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THE AMERICAS, ca. 1750

by James Lang
Vanderbilt University

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IMPERIAL REORGANIZATION IN
THE AMERICAS, ca. 1750

by James Lang
Vanderbilt University

Between 1750 and 1780, Portugal, Spain, and England tried to reorganize their empires. The remedies each state proposed suggests how different their empires were. Portugal's colonial problem was directly related to how England siphoned off the profits from Luso-Brazilian trade. The Bourbon reformers began by attacking the Spanish-American bureaucracy. In English America, the assemblies waylaid Parliament's tax proposals. Brazil's export economy, the Spanish American bureaucracy, and the assembly provide touchstones for understanding crucial aspects in the development of each region.

The objective of Portuguese colonization was commercial. The state organized itself as an entrepôt to tax trade; its allies in Brazil were the planters. Except in the ports and the mining centers, bishops and bureaucrats were scarce. In the countryside, the crown simply commissioned the coronéis to raise militia units. It is the skimpiness of Brazil's bureaucracy rather than its similarities to Spanish-American prototypes that is most striking. Minas Gerais and its gold mines did draw the king's bureaucrats into the interior. But until gold production declined, it only reinforced the import-export syndrome. That trade contracted along with gold production suggests how export-oriented the Luso-Brazilian economy was. In the Spanish Indies, trade with Spain fell sharply during the 1630s -- before the drop in silver production. Thereafter, despite substantial bullion output, Spain's American trade did not recover until the Bourbon reforms. Spanish America turned to domestic markets long before inter-colonial trade became significant in Brazil, or in England's mainland colonies.¹

Each metropolis had to counter the centrifugal forces colonization implied. The export economy rather than the bureaucracy pulled Brazil back toward Portugal. Economically, this pull reached deep into the sertão, since ranchers supplied the plantations with dried meat, hides, and oxen. In the north, Pombal's companies tied Para and Maranhao more effectively to the metropolitan economy; during the 1790s, Rio Grande's beef and wheat exports helped feed Salvador and Recife -- planters were too busy producing sugar, tobacco, and cotton to worry about provisioning the cities.

The Luso-Brazilian economy was a shared enterprise. The division between merchants and planters was bridged by men who had a stake in both enterprises, or who participated indirectly, because of the social bonds that often linked both groups. Brazil's planters necessarily had connections in the ports; their livelihood depended on transatlantic trade. Most Spanish estates, since they supplied domestic markets, were isolated from Atlantic trade -- one factor, among many, that kept Creole landowners and Peninsular merchants apart.

The productivity of Brazil's mines and plantations depended on slave labor. During the eighteenth century, the slave trade became a Brazilian-centered enterprise run from Salvador and Rio de Janeiro. Brazil's exports: tobacco, sugar-cane brandy, rum, and gold paid for slaves. Only in Brazil was the slave trade a colonial business. The English slave trade was organized by metropolitan merchants operating out of British ports.² One reason why Portugal's over-taxed trading system survived was because Brazil had a dependable source of slaves; and profits from the slave traffic stayed within the Luso-Brazilian economy. Spanish Americans had to purchase their slaves with silver, and from foreign suppliers.³

The crown protected its planters and miners, exempting them from foreclosure. The bureaucracy's job was to collect port taxes and make sure exports got back to Portugal. Even when gold provided new revenues (1720-1750), the crown did not set up a bureaucracy on the Spanish model: no additional vice-royalties, no new High Courts or bishoprics. Rarely did Brazil's royal government directly challenge entrenched colonial interests. If the crown levied taxes, local tax farmers ran the business. While the king sent out his judges to supervise the colony, Brazilian students went to Coimbra and came back as magistrates. If Brazil's planters did not have assemblies, they had their own militia units. Although the state church was weak, local brotherhoods organized religious life. Neither the crown's authority nor the institutional strength of the church reached into the countryside. On the local level, rural clans formed alliances that stretched into the cities and involved the bureaucracy. Such networks protected powerful families; they did not provide a forum or an ideology for independence. If the state's authority was segmented, so too was that of its potential adversaries.⁴

For Pombal, the colonial problem had little to do with Brazil: in the 1750s, the Brazil fleets were richer than ever; Luso-Brazilian trade was booming. But at the core of that prosperity was a simple exchange of Brazil's gold for English textiles. The Portuguese were really commission agents for English merchants who supplied goods on credit. The profits from Portugal's empire ended up in London. The problem was not how to change Brazil, but

how to change Portugal. Pombal's reforms challenged the old order in the metropolis, not Brazil's planters. By subsidizing a small group of metropolitan businessmen, Pombal created wealthy entrepreneurs with enough capital to finance important sectors of the Luso-Brazilian economy. This privileged group profited from the state's commercial monopolies, and they ran state-fostered industries and trading companies. In the new governmental agencies Pombal set up, businessmen superseded the old nobility. Opposition centered in Portugal, not Brazil.

Far from attacking Brazilian interests, the treasury boards Pombal established in the captaincies bolstered the role influential planters, merchants, and miners played in the colonial economy. By the 1770s, Mineiro businessmen controlled the fiscal apparatus of the crown's wealthiest and most populous captaincy; even the officer corps of the Minas dragoons was dominated by native sons. The companies that monopolized trade with Pará, Maranhão, and Pernambuco supplied slaves on easy terms to local planters, and promoted new export crops like rice and cotton. Pombal's policies reinforced the planter class.

If the British carried off most of Brazil's gold, the miners of Minas Gerais could hardly be blamed. Portugal's workshops simply could not supply Brazilian markets. To reduce the empire's dependence on British textiles and other manufactured goods, the state and its businessmen had to promote competitive industries in Portugal. This strategy did not require any basic shifts on the Brazilian side of the empire's economy. If Brazil could be supplied with more Portuguese merchandise, it was the English, not Brazil's planters, who stood to lose the most. A more diversified colonial economy that produced high-priced agricultural exports benefited Portugal's re-export business, but it also meant a thriving slave trade and wealthy planters.

