Number 82

NOTES ON TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE IN LATIN AMERICA AND LATIN EUROPE

A Rapporteur's Report

Kevin J. Middlebrook
Indiana University-Bloomington

Author's note: This paper is the rapporteur's report for an October 1980 conference on "Prospects for Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule in Latin America and Latin Europe" sponsored by the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. 20560, in conjunction with the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies.

This essay is one of a series of Working Papers of the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Dr. Michael Grow oversees preparation of Working Paper distribution. The series includes papers by Fellows, Guest Scholars, and interns within the Program and by members of the Program staff and of its Academic Council, as well as work presented at, or resulting from, seminars, workshops, colloquia, and conferences held under the Program's auspices. The series aims to extend the Program's discussions to a wider community throughout the Americas, and to help authors obtain timely criticism of work in progress. Support to make distribution possible has been provided by the Inter-American Development Bank.

Single copies of Working Papers may be obtained without charge by writing to:

Latin American Program, Working Papers
The Wilson Center
Smithsonian Institution Building
Washington, D. C. 20560

The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars was created by Congress in 1968 as a "living institution expressing the ideals and concerns of Woodrow Wilson . . . symbolizing and strengthening the fruitful relation between the world of learning and the world of public affairs."

The Center's Latin American Program, established in 1977, has two major aims: to support advanced research on Latin America, the Caribbean, and inter-American affairs by social scientists and humanists, and to help assure that fresh insights on the region are not limited to discussion within the scholarly community but come to the attention of interested persons with a variety of professional perspectives: in governments, international organizations, the media, business, and the professions. The Program is being supported through 1982 by three-year grants from the Ford, Mellon, Kettering, Rockefeller, and Tinker Foundations, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and the Xerox Corporation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

NOTES ON TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE IN LATIN AMERICA AND LATIN EUROPE

A Rapporteur's Report

Kevin J. Middlebrook
Indiana University-Bloomington

Introduction

Scholars' and policymakers' recent interest in the transformation of authoritarian regimes in Latin America and Southern Europe has focused their attention on the characteristics and dimensions of change in and from authoritarian rule. Increasing signs of liberalization and/or movement toward more democratic political practices and procedures in several South American "bureaucratic-authoritarian" regimes and the breakdown of enduring authoritarian systems in Spain and Portugal during the late 1970s have raised the question of regime transformation as a major issue in the study of political change. However, the conceptual and theoretical issues raised by this question are not bound to a particular geographical context or a specific historical period. The origins of such transitions may vary considerably depending on a country's geopolitical position and the time period in which this change occurs. The outcome of the transition effort can range from a limited degree of regime liberalization and a modified form of authoritarianism to various forms of democratic political arrangements. Indeed, the attempt at political transition may fail for a variety of reasons. But transitions from authoritarian rule in different countries, contexts, and time periods may share certain overarching similarities, common factors, and recurring patterns. A better understanding of the process of regime change may also highlight the means by which the prospects for a democratic outcome can be improved.

Historical and contemporary cases of transition from authoritarian rule can be examined at three different levels of analysis. These different approaches, while analytically and conceptually distinct, are complementary means of considering specific cases of regime change. First, what impact do the international environment and external actors have on the process of regime change and the transition from authoritarian rule? Does regime change in late-developing, peripheral capitalist countries evidence special characteristics or properties? What influence does a country's geopolitical context have on the direction of political change and the prospects for a successful democratic transition? Do factors such as these establish general patterns and overall trends in specific cases of transition from authoritarian rule? What role do regional alliances and organizations, individual foreign countries, and specific external events such as defeat in war have in this process? To what extent does international political learning occur among different countries, either during the same historical period or over a longer time? What specific role has the United States played in recent efforts at transition from authoritarian rule to more democratic practices and procedures in Latin Europe and Latin America?

Second, how do national actors, events, and political arenas shape the transition process and influence its outcome? To what extent do differences in the kind of authoritarian regime affect the characteristics of the transition process? What impact do socioeconomic and political changes effected under authoritarian rule have on subsequent liberalization efforts and/or the transition to more democratic political arrangements? What possibilities for change do certain events, actions, or policies create? What effect do different origins of the transition process--whether it is an action consciously undertaken by the established authoritarian regime, the result of specific events or crises, or a more general internal deterioration of the authoritarian regime--have on the characteristics of the process itself? Which sociopolitical actors are most relevant to the transition process? In what ways do the authoritarian regime's institutional and structural characteristics affect the direction of the transition? What role do different political arenas play in this process? Are there significant differences between Latin American and Southern European cases of regime change in areas such as these? How do the characteristics of the transition process itself influence its final outcome?

Third, to what extent can the transition process be shaped and influenced by voluntaristic actions? What are the possibilities and ways of achieving an exit from authoritarian situations and establishing more democratic norms and procedures? Is the process of regime change historically determined and thus predictable from an analysis of existing structural constraints, or can it be substantially affected by political leadership and statecraft? What has been the role of specific individuals in different cases of successful democratic transition from authoritarian rule? How do the political strategies pursued by opposition forces and elements within the established authoritarian regime affect the outcome of the transition process? How does political learning occur within a single nation over time? What impact does such learning have on the political outcome of the transition process?

In October 1980, an international group of scholars gathered at the Wye Plantation near Washington, D.C. to examine questions such as these in the context of contemporary and historical cases of political change in Latin America and Southern Europe.* While conference participants

---

*The conference on "Prospects for Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule in Latin America and Latin Europe" was held on October 12-14, 1980, at the Wye Plantation. It was sponsored by the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Smithsonian Institution) and the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, under the direction of Guillermo O'Donnell (Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad [CEDES], Buenos Aires) and Philippe C. Schmitter (University of Chicago). The organizer and academic coordinator of the conference was Laurence Whitehead (Latin American Program, Wilson Center). A list of conference participants appears at the end of this report. Revised versions of the papers presented at the conference are being published by the Wilson Center as part of the Latin American Program's Working Papers series. This rapporteur's report may be usefully read in conjunction with these conference papers.

frequently differed in their judgments regarding the overall characteristics and likely consequences of contemporary transitions from authoritarian rule, they agreed on the importance of these changes and the desirability of conducting investigations which might enhance the prospects for democratic political outcomes. The conference discussions were principally concerned with examining the transition process itself rather than the dynamics and internal structure of established authoritarian regimes. While some of the discussions necessarily considered the origins of efforts at regime change in different countries and the characteristics of the widely varying political outcomes of such transitions, the principal focus of the conference was on the different forces and factors which shaped the transition process.

In preliminary discussions held at the Woodrow Wilson Center in September 1979, project participants sought to identify major theoretical issues and methodological concerns in the study of transitions from authoritarian rule. The participants in the 1979 workshop were especially interested in constructing analytical categories which would be broadly useful in examining contemporary and historical cases of regime change. The 1980 conference examined some thirteen different cases of political transition in Latin America and Latin Europe. The cases were selected to represent a wide range of historical and contextual experiences within a single broadly defined culture area. The cases included examples of "bureaucratic," "populist," "sultanistic," and other forms of authoritarian rule. They also represented considerable diversity in terms of the outcomes of the transition process: relatively successful transitions to different democratic political arrangements in Colombia, Greece, Italy, Peru, Portugal, Spain, and Venezuela; liberalization efforts within authoritarian regimes in Brazil and Mexico; a revolutionary and still open-ended transition in Nicaragua; and failed transition efforts and/or sustained authoritarian rule in Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile. These cases generally were used as paired comparisons to illuminate theoretical issues; there was no attempt to explain different cases of political change in the same way. By examining this range of specific experiences in some detail, conference participants sought to determine appropriate questions and ways of conceptualizing the transition experience that would facilitate future analyses of this process. They also sought to discern broad similarities and differences between cases in Latin America and Latin Europe.

This rapporteur's report provides a summary of the general themes and competing interpretations which emerged in the course of discussions during the conference. While many participants might agree that a variety of factors affect the process of authoritarian regime transformation in Latin America and Southern Europe, many of the interpretations offered are not easily reconcilable. The same problem is often given a considerably different meaning when viewed through different conceptual lenses. No attempt to reconcile those differences will be made here. On the contrary, the purpose of this report is to highlight the principal areas of agreement and disagreement. The report is neither a critical summary of the papers which provided the basis for conference discussions nor a review of existing published materials on issues related to contemporary and historical cases of regime change. Instead, it attempts to present the arguments offered by conference participants in cogent and coherent

form. Statements made here should be taken only as summaries of major lines of argument. Different points are frequently identified with their specific proponents, but they were not necessarily endorsed by conference participants in general. This report also uses references to specific cases to illustrate various points in different contexts. However, this is not necessarily a complete or representative summary of any particular case; some aspects may be omitted that are present in the conference paper's more balanced appraisal of an individual case.

The meanings of "liberalization" and "democratization" are important underlying issues in an analysis of transitions from authoritarian rule. These concepts may imply very different issues and changes depending on the kind of authoritarian regime and the geopolitical and/or historical context in which this change occurs, the cause or origins of the transition process, and the actors and personalities involved in the transition. In a general sense, liberalization involves the reestablishment of political rights and some degree of citizen control over political processes (Martins). This is not a linear process, and regression to authoritarian rule has been a continuing concern even in successful cases of regime change. Moreover, liberalization may or may not lead to democratization. The precise outcome of this process and the particular socioeconomic and political characteristics of "democracy" in different national contexts may vary considerably. At a minimum, democratization involves the institutionalization of open competition for public office and control over public policy without fear of reprisal (Schmitter). Elections may play a central role as a political arena in the creation of democratic practices and procedures, but given the great possible variation in different democratic forms of governance, the holding of elections is not synonymous with democratization. There appears to be much more variation in forms of democratic government in Europe than in Latin America, where political arrangements are frequently patterned on the United States' presidential model (Schmitter).

Although conference discussions did not analyze different possible democratic arrangements in detail, understanding the degree of variation in political outcomes of the transition process is necessary for a careful examination of different cases. Especially in authoritarian regimes where the pressures for, and evidence of, political transition are very limited, one should not view the ongoing political process in terms of the observer's pre-established goals and preferences shaped or influenced by a particular national experience. Nonetheless, conference participants were concerned with those factors and forces which might operate in favor of movement toward or adoption of democratic practices and procedures in specific cases of regime transition.

I. The Influence of the International Environment and External Actors on Regime Change

Dependent Capitalism and Geopolitical Factors. Regime stability and the direction of national political change may be significantly influenced by a country's position within the international economy. For example, political instability and considerable variation in regime form may be characteristic of peripheral, dependent capitalist development (Mouzelis). An examination of the question of regime change from this perspective

focuses on the structural tendencies of the post-oligarchic state in the capitalist periphery. Commercialization and urbanization in these countries frequently undermined restrictive, oligarchic politics without resulting in the emergence of broad-based political democracy. The late development of industrial capitalism and the penetration of peripheral economies by multinational capital inhibit the formation of an independent industrial base, and the national bourgeoisie remains highly dependent on the state for patronage and protection. Unlike its historical predecessor in Western Europe, the bourgeoisie in this context does not act aggressively to challenge and overthrow the entrenched traditional oligarchy. Similarly, the weakness of the emerging industrial working class facilitates its subjugation by the state. The limited degree of socioeconomic integration contributes to the persistence of vertical modes of political integration (such as clientelism and populism) which inhibit the horizontal expansion, mobilization, and political integration of the working class through modern, mass-based political parties. In the historical development of Western European nations this was an important factor working in favor of democratization. The failure to consolidate strongly institutionalized, non-personalistic, horizontal organizations (such as class-based political parties) as the dominant mode of political integration is a source of continuing instability in these societies (Mouzelis).

Regime change in this context frequently occurs as a pendular movement between limited democratic arrangements and periods of authoritarian rule. Underlying structural tensions and the low degree of socioeconomic integration make the system susceptible to political instability and breakdown. A threat to the political mode of integration or the dominant economic mode of production may lead to an authoritarian response (Mouzelis). Authoritarian regimes may offer these countries an opportunity to accelerate the process of capital accumulation and economic growth in an effort to emulate the success of the advanced capitalist nations. Yet these advanced countries also tend to be political democracies with well-developed social policies, and they may constitute implicit or explicit sources of pressure for peripheral states to implement similar kinds of political and social arrangements (Hirschman, Whitehead). In contemporary peripheral capitalist countries, relatively high levels of industrialization and a considerable degree of integration into, and contact with, the international economy and state system make the consolidation of such authoritarian regimes more difficult. These regimes face major difficulties in developing means of generating popular support, and the greater relevance of mass-based political actors provides opportunities for mobilization against the regime in moments of economic downturn (Mouzelis).

These factors appear to have been important in the historical pattern of political change in Greece. Greece may be in part distinctive in the particular impact of Ottoman and sultanistic legacies on the origins of an incorporative state which inhibited the emergence of a strong civil society, but it also shares important characteristics with other dependent capitalist countries (Mouzelis). As a result of the late, dependent development of industrial capitalism in Greece, the national bourgeoisie did not challenge oligarchical control. The relatively weak labor movement remained dominated by state incorporative controls over

labor relations, and strong horizontal popular organizations did not develop. However, the consequences of socioeconomic change and social mobilization fundamentally challenged the system of "guided democracy" which appeared after World War II. To have opened up the political system in the face of growing popular pressures would have endangered the position of the army, the dominant force in post-civil war Greek politics. The army was thus forced to intervene in politics openly and unilaterally.

