

Ready to Lead:

UNDERSTANDING WOMEN'S PUBLIC
LEADERSHIP IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND
NORTH AFRICA

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*with Foreword by President and CEO of the
Wilson Center Jane Harman*



ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST WOMEN'S INITIATIVE

The Wilson Center's Middle East Women's Initiative (MEWI) builds on the work of the Middle East Program and the Haleh Esfandiari Forum in promoting the empowerment of women in the region. Through an open and inclusive dialogue with women leaders from the Middle East and continuous research, MEWI aims to deepen understanding of both the challenges and opportunities in gender development and prescribe policy recommendations for governments, civil society and the private sector to achieve gender parity across the region.

In addition to the Middle East Women leadership Index, the Middle East Women Initiative includes policy dialogue sessions with gender development experts, regional experts, and women leaders from the Middle East representing both public and private sectors and civil society. In March 2019, the Middle East Women's Initiative launched *Enheduanna: Voices of Women in the Middle East*, a blog featuring diverse voices of women from the region. It is a space where these contributors share thoughts and express ideas about the state of women in their countries, as well as their often ignored, yet important, work to advance women's issues across the region.

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FOREWORD

Going back to the time of Cleopatra, there has been a tradition in the Middle East of women leaders. But today, cultural and legal barriers prevent even highly-educated women from advancing in public-sector leadership roles.

The turmoil in the decade following the so-called Arab Spring has left countries across the Middle East and North Africa struggling to exercise governance. More than ever, it is important to ensure that workers, especially in the public sector, are empowered, trained, and given resources to use their talents most effectively.

Lots of those workers can and should be women. In some MENA countries, women outnumber men in university enrollment; on average, the rate of female enrollment in universities and postgraduate programs has exploded from under 5 percent in 1970 to around 42 percent in 2017. And yet female labor force participation is just 20 percent compared to the global average of 47.8 percent. According to a report by the McKinsey Global Institute, if the MENA workforce reached gender parity, the region's annual GDP would increase nearly 50% by 2025.

I've been a regular visitor to the Middle East for decades, and recently returned from a trip to the region. Many governments appreciate what women bring to public service, and are committed to fixing some of the barriers identified in this new Wilson report, "Ready to Lead: Understanding Women's Public Leadership in The Middle East and North Africa," which explores women's leadership across the region.

The report introduces a new framework for comparing how different countries tackle this challenge, describing them on a scale from "aspiring" to "ascending" representation of women. It concludes that countries with strong female labor force participation, high degrees of asset ownership among women, and quotas for women in parliament are most successful in approaching gender parity.

The Wilson Center is committed to producing research and policy recommendations that advance women in the MENA region and around the world. Reports like our Middle East Women's Leaders Index are a major part of why we have been ranked number one by our peers in regional studies for three years in a row.

My thanks to the talented team at the Wilson Center, including Merissa Khurma and Alex Farley, as well as data scientists Cassandra Pagán and James Alex Horner. Thank you also to our many supporters in the region, and especially the government of the United Arab Emirates for supporting our research.

Jane Harman

Director, President and CEO
Wilson Center

PREFACE

We are very proud to present to you, *Ready to Lead: Understanding Women's Leadership in the Middle East and North Africa*, which introduces the first research instrument of its kind: *The Middle East Women Leaders Index*. This data tool quantifies and compares the extent of women's leadership in the public sector across the MENA region. Like the rest of the world, countries there continue to witness a leadership deficit amongst women, despite significant progress in education and in health outcomes.

Women in the region have certainly come a long way in reaching positions of authority in the public sector. As you will read in this report, there are women ministers, members of parliament, and in the United Arab Emirates, the first woman speaker of parliament, Dr. Amal Al Qubaisi. In 2019, Tunisia witnessed two woman candidates running for President: Selma Elloumi Rekik and Abir Moussi. That is a step in the right direction.

We are yet to see a woman president in any of the MENA republics and there is certainly a long way to achieving gender parity in public sector leadership in MENA. However, these women offer a glimmer of hope. Their mere presence in the public eye serves to inspire girls and young women to reach their full potential, in spite of many legal and social barriers. I was certainly inspired by women role models starting with my own mother who was one of the first five women in Jordan to enter the Foreign Service. I also still remember being in awe of meeting one of the first Arab women pilots, Captain Taghreed Akasheh and my father telling me, "see, the sky's the limit."

It is worthy to mention that in addition to impressive women leaders in the public sector, acting or retired, many other women are exercising leadership in business and entrepreneurship and more so in the social sector and non-governmental organizations. While this report does not measure women's leadership in these domains, one key lesson we took as a team for this project, is that future research should assess women's leadership beyond the public sector; especially in light of the prominent role women are currently playing in protest movements from Lebanon and Iraq to Sudan and Algeria.

In closing, I would like to express my gratitude to Wilson Center President and CEO Congresswoman Jane Harman for her leadership and support of this initiative. I am incredibly grateful to the primary architect of this index and author of its accompanying report Cassandra Pagan and the commitment and hard work of Alex Horner, and program associate Alex Farley for honing its quality and precision. My appreciation also goes out to Wilson Center distinguished fellow and director emerita of the Middle East Program, Haleh Esfandiari for her keen guidance and to Senior Vice President Robert Litwak for his active support. Many thanks to the editor, Richard Byrne and graphic designer Kathy Butterfield for lending their professional skills in its preparation. Lastly, and on behalf of my team, thank you to the Government of the United Arab Emirates for supporting this initiative.

Merissa Khurma

Project Manager, Middle East Women's Initiative
Wilson Center

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Middle East Women's Initiative would like to express its deepest gratitude to the team of collaborators, contributors, and partners who made this research possible. We would like to acknowledge the support of the leadership at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, without whom the development of the of the to Pipeline-Participation-Authority Framework (PPA) would not be possible.

A special thanks to the Director, President and CEO of the Wilson Center, Jane Harman, for her leadership and support.

Our gratitude also extends to Dr. Haleh Esfandiari, founding Director of the Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center, and a true champion of women's rights in the MENA region.

This index benefited tremendously from the advice and insights of Dr. Müge Köten Finkel and Dr. Melanie Hughes of the University of Pittsburgh and the Gender Inequality Research Lab (GIRL Lab), and we are ever grateful for your continued scholarship and collaboration on the subject of women's participation in the public sector.

We are grateful for the support of the Middle East Women's Initiative team, who have brought their rich experiences, vision and dedication to the development and execution of this research. A heartfelt thanks to Alex Horner and Alexander Farley for their dedication, insights and hard work, without which this research would not have been possible. Special thanks to Merissa Khurma for her inspiring leadership of the initiative.

We also thank the United Arab Emirates Gender Balance Council for its generous support of this initiative, which made it possible to continue this important work in the region.


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Middle East Women Leaders Index (MEWLI) is a comprehensive data tool designed to quantify women's representation in leadership in the public sector in the MENA region. This index introduces the Pipeline-Participation-Authority Framework (PPA) that seeks to measure gender parity beyond descriptive representation which limits measures of representation to reaching a set proportion of positions, i.e. women are 50% of the population and this should be reflected by 50% of women in leadership positions. This framework expands on the meaning of gender parity in public institutions by also considering enablers and barriers for women to reaching such positions as well as the authority a women leader can effectively wield once in power. This framework addresses contextual factors and data limitations, and employs the Ascending Leaders categorization launched in this report by placing 21 MENA societies in one of four categories based on the extent of women's representation in public leadership (Glass Ceilings score), as well as the distribution of women leaders across policy functions (Glass Walls score).

The resulting analysis found that factors such as asset ownership and equality of inheritance is a strong predictor of women's public leadership. This is a finding that warrants deeper study of the relationship between assets and legal frameworks regarding property and access to public leadership positions. Our analysis of the index results also confirmed the inverse relationship between women's educational attainment and labor force participation in the region, a phenomenon also known as the MENA Paradox. Moreover, this index found a compelling relationship between the adoption of voluntary party quotas, women's leadership, and the power they wield while in office.

Our analysis of the index results – as well as from insights collected through a survey conducted with women who have or are currently serving as women leaders in the MENA region – allowed us to arrive at a set of recommendations for MENA societies who seek to improve women's representation in public leadership.

- Firstly, we recommend that MENA governments should support and work with civil society groups, particularly those that support women's capacity building in the public sector.
- Governments in the region should adopt policies that promote women's participation in the labor force such as affordable child care support and flexible working hours to alleviate the double burden working women often carry.
- Government bodies and political parties should consider the adoption of quotas and other policies meant to overcome the structural barriers to entry that women have faced in entering public office.
- And finally, we strongly recommend that all governments in the region and globally work to make sex-disaggregated data available for further study of the gendered aspects of public institutions.



Introduction

The coming of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) has brought with it waves of change that have pulled the fabric of society in various directions – stretching, gathering and reshaping how humanity organizes itself.


On one side, we see a world more connected than ever, with ideas and content emerging from all corners of the globe, and shared on a massive scale in an instant. In this context, we see more opportunities than before for women and girls go to school, to tell their stories, to create their own spaces, to shape their world and lead. In Saudi Arabia, women have recently gained the ability to drive, apply for a passport, and register births, marriage or divorce without a male relative's permission.

Yet at the same time, we are also experiencing a wave of reactive measures that seek to limit the independence of women and girls. Recent movements in the United States and Poland to limit women's reproductive rights and access to reproductive care are part of this trend. Unlike inflection moments of the past, in which the changes were accelerated, but growth remained linear, the 4IR moves at an exponential rate. This makes it more imperative than ever to develop tools that measure our understanding of how the world is changing, so that we might guide the changes we seek to achieve, be they creating jobs for youth, or increasing the political participation of women in their societies.

