LATIN AMERICAN PROGRAM

THE WILSON CENTER

SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION BUILDING WASHINGTON, D.C.

WORKING PAPERS

Number 96

THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES, DIPLOMATIC DECOLONISATION AND RELOCATION: RELATIONS WITH HEMISPHERIC MIDDLE POWERS

Vaughan Lewis
Director, Institute of Social-Economic Research,
University of the West Indies, Jamaica

Number 96

THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES, DIPLOMATIC DECOLONISATION AND RELOCATION: RELATIONS WITH HEMISPHERIC MIDDLE POWERS

Vaughan Lewis
Director, Institute of Social-Economic Research,
University of the West Indies, Jamaica

Author's note: This paper was presented at a July 22, 1981 colloquium sponsored by the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C., 20560. The paper should not be quoted or distributed without the author's permission.

1981

This essay is one of a series of Working Papers of the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Dr. Michael Grow oversees preparation of Working Paper distribution. The series includes papers by Fellows, Guest Scholars, and interns within the Program and by members of the Program staff and of its Academic Council, as well as work presented at, or resulting from, seminars, workshops, colloquia, and conferences held under the Program's auspices. The series aims to extend the Program's discussions to a wider community throughout the Americas, and to help authors obtain timely criticism of work in progress. Support to make distribution possible has been provided by the Inter-American Development Bank.

Single copies of Working Papers may be obtained without charge by writing to:

Latin American Program, Working Papers
The Wilson Center
Smithsonian Institution Building
Washington, D. C. 20560

The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars was created by Congress in 1968 as a "living institution expressing the ideals and concerns of Woodrow Wilson . . . symbolizing and strengthening the fruitful relation between the world of learning and the world of public affairs."

The Center's Latin American Program, established in 1977, has two major aims: to support advanced research on Latin America, the Caribbean, and inter-American affairs by social scientists and humanists, and to help assure that fresh insights on the region are not limited to discussion within the scholarly community but come to the attention of interested persons with a variety of professional perspectives: in governments, international organizations, the media, business, and the professions. The Program is being supported through 1982 by three-year grants from the Ford, Mellon, Kettering, Rockefeller, and Tinker Foundations, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and the Xerox Corporation.

ABSTRACT

The Commonwealth Caribbean Countries, Diplomatic Decolonisation and Relocation: Relations with Hemispheric Middle Powers

As the states of the British Caribbean have become fully sovereign, and the veil of colonial protection has been lifted from their relations with other states of the international system, these Caribbean states have in some cases had to reorganise such relationships, and in other cases to establish new relationships with countries with which they previously had minimal or no contact.

This paper discusses the various factors influencing or conditioning this process, which we refer to as one of diplomatic decolonisation and diplomatic relocation. In particular, we discuss the process as it involves relations with the much larger, geographically proximate, states in the Caribbean basin and on its periphery--in particular Venezuela, Mexico, and Brazil, the so-called middle powers.

To this end, we examine the interests and perspectives of these middle powers as they might relate to the new Caribbean states, and the interests and perspectives of the Caribbean states vis-a-vis these middle powers. We examine the various levels of activity of "spheres of diplomatic action" in which the Caribbean states are likely to become involved, and the additional complexity which the involvement of Cuba as a revolutionary country in the area introduces into state perspectives, and into their diplomatic action-spheres.

Finally, it is suggested that middle-power concern with Cuba may induce activity on their part, and an attribution of roles to the new states, that could hinder the development of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) as an identifiable diplomatic unit in future international relations.

THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES, DIPLOMATIC DECOLONISATION AND RELOCATION: RELATIONS WITH HEMISPHERIC MIDDLE POWERS

Vaughan Lewis
University of the West Indies
Jamaica

With the end of the colonial era, in which "regional" boundaries in the Caribbean area (for example, those defining the CARICOM system) were really an inheritance defined on the basis of metropolitan administrative convenience, these boundaries have become subject to pressure and contention, and have begun to lose their aura of definitiveness. Various segments of particular countries' environments have begun to assume different kinds of relevance. And these environments exert pressures on the sub-region, forcing inputs into the system from which it had previously been protected by the colonial presence and power.

Such pressures have come not simply from the general international environment of the Commonwealth Caribbean countries, but perhaps more forcefully from their immediate geographical environment, constituted by states on the continental mainland much larger in material size than themselves. In response, the CARICOM countries, which had at first thought it possible to conduct relatively passive and tranquil diplomacy within the traditional pattern of "Western" international relations, have found themselves forced to undertake processes of diplomatic adjustment in order to effectively cope with the new environmental inputs: to undertake processes of diplomatic decolonisation and diplomatic relocation.

There have, broadly, been two environmental arenas--what can be called diplomatic action-spheres--to which adjustments have had to be made: the traditional action-spheres, involving relations with the traditional metropolitan power and relations with the dominant global power which in the post-war period had demarcated limits of permissible activity for countries within the "Western" sphere; and secondly as intimated above, the action-sphere of the immediate continental mainland, a new diplomatic environment in the sense of implying for the first time face-to-face, or direct country-to-country, contacts over a range of issue-areas.

We might delineate the modes of diplomatic adjustment which the CARICOM countries have had to undertake (not necessarily simultaneously) in the post-colonial period, by way of a series of generalisations in the following terms:

(1) Each country has had to seek to come to terms with problems arising from geographical contiguity. In the Caribbean there have

arisen a number of physical boundary problems that have hitherto been dormant, as a consequence of the hegemony of one or another major power. Similarly, there arise problems of undesired and unregulated migration from resource-poor to resource-rich countries. The attempt to settle such problems implies consideration of the extent to which redefinition of the existing concept and limits of the "region" might be necessary. For countries may feel it necessary to construct networks of arrangements with geographically peripheral (to the existing regional system) states, aimed at minimising conflict where outright diplomatic "victory" is not attainable. The question then arises of weighing the salience of such networks for the CARICOM country, against the salience of its existing regional diplomatic framework.

(2) Each country has come to deem it necessary to evolve diplomatic conventions and relations with states of particular ideological and/or economic salience in its immediate geographic environment. Since ideological orientation is essentially a factor of domestic politics, diplomatic relationships established on this basis are not necessarily stable, and are subject to change with regime change.

(3) Each country has sought to identify and evaluate the significance of the hemispheric hegemonic power in issue-areas relevant to itself, in a period in which the stability characteristic of that power's post-war relationships has diminished. The process of evaluation has involved elaborating relationships appropriate to the achievement of some degree of reciprocity in those issue-areas. The point of importance here is that the relations which one CARICOM state seeks to evolve with the major power may not coincide or harmonise with those established by another CARICOM state or states; and this necessarily affects the nature and coherence of regional relationships.

