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ARMED FORCES AND POLITICS IN BRAZIL, 1930-1945

José Murilo de Carvalho
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton

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ABSTRACT

Armed Forces and Politics in Brazil, 1930-1945

The paper discusses the transformation of the Brazilian armed forces, particularly the army, into a crucial political actor during the period 1930-1945. This transformation involved changes in the dimensions and structure of the military organization, in its ideology, and in its relations with state and society. Out of the political turmoil that followed the 1930 revolution, and for which the army was in part responsible, a military faction, playing on the interests of the organization as a whole, was able to establish its hegemony and conceive of a project of political intervention that was to affect many sectors of national life. The development of this project coincided with the growth of the role of the state and with the need to cope with the increasing importance of political mobilization.

The paper also briefly suggests that a dynamic similar in its military and political components to that which led to the Estado novo dictatorship of 1937 can be found in the events that preceded the 1964 military takeover.

ARMED FORCES AND POLITICS IN BRAZIL, 1930-1945

José Murilo de Carvalho
Institute for Advanced Study
Princeton

During the period 1930-1945, important transformations took place both inside the Brazilian armed forces and between them and the Brazilian state and society. From a weak and poorly organized institution and a rather marginal social and political actor at the beginning of the period, the armed forces, particularly the army, had been transformed into a more efficient fighting force and a powerful social and political actor at the end. The changes affected the structure of the military institution, the conception of its political role, and that role itself. The changes can be said to be crucial for a better understanding of the nature of the military government that emerged in 1964.¹

The Divided Forces

One of the major consequences of the 1930 revolution which put an end to the First Republic was the catapulting of the armed forces into the very center of national political life.² The divisions and conflicts among the various sectors of the old civilian elites had made possible the establishment of the revolutionary government, whose support came in large part from the sector of the army that had joined the revolution and helped bring it to a successful completion.³ But the consolidation of the new government and of the political influence of the armed forces was to be a long and bloody process involving the confrontation of opposing factions both inside and outside the military establishment.

Victory found the armed forces divided along different cleavages. There were conflicts between revolutionary and legalist officers; between junior and senior officers; and between commissioned and non-commissioned officers--not to speak of the traditional rivalry between the army and the navy, and between the army and the states' police forces. An illustration of this fragmentation is provided by Table 1, which shows the number of military incidents throughout the 1930-1945 period. Incidents here include an array of events ranging from conspiracies, to protests, to rebellions. Of the 96 incidents included, only 18 are not related to the army (8 were initiated by members of the police forces, and 10 involved navy personnel). There were 10 rebellions in the first part of the period, 5 in the second, and none in the third.

TABLE 1

MILITARY INCIDENTS, 1930-1945⁴

<u>Major Actors</u>	<u>1930-1934</u>	<u>1935-1939</u>	<u>1940-1945</u>	<u>Total</u>
Generals	7	6	2	15
Other Officers	17	12	3	32
Non-commissioned Officers	20	12	1	33
Other*	<u>7</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>16</u>
TOTAL	51	37	8	96

*Incidents in which leadership could not be clearly identified with a particular layer of the military hierarchy. See footnote 4. Table 1 was organized by Lúcia Lobo, of CPDOC, and was based mostly on the Getúlio Vargas, Osvaldo Aranha, and Bertholdo Klinger papers (CPDOC); the Góes Monteiro papers (Arquivo Nacional); memoirs of military leaders; and documents of the Army and Navy Archives. A complete list of the incidents can be found at CPDOC.

The numbers are eloquent and reveal a badly divided and undisciplined military establishment. But they also show a drastic drop in the number of incidents in the last part of the period. This indicates, as we will see, that one faction within the army had been able to establish its hegemony and restore discipline to the whole body. But before going into the dynamics of this evolution, some comments on other aspects of Table 1 are in order, particularly those relating to the involvement of different sectors of the hierarchy.

The political involvement of generals was not new in Brazilian history. It had been significant at the beginning of the First Republic (1889-1895). But it reached new relevance after 1930, due to the generalized lack of discipline within the armed forces and the overall political instability that followed the victory of the rebellious movement. On account of these circumstances, many ambitious generals realized that the road to key military positions, or even to the presidency, was made easier, with the result that they became involved in several conspiracies among themselves and with civilian leaders. Almost all of the leading generals at the time were said to be involved in such conspiracies for one reason or another. Some led the rebellion of 1932 in São Paulo that turned into a full civil war. Conspiracies were also under way in 1934, when a new president had to be elected by Congress, and in 1935 when Congress hesitated in voting a pay raise for the military. In each of these cases, political circumstances were unfavorable and the movement failed. But in 1937 and 1945, one group of generals was able to muster enough support to intervene--in the first case to establish the Estado novo, and in the second to do away with it.

Junior officers--captains and lieutenants--had been also politically active since 1922, not to mention their role in the overthrow of the Empire. Most of those involved in the 1922 and 1924 rebellions, some of them still outside the army, joined the 1930 movement and were, after victory, major supporters of social and political reforms. Efforts were made to organize the group in order to make its action more effective. In 1931, for instance, a Pacto de Honra (Pact of Honor) was agreed upon by revolutionary young officers with the purpose of strengthening the new government.⁵ Later in that same year, a self-appointed Revolutionary Committee was established in Rio which issued a Proclamação ao Exército (Proclamation to the Army) trying to rally the military youth behind a reform program.⁶

This type of political mobilization could not fail to arouse the reaction of higher ranking officers who saw it as a threat to the hierarchy and a distortion of the proper role of the army. But it also antagonized other junior officers who had not joined the revolutionary movement and who felt their careers jeopardized by the re-admission into the army of hundreds of fellow officers expelled during the 1920s.⁷ This combined reaction materialized in a movement called União de Classe Militar (Unity of the Military Class), organized in 1931 with the open support of a group of generals, whose major goal was to rally the officers behind their hierarchical commanders and to oppose the political involvement of the military.⁸ As a consequence of this reaction, the reformist officers were forced to take their political action outside the organization into the broader political arena. The Clube 3 de Outubro (Third of October Club), organized in 1931, represented the major instrument of the new strategy. Among its military members, the overwhelming majority (85 percent) consisted of captains and lieutenants. But the Clube had also its drawbacks: the enlarged arena brought in new enemies among the civilian elites and it was less efficient as an instrument of military mobilization.⁹

Less visible but no less serious from the point of view of the military organization were conflicts involving non-commissioned officers, particularly sergeants. Overlooked by the literature, the role of the NCOs was nevertheless very important in all movements led by lower-ranking officers, including the 1930 revolution.¹⁰ But NCOs also engaged in movements of their own which usually took the form of revolts by small army units. The reaction of the officer corps was always strong and punishment harsh.¹¹ Examples of such revolts occurred in 1931, when sergeants and enlisted men took control of both the 25th Infantry Battalion of Teresina and the 21st Infantry Battalion of Recife. The same happened in 1932 with the 18th Infantry Battalion of Campo Grande. In Teresina the rebels went so far as to overthrow the interim governor and substitute a corporal in his place.¹² A vast conspiracy for a major revolt led by sergeants developed in São Paulo between 1933 and 1934. Its leader called himself the Fulgencio Batista of Brazil, referring to the sergeant who had just come to power in Cuba in the wake of a revolt of petty officers.¹³ The most radical formulation of the sergeants' cause can be found in an undated manifesto (probably of 1933) which argued that the NCOs were drawn from the proletariat, and that it was therefore their duty to rise in arms against the bourgeoisie.¹⁴

The army was thus divided both horizontally and vertically. The horizontal division set officers apart from NCOs and enlisted men; the vertical division separated interventionist and reformist elements from those who were against military involvement in politics and who in general were also more conservative. The first was a structural cleavage, derived from the model of military organization adopted in Brazil, and could not be eliminated without the complete reformulation of the model. Only its negative effects could be minimized by palliative measures. The second was ideological in nature and had to do with different conceptions of the proper role of the military in the political system. Three basic conceptions were at play, although not always clearly formulated by their advocates. They could be summarized as follows.

The first view reflected the traditional professional orientation developed within European armies and introduced in Brazil first by a small group of officers sent to Germany during the first decade of the century, and then particularly by the French military mission in operation since 1920. It was a creation of liberal democracies that had evolved from strong absolutist states. The bourgeois hegemony that had matured in these societies made possible, and even asked for, an army concerned mostly with external defense with little interference in internal politics: la grande muette as the French called it. It can be said that this was the position of the majority of the officer corps, certainly that of those who had not joined the 1930 movement. The clearest expression of this view can be found in the manifesto made public by the União da Classe Militar movement, already mentioned. One of the inspirers of this movement was B. Klinger, a German-trained general. Even Góes Monteiro, the military commander of the 1930 revolution, held the same view in 1925, reflecting the influence of the teachings of his French instructors: "In political struggles, the Army should remain the great mute . . . its true and only politics is the preparation for war" (Góes's emphasis).¹⁵

The second conception could be called reformist interventionism. It had its historical roots in the positivist influence among army officers that dated back to the second half of the nineteenth century. The rebellious young officers (tenentes) of the 1920s had absorbed this tradition and were joined by some of the old-time positivist officers still active in the 1930s.¹⁶ Its basic ideas can be found in the Proclamação ao Exército (Proclamation to the Army) issued in 1931 by the Revolutionary Committee mentioned above. The Proclamação called for an extensive program of political, social, and economic reforms, including agrarian reform, minimum salary and strike legislation, and the development of a national steel industry. It also asked for an increase in the size of the army and a merger of the state police forces into the army. Nations like Brazil, concluded the Proclamação, needed the tutelage of the army, the best organized and least depraved elite in the country.¹⁷ The most forceful formulation of this view of the role of the armed forces was expressed by a cadet in 1931: "The Army," he said, "is the vanguard of the people."¹⁸