The Luso-Brazilian economy was shackled with its share of monopolies and taxes. How and where these levies were collected is instructive. The state taxed Brazil's export economy by collecting customs duties in Lisbon. In America, the crown concentrated its treasury officials in the ports, since everything of value in Brazil: sugar, tobacco, slaves, equipment for mills, foodstuffs, and textiles passed through Recife, Salvador, and Rio de Janeiro. The gold rush modified but did not reverse the port system. To deduct the king's share of gold production and tax the captaincy's imports, royal officials followed the miners into the backlands of Minas Gerais. Nonetheless, tax collection continued to be a business that the crown shared with local entrepreneurs. The largest share of the state's Brazilian revenues still came from customs duties levied in Lisbon and from the tobacco monopoly. Compared to Spanish America, where the bureaucracy had to tax a diversified

domestic economy, royal government in Brazil gravitated to the export zone; the crown left the sertão to the ranchers and their armed retainers. It was overseas trade that the crown taxed, more than the circulation of goods domestically. Pombal's policies left this system undisturbed: aside from the treasury boards, the most significant bureaucratic reforms consisted in transferring the title of viceroy from Bahia to Rio del Janeiro, and setting up a new High Court in the Carioca capital -- the core of Brazil's economy was shifting from north to south, and the crown followed suit.

The point of departure for Brazil's colonial history is the export economy. Viewed as a great plantation or as a gold mine, colonial and metropolitan interests were not antagonistic. As long as the Brazilian economy did not produce its own version of import substitution, as long as Brazil could find new export to pay its bills, then dependency paid dividends on both sides of the Atlantic. When this equation broke down, as in Minas Gerais, local and imperial interests soon parted company. The way Pombal and his disciples diagnosed Portugal's situation presaged accommodation, not a collision course. Portugal strengthened its position in the empire by challenging the British rather than Brazilians. In Spanish and English America, imperial reorganization directly attacked the colonial status-quo.

During the 1780s, Melo e Castro's anti-Brazilian stance threatened the wealthy Mineiro plutocrats who ran the captaincy's economy. Such a confrontation, however, was an anomaly, not a pattern. Pombal's protégés returned; their more Brazilian-centered view of the empire helped to diffuse a potentially explosive situation. They had plenty of help: during the 1790s, the export economy paid unprecedented dividends. If the state's income rose, so too did the profits of the empire's merchants, slave traders, and planters. Dependent upon and outnumbered by their slaves, Brazil's planters had good reasons to fear the kind of republicanism practiced in France and Haiti. Rather than an adversary, the interests that controlled Brazil's economy saw the monarchy as a stabilizing force. When the prince regent arrived in Brazil in 1808, he did not find a colony in revolt.

Brazil became independent without a revolution, and it did not become a series of republics.⁵ Tied to exporting and the slave labor system, Brazil's planters were cautious and conservative. Only when the Cortes attacked free trade and the Brazilian monarchy, when its aggressive claims threatened to shatter the colony's fragile political stability, only then did planters endorse independence. Fortunately, an exiled monarchy had created a legitimate imperial center in Rio de Janeiro that could be taken over by Brazilians, or, more accurately, by powerful Paulista coffee

exporters. The Second Empire (1840-1889) was simply a more advanced version of the colonial export economy. In its own way, however, exporting was a unifying factor for a state struggling to create a nation. Since most of Brazil's entrepreneurs lived off the export sector, economic policy was less controversial. In the United States, cotton planters, industrialists, and small farmers created competing versions of society; federalism collapsed.

Against the contentious forces unleashed by Cortés and Pizarro, Spain posed a uniform bureaucracy and a single faith, not an export economy. Only Spain carried out a spiritual conquest of the Americas.⁶ If the Puritans established a "plantation of religion," it did not include Indians. When the Laws of the Indies were systematically indexed in the seventeenth century (Recopilación de Leyes), lawyers had to sift their way through some 100,000 royal cedulas; they reduced the code to four volumes and a modest 6,500 entries.⁷ Reconstructed from the viewpoint of the Council of the Indies, the bureaucracy soon dominates colonial history. Yet, the breach between intention and performance quickly erodes the official version of the empire. The bureaucracy points to the special character of Spanish America, not because it was the state's centralized, all powerful agent, but because of the great problems it was intended to resolve. Conquest was the decisive event that separated Spanish America from all other colonial enterprises; it created an agenda for royal government that was not duplicated elsewhere. For in two decades, the king's American domains had grown from a foothold in the Caribbean to immense, populous territories on two continents. The key to Spain's new world was Tenochtitlán, just as sugar was the key to Brazil, tobacco to Virginia, and religion to New England; they opened very different doors to the future.

In English and Portuguese America, colonization was a gradual, cumulative process. In 1570, Brazil was still a series of struggling sugar plantations. Settlement was confined to coastal enclaves in Pernambuco and Bahia; Indian labor failed to provide a suitable work force. Englishmen starved in Virginia before they found a marketable commodity -- tobacco -- to prop up the colony's flagging economy; only in the 1680s, as African labor began to replace indentured servants, did the planters manage to control the work force to their satisfaction.⁸ In Spanish America, the conquest of a rich and diverse economic system run by a skilled and well organized labor force had dramatically resolved such problems. The Spaniards had only to reap the harvest and adjust the labor system to accommodate Spanish enterprises: sugar, wheat, and vineyard cultivation, textile production, mining, and construction.⁹ In regions where Indian labor was not so available, or native cultures less adaptable, expansion was retarded and colonization more difficult.¹⁰ How different Spain's New World would have been, if Cortés had encountered the Tupinambá instead of the Aztecs, Powhatan instead of Montezuma!

Unlike Brazil's sugar, which was only valuable as an export sold in Europe -- and it could be taxed upon arrival in Portugal -- the wealth of the Indies went to those who controlled Indian labor, ran the mines, and circulated commodities. To get its fair share of the spoils, Spain had to intervene in the New World in a way that was largely irrelevant to the kind of economies that initially developed in Brazil and Virginia. The prospect of a powerful colonial nobility served by the Indians, the many ways that American's wealth could escape the royal coffers, these were scenarios peculiar to Mexico and the Andean sierra. The Conquest drew the state bureaucracy into the vortex of Spanish-American history. How else could the crown tax disparate, relatively self-contained agricultural economies and monitor silver production? How else could it prevent the conquistadors from becoming too powerful, or protect the Indians from the kind of exploitation that had annihilated the peoples of the Caribbean?

To oversee American affairs, the crown duplicated the bureaucratic structure of Castile in its new kingdoms. Tithes collected on the produce of Indian communities paid the clergy; taxes on silver production paid the salaries of Spain's university-trained judicial cadres.¹¹ The authority of viceroys, High Court magistrates, and crown-appointed corregidores reduced the initial political significance of town councils and the broad mandates ceded to the first conquistadors.¹² The crown refused to turn its licensed conquerors into hereditary officials, and it launched an attack against their economic base, the encomienda.