(4) Since, in the American hemisphere, a relatively clear gradation or ranking among countries (or among groups of countries) can be identified in terms of size, economic significance, and capability for maintaining security systems, each new country in the hemisphere has had to assess the salience of states with varying levels of status, in issue-areas relevant to itself. Such an assessment has naturally been partly determined by the factor of geographical proximity or contiguity.

(5) Countries involved in interaction as a result of the existence of areas of common concern (for example, boundary problems) have had to identify the degree (if any) of hegemonic power influence in the process of resolution of problems in these areas.

(6) Finally, contrary to earlier post-independence suppositions, each state in the sub-region has had to make an evaluation of the salience of superpower competition in the global system, in terms of its possible effects on hemispheric interactions.

These modes of diplomatic adjustment have set the framework for the evolution of differing kinds of foreign-policy choices. In

specific terms, they have given rise to four sets of action-spheres for the Caribbean Community countries.

First, the process of reorganisation of United Kingdom-European relations has led Caribbean countries into the diplomatic framework established by the Lome Convention, involving a quadripartite interaction network: Europe-Africa-Pacific States-Caribbean States. This now exists in competition-cooperation with the traditional Commonwealth system originally radiating from the United Kingdom.

Secondly, the Caribbean states have had to establish relationships with the United States, with the fact of that country's increasing dominance of their economies and economic relationships. They have also had to negotiate entry into the hemispheric alliance system, cognisant of the fact that relationships within that system have traditionally been heavily asymmetrical, and that their attitudes to the system would tend to be taken as symptomatic of their attitudes to the United States.

Thirdly, the new states have sought to cope with global superpower competition by inclining in various degrees to the system of Third World non-alignment. Most of the countries of the inter-American system have not been members of the non-aligned movement, since it implied, for the dominant hemispheric power, deviation from the alliance system. The Caribbean countries' adherence to the non-aligned movement has therefore continually raised, with varying degrees of severity, the question of the relationship between geopolitical location and their diplomacy of non-alignment, involving inter-alia their relationships with the world socialist system.

Finally, there is the diplomatic action-sphere of the immediate geographical environment involving, as we have already suggested, the continental Caribbean basin states, the major ones being Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico in the western Caribbean, and Brazil and (again) Venezuela which share land borders with Guyana. For Belize in the western Caribbean, Guatemala has particular salience as a result of their land border and dispute; but for Guatemalan diplomatic activity, Mexico's attitude is a significant factor. And all of these states have, since the 1960s, perceived themselves as having important competitive-cooperative relationships with Cuba, which they see as possessing security capabilities comparable to their own.

It is the possible relationships within this latter action-sphere, and their implications, with which we are concerned in this paper. In particular, we place special emphasis on Venezuela, Mexico, and Brazil, so-called middle powers in the CARICOM states' immediate geographical environment.

Unlike the CARICOM states, these countries, independent for over a century, have had an extensive practice of international relations and foreign-policy-making, both among themselves[1] and in relation to the dominant hemispheric power. They have developed

among themselves institutionalised modes of behaviour, as evidenced in a substantial body of international law in some measure distinct from that to which the United States or the United Kingdom have adhered. (Some "Latin" states within the archipelago have also been adherents to this body of law). And given their physical size and capabilities, and relatively long history of peaceful and conflictual interaction, many of these states have developed fairly firm geopolitical conceptions.[2] In some cases, these conceptions encompass the Caribbean Sea and the entities within it, in much the same sense that the United States has had geopolitical conceptions embodying this area. Such conceptions have led to notions of national, or national security, interest vis-a-vis the Caribbean states, reinforced as British colonial jurisdiction and protection have been removed from the area.

These assertions of national and security interests have forced the CARICOM countries to begin to re-assess their diplomatic behaviour patterns, and the diplomatic norms by which they need to abide. At times, this has induced behaviour in "unconventional" ways, ways which would hitherto have brought sanctions from the colonial power (as for example in the case of British Guiana's attempt to establish relations with Cuba in the early 1960s).

The Middle Powers and the Caribbean Micro States: Some Comparisons

As is apparent from even casual observation, in material terms a wide gap separates the Commonwealth Caribbean states from many surrounding continental states of South and Central America. We can follow Spiegel in categorizing Brazil and Mexico as middle powers;[3] and although Spiegel, writing in 1972, places Venezuela in the category of minor powers, the subsequent revolution in petroleum prices, which has substantially increased Venezuelan financial resources, would seem to justify placing that country in a category similar to those others. Spiegel also places Cuba in the category of minor powers, but in some respects the distinguishing criteria between minor and middle powers are somewhat blurred; differences in population, and thus of available manpower resources, are however obviously important. In addition to material differences, it can plausibly be said that a substantial cultural gap also separates the two sets of states--in terms, that is, of language and traditions; though it must be observed that this has not, historically, inhibited large popular migrations from some Commonwealth Caribbean countries, for example Jamaica, to continental locations involved in intense economic activity requiring surplus skills--e.g., Panama, Costa Rica.

In examining material differences, the most apparent is that of mere land area available to the various states. The surface area of the whole Caribbean area is approximately 238,000 square kilometers, smaller than that of either Mexico, Venezuela, or Brazil. Guyana has a relatively large land area (214,000 sq. km.), but her population is miniscule (701,000) when compared with the continental states and even with some archipelago countries.[4]

The larger Caribbean islands bear some comparison in terms of per capita income, though not, of course, in terms of the actual sizes of gross national product. Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico, Jamaica, Barbados, and Trinidad and Tobago all have per capita (G.N.P.) incomes within the range of U.S. $1000-3000, thus placing them firmly within the ranks of middle-income countries.[5] The petroleum price explosion and discovery of new resources in Mexico, Venezuela, and Trinidad, have further distanced them from all other states in the region; and the sizes of the petroleum and natural gas industries of Mexico and Venezuela have distanced these states from Trinidad itself, in terms of disposable national income. Insofar as financial capability is an important indicator of, or base for, the exercise of influence in inter-state relations, then their relative status has *prima facie* been increased--especially as many other states in the hemisphere have had difficulty in maintaining their levels of disposable income.