The third view could be found among more radical officers and NCOs. In its more elaborate form, it reflected the influence of the Communist Party, whose prestige among the military had greatly increased after former army captain Luís Carlos Prestes had joined it in 1931. The model here was that of the popular army as it had developed during the fighting stages of the Russian and Chinese revolutions. Prestes himself in 1931 called upon soldiers and sailors to turn their weapons against their officers, who were--according to him--"the lackeys of the bourgeoisie."¹⁹ After the defeat of the Communist-led rebellion of 1935, particular attention was given to the formation of a popular revolutionary militia. The model called for a complete change in the military structure and hierarchy and for a radically different conception of the role of the armed forces based on the alliance of soldiers, workers, and peasants.²⁰

In the political circumstances of the time, however, the first and third conceptions were completely unrealistic. In a time of political turmoil, of realignment of social and political forces, the military could not possibly stay away from politics, particularly after being in large part responsible for initiating the changes. Many of the so-called professionals found themselves leading protests and rebellions in open contradiction with their own views. As we have seen, the military leader of the revolution, Góes Monteiro, had been a strong believer in professionalism. Another outspoken professional, B. Klinger, ended up as military commander of the 1932 Paulista civil war. A popular army was also very difficult to organize. For one thing, the most aggressive sectors of the working class had a long tradition of anti-militarism due to anarchist influences that went back to the beginning of the century. For another, the NCOs and enlisted men, not to mention the officers, were much too oriented toward their own organization, as a result of repeated re-enlistments, to be able to effectively mobilize workers and peasants. As far as the reformist-interventionist group was concerned, it was caught on the horns of a dilemma: to implement its reforms it had to gain control of the military organization; but by trying to do so, it could not fail to disrupt the hierarchy, since the bulk of the group was formed by junior officers; and by disrupting the hierarchy they could not help but reduce the power of the organization and its capacity to successfully intervene in the political arena.

Out of this impasse, a fourth conception slowly took shape, coming to full realization in 1937 with the Estado novo. For lack of a better expression, we will call it controlling interventionism. It came about by virtue of an alliance that brought together the reformist and professional groups. The latter accepted interventionism, provided it was done under the control of the hierarchy; the former accepted hierarchical control, provided it agreed to intervene. The hybrid that resulted was certainly hierarchical and interventionist but hardly reformist. We will look next at some of the major changes implemented by the coalition which managed to win control of the army, displacing, at least for the time being, the rival factions.²¹

The Opening of Society to the Army

One point on which almost all of the military could agree was the need to strengthen the military organization itself in terms of size, better weapons, greater share of the federal budget, control of the state police forces, etc. But the basic aspect of military power--almost a sine qua non for the rest, and one for which the army had been fighting for almost a century--was the implementation of an effective universal draft system. If in Europe the democratization of the absolutist state required the opening of the armies (that is, their officer corps) to society (that is, to the bourgeoisie), in Brazil the consolidation of the power of the army required the opening of society to the army's penetration, and this could only be achieved through the implementation of an effective universal draft system.

The relationship between modern armies and society could be described in terms of backward and forward linkages, borrowing the well-known concepts coined by Albert O. Hirschman. The first indicates the inflow of people from society into the army, the second the outflow of people from the army into society. In Brazil in the early 1930s, both linkages were very weak, and the Brazilian army was very much isolated from important sectors of society. Looking first at backward linkages, despite the introduction of a universal draft system in 1916, the picture that emerged was one of an army that recruited its enlisted men almost exclusively from the poorest sectors of the population and mostly through coercion. NCOs came from the ranks, and officers were recruited either from the NCOs or from sons of military, the remaining minority coming from civilian low middle sectors. Despite a long struggle, intensified after the return of the officers sent to Germany and during the first World War, the army was still basically unable to force into the enlisted ranks the sons of the middle and upper classes. The open and disguised opposition of the civilian elites had been always effective in preventing a universal draft from being fully implemented, to the desolation of army chiefs who envied the Argentine success in this same matter since 1911.²²

As far as forward linkages were concerned, the situation was also discouraging. Such linkages were almost nil. Despite some small changes that had taken place since 1916, the army was still an almost totally professionalized body from officers to enlisted men. The only way to leave the organization was by expulsion or by completion of 25 to 30 years of service. There was no training of reserve officers and very little of enlisted men. As a consequence, mobilization capacity was close to non-existent, making the armed forces in general and the army in particular a very ineffective instrument of national defense. The isolation also crippled the social and political power of the military establishment to the extent that it prevented it from influencing important sectors of the population in a direction more favorable to the interests of the armed forces and of national defense.

By the end of the Estado novo, in 1945, this picture had been substantially changed. Several punitive measures had been introduced in the period (consolidated in the 1939 draft law) seeking to prevent the time-honored national habit of draft dodging. A certificate of military service was required of all candidates applying for public office and of all prospective voters; penalties were introduced to punish draft dodgers and fees were imposed on those from whom service was not required. Góes Monteiro, as Minister of War in 1934, went so far as to attempt to extend the draft to women.²³ In addition, new mechanisms had been either revitalized or recreated to provide military training--for instance, the Tiros de Guerra, which were given new life, and the many Escolas de Instrução Militar, devised to provide initial military training to high school students. In 1939, nearly 500 Tiros and Escolas were active in the country.²⁴ Improvements in the quality of life within the barracks and in the military school system had also made the career of NCOs more attractive to members of the petty bourgeoisie. Graduates of preparatory schools who were not able to enter the Military Academy were admitted into the army as sergeants, substantially improving the educational level of this particular group. As far as the officers were concerned, the new visibility and political importance of the military had also enhanced the image of the career among members of the middle and upper classes, who began to consider it as a possible alternative to the traditional degrees in law, medicine, and engineering. But coercion was also applied here, and a reserve officer training program was introduced and imposed on all male university students, thus forcing the sons of the upper classes into military service for the first time.²⁵

By 1945, the military organization was linked to society by several strong backward and forward linkages. The draft was reaching all sectors of the population, although admittedly still not on an equal basis. Thousands of citizens were moving annually in and out of the army. The enlisted men had been completely deprofessionalized and efforts had also been made to enlist NCOs on a temporary basis.²⁶ A national army had emerged, based on a professional officer corps, capable of penetrating all strata of the population and of mobilizing an increasing number of trained reserves. It was a substantial departure from the weak and isolated institution still in existence at the beginning of the decade.

There was, for sure, a clear military meaning to this transformation. Since the arrival of the German-trained officers, and particularly since the first World War and the French mission, military leaders had been convinced of the idea that modern wars were waged not only between armies but between entire national populations--that modern wars were total wars. The capacity for mobilizing the whole nation was clearly seen as a requirement of modern warfare. The example of Argentina--the most likely enemy Brazil would face in an international war, according to the strategic doctrine of the time--was frequently mentioned to further stress the military importance of the changes being implemented.

But the political connotations were no less relevant. In 1930 the army was placed at the center of national power and presented itself as the incarnation of national interests, above regional and partisan factionalism. But given its isolation, it could not have any impact on the population, not only in terms of military preparedness--of the discipline of the bodies, as Foucault would put it--but also of the discipline of the minds. The latter was crucial because it was to some vices of the mind, as they were called, such as aversion to discipline, pacifism, and liberalism, that the military attributed the lack of concern for national defense among the elite and the dislike of military service among the population in general.²⁷ Hence the importance of the struggle for the minds, not only in terms of fighting Communist ideas, but also of infusing new values and beliefs seen as more compatible with the requirements of national defense, such as nationalism, the inevitability of war, the importance of military preparation, and the need for a strong government capable of promoting the defense and progress of the country. The new linkages that were created made possible the implementation of this effort, particularly through the teaching of morals and civics to thousands of Brazilians who were now every year brought into contact with the army. With some exaggeration, the new situation was aptly described by the title of a 1941 article published in A Defesa Nacional, which read: "The Nation today is an immense barrack." It bears noticing that the author of the article was a noted Paulista poet, Menotti del Picchia.

The Closing of the Army to Society

One possible consequence of opening society to the army, however, was to open the army to society, to make it more vulnerable to external influences. This consequence could be acceptable to some reformist elements, represented by the cadet quoted above. But it was unacceptable to the professional group and to the officer corps in general, and considered detrimental to the integrity of the organization. In fact, the introduction of external cleavages into the armed forces, of political factionalism, was seen by many as a major obstacle to building a strong, disciplined, and efficient military apparatus.²⁸ The power of the army as a political actor would also be threatened by internal divisions.