However, the authoritarian regime established in 1967 was inherently unstable. The 1967 coup divided the military internally, and this division constituted a continuing obstacle to the consolidation of authoritarian control. The military lacked a popular base in 1967 and was unable to form a party capable of mobilizing political support after it took power. There was no basis for totalitarian mobilization. Although public opposition was more passive than active, the military could not open up the political system to defuse socioeconomic discontent. International opinion also worked against the consolidation of long-term military rule. Discontent continued to rise, and the 1972-1973 economic crisis undermined the regime's position. Papadopoulos' 1973 liberalization effort temporarily failed as hardline elements under Ioannides took control. But the regime then became even more isolated politically. The military fiasco in Cyprus ended with the Turkish invasion of the island, and the army general staff deserted Ioannides. Karamanlis finally restored civilian rule as Greece swung back toward parliamentary democracy (Mouzelis).

While an interpretation of transitions from authoritarian rule in these terms provides a broad structural framework for analysis and emphasizes certain overall trends, a number of specific dimensions require further elaboration. For example, the meaning and implications of "integration into the world capitalist system" may vary substantially among different countries and over time. For Latin American countries, during the 1960s this integration occurred through efforts to replicate the core capitalist countries' industrialization model by adopting modern industrial technology and promoting exports. During the 1970s this integration tended to occur through an individual country's pursuit of its comparative economic advantage in production, even though this may not have involved industrialization. The political consequences of these different strategies also varied substantially (Cavarozzi). In Greece the expansion of multinational capitalism via foreign investment and economic growth appears to have undermined the authoritarian regime, while in South American bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes the perceived need to facilitate national integration into transnational capitalism was an important motivation for the emergence of such regimes (Whitehead). Thus the concepts of "central/core capitalism" and "integration" need to be further disaggregated and specified (Hirschman), and "periphery" needs to be translated concretely into different class structures and alliances (Schmitter). For example, if this structural interpretation is to apply to all of Southern Europe, what does it mean that Spain is both "peripheral" and one of the world's most important industrial economies? (Linz)

To the extent to which the pendulum effect does operate in such cases of regime change, how does one determine the duration of the cycle in the swing between democratic and authoritarian regimes? There may be major variations in this regard among peripheral countries (Hirschman). Even though different modes of political integration (clientelism, populism, horizontal linkages through mass-based political parties) may be individually weak in peripheral capitalist countries, could these three different modes not combine to produce a relatively stable political arrangement? Are the pendular forces favoring parliamentary rule or an authoritarian regime symmetrical, or are the tendencies in one direction more powerful than countervailing forces? (Whitehead) An analysis of this kind must also seek to reconcile different levels of interpretation. How does one link a general theory of political instability with a particular case of regime change? For example, one issue in an examination of the Greek case is the problem of differentiating political changes resulting from shifts in international economic forces from those produced by internal matters such as promotion patterns within the military, which was the specific origin of much internal military division that surfaced in the 1967 coup (Przeworski). How does a crisis of society become a crisis of politics, and perhaps a crisis of regime? These are different developments, and one need not necessarily follow from the others (Linz).

Furthermore, the concept of periphery may include geopolitical dimensions as well as an accumulation dimension. The two may combine to define Southern Europe and South America in very different structural terms. Southern European countries, regardless of their relatively lower level of socioeconomic development, are still part of central, urban Western Europe. Their contacts and interchanges with the center are much more dynamic. These economies are also more penetrated by (or less protected from) external influences than those of South American countries. The class structure is thus very different and much more varied than in Latin America. For example, the importance of shipping and trade as economic activities has produced a much more important petite bourgeoisie. Internal class alliances are more flexible, dynamic, and less isolated. Labor exchanges and tourism are critical economic components in Spain, Portugal, and Greece (Schmitter). External labor migration has in part served as a safety valve for the consolidation of conservative democracies by reducing unemployment and complementing the stabilizing effects of low population growth and the role of a merchant marine as a source of employment creation, but this expanded international contact may have also served as a radicalizing impact on national society and politics (Mouzelis). While such international flows do exist in Latin America, they are comparatively less important in these countries. Such differences in the operation of capital and labor markets in the post-World War II period may also be a more important force favoring democratization in Southern Europe than in Latin America (Schmitter).

Within these broader economic and geopolitical contexts, regional alliances and organizations may exert an important influence in favor of the emergence of political democracy. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and especially the European Economic Community (EEC) have served as democratic poles for Southern European countries. Regional norms and expectations deriving from Greece's ties with the

Council of Europe may have been an important influence on political change (Schmitter), and Greek membership in NATO may have had a special impact on the political role of the military (O'Donnell). The EEC was explicitly committed to a democratic world and was concerned about "pre-1945 throwbacks" such as Spain, Portugal, and authoritarian Greece. It was very visible in all these cases and attractive to diverse domestic groups. These countries stood to gain both materially and in terms of international prestige by joining the EEC and becoming full-fledged, developed European countries. In this sense the EEC may have been an important influence in the transition process in these countries.

As a reflection of more general differences in their geopolitical or geostrategic contexts, the availability of democratic poles in the form of regional organizations may also set the European and Latin American cases apart (Whitehead). Whatever else might be said of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), it has not served as a significant stimulus for the emergence of democratic processes and procedures in Latin American countries. The different degrees to which these regional economic organizations provide a stimulus for democratization through access to external resources may account for this difference in impact (Schmitter). However, one might ask if some other organization or actor serves as a functional equivalent to the EEC in pushing for democratization in Latin America (Whitehead).

International Conflict and Military Defeat. Specific international events and actors may also be important in shaping the transition process. For example, the Allied victory in World War II significantly influenced various aspects of Italy's postwar democratic consolidation. After the invasion of Sicily in 1943, Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union became important actors in the Italian political process. Although power in the area shifted from Great Britain to the United States after 1945, Churchill's perception of the Italian monarchy as a stabilizing element was important in terms of the role which the king played in the transition process. The postwar environment and the beginning of the cold war forced the United States to accept those elements of an emerging political coalition which were not aligned with the Soviet Union. Thus De Gasperi succeeded in exploiting the international political environment to win U.S. support and oust the Italian Communist Party after 1947. The left's loss in the April 1948 elections marked a critical turning point in the consolidation of Christian Democratic political power (Pasquino). These international political pressures favoring a democratic political transition may have been more intense in postwar Italy than in Spain and Portugal, which did not directly enter World War II (Whitehead). Somewhat more generally, the altered geostrategic environment in post-World War II Europe may have changed the context in which political change occurred by reducing many nations' perceived insecurities regarding security threats from their neighbors (Schmitter).

Defeat in war has been an important factor in the successful transition from authoritarian rule in several cases. The military defeat of the Fascist government helped lay the basis for a democratic regime in the post-1945 Italian political transition (Hirschman). The threat of defeat in African colonial wars was also important in the overthrow of Caetano in Portugal and the emergence of a democratic regime (Maxwell),

but other countries may well have to find some functional equivalent to aid a political transition (Hirschman). In this sense, Italy and Greece may constitute a form of controlled experiment in comparing the impact of international and domestic factors on the transition process. Defeat in war facilitated the transition process in Italy, while in Greece the outcome was much more dependent on voluntaristic elements--especially the political strategy pursued by the Communist Party (Whitehead). In Greece, the Communist Party's advocacy of radical sociopolitical change precipitated a civil war (1946-1949) which provided the Greek military with an opportunity to intervene and impose an authoritarian solution which excluded the Communist Party. At a later date, the fiasco resulting from the Turkish invasion of Cyprus threatened military cohesion and served as an important factor undermining the authoritarian government (Whitehead, Mouzelis). Although it was the result of civil strife rather than international conflict, Somoza's military defeat in Nicaragua has also proved very important in terms of the current revolutionary transition. The Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinist National Liberation Front, FSLN) came to power following a negotiated military surrender, but the fact that it successfully led the armed struggle is a critical source of the FSLN's current legitimacy. While the civil war also brings with it problems of financial bankruptcy and economic reconstruction, the successful anti-Somoza armed movement provides an important basis for national unity (Fagen).

United States Policy Toward Regime Change. The United States in particular has been an important factor in several of these cases of political transition. For example, the United States' rigidity regarding the long-standing conflict over the International Petroleum Company (IPC) may have hastened the 1968 military coup in Peru, and subsequent U.S. behavior following the Velasco government's nationalization of the firm may have reinforced the military's domestic political position (Crimmins). More attention should also be given to the U.S. role in the 1977-1980 period of democratic transition in Peru (Lowenthal). The United States' hemispheric presence and its strategic interest in dependable access to Venezuelan petroleum may have significantly affected Betancourt's behavior in the Venezuelan transition by setting implied limits to political action (Cotler), and U.S. military aid to the Bolivian armed forces after their destruction in the 1952 revolution was critical to reestablishing the military's political presence--with dramatic consequences in the failure of the recent democratization effort (Whitehead). The United States also had an important long-term impact on the course of political change in Nicaragua. As in Cuba and the Dominican Republic, the United States long supported a sultanistic authoritarian regime but then played a somewhat ambivalent role in its last phases. The Nicaraguan case provides an excellent opportunity to focus on the U.S. role in such transitions in terms of U.S. goals and leadership and the general international context in which regime change occurred (Lowenthal).

The United States may also play a significant role in future political change in Mexico. Although external actors were not of direct relevance in the initiation and implementation of the López Portillo government's 1977 political reform project (Middlebrook), the relative lack of U.S. involvement in the Mexican case may be a reflection of the limited degree of change involved in recent liberalization measures. Rapid,

uncontrolled political change and substantial democratization in Mexico would threaten U.S. security interests. While the United States may favor democratization elsewhere in the world, its interests in Mexico are best served by an essentially authoritarian system which engages in periodic episodes of political theater without altering the underlying structure of the established regime (Whitehead). A future U.S. response to uncontrolled political change in Mexico might be particularly aggressive due to the importance of Mexico's newly discovered oil reserves in an increasingly difficult international energy situation (Sharp). However, attention to the United States' possible opposition to radical political change in Mexico should not underestimate the ruling political elite's own resistance to such change. There is considerable room for the emergence of a rightist national coalition within the established authoritarian regime. Such a move to the right to contain radical political change need not take the form of a military coup (Middlebrook), although the increasing strategic importance of Mexican oil resources and rapidly changing political situations in Central America and the Caribbean may well result in an expanded political role for the Mexican military in the future (Maxwell).

However, the United States has not always been a unified or unconstrained actor in such cases of regime change. In the case of U.S. policy toward Italy in the post-World War II period (in which the United States was suddenly confronted with a drastically altered international environment), a variety of bureaucratic elements and U.S. actors sought to implement different, often conflictive policies. The dominant U.S. advisers were also at odds with the Italians: as Keynesians, these U.S. advisers were much less concerned about inflation than were the Italians. For historical reasons, Italians were especially concerned about working-class protests and, because of the heritage of fascism, had an aversion to economic controls and even to planning (Hirschman). In the Portuguese case, there were major constraints on what the United States (especially in the form of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger) could do in the post-Vietnam era in terms of political intervention. Although one should not overemphasize the impact of a single ambassador in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy (Lowenthal), U.S. Ambassador to Portugal Frank Carlucci appears to have played an important role in the transition process by using independent political access in Washington to help mobilize West Germany behind policies which corresponded to his view of the international political environment. And despite very heavy overall involvement in the Portuguese case (for example, in negotiations of balance-of-payment support under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund), the United States did not always make use of obvious linkages and connections. For example, the United States did not move to support Spinola and Sá Carneiro in the early stages of the transition--even though these were the most traditional and likely collaborators--because Spinola had brought the Communist Party into the new government (Maxwell).

Crossnational Political Learning. The international environment may also be of significance at a more general level in the form of political learning and the availability of international allies and assistance which affect the course of the transition process. For example, the "lesson of Chile" served an important role in the first few months of the Portuguese transition in 1974 (Maxwell). Over a longer period of time in Portugal,

Eurocommunism's coparticipation strategy was an important contextual variable in this transition. Conversely, the Portuguese Communist Party's position as the first European communist party to share power since the 1940s had an important impact on evolving leftist strategy in Europe. The sheer number of external actors participating in the Portuguese political process at this time was striking. International spheres of influence and rules of international behavior became blurred there, and Western European countries, the Soviet Union, and the United States all were substantially involved as sources of financial assistance, political support, and so forth. Western European socialist, communist, and social democratic parties all backed groups in Portugal.

This was in large part due to the fact that Portugal had become an important international issue and part of the superpower dialogue. (For example, Arab oil-producing countries had boycotted Portugal due to the United States' use of the Azores to resupply Israel during the 1973 war, and the 1973 oil crisis had hit Portugal particularly hard.) (Maxwell) While it is to some extent true that any country in turmoil becomes the subject of international concern (O'Donnell), Portugal was unique in that both national politics and its colonial empire in Africa were at a turning point (Maxwell, Schmitter). Portugal had revived the question of whether or not social revolution was possible in the late twentieth century, and the roles of a radicalized military and a pro-Soviet Communist Party had become politically sensitive issues. Finally, a growing balance-of-payments problem forced the new Portuguese regime to seek external financial support from the United States and West Germany, and this produced a slowing in the regime's movement to the left (Maxwell).

The international political environment has also been a significant factor in shaping several Latin American cases of regime transition. In the case of Venezuela, the international environment was important in consolidating democratic political arrangements in the early period after the 1958 transition from authoritarian rule. During the period 1959-1963 the Cuban revolution had a larger impact on Venezuela than on any other single Latin American country. The presence of guerrilla movements supported by Cuba produced a counterinsurgency program and substantial amounts of U.S. financial assistance to the Venezuelan government under the Alliance for Progress. Most significantly, the party system created after 1958 emerged as the moderate, centrist option; it was the alternative to the Cuban revolution and guerrilla insurrection (Karl). A similar awareness of the international environment and the international impact of the transition was a critical element in the Nicaraguan case. The anti-Somoza coalition successfully handled relations with such varied international actors as Venezuela, European social democratic parties, and some sectors of U.S. public opinion (Fagen). Although linkages with European social democratic parties have in general been weaker as pro-democratic influences in Latin America than in European cases of successful transition (O'Donnell), the involvement of Western European countries in contemporary Nicaragua may be an important element in the democratic evolution of the current transition process there (Stepan). And in cases such as Brazil and Mexico, the country's international image may be an important issue in the regime's future (Hirschman).