The men who risked their lives and fortunes to enlarge the king's American domains expected to be rewarded with Indians assigned to them as workers -- the encomienda system. By the 1530s, the contradiction between commissioning armed bands of Spaniards to conquer Indians, and at the same time, christianize them, was all too apparent. The Conquest created a theological problem for Spain as real as America's silver. The state was determined to decide how Spaniards could use Indian workers. The New Laws (1542) shifted the obligations of native communities assigned to encomenderos from labor services to an annual payment, often made in kind.¹³ Since payments were adjusted to the size of communities, the demographic decline that followed the Conquest reduced their value.

European diseases cut down the native labor force. Central Mexico's indigenous population fell from around 25 million in 1500 to about 2 million at the end of the century. Had the Indian civilizations retained their demographic strength, there would have been less room for Spaniards and their estates. As it was, neither the encomenderos nor the native nobility provided the kind of continuity initially envisioned. Although the surviving population was large enough to support the mining industry and provision the growing

number of Spanish cities and towns, the future belonged to those enterprising men who secured title to vacated lands and built up productive estates. The economy still depended on the many tasks Indian workers performed, but the bureaucracy and Spanish employers organized the labor force in new ways. In the process, many encomenderos failed to make the transition from tribute collectors to estate owners.¹⁴

The social history of Mexico and Peru revolves around the shifting relationships between Spaniards and Indians, but the precise pattern: the interplay between competing labor systems, how, why, and to what extent native communities were pulled into the orbit of Spanish institutions, or, conversely, escaped and retained a significant degree of autonomy, varied greatly from one region to another, even from one valley to the next.¹⁵ The closer Indian communities were to Spanish urban centers the more likely it was that they had to specialize in the goods and services Spaniards valued. In many respects, the Spaniards who followed the conquistadors to the New World were entrepreneurs who reorganized production, and the silver mines provided capital to set up a European-style economy.

By the 1580s the crown had divided the Indies into two viceroyalties, ten Audiencias, and hundreds of smaller administrative districts. Around 1630, Spanish America had five archbishoprics, twenty-nine bishoprics, twenty-three colleges, ten universities, three tribunals of the Inquisition, seventy-four convents, ninety-four hospitals, and 334 monasteries.¹⁶ There were hundreds of towns with diverse economic functions, served by battalions of merchants, whose networks often extended to Lima and Mexico City. By 1600, over 300,000 Spaniards had migrated to the New World. In their towns, along with royal officials and a vast array of clergymen and nuns, colonists reproduced a faithful version of the mother country.¹⁷ Brazil's sugar plantations, Virginia's tobacco farms, and New England's Puritan towns provided a narrower base for replicating the social forms of the metropolis.

The epic of Spain in America commenced on a scale unknown anywhere else in the New World, and its first century reveals a movement and rhythm that places Spanish America beyond the reach of a simple category like colonization. By contrast, sixteenth-century Brazil had little in common with its Iberian neighbors. A few scattered officials did not make up a bureaucracy, a single bishop and some missionaries did not constitute an ecclesiastical hierarchy. But then, the problems each state faced in America diverged sharply. Spain took over an Indian empire, the Portuguese turned Brazil into a sugar plantation. By the time Brazilian colonization began, the state had diverted its bureaucratic energies to taxing trade and organizing the spice fleets. The king's factors in Africa and Asia

channeled slaves and pepper back to Portugal. Brazil's sugar industry fit neatly into this scheme. The crown took its share of the colony's wealth, but it didn't have to dispatch a corps of bureaucrats to get it. The king simply waited in Lisbon for sugar to be unloaded at the customs house. If sugar planters imported African slaves, Portuguese slave traders had to buy a license from the king. In one way or another, much of Brazil's wealth ended up in Lisbon. The king simply didn't need a Spanish-style bureaucracy.

The native economies of Mexico and Peru were productive enough to support bishoprics, religious orders, and encomenderos; indeed, the crown feared that its colonists would become self-sufficient. The mansions, textiles, and crops Indian labor produced for the Spaniards did not benefit the royal treasury. But Brazil was only profitable as a sugar plantation. If planters captured and enslaved Indians, forcing them to work on their estates, at least the king benefited indirectly. The crown was always responsive to complaints that its Indian legislation would reduce sugar exports. Once African slaves replaced the decimated Indian population, the state no longer pretended to run the labor system. African slaves were private property; their welfare was the planter's responsibility. Consequently, the crown did little to monitor the affairs of slave owners. In Spanish America, the crown was determined to decide how Indian workers could be used; it disinherited the encomenderos. In Brazil, the sugar planter was king.

Until the 1620s, the great fleets that supplied Spanish America and returned with silver were the envy of other European states. Between 1616-1620 and 1646-1650, however, tonnage dropped 60 percent.¹⁸ At the same time, the silver shipped back to Spain on the king's account fell from 4.3 million pesos to 1.7 million; private consignments declined from 30 to 12 million pesos.¹⁹ Between 1650 and 1700, only nineteen fleets reached Panama, the terminus for Spain's trade with Peru.²⁰ The collapse in transatlantic trade was much more severe than the drop in silver production. While bullion output continued to reach high levels, Spain had to be content with a smaller share of America's silver. The crown, for example, spent more locally on administration and defense; between 1651 and 1739, 80 percent of Lima's treasury receipts, or 155 million pesos.²¹ More significant, as regards trade, Spanish America bought less from the metropolis. Agriculturally self-sufficient, America no longer needed Spanish exports, like grain, biscuits, wine, and olive oil; domestic industries produced a wide assortment of textiles and other necessities. From their bases in the Caribbean, Dutch and English suppliers could undercut the fleets with contraband merchandise. Spain's colonists retained a greater share of silver for their own use. They built ships, traded in regional commodities, developed domestic agriculture, and invested their capital in illegal trades, mining, ranching, and textile factories.²²

By the eighteenth century, the sporadic fleets that left Cadiz indicated how much Spanish America had withdrawn from the metropolitan trading system. After 1700, Mexican silver production rose steadily, and Peruvian output started to climb in the 1730s.²³ Yet, Spain's American trade did not make corresponding gains. Capital was diverted to the domestic economy, the bureaucracy, the church, and contraband trades.²⁴ While Portugal and England taxed colonial staples unloaded in Lisbon and London, the Spanish-American economies did not export any tropical product that compared with Chesapeake tobacco or Brazilian sugar; Cadiz was not a great entrepôt for colonial re-exports. Venezuela, for example, sent more cacao to Mexico than to Spain.²⁵ Spanish haciendas, whether they produced sugar, tobacco, hides, wheat, wine, or olive oil, supplied local and regional markets. The textile workshops of Quito and Lima sent their wares throughout the viceroyalty of Peru; industrial towns, like Puebla and Queretaro, supplied Mexican markets.²⁶ In 1750, Spanish America was more self-sufficient and economically diversified than either Brazil or English America -- precisely Spain's problem. The wealth of the New World did not come to Cadiz, it circulated in America.