Therefore, a parallel effort was made by the victorious coalition to close the army to society, that is, to prevent it from being contaminated by external conflicts. And since the only true professional group was now the officer corps, attention was concentrated on its recruitment and training. One first set of measures sought to increase the distance between officers and NCOs. The promotion regulations of 1934 and 1937 reduced to a minimum the possibility of commissioning petty officers, a fairly common practice until then.²⁹ But the most important initiatives were directed toward the recruitment process into the Military Academy. First, access to the Academy was limited to candidates coming from military schools, preparatory courses, or the ranks. Next, several restrictions were introduced regarding candidates to all military schools, particularly to the Academy. The instructions for the 1942 entrance examination to the

Academy included restrictions relating to race, religion, family background, and ideology, which were also valid for candidates applying to the military schools and preparatory courses.³⁰ In practice, this meant the exclusion from the officer corps of Jews, blacks, sons of immigrants or of non-legally married parents, and candidates whose parents were suspected of having undesirable political ideas.³¹ Part of this discrimination, particularly that referring to Jews and blacks, can be attributed to the prevailing atmosphere of the time, strongly influenced by Nazi propaganda. But it is significant that the instructions for 1947, two years after the end of the war and of the Estado novo, still retained most of the limitations listed above.³²

Inside the military schools, the training itself began to give paramount importance to ideological indoctrination. A report written by an army captain in 1934 at the request of Minister of War Góes Monteiro recommended strong emphasis on ideological preparation as the very essence of the social policy of a modern army. This preparation was necessary, according to the captain, to face the parallel effort of Communism, and in its implementation there should be no hesitancy in following the Communists' own methods. In terms of practical measures, he suggested the teaching of morals and civics to enlisted men, of social economy to NCOs, and of sociology, of all things, to cadets. Several of his suggestions were implemented.³³

On the negative side, legislation was introduced trying expressly to forbid the participation of the military in partisan politics. Participation was intense during the first years after 1930, when the Clube 3 de Outubro and the military interventors acted as a true pressure group, to the irritation of other officers and especially of the civilian political elite. A first attempt to change this situation was made by Góes Monteiro in 1933 when he was a member of a committee in charge of drafting the new constitution. He proposed, and the committee went along for the most part, measures that amounted to an almost complete elimination of political participation by the military, including the right to vote. But the Constituent Assembly, which had among its members 20 military men, defeated the proposals and reproduced the very liberal dispositions of the 1891 Constitution.³⁴

The Communist-oriented uprising of 1935, however, made possible the introduction of drastic measures. Some of them--such as making officers' commissions revokable by decree, which was introduced in 1935 by Constitutional Amendment No. 2--was so strong that even Góes Monteiro opposed it as a potential factor of demoralization of the officer corps.³⁵ The Estado novo constitution of 1937 eliminated this point but accepted the 1933 suggestion to disenfranchise the military. This was the culmination of the attempt to isolate the army from external influences in order to transform it not only into an efficient fighting machine, but also into a powerful political actor. The implementation of this policy was the result of a long and frequently bloody fight which ended in the final victory of one military faction over its opponents. To this political struggle we now turn.

The Struggle for Hegemony

The process of moving from the situation of deep fragmentation described at the beginning of this paper to one of unified leadership in 1937 involved two basic aspects: the complete substitution of the pre-1930 high command, and the purge of the most active, or vocal, elements of the opposition. Given the hierarchical nature of the military organization, control of the top command positions at the level of general officer was a crucial step in controlling the organization as a whole. In this respect the position of the revolutionaries was a very precarious one in 1930. The revolution was conducted under the military leadership of a lieutenant-colonel and did not have the support of a single general on active duty. Góes Monteiro had to be awarded three promotions in little more than a year to make it possible for the group, by the end of 1932, to have one of its members in the highest post, capable of being appointed minister of war or army chief of staff.

But if it was possible to promote new generals, it was much more difficult, following normal procedures, to exclude from the army the generals promoted by the previous governments, many of whom were far from sympathetic to the new rulers. The opportunity to do so was provided by the 1932 revolt that took place in São Paulo with the support of many high-ranking officers. After a difficult victory, the government took advantage of the situation to get rid of opponents inside the army. In that same year, 48 officers were sent into exile, including 7 generals. In addition, 460 other officers were forced into retirement, the total number of expulsions amounting to 10 percent of the officer corps.³⁶ Many were granted an amnesty two years later, but few of the higher-ranking officers went back to active duty. With the help of the revolt, the government was able to renovate the army high command almost completely. By the end of 1933, 36 of the army's 40 generals had already been promoted by the new government. From this group, especially from those promoted after the 1932 revolt for their loyalty, came the bulk of the military leadership until 1945.

This leadership was consolidated around Góes Monteiro and Eurico Dutra, the former being the major formulator of the military policy of the time, the latter its major executor. The two monopolized the highest military posts after 1937--Góes Monteiro was army chief of staff from 1937 to 1943 and Dutra was minister of war from 1937 to 1945, when he resigned to run for the presidency, being replaced by Góes Monteiro. Góes was also minister of war from 1934 to 1935.³⁷ The only major conflict among the members of this new leadership took place in 1937 when the Ação Integralista Brasileira (AIB), a para-fascist political organization, was closed down by the Estado novo. There were protests from several generals and 10 of them were forced into retirement. The fact that this purge could be carried out without trauma indicates that the hegemony of the group was by then well-established.

A further opportunity to purge dissident elements was provided by the Communist-oriented rebellions of 1935 and the Integralista-attempted putsch of 1938. At least 107 officers and 1,136 non-commissioned officers and soldiers were expelled from the army between 1935 and 1936 (the 1938 purge was primarily directed toward the navy where the Integralistas enjoyed strong support).³⁸ And it must be added that exclusion from the army was only the tip of the iceberg. Many other less drastic forms of punishment were used which frequently resulted in irrevocable harm to an officer's career, such as imprisonment, transfer, reprimand, etc. An indication of an increase in such punitive measures was the number of appeals to the Supreme Military Court, which jumped from 239 in 1934, to 824 in 1935, to 910 in 1938. The number of convictions by this court also increased from 139, to 369, to 616 in the same years.³⁹ Testimony of officers who lived through this period speaks of a generalized atmosphere of fear, mostly after 1935, when a stiff National Security Law was passed, complemented by the establishment of a National Security Court in 1936, and of special committees to investigate the political activities of radical groups.⁴⁰ Some of these groups, such as the Aliança Nacional Libertadora or ANL (National Liberation Alliance), and the Ação Integralista Brasileira, had strong military participation and were the promoters of the 1935 and 1938 revolts. The ANL was closed down in 1935 and the AIB in 1938, and many of their military members were brought before the National Security Court.⁴¹

Fierce political infighting and coercion thus accompanied the formation of a new hegemonic group within the armed forces, particularly the army. More on the political project of this group and on the relationships between its emergence and the overall political picture will be said in the last section. First, however, it will be useful to show other measures taken to strengthen the power of the military organization in its more specific goal of achieving a monopoly over the physical means of coercion.

The Growth of Military Power

The changes in recruitment patterns, training, and promotion systems that we saw above were only part of the project to consolidate the military and political power of the armed forces. A necessary complement had to do with increasing the size of the military apparatus and improving its equipment, both of course dependent on a greater share of the national budget being allocated to national defense. Again, the struggle for these goals, on the part of both the army and the navy, had been going on for a long time. The ministerial relatórios since imperial times refer to the complaints regarding what the military believed to be a lack of understanding on the part of the civilian political elites of the needs of national defense. After 1930, with the increased political leverage by the armed forces, the demands did not fall on deaf ears. The results in terms of size of the army can be seen in Table 2.

TABLE 2

SIZE OF THE ARMY, 1930-1944

Category	1930	1932	1934	1936	1940	1944
Officers	4,185	5,037	6,103	6,585	6,429	10,087
NCOs and Enlisted	43,812	57,358	74,079	74,284	---	161,213
TOTAL	47,997	62,395	80,182	80,869	93,000	171,300

Sources: for 1930, 1932, 1934, 1940, Almanaque do Ministério da Guerra, years of 1931, 1933, 1935, 1937, 1941. The figure for NCOs and enlisted men for 1936 was taken from Coleção de Leis (Law 131 of Dec. 9, 1955). The total for 1940 can be found in Gen. Eurico Dutra, O Exército em Dez Anos de Governo do Presidente Vargas, p. 27. For 1944, GV 44.06.00. Figures for this last year include cadets and those enrolled in reserve officer training. Table 2 was organized by Lúcia Lobo.

Despite the difficulties in finding reliable data (the relatórios of the minister of war stopped giving them), Table 2 should represent near reality. If we exclude the year 1944 because of its exceptional nature--Brazil had actively joined in the war effort--it remains true that the size of the army doubled between 1930 and 1940, with great jumps in 1932 and after the establishment of the Estado novo. The importance of the change is further enhanced if we take into account the large number of reserve officers and enlisted men being trained. It has been calculated, for example, that only 51 percent of the lieutenants sent to Italy with the Brazilian expeditionary force came from the ranks of the professional military; the remaining 49 percent were recruited among the reserve officers.⁴²

Another indication of the significance of the change is that the size of the state police forces increased by only 28 percent between 1933 and 1942 (from 38,213 to 48,812). And most of this increase took place before 1937. After the Estado novo had been proclaimed, their size remained almost stable, and other measures were taken to assure the supremacy of the federal army--such as putting the military police forces under the control of the ministry of war and forbidding them the use of heavy weapons. This was a turning point in the republican history of the country. Before 1930 in several important states, such as São Paulo and Minas Gerais, the military police was a force of equal, if not greater, strength than the local garrisons of the federal army. This situation was utterly unacceptable to the latter, and its leaders had long been asking that it be changed. Now, for the first time, and irreversibly, the army had achieved supremacy over the coercive apparatus.⁴³

The material means to make the change possible had to come for the most part from the federal budget. The evolution of military expenditures during the period is shown in Table 3:

TABLE 3

MILITARY EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE FEDERAL BUDGET, 1929-1946

Years	Ministries			Total
	Army	Navy	Air Force	
1929	12.5	7.2		19.7
1930	12.3	7.3		19.6
1931	13.5	6.0		19.5
1932	25.0	6.4		31.4
1933	17.6	7.3		24.9
1934	19.6	7.6		27.2
1935	18.1	6.7		24.8
1936	17.6	6.7		24.3
1937	19.9	9.7		29.6
1938	19.2	11.2		30.4
1939	18.1	7.2		25.3
1940	19.0	7.8		26.8
1941	19.3	7.3		26.6
1942	23.5	7.5	5.5	36.5
1943	17.4	7.0	5.8	30.2
1944	18.4	7.2	6.5	32.1
1945	16.3	6.3	6.3	28.9
1946	18.8	7.8	9.2	35.8

Source: Balanços da União, 1929-1946.