II. National Actors, Events, and Arenas in the Transition Process

The Impact of Authoritarian Regime Experience. An analysis of a country's prior political experience and the problems of the established authoritarian regime constitutes both a necessary first stage in the examination of a transition from authoritarian rule and an important point of departure in the comparative study of this process (Linz). When are policies or reforms successfully undertaken to strengthen the established regime, and when do they tend to undermine its viability? What possibilities and/or probabilities for change do certain events, actions, or policies create? (Kaufman) Does the authoritarian experience lay basic socioeconomic and political preconditions for the subsequent creation of democratic political arrangements? Conversely, does the impact of the authoritarian regime on civil society undermine or make more difficult a transition to political democracy?

The impact of authoritarian rule may have very distinct consequences in different national settings. For example, some of the differences between the Spanish and Portuguese transitions may be the result of the differences between the two countries' sociopolitical conditions when the transition occurred. In Spain, considerable social modernization and economic growth occurred under Franco (Eaton). To the extent to which relative social equality is an important underlying condition for political democracy, Spain did achieve major improvements in socioeconomic equality by the 1960s (López Pintor). But the authoritarian regime experience also left unresolved major sociopolitical issues which pose significant obstacles to the new regime. The principal political problem in contemporary Spain is the transformation of a centralized state into a multinational, multilingual entity. This is a somewhat different kind of problem than that faced by new regimes in other cases of transition, and it has tended to shape and slow the transition process in Spain. There is no basic consensus on the "centralism vs. regional autonomy vs. federation" issue; centralists now appear to be a minority, while those favoring regional autonomy seem to constitute a plurality in most areas (although certainly a majority in the Basque areas). What is perhaps most interesting theoretically regarding this kind of issue is the extent to which decisions regarding "transitions to democracy" can be separated from other major issues. To the extent to which this is possible, the chances of a successful democratic transition are probably much greater (Linz).

In Portugal, socioeconomic change under the Salazar regime also had an important effect on the subsequent transition from authoritarian rule. Salazar drew his principal support from the Church, government bureaucrats, the rural peasantry in the north, and the large landowners in the south. His regime also benefitted from considerable isolation in the early 1960s. But broader processes of economic change challenged the regime. For example, migration out of Portugal undermined its rural base. Migration and tourism linked Portugal much more closely to the French and West German economies, ending the isolation which had protected the established authoritarian regime from destabilizing influences and impacts (Maxwell). Such changes may account for the character of political mobilization in the Portuguese transition and the importance of international influences on the transition process.

The legacy of long authoritarian rule under the Somozas will also pose a difficult future political problem in Nicaragua. Although pluralism and a vision of future democratic politics are very much part of contemporary political discourse, the duration and character of Somoza rule leave contemporary Nicaragua with no memory of prior democratic politics. Political memory focuses only on the long-standing problems of U.S. domination, the U.S. Marines' occupation in the 1930s, and somocismo. "Post-somocismo" must be invented. While the FSLN currently rules Nicaragua, the problem of constructing viable political structures still lies ahead. The FSLN is, both publicly and privately, a collective leadership with fluid ties to emerging social forces. But one immediate problem is the transformation of the FSLN from a military force into a party organization. How political and organizational ties between the FSLN and previously existing or newly emerged mass organizations will be forged is still somewhat unclear. While the FSLN still functions as a vanguard, due both to its Marxist-Leninist ideological origins and its historical role, there are clear tensions between this role and widely held prior assumptions regarding the liberal, pluralist regime which would follow Somoza's overthrow (Fagen). This problem takes specific form in the tension between participation and bureaucratic control. How such issues are formulated and how such decisions are made will have a critical impact on the direction of political change in Nicaragua. To postpone the decision in favor of other, higher priorities is in fact to make the decision in a bureaucratic fashion (Pásara). This issue has so far been the subject of continuing, pragmatic discussions and negotiations (Fagen). An examination of the participatory content of emerging mass organizations and a discussion of the role of elections in socialism might be useful bases on which to evaluate this question (Stepan).

Although the role of economic factors changes in different situations (Przeworski), in most cases economic success under authoritarian rule appears to facilitate a successful political transition. In Spain, however, the 1973 economic crisis may actually have aided democratic regime change by encouraging caution and moderation on the part of both the opposition and the government. Real wages continued to increase and economic concerns do not appear to have influenced individual opinions significantly. But the economic context caused the labor movement and the political opposition to modify their demands. The regime's concern regarding the future and the possibility of growing popular discontent prevented it from implementing an economic austerity program, as other Western European countries were forced to do at this time. Insecurity regarding the future may also have resulted in splits within the government, which also facilitated the transition process (López Pintor). Similarly, economic crisis in Peru appears to have had an important "index value" for perceptions of regime deterioration. After 1975 both capitalists and financiers worked for the military's extrication from politics (Stepan).

The relationship between economic change and political events raises a more general question regarding the nature of the transition process in Southern Europe and Latin America. What issues are placed on and taken off the policy agenda by the established regime in different cases of transition? (O'Donnell) To the extent to which economic and political trade-offs are part of this process, the nature of those trade-offs may be time-bound to an important degree. Concessions regarding

economic policies now made in Latin America as part of transitions from authoritarian rule may be substantially different from those made in contemporary European cases of transition. However, they may be relatively similar to those involved in earlier periods of European industrialization (Karl).

The kinds of socioeconomic and political trade-offs facing a post-authoritarian regime are especially dramatic in the case of the revolutionary transition in Nicaragua. The FSLN in some ways functions as a transitory pact with the private sector over an undefined period. This relationship is fraught with tensions, and the pact will no doubt be negotiated over time. Economic production continues at the present because adequate profit margins are still possible, but capitalists are clearly reluctant to undertake major new investments. The real loss of purchasing power by wage-owners is another important tension. Moreover, the pact is in part unstable because there is a real, continuing commitment to socialism within the FSLN leadership. The realization of this commitment would involve a major renegotiation of public and private sector relations, especially in basic economic activities. The transition to socialism would eventually require the consolidation of a new pact. Current government policies which tend to divide capitalists among themselves may be an initial step in that direction (Fagen). However, discussions focusing on "capitalism vs. democracy" should not lose sight of an older, long-standing historical debate regarding the nature of social democracy and its potential viability in a revolutionary context such as this (Stepan). There may also be conjunctural factors in the Nicaraguan situation such as the complete removal of the repressive apparatus of the old regime, the FSLN's broad mass support, and a willingness to experiment with different forms of socioeconomic and political organization which attenuate somewhat the need for trade-offs between "equality" and "liberty" (Kaufman).

The relationship between economic and political change has also been a central theme in the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes which emerged in Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay in the 1960s and 1970s. During the 1940s and 1950s these countries pursued a "developmentalist" strategy designed to reconcile democratic party politics and the economic requirements of rapid industrialization. But the economic success of this strategy in countries such as Argentina and Brazil produced acute political problems, especially in the form of severe inflation. The military coups of the 1960s and 1970s ended the developmentalist strategy. These new bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes stressed economic stabilization as the prerequisite for industrial growth, although stabilization was not the goal itself. These regimes also sought to eliminate party politics, which they perceived not so much as a specific threat as an obstacle to economic growth. Especially in Argentina and Brazil, bureaucratic-authoritarian rule produced considerable economic success and concerted efforts to resolve critical social and political problems (such as the guerrilla threat in Argentina). Yet there were also important differences in the impact of authoritarian rule in these countries, and some of these differences explain variations in the prospects for political liberalization. The Brazilian move toward political liberalization has been possible in part because the guerrilla threat emerged relatively early and was eliminated more easily than in Argentina. In Argentina,

the maximalist guerrilla wing of the Peronist coalition dominated the political opposition, and hardline elements within the military controlled the government. Although most aspects of the social crisis had been neutralized by 1974-1975, the continuing political impasse resulted in the 1976 coup (Cavarozzi).

Argentina's current military government differs substantially from those which held power there in the 1960s. For example, it has pursued radically different economic policies. Rather than emphasizing economic growth, it has stressed economic efficiency in both the public and private sectors. Official economic policy has selectively promoted certain sectors in the world economy, which has meant considerable deindustrialization and a return to an emphasis on primary exports. Considerable control has been imposed on the working class, the national bourgeoisie, and even some sectors of foreign capital. The productive capacity of the state has been cut back, even though regulatory policy has increased in importance. Fiscal, monetary, and foreign-exchange policies are used to penalize inefficient producers. There has also been a general deterioration in social services. The political strategy of these regimes has also changed: party politics is seen as part of a profound social crisis rather than a simple obstacle to economic progress. Thus the government has sought new kinds of sociopolitical solutions rather than the simple elimination of political opponents. A future transition from authoritarian rule in Argentina is likely to involve a negotiated arrangement between the military and existing political parties (Cavarozzi).

The authoritarian regime experience may also effect widespread structural changes in sociopolitical life which seriously undermine the chances for a return to political democracy. Contemporary Chile is among the most dramatic examples of this phenomenon. The two key political processes under way in Pinochet's Chile--an effort to constitute a hegemonic nucleus within the dominant sociopolitical bloc, and an attempt to institutionalize political leadership in the state's summit--fundamentally affect the possibility for redemocratization. The formation of a hegemonic nucleus has occurred around the personalized leadership of Pinochet and the control over economic policy exercised by the "Chicago boys." Within the military, the absence of a unified political project reinforced the importance of the formal institutional hierarchy. This effort at "institutionalization" after 1977 began a second phase in Pinochet's rule, following the first repressive period of military dictatorship. The July 1977 announcement of a political plan to keep the military in power until 1985 opened a discussion within the dominant bloc between duros ("hardliners") and blandos ("softliners"). However, because there is no alternative for different sectors and groups to act outside the regime, this discussion is not directly linked to a political transition from the authoritarian regime. Such internal political maneuvering always ends with Pinochet's personalized leadership. It is not clear whether the personalization of power in Pinochet will be an advantage in a future Chilean transition, as it appears to have been in Spain. A broader process of institutionalization would involve an effort to elaborate "rules of civil life" (Garretón). Although there is reason to doubt that measures such as the Pinochet government's plan for labor constitute a significant basis for broader regime institutionalization (Karl), some efforts to do that have now emerged in the form of national and sectoral plans. Moreover,

there are now some indications of a military political project which might make it possible to remove Pinochet without the military itself leaving power (Garretón).

As a result of the elimination of political arenas and "political space," Pinochet's rule has produced a severe decline in the importance of Chilean political parties. It should not be assumed that Chile's long and vigorous civilian democratic experience will provide the basis for a return to a democratic regime. The social and political ties manifested in Chilean parties are frozen, but they are no longer of direct relevance. While the Catholic Church has had an important role as a substitute political arena, an erosion of the current authoritarian regime would have no clear recipient in the political center. In this context it is important to note that in Chile polity and civil society have historically been closely and directly linked to specific organizations such as individual party-affiliated labor confederations. As a result of the sociopolitical changes brought about by the Pinochet regime, the basis for constructive social movements has been substantially changed. For example, the new student movement that might emerge in a post-military situation would be significantly different from that which existed before 1973. New or reconstituted political parties are also likely to represent different social forces, and alliances between parties such as the Christian Democrats and the Communists are likely to have a very different content and meaning (Garretón). In Chile, and in other southern-cone cases such as Argentina, the ruling elites are firmly opposed to the existence of any political apparatus (including corporatist representational structures) which might unite potential opposition groups, especially the working class. Their effort to atomize the population is a new experience in the political histories of these countries, and it will have an important influence on subsequent political change (O'Donnell).

Thus the opposition's strategy is a principal problem in Chile's contemporary political evolution. The question of redemocratization <u>per se</u> would involve an acceleration of the stated schedule for a return to civilian rule. But the kind of democratic regime which would emerge, given the broad and fundamental changes which have occurred in society, remains uncertain (Garretón). This said, however, what specific problems, obstacles, and opportunities are there for the formation of new party linkages and alliances? If social relations and the structure of socioeconomic interests have been significantly altered during the course of the Pinochet regime, a new party system would also presumably be substantially different from the old one. A more detailed analysis of the current economic situation would be an important basis for understanding the future evolution of these relationships. The degree of economic disintegration and the dramatic reduction in the state's economic role have been more significant in Chile than in Argentina, and this difference may be quite important in a future transition from authoritarian rule in Chile (Przeworski). While it may be relatively easy to identify those economic factors and issues which affect the origins of the transition, how are they relevant to the transition process itself? To what extent would significant liberalization in the current Chilean context result in a tremendous wave of accumulated socioeconomic demands? The prospect of economic tensions such as these significantly shapes the overall opportunities and possibilities for a political transition (Fagen). Finally,

even if the preexisting party system and party tradition are not directly relevant during the initial stages of regime transition, they may well be important later on (O'Donnell).