In 1750, the Luso-Brazilian economy was the fulcrum of Portugal's Atlantic empire. If the large convoys that annually left the metropolis for Brazil's major ports brought English goods, at least the merchandise came on Portuguese ships, and Luso-Brazilian merchants made commissions. If gold ended up in London, most of it passed through Lisbon first. That England's treasure came by foreign trade had long been the axiom of the realm's mercantilists.²⁷ The Navigation Acts, rather than instructions to royal governors, defined the core of Britain's colonial policy. How different was Spanish America, a colonial empire linked in haphazard fashion to the metropolitan economy. The Portuguese, for example, managed to confine British merchants to the Lisbon factory; they monopolized the carrying trade with Brazil. Providing contraband goods to Spain's undersupplied colonial markets, however, was an international venture. In 1761, a Spanish critic claimed that the illegal trade between Mexico and Jamaica was worth 6 million pesos a year.²⁸

If the Indies had withdrawn from Spain's economic orbit, the metropolis still maintained the largest bureaucratic establishment in the New World. Spiritual and political bonds defined the character of Spain's role in America; the church and the civil bureaucracy, rather than transatlantic trade, stood at the center of the empire. By 1750, a long-standing accommodation between Spanish and colonial interests prevailed.²⁹ The Janus-faced bureaucracy paid homage to Spain, while local entrepreneurs used the state's patronage system to their own advantage. The church had become a powerful economic institution dominated by Creole interests.

Everywhere, influential local groups had infiltrated the bureaucracy; it was no longer the state's agent -- or so it seemed to the Bourbon reformers. This was no less true in Brazil. Unlike Portugal, however, Spain's most important imperial profits came from taxes collected in America, not from duties on overseas trade. To strengthen Spain, the Bourbon state had to reconquer America; it began by cleaning up what it considered to be a corrupt, inefficient bureaucracy. By so doing, it attacked the interests tied to the old order.

To José de Gálvez, visitor-general in Mexico (1765-1771) and Minister of the Indies (1775-1778), Spain's weakness was a consequence of the way colonial interests had subverted the bureaucracy. Creole officeholders, tied in multiple fashion to colonial society, did not make reliable bureaucrats. Yet, Americans had bought their way into the bureaucracy. They held crucial positions in the treasury, and even dominated the most prestigious Audiencias.³⁰ The town councils and corporations, like Mexico City's merchant guild, purchased the contracts for collecting sales taxes (alcabalas) on domestic trade.³¹ The corregidor, the crown's local representative, was really a businessman who owned his office; in Indian towns, with the support of merchant backers, the corregidor monopolized trade.³² When Spaniards purchased the office, they often hired Creoles to be their lieutenants, thus allying themselves with local families. On the provincial level, the church was better organized than the state. But from the Bourbon perspective, the church was no longer a dependable ally. In Mexico, a Creole clergy staffed the cathedral chapters, the universities, the monasteries, and the parishes; even the Jesuits were predominately native sons. Besides supervising its great estates, the church held permanent mortgages on much of the rural property in Mexico, and it was a major source of credit for the domestic economy.³³ In Brazil, the church never acquired such economic and political significance; after independence, nationalizing ecclesiastical property did not become a significant issue.

To make the empire more profitable, Spain had to reshape the bureaucracy. The Bourbon "revolution in government" focused on America, not Spain. By removal, transfer, and making new appointments, Peninsular judges gradually regained control over the Audiencias. A cadre of treasury officials, trained in the metropolis, took over the reorganized exchequer; tax farming was curtailed, while rates increased. Intendants, often military officers from Spain, replaced the corregidores. The traditional privileges of the church came under attack; the crown expelled the Jesuits. The preferred instrument for retaining American loyalty was the army rather than the church. By sponsoring more efficient government, the state became an antagonist.³⁴ In Brazil, Pombal courted the colonial elite.

Under Gálvez, imperial reform bore an unmistakable prejudice against Americans. The office of intendant, for example, went to the new Bourbon bureaucrat whose competence and loyalty had been tested in Spain. Creoles were too bound by "ties of family and faction in the New World to provide disinterested, impartial government."³⁵ While Gálvez was displacing Creoles, Pombal was just as busy appointing Brazilians to the local treasury boards. The problem is not to decide which approach was the best; the character of each empire required different strategies. For Pombal, purging the Brazilian bureaucracy was less germane to Portugal's colonial problem. But in Spanish America, the role the bureaucracy played had tremendous fiscal significance. Unless the state could tax domestic production more effectively, America's wealth would not reach Spain. When Gálvez set up a tobacco monopoly in Mexico -- and a new division of the exchequer to manage it -- the objective was not to channel exports to Spain; the crown went into the business to control Mexican distribution; the American market was more profitable.³⁶ Between 1765 and 1782, revenues collected in Mexico rose from 6 million to 19 million pesos. Higher taxes, efficient collection, and new domestic monopolies paid off handsomely.³⁷

Drawing more revenue to Spain was not just a matter of taxing local production and the mining industry. Silver ended up in Cadiz to the extent that the metropolis supplied the colonies with sufficient merchandise. The fleet system, with its intermittent sailings and the way it confined transatlantic trade to Cadiz, Veracruz, and Cartagena, kept American markets undersupplied and prices high. The Cadiz monopoly, however, suited Mexico City's great merchants; with their silver, they bought out the Veracruz fleet and then hoarded the goods until market conditions were most favorable. The fortunes they accumulated depended on scarcity and high profit margins.³⁸ While restricted trade was a profitable business for the powerful merchant guilds of Cadiz, Lima, and Mexico City, the reduced volume that resulted was prejudicial to the exchequer and to Spanish industries, thus cut off from direct access to American markets. Strengthening the Spanish economy meant restructuring colonial trade; it also meant dislodging the merchants who profited from the monopoly system.