Across the four gaps measured by the World Economic Forum's 2018 Global Gender Gap Report (Educational Attainment, Health and Survival, Economic Participation and Opportunity and Political Empowerment), the largest gap exists in Political Empowerment (77.1 percent).¹ The global political empowerment gap will close in 108 years at the current rate, but within the MENA region, the overall gender gap is expected to close in 153 years at the current rate.²

However, women in the MENA region are not inclined to wait another five generations before they achieve gender equality. The 4IR can either be an opportunity to harness momentum, leverage emerging technologies and paradigms, and reduce the wait. Or, conversely, the 4IR can exacerbate existing inequities. Which direction we take ultimately depends on the willingness of policy makers, and others in positions of power, to address the systemic barriers that keep women from participating fully in public life.

The hopes contained in the Middle East Women's Leaders Index (MEWLI) are that it will serve as a weathervane during this time of uncertainty, and provide a sense of how women's leadership in the public sector is evolving.



Part I:

The Pipeline-Participation-Authority Framework

The Middle East Women Leaders Index (MEWLI) was created to measure the magnitude of the leadership gap between men and women in the public sector in the region. In order to quantify this gap, we first had to develop a framework that could address three key issues: 1) what does it mean to be *fully and equally* represented? 2) how do we know what public positions qualify as leadership positions? And 3) is holding/participating in a position of leadership sufficient if the participants do not wield the same authority or have influence?

In addition to presenting the index, this report also introduces the Pipeline-Participation-Authority framework to address the specific challenges in creating and nurturing women's leadership in the MENA region, but with global scope in mind. While certain indicators have been included in this edition to address the social, legal and economic context of the MENA region, it should be noted that the broader framework has been designed with the intention of applying to any region or even the global context, acknowledging that the specific indicators used may be adjusted for context or data availability.

What does it mean to be represented, especially in leadership positions? In her seminal work, *The Concept of Representation*,³ Hanna Fenichel Pitkin outlines the various conceptions of political representation in four categories: Formalistic Representation, Symbolic Representation, Descriptive Representation, and Substantive Representation.

Formalistic representation argues that to be represented depends on the process by which the representative enters into the position. This process of designating representation should be evaluated in two dimensions: authorization and accountability. Legitimacy, which gives the representative the authority to act, must come from the process by which the representative entered the position (for instance: were the elections considered fair?). It also rests on what mechanisms a constituency has available to remove a representative when their legitimacy is compromised.

Symbolic representation takes the view that the representative must "stand for" the constituency. The position must hold a symbolic meaning for those being represented. Rather than being concerned with the institutional positioning of the representative, symbolic representation seeks to understand the acceptance and response of the represented in relation to their representative.

Descriptive representation is a third category introduced by Pitkin. It understands representation as the extent to which the representative resembles the characteristics of those who are represented. In the context of gender and public institutions, the argument has been made that approximately 50 percent of the global population are women therefore women should hold 50 percent of positions in any given firm, sector or institution.

Lastly, **substantive representation** seeks to understand representation in terms of the actions and “substance” of the representative, and how well they advance the interests of those whom they represent.

Pitkin acknowledges the paradoxes and contradictions that may arise from these four divergent conceptualizations. She argues that instead of seeking to reconcile them, we should seek to maintain a level of autonomy for both the representative and represented.

The PPA index framework was devised with Pitkin's multidimensional conceptualization in mind. It seeks to go beyond existing measurements that limit the understanding of representation largely to descriptive representation. The goal of this index is to seek to understand the extent of women's representation, capturing to the fullest extent possible not only what it means to be represented, but the forces that shape representation.

In addition to expanding the notion of how to measure the extent of representation, the PPA framework was designed to elaborate a systems-level view of the state of women's leadership across government sectors, expanding past the executive and legislative branches into the judiciary, the security sector, and (where data are available) other branches of public service. To achieve this, publicly available data was used to measure three pillars that enable women to realize parity in high-level government positions across sectors.

PILLAR ONE: PIPELINE

The Pipeline pillar examines structural factors that pave the way for women to attain positions of leadership, or act as roadblocks to women reaching these positions. It seeks to measure elements of formalistic representation in regards to the process of entering such positions. In particular, the Pipeline pillar takes stock of the policies, practices, institutions, and dynamics that shape women's access to leadership positions.

This pillar draws on indicators that measure three clusters: Access to skills and assets (i.e. educational attainment and property rights), Access to labor markets (i.e. employment rates, maternity and paternity leave, legislation on sexual harassment

in the workplace, and female share of seats in large publicly traded companies), and Access to the public sector (i.e. quotas for women representatives in elections, the presence of an equality clause in the constitution).

The Pipeline pillar helps us to understand and identify what obstacles present the most persistent barriers, and recognize the successful policies, skills and practices that enable women to attain leadership positions.


PILLAR TWO: PARTICIPATION

The Participation pillar measures descriptive representation across four sectors of government: the proportion of women leaders in the executive, legislative, judicial, and national security branches at the national level. (Data on women in the civil service was not sufficiently available in the region to include in the index scores for this edition, although it is briefly discussed below.)

By the “national” level, this measure refers to the central government at the highest level of an individual state; it does not include international organizations or supra-national bodies. The global version of the index includes measures of descriptive representation at the intermediate and local levels of government in the Participation pillar. Since these data are very scarce in the MENA region, this report examines only the extent of representation in leadership at the highest levels of government. As these data become available in the future, the MEWLI index will seek to include these indicators as well.

The unique challenge of this pillar is identifying which positions qualify as “leadership” positions and which do not. It is common in the literature on this subject to see leadership characterized as a set of behaviors in which a “leader” engages. This categorization presents challenges to parsing out leadership as a position, as opposed to individuals filling that position. The purpose of this index is to measure the magnitude of women’s leadership across government, which requires us to look at the universe of leadership positions that exist, and assessing how many are occupied by women.

Since governments are organized differently from country to country, creating a complete list of what positions qualify as leadership position consistently presents a challenge. Therefore, in keeping with a similar approach to the European Institute for Gender Equality’s methodology, and with organizational management theorist K. Provan’s characterization, this index defines leadership positions as positions that fulfill one of two criteria:



Formal authority: This measure may be determined objectively, by simply looking at a chart depicting formal organizational relationships, or by asking organization members to indicate who reports to whom.

Membership in decision-making units: Like formal authority, this approach is also based on position (either within an organization or a larger social structure); however, the focus is not on hierarchical or otherwise formally mandated power relationships. Rather than an organizational actor being required to comply with the decisions of a particular group, power exists because the group controls resources desired by the act.⁴

As mentioned above, these criteria are consistent with the methodology published by the European Institute for Gender Equality's Gender Balance in Decision-making Database. That measure requires a decision-making position to fulfill one of two criteria: 1) Be a position where it is possible to take or influence a decision⁵ within a domain at the organizational level, or 2) do the same within the organization at a hierarchical level.

While these definitions are not identical, both hinge on the powers granted by the position either within an organization, or as part of a decision-making body that may or may not be larger than a single organization or department. These definitions do not limit decision-making to set of titles, but rather take into consideration the different structures across government sectors and government systems and are sensitive to context.

PILLAR THREE: AUTHORITY

It is not enough to achieve parity if women hold half of the available positions of leadership, but effectively hold less than half of the authority to act in these positions. This pillar examines the challenges that women face once they have reached a level of leadership. It seeks to measure elements of formalistic representation (authority), symbolic representation (public opinion) and substantive representation (glass walls) in a limited way. If a single gender consistently holds positions that wield more authority by occupying positions with relatively higher amounts of influence, or more resources and large budgets (defense, energy), or large stakes in policy outcomes (oil, trade), then we cannot consider that the institution has achieved gender parity in representation.

By understanding authority as the capacity to exert influence, this pillar measures the ability of women holding leadership positions to effectively wield power in the government. It utilizes indicators that measure public perception, "glass walls" (the distribution of women across different policy functions), and governance.

Public perception is a key element to the Authority pillar, because it measures how the public views women as agents of power. Does society give the same weight to both men and women's perspectives in the political sphere? Lack of public buy-in for women leaders impacts their ability to exert authority effectively. The more a given society favors and supports women leaders, the greater ability these women possess to make decisions in leadership positions.

The Authority pillar also cross-functionally measures the extent of glass walls as a determining factor of women's power in leadership positions. For instance: Do women only have influence in traditionally feminized functions (such as health, education, culture, women's or family affairs functions), or do they have representation in a multitude of sectors, particularly those with large budgets and greater influence over policy areas (defense, finance, energy or justice)? Women have more power in societies where they not only participate in policy discussions across sectors and functions, but also have decision-making capacity. In this context, power is defined as access to all branches of government and all its functions: finance, defense, and infrastructure, as well as health and education. It is measured by the percentages of women heading each respective ministry.

The last component of the Authority pillar is governance, which directly affects the extent of women's influence in leadership positions. Governance measures the degree to which systems allow a woman to exercise authority by analyzing indicators such as the effectiveness of the government, political stability and control over corruption. Where governance is strong, women's participation in politics and government is greater. The UN Sustainable Development Goals advocate for building accountable, effective and inclusive institutions for precisely this reason—to ensure justice, promote equality and to instill trust and faith in government.

WHAT IS UNIQUE ABOUT THIS INDEX?

The Middle East Women Leaders Index is essentially a regional application of the PPA framework, also launched with this index. It is important to note that the PPA framework was designed to be broad, recognizing that there are limited data available on the region and that unique contextual factors should be considered. We anticipate that future iterations of this index will apply the same broad framework while some indicators within the framework will differ in order to address challenges of data availability and appropriately address regional context.

As previously mentioned, indicators of representation at the intermediate and local levels of government as well as indicators of representation in the civil service were not included in this edition as sufficient data were not available at the time of publication, however we are hopeful that future editions will be able to examine these

critical portions of the public sector. This index includes a number of indicators that add texture and context that may not be appropriate in a future global edition or regional edition whose social, political and economic conditions differ significantly. For example in the Pipeline pillar, we have included measures regarding assets, property and inheritance, freedom of movement and travel, whether women are legally obligated to obey their husbands or guardians, whether women can file for divorce and whether there are incentives for political parties to include women candidates. In the Participation pillar, we sought to include measures of women's representation in the security sector (proportion of women serving in the armed forces and national police forces) that were not available for the MENA region. However, this edition does categorize the extent to which women are permitted to serve in the armed forces.