There are other questions which one might formulate regarding the Chilean case in a comparative examination of the impact of authoritarian rule on the transition process and the prospects for redemocratization. First, what kind of authoritarian regime is this? Given the predominant role of Pinochet, can it accurately be called bureaucratic-authoritarian? What will the role of the state be in the post-military political situation? (Przeworski) The role of Pinochet should also be viewed in comparative perspective. While the personalization of military power in Chile has aided the stability of the authoritarian regime, in Brazil the regime's durability has been increased by the non-personalization of power (Cardoso). Does not "institutionalization" involve more than simply "duration in power"? What other dimensions might be involved in this process or phenomenon? (Cavarozzi) How does the kind of economic change which has occurred in Chile (especially the new focus on externally oriented development) relate to the question of regime legitimacy? Is even rapid progress in achieving certain economic goals sufficient to legitimate a regime such as this? Indeed, how accurate is it to speak of "hegemony" in the Chilean case? (Cardoso) In what ways does regime transition in Chile--and elsewhere in Latin America--involve more dramatic trade-offs between political and economic choices and policies than in European cases of transition? (Karl, O'Donnell) Finally, these developments in the Chilean context raise the more general question of what a return to civil society means in a particular national context. Is it possible for the fragmented political opposition in Chile to develop a strategy to govern the transition process? Are not new forms of popular protest a more likely result in the current context, even though a development of this kind would not necessarily facilitate a smooth transition? (Cavarozzi)

While the Chilean case is a dramatic example of the impact of authoritarian rule, the kind and degree of change effected by the established authoritarian regime and its consequences for the transition process are often somewhat difficult to evaluate. For example, viewing the degree to which the Brazilian authoritarian regime has maintained a firm control over the political liberalization process and the opposition's limited ability to influence the process of change, one might ask why the correlation of forces has not changed more significantly over time (Martins). Despite the emergence of new social movements and some erosion of the regime's support and prestige, its overall position has not been substantially altered. The absence of such change cannot be attributed merely to the incompetence of the opposition forces (although that may have been quite real) or to certain institutional continuities over time. Rather, the answer must be sought at the level of civil society. The fragmentation of political life and the absence of national political arenas may have much to do with this phenomenon. The result is a lack of alternative political projects to the regime's liberalization policy which restricts the opposition's ability and capacity to influence and shape the process itself (Martins). Nor is the relationship between economic development and the attempted political transition always clear. For example, whether or not the recent economic setback after a period

of considerable economic success contributed to the recent Brazilian transition effort is open to debate, or at least the relationship is probably not as mechanical as that (Crimmins).

Yet on other dimensions there do appear to have been significant changes in Brazil over time. Transformations have occurred both in formal political institutions and in civil society. In examining areas of change, one should focus on political arenas and sociopolitical processes in order to determine the areas of dynamic movement (Stepan). In many ways Brazil is now a mass society, and it may be entering simultaneously both a legitimacy crisis and a crisis of the established authoritarian regime (Cardoso). The major growth in organized labor is one of the most conspicuous recent changes, but there have also been significant developments in the mass media, the Church, and the role of elections. The military as an institution has also changed; for example, there were three military candidates--and thus, three different options--in the last presidential succession. There have also been important changes in the regime's core support groups over time. The military government received the backing of broad sectors in 1971, but it enjoys much narrower social backing in 1980. In part this is due to the fact that the need for a military government is less clear now than in earlier periods. These kinds of changes make a dramatic authoritarian regression much costlier for the military unless its key institutional interests are at stake. As in the case of Chile, the political opposition's tasks must also change to adapt to these new conditions. Specifically, the opposition should seek to increase the subsystem autonomy of various institutions of civil society, expand their relative capacity to resist government control and thus increase the costs of authoritarian rule, and forge an alternative democratic project (Stepan).

These cases highlight the more general issue of the impact of authoritarian rule on civil society and its consequences for the transition process. How is civil society embodied in different countries, and which institutions of civil society are most relevant to the transition process? The South European and Latin American cases differ considerably in this regard. Authoritarian experiences in Latin Europe do not appear to have challenged the viability of structures of civil society in the way that some Latin American bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes appear to have done. In some cases, perhaps especially in Spain and Portugal, the socioeconomic modernization which occurred under authoritarian rule may have substantially strengthened those structures in such a way as to facilitate a subsequent democratic transition. The strength of political parties and civil society more generally in Spain (O'Donnell) contrasts with the situation in Latin American bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. The liveliness of civil society in Argentina may be the closest parallel to the European cases under consideration--and, indeed, may not occur elsewhere in Latin America (Schmitter). The strength of civil society may make liberalization easier in Argentina, but the weakness of political parties and other mediating institutions may make democratization extremely difficult (O'Donnell).

Variations in the characteristics and strengths of civil society among different Latin American countries may also have important implications for the kind of political arrangements which might be viable

following an end to authoritarian rule. For example, if consociational elements are present in Colombian democracy and might be possible in Chile, the absence of viable political parties with disciplined leaders and members capable of reaching and complying with political agreements would seem to make that option impossible in Argentina (Stepan). In contemporary Brazil, the regime's effort to correct errors and failures and to respond in part to specific opposition demands is one important example of continued state-society communication. For example, after the opposition's success in the 1974 elections, the electoral law was changed (Martins). This may be part of a broader dynamic in which the military regime is to some extent forced to "create" civil society so as to provide it with necessary feedback and information regarding developments in society. Governing and political control require this kind of feedback information, and to the extent to which the closure of various political arenas reduces its availability, corrective actions may be necessary. This might explain the regime's acquiescence to the emergence of independent labor unions more capable of accurately articulating labor discontent (Hirschman).

The Origins of the Transition Process. In some cases the characteristics of regime change may be significantly influenced by the way in which the transition process begins. Is the transition initiated by a conscious decision on the part of the established authoritarian regime, or is liberalization or regime transformation provoked by an event or series of actions which throw the authoritarian regime into crisis? (O'Donnell) What is the role of internal or external shocks in the origin of the transition process? (Schmitter) To what extent do such events or crises serve as catalysts in a more general process of internal regime deterioration? What influence does the way in which the transition begins have on the established regime's ability to control the process of political change, and what impact does this have on the political opposition? Crises such as these appear to have been more important and more frequent in Europe than in Latin America. Is it possible to create such events in different Latin American bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes? (Heine) While it is important to distinguish between those conditions surrounding the emergence of the transition process and those which might permit a democratic outcome (Hirschman), to what extent are conditions present in any particular case which encourage the simultaneous erosion of the established authoritarian regime and the creation of political democracy? (Stepan)

A conscious decision by the governing political elite to undertake political liberalization initiated the recent political reform process in Mexico. Liberal factions within the governing authoritarian coalition were especially concerned with the emergence of a number of minority, opposition political parties on both the left and right which remained unincorporated by the existing electoral and party system. Increasingly high rates of voter abstention signalled a decline in public support for the established regime, and the organizational viability and mobilizational capacity of the governing Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) had eroded as a result of the very limited--or, in some cases, nonexistent--electoral competition offered by minority political parties officially recognized before 1977. Without challenging the socioeconomic and political relationship on which the established authoritarian regime is based, the liberalization measure enacted by the López Portillo government in 1977

sought to expand the political system's representative basis by bringing previously excluded groups and parties into the legitimate political process. The 1977 political reform altered the procedures for party recognition so as to increase the number of opposition political parties competing in federal elections, facilitated their access to mass communication media, and increased their representation in the Federal Chamber of Deputies and the administrative structures overseeing the electoral process.

The Mexican political elite had relied upon selective repression and leadership cooptation to defuse political opposition during the late 1960s and early 1970s, and limited electoral reforms had been enacted in 1963 and 1973. But the López Portillo liberalization measure was broader in scope and introduced a legitimate political opposition to the left of the PRI (represented by the Mexican Communist Party and several other leftist parties and groups) for the first time. The fact that the regime itself initiated the political reform and undertook the liberalization process from a position of considerable political strength accounts for two important characteristics of the liberalization process itself: the ruling elite's capacity to control the timing and speed of the reform process, and the political opposition's limited ability to affect the content and direction of the political reform. Although the process began at the government's initiative and addressed political problems which had emerged over a longer period of time, the context in which the political reform measure was implemented was critical. The political and economic crisis surrounding the 1976 devaluation convinced the reform's supporters that political liberalization was necessary in order to forestall a broader regime crisis (Middlebrook).

Since the Mexican regime undertook political liberalization at its own initiative and has retained control over the reform process, one must ask what the limits to this process may be. In one sense the López Portillo political reform corresponds to a well-established pattern in Mexican politics in which the new president embarks on a series of reforms designed to distance himself from his predecessor. While the current liberalization effort is fuller and more ambitious than previous political reforms, how much of this change is due to sociopolitical pressures from below, and how much corresponds to this more traditional political pattern in the Mexican authoritarian regime? (Whitehead) What does the close relationship between government and party in Mexico imply in terms of the possibilities of broad political change and a significant modification in the PRI's political role? How can a more democratic system evolve where government-controlled resources can so easily be used to coopt the opposition? The continued strong governmental control over the liberalization process in Mexico (especially the state's authority to set detailed requirements for political party recognition) contrasts dramatically with cases such as Spain (Linz).

The prospect of participation in the electoral process and the recognized party system under such controls posed a highly divisive issue for those opposition parties which had based their legitimacy on their opposition to the established regime (Middlebrook). What are the possibilities for the emergence of competitive politics in Mexico under these conditions? (Linz) One problem is simply envisioning any kind of regime other than the one which has been in power since the 1920s. Indeed, much of the

internal regime resistance to the 1977 political reform and the problems in its implementation came from different sociopolitical groups' difficulty envisioning what a substantially liberalized party system would be like (Whitehead). This is clearly important in terms of how different groups perceive the prospects of political change, as well as the kinds and degrees of change which are likely to occur (Middlebrook). What do opposition groups and parties hope for as a result of the López Portillo political reform? What would be a significant change in the established authoritarian regime? What is it to be in the opposition in Mexico in terms of political groups' historical roles and experience? (Whitehead) Where does the opposition's support lie? Which social forces have these new parties and groups sought to represent? (Bennett)

In cases where the initiative for political transition is undertaken within the ruling elite, particular individuals and personalities may come to play an especially important role. In Italy, for example, Dino Grandi was instrumental in orchestrating the initial move against Mussolini in 1943. However, institutional dimensions may also influence the interplay of key personalities. In the Italian case, the king held the power to dismiss the prime minister (as he had done in 1922 to install Mussolini), and Grandi's move against Il Duce was thus structured in terms of and sanctioned by the formal roles and institutions of the pre-fascist regime (Pasquino). Similarly, while Reyes Heroles' personal commitment to regime liberalization was important in the initiation and implementation of the 1977 Mexican political reform, his position as the powerful minister of the interior and the president's commitment to the reform measure as an important part of his administration were decisive (Middlebrook).

In other cases a specific event or crisis often marked the beginning of rapid regime deterioration and the transition process. As noted above, the Allied invasion of Sicily and the defeat of the fascist regime in war were critical developments in the Italian transition. The Athens National Politechnic episode and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in Greece, the cordobazo in Argentina, and Franco's death in Spain also served as important watersheds in the initiation of the transition process (O'Donnell, Heine, López Pintor). The particular impact of many of these events may have been due to the absence of channels to articulate demands within the regime (Whitehead). In Spain, opposition forces, pressures from below, and moderate opposition within the regime were all incapable of producing significant regime change. Franco's death was the key departure. Few saw the regime lasting after Franco; he was the regime to most of the population (López Pintor). Thus the extreme personalization of power may have facilitated the subsequent transition (Linz). However, one might also wish to ask why a particular event had such an important or decisive impact on the established authoritarian regime. For example, was the Mussolini regime already weak due to a lack of widespread support for fascist ideology and the limited mobilization capacity of the Fascist Party? Could no support be mobilized for the regime once it was challenged? (Strickland) Did the colonial wars constitute an equivalent event in Portugal? Was Salazar's death not different than Franco's in its import for the authoritarian regime? (Heine) In Nicaragua, the 1972 earthquake also marked an important departure. Somoza's handling of international emergency assistance and the reconstruction process

alienated virtually all groups and forces. By 1978-1979 the regime lacked a specific class form and the National Guard provided its only support (Fagen).

In a number of cases the process of regime transition emerged in the context of severe deterioration or desgaste in the established regime. Specific events or crises served as indications of accumulated sociopolitical discontent and catalysts for further change. In the case of Peru, for example, the move toward elections and regime transition followed the accumulation of considerable popular discontent with the kind of reforms and the way they were implemented in the 1968-1975 period. In 1973 Velasco had rejected a change in the regime's populist policies for fear of provoking a major popular mobilization. But 1975 saw major military operations against labor and peasant movements. A number of crises and problems surfaced in July-August 1975, and there was a general sense of relief when Morales Bermúdez replaced Velasco in August 1975. The left saw a victory in the replacement of officers seeking to demobilize popular actors, and the government "political space" was thus increased. Although similar suggestions had been made since 1972, suggestions regarding future elections and the renewed role for traditional political parties really date from this time. A tremendously successful general strike against the government on July 19, 1977 pushed this issue to the fore, but the government's dilemma was to resolve continuing economic problems while simultaneously opening or liberalizing the political system. The political problem was resolved through elections (1978) for a constituent assembly in which advocates of "political democracy" (capitalists, traditional political parties, and the incumbent regime) confronted advocates of "socioeconomic democracy" (popular actors) (Cotler).

The rise of organized opposition was especially important and particularly rapid in the case of Portugal. The post-1974 collapse of the state apparatus facilitated the rise of the organized left, and the speed of decolonization fueled this trend as FRELIMO and other liberation movements allied with the leftist military. These alliances broke down once decolonization was completed, but they were an important accelerating factor at an early stage (Maxwell). The suddenness with which change occurred was also due to the extraordinary weakness of the old regime and the fact that the transition was sponsored by the military. However, how does one explain the rapid, unexpected character of mass mobilization and the subsequent countermobilization? It was not only the result of accumulated socioeconomic demands. Similar "explosions" have not occurred elsewhere under similar circumstances. Although the overall rate of change was rapid, can one speak of different phases in the transition process? Were these phases punctuated by the collapse of various alliances? (Schmitter) Is it possible to identify thresholds of change that would enable one to determine the duration of the transition period and the point at which it ends? (Pasquino)

Venezuela also provides an example of democratic transition following broad deterioration of the established authoritarian regime. The fall of Pérez Jiménez in 1958 followed the general disintegration of the ruling power bloc. Like Somoza in Nicaragua, Pérez Jiménez alienated a wide range of groups. The national economic elite felt threatened by a trade agreement with the United States, which flooded the domestic market

with imported goods, and Pérez Jiménez had denied national private capital participation in the newly developing steel industry in favor of state ownership. General mismanagement of the economy resulted in the private sector's joining a national general strike against him. The military also objected to Pérez Jiménez' personalism, the growing role of the secret police, and the need for repression to contain social unrest. The organized opposition against Pérez Jiménez began in 1957, and mass demonstrations against the government forced him out of power (Karl).

