

CAN U.S. ANTI-VIOLENCE MODELS SUCCEED IN MEXICO AND THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE?

BY: ALEXIA GARDNER, ANDREA KIM, AND ALYSON WOOLLEY
CONTRIBUTIONS: ANNABRONIA OSPECK



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Executive Summary

In 2019, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)¹ published a report examining global data to identify steps the international community could take to reduce intentional homicidal violence² in accordance with Sustainable Development Goal 16.³ UNODC's study stated that the Americas experienced the highest levels of intentional homicides per 100,000 population in the world, with El Salvador and Honduras at the top at 62.1 and 41.7 respectively, and with Mexico at 25.7.⁴

The report concludes that the three models - cognitive behavioral therapy, the community approach, and the integrated approach - have either (1) been shown to make similar reductions in violence in their implementation sites in Mexico and/or the Northern Triangle, or (2) they have demonstrated the potential to make significant reductions in violence in Mexico and/or the Northern Triangle with sustained implementation.

Many entities have sought to devise and implement programs to reduce the widespread violence in the Northern Triangle and Mexico. This report⁵ looks closely at three prominent U.S. based models that have contributed to significant reductions in violence in the United States' localities where applied to see if they help produce similar results in these countries. The report concludes that the three models - cognitive behavioral therapy, the community approach, and the integrated approach - have either (1) been shown to make similar reductions in violence in their implementation sites in Mexico and/or the Northern Triangle, or (2) they have demonstrated the potential to make significant reductions in violence in Mexico and/or the Northern Triangle with sustained implementation. It is important to note that these claims are based on the available

information and that additional data is needed to make stronger claims about the model's effectiveness in Mexico and the Northern Triangle. The cognitive behavioral therapy and community approach models address violence broadly, which can include collective violence, while the integrated approach specifically addresses collective violence. This report focuses on the challenge of addressing collective violence.

To identify successful initiatives and gather data, the authors interviewed academics, law enforcement officials, public servants, community leaders, faith-based leadership, program participants, and others, under the direction of Ambassador Earl Anthony Wayne (ret.) and with guidance from Director Ricardo Zúñiga. They consulted government reports, promotional materials, and scholarly literature as well. Based on the available data, research, and interviews conducted, the authors have identified the following key takeaways from successful implementations discussed in Mexico and the Northern Triangle:

- (1) The Importance of Trust:** For success, two models covered in this report depend on the pre-existing trust that local organizations and entities have established within the community. In San Pedro Sula, Honduras, Cure Violence partnered with a local church, which had intimate knowledge of the community. Ceasefire Mexico City was led by the government of Mexico City with technical assistance from advisors of the U.S. based models. Distinct from Cure Violence and Ceasefire, Glasswing International and Catholic

Relief Services built organic trust by capitalizing on facilitators' and youth guides' abilities to connect with participants.

(2) Addressing Implementation Settings: To find success in Mexico and countries in the Northern Triangle, all organizations had to adjust implementation by making important changes to the model as it had been applied in the United States. The implementation modifications reflect different community relations with law enforcement, workforce demographics, and accessibility to various governmental bureaucratic systems. The report discusses the adaptations and modifications to local circumstances in some detail.

This report concludes that the implementation of U.S. based anti-violence models in Mexico and the Northern Triangle provide critical lessons for future implementation in other regional contexts, and further programming in other international settings as well as in certain U.S. locations. The authors also believe that further research in the perspectives of program participants and continued sustained funding for anti-violence organizations will yield more positive results in the region and in this field.



Introduction

The high rate of “generalized violence” observed in Mexico and countries in the Northern Triangle⁶ poses a risk to human security and citizen health, with the lack of health defined as, “not experiencing peace within the family, community, and country.”⁷ Preventing and decreasing violence in Mexico and the Northern Triangle is thus critical for citizen welfare. Local governments, law enforcement agencies, community organizations, and foreign entities have sought to address the widespread violence by enacting legislation, programs, and instituting transformative practices. This report specifically examines previously identified, successful U.S. based anti-violence models that have been implemented or are being implemented in the context of Mexico and the Northern Triangle. The models include (1) cognitive behavior therapy, (2) the community approach, and (3) the integrated approach.

This report identifies several changes to the U.S. based models that are required for the successful implementation to a Mexican and Northern Triangle context. The authors are not evaluating the success of the selected U.S. based anti-violence models, but rather providing information on the implementation strategies employed in the three countries. While many of the U.S. based anti-violence models address violence broadly, this report will examine their applicability to collective violence. The authors will use the World Health Organization’s definition of collective violence: “the instrumental use of violence by people who identify themselves as members of a group.”⁸ This report will not focus on drug cartels or state-sanctioned violence, but rather what is often called “gang violence.”⁹

The authors would like to address the limitations of this report as well: (1) we are not international development specialists, nor have we worked in implementing any of the mentioned anti-violence programs; (2) accurate data and information is limited and not always accessible in the operational areas in Mexico and the Northern Triangle; and (3) a main source of data was collected from informal interviews, which can include subjectivity or opinion.

Featured Programs

Of the many initiatives examined for the report, the authors found three noteworthy U.S. based anti-violence models that address gang-violence to feature, which have been successful in their implementation in the United States and have either (1) been shown to make similar reductions in violence in their implementation sites in Mexico and/or the Northern Triangle, or (2) have demonstrated the potential to make significant reductions in violence in Mexico and/or the Northern Triangle with sustained implementation. The models are presented in alphabetical order and do not denote ranking.

Cognitive Behavioral Therapy

The 2016 study, “What Works in Reducing Community Violence: A Meta-Review and Field Study of the Northern Triangle,” prepared by Thomas Abt and Christopher Winship for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), recognized cognitive behavioral therapy as an effective people-based approach to reducing crime and violence.¹⁰ Cognitive behavioral therapy, or CBT, is defined by Abt and Winship as “using clinical psychological techniques to alter the distorted thinking and behavior of criminal and juvenile offenders.”¹¹ CBT programming includes, “cognitive skills training, anger management, and lessons on social skills, moral development, and relapse prevention.”¹² Based on fifty-eight evaluations of CBT, nineteen of which were randomized control trials, CBT programs have been effective in reducing recidivism rates in youth and adults both in the community and in correctional facilities by 25 to 52 percent,¹³ and are cost-effective, in that the programs yield a savings of \$26 for every dollar invested.¹⁴ Abt and Winship noted that CBT is most effective when paired with another program like vocational training and educational programs, especially when the programs focus on high-risk offenders and sound implementation.¹⁵ As a result of the resounding benefits that CBT can provide, the model has been adapted for international and national implementation. The programs below provide case studies for how CBT has been adapted to diverse settings.

The CBT Model in the United States

Led by Chicago-based organization Youth Guidance, the Becoming A Man (BAM) program is a well-known North American implementation of cognitive behavioral therapy, which seeks to re-teach masculinity to create young men resistant to provocations of violence.¹⁶ The core values of the BAM program are “integrity, accountability, self-determination, positive anger expression, visionary goal setting, and respect for women,” which are taught through lessons on “impulse control, emotional self-regulation, recognition of social cues, and developing a sense of personal responsibility.”¹⁷

The thirty-week in-school program for male students in grades 7 to 12 has been described as “part youth group, part psychotherapy.”¹⁸ Program participants are referred to the program based on school performance and crime involvement such as previous suspensions, truancy, drug and alcohol abuse, gang involvement, and violence.¹⁹ BAM program participants are not the highest risk for violence, as many high-risk offenders do not participate in educational institutions.²⁰

During the thirty-week program, participants meet once-per-week for sessions that involve role-playing, group exercises, field trips, problem-solving activities, and group missions.²¹ Each session begins with a PEIS check-in, which stands for “physical, emotional, intellectual and spiritual,” which allows for the counselor to gather information on how each participant is feeling, thinking, and emoting.²² PEIS check-ins are completed in a circle to represent the equality of all involved, including the counselor.²³ Anthony Ramierez DeVittori, BAM’s founder, identified the counselors as essential to the program’s success.²⁴ These counselors are trained individuals, often possessing a Master’s in social work or psychology, who are full-time staff in the participating schools to be accessible to the program participants. The counselors are men, who have authentic youth-engagement skills, like the ability of earning the respect of program participants, and must undergo 300 hours of training prior to working with participants.²⁵