WHERE ARE THE WOMEN IN THE CIVIL SERVICE?

Generally speaking, the civil service comprises one of the largest swaths of government, and, according to available global data, it is where we expect to find the most women serving in leadership in the public sector. The data were not sufficiently available to include indicators of women's representation in the civil service in the index framework, but what data are available hint that this may, in fact, hold true in the region. In Kuwait, for example, women make up more than half (53.1%) of those serving in the civil service and in Bahrain women make up just less than half (47.8%). Of the societies who provided data on women's representation in the civil service we see that on average women make up 37.8% of civil servants, compared to 15.8% of women in parliaments in the region or 10.1% of women in ministerial positions. More sex-disaggregated data are necessary to better understand the nature of women's representation in the civil service, and we laud the efforts of UNDP GEPA and the University of Pittsburgh to make these data available.

| Country/ Territory | Proportion of women in the civil service* |
|-----------------------|--|
| Algeria | 35.7% |
| Bahrain | 47.8% |
| Egypt | 20.1% |
| Kuwait | 53.1% |
| Oman | 43.0% |
| Qatar | 17.7% |
| Saudi Arabia | 42.6% |
| West Bank and Gaza | 42.7% |

*Source: UNDP Gender Equality in Public Administration Project



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
Visit of Dr. Amal Al Qubaisi,
former President of UAE
Federal National Council at
OECD

May Chidiac - Minister of
State for Administrative
Affairs, Lebanon

Selma Elloumi Rekik – Busi-
ness woman and parliamen-
tary candidate, Tunisia

Tzipi Livni – former Minister
of Foreign Affairs, former
Member of Knesset, Israel






Part II:

Ascending Leaders

While developing a comprehensive score to measure representation it is an important first step to understanding the women's representation in MENA, these scores need to be framed to glean meaningful insights. Apart from rankings, how do we interpret these numbers and what insights can we draw from them? The Ascending Leaders chart was developed to understand how societies compare to one another in two key dimensions of the leaders index: Glass Walls and Glass Ceilings. By focusing on the extent of representation and the distribution of representation, we have categorized the type of parity exhibited in each of these societies. It should be noted that these scores are relative to one another, and would not be comparable with the scores and categorizations from a future global or regional index.

All scores shown here are relative to other societies in this investigation.

Ascending Leaders Chart




The term “glass ceiling” was coined by Marilyn Loden in 1978, and it refers to the pervasive resistance to allow women to occupy positions of leadership. Here, the extent to which glass ceilings have been shattered is measured by the Positions pillar score, which measures the extent of women's representation in top leadership positions in the executive, legislative, judiciary branches and security sectors of national government.

The glass walls score is a measure of how evenly women leaders are distributed across policy functions. This score relies on measurements from the Authority pillar, and looks at the proportion of women cabinet ministers leading departments for basic functions (such as Justice, Interior, Security), economic functions (Finance, Trade, Agriculture), infrastructure functions (Energy, Transportation, Environment), and sociocultural functions (Education, Family, and Health).

In the MENA region, we found that women leaders comprise 5.9 percent of basic functions ministers, 9.2 percent of economy ministers, 9.0 percent of infrastructure ministers and 22.6 percent of sociocultural ministers. In other words, when women are leading top government departments in MENA, they are 4 times more likely to be found in what are considered to be traditionally “feminized” roles that focus on various forms of caretaking. This finding is consistent with much of the literature on women's leadership in the region that finds “a woman's primary role is still mostly in the family realm or in traditional roles, with rigid... interpretations.” If women are systematically limited to a leadership position of socio-cultural functions, then we cannot consider that the government has achieved gender parity in leadership.

Each category is determined by the median value of the Glass Ceiling scores (or Positions pillar scores) and the median value of the Glass Walls scores. This means that when considering Glass Ceilings scores and Glass Walls scores, half of the societies measured will fall on either side of the median. (This is why this categorization should be considered relative.)



Societies that score above the median in Glass Ceilings will either fall in the Ascending Representation or Vertical Representation category as these societies demonstrate a relatively high number of women rising into positions of leadership when compared within the region. Societies that fall below the median in Glass Ceilings will fall in the Horizontal Representation or Aspiring Representation categories as they demonstrate relatively low amounts of representation for the region. Societies that fall above the median in Glass Walls will either fall in Ascending Representation or Horizontal



Sudanese Woman Protestor, 2019

Representation categories, as these societies have women leaders serving across functions at a relatively higher levels than societies who fall below the median. These societies below the median in Glass Walls will either fall in Vertical Representation or Aspiring Representation categories, as they demonstrate relatively low representation of women across policy functions.

Ascending Representation

True parity means balancing both glass walls and glass ceilings, and allowing any person – regardless of their sex – the opportunity to serve in any capacity. In this regional context, ascending societies are those making the most progress towards the goal of gender parity in public institutions. While there is still much work to be done, and earning this title does not indicate that parity has been achieved, these nations currently lead the region with women serving in positions of leadership across diverse sectors.

Morocco, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates all fall into this Ascending Representation category. This grouping of societies has an average of proportion of women in parliaments of 24.25 percent, just above the global average (23.96 percent) and above the regional averages of North America (22.85 percent), Central Europe and the Baltics (22.22 percent), South Asia (18.26 percent), East Asia and Pacific (20.22 percent), Sub-Saharan Africa (24 percent), and MENA at large (16.63 percent). However this group fares slightly below the world average (18.4 percent) when it comes to women in cabinets, with women occupying 16.6 percent of ministerial positions.

While below the global average, these societies still have more women represented in ministerial positions than East Asia and Pacific (12.6 percent), South Asia (8.8 percent) and the larger MENA region (10.7 percent). Again, there is much progress to be made and Ascending Representation should be considered a relative term as Egypt, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates who all fall in this category do not have a single women serving on the constitutional court, for example.

Horizontal Representation

In societies identified as showing Horizontal Representation, a relative parity exists in women's leadership across sectors in low-level positions; women have broken through glass walls, but not glass ceilings. In Horizontal societies, women do not see representation in positions of leadership, despite cross-sectoral representation. When women do occupy positions of public leadership, they are also represented in functions that are not confined to traditionally feminized roles. Societies in this group include Mauritania, Jordan and Kuwait.

Horizontal Representation societies should look to promote policies that enable women to break through glass ceilings and rise to the highest levels of government.

Vertical Representation

In Vertical Representation nations, parity only exists in certain sectors; glass walls block representation in high-ranking positions across sectors and functions. In Vertical societies, women are more likely to serve in more traditionally feminized and sociocultural roles such as education or health, whereas the defense, finance and industry functions of leadership largely remain the domain of men. Libya, Israel and Iraq are all categorized as Vertical Representation societies.

Vertical Representation societies should identify ways to achieve representation across sectors and functions.

Aspiring Representation

For some societies, even the groundwork still needs to be laid. Societies that are considered aspiring do not have many women leaders, nor are women able to move beyond more traditional functions and roles. These Aspiring Representation societies, which include Bahrain, Iran and Yemen, present the greatest opportunities to improve gender balance in leadership.


Table 1. Balancing Parity Categories

| Category | Country/Territory | Data Highlights* |
|---------------------------|----------------------|---|
| Ascending Representation | Algeria | 24.3% of women in national parliaments |
| | Egypt | 16.5% of women in ministerial positions |
| | Morocco | 5.0% of women serving as constitutional court justices (Tunisia excluded as Parliament had not established a constitutional court at the time of this study) |
| | Sudan | |
| | Tunisia | |
| | United Arab Emirates | 5.1% of women leading basic functions ministries 17.3% of women leading economy ministries 17.4% of women leading infrastructure ministries 34.4% of women leading socio-cultural ministries |
| Vertical Representation | Iraq | 22.2% of women in national parliaments |
| | Israel | 8.3% of women in ministerial positions |
| | Libya | 6.7% of women serving as constitutional court justices (Only in Israel are women serving on this court) |
| | Saudi Arabia | 2.5% of women leading basic functions ministries 0% of women leading economy ministries 0% of women leading infrastructure ministries 15.6% of women leading socio-cultural ministries |
| | | |
| Horizontal Representation | Jordan | 11.3% of women in national parliaments |
| | Kuwait | 14.3% of women in ministerial positions |
| | Lebanon | 0% of women serving as constitutional court justices |
| | Mauritania | 12.1% of women leading basic functions ministries |
| | West Bank and Gaza | 19.7% of women leading economy ministries 18.7% of women leading infrastructure ministries 20.8% of women leading socio-cultural ministries |
| | | |

| | | |
|-------------------------|---------|--|
| Aspiring Representation | Bahrain | 6.3% of women in national parliaments |
| | Iran | 6.4% of women in ministerial positions |
| | Oman | 4.7% of women serving as constitutional court justices |
| | Qatar | |
| | Syria | 5.0% of women leading basic functions ministries |
| | Yemen | 0% of women leading economy ministries |
| | | 0% of women leading infrastructure ministries |
| | | 20.9% of women leading socio-cultural ministries |

**All calculations are arithmetic averages of the group*


Ascending Leaders Categories



- Ascending
- Horizontal
- Aspiring
- Vertical



Tunisian Parliament



Part III:

Takeaways: Insights and Implications for Women, Governments and Organizations

Assets and the importance of equal inheritance

“For women who choose to devote themselves to their work situation, the financial and moral cost of this almost guarantees professional and familial isolation.” – Lilia Labidi, former Minister of Women’s Affairs, Tunisia

This index includes indicators that examine the extent to which women are accessing financial institutions, and what the legal framework has to say about equal inheritance: the rights of married men and married women – as well as rights for sons and daughters – to inherit from their parents.