In such cases of severe deterioration within the established regime, the characteristics of the political opposition are important both to the initiation of the transition movement and to the outcome of this process. To the extent to which the opposition is severely divided internally, it may be less successful in pushing for more than limited change. In Italy, the internal weaknesses, divisions, and contradictions within the anti-fascist coalition and the left meant that their political victory was only partial; the opposition failed to achieve major socioeconomic changes (Pasquino). In the case of Portugal, working-class and peasant organizations in southern Portugal in 1974 moved the direction of political change to the left. The countermobilization of small proprietors in 1975 forestalled a social revolution, but major rural mobilizations in the context of the agrarian reform program were nonetheless critical to raising the prospects of revolutionary change. This development significantly affected the military, and by 1975 there was considerable degeneration within the armed forces as "soviets" and debating societies proliferated (Maxwell).

In other cases, the specific origins of the transition may remain unclear. Whether the current Brazilian liberalization is perceived as part of the tightly-controlled transformation process, a strategic game among major sociopolitical actors, or a legitimacy or hegemony crisis, it is still difficult to explain <u>why</u> the military has done what it has. It seems clear that the regime was not obligated to act as a result of demands or pressures from below by groups such as organized labor, and protests by groups such as journalists and the Church predate the initiation of the liberalization program (Cardoso).

In Mexico, the 1968 student movement might be considered the origin of a sociopolitical process which culminated in the 1977 effort at political liberalization. The student movement was the predecessor of many of the leftist political parties which were the focus of the 1977 political reform, and the government's violent repression of the student strike and the killing of many students in the "Tlatelolco massacre" marked a significant change in urban middle-class support for the established regime (Middlebrook). The 1968 opposition movement articulated the accumulated problems and discontent which the dominant model of economic development ("stabilizing development") had produced during the 1950s and 1960s. The events of 1968 marked a new awareness of problems such as increasing concentration of wealth and the growing inequality of income distribution. This discontent was particularly strong among the intelligentsia, who constituted an important sounding board for the established regime. After 1968 some degree of previously existent state autonomy was perceived to have been lost (Hirschman). The urban middle-class focus of this discontent and the critical role which this group

plays in the Mexican authoritarian regime explain why the government responded to the 1968 opposition movement with liberalizing measures, whereas challenges to the regime by workers in 1958-1959 were repressed without subsequent reform. In similar fashion, López Portillo's political reform may be more a reaction to middle-class pressures than an adequate response to problems affecting popular groups and classes (Cotler).

However, how does one explain the timing of the 1977 liberalization effort? Even if there were other interim regime responses before 1977, how is it possible that the political system took so long to respond fully to the major political shock of 1968? Is this to be explained by the strength and broad underlying legitimacy of the established regime, or was the 1968 opposition movement only a remote background event, while the 1977 political reform was one of the measures designed to resolve the 1975-1977 crisis? (Cotler) This later period of crisis, especially the land invasions provoked by Echeverría in his last weeks in office, may have constituted a more fundamental challenge to systemic legitimacy in its threat to property relations and the basic economic-political pact which has characterized post-1940 Mexican politics and development than did the 1968 student opposition movement. The 1968 movement profoundly perturbed Mexican politics, but a challenge to regime support should not be confused with a crisis in systemic legitimacy (Fagen). The growing strength of the national bourgeoisie and its increasing autonomy from the Mexican state in shaping the development process were at issue in the 1975-1977 crisis. The 1977 political reform may be an effort to increase the size of the leftist opposition so as to provide the Mexican state with additional bargaining space and political leverage with the bourgeoisie and the right (Bennett). How do 1968 and 1975-1977 compare to earlier periods, such as Cárdenas' mobilizational activities in the late 1930s, in terms of the possibilities created for broad political change and new departures? (Fagen) One counterfactual way of posing the issue of systemic legitimacy in the Mexican context would be to ask what the national and international response might have been to the killing of several hundred students in Franco's Spain (Linz).

Characteristics of the Transition Process. What are the principal characteristics of the transition process itself, and how do these characteristics affect the political outcome of the transition? In many cases the transition process is remarkable for its velocity and its fluidity. Change occurs much more rapidly than under the previous period of authoritarian rule, and the process may involve shifting coalitions and changing options. The momentum of the transition process may increase the established regime's tolerance of change beyond that originally contemplated; similarly, the opposition's opportunities to influence the direction of change may be considerably expanded once the process has begun. To what extent do transitions from authoritarian rule in different national contexts share these traits? In what terms do different actors perceive the transition process once it begins? Do these perceptions differ significantly depending on the kind of political system in which the transition occurs? What forces push the transition forward and keep it open-ended? To what extent is a breakdown possible during the transition phase? Which actors favor this outcome, and which actors move to prevent or discourage it? What impact do threats of interruption and fears of regression toward a more closed, authoritarian outcome have on the transition process in different historical contexts? (O'Donnell)

Is "political democracy" in conflict with "socioeconomic democracy" or other issues during the transition process? (Stepan) How do different meanings of democracy affect this process? Ambiguity regarding democracy as a formula may be important to maintaining the flexibility of the transition process and allowing actors with different interests and goals to cooperate for some period of time (Lowenthal). Fruitful discussion would concern variations in forms of political democracy, not just "economic vs. political democracy." Does the lack of an innovative sense of possible variation in democratic arrangements increase the chances that the outcome of the transition from authoritarian rule will be nondemocratic? (Schmitter) What outcomes may be chosen other than democratic ones? In some cases the rejection of middle-ground solutions may be conscious and not just due to a lack of imagination regarding alternative outcomes (Hirschman). How are trade-offs among these issues presented and resolved during the transition process? (O'Donnell) To what extent is democracy a normative goal, and to what extent is it linked with economic aspects such as the broad rules and procedures governing property relations and the production process? (Karl)

The post-1974 Portuguese transition was both flexible and dynamic in nature. Did the length of the prior authoritarian experience substantially increase the uncertainty of various actors regarding the future? What experiences were different actors able to draw upon? Was a learning process involved during the course of the transition? (Whitehead) In terms of overall operating concepts, both the left and the right were unprepared for the emergence of liberal democracy in the Portuguese context. This raised analytical problems for both sides (Maxwell). A simultaneity of models and vague intellectual conceptions, most of them little understood and much-manipulated, characterized the transition period (Schmitter). To what extent did prolonged confusion facilitate the subsequent evolution of "democracy?" (O'Donnell)

Different cases of regime transition also vary substantially in terms of the amount of violence involved. For example, there appears to have been considerably more violence in Spain than in Portugal during the transition process. The reason for this is difficult to determine, but it may be due in part to Portuguese political style: conflict is conducted as a display of force which creates moments of crisis to legitimate actions taken, but which avoids actual conflict. It may also be due to the fact that Portugal is more culturally homogeneous than Spain. In addition, opposing sociopolitical forces in Portugal tend to be regionally based, so opposing groups rarely come into direct conflict. In the single most important case of social violence, in the Río Mayor area north of Lisbon, the mixture of medium-sized peasant holders and peasants on large estates brought these opposing groups into direct contact. Nonetheless, significant violence may still occur in the future in Portugal. The potential for conflict exists in the sense that real socioeconomic and structural changes have occurred, and very different kinds of social forces may now confront each other (Maxwell).

In Argentina, the 1969 cordobazo's mobilization of labor, middle-class, and student opposition to the regime created the basis for an extremely strong guerrilla movement. One especially significant result of guerrilla activity was the idealization of violence--encouraged in part

by intellectuals, either by their silence in the face of escalating violence, or by their justification of it in the name of "higher" political goals. In this context, the politicization of violence superseded the state by eliminating its claim to a legitimate monopoly of the use of force. These developments combined with a growing economic crisis to produce a pervasive sense of doom, defeat, and impotence in the period before the 1976 coup. Although the guerrilla movement has been effectively repressed, the widespread use of violence during this period has made the question of political liberalization much more problematical (O'Donnell).

While in Colombia "La violencia" served as an important aspect of political learning and the basis for a negotiated political transition in the 1950s, violence itself had not been glorified. Political violence had been associated with the activities of both major political parties in the 1949-1957 period, but both Liberals and Conservatives had deplored it (Wilde). To the extent to which the political arena is dominated by violence, it may be more likely that an armed vanguard will lead the transition process. This has been the case in Nicaragua, and this characteristic of the transition holds important implications for the subsequent consolidation of political pluralism (Stepan). The possibility of formulating democratic political arrangements where there is considerable violent conflict over social and economic rules and the direction of the socioeconomic order is obviously slight. Thus the degree of conflict present in the transition process has important implications for the prospects of a democratic outcome (Collier). However, the creation of such democratic procedures and reliance on the electoral process may not be so much dependent on an overall consensus or absence of conflict as on the elaboration of a dependable agreement regarding political norms and procedures among political leaders (Przeworski).

In some cases the transition process may be reasonably well demarcated by a series of specific events. For example, in Spain the death of Franco and the appointment of Adolfo Suárez as prime minister were clear turning points. The referendum on the constitution and the first elections may mark the end of the transition process per se (López Pintor). But how did models of a negotiated break with the old regime and a negotiated agreement for a democratic outcome emerge in Spain? The former was the continuing perception of the regime forces, while the opposition saw the latter. To what extent was the Francoist option not viable during the transition process? That the civil war leaders were dead and that the civil war itself was a negative memory for most Spaniards were clearly important factors. In addition, the fascist component of the Franco regime had been defeated with the Axis in World War II, and the Catholic Church had distanced itself from the regime after Vatican II. The key decision in moving the transition forward was to move directly to national elections for a constituent assembly (Linz).

Where there has been more than one case of regime transition it is important to compare and contrast changes over time which may affect the characteristics of the transition process. What historical legacies do past transition efforts hold for subsequent attempts? (Collier) For example, what is the relationship between the end of democratic periods and the end of military rule in a country such as Peru? (O'Donnell)

It may be that the more distinct the division between the breakdown of democratic rule and the emergence of the authoritarian regime, the easier and more protracted subsequent democratic institutionalization may be (Schmitter). Why did the 1968 coup occur without widespread protest, and how could military rule end so easily in 1980? What kind of authoritarian regime was this? Did the earlier characterization of the regime as a case of military populism change dramatically during the 1968-1980 period? How might Peruvian democracy be different in 1980 than it was in 1962-1963 or 1968? What factors might explain different kinds of outcomes at these different times? What factors explain the timing of regime change? (O'Donnell) In both 1968 and 1980, for instance, there was agreement on a solution to resolve a situation of stalemate. In 1968 democracy was discredited, and the political system and dominant economic structures were notably backward. How did the initial military reforms move forward so well and so quickly? In contrast to 1968, in 1977-1980 the government faced an impasse: there was no popular support for the incumbent regime, but there was no alternative civilian claimant to rule. What impact did an individual leader such as Haya de la Torre have in these different periods? In 1968 he was still a potential threat, but in 1980 he helped form a quasi APRA (Alianza Peruana Revolucionaria Americana)-military alliance. The 1968-1980 period also saw the end of claims by various groups (APRA, técnicos, or the military) to "save Peru." No group now makes that kind of claim (Lowenthal). The left's access to television to articulate its appeal was critical to changing popular opinion and substantially expanding its presence in the 1980 elections in Peru (Cotler). What implications do such changes have for the transition process?

Major actors' perceptions of the transition or liberalization process may be very important to the overall characteristics and directions of the process itself. For example, in the case of Brazil the military government's liberalization (distençao) project is perceived as part of a broader process of change, but it is not viewed as the decomposition of the established authoritarian regime. The regime sees liberalization as its political project, an idea closely associated with the inner circles of the regime which has certain consequences for civil society, but one which does not link the two. Geisel foresaw and planned a gradual, slow, and secure process of liberalization. His successor (General Figueiredo) has approached the process as one which involves "leasing" certain rights and procedures to civil society with the retained option of abrogating the terms of this contract as conditions change. The process remains highly voluntaristic, but its characteristics and the current terms of discourse fit closely with the regime's mentality and overall strategy. Political rules have been changed reasonably successfully over the last three years without much resistance from civil society. The regime is convinced that time will work to its advantage, and that excessive popular demands can be adequately controlled (Martins).

While various opposition groups and forces have had an impact on the evolution of this process, and society's attitudes have changed substantially over time, demands from below were not the initial source of the liberalization program. Rather, the 1974 elections were held due to the regime's mistaken belief that its official party, the ARENA (Aliança Renovadora Nacional) party, could win the elections. These elections

did not serve to redefine forces within the regime and within the opposition, but the opposition's considerable success did mark the point of departure for the liberalization process. When the process has threatened to escape the regime's control--as with, for example, the São Paulo metalworkers's strike in the spring of 1980--the government has acted forcefully to cut short manifestations of social unrest and thus prevent the formation of a "social pact" between the bourgeoisie and organized labor. Thus the regime's initiative and control over the political process, as well as the decisions governing it, have not changed. An authoritarian regression is always possible (Martins).