Between 1765 and 1789, free trade was gradually extended throughout the empire. All Spain's major ports could now ship their goods directly to a growing list of American entrepôts. Sporadic fleet departures had long retarded export agriculture; now, Spain finally provided abundant, regular, and dependable shipping. In exchange for merchandise, Spanish America exported increasing quantities of indigo, cochineal, sugar, hides, and cotton. Free trade promoted exporting as the old system never had, and it flooded American markets with cheap Catalan textiles to the detriment of local industries. Fundamentally different from monopolistic

economics, free trade required a new kind of expertise; high volume reduced profit margins. Before, it was only necessary "to import infrequently enough and the high prices would follow," it was now necessary "to make the proper kind of importations at the right time." Mexico City's wealthy merchants abandoned what had become a less profitable enterprise; they diverted their capital to the mining industry, or bought out Creole estate owners.³⁹

The Bourbon reforms did not cause the Spanish-American revolutions, but they unleashed complex reactions with multifaceted regional variations.⁴⁰ Free trade, for example, turned Buenos Aires into a thriving port: Platine ranchers now had a dependable outlet for their hide exports; directly supplied from Spain, Porteño merchants ruined Lima's trade with Upper Peru. Under the monopoly system, goods had circulated south from Lima and finally trickled into Argentina. Free trade reversed the flow: Spanish exports now went to Buenos Aires for reshipment to Asunción, Córdoba, Tucumán, and Potosí.⁴¹ Just as the Spanish-American economies were diverse, so too were the consequences of Bourbon commercial policy. As the reform program gained momentum, the fortunes of different groups: Creoles and Peninsular Spaniards, the old monopolistic merchants and the new merchants of free trade, the army and the church, the corregidores and the intendants, exporters and textile producers, rose and fell in different combinations throughout the Spanish Indies. How loyal Creoles were to this more aggressive Bourbon state became an increasing concern to Spanish authorities. Tax revolts occurred in a number of cities, and turned into serious rebellions in Colombia and Peru.⁴² Nonetheless, fiscal reform continued. The role of the bureaucracy as mediator -- the Hapsburg scheme -- had given way to a new conception of state and empire.⁴³ By 1800, three decades of reform had touched virtually every sector of colonial society, causing complex shifts in the crown's support. In many regions, the bureaucracy was seriously divided; traditional institutions, like the Audiencias, resisted the challenge to their authority posed by the intendants and the treasury officials. The Spanish-American revolutions occurred in societies where the reforms had generated shifting sources of power, wealth, and status. The intricate rearrangements this produced in elite composition had created a volatile social order.⁴⁴ When Napoleon usurped the Spanish throne, bureaucratic authority in America lost its moorings; the empire collapsed.

In Spanish America, each region had its own kind of revolution, and independence produced a series of independent republics.⁴⁵ To view this as a fragmentation of the imperial order ignores how the bureaucracy had masked the empire's diversity. For Spanish America was an amalgam of different castes, elites, and economies; and free trade only accentuated economic divergence.⁴⁶ Cut off from Spanish markets by prohibitive transportation costs, Peruvian

estate owners could hardly embrace exporting like Guatemala's indigo planters or Platine ranchers. While a legally distinct caste of Indians tied to indigenous communities still characterized much of Peru and Mexico, a mobile caste of mestizos had created a very different kind of social order in regions like the Bajío.⁴⁷ It was the bureaucracy that maintained the charade of a unified Spanish empire. By 1810, however, the Bourbon reforms had produced turbulent societies and a divided bureaucracy. The independence movements began as local struggles to control a bureaucracy set adrift from the metropolis; they culminated in its destruction. Spanish Americans faced the enormously difficult task of both dismantling and constructing institutions simultaneously. There were no assemblies, or an exiled monarchy, to oversee the transition from colony to nation. The centrifugal forces unleashed by the Conquest had finally surfaced; the charade ended.

Like Brazil, English America had an export economy. Navigation Acts made the metropolis the required depôt for all enumerated colonial exports, and for all European goods shipped to the colonies.⁴⁸ The credit English and Scottish merchants extended to Virginia's planters, and their ability to market exports, kept the tobacco business booming. Between 1740-1744 and 1760-1764, tobacco exports to Great Britain climbed from 57 million lbs a year to 82 million.⁴⁹ If Massachusetts and Pennsylvania did not send their exports "home," they provisioned England's Caribbean sugar colonies with grain, lumber, meat, and fish. During the 1750s, Caribbean demand provided the stimulus for rising northern export prices. While mainland ports carried on brisk local exchanges, the export sector, rather than coastal trades, sustained growth.⁵⁰ With the profits colonists made as planters, merchants, and farmers, they purchased a growing assortment of British goods: the value of Britain's export trade with the mainland colonies increased from an average of £738,000 (1741-1745) to £1.8 million (1761-1765).⁵¹ During the middle decades of the eighteenth century, colonial trade was the principal dynamic element in England's industrial growth.⁵² If England had a colonial problem in the 1760s, it did not stem from the way trade was organized: colonial commerce largely conformed to the mercantilistic axioms embodied in the Navigation Acts.⁵³ The problem with English America was its peculiar politics, in particular, its assemblies.

How Portugal and Spain taxed their colonies reflected the difference between Brazil's export economy and Spanish America's stubborn self-sufficiency. In general, this applies to English America too.⁵⁴ Since England was the entrepôt for colonial trade, it made more sense to tax tobacco in London or Glasgow than to attempt the task in America. The duty on tobacco was several times greater than the weed's actual value, and it was taxed again as an item of popular consumption.⁵⁵ Unlike Portugal, however, England

rebated duties on colonial re-exports to keep them competitive. Similarly, exported British merchandise was lightly taxed. America was valuable to England because it was a good customer and supplier, not because it was a good taxpayer. Except for tobacco, hardly a strategic raw material, Parliament usually avoided excessive taxes on trade; experience showed that high duties only encouraged smuggling.⁵⁶ Moreover, the realm's merchants and the West Indian sugar lobby, both entrenched in the House of Commons, conspired to keep customs duties low.⁵⁷ Thus, political expediency and economic policy both argued against burdening the empire's commercial traffic. By the 1760s, English land taxes and the excise on domestic necessities consumed at home far exceeded the state's revenues from overseas trade.⁵⁸