There is ample evidence that links the importance of asset ownership to issues including housing security, livelihood security, emergency response and poverty reduction. When considered in the context of gender dynamics, asset ownership is arguably one of the most useful indicators of women’s economic empowerment. Asset ownership influences a women’s bargaining position, both within family units and in society at large. Moreover, the legal framework regarding inheritance and asset ownership itself is an indicator of economic empowerment, as “less legal discrimination against women is strongly associated with higher female labor force participation.” Incidentally, in the MENA region, the majority of societies do not uphold the same inheritance rights for daughters as sons and “equality of inheritance remains rare: daughters [generally] inherit only half the share of their brothers.”

In examining the relationship between indicators of asset ownership, we also found a strong, positive relationship between asset ownership and women’s representation in public leadership

positions, most strongly associated with representation in the highest courts of the judiciary. This indicator is the most closely correlated with women's representation in public leadership and measures whether sons and daughters have equal rights to inheritance. This relationship implies that the unequal transfer of wealth to male children has ramifications beyond economic empowerment, and impacts gendered dynamics of political empowerment as well. It is an issue that deserves further study to uncover the implications of asset ownership and women's representation in the public sphere.

There is a strong correlation between assets and positions held by women across different government branches throughout the region. But it must also be noted that it is only in Israel that sons and daughters inherit equally, since that nation's system is not based on religious law. (Only in Mauritania do women not have the same right of equal property ownership.)

Tunisia's Cabinet passed a law in November of 2018 requiring equal inheritance between sons and daughters. If this measure is adopted, it will make Tunisia the first of the Arab states to eliminate gender differences in inheritance laws. Constitutionally, the law gives men and women inheritance in equal shares by default, with the option to divide assets via the Shari'a system of inheritance in effect only if explicitly outlined in a will.

However, this change in Tunisia did not come without encountering significant resistance, and this case highlights the challenge of passing similar legislation in the region. Tunisia had enshrined certain Islamic principles into the Personal Status Code dating back to 1956, after the nation gained independence from France. The Personal Status Code, while considered progressive for its time, upheld the Shari'a system of inheritance nearly verbatim. Shari'a law's definition of what can be inherited by whom stipulates that women relatives receive half the share received by male relatives. Religious institutions – and, in particular, the center-right “Muslim Democratic” Ennahdha Movement – opposed the change. Even at the time of its passage by the Cabinet, 62 percent of Tunisians (including 52 percent of women) oppose equal inheritance.

It is unlikely that many more governments in the region will adopt changes to inheritance in the near future, and Tunisia's case will serve as a litmus test for whether equal inheritance can co-exist with traditional inheritance laws. It will also be a testing ground to see the impacts of equal inheritance on women's economic and political empowerment in the region.

Labor Force Participation - The “MENA Paradox”

“Unlike my male colleagues, as a woman diplomat, I didn’t receive allowances and financial support for my family. Similarly, the husband of a female diplomat is not entitled to a diplomatic passport whereas the wife of male diplomats do.” -Nuseyba Ali, Diplomat, Sudan

We often assume that education is a key input to improving women’s participation in the labor force at large – as well as increasing representation in public leadership.

In the MENA region, however, this relationship does not hold true. Contrary to economic theory, increasing women and girls’ access to education has not lead to gains in labor force participation. In fact, the region appears to show the inverse relationship, as “Arab women with post-secondary education are more likely to be unemployed than women who do not have a post-secondary education.” The World Bank has coined this phenomenon the *MENA Paradox*, which is described as the “disconnect between rising educational attainment and low and stagnant rates of economic participation” in the region. Women’s economic participation in the workforce is much lower when compared to the rest of the world. In fact, it is less than half the global rate with women’s labor participation in the region at 20.3 percent compared to 47.8 percent globally.

Even when women do enter the workforce, social norms play a crucial role in determining “the sort of employment that is deemed acceptable.” These norms also largely limit the roles that women play in the workforce to traditionally “feminized” positions in health, education, and social services.

The same pattern plays out in the public sector even at the highest levels of government; women are 4 times more likely to serve in sociocultural functions than in basic functions, and roughly 2 times more likely to serve in caretaking or “feminized” functions, as compared to economy or infrastructure functions. Women also carry the burden of caretaking at home as “societal expectations are that women should take care of all the household chores (cooking, cleaning, caring for children, taking them to school, etc.)... [While] men’s contribution to household chores is negligible, regardless of women’s work status, (except when it comes to feeding children).”

On the supply-side, the MENA region also lags behind in guaranteeing that women have the support they need in order to sustain careers long enough to enter positions of leadership. Legal frameworks are critical to women’s economic empowerment, as “legal changes have also on average been associated with marked increases in female labor force participation over time.” Adopting

policies regarding equal pay, childcare services, maternity and paternity leave and forbid sexual harassment in the workplace are critical for providing the support that women need to pursue their career goals.

In interviews conducted with women leaders in the region, almost every respondent stressed the importance of providing support for women with familial responsibilities. They cited the prevailing norms of working women also being required to attend to work responsibilities at home, while men's responsibilities to the household are more typically successive. In practice, this means that a "woman may be called in at work regarding a sick child, whereas typically a father may fulfill role obligations after work hours." These challenges are especially acute for "women who live and/or work in rural areas, whether they be doctors, engineers, or teachers, [as they] suffer even more than city dwellers from isolation and from cultural norms that have changed only a little over the years. In addition, in rural areas unemployment among women with university degrees is twice as high as among men."

In order for women to have the equal opportunity to serve their nations in public leadership, women need the chance to develop professional skills that will propel them into such positions. Women also need to be supported in pursuing their professional goals, and we must acknowledge that "a major hurdle women face is that they must fit into existing models. Individual women are entirely responsible for meeting the requirements and expectations of positions and institutions that were established with the intention of excluding them." It is crucial that regional governments seek to implement inclusive policies and practices in the public sector.

Quotas, Public Perceptions, and Power

"Improving the number of women in public and political leadership requires a fundamental shift in resourcing and advancement structures."

-Gali Levi, Chief Prosecutor, Ministry of Economy, Israel

Gender quotas are arguably the largest socio-political trend of the modern age; since the 1970s more than 130 countries have adopted some form of gender quota making it more widespread than the third wave of democracy or neoliberalism. Gender quotas are "laws or party rules requiring that women make up a certain percentage or meet a specified threshold of a candidate list, parliamentary assembly, committee, or government."

There are several types of gender quotas, although for the purposes of this discussion, we will limit to those pertaining to the public sector, generally known as "electoral quotas". Electoral quotas are designed to moderate women's election to positions in legislatures, assemblies, or other elected



November 24 2016: Hundreds of people marched on the streets of Tel Aviv, Israel to mark the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women

bodies. These quotas come in three forms: reserved seats, candidate quotas, or political party quotas. Reserved seats designate either a percentage or a threshold for the number of seats in an elected body for women to occupy, thus guaranteeing that women participate. Candidate quotas require political parties to put forward a specified threshold of women candidates. This type of quota does not guarantee that women will be elected, but ensures that women participate in the electoral process. And, finally, political party quotas are voluntary, internal quotas that designate a threshold for women candidates within the party. Voluntary party quotas may or may not be consistent across parties within the same elections. We found a strong, positive relationship between systems that have voluntary party quotas and women's representation in public leadership. There is evidence that "quotas produce gains in women's legislative representation with increasing effectiveness over time."

Quotas do, in fact, promote women's representation in elected bodies, and yet the policy remains controversial. In a fundamental sense, it undermines what Pitkin described as the linchpin for establishing formal representation: authority. Within the formal representation conceptualization, a representative wields authority when the process by which they entered the position (electoral processes) is considered valid. The institutional position of the representative is vital; therefore, when quotas are introduced that will put some candidates who would not have otherwise been elected without

such policies into positions as representatives, it fundamentally undermines the authority of the representative. In turn, the representative is less likely to wield as much influence, have less support from their constituencies and effectively have less power to act. In our framework, an institution is not considered gender balanced until women are equally represented by the proportion of positions they hold *and* wield equal power while occupying the role of representative.

However, this is problematic because it fails to recognize that “*These positions and institutions were not imagined by women, were not created by women, and have yet to make a sustained effort to listen to women and respond to their concerns.*” The processes by which citizens may enter public institutions have systematically excluded women. So, in order to reach gender parity in the public sphere, we must acknowledge and address those mechanisms. This index found that in the MENA region, reserved seats quotas had less of an impact than voluntary party quotas on the extent of women's representation in the legislature, which is somewhat counterintuitive, because “reserved seats... may be more effective at increasing women's numbers than candidate quotas, which affect only the candidate pool.” This may be true because either those institutions responsible for elections or constituencies do not recognize the intrinsic value of women's representation in public leadership, and they may not see the women who rise to these positions as true representatives because the quota has undermined their authority to act. As a result, electoral commissions may not adopt or enact enforcement mechanisms or institute incentives to adopt quotas due to a lack of political will.

Our index found the strongest relationship between women's representation in legislatures in the MENA region when considering reserved seats, voluntary party quotas, sanctions for noncompliance *and* incentives for candidate quotas together. But the fact remains that women cannot debunk myths regarding their ability to lead if they never have the opportunity to prove critics wrong.

Public perceptions regarding women's ability to lead is a key driver of how much power they will have while in office. It was also the strongest predictor of women's representation in public leadership in the MENA region. Specifically, we found that whether or not people believed that men are better at political leadership than women was a critical indicator, demonstrating the “chicken or the egg” nature of the challenge of increasing women's representation in the sector. Former Minister of Planning and International Cooperation Mary Kawar of Jordan explained that, in her experience, the greatest systemic hurdle women face is that, “your worthiness as a leader is put under question and partly because no one thought you are deserving in the first place.” If we never show that women can and deserve to lead by giving concrete examples, then we are unlikely to change the minds of the public.