However, an approach which focuses predominantly on the principal actors' perceptions of the transition process is only one alternative interpretation of the Brazilian liberalization process. One might view the liberalization as the result of a legitimation or hegemonic crisis. Or one might also analyze the process as a strategic game (as at least one main actor, Golberi, appears to do). Simply because the liberalization process is currently under control does not necessarily mean that the regime knows what its goals are. To what extent does the process imply more than the regime wants? The outcomes and outputs of the liberalization so far may not exactly conform to the regime's initial goals and preferences. For example, as a result of the military's liberalization effort, Brazil is no longer a purely authoritarian regime. There is some degree of freedom of the press, some room for union activities, and even some party organization. Leftist parties are allowed to operate their own newspapers, and there is some opportunity for criticism and debate. The regime now symbolically represses workers' strikes but simultaneously responds to their specific demands, as in the case of creating workers' councils at the factory level. The process itself is much more complicated than the principal actors expect, and the outcome may be a very different kind of social organization and political structure than that imagined by the regime. However, this does not mean that the current transition is to political democracy. The overall rules of the process are still strictly controlled, and the military remains the central political power. Congress is powerless. Thus how does the term democracy help to explain the sociopolitical process in operation in this regime? (Cardoso) If an authoritarian regression were to occur, what might its effects be? Is the process already so dynamic that such a regression could not last for any sustained period of time? It is even possible that the process of liberalization is not so entirely well-controlled as some observers might suggest (Crimmins).

The principal consequence of the Mexican liberalization effort so far has been to increase the established authoritarian regime's legitimacy by broadening the system's claim to the representation of diverse ideological perspectives. But even the comparatively limited liberalization measures introduced by the 1977 Mexican political reform may have consequences originally unintended by the reform's proponents (Middlebrook). The presence of opposition party representatives on supervisory committees at polling sites may substantially increase the honesty of the electoral process, and this may prove increasingly damaging to the PRI (Collier). The presence and organizational activities of opposition parties may become especially important as rapid, oil-based economic growth produces new social forces and political tensions. The

mobilization of new groups in the party and electoral arenas might create opportunities for significant new departures in Mexican politics. Much depends on the political strategy pursued by opposition parties, especially their dedication to challenging the social bases of the established regime and its control over organized labor and peasant movements. Whether future presidential administrations allow the liberalization process to proceed, or whether conservative actors succeed in limiting its scope, will also be critical in determining the final outcome of the current liberalization effort (Middlebrook).

Actors in the Transition. The identification of those sociopolitical actors directly relevant to the transition process is a central issue in the examination of transitions from authoritarian rule. What kinds of relationships link "political" and "social" actors in the established regime, and what impact do these linkages have on the transition? What is the sequence or timing of different actors' entry into the liberalization or democratization process? (O'Donnell) What role do political parties, the military, and other actors play in the transition process? To what extent do political parties operate as institutions which mediate social forces and lay the basis for a democratic political outcome? Does the role of the military--especially its position regarding participation by different kinds of sociopolitical actors--change significantly over time? Are there significant differences between Latin Europe and Latin America in terms of actors directly relevant to the transition process? One goal of an examination of the liberalization or transition process is to understand the logic of different political actors' behavior and actions (Martins). Are actors which are active during the transition process excluded from the final political outcome? If so, what are the implications of such exclusions, and what are the trade-offs involved as an institutionalized outcome to the transition process emerges? How are such changes related to the resolution of socioeconomic problems and demands raised during the course of the transition? (O'Donnell)

The institutional structure of the established authoritarian regime frequently has a significant influence on the characteristics of the transition process and those actors important in it. In several cases the limited pluralism of the authoritarian regime defined the actors directly relevant to the transition process. In Italy, for example, the monarchy, the Catholic Church, the military, entrepreneurs, and the "Grand Council of Fascism" all had defined and significant roles to play (Pasquino). The fascist regime itself may have sought to retain some preexisting structures (especially the king and the Pope) as a protective covering rather than to establish total, penetrative domination (Hirschman). The roles of constitutional continuity and the "Grand Council" in the Italian transition were closely paralleled by those of the king and the Cortes in the Spanish case (Linz).

In many of these cases of regime transition, mass political actors such as organized labor have constituted an important source of pressure in favor of political liberalization and/or the adoption of more democratic practices and procedures. But in the case of Mexico, the organized labor movement initially opposed the López Portillo political reform project. The major, politically significant labor and peasant groups in Mexico have been subject to a variety of legal and structural

controls since the 1940s. These controls over mass political actors' activities are an important characteristic of elite-mass linkages in Mexico, and they in part account for the relative freedom of action which the ruling political elite enjoys in many areas. But the critical role which these actors play as the established regime's mass social bases also provides them with some leverage in political decisions which affect the governing authoritarian coalition itself. The "official" labor movement (especially the Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos, CTM) resisted López Portillo's political reform project in part because the measure's greater emphasis on the electoral process as political arena and legitimacy formula implied a relative decline in the political importance of PRI-affiliated sectoral organizations such as the CTM. The CTM also feared that an increased role for opposition--especially leftist--political parties would reduce its own access to patronage resources (in the form of seats within the federal Chamber of Deputies) and encourage opposition parties' organization of "independent," non-CTM unions within its own membership. The CTM played a central role in the government's 1976-1977 economic stabilization program by restricting labor demands and accepting a decline in its members' real wages. In turn, the CTM used its conjunctural economic importance to bargain for concessions in the political reform measure. In the end, the CTM and other conservative members of the governing authoritarian coalition appear to have successfully limited the scope of the 1977 liberalization measure in several important ways (Middlebrook).

One important difference between the South European and the Latin American cases with regard to the role of established institutions' influence on the transition process concerns the monarchy. In Spain, Greece, and Italy the monarchy was an important actor in the transition process. In Italy the constitutional aspect of the monarchy was an important rallying point for conservative forces during the transition (Pasquino). Similarly, in Greece the monarchy played an important mediating role between the parliament and the military for a considerable period of time. The king's position as commander-in-chief and his constitutional role in appointing the prime minister increased royal influence when the army and the parliament were deadlocked (Mouzelis). Spain's King Juan Carlos, both as a monarch and as political leader, played a critical role in the transition from the Franco regime. He offered something to everyone, especially in terms of demonstrating the legality and legitimacy of the transition process (López Pintor). There is no historical institution in Latin American countries capable of playing an equivalent part in the process of regime transition.

(1) The Military. The military generally comprises an important part of the established authoritarian regime, yet its role in the transition process may vary considerably. To the extent to which the armed forces are closely identified symbolically and substantively with the authoritarian regime's policies, the military may make the transition process more difficult. What are the costs and benefits of various forms of military behavior, of retaining an active presence in the transition or rapidly extricating itself from the political process? Given the military's position as the principal source of coercive force, the internal cohesion and motivation of the armed forces are central variables in the transition process (Stepan). How do groups such as the national

bourgeoisie view the dispensability of the military, and how do these perceptions affect the military's position and behavior during the transition process? Changes in the military's role over time, especially changes in its perception of the political process and the participation of different political actors, have a major impact on the transition process. Finally, to what extent are there important variations in the role of military institutions in Latin America and Latin Europe which reflect these nations' differing geopolitical situations and consequent differences in their armed forces' security roles? (Schmitter) What impact does direct military rule in many Latin American cases have on the character of the established authoritarian regime and the likely outcome of the transition process? (Kaufman)

The military stands as a critical guardian of the political process in a number of different Latin American countries. In Peru, for example, the military's lack of organizational and professional development and its concern with growing political mobilization during the 1950s constituted obstacles to broader social change during the 1962-1963 military government. The social change which did occur at this time was conditioned by the military: it was to occur without significant mass mobilization and according to certain procedures determined by the armed forces. Significantly, the military groups responsible for this limited social reform in 1962-1963 also shaped events in the Velasco government after 1968. At this time the armed forces also generated a military intelligentsia which rejected democracy as a formula or social arrangement appropriate to Peru. Following the earlier pattern, social reforms implemented after 1968 were bureaucratic and bonapartist--rejecting mass support and mobilization in the formulation and implementation of policies designed to promote sociopolitical change (Cotler).

To the extent to which social mobilization did occur in Peru after 1968, it involved all social classes. Due to the nature of the reforms and the way in which they were handled, this social mobilization tended to occur <u>against</u> the military. The military was thus dramatically confronted with the problem of national integration and the issue of social disintegration (Cotler). In addition, the military's concern for its own internal cohesion and the tension between "the military as government" and "the military as institution" resurfaced. In 1968 the armed forces' concern with national security constituted an important motivation for their political intervention and their social reform program. After 1975 the military's growing social isolation and its concern with internal institutional problems in the face of increasing tensions with Chile raised national security as a principal motive for its extrication from government (Stepan). Through the June 1980 elections and at the present time, the armed forces continue to condition the political process. They established the timing and the legal procedures for the 1980 elections and, as a result, the rules for their own exit from politics. But as in 1962, the armed forces' critical commitment is to their own autonomy--an autonomy which is currently virtually total (Cotler). And even though the Peruvian military exited from government in 1980, how long it might take the armed forces to renew a consensus regarding their need to "save Peru" remains unclear (Pásara).

In the case of Brazil, the military has had a complex role in the evolution of the authoritarian regime and the transition process. On the one hand, the military has not played an historical role with the cohesion and clarity often attributed to it. The armed forces' internal cohesion was eroded in the early 1970s by the bureaucratic apparatus established to fight the guerrilla opposition. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, senior military officers (especially General Geisel) perceived a need for the military to disengage from politics in order to preserve its internal cohesion at a time at which its decisions were shaping society. To the extent to which the military regime has exhausted its historical role by producing a new economic model and consolidating a new class structure, the military might succeed in disengaging from politics. But it might also return in a new authoritarian regime were guerrilla activity to reappear--even though the military might not return to power with a new vision or political project. Such a development would parallel the recent experience of the military in Argentina (Martins).

The military was also important, if less dramatically so, in the European cases of regime transformation. In this regard there appears to be an important difference in the role of the military in the Latin American and South European transitions considered here, based on the relative importance of conservative civilian politicians in the transition process. These conservative leaders appear to play a more important intermediary role in European cases, while the military itself is generally much more directly involved in the transition process in Latin American cases. Broader civilian participation in the transition process itself may substantially improve the chances for a durable democratic outcome (Mouzelis).

In Greece, the role of the military changed in important ways over time. During the interwar period it shifted from an oligarchic to democratic moderator in the intra-bourgeois conflict over the role of the monarchy. After the civil war, as mass actors became a significant issue in national politics, the military served not as a liberal arbiter among contending social forces but as the guardian of the bourgeois order against threats from below (Mouzelis). In Spain, there was considerable division within the military regarding the transition. Its principal concern was that previously established legal norms and procedures be followed in the reform process and that the communists not be favored excessively. Yet neither has the military openly opposed political reform and democratization (López Pintor). This behavior may be due in part to the transformation which occurred within the Spanish military under Franco, who depoliticized and bureaucratized the armed forces. The social status of the military declined considerably over time. Moreover, the army no longer saw itself as "Franco's"; high officers could, and did, criticize Franco. This change proved very important during the transition process (Linz). This vision and role of the Spanish military differed dramatically from that of the National Guard in Somoza's Nicaragua, which constituted Somoza's most important support in his struggle against the revolutionary opposition. However, it is also possible that the Spanish military's domestic sociopolitical role may change in the future if Spain joins NATO and the military's resources and perceived importance increase substantially (Schmitter).

(2) Political Arenas: The Party System and Elections. Specifically political actors such as political parties obviously play a central part in the transition process. Yet their function and impact may vary substantially in different national contexts. For example, the future evolution of political parties as mediating institutions in a case such as Peru is somewhat unclear. The APRA party might conceivably play this role, but Belaúnde's Acción Popular ("Popular Action") party is unlikely to do so. Political parties' relative inability to constrain labor-union demands and limit the direct pressure which they may exert is a major problem for the civilian government which took power in 1980 (Pásara). In an analysis of a case such as Peru, what might be learned from the way earlier Latin American populist governments handled this problem of political mediating institutions in the 1940s and 1950s? What conditions surrounded the radicalization of the Peruvian labor movement? Does a development such as this raise the possibility of a major move toward the political left in Peruvian politics? What role have Velasco's corporatist political institutions played in the contemporary Peruvian political process? To what extent has the Peruvian labor movement learned from its recent historical experiences, and to what extent will the dangers and costs of repression cause the labor movement to proceed cautiously? (Collier) Would this kind of assertion by the left provoke the return of the military to power? (Eaton)

Similarly, a future problem in Brazil will be the extent to which political parties will be able to respond adequately to new sociopolitical conditions. The issue concerns more than the parties themselves and their relative strengths and weaknesses. What kind of political participation will develop in post-authoritarian Brazil? How can political behavior be handled in such a society? (Cardoso) In this regard Brazil may demonstrate major differences in comparison to other South American countries such as Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay. Whereas the discussion of these cases is often in terms of the degree of fragmentation and atomization which has occurred in civil society during the course of authoritarian rule, the characterization of Brazil as a mass society has a very different implication for the role of parties and political institutions. A comparative examination of these cases might consider the implications of these differences more carefully (Cavarozzi). To the extent to which political parties prove inadequate in altered contexts such as these, what other ways are there of organizing political participation? (Karl) In what ways are sociopolitical conditions such as those now existing in Brazil not propitious to the creation of democratic political arrangements? (Przeworski) To the extent to which existing political organizations are "empty" and no longer accurately represent social forces, the "rebirth of civil society" may result in the erosion of old political structures. It may also result in the spontaneous creation of new organizations to represent new tendencies within civil society (Cotler).