The BAM program has been evaluated by the University of Chicago’s Crime Lab in two randomized control trials. The initial evaluation concluded that BAM participants were “44 percent less likely to be arrested for violent crimes than the specified control group and 36 percent less likely to be arrested for any other crime.”²⁶ The second evaluation observed a 31 percent reduction in arrests in program participants.²⁷ Overall, the BAM program increased the response time of youth by 79 percent²⁸ and provided a return on investment of at least \$30 for every \$1 spent on programming.²⁹ As a result of the significant reductions, BAM programming was recognized by former President Barack Obama, and as of 2020, has been implemented in 140 schools in Chicago, Boston, Los Angeles County, and King County Washington, serving 8,000 youths.³⁰

International Implementation of the CBT Model

Similar to the BAM program, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) employs a cognitive behavioral therapy informed approach in Central America, specifically, in its “¡Estoy DISPUESTO!” curriculum. The curriculum was originally designed for out-of-school and unemployed youth living in neighborhoods with high rates of violence.³¹ Our report will examine the curriculum’s implementation with two groups: students between 12 to 15 years of age enrolled in middle school and adult male inmates 18 years and older in El Salvador.³²

¡Estoy DISPUESTO! Curriculum

The “¡Estoy DISPUESTO!” curriculum is recognized as “cognitive behavioral therapy-informed”³³ to “help participants improve intra and interpersonal relationships with a particular focus on self-control.”³⁴ It is an adaptation of traditional CBT therapy modified to account for location conditions and the desired outcomes for beneficiaries. According to CRS, the curriculum uses “evidence-based psycho-social tools to help participants” realize and “manage thoughts, feelings, and behaviors.”³⁵ Unlike BAM, the curriculum accommodates all genders, consisting of meetings twice a week for 16 weeks, covering 1 unit per week.³⁶ Each unit contains an awareness lesson and a transformation lab. In an awareness lesson, a topic is introduced, and in a transformation lab, participants are encouraged to reflect on the topic and apply it to various scenarios in a group discussion setting.³⁷ The first seven units address intrapersonal skills like developing coping strategies and establishing personal rules; and the last nine units focus on building interpersonal skills, which includes verbal and nonverbal communication.³⁸ Facilitators of the “¡Estoy DISPUESTO!” program, unlike BAM, are of any gender, must undergo a 6-step certification process which includes in-depth learning of the curriculum in person, psychological first aid training, practice implementing all 16 units paired with 6 facilitation strategies, an exam, and an observation conducted by a certified facilitator. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, CRS has ceased all training and certification processes.³⁹

According to Katharine “Kay” Andrade-Eekhoff, a Youth Employability Advisor for Latin American and the Caribbean at CRS, there are many challenges to implementing the curriculum in Central America. For instance, the staff does not consistently have advanced educational training in psychology or social work like the Becoming A Man staff.⁴⁰ Therefore, human resources and context of the region was taken into consideration when designing the curriculum, explained Kay.⁴¹ Additionally, the program’s duration and frequency has to be flexible to accommodate the implementation settings.⁴²

¡Estoy DISPUESTO! in Salvadoran Schools

Glasswing International, a Salvadoran nongovernmental organization focused on the precursors and consequences of violence and poverty, partnered with CRS and the Tinker Foundation to implement the “¡Estoy DISPUESTO!” curriculum in 10 public schools in high-risk communities in San Salvador, El Salvador, as a pilot program.⁴³

The curriculum was paired with Glasswing International’s Mindfulness program to “reduce stress, aggressive and impulsive actions, and improve their ability to make decisions,”⁴⁴ and Glasswing International’s Community Schools model, which aims to promote the idea that local public schools can be “centers of the community” to provide or enhance “children and youth’s protective factors,” which enables young people to “thrive despite adversity.”⁴⁵ Glasswing International’s Community Schools model has four main components: (1) to provide a safe, healthy, and stimulating environment, (2) improve academic enrichment, (3) introduce life skills development, and (4) establish integrated communities.⁴⁶

In the pilot implementation of CRS’s curriculum, students, between the ages of 12 and 15, were randomly placed in the CBT program, Mindfulness program, or the control group.⁴⁷ Glasswing International concentrated with students in this age demographic, as they were identified as “more prone to gang recruitment.”⁴⁸ The CBT curriculum was presented as an after-school program that met one to two times per week for 45 minutes led by youth guides chosen by the participating students⁴⁹ and trained by a coordinator, who underwent CRS training.⁵⁰ Each session involved the introduction of the awareness lesson, like anger management, and a transformation lab, which allowed participants to apply anger management skills to various scenarios.⁵¹ For the Mindfulness participants, the students would meditate before and after school for three minutes in a circle.⁵² These meditations would include discussion of how they were feeling that day or other student-chosen topics and topics in the Calm Classroom Curriculum.⁵³ This “trauma-informed” curriculum introduces self-awareness, mental focus, and emotional wellbeing into the classroom.⁵⁴ Along with the Mindfulness and CBT curriculum, students were given the opportunity to participate in other after-school activities. Glasswing International offered four options: (1) leadership, (2) art and culture, (3) sports, and (4) science. Each option consisted of activities related to the option’s theme.⁵⁵

The youth guides, who led the Mindfulness and CBT programming, did not always possess degrees in psychology or social work, but were chosen on their ability to connect with the participants, and did not necessarily have similar backgrounds to the participants.⁵⁶ Glasswing International allowed the students to select the youth guides; these youth guides were chosen based on their “youth magnet” abilities, the ability for the individual to be able to gain the students’ trust.⁵⁷ Youth guides would occasionally conduct individual meetings with participants if he or she needed additional support as well.⁵⁸ In addition to access to the CRS trained coordinator, the youth guides had access to a local professor partnering with Glasswing International, who had previous experience with CBT, for guidance and additional training.⁵⁹

Data on the program has been limited and unreliable; however, school staff had noticed “tangible change” in participants’ behaviors, management of emotions, and productivity, when the full CBT

curriculum was employed.⁶⁰ Due to the high cost of implementing the full CBT curriculum, Glasswing International no longer implements the “¡Estoy DISPUESTO!” curriculum as part of the Community Schools model.⁶¹ It is important to note that elimination of the program in Glasswing International’s model does not indicate that the program is not cost-effective, but rather the funding the organization received for this particular implementation had ended.

However, Glasswing International has integrated certain lessons from the curriculum and the Mindfulness program as permanent additions to the Community Schools model like prioritizing the building of connections with participants, which has been implemented in 9 countries.⁶² In Honduras, the model is present in 31 schools for 12,114 students, and will be expanded to 187 schools to reach 40,000 students as a result of a 2020 partnership between El Salvador’s Ministry of Education and Glasswing International.⁶³ The Community Schools model has since been digitized as well, to reach participating students in the wake of school closures due to COVID-19.⁶⁴ The digital program has the benefit of offering students access to even more activities than were previously available, like French lessons.⁶⁵

Segundas Oportunidades or Second Chances

Made possible by a grant from the United States Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, CRS, in partnership with Central American University and the Directorate General of Prisons, implemented the “¡Estoy DISPUESTO!” curriculum with adult male inmates 18 years and older in Salvadoran correctional facilities to emphasize rehabilitation and reintegration beginning in 2017.⁶⁶ To adapt the curriculum to the incarcerated population, the frequency of the program was limited to meeting once per week with two sessions being conducted in one day in accordance with the correctional facilities’ requests; program participants were pre-selected by prison authorities using a selection tool created by Central American University; facilitators underwent more technical training, and building a culture of peace was emphasized more in this particular curriculum implementation site.⁶⁷ The CRS program currently operates in 8 Salvadoran prisons with La Esperanza being one of them.⁶⁸ However, CRS programming was put on hold due to new security measures introduced by the Directorate General of Prisons and continues to be on hold due to COVID-19.⁶⁹ In the absence of facilitators, incarcerated individuals, who graduated CRS’s inmate peacebuilding program and received additional training, have continued teaching other program content, which does not include the “¡Estoy DISPUESTO!” curriculum.⁷⁰

The program consists of six steps. The first includes identifying and selecting the inmates who will participate in the CRS program. Typically, these individuals are seen as more low risk and are observed as having a high potential for success. Following the selection process, the incarcerated individuals participate in the “¡Estoy DISPUESTO!” curriculum along with job skills training, and lessons focused on family and peacebuilding. These sessions are led by certified CRS facilitators and Directorate General of Prisons staff.⁷¹ CRS facilitators also work with prison guards so they have familiarity with the curriculum content, as guards are key actors in the prison ecosystem.⁷² After completing the program, the individuals are released from prison and given access to legal support, and later, are gradually re-inserted into their past family and social life. Step five offers Second Chance graduates employment opportunities, as CRS has established partnerships with many private companies to hire more previously incarcerated individuals. The final step is a

follow-up with the individual. CRS offers case management, mentoring, support networks, and extracurricular activities to assist in the reintegration process.⁷³

Rosa Anaya, a coordinator of the Second Chance program, noted in an interview with Professor Marta Flores of Central American University, that a challenge specific to the prison program is the limited number of employment opportunities given to previously incarcerated people. For the released prisoners, employment is essential for successful reintegration; however, private companies are reluctant to offer opportunities due to pre-conceived notions.⁷⁴ Without this crucial step, the reintegration process becomes more difficult for the individual.