Of course, the general underdevelopment and relative dependence of even these middle powers need to be emphasised, as conditioning their status in the global system and their capacity for independent action *vis-a-vis* the dominant power. As one economic analyst of the region has written:

> Successive takeoffs have usually been terminated by balance of payments crises and/or political instability exacerbated by social tensions related to the preceding phase of inequitable economic growth and its denouement. In consequence, Latin America's power assertiveness has not risen commensurately with its economic advances . . . the dependence of its growth on external stimuli to exports and on infusions of foreign capital and technology diminishing only modestly in the course of the past century. This failure to grow into an autonomous centre of international economic and political power is rooted in turn in the failure to achieve sustained broadbased economic growth and distributional equity.[6]

Nonetheless, in relation to the Caribbean and Central American sub-region, the relative status of Mexico and Venezuela has undoubtedly risen, as their "plantation staples" experience a new upswing. We discuss below the extent to which this status ascendancy has allowed them to assert or re-assert claims to playing legitimate roles in the determination of political processes in the region, against the traditional and unilateral orientation of the United States.

Given the wide differences between the continental states and the Caribbean countries in terms of population, it is natural that these differences should be reflected in the relative sizes of the military and para-military (manpower) forces available to the respective states. While the military and para-military forces of Jamaica or Guyana do not exceed 15,000 (1978 figures), the regular forces of Mexico number approximately 100,000, and those of Venezuela, 41,000. It has recently been observed that "Once logistics and

training programmes are carried through . . . [the Venezuelan] navy will become the most important in the Caribbean."[7]

Finally, as middle powers in a hierarchical though partially decentralised contemporary international system, Venezuela, Mexico, and Brazil have tended to be attributed roles in the partial international system (the hemispheric system) in which they participate with the dominant partner, the United States. Sharing the system's dominant values concerning order and security that emanate from the dominant partner, they have tended to be characterised by that country as having specialised responsibilities in the system--hence their designation, for example, as "regional influentials" within it. Yet, especially in respect to smaller states, they are aware of the dangers of being seen as purveyors and maintainers of U.S. conceptions of order. Hence, a continuing tension exists for them between being perceived as "influentials" in the system on the one hand, and "proxies" of the system on the other. Differing perceptions play some part in their capacity to exercise authoritative activities in the "spheres of influence" which they, partly unilaterally, determine for themselves in the region.

The Orientations of the Middle Powers. The Caribbean countries, as a sub-region, constitute, as we have indicated above, a relatively small segment of the hemispheric system in terms of size, financial resources, and security capabilities. Their relationship to the middle powers has traditionally been geopolitical--based on geographical proximity--rather than structural in the sense of exhibiting major economic linkages. At the same time, however, Venezuela, Mexico, and Brazil have been involved in other sets of geopolitical relations with (other) geographically proximate states, to which, in a diplomatic hierarchy of attention and awareness, greater importance has been attached.

Thus, while periodically asserting the importance of the Caribbean as her natural maritime outlet, Venezuela has traditionally exhibited a greater geopolitical concern with her immediate neighbours in northwestern South America. On the other hand, 50 percent of her major export commodity, petroleum, is traded with the United States, which is also the source of nearly 50 percent of her imports (by value). Finally, as a founding member of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, a major arena of her diplomacy is to be found in this sphere.

The major geopolitical relationship for Mexico, on the other hand, derives from the factor of her 2,000-mile border with the United States. This relationship has been the basis of the Mexican concern with a diplomacy of non-intervention, while at the same time (as in the case of Canada) determining the nature of her trading relations. Approximately 57 percent (in value terms) of Mexico's imports derive from the United States, while 62 percent of her exports go to that country (1976 data).[8] The country's discovery of new petroleum resources is increasing this concentration. Thus, her economic and political diplomacy is, and will be, dominated by these relationships. In geopolitical terms, her next most salient relationships derive from her territorial contiguity with

the Central American states, and the geographical proximity of Cuba to the Gulf of Mexico.

The geographical size of Brazil has been the basis for her arrogating to herself a series of geopolitical concerns based historically, first, on the sharing of a common value system concerning hemispheric security with the United States, and secondly, on the notion of absolute security at her frontiers. As is often indicated, Brazil, perceiving Argentina to be her most assertive potential competitor for status on the continent, continually engages in a competitive and cooperative relationship with that country, using the intervening buffer states (Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay) as stakes in that relationship and, therefore, as arenas for competition for influence. Venezuelan claims to substantial territory of Guyana, with which Brazil shares a border, have now induced a second sub-regional zone of competition in which Brazil has become involved. Nonetheless, this zone clearly concedes precedence in the hierarchy of Brazilian concern to the Bolivia-Paraguay-Uruguay zone.[9]

In large measure, the styles and content of these orientations, as of their competitive character, have been traditional and non-ideological, focussing on the search for material accumulation and for spheres of influence for maintaining geo-strategic security. In that context, the CARICOM states have come low in the middle powers' hierarchy of concern--largely because they are relatively new entrants into the hemispheric interaction system, and, protected hitherto by the United Kingdom, did not constitute a "vacuum." The previously independent Greater Antilles (Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti) had traditionally fallen under the security surveillance of the United States. Thus even the case of the Brazilian extension into the Dominican Republic (1965) under the umbrella of the Organization of American States is more properly seen as a means of the new military regime signalling reinforced allegiance to United States' Cold War conceptions, within the context of the Brazilian notion of "ideological frontiers."[10] And in much the same way, the developing relationship between the Quadros regime and the Cuban revolutionary regime at the beginning of the 1960s is more indicative of an attempted reorganisation of U.S.-Brazilian relations, than of a major Brazilian reorientation toward the Caribbean.

The middle-powers' relationships with the newly sovereign Caribbean states take place, then, in the context of a complex of hemispheric interactions, at differing levels of action. These levels of action are seen as being based on particular regional centres of power,[11] essentially what we have been calling middle powers, with Brazil seen as the power centre having the most substantial potential for upward mobility into the category of secondary powers.[12] The complex of interactions involves Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, and increasingly Mexico, as that country increases its financial weight in the system. The levels of interaction, whether between Brazil-Argentina, Brazil-Venezuela, Brazil-Mexico, or Mexico-Venezuela, extend over a wide range of issue-areas encompassing security, economic relations, and the area of nuclear technology. They are unstable in the sense that they extend from coherent to

antagonistic and disintegrating, depending on individual countries' perceptions of how the gains from interaction are likely to enhance the relative status of one or another state.

One implication of this mode of interaction for smaller powers or groupings is that given the differences in capabilities between themselves and the middle powers, they are perceived as stakes, and are likely to find themselves incapable of sustaining the allegiance or protection of such powers consistently over time. Even within the restricted international sphere of regional politics, the middle powers are unlikely to be consistent patrons. The instability of the interaction systems inhibits the development of sufficient hegemony by any single power.