The electoral process and constitution-drafting play a very important part in the evolution and outcome of the transition process (O'Donnell). What is the meaning of elections once the transition process begins? In what ways does their meaning vary in different contexts? Elections may prove critical in specifying mass-elite linkages and identifying actual constituencies. In the case of Portugal, the 1976 constitution constitutes a truce between counterbalancing, contrasting mobilization

movements in the north and south. This truce may be reopened or renegotiated in the next elections. It is an important underlying basis of the current regime, but the transition is still not over (Maxwell). Similarly, in Italy the 1948 elections served to crystallize the form of social conflict and political power (Pasquino). In Spain, the population was generally depoliticized, and the popular mood was one of passive support for the Franco regime linked to economic performance and prosperity. Thus before Franco's death, opposition political groups could not accurately judge the extent of their electoral support; the Communists thought that they would receive much stronger electoral support than they actually did, and the Socialists greatly underestimated their potential support. Here again the elections in 1977 and 1979 proved important (López Pintor).

Elections have proven especially significant in the creation of political arenas for the transition process in Brazil and Peru. The results of the 1974 congressional elections were very different from those expected by the military government, as well as different from those predicted by opinion polls taken prior to the elections. What was most important about the elections was that they opened up significant political arenas, with very unexpected consequences. This has been true of the liberalization process more generally in Brazil: while it remains firmly under the control of the established regime, it has produced conditions which would not otherwise have appeared--nor which would have been wished or planned by the regime (O'Donnell). In Peru, the election of the constituent assembly in 1979 was also an important example of arena creation (Stepan).

Opposition party participation in the Mexican electoral process and representation in the federal Chamber of Deputies have also expanded and redefined existing political arenas. Party representation in the congress and expanded access to mass communications media such as radio and television have given the political opposition a new national forum for the articulation of ideas and party programs. As socioeconomic change accelerates in the process of petroleum-led development, it is likely that political parties and the electoral arena will become increasingly important for the competitive political mobilization of new groups and social forces. Such a change would be an important departure within the established authoritarian regime. It would mark a move away from internal negotiations among different PRI sectors and toward electoral activity as the principal source of legitimacy and focus of political activity (Middlebrook). However, for the significant creation of new power arenas over a sustained period of time, these changes must ultimately reduce the tremendous political power of the Mexican presidency (Linz).

The creation of political arenas where positions can be formulated by actors outside the regime is a critical part of successful regime transition. The very nature of these political arenas may differ in the European and Latin American cases. To a considerable extent "politics" in Europe concerns parties, parliaments, and so forth, but not unions or social movements. The meaning of "to be in politics" is very different in Latin America. Because of this difference in meaning and context, the process of political liberalization and/or regime transition may take on different significance in Latin America. To an established authoritarian government, the most threatening event might be to link "politics" with new developments in civil society that have occurred as

a result of socioeconomic and political transformations effected in the course of authoritarian rule. Thus the question "What is politics?" takes on critical meaning in many of these cases of Latin American liberalization and/or transition. The way in which the question is posed may have an important impact on the transition process and the extent to which its outcome is democratic (O'Donnell).

Elections also play an important legitimating role in the process of regime transition. Although "democracy" may be a somewhat more important legitimating idea in Europe than in Latin America (Schmitter), the electoral idea appears to be all-pervasive in the different cases discussed here--either as part of the nation's historical political culture or as introduced by external actors (Fagen). But are not some prior forms of legitimacy necessary, before elections can be agreed on as a technical means of processing social conflicts? (Przeworski) For example, one of the principal weaknesses of Weimar Germany was the lack of any fundamental change in the position of different classes, groups, and power holders, so that the electoral process was widely felt to be a façade (Hirschman). To what extent are concepts such as "legitimacy" and "hegemony" applicable or relevant in a regime of force such as Pinochet's Chile? (Garretón) What is the source and role of legitimacy in moments of historical transformation? (Fagen) Legitimacy based on economic performance tends to be quite fragile, as the case of Brazil indicates. Indeed, legitimacy based on this criterion may constitute a severe underlying problem for an authoritarian regime (Whitehead). Brazil's economic miracle gave the incumbent regime considerable prestige, but this did not constitute legitimacy <u>per se</u>. The regime has been dedicated more broadly to the maintenance and consolidation of capitalism (Martins). In cases such as this, authoritarian rulers' own perceptions and justifications of their right to rule may be more important than the public's views of their leaders (Schmitter). But the general issue remains what role legitimacy plays in the transition process (Przeworski).

More generally, how do specific events and historical experiences affect the legitimation process? For example, in Portugal past failures (the colonial war) and current regime successes (ending that war) have not produced broad-based regime legitimacy. Is there any evidence that public attitudes favorable to the consolidation of democratic political arrangements have changed for the better or for worse? In contrast, Spain has been much more successful in building regime legitimacy in part due to its success in dealing with a number of social problems (except for the continuing problem of Basque separatism) (Linz). To what extent are ideas of legitimacy time-bound? That is, acceptable practices and procedures may vary significantly over time. In earlier historical periods "liberty" was a key concept, while "equity" or "equality" may be a more important theme in the contemporary period (Karl).

III. <u>"Virtù" and "Fortuna": Personality, Statecraft, and Resources in the Transition Process</u>

The degree to which the transition from authoritarian rule is subject to broader economic processes and geopolitical factors and thus predictable from an analysis of existing structural constraints, or the extent to which it is open to voluntaristic influences such as political

leadership and choice, is a major issue in the analysis of different cases of regime transition (O'Donnell, Kaufman). In a number of cases, individual choices and statecraft were clearly important in bringing about a successful transition to political democracy. One purpose of focusing on this level of analysis is to identify central issues and choices to be made during the transition process. To the extent to which rules of the game can be established for the process, the outcome of the transition may be open to influence. How can parties and political alliances be structured to facilitate transitions to democracy and to prevent a regression to authoritarian rule? (O'Donnell) This concern in part reflects the particular nature of the founding of a democracy. It requires a more willful act of collective choice than the formation of an authoritarian regime because it is a commitment to practices and procedures which have uncertain specific consequences (Schmitter).

This concern with the issue of choice in part reflects a change in mood and prevailing social reality. Many of the writings on Latin American bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes have focused on a variety of domestic and international economic forces to explain the rise and particular form of such regimes (Lowenthal). Some of the characteristics which could be distinguished in many (although not all) of the military coups which occurred in Latin America during the 1960s and early 1970s seemed to suggest that driving forces were in operation which could not be deterred, forces which froze individuals in different roles which could not be escaped. While not all of this analysis may have been correct, the prevailing sense was that the chances of avoiding these tragic outcomes were few. In contrast, one of the important characteristics of the "opening" of authoritarian regimes is that it produces opportunities to affect the course of political change, opportunities to do more than simply observe the historical stream of events. These opportunities for choice and action are in a very real sense privileged moments. Thus in some cases this emphasis on voluntarism is a change in mood, but it also reflects real opportunities offered by the cracking--or, at least, self-doubt--of otherwise imposing authoritarian regimes (O'Donnell).

Leaders and Personalities. Individual leaders have had an important impact on the direction of political change in a number of cases of successful transition from authoritarian rule. In the case of Greece, Karamanlis could serve as a conservative interlocuter in the political transition because his credibility had been reinforced by not having become involved in the 1967 coup. His personal political capital, in turn, served as a pivot in the 1973 political transition. In Chile, in contrast, Frei is not acceptable to the political left in such a role because of his participation in bringing about the 1973 military coup (Whitehead). In a less purposeful way, Mussolini's personality may have played a significant part in the Italian transition. The internal regime challenge to Mussolini's position came at a time when he was depressed and under considerable personal stress. Apparently due to these factors and Mussolini's belief in his own charisma and psychological superiority, he did not mobilize the Fascist Party in his political defense (Pasquino). More attention should also be given to the role of Caetano in the Portuguese case. Did he act to sustain the old regime, or was he a "failed reformist"? (Linz)

One indication of the importance of political leadership in the Spanish transition is the fact that Suárez had articulated his design before he became prime minister, including his idea of a democratic pact. He made the calculation that the cost of toleration (especially vis-à-vis the Communist Party) was less than the cost of repression. Significantly, the vision of a negotiated break with the old regime held by Santiago Carrillo and the Communist Party paralleled that of Suárez very closely (Linz). In a somewhat different way, the "revolutionary voluntarism" shown in the 1973 assassination of Carrero Blanco also significantly affected the transition process by ending the possibility of a Francoist succession (Whitehead). In the case of Nicaragua, leadership and statecraft were critical to holding the anti-Somoza coalition over time as its composition changed. This task was especially complicated due to the fact that the coalition directed both military affairs and international relations. After the FSLN victory, innovative political leadership in moments of crisis has been important to maintaining the unity of the anti-Somoza coalition. The negotiations to keep private-sector representatives participating in the state council and the restraint shown during the long, tedious (and sometimes insulting) U.S. congressional debates regarding economic assistance for Nicaragua are both examples of this (Fagen).

Of course, the possibilities for a democratic transition can also be negatively affected by the choices, personalities, and actions of particular individuals. In Mexico, for example, Echeverría's personality and political background may have had as much to do with the absence of a broad political reform initiative under his administration than more explicitly political calculations regarding the viability of a reform at that time (Hirschman). In Chile, the importance of Pinochet's actions in transforming military institutional rule into a personalist government should not be underestimated. Over a period of time Pinochet has succeeded in carefully timing decisions and taking obvious political risks which have substantially increased his own power. In a situation such as this, the political opposition's tasks also change. It may be necessary to create political events which provoke a movement toward a broader political transition (Heine). But there may also be other limitations on Pinochet's personalist rule. Pétain, Franco, and Pinochet all demobilized and destroyed the political left, unions, and working-class parties. But Pinochet lacks a fascist party or other unifying and mobilizing vehicle to recruit middle-class elites and generate political support. He has not succeeded in creating an equivalent to Franco's Cortes. Nor is there a world ideological context which would legitimate his regime, although the recent plebiscite was an effort to do this (Linz). More generally, a comparative analysis must focus on the structure of different organizations and sociological roles in order to determine individuals' flexibility in those positions and their independent capacity to shape the course of the transition process (Schmitter).

Political Leadership and Opposition Strategies. At a somewhat more general level, the opposition's political strategy may have a decisive influence on the final outcome of the transition process. In many cases it appears important for the political left to pursue a policy of demobilization before the first election in order to effect a democratic outcome to the transition process (Przeworski). In part this is due to the

fact that "democracy" requires a commitment not to pursue social change by other means, such as broad political mobilizations or general strikes. The political history of several Western European democracies included the suppression of general strikes called in support of economic demands, while general strikes in favor of suffrage demands tended to be successful. After the suppression of economically motivated general strikes, social democratic parties tended to pursue constitutionalist, non-confrontational strategies (Przeworski).

While this proposition suggests a fruitful line of inquiry, several qualifications might be added. What may be required to achieve a successful democratic transition is the partial demobilization of the political left (Linz). Stated more generally, the nondominant group (perhaps the political left in capitalist countries, or the national bourgeoisie in revolutionary Nicaragua) may need to submit temporarily to the dominant group to effect a democratic transition (Hirschman). But a real, effective demobilization of the left where the established authoritarian regime retains a major repressive capability may actually prevent political change and political transition (Kaufman). In some cases opposition mobilization may be necessary to increase the cost of continued rule to the authoritarian regime and, simultaneously, to convince the armed forces that a viable political alternative exists which would allow them to step aside (Stepan). Important structural changes which accompany such restraint by a political opposition may also be important in order to provide a substantive basis to, and incentives for, electoral participation. This combination of economic and political developments may be most feasible where ruling groups feel confident and open to experimentation following considerable economic success, as appears to have been the case in recent transition efforts in both Spain and Brazil (Hirschman). And while economic issues, political learning from similar situations in other countries, and prevailing public opinion are important contextual factors in this regard, the demobilization strategy must be a conscious choice by the political opposition (Eaton, López Pintor).

In addition to a policy of demobilization by the left, a successful democratic transition may also require the mobilization of the right. At a very minimum the right must be a major factor in the elections which accompany the transition process, or the right may reject the electoral process and pursue other means to protect its position and interests. However, in many cases the right is unable to mobilize itself electorally (O'Donnell, Schmitter). More generally, successful transition efforts have involved not just the demobilization of popular actors, but a pact between elements of the incumbent regime and the opposition. What is important is whether or not the opposition is willing to accept that kind of alliance strategy (Pasquino).

Several of these factors appear to have been important in the recent Spanish transition experience. While the political left's commitment to moderation and political demobilization was a conscious decision (Eaton, López Pintor), it may also have been significantly influenced by a fear of the return of fascism (Przeworski). Suárez asserted the right to mobilize the political opposition, but he did not seek to use this tactic. The role of the Spanish Communists was also critical in this regard.

For example, the army and the police had not been infiltrated by the political opposition, and the Communists were careful not to legitimate political organization within the armed forces. This strategy kept them undivided and neutral; it proved to be a key to the armed forces' loyalty to the democratic process. In Suárez' skillful negotiation of the Communist Party's legalization, the Communists recognized the legitimacy of the army and the national flag, thus acknowledging their loyalty to the democratic political process. They sought their own legitimation and "space for freedom" as the most rewarding long-term strategy. Cooperation between Communists and Socialists was necessary and important to the success of this strategy because they shared many constituencies (Linz). Finally, although there was considerable division both within the opposition forces and within the ruling elite regarding the desirable outcome of the transition process (López Pintor), both major Francoist elements and the opposition were committed to democratization. Significantly, the opposition did not link the transition process to a social revolutionary outcome (Linz).