In America, the duties the crown managed to collect did not even cover salaries for customs officials.⁵⁹ Local taxes levied by the assembly and collected by its agents paid for royal government.⁶⁰ Unless authorized by Parliament, the executive could not tax the colonies. Although governors were often hard-pressed financially by recalcitrant assemblies, the crown was reluctant to invoke Parliament's intervention; rewarding its supporters with colonial posts was one of the ways the executive kept Parliament in line. Except for matters of trade, powerful Whig ministers were determined to keep colonial affairs, especially the patronage system, beyond the scrutiny of the House of Commons.⁶¹ Taxing the colonies by acts of Parliament only invited such interference. The Whig strategy was to cover the cost of the colonial executive with the local taxes levied by each assembly. As men like Walpole and Newcastle realized, tampering with this arrangement was likely to provoke a constitutional crisis in America.⁶² For in the colonies, the crown had to reckon with a well organized opponent -- the assembly.

England's victory in the Seven Years War (1757-1763) made this old balancing act untenable. At the Peace of Paris (1763), France ceded Quebec, the Great Lakes, and the Mississippi Valley to the English. Britain now had a greatly enlarged American empire that placed additional burdens on a debt-ridden treasury; the national debt, much of it acquired in defense of the American colonies, had risen from £78 million in 1757 to £132 million.⁶³ To defray the cost of empire, the king's ministers, with Parliament's approval, tried to raise modest revenues in the colonies; the consequence was the American Revolution.

Resistance to taxation occurred everywhere in the Americas. The Bourbons had to quell the tax rebellions that their fiscal policies helped create; the fifths could not be collected in Minas Gerais without the dragoons. But the Bourbons, whose objective went far beyond the modest remedies Parliament proposed, succeeded, while the English government failed. The crucial difference stems from the structure of colonial politics.

Iberian colonists did not come to America to escape their king or to find new ways to save their souls; the basis of the state's authority was resolved before colonization commenced. In Portugal and Castile, the Cortes could not contest royal authority as successfully as the House of Commons. But the Stuart kings did not have the spice trade or American silver to help keep the monarchy solvent. In Iberia, salvation depended on the sacramental rites monopolized by a religious hierarchy tied to the state; post-Reformation England spawned a multiplicity of contentious sects. In America, colonists made their own arrangements with God.

English America was the creation of a society that practiced regicide. If the Spanish crown displaced the conquistadors, Englishmen disinherited the Stuarts. Colonization occurred during England's century of revolution, a period of unprecedented social mobility, political conflict, and religious fervor. Puritan dissenters threatened the Anglican establishment; a new class of wealthy merchants and gentry defended the liberties of the House of Commons against a monarchy bent on expanding its authority and income. Frustrated in its battle to pry subsidies from a distrustful Parliament, the crown tried, unsuccessfully, to impose taxes on its own authority. At stake was the control of the state and man's salvation.⁶⁴ Locked in a battle at home, the crown had little time to worry about the constitutional implications of empire. When the restored Stuart monarchy finally turned to America in the 1670s, and tried to reorganize royal government, it found that authority was already claimed by others.⁶⁵

Relative to the Spanish Indies, royal government in both Brazil and the English colonies was less comprehensive; but the reasons why and the results were fundamentally different. In Brazil the bureaucracy was designed to supervise the export sector; Paulistas, ranchers, and squatters took over the sertão. Powerful rural clans and local folkways defined authority rather than formal political institutions. Of course, Spanish America had its backlands too, and the state's ability to monitor the corregidores was always problematic, hence, the Bourbon intendancies. Nonetheless, authority largely derived from holding an office or a position in the church. In English America, the crown's bureaucrats did not run the colonies; aldermen, circuit judges, preachers, and assemblymen did. As the frontier expanded, the assemblies incorporated new townships and counties into the colonial political order.⁶⁶ The authority of New England's towns and Virginia's county courts did not represent the crown's vision of empire, instead, it reflected the interests of those who ran the Godly Commonwealth and Virginia's tobacco economy.

If local institutions run by local men became the hallmark of English colonization, it bore bitter fruit for the thousands of indentured servants lured to Virginia. Those who made it to the top as planters used their control of the assembly and the county courts to systematically defraud and overwork their servants. Before the 1670s, opposition to the laws passed by Virginia's assembly did not come from the crown; it came from overtaxed, discontented freemen who wanted to dislodge the oligarchy that monopolized local offices, speculated in land, levied taxes, and narrowed the franchise. Bacon's rebellion, the most serious colonial conflict before the American Revolution, was the consequence.⁶⁷ In Virginia, there were no Franciscans or Jesuits to protect the Indians, no royal judges to run the labor system.

Only in New England did a dissident, alienated community set up a Godly Commonwealth to stand against the decadence of the king's court. They came to establish a "plantation of religion," not a "plantation of trade." The ordered, spiritual life of the Puritans was an intense, personal response to the social disorder that prevailed in England. The notion that unrestrained, economic self-interest produced the common good was anathema; the Puritans were not disguised capitalists. They did not come searching for gold, new export crops, or social mobility. They sought to construct a society of ordered relationships, "the kind of society that God demanded of all his servants but that none had yet given him."⁶⁸

New England was run by theologians, Virginia by planter capitalists. That two such disparate offshoots were children of the same parent reflects the potent forces unleashed by the English Reformation. How planters and Puritans ended up on the same side of the American Revolution reflects the common stake they had in defending the liberties of the assembly. For English Americans built their political systems around the threat they thought royal government posed to local institutions.⁶⁹ In Virginia, slavery helped diffuse the colony's explosive social order. During the 1680s, planters turned to exploiting slaves rather than other Englishmen; the assembly reached out to embrace the common planter, reducing taxes and enlarging the franchise.⁷⁰ While colonial politics was often intensely factional, rivals fought to control, not disband, the lower house. When in power, the very men who had attacked the assembly's alleged abuses became staunch supporters of its authority. By 1750, the assembly had a legitimacy in local society that no cabildo or cámara could match; its strength reached into towns and counties.⁷¹ Politically ambitious men often preferred election to the assembly rather than an office in the crown's service.