A second implication is that the styles of diplomatic activity among the centres of power on the one hand, and between any particular centre and the smaller power or powers on the other, are likely to differ. In the first case, diplomatic activity takes the style predominantly of bargaining relationships. In the second case, it involves a combination of bargaining and command politics on the part of the middle power. (The relationship between Mexico and Jamaica in respect to the Javamex alumina smelter is a striking recent instance of this.)[13]

And a third implication, historically familiar in international relations, is that such middle powers, with some sense of capacity for partially autonomous activity in global relations, are likely to support smaller sub-regional systems for reasons extraneous to the objectives of the smaller powers. One analyst argues, for example, that Venezuela's entry into the Andean Common Market was "in part . . . directed toward counteracting Brazilian imperialism in Latin America," then-President Caldera taking the view that (in the words of the writer) "The growing economic and political influence of Brazil in the Caribbean as well as the Andean area was a major concern."[14]

At the level of the international system, the orientation of these middle powers, especially since the period of detente, has been to diversify their economic and diplomatic relations away from the United States. This has taken different forms in particular countries: the "pragmatism" of Brazilian diplomacy directed at enhancing the economic growth and status of the country; the Venezuelan "diplomacy of projection," concerned to establish coherent relations with non-hemispheric middle powers; or Mexico's diplomacy of reform of the international economic order.

For the minor powers and micro-states of the hemisphere, the point of significance of these diplomatic orientations is that none of the states undertaking them perceives itself capable of sustaining alliances of smaller powers involving distribution of gains from these endeavours. For this, the smaller powers would still have to seek relationships beyond the diplomatic and other institutional arenas dominated by middle powers. Within this broad understanding, then, of the orientations and styles of, and limitations on, middle powers in the hemisphere, we turn now to more narrowly identify the specific interests that they pursue in the Caribbean sub-region.

Middle-power National Interests and the Caribbean

The Interests of Venezuela.[15] Venezuelan interests in the area can be defined in terms of two sets of factors. The first of these relates to her geographical contiguity to Guyana on the mainland, and her geographical proximity to Trinidad and Tobago which has involved the two countries in maritime disputes. With the imminent independence of the then British Guiana, Venezuela revived a territorial claim to virtually two-thirds of the territory of that country. The so-called Geneva Settlement, committing the two countries to peaceful means of resolving the dispute, was followed by the 1970 Protocol of Port-of-Spain, "freezing" the dispute for a period of 12 years. This followed a period of intense diplomatic activity by the Guyanese government involving a degree of internationalisation of the dispute and the search for diplomatic support at the United Nations and within the Third World.

The government of Guyana, in the course of her diplomatic activity, was able to attain the support of Brazil to the extent that that government was willing to assert a position on the maintenance of existing boundaries, and the muting of her own lesser territorial claim against Guyana, as long as there was no aggressive territorial move by Venezuela. Here, in fact, there has developed a triangular relationship among Guyana-Venezuela-Brazil on this issue area, in which a fundamental objective of Guyana is to conduct internal and external policy in such a manner as not to alienate the support of Brazil. Venezuela, in turn, has become cognisant of the fact that the assertion of her interest through the territorial claim is constrained by the protective stance of Brazil.

The maritime dispute between Venezuela and Trinidad is less severe, although the difficulty in resolving it has led to a degree of diplomatic hostility toward Venezuela on the part of the Trinidad government, and claims by the latter of "Venezuelan imperialism" in the Caribbean. This maritime dispute is indicative of the second set of factors through which Venezuela asserts a national interest. Venezuela claims to have a general diplomatic and strategic (security) interest in the evolution of relationships among the countries of the Caribbean Sea. As her representatives have often claimed (partly in the face of opposition to her assertion of an interest here), the Venezuelan coastline on the Caribbean is the longest of any Caribbean country (3000 kilometres).[16] It is pointed out that the important commercial and industrial centres of Venezuela (Caracas, Maracaibo) face the Caribbean Sea, and that outlets on the Caribbean Sea are of prime significance for Venezuelan exports of oil and oil products, which constitute the major source of the country's foreign exchange. "Venezuelan history," President Carlos Andres Pérez claimed at the third U.N. Conference of the Law of the Sea, "had developed along the Caribbean and largely under its influence," though on the other hand "the country had never applied a policy towards the sea."

In applying a policy so as to consolidate her claimed interests in the Sea, Venezuela in recent years has initiated a series of boundary delimitation and fisheries agreements with other Caribbean and

Caribbean-related states. Such agreements have involved a re-assertion of Venezuelan possession of the minute Aves Island in the northern Caribbean. The importance of this derives from the growing consensus at UNCLOS III that islands, properly defined, might be entitled to their own law-of-the-sea regime. Such a regime as relating to Aves Island would give Venezuela an even more integral presence in the Caribbean, and project her strategic interests even further.

Venezuela's asserted interests have led to the elaboration of a variety of economic-aid relationships with the Commonwealth Caribbean countries, both dependent and independent, since the late 1960s; and to particularly intense activity in the Windward and Leeward Islands. This activity has been reinforced since the rise in petroleum prices, through the concessional arrangements for provision of petroleum to the Central American and then to the Caribbean countries, participation in the Caribbean Development Bank, and the more recent joint Mexican-Venezuelan facility for new concessional arrangements for petroleum to a variety of states in the Caribbean basin (the San José facility).[17]

There has been a suggestion, here, of the Caribbean as a Venezuelan "sphere of influence" in the traditional sense, which has, as we intimated above, met with some degree of hostility from Trinidad and Tobago, also a recipient of oil revenues, and concerned to elaborate her own arrangements for financial assistance towards the sustenance of what that government sees as the Caribbean Community identity. Venezuelan assertions of the need to protect "democratic values" in the area have also been partially responsible for developing ideological and diplomatic competition with Cuba.[18]

The Interests of Mexico. Mexico has traditionally demonstrated little concern with the Commonwealth Caribbean territories. President López Portillo has recently profferred the view that ". . . unlike the continental mainland, where the principal nations of Europe established their culture over widespread areas, those [Caribbean] islands became the sites of isolated enclaves. . . . the emerging nations of the Caribbean constitute a new geopolitical configuration. The lack of meaningful contacts with their nearest neighbours--the inevitable result of colonial organisation--is gradually being replaced by a conscious search for regional exchanges."[19]

Within the Caribbean, Mexico's major area of concern in the post-war period has been Cuba, which points into the mouth of the Gulf of Mexico, and thus at Mexico's gateway to the Atlantic. But even in respect to the revolutionary regime in Cuba, Mexican policy has mainly been aimed at inhibiting U.S. tendencies to draw the Latin American states into justification of overt intervention in that country. More positively, she has sought to encourage the Cuban government towards concentrating on the primacy of material (economic and financial) relationships with the hemisphere over ideological ones.