It can be seen that there was an increase of 16 percent in military expenditures, with peaks in 1932, due to the civil war; in 1937, when the navy was especially rewarded; and in 1942, with the creation of the air force. And it must be added that real expenditures for the war years were much higher, since Table 3 does not include the resources provided by the Lend-Lease bill, which in 1942 were set at US\$200 million and were earmarked for the purchase of weapons and equipment at 35 percent of the real value.⁴⁴ The Força Expedicionária Brasileira (FEB) was also armed and equipped by the U.S. Fifth Army at an approximate cost of US\$20 million, fully borne by the United States. After the war, the sale of U.S. weapons would continue under the special provisions of the War Surplus Plan.⁴⁵

One revealing aspect of the military budget is that a good part of the allocations, sometimes over 50 percent, was made under special provisions that protected it from the scrutiny of congressmen.⁴⁶ The fact indicates the continuing suspicion about the willingness of civilian politicians to increase defense expenditures. That this

suspicion was somewhat justified became clear in 1935 when the government sent to congress a project drafted by the ministers of war and navy raising the salaries of military personnel. There was a heated debate, which spilled over into the press, arousing popular opposition. The reaction of the military was also very strong. The minister of war threatened to resign and there was even talk of a possible military coup. Congress finally passed a compromise bill also increasing the salaries of civil servants, but the president vetoed this addition.⁴⁷

The incident was important not only because it revealed the continuing reluctance of politicians to accept increases in military expenditures, but also because it showed a disagreement among generals themselves regarding the radical position of the minister of war, Góes Monteiro. Some accused the minister of holding caudilistic tendencies and were wholeheartedly supported by civilian leaders with presidential ambitions, such as the governor of Rio Grande do Sul, Flores da Cunha. Presidential elections were scheduled for 1937, and it was in the interest of Flores to avoid a military coup, particularly one led by Góes whose ideas on the need to strengthen the federal government and curtail the power of the states were well known. Flores finally managed to get Góes out of the ministry, prompting his angry remarks about "devilish political plans" against the armed forces and "machinations against the existence of the Army."⁴⁸ The conflict further convinced Góes Monteiro and his close associates of the great difficulty that lay in the way of preventing politics from dividing the army. Trying to isolate the organization was possible only up to a certain point. As long as regional, social, and political cleavages continued to divide society, the armed forces could not be safe from contamination-- that is, politics would continue to be practiced inside the army, preventing the implementation of the politics of the army, according to Góes Monteiro's own formula coined at the beginning of the decade.⁴⁹

The Estado novo, by eliminating party politics in society, would also allow the army chiefs to eliminate party politics from the armed forces and to implement the politics as well as policies of the army. In regard to the military itself, the goal was to further strengthen its power by increasing its resources, reforming its structure, and enhancing its professional capability. The substantial increase in budgetary allocation for both the army and the navy in 1937 and 1938 is an indication of the sort of bargaining that was behind the establishment of the new regime. The report of the minister of war in 1940 reveals how the resources were used: all of the basic regulations of the army (recruitment, training, promotion, etc.) had been reformulated; new schools and barracks had been built; new army corps had been created; new equipment and weapons had been procured, either by buying them abroad or by getting national industry to manufacture them.⁵⁰ Such policy had the full support of the more professionally oriented officers, even when in disagreement with the more general political orientations of the regime. A good illustration here is the case of General Leitão de Carvalho, a member of the German-trained group and a political liberal. As commander of the 3rd Military Region he was able to fulfill his professional dream of

dedicating a full year to the training of his troops, without any interruption caused by political disturbances, and to culminate it by the perfect planning and execution of imposing maneuvers attended by the president of the republic himself. In his speech celebrating the conclusion of the maneuvers, Leitão de Carvalho credited the event to the "establishment of a regime of political peace and of real concern for the armed forces."⁵¹

It was a perfect example of the coalition between professionals and interventionists. Political intervention by the organization as such, under the control of the hierarchy, was accepted by the professionals insofar as it could be beneficial to the specific interests of the military establishment. By enhancing these interests, the interventionists were also improving their capacity of political control over society and polity. This last aspect will be discussed next.

The Armed Forces and National Politics

If the transformations of the military establishment that we have been discussing had behind them some sort of internal logic, it is no less true that they were also part of the larger picture that encompassed the whole fabric of Brazilian society. It is important now to broaden our analytical perspective to capture this larger picture and the additional meaning that it may impart to the question of the political role of the armed forces.

Soon after the 1930 revolution, its civilian leaders pondered the wisdom of their decision to accept the partnership of the military. The most influential among these leaders, Osvaldo Aranha, immediately sensed the danger of a military dictatorship and developed an effort to organize civilian political groups called "legions" to counteract it. The prestigious leader of Rio Grande do Sul, Borges de Medeiros, also feared the "sinister specter of militarism" haunting the country.⁵² But it was not only the prospect of a military government in itself that bothered Aranha. It was also, and primarily, the political orientation of the military group that was supporting the new government: "The militaristic tendency . . . took a new direction, much worse, letting itself become contaminated by leftism and even Communism! Look at Luís Carlos Prestes. In this way the Army, without unity but wounded by a lack of discipline instead, threatens to become a danger, not to the present order of things but to the fundamental institutions of the national organism." (Aranha's emphasis)⁵³

As if answering Aranha's charges, the Proclamação ao Exército launched a strong attack on the civilian politicians, especially those of Rio Grande do Sul and Minas Gerais, and called for the introduction of some social reforms, such as the division of latifúndia, that would be greatly detrimental to the interests of the dominant agrarian groups. According to the Proclamação, the "legions" proposed by Aranha were nothing less than fascist devices against freedom and against the army.⁵⁴ At that same moment, Prestes was calling on the soldiers to stage a radical revolution.

Aranha's view and that of the Revolutionary Committee pointed to some basic contradictions at the center of national political life between 1930 and 1937. The armed forces as an institution had interests that conflicted with those of the civilian elites as a politically dominant class; these interests called for changes in the regime to allow for greater centralization of the political system, less power to the regional oligarchies, control of the military police forces by the army, greater state intervention in the economy, etc. The leftist sectors of the armed forces, on the other side, had a reform program that contradicted the interests of the civilian elites as a socially dominant class, and could potentially challenge the nature of the State itself. If the political elites disliked the first, they feared the latter. Out of these conflicts, the solution that was arrived at in 1937 began to be worked out slowly.

The initial difficulty was that both sides, the armed forces and the civilian elites, were divided and could not present a unified front. We have described in detail the fragmentation of the former; the latter were in no better shape, since the revolution itself was in part a product of the antagonism among the strongest states of the federation, and the military defeat of the economically most powerful among them only increased the previous animosity. The first and more serious attempt at a coalition against the winners of 1930 took place in 1932, when the Paulista leaders managed to sort out their internal divergences and, with the support of dissident politicians from other states and of a sector of the armed forces, set in motion a military movement against the federal government. Their major demands were the re-establishment of a constitutional form of government, on the civilian side, and the restoration of discipline and hierarchy on the military side. It was an attack on the new regime and an attempt to go back to the power arrangement that had prevailed before the revolution. The revolt stood a good chance of winning, and it would have done so were it not for last-minute defections of some important allies, especially the Rio Grande do Sul leaders.⁵⁵

The results of this first round of the struggle were mixed. The federal government had won a military victory but felt that it was a close call and decided to speed up the process of bringing the country back to a constitutional government, according to the demands of the rebels; at the same time it began to curtail the power of the more reformist-oriented military that had been some of its major supporters. As far as the army was concerned, we have seen that the movement gave its leaders an opportunity to revamp the high command and to purge opposition elements, in addition to being an excuse to press the government for a greater share of the federal budget.⁵⁶ This further increased its political leverage in national life, as the still-divided political elites began to realize that there was no going back to the very decentralized regime of the Old Republic when the bargaining among major states was the secret to political stability. The inability of the state political elites to reconstruct civilian hegemony at the national level also opened the way to a greater role for the central government and the central state in general, of which the armed forces were now a major component.

The normalization of political life with the promulgation of the 1934 Constitution was accompanied by an upsurge of political mobilization unheard of in the history of the country. On the right, the AIB, inspired by European fascism, developed a strong program of mobilization and organization; on the left, the ANL, organized under the sponsorship of the Communist Party, did the same. Both movements were unwelcome to the political elites, more so the latter than the former, because the appeal to popular mobilization was deeply threatening to their traditional control of the population. The AIB also stressed political centralization and a strong role for the national state, which was not in the interest of the old elites either; it is not necessary to say that the reform program of the ANL was anathema to them. The picture was further complicated by the fact that both movements had substantial backing within the armed forces, the AIB within the navy, the ANL within the army. The position of the hierarchy regarding the AIB tended to be sympathetic, since there was agreement with several of their demands, not to mention their common concern with waging war against communism. What the military chiefs did not like was the mobilizing aspect of the AIB, and the fact that it tended to create a problem of multiple loyalties among its military members. The ANL was totally rejected since it tended to destroy the hierarchical backbone of the military organization and lead the country into a major social conflict.