While using quotas to address the structural nature of women's exclusion in public leadership is not a politically popular idea, it does provide women the opportunity to serve as representatives. But support for women leaders cannot end after they are elected if we want women to become *empowered* representatives. When asked what steps the government should take to increase the number of women in leadership positions, Gali Levi, the Chief Prosecutor for the Ministry of

Economy of Israel, responded that, “both voters and political parties would need to develop active programs of support for women that include campaigning, funding, and aggressively supporting women.”

Additionally, significant shifts in reporting would need to occur. The press should be held accountable for agenda setting and for contributing to the tokenization and discrimination women’s experiences in the public sphere.” How we portray women – and the narratives we repeat about them – matter. Media representation of women has shown that it is simply not enough to put women on the screen for them to be fairly represented. We need to relay narratives of women as leaders, and demonstrating characteristics of leadership that are realistic, nuanced, and positive, because “what we understand as good and effective leadership is what is accepted as masculine leadership... [and] therefore, adopting a female leadership style (communicative, empathetic, cooperative, team builder, enabler) is less recognized as a positive leadership trait.” In order to make real strides towards gender parity in public leadership, it requires more than a single policy. It requires broad systematic change.



UAE parliament



Part IV:

Concluding Thoughts

“If I have gotten to where I am it is perhaps largely because I was able to see the ties between women’s/my experiences and the superstructural and infrastructural conditions that provide the context for our lives.”

-Lilia Labidi, Former Minister of Women’s Affairs, Tunisia

Leadership is measured by much more than merely the position one occupies. In the MENA region, women are leading the process of change through civil society organizations, and to a lesser extent in the private sector and within public institutions.

In this index, we did not explore the role of women leaders in civil society, and the critical part that civil society plays in holding governments accountable. But that should not diminish the function that these women leaders play in driving toward stronger and more inclusive institutions. Sudan’s recent revolution is a great example of this trend. Women took to the streets and exercised agency in the pursuit of much needed change in their country. One recent article observed that it was a “coalition of women’s groups who have been mobilising people and leading protests throughout this uprising” that “issued a statement in support of the Declaration of Freedom and Change, demanding that at least 50 percent of those who make up every facet of the new transitional government are women, and that affirmative action be implemented in favour of representatives from marginalised regions.”

Women also played a central role in peaceful demonstrations in Algeria that resulted in the resignation of President Bouteflika after 20 years of rule. Such protests continue peacefully in the region, with women leading, alongside men, in pro-democracy efforts. These women leaders include Zoubida Assoul, leader of the Union for Change and Progress party, president of the Network of Arab Women Lawyers, and spokeswomen of the Citizen Movement. And it was the Workers’ Party

Secretary General Louisa Hanoune, the first woman to run for President in the Arab world in 2004, who pushed for impeachment proceedings against President Bouteflika. Women are not simply participating in protests, they are founding and leading NGOs, pushing for reforms and demanding implementation of reforms already passed, acting as empowered agents of change.

Progress for women in leadership is not organic; the patriarchal structures that excluded women from the start must be addressed. Civil society has led the charge, and provided the support many women needed when public institutions would not. This is why it is necessary that we “reimagine and transform our gendered understanding of governments, states, and political institutions.”

However, civil society is not fully free across the region. In Egypt, the Sisi government passed a law in 2017 restricting the work of NGOs to social and development work, and imposing jail terms of up to five years if NGOs did not comply within one year, affecting approximately 46,000 organizations. Amy Austin Holmes, a Woodrow Wilson Center Fellow in the Middle East Program and tenured professor at the American University in Cairo (AUC), experienced the effects of this legislation firsthand, when a military report referring to research she had conducted in Nubia on the impact of the NGO law labelled her as “an operative, intent on internationalizing the Nubians’ cause.” Holmes extended her sabbatical in the U.S., in part due to security concerns that would have arisen if she were to return to her post at AUC.

Similarly, when asked about the largest hurdles in her experiences, Hala Aldosari, a researcher and women’s rights activist from Saudi Arabia and a Jamal Khashoggi Fellow at the *Washington Post*, explained: “I find the limitations imposed by the state on the right of association as the most challenging... The leadership must expand the civil space to allow women not only a free exchange of information and ideas, but also the means to establish associations to advocate for gender reforms.”

Our index also found a strong relationship between those countries with stronger civil societies (demonstrated by high scores in “Voice and Accountability” in the World Governance Indicators framework), and countries that have placed more women in public leadership. This indicator captures “perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media,” and confirms what Ms. Aldosari has argued is essential to address persistent gender inequalities in the region. If MENA governments and societies want to make meaningful strides towards improving women’s representation in public leadership, it is essential that they allow civil society to support these movements, as well as providing support from within public institutions themselves.

In addition to expanding support for women in public leadership via civil society, it is critical that MENA governments adopt policies that promote women’s labor force participation. Women need the space to develop their skills and establish careers. They should not and cannot be expected to carry the double burden of work and caretaking simultaneously. Policies that alleviate these pressures are a first step.



CAMP ARIFJAN, Kuwait - Women attached to the 6th Iraqi Division conducted a subject search workshop focusing on the crucial role women of the Iraqi Security Forces had to play.

When asked what steps governments should take to improve women's representation in leadership positions, former Minister of Social Development of Jordan Hala Bseiso responded that governments should "provide more enabling environment[s] to women, by conducting systematic gender audits, provide supportive services like nurseries, flexible working hours and other needed services... for working mothers at a reasonable cost." Indeed, the systematic barriers to entering the labor force are so high for women in the region that we see the reversal of what economic theory would predict. Many women in the MENA region boast particularly high levels of educational attainment, but those skills are not being utilized to their full potential in the labor force. Governments in the region should seek to lower these barriers, and encourage more participation of women in labor markets, if they are committed to improving women's public leadership.

In addition to addressing structural barriers to labor force participation, the MENA region's governments need to address the fact that these institutions were created with the intention of exclusivity. Therefore, they should adopt policies and practices that address the structural barriers that exist for women who wish to serve in government, and particularly for those women who wish to lead in government. As politically unpopular as gender quotas may be, our findings show that when gender quotas, particularly voluntary party quotas, are adopted with incentives and enforcement mechanisms, more women serve in public leadership.

Political will is often lacking, and the international community certainly has a role to play in encouraging quota adoption, as there is “strong evidence that international incentives are positively and significantly related to a country’s likelihood of adopting a gender quota.” Moreover, when considering “international incentives by the presence of a United Nations (UN) peace operation that supports political liberalization, whether a country receives foreign aid, and whether a country invited international election monitors to its last election” that “such factors are significantly more likely to be related to the likelihood of quota adoption.” In other words, we can conclude that international advocacy and policy efforts to encourage quota adoption are not in vain. We recommend that the international community continues to encourage the adoption of quotas, incentives, and enforcement mechanisms to make up for the lack of political will and/or political distaste for quotas increasing women representatives. At the same time, governments in the MENA region should seek guidance and expertise from these actors, while also listening to and responding to recommendations and needs from women’s and other civil society groups within their own borders.


As much light as this index sheds on the challenges that prevent women’s full and equal representation in public leadership, there is much that we still do not know about women’s leadership. In large part, this is because of the lack of sex-disaggregated data that is available for study, especially from MENA. When information is available, “documentations and statistics on issues relevant to women’s rights are sparse, and exist in poor quality across various ministerial and governmental entities.” Sex-disaggregated data at the subnational level is particularly rare, when it is available at all, and the lack of such data severely limits our understanding of the extent of women’s public leadership.

We cannot recognize change when we do not measure it, and public institutions should be expected to provide accurate, timely, and sex-disaggregated data on their own employees. This welcome step towards government transparency might be achieved through better examination of payroll or other existing administrative records. Retrieval of these data is possible, and governments – both in the MENA region and globally – need to make the effort to provide them in a high-quality and consistent manner. Initiatives such as the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals work to create new indicators and methodologies where they do not yet exist, and such efforts have made huge strides in making these data available. But when governments fail to comply with reporting requirements for these crucial indicators, large gaps in the data remain. Governments which are serious about improving women’s public leadership should not be satisfied with the current level of data availability, and should make the necessary resources available to collect, validate and distribute high-quality, sex-disaggregated data on public institutions. Initiatives such as the Gender Balance Council of the United Arab Emirates prove that governments can effectively create and distribute sex-disaggregated data for public use.

The women who lead in the MENA region today continue the legacy of the women who led before them. They will continue to struggle to achieve their rightful place as equals at the highest decision-making table. But success in achieving their rightful place cannot happen without a comprehensive strategy to break the glass walls and ceilings that persist. Their progress can and should be assessed by data, and monitored along the way. As Former Minister of Social Development of Jordan, Hala Bseiso put it, "What gets measured gets done."



Wilson Center President, Director & CEO Jane Harman with Jordanian women entrepreneurs at Injaz, Amman, December 2019



Part V:

Methodology

Scaling and Scoring the Data

Indicator Weightings

The indicators are weighted first using a robust process where correlations and covariance are considered and reduced as much as possible within clusters and components. After making considerations for these effects, the weightings are then determined based on a subjective analysis of significance as well as an objective consideration to minimize covariance in a given pillar. The weightings of the components and drivers are an important part in calculating the overall score and making sure the weightings are accurate and minimize covariance is essential in the accuracy of the index. Ensuring that different components aren't overweighted or underweighted is an essential part of this process. Furthermore, minimizing covariance makes sure that no component is double-counted or over-emphasized in the model.

Computation of Scaled Data Scores

Indicator data is taken from a variety of sources and scaled to a five-point scale for uniformity. Scaling the data is executed by multiplying the data point for a given economy by a scale factor. The scale factor is calculated by finding the ratio of the difference between the data point and the minimum data point in the set and the overall range of the data. In this way, the maximum determined data point in a set will have an index value of 1, while the minimum value in the data set will have an index value of 0. The formula can be outlined as such:

$$\text{Scaled Value} = (\text{data value} - \text{minimum}) / (\text{maximum} - \text{minimum})$$

In some cases, the maximum data point in the set is determined by examining the maximum data point in a given set excluding any extreme outliers. If there is an extreme outlier in the data set, a maximum value is set as the next highest observed data point value, and the outlier is given the maximum possible score of 1.