In a chronological sense, Mexico's central concern with the Anglophone Caribbean is, in fact, an extension of her interest in Central America. Her efforts have been directed at inhibiting, through diplomatic means, any attempt by Guatemala to make real by physical means her territorial claim to Belize. In pursuit of this aim, Mexico has muted her own territorial claim to Belizean territory. And at the urging of Commonwealth Caribbean states, she has led other Central American states and Venezuela against the trend of their historical regional diplomacy, in agreeing that Belize should become a sovereign state, with necessary territorial adjustments being subject to normal international negotiation. Mexico thus maintains a general strategic and security interest in the evolution of Guatemala/Belize relations.[20]

More recently, Mexico has had a cooperative-competitive relationship with Venezuela in respect to Central America. The more cooperative aspect of this (the oil facility and technical assistance to particular countries) has been extended to the Caribbean countries. It is aimed partly at demonstrating the increasingly insistent Mexican view that economic and technical assistance, rather than security assistance, constitutes the optimal mechanism for developing socio-political stability in the Caribbean basin, and that, in López Portillo's words, "collaboration between Venezuela and Mexico is vital to achieve the stability of the 27 nations in the Caribbean Basin."[21]

Mexico was minimally responsive to Jamaican political and financial diplomacy during the 1970s, at a period when there was a certain coinciding of aims between the two countries in respect to reform of the international economic order. In that context, too, there was established the CARICOM-Mexico Joint Commission; and Mexico now seeks to multilateralise her assistance to the Caribbean Community countries by seeking membership as a contributing member to the Caribbean Development Bank.[22]

In general, and contrary to the position of Venezuela, Mexico's relatively restrained activity in the Caribbean area suggests that there has been a limited identification of interests in the sub-region. Mexican diplomacy towards the South-Central American zone has tended to be subject to the pre-eminence of her relationship with the United States, which is based fundamentally on their geographical contiguity. Within that framework, however, her new oil-derived financial strength seems capable of allowing her to exhibit a greater assertiveness in a role which she likes to see as appropriate for herself: that of diplomatic protector of the rights of small countries versus the more powerful ones. What was once largely a diplomatic and reactive stance can now be given some positive, more material, content.

The Interests of Brazil. These are perhaps the least formally operationalised of the three middle powers;[23] though Brazil has perhaps the most experience of dealing with small powers of her periphery. Her most direct intervention in the archipelago has been, as we indicated above, through security assistance to the U.S.-O.A.S.

forces during the intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965. This mirrored the new Brazilian military regime's anti-Communist, anti-Cuban stance at home. Given the Brazilian regime's concern to ensure the impenetrability of her frontiers by "alien" forces, her fundamental attitude towards the Caribbean would appear to be likely to be premised on her geostrategic views.

This would appear to be the basis of her approach to Guyana, with whom she shares a boundary. While the cultural similarities between Brazil and her South American small-power peripheral neighbours are likely to support a greater degree of direct intervention, the general principle that she applies to them would seem to apply to Guyana also. This is, that the peripheral small state should not seek alliances with forces or entities that are known to be ideologically or geostrategically hostile to Brazil. And there is also implied in this stance the suggestion that a peripheral small power should not attempt to sustain a domestic regime which can only be maintained by the presence of substantial assistance from states known to be hostile to Brazil.

We have already alluded to the existence of a triangular diplomatic relationship between Venezuela, Brazil, and Guyana, deriving from the Venezuela-Guyana territorial dispute. This relationship is likely to be joined by the small and weak state of Surinam, which has also asserted a claim to Guyanese territory. Within this sytem, both Brazil and Venezuela seek to influence the smaller entities through forms of economic and technical assistance. For Guyana is posed the question of whether, over the long term, this system of relations will gain greater salience for her sovereignty and diplomacy than the CARICOM system.

The Middle Powers' Interests, Cuba, and the Caribbean. Middle powers of some relative material strength, like primary powers, tend to locate their attitudes towards very small states within a wider geostrategic regional context encompassing these states. The inclination towards geopolitical emphases in policy-making on the South American continent reinforces this tendency.

A U.S. student of the traditional geopolitical approach to Latin American diplomacy, and to United States-Latin American diplomacy, has asserted "the presence of two great strategic centers in Latin America. Enlarging on the earlier effort of Mario Travassos of Brazil and Jaime Mendoza of Bolivia," he "identified these as the Charcas Heartland, approximating the area of modern Bolivia, on the one hand, and the closed Caribbean sea on the other." The writer, Lewis Tambs, identified Cuba as "the key to the New World Mediterranean,"[24] having previously argued the following:

> Colombia, situated in South America's northwest triangle . . . is geographically isolated from the rest of the continent by the cordillera oriental. . . . . Colombia does boast of its own constructive "pan" concept, La Gran Colombia . . . Federation for Ecuador, Venezuela, and Colombia, particularly the latter two, is dictated by geography. Cut off from the remainder of

> South America this northwest triangle is geopolitically dominated by whatever nation controls the Caribbean. Terra firma's three main basins--the Rio Magdalena, the Rio Orinoco, and Lago de Maracaibo--provide the natural routes of economic and naval penetration for Caribbean-based maritime powers. . . .[25]

These kinds of geopolitical notions--linking South America and the Caribbean through, as it were, an assertive and strategically located Cuba--appear to be basic to the operational orientation of the middle powers, in particular Venezuela and Brazil.

All of the countries have developed a strong awareness of what they perceive as the current and potential influence of Cuba in the Caribbean Community region. In response, the decade of the 1970s in particular was characterised by a dual policy on the part of these states and others in Latin America towards that country (Brazilian diplomacy has been somewhat more rigid than others towards Cuba, and what follows applies less to that government). On the one hand, they have sought to induce her re-entry into the inter-American system, and to legitimise her participation in the developing diplomatic relations of the Caribbean and Central America. On the other hand, they have sought to play a role in the determination of the nature and limits of the influence that Cuba might exercise in the area. This applies in particular to Venezuelan diplomacy.

There is a widespread awareness that, partly on the basis of her security and military-aid relationship with the Soviet Union, Cuban interests and diplomatic-political activities are more extensive over the globe than her physical and/or economic size would suggest. On the other hand, Cuba's foreign relations can, from her perspective, be said to be based on a global ideology of anti-imperialism and national liberation (defined to include both anti-colonialism and internal liberation), underpinned by the philosophy and praxis of Marxism-Leninism. Within this perspective, she asserts an identity of entitlement to full participation in the Latin American and Caribbean partial international system, not accepting any special legitimacy of, for example, Venezuela to assert limitations on her activity.