The enlargement of the political arena and polarization of political forces were favored also by the struggles in the international scene, setting the stage for a new round in the internal power game. This happened in 1935, when the government ordered the closing down of the ANL, pushing its military members to a desperate attempt at a military rebellion a few months later. The reaction was immediate and drastic. The army used the event to further purge its ranks and developed a real civic cult around the victims of the rebellion. But, more important, under pressure from the military chiefs, the government was able to obtain the support of congress to pass the severe punitive legislation already mentioned and to approve the declaration of a state of siege.⁵⁷ The fear of social commotion had now overrun the disagreements among the various sectors of the elite, leading them to support for the first time, albeit grudgingly, the demands of an again more unified and more powerful armed forces. The question of the political regime, which was dominant in 1932, began to give way to the problem of the social basis of the state. The elite was now showing its willingness to compromise on the first to preserve the second.

The presidential campaign of 1937 provided the scenario for the last round. One of the candidates, initially supported by the government, gave to his campaign a popular flavor that was disturbing to government and elites in general: "By trying to directly please the popular classes," one observer noted, "he created a situation of general alarm." Another observer pointed out that the new presidential campaign was different from those preceding 1930: "This time," he wrote, "the social question is at the center. Social question means revolution. This is going to become a Spain."⁵⁸ This alleged threat to social order was skillfully manipulated by the government, and

particularly by the armed forces which gave publicity to a forged document pretending to be a Communist plan for taking over the government. In this tense political climate, and facing an uncertain outcome in the presidential elections, civilian leaders began to admit the possibility of a breach in the constitutional life of the country. Those who tried to resist--such as the governor of Rio Grande do Sul, Flores da Cunha, who went so far as to mobilize paramilitary troops in the old style of the First Republic--were forced to resign manu militari.⁵⁹ The purged and unified army was now seen as a bulwark of social order, having come a long way from the early 1930s when the elites had seen it as a threat to this same order. Even the governor of São Paulo, the powerful state that had always been at odds with the 1930 revolutionaries and whose former governor was a candidate in the presidential elections, came to accept the change in the regime.⁶⁰

And so, with the additional help of the authoritarian winds blowing from abroad and internally reinforced by the Integralistas, and aided also by the perception of an impending major international conflict, the Estado novo dictatorship was established in November 1937, under the guarantee and supervision of the armed forces. Congress was closed, political parties and organizations banned (the AIB was closed in 1938), and a new constitution imposed on the country. From the point of view of the hegemonic faction in the armed forces, the effort to eliminate politics from within the organization was now completed with the suppression of one of its major sources--politics outside the organization. And, true enough, as Table 1 shows, there was a drastic reduction in military incidents during the Estado novo, allowing the armed forces to engage in a vast plan of expansion and improvement.

The idea of the army as a politically neutral institution had completely disappeared, but so also had its conception of itself as an instrument of social reform, as the "vanguard of the people." Instead, the new ideology presented the army as an essential part of the state and an instrument of its policies. Azevedo Amaral, the major ideologue of the Estado novo, formulated the new conception with his usual straightforwardness: ". . . the essence of the regime involves the concept of the militarization of the state . . . and the Army . . . coexists with the very structure of the state, of which it constitutes the dynamic element of affirmation and defense"; and again: "State and nation constitute one unity completed by the perfect integration of the armed classes in the political organization as the executive force of the will of the state."⁶¹ That is, the army was now seen not as the vanguard of the people, but as the vanguard of the state.

As such, its policy went far beyond the promotion of its specific interests. Góes Monteiro himself in 1934 had sent a document to Vargas in which he had drafted the major lines of a vast plan of national reconstruction. The document called for the formulation of a policy of national defense and for the strengthening of the nation's military capabilities. But it also contained a strong criticism of the political situation, characterized by "moribund liberalism," by individualism, and

by regional cleavages; and of the economic situation that allowed for the existence of impoverished and ignorant masses together with exploitive elites and external domination. And it complained that "there is not a truly national policy, devised to bring about a well-defined and clear national destiny." In terms of specific policies, the document listed a long series of economic and political measures, ranging from the promotion of national industry, particularly the steel industry, to union organization, to regulation of the press, to developing civic and physical education, to the emphasis on national integration, to the regulation of economic life and to reform of the state apparatus. And it ended by observing that in countries like Brazil, "a well organized Army is the most powerful instrument the government has to educate the people, to consolidate the national spirit, to neutralize the corrosive tendencies introduced by immigration." (all emphases are Góes Monteiro's)⁶²

In good part, the Estado novo's policy followed these guidelines. Two days before the coup, Vargas wrote Aranha about the reform program which the new regime would try to implement. It included a strong emphasis on internal and external defense, on the strengthening of the armed forces, on economic development, on basic industries, on export promotion, etc.⁶³ The Estado novo was certainly the authoritarian regime that its enemies denounced at the time and still denounce today. But it was not only that. Behind it we can find a more ambitious project of national development under the sponsorship of the state and of its vanguard, the armed forces.⁶⁴

Conclusion

The national political crisis of 1930, putting an end to the coalition among major states of the federation as a basis for political and social stability, opened the way for a greater role of the armed forces as political actor. Some military leaders saw the opportunity and developed both an ideology of political intervention and a strategy to put it into practice. The ideology defined the armed forces, particularly the army, as an instrument of national defense in the broadest possible sense of this concept, including the control and mobilization of material and human resources and the elimination of political and ideological sources of national divisions. The strategy called, in a first moment, for the unification and strengthening of the military establishment in order to transform it into an efficient instrument of political action under the control of the hierarchy. In a second moment, political intervention was seen as a necessity not only to implement the broader project, but also to make possible the unification of the armed forces. The continuing division of the civilian elites, the emergence of new and threatening political forces, and the international environment contributed to the viability of the military project.

Although springing originally from the dynamics of the expansion of the military organization's power, the development we have described related to the whole of Brazilian society on the political side by guaranteeing the social basis of power of the political elites, and on the economic side by coinciding in many aspects with the interests of

an emerging industrial sector.⁶⁵ To put it more bluntly, the emphasis on political control, national integration, and industrialization was compatible with the new industrial bourgeois order that was in the making, although it was the antithesis of political liberalism.

The 1945 coup which put an end to the Estado novo did make possible the restoration of some degree of political liberalism. But it is significant that it was staged by the same military leaders who had supported the 1937 coup and that their motivations were in part identical in both cases: to prevent the disruption of social order endangered by the vast mobilization of the masses encouraged now by the president himself, who certainly had the Peronist example in mind.⁶⁶ There was also no purge in the armed forces after the coup of 1945, and they retained most of the influence they had acquired. The difficulty was that liberalization of the political system and the renewal of political life in society again made possible the emergence and radicalization of factions within the military organization, again crippling its capacity for political control. When political mobilization directly threatened the hierarchical foundations of the organization in late 1963 and early 1964, the stage was ready for a new conservative coalition that would restore military unity by purging the opposing groups, change the nature of the regime, and guarantee social order. It could be argued that in general terms the same logic of 1937 was present in 1964. So was, and more cogently, the difficulty of creating a bourgeois hegemony within the framework of political liberalism.

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¹This paper was based mostly on materials from the following archives, whose abbreviations are given in parentheses:

Arquivo de Exército, Rio de Janeiro (AE)
 Arquivo da Marinha, Rio de Janeiro (AM)
 Arquivo Nacional, Rio de Janeiro (AN)
 Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea
 do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro (CPDOC)
 Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC (GV)
 Arquivo Osvaldo Aranha, CPDOC (OA)
 Arquivo Bertholdo Klinger, CPDOC (BK)
 Coleção de Documentos Avulsos CPDOC (DA)
 Arquivo Góes Monteiro AN (GM)

and the following military publications:

Boletim do Exército, Rio de Janeiro (BE)
A Defesa Nacional, Rio de Janeiro (DN)
Revista Militar Brasileira, Rio de Janeiro (RMB)
Nação Armada, Rio de Janeiro (NA)

We are grateful to the director of the Arquivo Nacional at the time, Raul Lima, for allowing consultation of the Góes Monteiro papers. Unfortunately, the same cooperative attitude was not found at the Arquivo do Exército.

²Although using the expression "armed forces," we will be dealing here almost exclusively with the army. The navy presents some special characteristics that require equally special treatment. The 1930 revolution has been the subject of a fast-growing bibliography. For a review of this bibliography, see Lúcia Lippi Oliveira, Eduardo Rodrigues Gomes, and Maria Celina Whately, Elite Intelectual e Debate Político nos Anos 30; Uma Bibliografia Comentada da Revolução de 30 (CPDOC, 1979).

³It is important not to overlook the fact that only a minority of the officer corps actively joined the revolution. Even in Rio Grande do Sul, where the revolution started, not one army unit joined the movement as a whole and more than 300 officers presented themselves as prisoners to the rebel command. In Minas Gerais, the second most important state in the conspiracy, all army units resisted the initial attacks. A legalist view of the Rio Grande do Sul case can be seen in Estêvão Leitão de Carvalho, Dever Militar e Política Partidária (São Paulo, 1959), pp. 133-134. As far as the navy is concerned, the new minister recognized that it was totally alien to the movement and remained loyal to the government until the very end. See relatório of Minister Protógenes Guimarães (1931-1934), p. 16. On the military aspects of the revolution, see Lourival Coutinho, O General Góes Depõe (Rio de Janeiro, 1956), and Jordan Young, "Military Aspects of the 1930 Brazilian Revolution," Hispanic American Historical Review 44 (May 1964), 180-196.