The Segundas Oportunidades or Second Chances program has served 2,100 incarcerated individuals and trained 277 facilitators as of 2020.⁷⁵ An independent evaluation of the “¡Estoy DISPUESTO!” program performed by the Central American University with advisory support from the University of Notre Dame observed statistically significant improvements in program participants’ ability to have and understand empathy and experience guilt,⁷⁶ which are essential emotions to prevent violent responses and actions. One source claims that 90 percent of released participants have not re-offended; however, the program is relatively new and corroborating data has been limited.⁷⁷ Not only does the program assist the participants, the program also addresses existing security issues and promotes collaboration among the various bureaucratic entities involved in the criminal justice system.⁷⁸ As a result of CRS’s success, the Directorate General of Prisons formally adopted the “¡Estoy DISPUESTO!” curriculum in 2019 as an authorized rehabilitation program for the Salvadoran prison system and is seeking to expand its use.⁷⁹ In addition, the curriculum and other CRS peacebuilding and rehabilitation strategies have been incorporated in one of the Juvenile Justice rehabilitation centers for young men by ISNA, the Salvadoran Institute for Children and Adolescents, and in a few female prison facilities.⁸⁰

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The cognitive behavioral therapy approach has been implemented by various organizations in diverse settings, emphasizing the model’s flexibility in application. Unlike other programs identified in this report, the programs that utilize the CBT model are largely preventative rather than reactionary to violence. This means that CBT programs often address the precursors of certain behaviors. However, with the introduction of CBT tactics to incarcerated populations, practitioners are hopeful that CBT will yield similar successful reductions in response scenarios as well. While CBT initiatives are largely preventative, the programs have shown lasting impact on the operational communities; however, it is important to note that CBT approaches must be augmented to international settings for similar results to be observed, which CRS has done. In CRS’s implementation of CBT, significant changes had to be made to the program’s staffing criteria, duration, and frequency, while still remaining committed to CBT core values.

Community Approach

The Cure Violence Epidemic Control (Health) model was developed by the physician, Gary Slutkin, MD in 1995 based on his experience with epidemiological interventions in Somalia and Uganda, and personal observations of violence in Chicago, Illinois.⁸¹ Dr. Slutkin employed tactics used to combat contagious diseases, such as HIV/AIDs, cholera, and tuberculosis, to understand violence in Chicago.⁸² In doing so, Dr. Slutkin found that violence mimics the spread of contagious diseases in that it experiences geographical and chronological clusters like disease transmission.⁸³ Cure Violence launched its first trial in the West Garfield Park neighborhood in Chicago, resulting in a 67 percent drop in shootings in its first year of operation.⁸⁴ The Health model has since been applied to 100 communities in 15 different countries, with all sites observing reductions in violence ranging from 20 percent to 95 percent.⁸⁵

The Cure Violence Model in the United States

The Cure Violence Health model is a “data-driven, research-based, community-centric approach to violence prevention.”⁸⁶ At the core of the model is the idea that violence is a “learned behavior and that it can be prevented using disease control methods.”⁸⁷ The model consists of three main components: (1) detect and interrupt potentially violent conflicts, (2) identify and treat individuals at the highest risk, and (3) mobilize the community to change norms.⁸⁸

Integral to all components are interrupters and outreach workers. Violence interrupters detect and interrupt potentially violent conflicts, which include the prevention of retaliatory shootings, the mediation of ongoing conflicts, and follow-ups with past participants.⁸⁹ Violence interrupters are selected based on their “own experiences with crime and violence, ability to establish relationships with the most high-risk young people in a community, and are usually between the ages of 15 and 30.”⁹⁰ These carefully recruited individuals must be seen as “credible messengers” by high-risk young people and usually are former high-level or popular gang members who have since turned their lives around.⁹¹ Outreach workers require the same characteristics as interrupters, but are tasked with connecting high-risk individuals with “positive opportunities and resources in the community,” such as “employment, housing, recreational activities, and education,”⁹² and ensure that program participants are attending therapy for six to twenty-four months.⁹³ Violence interrupters and outreach workers are successful in their tasks as they understand the lived experience of the program participants.

The third component, mobilizing the community to change norms, consists of public education efforts, media campaigns, and community events such as anti-violence marches and post-shooting vigils.⁹⁴ This component is integral in establishing long-lasting change by utilizing partnerships with faith-based organizations, neighborhood associations, tenant councils, and other community-based organizations who can gain support by serving as intermediaries between Cure Violence programming and the affected community.⁹⁵ While local partnerships are crucial to the success of component three, this does not include law enforcement. Cure Violence operates “independently of, while hopefully not undermining, law enforcement.”⁹⁶ Cure Violence will only seek to build a relationship with law enforcement when “strategic information on crime patterns” or assistance in hiring outreach workers or violence interrupters is needed and cannot be fulfilled by other community organizations.⁹⁷ In addition, Cure Violence never shares information with police to maintain the safety of the staff and the credibility of the program.⁹⁸ The Cure Violence model is a

localized approach that emphasizes community partnerships. However, there are some instances of partnerships with the local government as well.⁹⁹

Independent evaluations of the model have been performed on implementation sites in Chicago, Baltimore, New York City, Philadelphia, and Trinidad.¹⁰⁰ In Chicago, Cure Violence programming reduced shootings by 41-73 percent and retaliatory attacks by 100 percent in most of the operational areas, according to an evaluation by Northwestern University and the United States Department of Justice.¹⁰¹ Similar results were observed in evaluations by Johns Hopkins University, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation of other Cure Violence operational areas.¹⁰²

While Cure Violence has been proven to make significant large-scale reductions in community violence, the program has been instrumental in changing personal lives as well. Michael Davis, an international specialist and trainer at Cure Violence, who benefited from Cure Violence programming in his youth, stated that the credible messengers were most instrumental in changing his mindset and facilitating the opportunity to recognize that he could positively contribute to his community.¹⁰³

In recognizing the model's success, Cure Violence has been endorsed by the United States Conference of Mayors and has been implemented by many local health departments.¹⁰⁴ The success of the Cure Violence model reinforces the theory that violence transmits like a contagious disease. Dr. Slutkin, in 2013, stated that the "theory [violence as a public health epidemic] is validated by treatment," in that violence responds positively to disease control tactics because it is a disease.¹⁰⁵

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International Implementation of the Cure Violence Model

International implementation of the Cure Violence model usually consists of three stages: (1) pre-intervention observations, (2) intervention, and (3) post-intervention observations.

Pre-Intervention

Pre-intervention observations consist of visits by a Cure Violence team to assess whether the model can be implemented in a particular location. This stage consists of one or more site visits to assess the situation, identify the best places for implementation, and identify the best local partners to implement the program, which are critical elements of success.¹⁰⁶ Often, local partners will identify the credible messengers that should be hired to carry out the model.¹⁰⁷ In addition to the local partner, Cure Violence may partner with another non-governmental organization to assist with implementation and/or to provide some of the necessary wrap-around services. In the past, Cure Violence has worked with partners such as Save the Children UK, UNICEF, USAID, Chemonics, Creative Associates, and many more.¹⁰⁸

Intervention

If the site is determined to be feasible for the implementation of the program, preparations for the intervention will begin. This includes training on-site workers and establishing additional

partnerships if necessary. Michael Davis described the training of workers to consist of an agreed upon number of sessions, usually either two to three 40-hour sessions, depending on the specified contract.¹⁰⁹ Training sessions are usually conducted in-person with discussions of the model, violence interruptions, reduction training, management training, booster training and other relevant topics.¹¹⁰ Currently, Cure Violence workers are identified as essential workers and have continued their work during the pandemic, which includes interruptions.¹¹¹ However, training and site-visits are now conducted virtually and community activities have adapted to address the pandemic such as sewing masks, passing out hand sanitizer, and spreading information on social distancing.¹¹²

Post-Intervention

During the implementation, data is collected for analysis during post-intervention by either external or internal entities to determine if the model was properly implemented, identify changes in violence, and provide insight on ways the model can be adapted for a more favorable outcome.¹¹³