Cuba's relations with the middle powers, therefore, tend to vary within a pattern of closeness on the one hand, and partial disintegration on the other. This is the consequence of Cuba's revolutionary assertiveness and their (middle powers') periodic rejection of this assertiveness, depending on their assessments of its implications for their domestic systems, their relative status in the region, and their particular relationship with a United States normally hostile to Cuba. Their relationship with Cuba tends, therefore, to be systemically competitive.

This competitiveness is reinforced by a revived concern with the Caribbean as an important area of passage for petroleum and petroleum products, in a period of general resource scarcity. It is to be placed in the context of a general Western concern with the possible constraints, at the global level, on the availability of scarce resources located in unstable or undependable regions:

> For what is emerging is nothing less than a remarkable new strategic map. The practical effects are to resurrect the importance of geography and resources as a factor in military thinking, and to make us more sensitive to the geo-strategic perspectives of regional powers.[26]

The significance of these types of middle-power relationships with Cuba is, for our purposes, that the perceived extent of Cuban activity in the area partially defines--particularly in the case of Venezuela--the context in which they perceive the activities of the Caribbean Community countries. Thus Venezuela's attitude to these countries, for example, takes on the aura of being a function of Cuban-Venezuelan activity and systemic competition in the sub-region. The particular dynamics of the U.S.-Cuba conflict become, then, a constraining or permissive input into the definition of the Venezuelan attitude. And, in the case of the Venezuela-Guyana dispute, there would appear to be an element of manipulation of the perception of the salience of Cuban presence and activity in Guyana.

In summary then, on the basis of their perceptions of Cuba's role, the level of and receptivity to it on the part of other regional countries, and their structural (strategic) interests in the area, we can define the contemporary behaviour of the middle powers in the following way:

Venezuela has adopted an attitude of assertive interventionism, claiming a legitimacy borne of geopolitical location, for active participation in the nature of the development of the Caribbean as a diplomatic and strategic arena. Her increased financial resources provide additional capabilities for operationalising such a role.

Mexico can be said to have undertaken a role of reactive or protective diplomacy, still more concentrated in the western as against the eastern Caribbean. This represents a deviation from her tradition of non-intervention, and is appropriate to her perception that her present resources can permit her, selectively, to become a countervailing force and buffer vis-a-vis U.S. attempts to continue to unilaterally define the nature of, and constraints on, the regional sub-system.

Brazil continues to assert a role essentially of command politics vis-a-vis small powers, determined by her essentially geopolitical (traditional) view of Latin American international relations. Within this context, she is willing to offer peripheral states participation in her economic-development process, though the experiences of Commonwealth Caribbean states in one crucial issue-area, fisheries, have not been particularly beneficial.

It remains for us to examine these descriptions of orientations, interests, and patterns of behaviour from the point of view of the Commonwealth Caribbean countries' interests and objectives.

Perspectives and Interests of Caribbean Community Countries

Speaking somewhat over a year after he came into office, Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley remarked on the fact that Jamaica, as a relatively small island, was "surrounded by a continent of Latin American peoples." And in his work The Politics of Change,[27] he envisages a system of "economic regionalism" which would encompass the Central American states, the basin countries of Colombia and Venezuela, and the northeastern South American countries of the three Guyanas and Brazil.

Speaking in the first parliamentary debate on foreign affairs in an independent Trinidad and Tobago in 1963, Prime Minister Eric Williams, while noting that Trinidad had "developed close contact in the United Nations" with the Latin American group, went on subsequently, in reference to the possibilities of joining the Organisation of American States, to assert that "there has been a feeling in our direction of a certain resentment that our rights as a member of the American family are not recognised, and that we have to depend upon what ultimately appears to be something of grace instead of . . . as of right."[28] In the same speech, Williams made reference to the problems posed by territorial disputes for countries (he was clearly referring to Guyana) wishing to enter the Organisation of American States and its allied institutions.

Trinidad, since its independence, had been involved in a series of negotiations with Venezuela aimed at resolving, as we indicated above, a variety of sea-boundary and fisheries-delimitation problems. Guyana's territorial dispute with Venezuela, the only remaining substantial dispute of that kind in which a Caribbean Community state is involved, we have already discussed. Jamaica, while it has no territorial difficulties of this kind, has sought unsuccessfully for many years to arrive at a fisheries agreement with Colombia in order to advance her small fishing industry in one of the few relatively fruitful sources of fish in her immediate geographical environment.

In a sense, it might be said that the immediate post-independence history of the larger Caribbean Community states suggests an experience of recalcitrance--perceived difficulty in attaining objectives vis-a-vis neighbouring states of the South American continent. The decision by Venezuela to "de-freeze" the Protocol of Port-of-Spain appears to revive this imagery. While on the other hand, the speed of Venezuelan emplacement of a diplomatic presence throughout the Caribbean, allied to promises of substantial economic and technical assistance, led Prime Minister Williams by 1979 to remark on the "relegation of the Caribbean to the sphere of influence of Latin America."[29] Various commentaries have attempted to discern whether the "growing influence" of Venezuela might have the effect of "crippling CARICOM."[30]

Some of the difficulties alluded to by Eric Williams in various observations on Venezuelan influence reflect in part the very proximity of Trinidad to Venezuela, and the difficulties arising therefrom. Williams had also periodically alluded to the necessity to recognise, and sustain, the Caribbean archipelago countries and the mainland Guyana territories as having a cultural and ethnic identity different from that of the rimland states surrounding them. With additional Venezuelan financial resources after 1973, the question began to arise as to whether Trinidad or Venezuela would have the greater influence either in sustaining or breaking down this claimed particular identity.

It might also be asked whether, to those who hold the view of "separate identity," Venezuela can claim legitimacy of participation in and direction of the Caribbean arena, if her territorial claims (against Guyana) negate the territorial integrity and territorial legitimacy of a major component state of the Community? And whether her assertion of this claim might not be deemed more threatening than the assumed threat of an expansion of Cuban influence in that zone?

The debate concerning the relative strengths and consequences of Venezuelan as against Cuban influence has also reflected, however, differences within the Caribbean Community itself concerning (a) the relevant scope of the Community as a viable diplomatic actor, and (b) differing perceptions among constituent states, especially in an era of financial and resource scarcity, as to where such resources might be derived, and the nature of the relationships which needed to be made in order to ensure their derivation.

Both of these factors are visible in the diplomacy of Guyana and Jamaica in the 1970s, and particularly in that of the latter. Thus, the antagonism by the government of Trinidad towards Venezuela was as much directed towards that country as it was towards Jamaica, which in the 1970s had developed a concept of the proper scope of Caribbean regional relations, that diverged from the "particular identity" concept of Trinidad.