However, when considering scoring of certain indicators that are tied to targets such as much of the Participation data, the maximum is set at 50 percent to reflect the stated goal of reaching 50 percent of women in positions of leadership by 2050. This allows for explicit monitoring towards

that goal. In cases where women make up more than 50 percent of a given position, the full value of 1 is awarded, but no more than 1.

Dealing with Missing Data

Estimating Missing Data Points:

Our index could not be created without estimations due to missing and incomplete data. Thus, it is imperative to create a logical and systematic process to estimate missing data throughout the process. The process used in our index is conducted in three steps in order of difficulty. This three-step process assures that our estimates are both as accurate as possible and as reliable as possible.

1. The first step in our estimation process for addressing missing data points is for those points that do not require mathematical estimations, but can be found by simple research or common knowledge. For every indicator estimated in this way, the justification for the estimated value was recorded explicitly.
2. If the missing value of the indicator for a given economy was not clear, and could not be determined through research, then mathematical estimation was required. For an individual data point associated with an economy/indicator pair in a given year, the first thing that we checked was whether the other years associated with this economy/indicator pair needed to be estimated, or whether there was further data available. If it was the case that there was data available for other years for this society/indicator pair, then the estimation was simply calculated using an interpolation strategy.
3. If the previous two methods did not apply, then a further and more rigorous mathematical estimation was required. In this case, we used Harvard economist Gary King's estimation software program Amelia 2.0, which estimates missing data by performing multiple imputations as a general-purpose approach to missing values. The multiple imputations method has been shown to reduce bias and increase efficiency. The imputations we used are benchmarked from the base of a society's GDP per capita values, a standard procedure that is utilized in many indices. This method was limited to indicators where we have known baselines and panel data available to make reasonable estimations.

Calculating Pillar Scores

To determine the pillar scores, the components within each pillar are calculated using a weighted average formula. In this way, those components with lower weights have less impact on the overall mean of any sub pillar. The component scores are then averaged together to make up the final pillar score. An arithmetic weighted average of the components provides us with the most accurate score, and assures that the pillar means reflect the way that the components are weighted in the index.

Calculating the Final Index Score


We made the decision in this index, rather than to weight each of the three index pillars equally, to assign additional weight to the Participation pillar, implementing a 30/40/30 weight between the respective pillars. Because our key research question was the magnitude of the leadership gap between men and women, the Participation pillar was given more consideration due to the centrality of the data.

The calculated final index score determines a society's overall ranking in the index. The society with the highest final index score will have a ranking of #1, while the society with the lowest final index score will be ranked at #21. Although not the intended purpose of this index, ranking the final index scores demonstrates a broader perspective on how countries are performing relative to their peers, and serves as a basis for comparison, especially when considering specific regions.

Quality Assurance Process

Throughout the weighting, scaling, and scoring processes, several quality assurance measures were adopted to ensure the validity and accuracy of the index. By staging different statistical tools throughout the process including data cleaning, variance analysis, regression analysis, and simulations, the index scores were stress-tested at multiple levels to produce the most comprehensive and accurate numbers possible.

In order to test the validity of the final index scores, we checked our final index scores against other related indexes. We compared our index to the Global Gender Gap by the World Economic Forum and the Gender Inequality Index by the United Nations to see how scores differed. This QA process yielded results that instilled confidence regarding the reliability of final index scores. Any society's scores that jumped out as outliers in the index in the QA process were rigorously checked to make sure that the data in that society's was accurate and robust. This mitigates the chances of systematic errors in the process.



The Pipeline-Participation-Authority Framework

| | MEWLI Framework |
|--------------------------|--|
| Overall structure | 30/40/30 weighting with the Participation pillar carrying relatively more weight as these indicators are central to our guiding research question: What is the extent of women's representation in leadership positions in the public sector? |
| Pipeline | <p>Pillar Structure:</p> <p>Access to Skills and Assets</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Skills Attainment • Assets <p>Access to Labor Markets</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participation • Protections in the Workplace • Parental Benefits • Leadership and Entrepreneurship <p>Access to Public Institutions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rights • Quotas |
| Participation* | <p>Pillar Structure:</p> <p>Executive Branch</p> <p>Legislative Branch</p> <p>Judicial Branch</p> <p>Security Sector</p> <p>*This edition only covers national level positions</p> |
| Authority | <p>Pillar Structure:</p> <p>Glass Walls</p> <p>Public Perceptions</p> <p>Governance</p> |

List of indicators and sources

| Indicator | Data Source |
|--|---|
| Pipeline: | The World Bank |
| Percentage of students in primary education who are female (%) | |
| Percentage of students in secondary education who are female (%) | The World Bank |
| Percentage of students in tertiary education who are female (%) | The World Bank |
| RATIO: Account ownership at a financial institution or with a mobile-money-service provider, female (% of population ages 15+): male (% population ages 15+) | The World Bank |
| Married men and married women have equal ownership rights to property | The World Bank |
| Do sons and daughters have equal rights to inherit assets from their parents? | The World Bank-Women, Business and the Law Report |
| Labor force, female (% of total labor force) | The World Bank |
| Contributing family workers, female (% of female employment) (modeled ILO estimate) | The World Bank |
| Employment in agriculture, female (% female employment / % male employment) | The World Bank |
| Employment in industry, female (% female employment / % male employment) | The World Bank |
| Employment in services, female (% female employment / % male employment) | The World Bank |
| Law mandates equal remuneration for females and males for work of equal value (1=yes; 0=no) | The World Bank |
| Law mandates nondiscrimination based on gender in hiring (1=yes; 0=no) | The World Bank |
| Are women able to work in the same industries as men? | The World Bank-Women, Business and the Law Report |
| Is there legislation on sexual harassment in employment? | The World Bank-Women, Business and the Law Report |

| | |
|--|---|
| Are mothers guaranteed an equivalent position after maternity leave? | The World Bank-Women, Business and the Law Report |
| Is dismissal of pregnant workers prohibited? | The World Bank-Women, Business and the Law Report |
| What is the length of paid maternity leave? | The World Bank-Women, Business and the Law Report |
| What is the length of paid paternity leave? | The World Bank-Women, Business and the Law Report |
| Does the government pay 100% of maternity leave benefits, or parental leave benefits (where maternity leave is unavailable)? | The World Bank-Women, Business and the Law Report |
| Law mandates paid or unpaid maternity leave (1=yes; 0=no) | The World Bank |
| Maternity leave benefits (% of wages paid) | The World Bank |
| RATIO: Cost of business start-up procedures, female (% of GNI per capita) | The World Bank |
| Does the law prohibit discrimination by creditors on the basis of sex or gender? | The World Bank-Women, Business and the Law Report |
| RATIO: Employers (% female)/Employers (% male) | The World Bank |
| Female share of employment in senior and middle management (%) | The World Bank |
| Years since any women received voting rights | World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap report |
| Does the constitution contain a clause of equality? | The World Bank-Women, Business and the Law Report |
| Does the constitution contain a clause on nondiscrimination? | The World Bank-Women, Business and the Law Report |
| Can a married woman travel outside the country in the same way as a married man? | The World Bank-Women, Business and the Law Report |
| Can a married woman travel outside her home in the same way as a married man? | The World Bank-Women, Business and the Law Report |

| | |
|--|---|
| Legislation exists on domestic violence (1=yes; 0=no) | The World Bank-Women, Business and the Law Report |
| Legislation specifically addresses sexual harassment (1=yes; 0=no) | The World Bank-Women, Business and the Law Report |
| Law prohibits or invalidates child or early marriage (1=yes; 0=no) | The World Bank-Women, Business and the Law Report |
| Married women are required by law to obey their husbands (1=yes; 0=no) | The World Bank-Women, Business and the Law Report |
| Married women can obtain a national ID card in the same way as married men (1=yes; 0=no) | The World Bank-Women, Business and the Law Report |
| Can a woman obtain a judgment of divorce in the same way as a man? | The World Bank-Women, Business and the Law Report |
| What are the legislative quotas (reserved seats) in place for women representatives in national parliament? | The World Bank-Women, Business and the Law Report |
| Voluntary political party quotas | World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap report |
| Are there sanctions for noncompliance with mandated quotas for women on candidate lists for national parliament elections? | The World Bank-Women, Business and the Law Report |
| Are there incentives (e.g. financial) for political parties to include women on candidate lists for national parliament elections? | The World Bank-Women, Business and the Law Report |
| Participation: | World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report |
| Number of female heads of state to date | The World Bank |
| Proportion of women in ministerial level positions (%) | The World Bank |
| Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%) | The World Bank-Women, Business and the Law Report |
| Proportion of constitutional justices that are women | The World Bank-Women, Business and the Law Report |

Is the Chief Justice a woman?

The World Bank-Women, Business and the Law Report

To what extent are women permitted to serve in the armed forces?

Administrative record

Authority:

% women ministers heading Basic Function Ministries

Administrative records, Coded using EIGE Methodology

% women ministers heading Economy Ministries

Administrative records, Coded using EIGE Methodology

% women ministers heading Infrastructure Ministries

Administrative records, Coded using EIGE Methodology

% women ministers heading Socio-Cultural function Ministries

Administrative records, Coded using EIGE Methodology

In general, men are better at political leadership than women.

Arab Barometer

University education for males is more important than university education for females.