Throughout the eighteenth century, the embattled assembly held center stage in colonial politics; it resisted the evil designs, the threats to liberty and property that a patronage-ridden executive apparently posed to the rights of Englishmen. To prevent "influence" and "patronage" from destroying "liberty," the assemblies kept a firm grip on local taxation and expenditures. For example, the lower house insisted on nominating or appointing the officials who collected, held, and paid out provincial revenues; it fixed all fees by statute, thus preventing the governor and his council from setting them by executive order. While the governor could appoint judges, only the lower house could pay their salaries; they did so, but on an annual basis and by name. Thus, most governors had to select judges that had the assembly's support. Using a variety of stratagems, the lower house curbed the crown's patronage powers.⁷²

How, and to what extent, the lower house gained ground at the expense of the governor and his council varied. But by the 1760s, most of the assemblies exercised powers that far exceeded the mandate contained in the governors' instructions. The point at issue was clear enough. The check on the crown's inflated claims came from the way governors had to pry annual appropriations from wary assemblies. A financially independent executive, supported by Parliament's willingness to tax Americans, posed a mortal danger to the assembly's political role, and to the interests it represented.⁷³ What Parliament viewed as an intelligent program to finance an expensive empire colonial leaders viewed as a conspiracy to destroy home rule. An executive that could levy and spend taxes at its own discretion could expand the crown's pernicious influence; its grasp would soon spread to the judiciary, the assembly, the county, and the town. Liberty would be extinguished -- or so it appeared on the American side of the Atlantic.

Underlying the events that stretched from the Stamp Act to Lexington and Concord was a fundamental dilemma. How could the crown reorganize colonial administration except at the assembly's expense? Suppressing tax revolts is the state's business. But in this case, the assembly had become more legitimate than its rival, the royal executive. Colonial ideology related concretely to the defense of a particular institution, the assembly. England's colonial problem did not stem from the character of the empire's trade; instead, it proceeded from a political culture organized specifically to oppose executive authority.

In English America, the revolution preserved the social order the assembly represented; the problem of authority was already resolved. For Spanish Americans, who should govern, and how, was at the heart of the rebellions; the revolutions were also civil wars. English Americans had the advantage of fighting the crown

rather than one another.⁷⁴ The assembly helped organize the revolution and created the Continental Congress; later, it provided a model for the Republic.⁷⁵ In the United States, the pattern of colonial dependency changed more completely than anywhere else in the Americas; backed by a strong state, industrialists could defend domestic industries. Westward expansion helped delay the conflict between planters, manufacturers, and small farmers; an expanding economy provided new resources each could exploit. In Spanish-American republics, like Mexico, there was no unclaimed frontier: liberals and conservatives battled over how to reorganize the domestic economy.⁷⁶ The revolutions produced weak states whose resources were appropriated by foreign entrepreneurs. Cortés returned.

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⁴⁹Jacob M. Price, France and the Chesapeake. A History of the French Tobacco Monopoly, 1674-1791, and of Its Relationship to the British and American Tobacco Trades 2 vols. (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1973), vol. 2, pp. 843-844. On the character of the tobacco trade, also see Price, "The Economic Growth of the Chesapeake and the European Market, 1697-1775," Journal of Economic History 24 (1964), pp. 496-511; *idem.*, "The Rise of Glasgow in the Chesapeake Tobacco Trade, 1707-1775," William and Mary Quarterly 11 (1954), pp. 179-199; *idem.*, "The Tobacco Adventure to Russia. Enterprise, Politics, and Diplomacy in the Quest for a Northern Market for English Colonial Tobacco, 1676-1722," Transaction of the American Philosophical Society 51 (1961), pp. 5-110, and J.H. Soltow, "Scottish Traders in Virginia, 1750-1775," Economic History Review 12 (1959), pp. 83-98.

⁵⁰See Marc Egnal, "The Economic Development of the Thirteen Continental Colonies, 1720-1775," William and Mary Quarterly 32 (1975), pp. 191-222. On the structure of colonial trade, see James F. Shepherd, "Commodity Exports from the British North American Colonies to Overseas Areas, 1768-1772: Magnitudes and Patterns of Trade," Explorations in Economic History 8 (1970), pp. 5-76; James F. Shepherd and Samuel H. Williamson, "The Coastal Trades of the British North American Colonies, 1768-1772," Journal of Economic

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History 32 (1972), pp. 783-810, and James F. Shepherd and Gary M. Walton, Shipping, Maritime Trade, and the Economic Development of Colonial North America (Cambridge, Eng., 1972).

⁵¹Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter, English Overseas Trade Statistics 1697-1808 (Oxford, 1960), p. 17.

⁵²Ralph Davis, "English Foreign Trade, 1700-1774," Economic History Review 15 (1962), pp. 289-290.

⁵³Oliver M. Dickerson, The Navigation Acts and the American Revolution (1951, New York, 1963), pp. 63-91, and Harper, English Navigation Laws, pp. 253-274. French trade with the West Indies, although legal, was periodically approved, tolerated, and opposed by British authorities. See Richard Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies 1739-1763 (Oxford, 1936), and Dorothy Bourne Goebel, "The 'New England Trade' and the French West Indies, 1763-1774: A Study in Trade Policies," William and Mary Quarterly 20 (1963), pp. 331-372.

⁵⁴One of England's advantages was its ability to tax a more commercialized domestic economy. For a discussion of the relationship between the state and the economy it taxes, see Gabriel Ardant, "Financial Policy and Economic Infrastructure of Modern States and Nations," in Formation of National States in Western Europe, Charles Tilly, ed. (Princeton, 1975), pp. 202-203, 164-242.

⁵⁵See Price, France and the Chesapeake, vol. 2, pp. 840-841.

⁵⁶Charles H. Wilson, England's Apprenticeship 1603-1763 (London, 1965), p. 319. A notable exception was the high tax on the tea imported by the British East India Company; it became a prime target for smugglers, both in England and in the colonies. See Hoh-cheung and Lorna M. Mui, "Smuggling and the British Tea Trade before 1784," American Historical Review 74 (1968), pp. 44-73, and Barrow, Trade and Empire, pp. 149-150. The stiff duty on the molasses trade between the French West Indies and New England was also evaded; see Gilman Ostander, "The Colonial Molasses Trade," Agricultural History 30 (1956), pp. 77-84.

⁵⁷On merchants and customs duties, see William Kennedy, English Taxation 1640-1799 (London, 1913), pp. 95-150. The influence of the sugar lobby is discussed in Richard B. Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, An Economic History of the British West Indies 1623-1775 (Baltimore, 1973), pp. 54-74.