Secondly, there developed in the 1970s a certain convergence (not identity) of diplomatic views--within the context of global detente, on appropriate policy towards the Third World, non-alignment, and international economic reform--between two major Caribbean Community states (Guyana and Jamaica) and two of the proximate middle powers (Venezuela through the policy of Carlos Andres Pérez, and Mexico through the policy of Echeverría). The Latin American partial international system has not had, with the exception of the experience of Cuba, a tradition in which minor states within it sought to undertake an autonomous diplomacy in respect to issue-areas that are global in scope.

On the other hand, given the differences in economic weight and therefore in diplomatic leverage, it could not be possible for the two small Caribbean states to form an effective hemispheric alliance with the two middle powers, on terms that might demonstrably provide benefits appropriate to their expenditure of resources on the negotiating process. There is also here a difference in perspective

about the scope of the time period in which benefits need to be derived. The subsequent formation of the Latin American Economic System (SELA) did not, nor could it, negate this problem. For SELA did not (and largely does not) function as a collective substitute, but as an additional negotiating resource. The Caribbean states' foray into diverse international relationships, and the search for supporting relationships among the middle powers, did not therefore, given the discrepancies of perspective and resources, provide any incremental support for the development of the Caribbean Community system.

A third area of Caribbean involvement has been the development in the late 1970s of political relationships based on ideological allegiances. Countries oriented to various forms of socialism have sought to consolidate state-to-state relations with the ideological cement of party-to-party relationships. This, in turn, revived the traditions of international alliances between those of liberal or Christian Democratic persuasion. Each grouping of parties-states has, in turn, sought the support of European sources from which the ideologies derive. And, in a period of relative U.S. abstinence, and partial discredit of U.S.-sponsored development strategies, political factions in various European countries have been able to exert some degree of influence on local state foreign-policy preferences. In return, local state decision-makers have been able to draw institutional and material support from the European sources.[31]

The main question arising here is whether such institutional and ideological linkages can withstand sustained United States opposition undertaken within a global Western context, and in which the leverage of the Caribbean sector is minimal.

Conclusion: The Middle Powers and CARICOM Sub-regional Relations

For most of the 1960s and 1970s, the relationships between the middle powers and the Caribbean Community states can be classed broadly into (a) economic aid and trade, with aid being the dominant component, (b) geopolitical, deriving from geographical proximity, and (c) institutional, deriving from the efforts of Latin American and Caribbean states as a whole to seek forms of collective economic security.

Within the sphere of economic-aid relationships, the most important of the powers involved has been Venezuela, which has sought to grant its assistance through a mix of bilateralism and multilateralism. Bilateralism, concentrated largely on the smaller Caribbean countries (the Lesser Developed Countries) was meant to ensure that with the gradual withdrawal of the British, no influence vacuum might be permitted to develop. In addition, Venezuela seems to have sought to ensure that her own aid relationship with these states was sufficiently continuous and predictable as to guarantee that her own influence might be a necessary (though not the only) factor in their decision-making about the types of regional and international relations they might embark upon after independence. (Venezuela's aid to these territories has been in train when they have been still, formally, dependents of the United Kingdom.)

This orientation on the part of Venezuela was first reinforced after 1970, the year in which political instability developed in the largest of the eastern Caribbean states, Trinidad and Tobago, the government of which appears to have made an appeal to Venezuela for substantial assistance to quell the uprising. This event certainly afforded Venezuela the feeling of legitimacy for playing, if not an interventionist, certainly an "overseer" role in the region.

Secondly, the early 1970s were a period in which Venezuela's continental CARICOM neighbour, Guyana, was itself attempting to consolidate its diversification of relations towards the world socialist system. This involved, first, the normalisation and then institutionalising of relations with Cuba; and secondly, the reorganisation of Guyana's political and economic institutions along Marxist-Leninist lines, to make its institutional structures appropriate to deepened relationships with the socialist bloc. These innovations were taking place virtually simultaneously with Guyana's attempt to reinvigorate the movement for political integration in the eastern Caribbean by seeking, through the Grenada Declaration of 1971, to establish a unitary political state with the countries of the area. Venezuela would have seen it as its task to combat such Guyanese influence, through inter alia the use of economic instruments.

Finally, as the CARICOM governments sought to normalise their relations with Cuba, and Cuba in turn sought to establish a presence in the CARICOM area, Venezuela gained an enhanced sense of increasing competition for influence in the sub-region. Within the CARICOM area itself, this competitive influence-seeking now involved Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, and Cuba, the former two having had their capabilities for exercising influence increased by the consequences of the petroleum price revolution. Venezuela's multilateralising of a portion of her economic aid through the Caribbean Development Bank became a means for further legitimising her Caribbean presence.

All of these factors in fact represented an attempt by Venezuela to widen the boundaries of the sub-region, and in effect to increase the number of legitimate participants within it. In this, she was assisted by Jamaica (in the second half of the 1970s), whose government sought to bring into effect a wider conception of a viable Caribbean system. This, as we have suggested earlier, would, for Jamaica, serve the purpose of bringing more extensive resources into the system. The government of Trinidad saw this, however, as weakening the "integrity" of the original system. This attempt therefore, at giving the regional relations in which the Anglophone states were involved a wider base had the paradoxical result of decreasing the coherence of the CARICOM system itself.

At the same time, relations between Jamaica, on the one hand, and Venezuela and Mexico, on the other, had, by the end of the 1970s, suggested that Jamaica had not autonomously developed sufficient "weight" to ensure that those relations would be conducted with predictability; or that, in a situation of de facto asymmetry, these middle powers would not resort to the unilateralist orientation of command politics. Trinidad, however, on the basis of her oil wealth,

could seek to establish trade relations with Brazil, based on market principles of comparative advantage.

At the level of geopolitical relations, the central question would appear to be whether relationships with larger states on the CARICOM periphery will, over time, gain greater salience for the CARICOM states involved, with one of two effects: (a) forcing a widening of the CARICOM system institutionally to accommodate these relations, with Venezuela, Brazil, and Guatemala (through her relations with Belize) as functional members of the system; or (b) a "tearing off" of the states with increasingly coherent relations with the peripheral middle powers, and their absorption into new systems of relations. This applies most forcefully to Guyana and Belize. The prospects for substantially increased trade between Trinidad and Venezuela, due partly to proximity, such that their trade would have greater salience for Trinidad than CARICOM trade, are however impeded by the nature of the industrialisation (manufacturing) process in Venezuela.