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⁴Table 1 should be taken as a first attempt to draw a more precise picture of military unrest during the period. Further research, especially in newspapers, can alter the figures, although not in a drastic way. The classification according to the hierarchical echelons involved may also suffer some minor corrections as new information is gathered.

⁵"Pacto de Honra. Absolutamente Secreto," dated Feb. 24, 1931, GM. The Pacto was clearly reminiscent of the Pactos de Sangue (Blood Pacts) made by young officers in 1889 in support of Benjamin Constant, the leader of the republican movement within the army.

⁶The Proclamação ao Exército can be found in GV 31.06.01/1. Another document signed by Góes Monteiro, Juarez Távora, Eduardo Gomes, and others, was sent to Vargas in May 1931. In it, the revolutionary leaders recognized the chaotic situation of the army and recommended the continuation of the dictatorship until such time as their program could be implemented. See GV 31.05.02/1.

⁷The conflict became known as the picolés versus the rabanetes. The rebellion of 1922 alone had led to the expulsion of 600 cadets, most of whom were now trying to come back. The government had to intervene to solve the dispute, which was done through the creation of a parallel system of promotion for the returning officers. The proceedings of one of the meetings between the two factions with the representatives of the government are in GV 32.05.31/1.

⁸See União da Classe Militar, BKj 31.11.14 and BKj 31.11.28. Col. Bertholdo Klinger, and Gen. Tasso Fragoso and Mena Barreto, all linked to the movement which in the last moment tried to keep the 1930 revolution within the boundaries of military hierarchy, gave their explicit support to the manifesto. Another strong reaction to the Pacto do Honra was voiced by Capt. Heitor da Fontoura Rangel in a letter to Lt. A. Etchegoyen on Apr. 4, 1931. Rangel charged the promoters of the Pact with implanting anarchy and subversion within the army and of "Sovietizing it." See OA 31.04.03/8.

⁹See Clube 3 de Outubro, Fichas de Inscrição dos Sócios (CPDOC). Góes Monteiro claimed to have created the Clube to prevent the tenentes from discussing politics in the barracks. See Lourival Coutinho, O General Góes Depõe, p. 157. The importance of the Clube declined rapidly after Góes Monteiro and O. Aranha abandoned it in 1932. Several attempts were made, especially by Juarez Távora, to transform it into a political party, equally without success. GV 34.11.30/2 and OA 33.03.22/4. Flores da Cunha, the gaúcho leader, once referred to its members as "those crazy people" (malucos), OA 32.06.06/5. A classical interpretation of the political role of the tenente movement after 1930, one which differs from ours in important respects, can be found in Virgínio Santa Rosa, O Sentido do Tenentismo (Rio de Janeiro, 1933). See also Edgard Carone, O Tenentismo: Acontecimentos, Personagens, Programas (São Paulo, 1975), and Michael L. Conniff, "The Tenentes in Power: A New Perspective on the Brazilian Revolution of 1930," Journal of Latin American Studies, 10:1 (1978), 61-82.

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¹⁰The role of the NCOs in the revolution is stressed by Juarez Távora in Uma Vida e Muitas Lutas, vol. I (Rio de Janeiro, 1973), and also in an interview given by Jehovah Motta to CPDOC. The Proclamação ao Exército also refers to the fact that a good part of the revolutionary troops, both in the northeast and in the south, fought under the command of NCOs because three-fourths of the officers had been stripped of their posts, GV 31/06.01/1. This fact would become another source of difficulty after 1930.

¹¹A report by Lt. H. Ricardo Hall to Vargas on the conditions of some rebels imprisoned in Recife mentions that some of them had "their testicles broken by kicks," GV 32.02.01.

¹²On the rebellion of the 25th Infantry Battalion, see the interventor's telegrams to O. Aranha, OA 31/06/04/5,6,8. On the 21st Infantry Battalion the special dossier in OA 31.10.29/5. On the 18th Infantry Battalion, BKj 32.03.01, which includes the Boletins of the local headquarters and newspaper clippings. See also the memoirs of Paulo Cavalcanti, O Caso eu Conto como o Caso Foi. Da Coluna Prestes á Queda de Arraes (São Paulo, 1978), pp. 90-94.

¹³See Capt. Raimundo da Silva Barros' report to Gen. Daltro Filho, Feb. 24, 1934, GM. The popularity of Batista is attested by the fact that many sergeants had his picture in their suitcases, according to a letter by Delfino Rezendo to B. Klinger, BK 34.03.23. On the Cuban events, see Louis A. Perez, Jr., "Army Politics and the Collapse of the Cuban Officer Corps: The 'Sergeants' Revolt' of 1933," Journal of Latin American Studies, 6 (May 1974), 59-76.

¹⁴"Em Prol da Revolução Social. Aos Sargentos do Brasil," no date, GM. According to the manifesto, all NCOs should be given commissions and exclusive right to enroll at the Military Academy and Naval Academy. A secret circular ("Circular-Secreto") of 1933 also called for a general uprising of the NCOs. It was signed by 412 sergeants and the uprising was set for Sept. 6, 1933, when all officers were to be put under arrest, GM. The complaints of the NCOs were frequently taken to the president or other important political figures. See, for instance, OA 38.00.00/3 and OA 38.44.00.00/5. They also organized several associations aiming at providing social benefits for their members. The ministers of war were always suspicious of such associations lest they become politically oriented, assuming union-like characteristics. Examples of such concern can be seen in Aviso 398 of Sept. 9, 1937, in which the minister warned against the danger of Communist penetration through NCO associations. Sêe AE, Gabinete do Ministro, Cx. 1142; and also Cx. 1141 for the requirement that the recently created União Social dos Sargentos include a formal prohibition of political and religious discussion in its by-laws.

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¹⁵"O Destacamento Mariante no Paraná Ocidental (Reminiscências)," written in July 1925, GM. On the experience of the German-trained officers, see Estêvão Leitão de Carvalho, Memórias de um Soldado Legalista (Rio de Janeiro, 1961), tomo I, pp. 91-156. On the French mission, see Manuel Domingos Neto, L'Influence Étrangère dans la Modernization de l'Armée Brésilienne (1889-1930), thèse pour le Doctorat de IIIème Cycle (Paris III, 1979).

¹⁶Such was the case, for instance, of Gen. Ximeno de Villeroy, the biographer of Benjamin Constant, who wrote a long letter to O. Aranha defending the role of the army as a "faithful executor of national aspirations," OA 33.02.22/1. One important difference between the positivists and the tenentes was the latter's militaristic orientation, while the former tended to dissolve the soldier into the citizen. The fusion of the old positivist tradition with the new reformism becomes very clear in Roberto Sisson's Carta Aberta à Marinha de Guerra (Rio de Janeiro, 1937). Sisson was a former navy captain and former ANL secretary. He quotes Benjamin Constant and justifies military intervention for the good of the people.

¹⁷GV 31.06.01/1.

¹⁸Article in unidentified newspaper signed by "Cadete" in OAj 31.05.14.

¹⁹Diário da Noite of March 27, 1931, GV 31.03.28.

²⁰See "Organização Militar das Massas da ANL," undated, GM. See also several documents on the military organization of ANL in CDA/ANL.

²¹For factual information, see Hélio Silva's well-known series entitled O Ciclo de Vargas, vols. III to XIV (Rio de Janeiro), published by Civilização Brasileira. Also useful are Nelson Werneck Sodré's História Militar do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 1965), and the five volumes by Edgard Carone dealing with the period 1930-1945, published by Difel (São Paulo).

²²On the struggle for a universal draft system during the First Republic, see José Murilo de Carvalho, "As Forças Armadas na Primeira República: O Poder Desestabilizador," in Boris Fausto (ed.), História Geral da Civilização Brasileira, O Brasil Republicano (São Paulo, 1977), tomo III, vol. II, pp. 180-234, and Frank D. McCann, "The Nation in Arms: Obligatory Military Service during the Old Republic," in D. Alden and Warren Dean (eds.), Essays Concerning the Socioeconomic History of Brazil and Portuguese India (Gainesville, Fla., 1977), pp. 211-243. The first attempt to implement the draft law of 1908 occurred in 1916, under the impact of the war and of Olavo Bilac's popular campaign to end "the monstrous divorce" separating the army from the people. See Olavo Bilac, A Defesa Nacional (Rio de Janeiro, 1965). On the Argentine military, see Alain Rouquié, Pouvoir Militaire en République Argentine (Paris, 1978).

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²³See José Afonso Mendonça de Azevedo, Elaborando a Constituição Nacional (no place, no publisher, 1933), pp. 877-924. See also decree 22,885 of 1933, and the 1939 Lei de Serviço Militar. In his 1939 relatório, Minister Eurico Dutra even suggested the denial of access to the judicial system to those without a certificate of military service. The persistent difficulty in getting recruits for the army, despite the progress made since 1916, can be seen in the fact that as late of 1938 in the first Zona de Alistamento Militar there were 28,753 draft dodgers out of a total of 40,074 that were called, and only 6,398 did in fact enlist. See Relatório da Diretoria de Recrutamento referente ao ano de 1939, AE, Gabinete do Ministro, Armário 20, Cx. 66. The relatório of the minister for 1940 still complains of the continuing aversion of the population regarding military service, particularly among the better educated, one of whom suggested to O. Aranha the creation of different military units according to social class to avoid the embarrassment of middle-class recruits having to mix with those from lower classes, OA 44.03.17/1.