San Pedro Sula, Honduras

The Honduras implementation site was Cure Violence's first program in Central and Latin America.¹¹⁴ As of 2008, Honduras was identified as one of the most violent countries in the world, "because of the frequency of cartel-related and gang-related violence, extortion, community conflicts, and interpersonal conflicts."¹¹⁵ It is important to note that Cure Violence programming addresses all types of violence, whereas this report seeks to address only gang-related violence. However, a substantial amount of all homicides in Latin America can be linked to gangs or organized crime and is indirectly addressed by Cure Violence programming.¹¹⁶

Pre-Intervention

Cure Violence conducted site assessments to determine the feasibility of implementing the model in Honduras during the Summer and Fall of 2012.¹¹⁷ According to Guadalupe Cruz, the International Training Director, the Cure Violence team, including her, visited on numerous occasions to identify the right local partner and to gather information on the unique situation in San Pedro Sula.¹¹⁸ Two initial challenges to implementation noticed by the team were the tight control gangs and groups had on the area and the community's suspicion of outsiders.¹¹⁹

The team determined that Chamelecon would be the first implementation site.¹²⁰ In the Chamelecon neighborhood, a religious group was identified as the local community organization, as it shared the same mission as Cure Violence and had the ability to recruit and work with individuals who had a prior criminal record.¹²¹ In addition to having access to the community, religious institutions are highly respected in the neighborhood, which elevated Cure Violence's credibility in the area.¹²² In addition to the local partner, Cure Violence established an implementing partnership with USAID and Creative Associates for the first five years of implementation, where the partners assisted by providing funding.¹²³

As a result of the situation observed in Honduras, the high-risk individuals for the program were defined as male, between the ages of 14 and 44, participating in the informal economy such as narcotics, extortion, or kidnapping, having a history of violence, carrying a weapon, lacking education, or having been recently deported from the United States.¹²⁴ This definition differs from the U.S. based model parameters in that it covers a larger age demographic, as younger individuals

leave school at an earlier age in Honduras than in the United States and remain at high-risk for a longer period of time.¹²⁵ The team also decided to only address community and interpersonal violence rather than state-sanctioned violence.¹²⁶

Noting the high-levels of violence in the area, a phased approach was preferred over the traditional implementation strategy to ensure the safety and credibility of workers.¹²⁷ A phased approach provided the workers with additional time to establish strong relationships and agreements with the local gangs and groups to prepare for conflict mediation (i.e. interruptions) and the changing of violence norms in the area.¹²⁸ To engage in relationship building, the Cure Violence workers introduced clear messaging in the area, with the foundational idea that the organization was focused on anti-violence initiatives and not anti-drug or anti-extortion so as to not provoke retaliation.¹²⁹

Intervention

In February of 2013, the first on-site workers were hired with the adapted approach.¹³⁰ According to Guadalupe Cruz, Cure Violence and the local partner determined that hired individuals could not be former gang members, which differed from Cure Violence's traditional approach.¹³¹ This is because individuals are not able to voluntarily leave gangs in Honduras.¹³² There are only three exits for gang members: (1) joining the Church in an official capacity, (2) being killed, or (3) leaving the country.¹³³ Instead of former gang members, other respected individuals in the neighborhood who had the ability to reach gang members were hired. For example, older women who fed neighborhood children were viewed as trusted and credible individuals by gang members, and thus were hired.¹³⁴ In the initial implementation, only interrupters were hired, as the site lacked funding and resources to hire outreach workers.¹³⁵

The on-site workers were brought to Chicago, Cure Violence's headquarters, as part of their training to learn about the program and observe the model in action.¹³⁶ In March 2013, the interrupters had their first 80-hour training session, which included further introduction to the model, methods for changing behaviors and norms, building relationships with high-risk individuals, conflict mediation, risk reduction, and other planning and implementing topics, and detection of violent events.¹³⁷ Cure Violence conducted three additional 24-hour face-to-face training sessions, four sessions of training through Skype, and two one-day planning workshops.¹³⁸ Interrupters were taught personalized mediation tactics rather than the group interruption strategies used in the U.S. implementation, as personalized interruptions were deemed safer for interrupters due to pre-existing deep divisions between individuals in the community.¹³⁹

Full implementation began in April 2013¹⁴⁰ Two more targeted zones were added in January 2014 and another two were added in August 2014.¹⁴¹ These zones were identified as areas of implementation in Chamelecon.

In February 2015, senior members at Cure Violence returned to San Pedro Sula to carry out a third phase of training, focusing on aspects of participation and community mobilization to reinforce changing community norms.¹⁴²

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From 2013 to 2015, the on-site interrupters were able to mediate between 14 and 20 conflicts per month in the operational areas. Of the mediations, 16 percent had a high probability of leading to shootings or murder prior to interruptions, and 59 percent were highly likely to lead to a shooting or murder prior to interruptions. Often, interruptions were assisted by people directly involved in the conflict such as family or friends.

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In addition to interruptions and mediations, Cure Violence and the local partner led public trust campaigns to increase the credibility of the program in the community. Guadalupe Cruz described two campaigns led by the implementation site. One of the campaigns had workers placed in strategic locations to ensure safe travel for local students to and from school.¹⁴⁶ Another campaign was the building of street signs in the community to enable quicker emergency response by easing the communication of an individual's location.¹⁴⁷

Post-Intervention

An integral part of post-intervention is analyzing data on violence and crime; however, this information was difficult to obtain.¹⁴⁸ Therefore, data was collected and compiled by Cure Violence staff and verified by external outlets like individuals in the community, the news media, and other sources during the intervention phase to be analyzed during post-intervention.¹⁴⁹ From the data gathered by Cure Violence, the implementation sites led to an 88 percent reduction in shootings in 2014 and a 94 percent reduction of shootings in 2015.¹⁵⁰

Since the release of the 2017 internal report, “El Modelo Cure Violence: Reducción de la Violencia en San Pedro Sula (Honduras),” Cure Violence has partnered with Chemonics to continue the Honduras Program, and most recently partnered with UNICEF to expand their programming to include gender-based violence, school-violence, and femicide.¹⁵¹ Partnering with UNICEF has allowed for the hiring of outreach workers, which was previously not possible with the initial partners.¹⁵² In addition, Cure Violence workers have noticed an increase in domestic violence and child abuse, as more people are being forced to stay home because of COVID-19 restrictions.¹⁵³ With the recent UNICEF partnership, Cure Violence will hopefully have the means to address this emerging violence.

The Cure Violence Epidemic Control (Health) model has been successfully implemented nationally and internationally, receiving praise from external entities. In successfully implementing the model to a Central American context, specifically San Pedro Sula, Honduras, Cure Violence and its local partner made changes, perhaps the most significant being expanding the program's targeted demographic. The program also opted for a phased approach to implementation, utilized personal mediation tactics rather than group mediation, and decided not to employ former gang members as interrupters. Furthermore, the program also had to adapt in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. While different environments will demand original adaptations and innovations, the model has shown the potential for future successful implementation in the Northern Triangle.

Integrated Approach

Focused deterrence strategies aim to reduce violent crime by focusing intervention efforts on the most violent groups and locations. Group Violence Intervention, commonly known as the “Boston Ceasefire,” or Ceasefire model, is a focused deterrence strategy that begins with a data-driven analysis of gun violence to discover the groups that drive crime. Members of those groups are warned of the consequences of continuing to participate in or instigate violence and are introduced to support services, including counseling, to encourage the deterrence of perpetrating crime. Implementation of GVI has led to a 35 to 60 percent reduction in community homicides in Boston and a 50 percent reduction in the homicide rate between 2012 and 2018 in Oakland, California. In this section, we examine the process of adapting the GVI model to Oakland and Mexico City.

