than "lateral" forms of political corruption ("old boy" networks, etc.). Cf., for instance, Clement H. Moore, "Clientelistic Ideology and Political Change: Fictitious Networks in Egypt and Tunisia," in Gellner and Waterbury (eds.), op. cit.

[42]A classical example illustrating this point is Marx's analysis of Louis Bonaparte's coup, where he argues that the bourgeoisie which was frightened by social unrest accepted the coup with relief, whereas its representatives in parliament opposed it.

[43]Cf. N. Diamandouros, "The 1974 Transition from Authoritarian to Democratic Rule in Greece: A Southern European Perspective," paper presented at a 1980 conference organised by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Madrid.

[44]For a discussion of these features of bureaucratic-military authoritarianism, cf. Linz, op. cit., pp. 285-301.

[45]Ibid., pp. 306 ff.

[46]On this point, cf. G. Therborn, "The Travail of Latin American Democracy," New Left Review, No. 113-114, pp. 107 ff.

[47]The case of Brazil is of course the most obvious example. For some of the structural reasons which might lead Chile to open up its political rule, cf. Robert Kaufrman, Transitions to Stable Authoritarian-Corporate Regimes: The Chilean Case? (London: Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics,1976). On the fall of the dictatorial regimes in Southern Europe, cf. N. Poulantzas, The Crisis of Dictatorships: Portugal, Greece, Spain (London: New Left Books, 1977).

[48]The pendular movement of regime change in peripheral capitalism does not, of course, mean that all open or closed solutions are similar, whatever the stage of capital accumulation or the participation of the masses in politics. For instance, military intervention and the imposition of dictatorial controls during the early period of accumulation (e.g., during the import-substitution phase) in Greece was qualitatively different from the post-war type of military dictatorship (cf. N. Mouzelis, Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment, ch. 6). Therefore the generalisations developed in this paper are not meant to explain all types of dictatorial intervention, but only those that occur at a certain advanced stage of capital accumulation.

[49]This generalisation would apply particularly to the Soviet Union-type of collectivist regime, but I think it is also relevant to regimes which have rejected the capitalist road without adopting Soviet principles of planning and control (e.g., Iraq, Algeria). There is no doubt, however, that one-party non-communist regimes have never achieved the degree of State penetration, ideological cohesion, or monolithic regimentation to be seen in communist one-party systems.

[50]For such a multi-factor approach to the problem, cf. J.J. Linz (ed.), The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Re-equilibration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1978), and J.J. Linz and A. Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1978).

[51]For a general introduction to the history of the Ottoman empire with focus on the Balkans, cf. D.S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958).

[52]From this point of view one can see the constitutional reforms of 1843 and 1864--both of which curtailed royal power--as successful attempts by the Greek oligarchy to maintain its autonomy vis-ă-vis the throne. The long period of constitutional stability between 1864 and 1909 can be seen as the result of a balance of forces between throne and oligarchy, a balance which was upset in the twentieth century by the rise of the new middle classes. Finally, it should be emphasised that this dominance of the traditional oligarchic families had of course very strict limits, prescribed by the political and economic domination exercised over Greece by the foreign powers.

[53]On this, cf. V. Kremmidas, Introduction to the History of Modern Greek Society (in Greek) (Athens, 1975), p. 201.

[54]As far as agriculture is concerned, wage-labour was negligible in the nineteenth-century Greek rural economy (cf. S. Andrahas, "Economy," in History of the Greek Nation, vol. I [in Greek] [Athens: Akdotiki Athinon, 1977]). Concerning industry, as late as 1921 Greece had 2,905 "industrial establishments," out of which only 492 employed more than 25 workers. The rest were

small family-run artisanal units. (Cf. G. Dertilis, "Social Change and Military Intervention in Politics: Greece 1881-1928" [unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Sheffield University, 1976], Tables X, X, XI.)

[55]Cf. G. Dertilis, "Social Change," Table XIV. Also, according to another calculation, at approximately the same time, a quarter of the non-agricultural labour force was employed by the State. Cf. C. Tsoukalas, "The age of Ch. Trikoupis," in History of the Greek Nation: Modern Hellenism 1881-1913 (in Greek) (Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 1977), p. 13.

[56]For the relatively early and (in relation to the country's economic resources and growth) overinflated character of nineteenth-century Greek education, cf. C. Tsoukalas, "Dépendence et réproduction: le rôle de l'appareil scolaire dans une formation transterritoriale" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Paris, 1975).