²⁴See Relatório da Diretoria de Recrutamento mentioned above. The Tiros existed since 1896 and the first attempt to introduce military training in high schools was made by Hermes da Fonseca, then minister of war, in 1908. Part of the new effort was spent in glorifying the figure of Olavo Bilac for his contribution in promoting the approximation of the citizen and the soldier. His birth date was made the National Reservists Day. For an example of such civic exaltation, see Ten-Cor. Mário Travassos, "Bilac-O Poeta-Soldado do Brasil," Anais do Exército Brasileiro (1939), pp. 365-377.

²⁵The training of reserve officers was done through the Núcleos de Preparação de Oficiais da Reserva (NPOR) and the Centros de Preparação de Oficiais da Reserva (CPOR). On the social origin of the cadets of the Military Academy between 1941 and 1943, see Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, 1971), p. 32.

²⁶Since 1937 (Aviso of May 31), an attempt was being made to prevent sergeants from re-engaging beyond a certain period of time. The military service law of 1939 recommended a maximum of nine years for their permanence in the service, causing serious inconveniences to many of those who were not prepared for a civilian life. One suggestion was made to transfer them to the civil service. See Cor. F. de Paula Cidade, Amparo aos Sargentos pelo seu Aproveitamento no Serviço Público Civil, RMB, 30 (abril, 1924), 229-232.

²⁷Blaming the civilian elites for the poor state of national defense was a common theme in the military literature of the time. As an example see Ten-Cor. Ascânio Vianna, As Elites Civis e a Defesa Nacional, DN, 20 (Jan. 1941), 193-197.

²⁸See, for example, Cap. Sérgio Marinho, Forças Armadas, Partidarismo e Política, DN, 22 (Jul. 1935), 806-809.

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²⁹According to decree 1351 of Febr. 7, 1891, the vacancies in the ranks of 2nd Lt., the first degree in an officer's career, were to be filled with both cadets and NCOs on a fifty-fifty basis. In 1934 the promotion of NCOs to 2nd. Lt. was permitted only in exceptional cases. In 1937 the possibility was not even mentioned.

³⁰BE, 40 (Oct. 3, 1942). For the military schools, BE, 18 (May 1, 1943), p. 1455. See also Um Grupo de Brasileiros, Relatório Secreto do Ministro da Guerra ao Chefe do Estado Novo (Rio, 1941), GM. On the training of officers in general, the best source is Jehovah Motta, Formação do Oficial do Exército (Rio de Janeiro, 1976).

³¹See Nelson Werneck Sodré, Memórias de um Soldado (Rio de Janeiro, 1967), pp. 182-190, where he describes his experience in helping to organize the São Paulo military school. The final decision regarding the acceptance of candidates belonged to the commander of the school and could not be appealed. Minister Dutra justified the restrictions on Jews and immigrants in the 1940 relatório and in a letter to Vargas dated Mar. 4, 1940, AE Minutas do Gabinete do Ministro.

³²See BE, 52 (Dec. 28, 1946), 4261. The emphasis on increasing selectivity regarding the officer corps in order to transform it into an "aristocracy" was shared by well-known opponents of the Estado novo such as Gen. José Pessoa. See his "O Problema da Formação do Corpo de Oficiais e os nossos Institutos de Ensino Militar," RMB, (Jan.-Jun, 1943), 5-13.

³³"Política Social do Exército. Plano elaborado de ordem do Exmo. Sr. Ministro da Guerra pelo capitão Severino Sombra," GM. Of this same captain, see O Exército e o Plano Nacional de Educação (Rio de Janeiro, 1936), and a series of articles entitled "Um Programa Pedagógico Militar," DN, 23, 260, 264, 265, 266 (1936). Sombra was in charge of the pedagogical section (Seção de Pedagogia) of DN. Sociology was in fact introduced at the Academy in 1940. See Motta, Formação do Oficial, p. 342. Another of his recommendations, the development of a military liturgy, was also heeded, particularly through the promotion of a civic cult around the figure of the Duque de Caxias, patron of the army.

³⁴See Azevedo, Elaborando a Constituição, pp. 877-924. The Constituent Assembly went even further than the 1891 Constitution in opening political participation to the military when it extended the right to vote to the NCOs. A strong criticism of the new constitution's failure to restrict political participation by the military was voiced in an editorial of DN, 21 (Jun., 1934), 283-286, entitled "A Execução da Reforma."

³⁵See Góes Monteiro, "Idéias para a substituição da Emenda no. 2," undated; also Góes's letter to his brother, federal deputy Manuel de Góes Monteiro, of Dec. 17, 1935, and a memorandum of Dec. 21, 1935, all in GM. There was talk in 1936 of a movement within the army to press for the repeal of the amendment. The commander of the 1st

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Military Region, Eurico Dutra, denied the existence of the movement and openly supported the measure, Boletim Reservado of May 25, 1935, GM.

³⁶For the number of exiles, see GV 32.12.05/2; for the forced retirements, BK 33.11.01; for the total number of officers, Table 2.

³⁷Góes and Dutra were also presidents of the Military Club between 1933 and 1936. From 1938 to 1943, their control of the military apparatus was complete, with the help of Gen. Meira Vasconcelos in the presidency of the Military Club. The first dissidence appeared only in 1944 with the election of Gen. José Pessoa, the opposition candidate, to the presidency of the Clube. See Theodorico Lopes e Gentil Torres, Ministros da Guerra do Brasil, 1808-1949 (Rio de Janeiro, 1949); EME, Síntese da Evolução Histórica do Estado-Maior do Exército (Período: 1896-1978); and Revista do Clube Militar. Góes's influence in the making of generals can be seen in a list of names he sent Vargas in 1934 with his personal evaluation of each candidate. Of the 45 colonels on the list, all of those he strongly recommended were promoted; of the 25 he considered mediocre, only 2 were made generals and this 4 years later; several others with positive evaluation were also promoted. AN S. P. E., no. 1556. On Góes Monteiro, see Coutinho, O General Góes Depõe, and Peter Seaborn Smith, "Góes Monteiro and the Role of the Army in Brazil," Instituté of Latin American Studies, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Australia, 1979. Smith's article contains the first analysis based on materials from Góes's papers. Marcos Bretas of CPDOC is also working with these papers, now made available to a larger sector of the public at the Arquivo Nacional.

³⁸For information on expulsions, see AE, Minutas do Gabinete do Ministro da Guerra; BE from 1935 to 1938; Boletins Internos of the 3rd Infantry Regiment, 29th and 21st Infantry Battalions; and lists of political prisoners at the Casa de Detenção and Casa de Correção of Rio de Janeiro. The lists were generously made available to us by Samuel Adamo. The computation was made by Vanda Aderaldo with the help of Marcos Bretas, and should be considered a first approximation. The years 1933 and 1934 were not included in the survey.

³⁹See, for 1934, Relatório do Ministro da Guerra (1934), p. 133; for 1935 and 1938, Relatório (1938), p. 81.

⁴⁰Interview of Gen. João Evangelista M. de Rocha by the author, Rio de Janeiro, Dec. 15, 1979. See also interview of Col. Kardec Lemme by the Centro de Memória Social Brasileira (Rio de Janeiro), July 7, 1974. On the National Security Court, see Reynaldo Rompeu de Campos, "O Tribunal de Segurança Nacional, 1936-1945" (M.A. thesis, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 1979). In 1935 a Comissão Central Militar de Repressão ao Comunismo was organized within the ministry of war. Among other tasks, it intended to make a list of all Communists within the army, to suggest punitive measures, to organize anti-Communist propaganda, and to involve the military police forces in the repressive effort. The condition of being a Communist or an

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extremist was to be indicated in the documents of transference or expulsion. See undated document "O Comunismo no Exército Sua Repressão," signed by Lt. Col. A. M. Moraes, GM. See also "Ação contra o Comunismo," document produced by the army general staff and sent by Góes Monteiro to Vargas on Nov. 8, 1934, AN, S. P. E., Lata 15, P. 3, Doc. 49,820.

⁴¹The penetration of AIB and ANL within the armed forces is the object of a special study at CPDOC by Vanda Aderaldo and Lúcia Lobo. On the AIB in general, see Hélió Trindade, Integralismo (O Fascismo Brasileiro na Década de 30) (São Paulo, 1979); on the 1938 Integralista attempted coup, see Hélió Silva, 1938: Terrorismo em Campo Verde (Rio de Janeiro, 1971); On the ANL, see Hélió Silva, A Revolta Vermelha (Rio de Janeiro, 1969), Agildo Barata, Vida de um Revolucionário; Memórias (Rio de Janeiro, 1962), Gregório Bezerra, Memórias (Rio de Janeiro, 1979), and Robert M. Levine, The Vargas Regime: The Critical Years, 1934-1938 (New York, 1970).

⁴²Interview of General Thório B. de Souza Lima, Clube Militar, Projecto de Memória Militar.

⁴³For the size of the police forces, Anuários Estatísticos of 1936 (pp. 411-412); 1930-1940 (pp. 1280-1281); 1941-1945 (pp. 515-516). For some examples of the position of army officers regarding the police forces, see editorial, "Polícias Militarizadas," DN 18 (Fev. 1931); and Ten-Cor. G. P. Gerper, "Exército e Polícias," DN, 21 (Ago., 1934), 430-432. Leitão de Carvalho in a letter to Góes Monteiro on Feb. 15, 1943 agreed that the only mission of the military police forces was to challenge the army, GM.