The GVI Model in the United States

Group Violence Intervention, or GVI, is a focused deterrence strategy designed to reduce homicide and gun violence, minimize harm to communities by replacing enforcement with deterrence, and to foster stronger relationships between law enforcement and the community.¹⁵⁴ GVI is an updated version of the evidence-based strategy that was first pioneered by David Kennedy, a leading criminologist and the Director of the National Network for Safe Communities, and his colleagues in Boston, Massachusetts with the deployment of “Operation Ceasefire” or Boston Ceasefire in 1996.¹⁵⁵ By focusing on gun trafficking, developing a special interagency focused deterrence response to gang violence, and a strong communication campaign, Operation Ceasefire in Boston demonstrated a 63 percent reduction in the mean monthly number of youth homicide victims and a 32 percent decrease in the monthly number of citywide shots-fired calls.¹⁵⁶

While GVI programs are known by different names in different cities where they are tailored to local conditions, all implementations of the model still preserve GVI’s core principles, like the prioritization of tackling violent crime and homicides and the establishment of partnerships with community members, law enforcement, and social services. Thus, contrary to the “broken windows” model that increases law enforcement presence, GVI favors counseling, fewer arrests, and obedience to the principles of procedural justice for law enforcement. Procedural justice refers to the fairness of legal processes and how people’s perception of this fairness relates to their overall experience with the justice system. These relations often connect to law enforcement procedures and behaviors. Yale Law School identifies four factors by which people base the procedural justice of their encounters with law enforcement. These include: (1) “whether they were treated with dignity and respect; (2) whether they were given voice; (3) whether the decision-maker was neutral and transparent; and (4) whether the decision-maker conveyed trustworthy motives.”¹⁵⁷

Any implementation of the model requires an initial gun violence assessment, examining historic to present-day data, and identifies individuals with risk factors for participating in violence, including: previous involvement in the criminal justice system, active gang membership, being a previous shooting victim, and/or having a loved one shot in the last twelve months.¹⁵⁸ Once those individuals have been identified by the program, human resource counselors will initiate communication and introduce support services, where individuals are connected with social workers and counselors.¹⁵⁹ This communication is different with each implementation. If individuals continue to participate in violence, then enforcement “levers” are utilized.¹⁶⁰ In the United States, levers are largely rooted in prosecutorial frameworks, like incarceration. That said,

it is important to note that the goal of Ceasefire is not to make arrests. In an interview with journalist Samantha Micheals following a visit to Oakland Ceasefire, the assistant police chief of Portland, Andrew Shearer, said: “You can’t arrest your way out of a problem. That’s something we really took away [from the visit to Oakland]”.¹⁶¹

Oakland, California

In 2012, Oakland was named the third most violent city in the United States.¹⁶² Oakland Ceasefire, the city’s adaptation of the GVI model, was initiated in late 2012 out of the efforts of the local clergy, particularly the Allen Temple Baptist Church, who rallied community support around the Ceasefire model and convinced then-Mayor Jean Quan to implement it.¹⁶³ To demonstrate the community’s support for a violence reduction program, the clergy organized “night walks” through an area known as “Murder Dubs,” and other areas that experience high homicide rates.¹⁶⁴ Until the COVID-19 crisis, the walks continued throughout Ceasefire’s programming, providing community members an opportunity to engage with each other and dissuade one another from participating in violence.

Oakland’s implementation of the Ceasefire model emphasized social services and mentorship while decreasing law enforcement presence. By the end of 2018, the annual shootings and homicide rate in Oakland were cut by nearly half from the 2011 statistics.¹⁶⁵ Additionally, according to a study conducted by Northeastern University, Oakland experienced an observed 43 percent reduction in gang shootings from 2013 to 2017.¹⁶⁶ Alongside this decrease in the homicide rate, use-of-force incidents and complaints against law enforcement also declined.¹⁶⁷

According to Guillermo Cespedes, the Chief of Violence Prevention for the city, three types of community actors are needed for Ceasefire’s success: law enforcement, community organizations, and moral voices in the community.¹⁶⁸ The moral voice of the community, Cespedes explained, can be a mother who has lost a family member and has become an activist, a respected member of the faith community, or a community organizer or a former group/gang member turned peacemaker.¹⁶⁹ As for community organization, 26 are grouped under the Oakland Unite banner, which provides city-government funding to local organizations, like YouthALIVE!, that focus on violence prevention and community healing.¹⁷⁰

Aligned with the focused deterrence strategy, the Oakland version of the program used data collection to center its efforts on the areas and groups most needing intervention assistance. Interagency collaboration between the police force and the government was critical to identifying the scope and nature of the violence. According to a senior member of the Oakland Police Department, Oakland used four methods of data gathering.¹⁷¹ First, law enforcement used ShotSpotter, a gunshot detection system that can detect 90 percent of shots in less than 60 seconds and provides location and time information.¹⁷² Second, intervention specialists and community members obtained information for Oakland Police Department (Oakland PD) to keep “scorecards” on gang activity, which includes information on the internal dynamics of the gangs, members, rivals, and other activities. Third, law enforcement monitored the National Integrated Ballistic Information Network, or NIBIN, an automated system that allows for the analysis of bullet casings and can provide further information on gang activities by linking various shootings based on bullet types.¹⁷³ Last, further data collection was facilitated through frequent meetings involving the executive team, investigators, street teams, the District Attorney’s office, external entities, crime labs, and other stakeholders.

Data that the Oakland PD collected to implement their strategy of focused deterrence included the age and ethnic makeup of participants of violence, the location of the violence, and the date and times that shootings took place. Essentially, they focused on gathering data to identify the areas and people who could benefit the most from violence intervention work. Resulting from these extensive assessments, Oakland Ceasefire officials realized that the majority of victims and perpetrators were not youth, as was expected, but individuals in their 30s.¹⁷⁴

Oakland Ceasefire then presents individuals with multiple risk factors for participating in violence with alternative life paths and warns them of the consequences of continuing on their current track.¹⁷⁵ It's important to note that Oakland Ceasefire used the data it collects with specificity; a senior member of the Oakland Police Force articulated that targeting entire communities and labeling them as “high-risk,”¹⁷⁶ is a poor strategy and only serves to perpetuate distrust in law enforcement.¹⁷⁷

Once identified, intervention begins. In Oakland, intervention took the form of call-ins and custom notifications. Call-in's gather multiple individuals needing intervention together in one room to hear from community members, clergy, law enforcement, and social service providers.¹⁷⁸ “At a standard call-in, invitees are alerted to their risk of becoming involved in gun violence as either a victim, a perpetrator, or both. These young men are assured that the community wants to see them alive and free, but that the shooting must stop and, if the violence continues, the law enforcement response will be swift.”¹⁷⁹ Custom notifications, in which individuals have a one-on-one conversation with a police officer and a clergy member and/or community organizer, were used in time-sensitive, high-threat of violence situations.¹⁸⁰

In addition to data gathering, Oakland's Ceasefire program focused on increasing trust between law enforcement and the community. Oakland PD had officers participate in procedural justice training and partnered with the Department of Racial Justice and Equity for further educational purposes. Community organizations were a central part of trust building, serving as the communication bridge between law enforcement officers and community members.¹⁸¹ The support of churches, which form the bedrock of support for communities of color in Oakland¹⁸², was critical to the successful implementation of Oakland Ceasefire. Their support of the initiative meant that the effort had a build-in connection with many members of the community.

International Implementation of the GVI Model

Mexico City, Mexico

The groundwork for implementation of the GVI model in Mexico City, Mexico began around May 2019. The program was led by Dr. Rodrigo Canales, an expert on organizational behavior and building effective policing in Mexico, the California Partnership for Safe Communities, under the direction of Vaughn Crandall and Reygan Cunningham, who played a key role in Oakland Ceasefire, the Secretariat of Citizen Security for Mexico City, and Mexico City's Ministry of Government.¹⁸³ At the present time, the implementing group is testing the program in Plateros, part of the Municipal Council of Alvaro Obregón, and an area of Mexico City approximately the size of Oakland, California, with hopes to expand the program citywide.¹⁸⁴ As Ceasefire Mexico City is a relatively young program, a comprehensive study to measure the effectiveness of the program has yet to be conducted; therefore, this report is not intended to be an evaluation of the

The study concluded that a majority of homicides in Plateros were not a direct result of large cartel activity, but rather the result of local gangs, and that the drivers of violence were men in their 30s motivated by retaliation.

success of the Ceasefire site, but rather an overview of the steps taken to ensure effective implementation thus far.

Pre-Analysis and Problem-Analysis

Pre-analysis, in which key actors are organized and partnerships with various government agencies, including the city's fiscalia (the Mexican equivalent of the District Attorney's office) lasted approximately 2 to 3 months.¹⁸⁵ Then, the team began the problem analysis

stage with a data-driven evaluation of crime in Mexico City, which yielded a similar result to its U.S. counterpart: the majority of crime is driven by a small number of local actors in specific times and specific places.¹⁸⁶ During the evaluation and throughout the implementing period, data collection was led by local actors, who provided the necessary local information and knowledge to map violence on a micro-level. The study concluded that a majority of homicides in Plateros were not a direct result of large cartel activity, but rather the result of local gangs, and that the drivers of violence were men in their 30s motivated by retaliation.¹⁸⁷

Following the evaluation study, the team identified eight locations controlled by identified local gangs out of the ten neighborhoods labeled "hotspots" of violence.¹⁸⁸ The team specifically chose locations where the violence was driven by local gangs to avoid dealing with extraneous variables in their first intervention.¹⁸⁹ To encourage community collaboration in the areas of operation, the team decided to rule out two locations of the aforementioned eight with the highest rates of violence.¹⁹⁰ Next, the implementation team examined other mitigating factors to narrow the pool of areas, including territorial characteristics, which left the team with three locations, two of which would receive programming and one of which would be the control. Additionally, the team took care to select areas where government officials were less likely to be accepting favors or other incentives from individuals participating in violence.¹⁹¹ This evaluation took approximately 2 to 3 months to complete.¹⁹²