[57]It was the 1929 economic crisis which forced the Greek State to radically reorient its policies vis-à-vis the world market and the management of the economy. Given the collapse of world trade and the incapacity of the Greek economy to export its traditional agricultural products, the State, as in many Latin American countries, had to embark on a programme of import-substitution industrialisation by adopting a highly protectionist customs policy, by favouring industrial capital in a variety of ways, and by generally becoming more involved with the management of the economy. The import-substitution effort was greatly enhanced by the massive influx a few years earlier (1922) of Asia-Minor refugees after the disastrous defeat of the Greek forces in the Greco-Turkish war in Asia Minor. The settlement of great numbers of refugees in the main urban centres meant the availability of abundant cheap labour and entrepreneurial skills, at a time when Greece was experiencing a powerful new injection of foreign funds in the form of government loans, international aid to the refugees, private investments in public works, etc. From 1923 to 1930, imported foreign capital amounted to 1,162.8 million gold francs. Considering the short period during which this capital came into the country, the influx was quite unprecedented in modern Greek history. Cf. M. Nikolinakos, Studies on Greek Capitalism (in Greek) (Athens: Nea Sinora, 1976), p. 55.

[58]Cf., for instance, J. Kordatos, History of Modern Greece (in Greek) (Athens: Aion, 1958).

[59]On the persistent clientelistic character of Greek politics, cf. R. Legg, Politics in Modern Greece (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1969).

[60]For instance, the industrial proletariat was immediately put under State tutelage after its organised appearance in the 1920s and 1930s, and all important social legislation concerning conditions of work and industrial relations came predominantly from above, through State initiative, rather than through working-class struggles. On this, cf. T. Katsanevas, "The Industrial Relations System in Greece: Historical Development and Present Structure" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London School of Economics, 1980).

[61]The IDEA group ("Sacred Bond of Greek Officers") was founded in Athens in 1944 by the merger of two rightist officers' resistance groups. The most interesting insider's account of IDEA is given by G. Karayiannis (The Greek Drama, 1940-1952, in Greek, n.d.), who was himself an IDEA man.

[62]Although general conscription was introduced in 1880, it was only during the Balkan Wars that numbers increased spectacularly. For statistics on this point, cf. D. Dakin, The Unification of Greece, 1770-1923 (London, 1972), p. 316.

[63]In 1917, tuition fees for the Evelpidon School (the top Greek military academy) were abolished. Before then, only wealthy students could afford this type of military education, and in the nineteenth century familial property or a good marriage were necessary for maintaining an officer's style of life. Of course, the "old respectable families stopped sending their children to the Military Academy once the institution became less exclusive and lost its social prestige." See T. Veremis, "The Greek Army in Politics" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Trinity College, Oxford, 1974), p. 78. Cf. also Veremis, "The Officer Corps in Greece, 1912-1936," in Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, vol. II (1976), pp. 113-14.

[64]The relatively dependent position of the military becomes understandable if one takes into account the historical rights of the modern Greek army. Contrary to what happened in many newly independent countries, Greece had a lack of continuity between the military forces which had participated in the war of independence against the Turks and those who constituted the post-independence Greek army. Indeed, with the establishment of the monarchical State in the early nineteenth century, the local military chieftains, who had contributed more than anyone to the war of liberation, were seen as an obstacle to the creation of a centralised, well-disciplined modern army. They were therefore brushed aside. King Otho, with the help of Bavarian officers and troops, created a new military organisation from the top, which was controlled firmly by the throne. Cf. I. Makriyannis, Memoirs (transl. H.A. Liderdale) (London, 1966).

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[65]King Paul knew of the existence of IDEA, and both he and particularly Queen Frederika were apprehensive of its growing power. Moreover, the rise of Marshall Papagos (whom King Paul did not trust), Papagos' enormous prestige among the officers, and his successful entrance into politics in 1952 through the creation of a popular right-wing movement (the Greek Rally), were indications of the army's autonomy from the crown. Cf. S. Gregoriadis, History of Contemporary Greece (in Greek) (Athens, 1974), vol. II, pp. 140-219.

[66]In 1962 their combined assets amounted to 96.3 percent of the total held by all Greek commercial banks together; and the fact that Greek banking capital was growing much faster than industrial or merchant capital only emphasises the enormous power of these two Goliaths. Not only did they handle 90 percent of the country's considerable savings, but they were also directly involved in the ownership and management of a large part of industry and insurance. (Cf. D. Psilos, Capital Market in Greece [Athens: Centre of Economic Research, 1964].) For a detailed account of the development of banking capital in Greece, cf. M. Serofetinidi, "The Breakdown of Parliamentary Institutions in Greece" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London School of Economics, 1979).