Within the sphere of geopolitical relations, there is also the perspective--found among at least some of the middle powers--of the states of the Caribbean sub-region as essentially "objects" of international relations, too individually weak to resist manipulation, but with insufficient resources to organise a collective system incapable of undesired penetration. This view can be read into the diplomatic orientations of Venezuela and Brazil, in particular. It implies a level of middle-power interaction, sometimes competitive but largely cooperative, in circumstances where the influence of Cuba appears to be becoming pervasive. This level of interaction would imply role responsibilities for particular middle powers, with respect to particular units or groupings within the CARICOM area. On the other hand, this geopolitical perspective would not see CARICOM as a functional unit, but the states of the wider Caribbean archipelago and basin as the more relevant unit. It is doubtful whether a concerted attempt to use resource capabilities to maintain stability over this wider sphere would leave the CARICOM system as an identifiable one in future international relations.

REFERENCES

[1]See, for example, Robert N. Burr, "The Balance of Power in Nineteenth-Century South America: An Exploratory Essay," Hispanic American Historical Review, 31:1 (1955), 37-60.

[2]John Child, "Geopolitical Thinking in Latin America," Latin American Research Review, 14:2 (1979), 89-111, and Child, "Strategic Concepts of Latin America: An Update," Inter-American Economic Affairs, 34:1 (1980), 61-82.

[3]Steven L. Spiegel, Dominance and Diversity (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972).

[4]United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1978.

[5]I.B.R.D., World Bank Atlas 1978. Detailed numerical comparisons between the various states are provided in another section of the work from which this paper is drawn.

[6]David Felix, "Latin American Power: Take Off or Plus (C'est La même Chose?" Studies in Comparative International Development XII:1 (1977), 59-85.

[7]Robert L. Scheina, "Regional Reviews: Latin American Navies," in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1981, pp. 22-27 at p. 23. The data on military force are taken from Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1979-1980 (London, 1979).

[8]Data on the structure of trade are taken from United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1978.

[9]See, on some of these relationships, from a heavily traditional geopolitical point of view: Lewis A. Tambs, "Geopolitical Factors in Latin America," in Norman A. Bailey (ed.), Latin America: Politics, Economics and Hemispheric Security (New York: Praeger, 1969); and Tambs, "The Changing Geopolitical Balance of South America," Journal of Social and Political Studies, 4:1 (1979), 17-35.

[10]See in general F. Parkinson, Latin America, The Cold War and the World Powers 1945-1973 (London: Sage Publications, 1974).

[11]Wolf Grabendorff, "Perspectivos y Polos de Desarrollo en América Latina," Nueva Sociedad 46 (Jan.Feb. 1980), 43.

[12]For one perspective on this, see H. Jaguaribe, "El Brasil y América Latina," Estudios Internationales VIII:29 (Feb/March 1975). And for some qualifications to Brazil's capacity for upward mobility in the short term, Wayne Selcher, "Brazil in the Global Power Systems," Occasional Paper Series No. 11, Centre for Brazilian Studies, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, Nov. 1979.

[13]Mexico, a major partner in a venture seen as an important project by the government of Jamaica, peremptorily withdrew from the project, after repeated assurances as to her continued participation.

[14]Donald L. Herman, Christian Democracy in Venezuela (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), pp. 183 and 179.

[15]This discussion of Venezuelan interests and the following section on Mexico are in part drawn from my "Geopolitical Realities in the Caribbean," prepared for publication in Elizabeth Thomas (ed.), Caribbean Regional Identity (University of Liverpool Press, forthcoming).

[16]See my paper, "The Interests of the Caribbean Countries and the Law of the Sea Negotiations," prepared for the Conference on Caribbean Maritime Issues, Florida International University, Miami, April 12, 1981.

[17]For a description, see Bank of London and South America Journal, 14:IV (Nov. 1980), 233; also Latin America Weekly Report, 10 April 1981, p. 12.

[18]See for recent general discussions, D. Buersner, "La Politique Exterieure du Venezuela: Evolution et Perspectives," Relations Internationales 23 (1980), 267-287; and F. Barthelemy-Febrer, "L'offensive Venezuelienne dans les Caraibes: Continuité et Changements," Amerique Latine 4 (Oct/Dec. 1980), 19-27. See also a recent Venezuelan newspaper editorial stating, " . . . el Caribe es el mare nostrum, el Mediterráneo natural de Venezuela," "El Caribe Mediterráneo," El Diario de Caracas, 1 Feb. 1981.

[19]Address delivered by the President of Mexico, José López Portillo, at a dinner in honour of Mr. Lynden Pindling, Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas, 23 February 1980.

[20]See, on Mexico's view, Up-Date: United States-Canadian/Mexican Relations. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, June 17 and 26, 1980 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1980), pp. 55 and 60. Guatemala has now conceded that Belize should become a sovereign state.

[21]"Mexico and Venezuela Plan to Counter Outside Intervention in Caribbean," New York Times, April 9, 1981.

[22]Venezuela and Colombia contributed, as members, 13.2% of the C.D.B.'s total resources as of December 1979. See CDB, Annual Report 1979 (Barbados, Feb. 1980).

REFERENCES

[23]See for a basically historical review that suggests this limited activity, Cleantho DePaiva Leithe, "Brasil y el Caribe," Revista Argentina de Relaciones Internacionales 15 (1979), 53-64.

[24]Tambs, "The Changing Geopolitical Balance of South America," op. cit., p. 17.

[25]Tambs, "Geopolitical Factors in Latin America," op. cit., pp. 46-47

[26]Geoffrey Kemp, "The New Strategic Map," Survival, XIX:2 (1977), 50-59 at p. 52.

[27]See the quotations and discussion in my "The Commonwealth Caribbean," in C. Clapham (ed.), Foreign Policy-Making in Developing Countries (London: Saxon House, 1976).

[28]The Foreign Relations of Trinidad and Tobago, 6 Dec. 1963 (Trinidad and Tobago, Government Printery, 1963), pp. 5 and 15.

[29]Government of Trinidad and Tobago, White Paper on CARICOM (n.d., circa April 1979), p. 9.

[30]See D. Renwick, "A Growing Influence," West Indies Chronicle, Oct/Nov. 1975, pp. 4-5 and 35; A. Thorndike, "Is Venezuela Crippling CARICOM?" West Indies Chronicle, Oct/Nov 1977, pp. 6-11; and D. Renwick, "Venezuela: Trinidad Still Suspicious of Its Neighbour," ibid., Oct/Nov. 1978, p. 5.

[31]See discussion in Le Monde Diplomatique, May 1980, on the role of the Socialist International; and ibid., February 1981, on Christian Democracy.