Pilot Intervention

Following the pre- and problem- analysis stages, the team began to engage in "intervention efforts," which hinged on the success of the pre- and problem-analysis stages. Pilot intervention efforts in the targeted area took approximately one year to complete.¹⁹³

In its pilot intervention, Ceasefire Plateros leveraged its data on "hotspots" and individuals in need of services to strategically allocate intervention services, of which include pulling levers, the provision of specialized services, and direct communication with people at risk of perpetrating violence (call-in's and custom notifications).¹⁹⁴ Canales noted that custom notifications were preferred to call-in's as the direct, personal contact they facilitated were quicker, more effective, and required less logistical planning.¹⁹⁵

Part of this intervention effort included making usage of the "pulling levers" strategy successfully modeled in both Oakland and Boston. Levers can be used as an enforcement mechanism with the idea being that social services offer individuals multiple alternatives to violence and then, if they don't pursue non-violent alternatives, the government will pull enforcement "levers," like incarceration.¹⁹⁶ In addition to being an enforcement strategy, levers can also be a mechanism to

encourage individuals to engage in intervention services. The activation of the lever, like incarceration, against one individual in a criminal network, is also a demonstration for the surrounding individuals/network that law enforcement agencies are not afraid to take action to prevent violence.¹⁹⁷ In demonstrating to individuals partaking in violence that (a) violent behavior is being monitored by law enforcement, and (b) enforcement actions are being taken against those that participate in violent crime, Ceasefire aimed to deter individuals from engaging in violence and increase the attractiveness of participating in intervention services.

As part of Mexico City Ceasefire's intervention strategy in Plateros, three sets of social services were provided to encourage individuals not to partake in violent activity. The first service is known as SANAR, a hospital based violence intervention program.¹⁹⁸ SANAR was based on the idea that being a victim of a shooting or having a family member, who is a victim of a shooting, increases an individual's risk factor to perpetuate violence themselves.¹⁹⁹ As such, SANAR sent social workers to the hospital immediately following a shooting to provide support for the victim and their family; these social workers encouraged victims and their families not to engage in retributive violence. Such efforts, "generate a bond of trust to transmit the message of "non-violence", while at the same time providing opportunities for life, in order to avoid spirals and escalation of violence at the community level."²⁰⁰ To date, SANAR has directly supported 49 cases, including 56 direct and 118 indirect victims (mainly victims' relatives).²⁰¹ Of the 56 direct victims, 32 people were suffering from gun injuries and 24 are homicide victims.²⁰² SANAR also provides victims' families with social services. For example, the program provided the pregnant wife of a homicide victim obstetric care whilst the local hospital was overloaded due to COVID-19.²⁰³

SANAR is partially inspired by Glasswing International's Sanando Heridas program in El Salvador and other hospital-based violence intervention programs in the United States. Like SANAR, the program supports victims of crimes in the immediate aftermath of an incident and provides services, which emphasizes an anti-violence message. While Mexico City Ceasefire's hospital-based program has yet to be formally evaluated, the World Bank's Development Research Group found Glasswing International's version to have the capacity to prevent approximately 1,050 cases of interpersonal violence that require hospitalization in El Salvador.²⁰⁴ Lelys Dinarte, the lead researcher on the evaluation, is continuing to evaluate the program for its impact on participants' engagement in criminal activities.

The second social service provided as part of Ceasefire Mexico City's intervention strategy was known as "Phoenix," a CBT intervention based on REPENSAR that gives violent individuals or gang members the tools they need to develop a new way of thinking about disputes and conflict.²⁰⁵ REPENSAR, and by extent Phoenix, is based on Thinking for Change, a CBT intervention utilized in parts of the U.S. penitentiary system.²⁰⁶ Given that all of the social services programs within Ceasefire are connected, participants from SANAR are often sent to Phoenix's program.²⁰⁷

Lastly, the third source of social services was an "individualized mentoring program" modeled on a program that was used in Stockton and Oakland for the most at-risk individuals. According to Canales, for such individuals, the government "will fund a mentor who will work with [them] intensely for a number of months to help [them] redesign [their] life."²⁰⁸ In simple terms, it can be described as "life coaching". In selecting mentors, the team has avoided using the Ministry of Security for staff, as it is inherently connected to policing institutions. Instead, the team has looked towards the penitentiary system and Ministry of Government's staff to find mentors with the closest match to the skills needed for violence interruption staff. To be effective, these mentors

must be paid, raising funding issues: Ceasefire functions best as a long-term solution, however, funding often operates on a short time basis.²⁰⁹

The Ceasefire program is supported by a “mesa de apoyo” (support group) that includes Mexico City’s Ministry of Government as well as private and civil organizations. If necessary, the Ceasefire program can tap this network to provide at-risk individuals with additional services on an as-needed basis.²¹⁰ To date, Ceasefire has carried out one relocation for an individual at risk of both perpetrating and being victimized by violence.²¹¹ Relocations, according to Pablo Vasquez, the Assistant Secretary of Citizen Participation and Crime Prevention for the Mexican government, are not easy to carry out, particularly in Mexico. This is due, in part, to the fact that relocations require the Ceasefire team to find a place with occupational opportunity and the presence of a support network for the relocated person.²¹² The team often works with both the Catholic and Evangelical church to assist with individual relocations.²¹³ However, as opposed to the grassroots implementation of Ceasefire with the Allen Temple Baptist Church in Oakland, the involvement of religious organizations in Ceasefire Mexico City has largely been a top-down approach.

Transforming Law Enforcement

The core part of the model’s success was a transformation of how law enforcement conducts themselves and thinks about violence.²¹⁴ To transform law enforcement’s understanding of what shapes violence, data analysis is critical; in the case of Mexico City, it demonstrated that men who perpetuate violence often do so as a method of retaliation after being victimized themselves. “[In many cases of gun violence] there’s no difference between victims and perpetrators,” explained Canales. “This is just a cycle of violence where victims become perpetrators who create victims who become perpetrators and so forth and so on so it’s a never-ending cycle of victimization. For law enforcement, this was a radical change in thinking: “Now you’re not thinking about criminals, you’re thinking about potential victims who you need to protect.”²¹⁵

Implementing the principles of procedural justice within law enforcement was essential to building trust between the community and law enforcement and stopping the cycle of retaliatory violence as well.²¹⁶ When individuals do not trust law enforcement to perform their duties in a manner that

When individuals do not trust law enforcement to perform their duties in a manner that is procedurally just, they will not seek assistance from law enforcement and will instead implement justice themselves.

is procedurally just, they will not seek assistance from law enforcement and will instead implement justice themselves.²¹⁷ The transformation of police departments to being procedurally just can be thought of as a shift towards thinking of the citizen as the customer.²¹⁸ Demonstrating competence is a crucial component to this transformation. Merely having an attentive and present individual from law enforcement following a shooting can demonstrate respect.²¹⁹

All law enforcement agents that operated in Ceasefire programming areas in Mexico City received procedural justice training.²²⁰ Canales hopes that eventually procedural justice principles will be implemented as an “organizational framework” that determines how law enforcement members are evaluated and recruited.²²¹ For example, cops are currently often promoted in accordance with how many arrests they make per diem, a policy that contradicts procedural justice’s citizen-focused ethos.²²² With procedural justice as an organizing framework, officers would be promoted based on the level of trust the community has in them.²²³

Several challenges arose in initiating the model in Mexico City, including the organizational differences between the United States and the Mexican government and the high levels of systemic police corruption in Mexico, particularly in Mexico City.²²⁴ A 2017 survey conducted by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography found that Mexico City has the highest level of corruption cases per police officer in the country, with 4,467 incidents of corruption per 1,000 police officers.²²⁵ Crandall and Canales also noted that differences in the institutional “levers,” which exist to dissuade individuals from participating in violence and also penalize them if they do engage in violence after intervention, challenged implementation in Mexico. In the United States, the prosecutorial system, which includes parole, probation, and incarceration, is utilized as the main “lever” in Ceasefire. In Mexico, says Canales, the “levers that you kind of take for granted in the US are not as reliable or as equally present in Mexico.”²²⁶ As a result, the Ceasefire implementers in Mexico are considering the usage of other types of available administrative “levers” to make individuals engaging in violence aware that the legal system is monitoring their behavior. For example, the program could demonstrate to an individual that he or she is being monitored by law enforcement and the government due to participation in violent groups by notifying said individual of his or her unpaid taxes or violations of business codes as a means of signalling governmental observation.²²⁷ It is important to note that the program is only considering the implementation of levers and has not taken action to include them in the program's strategy yet.