[67]Cf. J. Samaras, State and Capital in Greece (in Greek) (Athens: Synchroni Epochi, 1977), p. 107.

[68]An indication of this unwillingness was the fact that the two big banking concerns were unable to dispose of the 15 percent of their funds they were obliged to advance for the development of the manufacturing sector. Cf. D. Psilos, op. cit., p. 194.

[69]Manufacturing output in 1938 amounted to 85.6 percent of all industrial output, but declined to 79.9 percent in 1948-49, and to 73 percent in 1959-60. Cf. G. Coutsoumaris, The Morphology of Greek Industry (Athens, 1963), p. 55.

[70]Cf. G. Giannaros, "Foreign Capital in the Greek Economy," in E. Iliou, et al., Multinational Monopolies (in Greek) (Athens, 1973), p. 404.

[71]The share of light industry was 77.5 percent of total manufacturing in 1948-50, but dropped to 60.9 percent in 1963-70. Cf. B. Nefeloudis, Demythisation with Numbers (in Greek) (Athens, 1973), p. 146.

[72]Cf. D. Karageorgas, "Distribution of the Tax Burden by Income Groups in Greece," Economic Journal, June 1973.

[73]Cf. M. Mallios, The Present Phase of Capitalist Development in Greece (in Greek) (Athens, 1975), pp. 139 and 1111.

[74]For details, cf. D. Benas, The Influx of Foreign Capital into Greece (in Greek) (Athens: Papazisis, 1976), pp. 29 ff.

[75]Cf. Nefeloudis, op. cit., p. 96.

[76]The official rate of unemployment in 1979 was only 2 percent. This rate does not, of course, include the considerable current unemployment, nor school-leavers seeking employment for the first time.

[77]Empirical evidence on this pont is given in an as-yet-unfinished research project on the development of the patronage system in two Greek provinces during the 1960s. Cf. M. Comninos, "The Development of the Patronage System in Aitolo-Akharnania and Kavala" (unfinished Ph.D. thesis, London School of Economics).

[78]Cf. S. Gregoriadis, op. cit., vol. I, ch. 2.

[79]Ibid.

[80]Cf. General Panourgias' report on the events which led to the coup, presented to Karamanlis in June 1967 (Acropolis, 20 August 1974).

[81]As already mentioned, the civil-war requirements lowered the Military Academy standards of recruitment, and for the first time established a system of free education (Law 577/22-9-1945). As people of poorer backgrounds could now study at the Academy, there was a distinct difference in class origins between officers who had graduated before and after the war. The top leadership at the time of the coup belonged to the former cohort, while the majority of the low- and middle-ranking officers belonged to the latter. For statistics on the Greek officers' class origins, cf. D. Smokovitis, "A Special Social Group: The Greek Armed Forces" (unpublished thesis, University of Salonica, 1975).

[82]Most books on the dictatorship adopt the CIA explanation. Cf., for instance, P. Rodakis, The Colonels' Dictatorship (in Greek) (Athens, 1974), and J. Katris, The Birth of Neo-Fascism (in Greek) (Geneva, 1971).

[83]By this I do not mean, of course, that the colonels had no contact with the CIA. In fact, there is no doubt that the CIA, both before and after 1967, had strong links with the IDEA officers and with the whole repressive apparatus of the State (cf. Gregoriadis, op. cit.,vol. I, pp. 45 ff). But there is equally no doubt that these links have been much exaggerated and a great number of myths created concerning the extent of CIA control over Greek affairs.

[84]For an analysis of the 1977 elections and the rise of PASOK, see N. Mouzelis, "On the Greek Elections," New Left Review, March 1978.

REFERENCES

[85]For a representative work of this kind, cf. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries.

[86]Cf., for instance, Morse, "The Heritage of Latin America."

[87]S. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1968).

[88]For an example of the latter approach, cf. John Taylor, From Modernisation to Modes of Production; for a more extensive criticism of such approaches, cf. N. Mouzelis, "Types of Reductionism in Marxist Theory," Telos, forthcoming.

[89]Cf. for instance, Luciano di Causi, "Anthropology and Ideology: The Case of Patronage in Mediterranean Society," Radical Sciences Journal, No. 1 (1975); also M. Gilsenan, "Against Patron-Client Relations," in E. Gellner and J. Waterbury (eds.), op. cit.

[90]For an elaboration of this point, cf. N. Mouzelis, "Ideology and Class Politics: A Critique of Ernesto Laclau," New Left Review, No. 112.