⁴⁴On Lend-Lease, see the dossier of the Souza Costa mission, GV 42.01.30 and Vargas to Martins, GV 42.03.17. On U.S.-Brazilian relations at the time, see Frank D. McCann, Jr., The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937-1945 (Princeton, N.J., 1973), and Gerson Moura, Autonomia na Dependência; a Política Externa Brasileira de 1935 a 1942 (Rio de Janeiro, 1980). For a criticism of McCann's book, see Stanley E. Hilton, "Brazilian Diplomacy and the Washington-Rio de Janeiro 'Axis' during the World War II Era," HAHR, 59 (May 1975), 201-231.

⁴⁵See dossier on FEB, GV 44.06.00, especially Mascarenhas to Vargas, Oct. 12, 1944; and Martins to Vargas, GV 45.10.01/2.

⁴⁶This was possible through the use of special, supplementary, or extraordinary credits. See Balanços Orçamentários da União for the various years. Most of the fight for a bigger share of the budget in these circumstances took place between the military ministers and the minister of finance, with the eventual mediation of the president of the republic. See, for instance, the correspondence between Souza Costa and Dutra, GV 40.11.04; E. Santo Cardoso and O. Aranha, OA 32.12.12/1; Góes Monteiro and O. Aranha, OA 34.07.19; João Gomes and Vargas, AE, Correspondência do Ministro, Nov. 26, 1935. During the Estado novo there were confidential decrees allocating resources to the purchase of weapons. For an example of such decrees, see AE, Minutas do Gabinete do Ministro, Nov. 24, 1944.

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⁴⁷There is abundant documentation on the crisis. See dossier in GV 35.04.09/3 and GV 35.04.10. See also Diário do Poder Legislativo, Ano II, vol. 2 (1935). In 1943 with the congress closed, there would be no opposition to a new increase in military pay.

⁴⁸See his speech when transferring the post to a new minister in Anais de Câmara dos Deputados (1935), p. 497.

⁴⁹Gões Monteiro, A Revolução de 30 e a Finalidade Política do Exército (Rio de Janeiro, no date), p. 163. An elaboration of the idea of a conflict between the development of internal military factions and the interests of the organization as a whole can be found in Alain Rouquié (ed.), Les Partis Militaires au Brésil (Paris, 1980), especially the chapter by Rouquié, pp. 9-24. See also Edmundo Campos Coelho, Em Busca de Identidade: O Exército e a Política na Sociedade Brasileira (Rio de Janeiro, 1976), and Carvalho, "As Forças Armadas na Primeira República."

⁵⁰See Gen. Eurico Gaspar Dutra, O Exército em Dez Anos de Governo do Presidente Vargas (Rio de Janeiro, 1941). Dutra's orientation as minister was summarized in the slogan: "towards the barracks." See editorial, "Seis Anos na Pasta da Guerra," NA, 37 (Dez., 1942), 3-8.

⁵¹In GVj 40.03.19/6.

⁵²OA 31.03.31/4, letter to O. Aranha.

⁵³OA 31.03.26/3, and OA 31.03.12/9, both letters from Aranha to Borges de Medeiros.

⁵⁴GV 31.06.01/1.

⁵⁵See the desperate telegrams sent by O. Aranha to Flores da Cunha to secure his loyalty to the federal government, OA 32.07.14/2. Gões Monteiro, as commander of the federal troops, recognized in several instances the generalized sympathy of civilians and military alike toward the cause of the rebels, OA 32.07.26, OA 32.09.01/2, and BK 34.01.15. He also admitted the possibility of a military victory for the Paulistas, even without the support from other states. See his "Notas sobre as Operações do Destacamento do Exército do Leste," GV 32.07.21/2, and "Memória no. 3.," GV 32.08.09/1. This possibility was denied by one of the military leaders of the rebellion. See Euclides Figueiredo, Contribuição para a História da Revolução Constitucionalista de 1932 (São Paulo, 1977), especially pp. 299-302. Also informative is Hêlio Silva, 1932: a Guerra Paulista (Rio de Janeiro, 1967).

⁵⁶There was also a large purchase of weapons, according to dossiers in OA 32.07.14/6 and OA 32.12.12/1. The president of the Banco do Brasil calculated the total cost of the purchases at British £1.1 million. About 80 military aircraft were bought, creating, de facto, military aviation in the country (legally created in 1926).

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⁵⁷Góes Monteiro went as far as to suggest a military coup, abandoning the alternative when he felt that there was not enough support for such a drastic measure at the time. See "Voto do General Góes na Reunião dos Generais, presidida pelo Ministro da Guerra, de 3 de dezembro de 1935," GM. The 27th of November, the date of the ANL uprising in Rio, became a day of civic commemoration and an opportunity for vicious attacks on Communism and communists. For some examples of this oratory, see Anais do Exército Brasileiro (1939), pp. 133-140, and (1940), pp. 175-177.

⁵⁸Carlos Oliveira Vianna to O. Aranha, OA 37.09.04/4, and José Soares Maciel Filho to O. Aranha, OA 37.07.12/2. See also Alfredo E. de Souza Aranha to O. Aranha, OA 37.09.06/2. and again Maciel Filho to O. Aranha, OA 37.09.01.

⁵⁹On the crisis in Rio Grande do Sul, see the rich documentation of the dossiers in GV 37.01.04/1, GV 37.10.01/1, and GV 37.05.01. See also the report by Gen. Daltro Filho, GVj 37.11.04/2. The governors of Pernambuco and Bahia also disagreed with the plans for the coup and were replaced. On the alleged Communist plan, the Plano Cohen, see the conflicting views in Coutinho, O General Góes Depõe, and in Olympio Mourão Filho, Memórias, A verdade de um Revolucionário (Porto Alegre, 1978).

⁶⁰His support for the incoming coup was communicated to Vargas in a telegram sent by B. Valadares, GV 37.11.03. The favorable disposition of other governors can be found in another telegram, GV 37.10.27/2. Soon after the coup, the Paulista Republican Party (PRP) pledged its support to Vargas, GV 37.12.11. On the coup itself, see Hélio Silva, 1937: Todos os Golpes se Parecem (Rio de Janeiro, 1970).

⁶¹Azevedo Amaral, "O Exército e a Educação Nacional," NA, 4 (Mar., 1940), 29.

⁶²See GV 34.01.18/2 and GV 34.01.00/3. The document was sent also to O. Aranha, OA 34.01.29/2. The same conviction about the need for a new concept of the role of the armed forces, away from the tradition of the Grande Muette, can be found in Cap. Sérgio Marinho, "Forças Armadas, Partidarismo e Política," DN, 22 (Jul., 1935), 806-801.

⁶³OA 37.11.08/2.

⁶⁴The developmental and nationalist aspects of the Estado novo explain the support given the regime by some of its former enemies. This was the case, for instance, of Roberto Sisson, former secretary of ANL and exiled in Uruguay. Sisson made public his support in 1939, GV 39.04.03. Another ANL member, former Major Alcedo B. Cavalcanti, disagreed with Sisson's position in a letter published in El Dia of Montevideo on Apr. 13, 1939, GM.

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⁶⁵Both the navy and the army intensified their industrial activities and tried to involve the civilian industry as well, through incentives, preference to national products, technical assistance, etc. Army officers were involved in the promotion and construction of the Volta Redonda steel plant, in the Fábrica Nacional de Motores, in the Lagoa Santa aircraft factory, in the efforts to develop a national oil industry, etc. See relatórios of the navy minister for the years 1936 and 1937-1938-1939; the Aviso 128, of Nov. 28, 1939 of the minister of war; the Relatório da Diretoria do Material Bélico no ano de 1939; and also Gen. A. Sílio Portela, "A Cooperação da Indústria Civil na Defesa Nacional," NA, 13 (Dez., 1940), 17-19. The positive impact of military action on the industrialization efforts was studied by John D. Wirth in The Politics of Brazilian Development, 1930-1954 (Stanford, 1970). Stanley E. Hilton's criticism of this book refers to what he considers an excessive weight given by Wirth to the role of the military in promoting industrialization. He does not, and could not on the face of available evidence, deny the great interest of the military in the development of defense-related industries and their concrete efforts in promoting them, particularly after the beginning of the war. See Stanley E. Hilton, "Military Influence on Brazilian Economic Policy, 1930-1945: A Different View," HAHR, 53 (Feb. 1973), 71-94. On the industrial bourgeoisie in this period, see Eli Diniz, Empresário, Estado e Capitalismo no Brasil: 1930-1945 (Rio de Janeiro, 1978).

⁶⁶The pro-Vargas "queremista" movement was promoting mass meetings in major cities. One such meeting was said to have gathered 200,000 people in São Paulo, GV 45.10.17. There was talk of a general strike promoted by the Communist Party, GV 45.10.13/1. Vargas himself in a draft of a manifesto he apparently planned to make public by the time of his resignation, mentioned his concern for the well-being of the poor and the needy as the cause for having become "a motive for worry to the powerful, to the rulers of the moment," GV 45.10.29/2. In an earlier draft of a speech, he wrote against "the robber barons of industry and commerce," and the professional politicians and of the support he had from the people, especially the "proletarian classes," GV 45.08.00/2. Vargas and Perón had been observing each other's political moves at least since the beginning of 1944. Initially Perón was admittedly inspired by Vargas's labor policy, later Vargas seems to have become the disciple. On Perón's indebtedness to Vargas, see Caio to Vergara, Aug. 31, 1944; Caio to Vargas, Sept. 22, 1944; and Caio to Vargas, Oct. 20, 1944, all in GV 44.01.15.