Crandall also added that the decentralization of law enforcement structures proved challenging, as only the fiscalia, not the police, are allowed to actively investigate crimes,²²⁸ and the Ministry of Citizen Security cannot arrest an individual or file charges without direction from the fiscalia. This makes it difficult to prioritize cases for prosecution, which subsequently impedes law enforcement from efficiently stopping violent individuals from perpetrating crimes.

Ceasefire Mexico City has largely faced challenges due to its unprecedented nature in Mexico. According to Canales, “This idea [of Ceasefire] -- that you are going to focus attention on the most violent people and that you are going to truly understand what their situation and their needs are and that you are going to truly design a set of services for them...is unprecedented.”²²⁹ Owing to this, the social services infrastructure present in U.S. implementations of the model with organizations like Oakland Unite, for example, largely do not exist in Plateros. Mexico City Ceasefire also does not utilize violence interrupters (authentic messengers, like former gang members, who try to prevent violence on the ground) as there is not yet an institutionalized process with which to scale a program like that.²³⁰

A 2013 International Drug Policy Consortium report by Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown further illustrates potential limitations to the application of a focused deterrence strategy in Mexico.²³¹ Felbab-Brown argued that the pervasiveness of corruption among state agencies in Mexico creates a conflict of interest for a focused deterrence strategy as those in power promoting non-violence are, if corrupt, also the ones instigating it, damaging the credibility of a focused deterrence system. Felbab-Brown’s assessment spoke to the importance of Canales’ comments on the importance of transforming how law enforcement operates to dismantle perpetual corruption. It is important to note that Felbab-Brown’s study concentrated on the application of focused deterrence strategies on large actors that perpetuate violence rather than local level groups. Felbab Brown’s study also demonstrated the importance of inter-agency collaboration, which increases accountability among agencies and decreases the possibility for corruption.

In light of the shutdowns prompted by the COVID-19 pandemic, the shooting review meeting that typically happens weekly within the Ceasefire model has been replaced by a “hub and spoke model,” wherein the leader of the Ceasefire unit collects information from individual team members and then shares it amongst the team members.²³² However, despite the pandemic, the field work and social service provisions adjacent to Ceasefire have continued. Although new safety guidelines are in place and protective gear is provided to law enforcement, hospital staff, and other essential workers, the field work of Ceasefire remains largely the same.²³³

Concluding Thoughts

In featuring the cognitive behavioral therapy model, the community approach, and the integrated approach, we hope to promote more holistic, effective, and enduring solutions for combating and preventing collective violence, or the “instrumental use of violence by people who identify themselves as members of a group.”²³⁴ According to the World Health Organization, collective violence often arises from the “grossly unequal distribution of resources, particularly health and education services, and of access to these resources and to political power.”²³⁵ Thus, as this inequality contributes to collective violence, potential solutions to address this type of violence should not come at the expense of additional support for vulnerable groups.

Exploring preventative and responsive anti-violence models presents two vital takeaways for success that could further benefit implementation of the models in Mexico and countries in the

Exploring preventative and responsive anti-violence models presents two vital takeaways for success that could further benefit implementation of the models in Mexico and countries in the Northern Triangle: the tremendous importance of building trust in operational communities and the need to adapt implementation to reflect unique characteristics of local settings.

Northern Triangle: the tremendous importance of building trust in operational communities and the need to adapt implementation to reflect unique characteristics of local settings. The authors believe that these takeaways can lead to additional effective implementation of the models in other international locations and other U.S. implementation endeavors.

The Importance of Trust

In the three anti-violence models explored in this report, trust between the community and program implementers and practitioners played a critical role in the success of the initiative. The implementation of U.S. based anti-violence models in Mexico and the Northern Triangle predominantly rely on collaborating with local organizations and entities, such as religious groups, who

possess pre-existing trust with the community, enabling the U.S. based models to have access and insight to the community’s cultural dynamics. That is to say that U.S. models, which were designed with U.S. infrastructure, legal systems, and values in mind depend on local knowledge and expertise in Mexico, Honduras, and El Salvador to effectively address the different cultures, society and other relevant phenomena in each implementation site.

Capitalization on pre-existing trust was observed in most of the implementation sites examined in this report. In San Pedro Sula, the Cure Violence implementation team was aware of the influential

role that religion plays in Honduran culture from the team’s initial visits and sought to strengthen the credibility of the program by partnering with a local church. The partnership provided many credible interrupters while also facilitating program implementers’ accessibility to a previously unattainable community.

In the Ceasefire implementation in Mexico City, the implementation was led by local community actors, namely, local law enforcement and the city’s Secretariat of Citizen Security with Dr. Rodrigo Canales and the California Partnership for Safe Communities giving them technical support, like methodological guidance, to structure analysis and intervention efforts.²³⁶

Unlike the Cure Violence and Ceasefire implementation sites, Glasswing International and Catholic Relief Services relied on the building and earning the trust of the site communities by training local actors and focusing on human capacity building. In Salvadoran schools, Glasswing International’s youth guides had to possess the necessary attributes and characteristics to engage with the participating youth and build a rapport, without the understood facets of pre-existing trust. In addition, by allowing students to play an integral role in the youth guide selection process, further organic trust was earned through collaboration with the participants. Glasswing International also made an effort to include school administrators and parents in the process, which helped build trust with external individuals to the programs. In the CBT implementation in Salvadoran prisons, CRS facilitators were able to facilitate trust by offering continued support and services and providing learning and employment opportunities to the participants. In addition, CRS established relationships with not only inmates, but also, their families, local business leaders, prison guards, multidisciplinary prison teams, correctional leadership, the Ministry of Security and Justice, and U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs to encourage further trust and credibility building. Establishment of these relationships required continued listening and communication and efficient response to all concerns and constraints, while still maintaining a strong commitment to the program participants.

By integrating various forms of trust into anti-violence implementations in Honduras, El Salvador, and Mexico, the U.S. based models adapted to different circumstances that differ significantly

These findings strongly suggest that analyzing the dynamics of trust and the various tactics used to maximize the effects can be helpful when implementing these U.S. based models to other international sites in Mexico, El Salvador, and Honduras, and/or to sites in other countries.

from what they had experienced at U.S. implementation sites. These findings strongly suggest that analyzing the dynamics of trust and the various tactics used to maximize the effects can be helpful when implementing these U.S. based models to other international sites in Mexico, El Salvador, and Honduras, and/or to sites in other countries.

Addressing Implementation Settings

The second key takeaway from these examples is the need to give serious consideration to the settings and environments in which the models will be implemented, especially community relations to local law enforcement, accessibility to qualified personnel and various governmental bureaucratic systems and services, and gender dynamics.

Possessing a deep understanding of the community’s relationship with law enforcement is vital to program implementation, notably for implementation of the Ceasefire model. The Group Violence Intervention model, or Ceasefire, requires coordination between government entities and law enforcement. Because the model is dependent on law enforcement execution of focused deterrence, it was imperative that steps be taken to ensure that law enforcement officials would conduct themselves ethically in order to produce decreases in arrest and incarceration rates. As Ceasefire programming requires extensive collaboration with the local government, it is arguably the most challenging program to implement internationally, as systems of governance and their effectiveness vary greatly. The model, which was developed in Boston, is heavily oriented to adhere to a U.S. government structure or ecosystem, which is not always possible to apply to international implementation sites as they may have significantly different systems of governance, rule of law practices, and rates of corruption. For example, in the United States the “levers” used to penalize or deter violence are largely rooted in relatively effective prosecutorial systems: criminal sentencing, parole, and probation. In Mexico, for example, these systems can be unreliable, forcing implementers of Ceasefire in Mexico City to consider the need for administrative levers, like asking for unpaid taxes from individuals engaging in violent activity as a message that they are being monitored by law enforcement for their violent behavior. That said, Canales ultimately recommends against using administrative levers.²³⁷ Prosecutorial levers, like parole, are clearly linked as a consequence of participating in violence in official government policy, and their usage does not imply that the government is engaging in random retaliatory behavior.²³⁸ Administrative levers, on the other hand, like asking for back-pay on child support as a consequence of violent behavior, are not spelled out as a consequence for engaging in violence in the legal code.²³⁹

As cognitive behavioral therapy does not involve law enforcement agencies, model adaptation to implementation settings included different changes in El Salvador than the Group Violence Intervention model. Glasswing International and CRS had to address access to qualified personnel, or at least defined by the BAM implementation of CBT. In Chicago, BAM relies on facilitators who possess doctorates or master’s degrees in psychology or social work. Instead, in Central America, CRS and Glasswing put their facilitators through a rigorous certification process to implement the CBT program. Although these individuals do not have the same educational background as their U.S. counterparts, the facilitators possess important social and cultural knowledge that makes them effective in their communities. Understanding the workforce dynamics and availability of the implementation areas was crucial to making the necessary changes to the models to yield successful operational results, and should be considered in any application of international models.