Although the outcome stands in sharp contrast to the successful Spanish transition, these themes are also clearly present in the case of Argentina. After the cordobazo and the emergence of a major guerrilla movement, some sectors of the military did seek to bargain with Perón to arrive at a negotiated settlement. But unlike Karamanlis in Greece, Perón and the main currents within the Peronist movement refused to accept such a bargain (O'Donnell). These Peronist elements were convinced that political democracy was not compatible with their goals of economic democracy (Cavarozzi). It is possible that the Ongañía regime had not been repressive enough to convince these elements that accommodation was necessary to avoid a repetition of the authoritarian experience (Kaufman). There was no figure or actor outside the regime who retained independence and prestige, and there was no viable conservative actor to which political power could be surrendered without endangering the regime's established, preferred policies and allowing the Peronists to return to power. Moreover, between 1970 and 1975, there was a continuous, violent challenge to the coercive authority of the state and the basic elements of social control. Political opposition and guerrilla challenges to control over the productive process at the workplace level terrorized the dominant classes. While the guerrilla movement saw this as a pre-revolutionary situation which required additional struggle, the crisis inspired tremendous fear within the dominant classes. In other authoritarian regimes the political opposition has frequently been able to offer an alternative political project, but this was impossible in the Argentine context of the mid-1970s. Faced with the prospect of complete sociopolitical deterioration, many groups found simple order preferable (O'Donnell).

In the case of Peru, there is some recent evidence to suggest that elements within the leftist leadership are now open to bargaining, especially union leaders who are familiar with the art of compromise. But a more general underlying question in cases such as this is the extent to which the government is capable of ceding on important issues. The current economic crisis has hit the middle class especially hard. Thus one must ask if political stabilization and flexible bargaining are possible within this economic context (Cotler). One consequence of the military government's social reforms is that popular groups formerly excluded from

the political process are now able to bargain and exert political pressure to win socioeconomic benefits (Pásara). Additionally, an overall low level of socioeconomic development poses severe problems and limitations on political bargaining space. These problems are accentuated in Peru by more long-standing concerns regarding ethnic tensions and the problem of national integration (Cotler). Several years ago one might have argued that Peru's low overall level of socioeconomic development, disinvestment problems, and the existence of mobilized popular groups capable of pressing socioeconomic demands before the government were all conditions which worked against the emergence of political democracy. How can one explain the success which the transition effort has enjoyed so far in this socioeconomic and political context? (Whitehead)

In terms of the strategies pursued by different groups and political alliances, individual political leaders' decisions and actions may play a central role in determining the outcome of the transition process. In the case of the Italian transition, the emergence of working-class opposition to Mussolini's regime coincided with his sudden loss of support among industrialists, financiers, and entrepreneurs to create a critical moment of historical choice. Dino Grandi, who had initiated the move against Mussolini, removed himself from the ongoing internal political game so as to be able to play a mediating role with the conquering Allies. The king, in an effort to safeguard the monarchy's role within the constitutional process and a system of limited democracy, chose a discredited military leader to lead the transition process rather than relying on the pre-fascist political class. Similarly, Togliatti (the secretary general of the Italian Communist Party, then returning from exile in the Soviet Union) played an important part in the successful transition by agreeing to collaborate with Badoglio. This action broke the coalition of anti-fascist, leftist parties (which had not previously agreed to an alliance of this kind) and proved to be a critical turning point in the Italian transition (Pasquino). The success of this transition was also substantially aided by the left's commitment to limit broader political mobilization and pursue the transition via the electoral process (O'Donnell). Togliatti's learning from the Greek case appears to have been important in this regard. His conclusion from the Greek experience was that armed insurrection in the Western European/U.S. sphere of influence would either fail, or if it succeeded, make broad social reforms impossible (Pasquino). Geopolitical considerations such as these may also have influenced the accommodative strategy of the political left in Portugal. One might speculate that the political outcome in 1974-1975 would have been different had the Soviet army been at the border (as in the case of Czechoslovakia in 1947), perhaps encouraging aggressive and disloyal actions by the Communist Party (Maxwell).

Political Learning and Statecraft. Political learning was an important element in the leadership strategy employed in successful democratic transitions in both Venezuela and Colombia. In Venezuela, the Acción Democrática (AD) party had laid the bases for democratic party politics through greatly expanded popular mobilization under its 1945-1948 government. The military coup which overthrew the AD government in 1948 and the 1948-1958 period of authoritarian rule were important events in the civilian political parties' learning process. The pact negotiated in 1958 by the centrist parties, AD and the COPEI (Comité de Organización

Política Electoral Independiente), involved both economic and political dimensions. The elite-negotiated economic program focused on an "alliance for growth" which joined both elite actors and popular sectors. The conflict-regulation rules negotiated by these two parties established free elections and created coalitional governments which guaranteed both parties access to the state sector and oil revenues. It also relied upon military force to suppress violent opposition to these political and economic arrangements (Karl).

Colombia's successful transition from authoritarian rule in the 1950s stands as a major example of the importance of statecraft and political engineering in the creation of a democratic regime (Wilde, Hirschman). Following the May 1957 military overthrow of Rojas Pinilla, leaders of the Liberal and Conservative parties met in Spain to fashion an agreement for the reestablishment of oligarchical democracy via a December 1957 plebiscite. The "National Pact" was a consociational agreement which governed national party politics for the following twenty years. It preserved a limited, oligarchical democracy as the alternative to the violent interplay of social forces which had characterized Colombian politics for the previous decade. The parties' success in implementing the agreement was in part due to the weakness of the political left, but there were also several underlying factors which facilitated the democratic transition in Colombia. First, this was a conscious effort to restore the previous democratic regime with continuities to 1886. Colombia had been governed through the electoral process since 1910, and it had escaped the military coups which occurred in many other Latin American countries during the 1930s. The opposition party successfully assumed power through electoral victories in both 1930 and 1946. Second, the political process was based on strong political parties dating from the mid-nineteenth century, with strong party identification reaching down to the local level. These parties had also developed a tradition of agreement and pragmatic compromise, and there was a strong rejection of continuismo and boss rule. In addition, party affiliation followed geographical lines rather than class-based divisions. Third, modern social forces remained relatively weak in Colombia. The working class was small, and trade unions were weak. The military's social status was low,and the Colombian state was generally much weaker than in other Latin American countries (Wilde).

The political engineering which structured the democratic transition in Colombia had as its background the extraordinary violence which had dominated the previous ten years of national life. "La violencia" was the principal social problem in Colombian politics, and the effort to end widespread rural and urban violence was the central issue in the transition period. The opposition to the Rojas Pinilla regime arose in part due to the military's belief that the violence was a political, not a military, problem. The extent to which the dominant political parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, had learned from the authoritarian experience is indicated by the fact that their 1956 declaration accepted common blame for the fall of the democratic regime in 1948. The 1957 agreement for the national sharing of political power and elected positions was possible largely due to the overwhelming devastation of "La violencia" (Wilde).

Political learning of a different kind may occur following successive failures to achieve a democratic political transition. A bias against subsequent attempts may develop, and the persistence of collective memories may predispose certain actors against democratization (Pasquino). Democratization has a distinct social meaning in different countries and historical situations, and the defeat of Bolivia's 1980 democratic experiment shows the impact of an accumulated heritage of previous attempts at regime change. Although Bolivia had experienced oligarchic constitutional democracy between the 1880s and 1930 and a second brief period of formal democratic government immediately after 1946, the 1952 social revolution has had the most lasting effect on national politics. The 1952 revolution produced a constitution, universal suffrage, and a period of regular elections that ended only with the 1964 military coup. Thereafter, the social meaning of democracy in Bolivia was understood in terms of the 1952 revolution. This meaning tended to be reinforced by the fact that many of the contemporary period's leading civilian politicians were major figures in the revolution. This historical legacy made it difficult to keep the recent 1979-1980 transition process within bounds. Any political opening in Bolivia is assumed to involve substantial democratization of the socioeconomic and political process, which of course is strongly opposed by traditional elite actors. The intensity of the repression which accompanied the 1980 coup indicates the extent to which democratization had occurred. The failure of the 1980 transition effort not only shifts the political balance in southern South America in favor of existing bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, but it will also color future transition efforts in Bolivia (Whitehead).

The Role of "Fortuna." While effective leadership and statecraft are essential for the successful creation of democratic political arrangements following a period of authoritarian rule, a democratic outcome to the transition process can be greatly facilitated by the availability of substantial financial resources. In some cases the availability of such resources seems to be largely the result of good fortune. Salazar's accumulated gold reserves facilitated the Portuguese transition by removing many economic constraints on the new regime's actions for some eighteen months (Maxwell, Schmitter).

But perhaps the most interesting example of the role of fortuna in this regard is the importance of oil in Venezuelan politics. Although other factors such as statecraft and political learning have played especially important parts in Venezuela's recent political history, oil has been a critical element in the successful consolidation of Venezuelan democracy (Karl). The socioeconomic changes associated with the development of the petroleum industry were important in undermining the Gómez dictatorship during the early decades of the twentieth century and in providing a basis for the creation of a democratic regime (Karl). Although the relative absence of an important Church-state cleavage in Venezuela may also have been important in this regard (Middlebrook), the economic consequences of oil diminished the opportunities for the emergence of an important rightist party by undermining the international competitiveness of Venezuelan agriculture and destroying the power of rural landowners. This tended to reinforce the central position of Acción Democrática. The availability of oil revenues facilitated compensation arrangements for the agrarian reform and aided in the consolidation

of AD's rural peasant bases (Karl). In other contexts (Iran, for example) the availability of large petroleum revenues has not prevented extreme political conflict (Hirschman), but in Venezuela these resources have served to facilitate the resolution of political problems. Petroleum-led, capital-intensive development also produced a relatively small industrial workforce and a greatly expanded middle class based on employment in the state bureaucracy, developments which had important influences on party development and party positions. For example, petroleum earnings provided the material basis for the broad political alliance established by the 1958 AD-COPEI pact. Capital accumulation occurred through petroleum production rather than by generating an economic surplus from labor. Oil thus provided the economic space for a durable democratic political coalition (Karl).

Yet over a longer period of time Venezuela's oil wealth may constitute a threat to the viability of democratic institutions. This is in part due to the negative consequences which petroleum-led development have had for the Venezuelan economy (Karl). Although the exploitation of petroleum or other natural resources has produced somewhat different outcomes in other countries (Hirschman), oil has had a major impact on the capital-intensive character of Venezuelan industrialization, the class structure, and the role of the state in economic development. Oil-mediated integration into the world economy slowed national industrialization, even though substantial resources were available from petroleum production. The economy's inability to generate sufficient employment opportunities in the context of declining petroleum production is a major problem now threatening the economic pact negotiated in the 1950s. Although party access to state resources need not always signify widespread corruption (Schmitter), in Venezuela the political pact which allowed broad access to resources in the state sector has encouraged corruption and personalism, undermining formal political rules and institutions (Karl).

Recently discovered petroleum resources may have a parallel impact on the Mexican regime's efforts at political liberalization. The sudden availability of large financial resources derived from oil and gas exports may undermine the possibility of further reform in political organizations and electoral procedures by allowing the political elite to rely on the distribution of material benefits to resolve a wide range of socioeconomic and political problems. Given the opposition within the established authoritarian regime to such liberalization measures as the 1977 political reform, this approach is likely to be a more attractive option than continuing efforts to negotiate change within the regime in order to confront future political problems. However, this strategy may result in even more severe political challenges at some time in the future as the socioeconomic problems resulting from rapid petroleum-led development (including inflation, the decreasing viability of peasant agriculture, and the disruption of traditional social structures) become more pressing and as new groups and social forces enter the political arena (Middlebrook).

Oil may prove to be a particularly destabilizing element in Mexico as a result of rapidly rising popular expectations. An oil-confident PRI may not respond quickly enough to such problems; indeed, perhaps no regime can deal adequately with volatile popular expectations produced

by an oil boom in a developing country (Sharp). Rising popular expectations may make it impossible for the government to withhold oil revenues for long-term economic development programs, and--unlike Venezuela--Mexico does not have a two-party system which could defuse popular discontent by removing the incumbent leadership from office. International pressures which continue to force petroleum prices upward contribute to domestic instabilities by making both short-term distribution and long-range economic planning more difficult (Karl). Thus the Mexican political elite faces a critical challenge in the need for continuing liberalization and political reform to provide channels for the resolution of problems in rapidly changing socioeconomic conditions (Middlebrook).

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Conference on "Prospects for Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule in Latin America and Latin Europe"
October 12-14, 1980, Wye Plantation

Latin American Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Co-sponsored by the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies

Project Directors: Guillermo O'Donnell, CEDES, Buenos Aires
Philippe Schmitter, University of Chicago

Project Coordinator: Laurence Whitehead, The Wilson Center

Douglas Bennett
The Wilson Center

Fernando Henrique Cardoso
CEBRAP, Sao Paulo

Marcelo Cavarozzi
Yale University

David Collier
Univ. of California, Berkeley

Julio Cotler
Instituto de Estudios Peruanos
Lima

Jack Crimmins
Former U.S. Ambassador to Brazil

Samuel D. Eaton
Department of State

Richard Fagen
Stanford University

Manuel Antonio Garretón
FLACSO, Santiago

Charles Halstead
Washington College

Jorge Heine
The Wilson Center

Albert Hirschman
Institute for Advanced Study

Terry Karl
Harvard University

Robert Kaufman
Douglass College
Rutgers University

Juan Linz
Yale University

Rafael López Pintor
Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Madrid

Abraham Lowenthal
The Wilson Center

Luciano Martins
Centre Nationale du Recherch Scientifique
Paris

Kenneth Maxwell
The Tinker Foundation

Kevin Middlebrook
Indiana University-Bloomington

Nicos Mouzelis
London School of Economics

Luis Pásara
The Wilson Center

Gianfranco Pasquino
SAIS, Johns Hopkins, Bologna

Adam Przeworski
University of Chicago

Daniel A. Sharp
Xerox Corporation

Daniel Sherman
Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies

Alfred Stepan
Yale University

Stephen Strickland
Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies

Alexander Wilde
The Wilson Center

Staff Coordinator: Rebecca Stone-Franklin