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⁵⁸Wilson, England's Apprenticeship, pp. 313-320.

⁵⁹Barrow, Trade and Empire, p. 74.

⁶⁰For example, see Marvin L. Michael Kay, "The Payment of Provincial and Local Taxes in North Carolina, 1748-1771," William and Mary Quarterly 26 (1969), pp. 218-240.

⁶¹See Bernard Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics (New York, 1967), pp. 28-29, 88-91, and Stanley Katz, Newcastle's New York: Anglo-American Politics 1732-1753 (Cambridge, Mass., 1968).

⁶²Sir Robert Walpole was First Minister from 1721 until 1742; for a brief summary of his colonial policy, see Jack P. Greene, ed., Great Britain and the American Colonies 1606-1763 (Columbia, South Carolina, 1970), pp. xxxi-xli. The Board of Trade took a more aggressive stance; but its position was undercut by the rise of the Cabinet vis-a-vis the old Privy Council. While Secretary of State for the Southern Department (1724-1748), the Duke of Newcastle, rather than the Board of Trade, controlled colonial patronage. See Oliver M. Dickerson, American Colonial Government 1696-1765. A Study of the British Board of Trade in Its Relation to the American Colonies: Political, Industrial, Administrative (Cleveland, Ohio, 1912). On Newcastle's attitudes toward colonial government, see Bernhard Knollenberg, Origins of the American Revolution 1759-1766 (New York, 1961), pp. 21-24.

⁶³Wilson, England's Apprenticeship, p. 313.

⁶⁴See Christopher Hill, The Century of Revolution 1603-1714 (London, 1961); Lawrence Stone, "Social Mobility in England, 1500-1700," Past and Present 33 (1966), pp. 16-55, and Wilson, England's Apprenticeship, pp. 89-107.

⁶⁵See David S. Lovejoy, The Glorious Revolution in America (New York, 1972).

⁶⁶For example, see Bailyn, Origins of American Politics, pp. 80-81; J.R. Pole, Political Representation in England and the Origins of the American Republic (London, 1966), pp. 33-148; Warren M. Billings, "The Growth of Political Institutions in Virginia, 1634-1676," William and Mary Quarterly 31 (1974), pp. 225-242, and B. Katherine Brown, "The Controversy Over the Franchise in Puritan Massachusetts, 1654-1674," William and Mary Quarterly 33 (1976) pp. 212-241.

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⁶⁷See Edmund S. Morgan, American Slavery-American Freedom. The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia (New York, 1975), pp. 215-270, and Bernard Bailyn, "Politics and Social Structure in Virginia," in Seventeenth-Century America. Essays in Colonial History, James Morton Smith, ed. (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1959), pp. 90-115.

⁶⁸See Perry Miller, Nature's Nation (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), the quote is from p. 33; Edmund S. Morgan, The Puritan Dilemma. The Story of John Winthrop (Boston, 1958), quote is from pp. 46-47, and Michael Walzer, "Puritanism as a Revolutionary Ideology," History and Theory 3 (1961), pp. 59-90; *idem.*, The Revolution of the Saints. A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics (New York, 1971).

⁶⁹In early New England, even elected governors were suspect. See T.H. Breen, "English Social Change and the Shaping of New England Institutions," William and Mary Quarterly 32 (1975), pp. 3-38.

⁷⁰On the character of this accommodation, see Morgan, American Slavery American Freedom, pp. 338-387, and John C. Rainbolt, "The Alternation in the Relationship Between Leadership and Constituents in Virginia, 1660-1720," William and Mary Quarterly 27 (1970), pp. 411-434. In the 1760s, however, religious movements provided a new focus for those excluded from genteel society. Revolutionary leaders, like Madison, quickly embraced religious toleration. See Rhys Issac, "Evangelical Revolt: The Nature of the Baptists' Challenge to the Traditional Order in Virginia, 1765 to 1775," William and Mary Quarterly 31 (1974), pp. 345-368.

⁷¹While this was generally the case, some assemblies ignored and alienated their western constituencies. See John S. Bassett, "The Regulators of North Carolina (1765-1771)," American Historical Association Annual Report (1894), pp. 140-212, and James P. Whittenburg, "Planters, Merchants, and Lawyers: Social Change and the Origins of the North Carolina Regulation," William and Mary Quarterly 34 (1977), pp. 215-238.

⁷²On colonial ideology and the assembly's growing power, see Bailyn, Origins of American Politics; *idem.*, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., 1967); Leonard Labaree, Royal Government in America (Princeton, 1930), pp. 172-419; Jack P. Greene, "The Role of the Lower House of Assembly in Eighteenth-Century Politics," Journal of Southern History 37 (1961), pp. 451-474; *idem.*, The Quest for Power. The Lower House of Assembly in the Southern Royal Colonies 1689-1776 (Chapel Hill, North

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Carolina, 1963); idem., "Political Mimesis: A Consideration of the Historical and Cultural Roots of Legislative Behavior in the British Colonies in the Eighteenth Century," American Historical Review 75 (1969), pp. 337-360; Pole, Political Representation, pp. 3-382, and J.G.A. Pocock, "Machiavelli, Harrington, and English Political Ideologies in the Eighteenth Century," William and Mary Quarterly 22 (1965), pp. 549-583. At times, the governor and his cronies did manage to control the assembly; see Jere R. Daniell, "Politics in New Hampshire Under Governor Benning Wentworth, 1741-1767," William and Mary Quarterly 23 (1966), pp. 76-105.

⁷³How various tax schemes threatened colonial interests is discussed in Dickerson, Navigation Acts, pp. 161-300; Knollenberg, Origins of the American Revolution, pp. 131-171; Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Colonial Merchant and the American Revolution 1763-1776 (1918, New York, 1939); Edmund S. Morgan and Helen M. Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis. Prologue to Revolution (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1953), and Robert J. Chaffin, "The Townshend Acts of 1767," William and Mary Quarterly 27 (1970), pp. 90-121.

⁷⁴Of course, English America had its Royalists too. See Wallace Brown, The King's Friends (Providence, Rhode Island, 1965).

⁷⁵See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (1969, New York, 1972).

⁷⁶See John H. Coatsworth, "Obstacles to Economic Growth in Nineteenth-Century Mexico," American Historical Review 83 (1978), pp. 80-100.