Arab Barometer

Voice and Accountability

The Worldwide Governance indicators

Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism

The Worldwide Governance indicators

Government Effectiveness

The Worldwide Governance indicators

Regulatory Quality

The Worldwide Governance indicators

Rule of Law

The Worldwide Governance indicators

Control of Corruption

The Worldwide Governance indicators

Interview Methodology

To contextualize the findings from the index, we supplemented the quantitative research with a brief (2 questions) survey to women either who have served in the public sector or who are scholars in the MENA region. These women were identified and contacted by leadership at the Middle East Women's Leadership Initiative at the Woodrow Wilson Center. Each participant was asked to respond to the same two questions in written format on August 13th, 2019 and were asked to submit their responses by August 27th, 2019. The responses were then compiled and reviewed by the research team. Quotes that have been included in this report have only been altered to align syntax and changes have been accordingly punctuated.

Sample request:

I am writing to seek your expertise as the Wilson Center's Middle East Women's Initiative finalizes its report on women and leadership in the public sector in the Middle East and North Africa region. According to the Global Gender Gap Index published by the World Economic Forum, the region continues to lag behind in gender equality outcomes, particularly in terms of political empowerment. While many countries have made significant progress, there remains a noticeable deficit of women in public leadership positions across the region.

In an effort to better understand this dynamic, the Wilson Center's Middle East Women's Initiative is building an index that not only measures participation in positions of authority in public service, but also looks at decision-making authority exercised by women and tracks pathways for women to pursue leadership.

Given your expertise and experience in (name of country), we value your insight on the topic of women and leadership in the public sector. Accordingly, we kindly ask you to answer two questions, which will add essential qualitative background to our research and will corroborate and contextualize the findings of the index:

- What have been the greatest systemic hurdles that you have faced in your path to leadership?
- What steps should governments take to increase the number of women in leadership positions?

If you wish for your answers to be off the record, please make it explicit in your response. We would highly appreciate receiving your comments by August 27, 2019.

I thank you in advance and look forward to hearing your insight.



APPENDIX A: THE INDEX SCORES

Pillar and Overall Scores

| Economy | ISO3 | PIPELINE | PARTICIPATION | AUTHORITY | Overall |
|----------------------|-------------|-----------------|----------------------|------------------|----------------|
| United Arab Emirates | ARE | 0.42 | 0.30 | 0.58 | 0.42 |
| Bahrain | BHR | 0.46 | 0.11 | 0.42 | 0.31 |
| Algeria | DZA | 0.60 | 0.35 | 0.41 | 0.44 |
| Egypt, Arab Rep. | EGY | 0.46 | 0.23 | 0.48 | 0.37 |
| Iran, Islamic Rep. | IRN | 0.51 | 0.18 | 0.38 | 0.34 |
| Iraq | IRQ | 0.50 | 0.22 | 0.28 | 0.32 |
| Israel | ISR | 0.69 | 0.69 | 0.49 | 0.63 |
| Jordan | JOR | 0.48 | 0.16 | 0.50 | 0.36 |
| Kuwait | KWT | 0.45 | 0.16 | 0.48 | 0.34 |
| Lebanon | LBN | 0.45 | 0.16 | 0.45 | 0.33 |
| Libya | LBY | 0.54 | 0.34 | 0.27 | 0.38 |
| Morocco | MAR | 0.56 | 0.39 | 0.54 | 0.49 |
| Mauritania | MRT | 0.44 | 0.18 | 0.56 | 0.37 |
| Oman | OMN | 0.45 | 0.20 | 0.47 | 0.35 |
| West Bank and Gaza | PSE | 0.52 | 0.16 | 0.42 | 0.35 |
| Qatar | QAT | 0.46 | 0.19 | 0.40 | 0.33 |

| | | | | | |
|----------------------|-----|------|------|------|------|
| Saudi Arabia | SAU | 0.36 | 0.22 | 0.28 | 0.28 |
| Sudan | SDN | 0.43 | 0.37 | 0.28 | 0.36 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | SYR | 0.43 | 0.21 | 0.24 | 0.28 |
| Tunisia | TUN | 0.54 | 0.62 | 0.55 | 0.58 |
| Yemen, Rep. | YEM | 0.36 | 0.01 | 0.28 | 0.20 |

Pipeline Cluster and Component Scores

**Clusters are highlighted to distinguish from component scores, which are combined to form clusters (only in the Pipeline pillar)*

| Economy | ISO3 | Access to Skills and Assets | Skills Attainment | Assets | Access to Labor Markets | Participation | Protections in the workplace | Parental Benefits | Leadership and Entrepreneurship | Access to Public Institutions | Rights | Quotas |
|--------------------|------|-----------------------------|-------------------|--------|-------------------------|---------------|------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------|--------|
| Algeria | DZA | 0.65 | 0.80 | 0.51 | 0.50 | 0.30 | 0.67 | 0.67 | 0.38 | 0.65 | 0.80 | 0.50 |
| Bahrain | BHR | 0.81 | 0.99 | 0.62 | 0.28 | 0.29 | 0.17 | 0.33 | 0.35 | 0.30 | 0.60 | 0.00 |
| Egypt, Arab Rep. | EGY | 0.77 | 0.97 | 0.57 | 0.36 | 0.49 | 0.33 | 0.33 | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.44 | 0.05 |
| Iran, Islamic Rep. | IRN | 0.80 | 0.96 | 0.65 | 0.57 | 0.59 | 0.33 | 0.92 | 0.43 | 0.17 | 0.34 | 0.00 |
| Iraq | IRQ | 0.73 | 0.87 | 0.59 | 0.44 | 0.41 | 0.67 | 0.34 | 0.32 | 0.33 | 0.41 | 0.25 |
| Israel | ISR | 0.99 | 0.98 | 1.00 | 0.60 | 0.49 | 0.83 | 0.60 | 0.48 | 0.49 | 0.73 | 0.25 |
| Jordan | JOR | 0.74 | 0.99 | 0.49 | 0.33 | 0.24 | 0.17 | 0.56 | 0.32 | 0.38 | 0.69 | 0.06 |
| Kuwait | KWT | 0.81 | 0.99 | 0.63 | 0.25 | 0.31 | 0.00 | 0.31 | 0.39 | 0.28 | 0.56 | 0.00 |
| Lebanon | LBN | 0.76 | 0.99 | 0.53 | 0.27 | 0.30 | 0.17 | 0.31 | 0.31 | 0.31 | 0.63 | 0.00 |
| Libya | LBY | 0.79 | 0.96 | 0.61 | 0.42 | 0.41 | 0.50 | 0.34 | 0.43 | 0.41 | 0.71 | 0.11 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------|-----|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Mauritania | MRT | 0.53 | 0.87 | 0.20 | 0.42 | 0.38 | 0.33 | 0.59 | 0.36 | 0.38 | 0.44 | 0.32 |
| Morocco | MAR | 0.71 | 0.95 | 0.47 | 0.63 | 0.44 | 0.83 | 0.67 | 0.59 | 0.35 | 0.62 | 0.08 |
| Oman | OMN | 0.76 | 0.99 | 0.54 | 0.35 | 0.23 | 0.50 | 0.30 | 0.39 | 0.24 | 0.48 | 0.00 |
| Qatar | QAT | 0.82 | 0.98 | 0.66 | 0.34 | 0.32 | 0.17 | 0.30 | 0.57 | 0.24 | 0.47 | 0.00 |
| Saudi Arabia | SAU | 0.76 | 0.94 | 0.57 | 0.23 | 0.22 | 0.00 | 0.39 | 0.30 | 0.10 | 0.09 | 0.10 |
| Sudan | SDN | 0.64 | 0.77 | 0.50 | 0.32 | 0.45 | 0.17 | 0.30 | 0.35 | 0.32 | 0.45 | 0.20 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | SYR | 0.76 | 0.98 | 0.55 | 0.26 | 0.34 | 0.00 | 0.36 | 0.34 | 0.27 | 0.54 | 0.00 |
| Tunisia | TUN | 0.76 | 0.98 | 0.54 | 0.34 | 0.38 | 0.17 | 0.47 | 0.35 | 0.53 | 0.80 | 0.25 |
| United Arab Emirates | ARE | 0.80 | 0.99 | 0.61 | 0.22 | 0.23 | 0.00 | 0.29 | 0.38 | 0.23 | 0.47 | 0.00 |
| West Bank and Gaza | PSE | 0.74 | 0.99 | 0.49 | 0.35 | 0.43 | 0.00 | 0.58 | 0.39 | 0.45 | 0.58 | 0.33 |
| Yemen, Rep. | YEM | 0.64 | 0.90 | 0.38 | 0.21 | 0.36 | 0.00 | 0.31 | 0.18 | 0.21 | 0.43 | 0.00 |

Participation Component Scores

| Economy | ISO3 | Executive Branch | Legislative Branch | Judicial Branch | Security Sector |
|--------------------|------|------------------|--------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Algeria | DZA | 0.13 | 0.52 | 0.00 | 0.75 |
| Bahrain | BHR | 0.05 | 0.15 | 0.00 | 0.25 |
| Egypt, Arab Rep. | EGY | 0.12 | 0.30 | 0.00 | 0.50 |
| Iran, Islamic Rep. | IRN | 0.10 | 0.12 | 0.00 | 0.50 |
| Iraq | IRQ | 0.11 | 0.51 | 0.00 | 0.25 |
| Israel | ISR | 0.69 | 0.55 | 0.50 | 1.00 |
| Jordan | JOR | 0.07 | 0.31 | 0.00 | 0.25 |
| Kuwait | KWT | 0.07 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.50 |

| | | | | | |
|----------------------|-----|------|------|------|------|
| Lebanon | LBN | 0.03 | 0.09 | 0.00 | 0.50 |
| Libya | LBY | 0.04 | 0.32 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Mauritania | MRT | 0.31 | 0.41 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Morocco | MAR | 0.13 | 0.41 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Oman | OMN | 0.06 | 0.02 | - | 0.50 |
| Qatar | QAT | 0.06 | 0.20 | 0.00 | 0.50 |
| Saudi Arabia | SAU | 0.00 | 0.40 | 0.00 | 0.50 |
| Sudan | SDN | 0.11 | 0.61 | 0.00 | 0.75 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | SYR | 0.06 | 0.26 | 0.00 | 0.50 |
| Tunisia | TUN | 0.23 | 0.63 | - | 1.00 |
| United Arab Emirates | ARE | 0.27 | 0.45 | 0.00 | 0.50 |
| West Bank and Gaza | PSE | 0.23 | 0.26 | 0.00 | - |
| Yemen, Rep. | YEM | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |

Authority Component Scores:

| Economy | ISO3 | Glass Walls | Public Perceptions | Governance |
|--------------------|------|-------------|--------------------|------------|
| Algeria | DZA | 0.35 | 0.49 | 0.40 |
| Bahrain | BHR | 0.17 | 0.54 | 0.55 |
| Egypt, Arab Rep. | EGY | 0.44 | 0.60 | 0.40 |
| Iran, Islamic Rep. | IRN | 0.13 | 0.60 | 0.40 |
| Iraq | IRQ | 0.08 | 0.51 | 0.25 |
| Israel | ISR | 0.11 | 0.53 | 0.83 |
| Jordan | JOR | 0.37 | 0.53 | 0.60 |
| Kuwait | KWT | 0.33 | 0.55 | 0.57 |
| Lebanon | LBN | 0.26 | 0.66 | 0.42 |

| | | | | |
|----------------------|-----|------|------|------|
| Libya | LBY | 0.17 | 0.49 | 0.15 |
| Mauritania | MRT | 0.58 | 0.66 | 0.44 |
| Morocco | MAR | 0.45 | 0.64 | 0.55 |
| Oman | OMN | 0.14 | 0.60 | 0.65 |
| Qatar | QAT | 0.13 | 0.36 | 0.70 |
| Saudi Arabia | SAU | 0.00 | 0.30 | 0.55 |
| Sudan | SDN | 0.17 | 0.46 | 0.21 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | SYR | 0.11 | 0.50 | 0.11 |
| Tunisia | TUN | 0.43 | 0.66 | 0.58 |
| United Arab Emirates | ARE | 0.39 | 0.58 | 0.78 |
| West Bank and Gaza | PSE | 0.24 | 0.55 | 0.48 |
| Yemen, Rep. | YEM | 0.10 | 0.57 | 0.16 |

APPENDIX B: QUOTAS AND REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENTS IN THE MENA REGION

| Economy | Quota Type* | Enforcement/ Incentives** | Legislative Quotas/ Reserved seats* | % Women in Parliament*** |
|---------|--|---|---|-----------------------------|
| Algeria | Legislated candidate quotas for the Single/Lower House Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level | Yes, both sanctions for noncompliance with mandated quotas for women on candidate lists for national parliamentary elections AND incentives for parties to include women on candidate lists | Article 2 of the 2012 Law for the Representation of Women requires variable quotas of between 20% and 50% of the candidates for parliament to be women, depending on the number of seats in each electoral district. | 25.8% |
| Bahrain | None | N/A | - | 7.5% |

| | | | | |
|--------|---|--|--|-------|
| Egypt | Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level | Enforcement: N/A Incentives: None | Article 180 of the new Constitution reserves 25% of the seats for women in the elected local councils. | 14.9% |
| Iran | None | N/A | - | 5.9% |
| Iraq | Legislated quotas for the Single/Lower House: Reserved seats Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level | Yes, sanctions for noncompliance with mandated quotas for women on candidate lists for national parliamentary elections, however no incentives for parties to include women on candidate lists | According to Article 49.4 of the Constitution: "The elections law shall aim to achieve a percentage of representation for women of not less than 25% of the members of the Council of Representatives." | 25.5% |
| Israel | Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level Voluntary quotas adopted by political parties | N/A | The reserved places mechanism is implemented only if women do not attain the reserved positions or higher ones. For example: A Political Party has reserved the 10th place for a woman in its candidate list. If the first woman-candidate in this Political Party is elected (in primaries) to the 12th place, the reserved places mechanism is implemented, and she is promoted to the 10th place on the list. But if the female candidate is elected to the 8th place, the candidate retains this seat won through primary elections. | 27.5% |

| | | | | |
|------------|---|--|--|-------|
| Jordan | Legislated quotas for the Single/Lower House: Reserved seats Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level | N/A | Mixed-member proportional electoral system, 108 members are elected from 45 single or multi-member districts, 15 seats are reserved for women | 15.4% |
| Kuwait | None | N/A | - | 3.1% |
| Lebanon | None | N/A | - | 4.7% |
| Libya | Legislated candidate quotas for the Single/Lower House Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level | N/A | The General National Congress consists of 200 members, 120 of whom are elected by majority, based on a first-past-the-post system for single-member districts, where the winner is the candidate with the most votes. For multi-member districts, a single non-transferable vote system is adopted. The remaining 80 members are elected by proportional representation from closed electoral lists, presented by political entities in multi-member constituencies. | 16% |
| Mauritania | Legislated candidate quotas for the Single/Lower House Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level | No sanctions, however there are incentives for parties to include women on candidate lists | 20 seats are reserved for women candidates running in a single nationwide list. | 20.3% |
| Morocco | Legislated quotas for the Single/Lower House: Reserved Seats Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level | N/A | 305 of the 395 members of the lower house are elected in 92 multi-member constituencies through a proportional representation system. An additional 60 seats are reserved for women, while 30 are reserved for young men and women under the age of 40 | 20.5% |
| Oman | None | N/A | - | 1.2% |
| Qatar | None | N/A | - | 9.8% |

| | | | | |
|--------------|---|-----|---|-------|
| Saudi Arabia | Legislated quotas for the Single/Lower House: Reserved Seats Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level | N/A | A January 2011 Royal Order amended the composition of the previously all-male 150-member Consultative Council by reserving 20% of its seats for women members. | 19.9% |
| Sudan | Legislated quotas for the Single/Lower House: Reserved Seats Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level | N/A | Article 29 (2:b) of the 2008 National Election Act, “twenty five per cent of the women members shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation at the state level from separate and closed party lists.” Voters vote for only one women’s list of their choice. Only parties whose women’s lists clear the 4% threshold qualify to access seats reserved for women. Seats are allocated according to proportional representation among these parties. Furthermore, “the seats designated to women’s lists shall be won by the candidates of those lists in the order their names appear in the list concerned from top to bottom.” | 30.5% |
| Syria | None | N/A | - | 13.2% |

| | | | | |
|----------------------|---|--|--|-------|
| Tunisia | Legislated candidate quotas for the Single/Lower House Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level | Yes, sanctions for noncompliance with mandated quotas for women on candidate lists for national parliamentary elections, however no incentives for parties to include women on candidate lists | Article 46 of the 2014 Constitution guarantees "equality of opportunities between women and men to have access to all levels of responsibility and in all fields. The state seeks to achieve equal representation for women and men in elected councils." | 31.3% |
| United Arab Emirates | None | N/A | - | 22.5% |
| West Bank and Gaza | Legislated candidate quotas for the Single/Lower House Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level | Yes, sanctions for noncompliance with mandated quotas for women on candidate lists for national parliamentary elections, however no incentives for parties to include women on candidate lists | The 2005 Election Law (Law No. 9) and the 2007 Decree on the Election Law state that political parties must have at least 1 woman among the first 3 candidates on the list, at least 1 woman among the next 4, and 1 woman among every 5 for the rest of the list (Article 4). The law applies to the proportional representation component of the election, and the lists are closed. This guarantees about 20% women among the candidates. | 22.7% |
| Yemen | None | N/A | - | 0.0% |

* Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance


** Source: The World Bank, Women, Business and the Law Report 2018

*** Source: IPU

ABOUT THE MEWLI TEAM

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Merissa Khurma is project manager of the Middle East Women Leadership Initiative. She leads the Middle East Special Initiatives at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. She is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. Merissa has leadership experience working in a range of development projects in the Middle East and Africa that focused on economic development, the Syrian refugee crisis, education, youth, gender development, and governance. Additionally, Merissa served as director of the Office of Jordan's Prince Ali Bin Al Hussein (2010- 2013) and as press attaché and director of the Information Bureau at the Embassy of Jordan in Washington, D.C. (2003-2010). Merissa has a master of public administration from Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, a master of science in international security and foreign policy from Georgetown University, and a bachelor of art in political science from McGill University. Merissa speaks Arabic and French.

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Cassandra Pagán is the author of this research and consults as the data technical expert for the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars Middle East Women's Leadership Initiative. She has also served in this capacity in the development of the Global Women's Leadership Initiative Index at the Wilson Center and served as the consulting data scientist for EDGE Strategy, the leading global assessment in gender equality for business. She formerly served as research lead for Digital Inclusion at the Institute for Business in the Global Context developing data toolkits including the Digital Evolution Index in collaboration with MasterCard's Global Risks Division. In addition to her experience in research, she has worked in women's leadership and at School of Leadership-Afghanistan in Kabul preparing teachers in STEM subjects, served as AmeriCorps Program Director for the Boston Teacher Residency and served as an AmeriCorps volunteer with Tahoe SAFE Alliance. She holds a Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School at Tufts and a degree in International Political Economy from the Colorado College and is currently based in São Paulo, Brazil.

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Alex is the program and research associate for the Middle East Special Initiatives at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He holds a Master of Public Administration and Master of Arts in International Studies from the University of Washington with a focus international development policy and management. He has conducted qualitative research on refugees and the nonprofit sector in Jordan and the refugee resettlement system in the United States. His specializations include migration, refugees, governance, the nonprofit sector, social movements, workforce development, and education policy in the MENA region. He has previously lived in Morocco and Jordan. Alex

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Alex is a consultant and data scientist based in Boulder, Colorado. As a consultant, Alex works with nonprofits and organizations focused on international development to answer complex technical questions. Alex's specialties include international development and demography in addition to statistical analysis and econometrics. Alex holds a Master of Arts in Global Finance, Trade, and Economic Integration from the University of Denver, and a Bachelor of Arts in Romance Languages and International Affairs from the Colorado College.

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