It is also important to consider the gender dimensions of collective violence. Women, despite being both victims and perpetrators of violence, are often absent in the field of criminology. CBT and Cure Violence implementation in these settings have worked to address women’s involvement and experiences with violence. In implementing CBT in Salvadoran schools and prisons, the curriculum addresses both men and women, as both genders experience violence. However, in adapting CBT to the prison populations, the program is primarily implemented in male prison facilities. Expanding the opportunity and access to rehabilitation and reintegration

It is also important to consider the gender dimensions of collective violence.

programs to more women prisoners would promote further security and hopefully decrease recidivism and reoffending rates for them. Cure Violence addresses gender in the San Pedro Sula site by relying on well-respected women in the community performing the role of “interrupters,” as they are seen as authentic messengers. In addition, Cure Violence has expanded programming to intervene in gender-based violence as well.

Ultimately, emphasizing the need for sustained trust and adapting implementation for key differences in the operational areas underscores the need to adjust long term violence reduction models to meet the needs of local beneficiaries to achieve successful results. Sustained funding and support for organizations working in this medium is critical, as many practitioners interviewed stressed that these factors remain vital to program longevity and overall effectiveness.

With the research included in this report, the authors believe that further research requires more input directly from the program participants. Having access to the personal experiences and outcomes of program participants can provide continued insight on how U.S. anti-violence models can adjust to yield further reductions in group violence and subsequently, long lasting impacts in the region.

Appendix I: List of Interviews

Title	Organization
Vice President of Programs	Glasswing International
Education Programs Director	Glasswing International
Youth Employability Advisor, Latin America And the Caribbean	Catholic Relief Services
Vice President for Partnerships and Strategy	Cure Violence
National and International Program Specialist and Trainer	Cure Violence
International Program Specialist	Cure Violence
International Training Director	Cure Violence
Executive Director	National Network for Safe Communities
Executive Director	National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform
Police Chief	Oakland Police Department
Chief of Violence Prevention	City of Oakland
Sub Secretary of Citizen Participation and Crime Prevention	Mexico City’s Bureau of Citizen Security
Associate Professor of Organizational Behavior	Yale University
Co-Director	California Partnership for Safe Communities
Executive Director	Southern California Crossroads

Academic Coordinator	Diálogos
Program Officer	Open Society Foundation
Community Outreach Coordinator	Community & Youth Outreach

Appendix II: Excerpt

The authors of the report have included the executive summary and a list of interviewees of Lessons Learned: Anti-Gang Initiatives in the United States for contextualization purposes.

Executive Summary

American University’s Countering Gang Violence Task Force identified and investigated successful examples and best practices of local efforts to deal with gang violence across the United States at the request of the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL). This project is part of American University’s Diplomacy Lab program that the U.S. Department of State organizes with U.S. universities and colleges.

In identifying successful initiatives, the Task Force used a variety of indicators of success including internal and external measurements. Internal measurements included data collection such as the reduction in gang-related crimes (i.e. homicide rate, violent arrests, home invasions, assault, and petty crime) and school-related success data (i.e. graduation rate and grade improvements). External measurements included outside evaluations and recognition by respected institutions and associations, university centers, and academics. Apart from quantitative measurements, many community-based organizations rely on qualitative data such as surveys, participant interviews, focus groups, and allocation of funding.

Based on the range of data, research and interviews conducted, the Task Force identified the following as best practices for gang violence reduction and prevention throughout the U.S.:

- (1) Community Collaboration;
- (2) Building Trust;
- (3) Focused Deterrence;
- (4) Extracurricular Programming;

Based on its research, the Task Force identified best practices and effective programming strategies for gang reduction efforts in the United States that have the potential for implementation in Central America.



Lists of Interview

Title	Organization
Executive Director	National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform
Staff Coordinator	Drug Enforcement Administration
Director and Senior Fellow	Council on Criminal Justice
Special Agent	Federal Bureau of Investigation North Shore Gang Task Force
Program Director	Gang Resistance Education and Training
Communications Officer	UTEC
Police Chief	Lawrence Police Department
Police Officer	Elgin Police Department
Senior Research Associate	Institute for Intergovernmental Research, National Gang Center
Vice President for Partnerships and Strategy	Cure Violence
Judge	Circuit Court of Cook County
Judge (ret.)	Circuit Court of Cook County
Deputy Chief	Cook County Sheriff's Office Gang Unit
Associate Director	University of Chicago Crime Lab
Sergeant	Metropolitan Police Department of Nashville & Davis County Gang Unit
Director	MetroPeace
Director	National Network for Safe Communities
Director	Northern Virginia Regional Gang Task Force
Director of Citizen Security Practice Area	Creative Associates
Director	High Point Community Against Violence
Gang Prevention & Intervention Coordinator	Alexandria Gang Prevention Community Task Force
Executive Director	Taller Salud
Program Director	Choose Gang Free
Gang Prevention Specialist	Salt Lake City Police Department
Police Chief	Oakland Police Department
Lead Violence Interrupter	YouthALIVE!

Chief of Violence Prevention	City of Oakland
Regional Program Coordinator	Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program
Police Officer	Gang and Narcotics Division, Los Angeles Police Department
Director	Teens on Target
Community Outreach Coordinator	Community & Youth Outreach
Sergeant	Gun Violence Reduction Team
Youth Participants (1, 2, 3)	Teens on Target

Acknowledgements

The authors thank Ambassador Earl Anthony “Tony” Wayne (ret.) and Ricardo Zúñiga of the U.S. Department of State for providing unprecedented insight and guidance, Director Cynthia Arnson for the opportunity to publish, and the original members of the Countering Gang Violence Task Force for their individual contributions to the initial report. We would also like to extend a huge thank you to all of our interviewees for their time in working with us and commitment to creating a safer society.

Resources

To learn more about the Latin American Program, including its work on citizen security and on Central America, click [here](#). The authors would especially like to draw attention to Tani Marilena Adams’ report, “[How Chronic Violence Affects Human Development, Social Relations, and the Practice of Citizenship: A Systemic Framework for Action.](#)”

¹ “Victims of Intentional Homicide, 1990-2018,” UNODC, October 15, 2020, <https://dataunodc.un.org/content/data/homicide/homicide-rate>. The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) annually collects intentional homicide rates for the United Nations Crime Trends Survey (UN-CTS) from national authorities and other reliable sources.

² UNODC defines “homicide” as “unlawful death inflicted upon a person with the intent to cause death or serious injury.” UNODC, *International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes Version 1.0*, 2015, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime/ICCS/ICCS_English_2016_web.pdf. UNODC defines “homicide” as “unlawful death inflicted upon a person with the intent to cause death or serious injury.” UNODC, *Global Study on Homicide 2019: Booklet 1*, 2019, <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/global-study-on-homicide.html>, 7. UNODC specifies “intentional homicide” as “the complete liability of the perpetrator, which differentiates it from killings related to armed conflict and war, self-inflicted death (suicide), killings due to legal interventions and justifiable homicide (such as self-defence), and from deaths caused by reckless or negligent actions, which were not intended to take a human life (non-intentional homicide).”

³ UNODC, *Global Study on Homicide 2019: Booklet 1*, 2019, <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/global-study-on-homicide.html>, 1. The UN’s Sustainable Development Goal 16 is to significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates by 2030.

⁴ We rely on the most recently available data from the UNODC database (2018). Data from 2019 and 2020 is not yet available. UNODC, *Global Study on Homicide 2019: Booklet 2*, 2019, <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/global-study-on-homicide.html>, 17.

⁵ This report is an extension of *Lessons Learned: Anti-Gang Initiatives in the United States* prepared by Sophie Goguichvili, Alexia Gardner, Andrea Kim, Annabronia Ospeck, Alyson Woolley, Diana Roy, Joseph Marquez Machado, Kacie Sampson, and Samantha Romano, under the direction of Ambassador Earl Anthony Wayne (ret.), for the U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs in conjunction with American University Diplomacy Lab Program. Executive Summary of the report and a list of interviews for that report can be found in Appendix II.

⁶ Robert Muggah and Katherine Aguirre Tobón, “Citizen Security in Latin America: Facts and Figures,” Igarapé Institute, Strategic Paper 33, April 2018, <https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Citizen-Security-in-Latin-America-Facts-and-Figures.pdf>, 2-8. According to a report by the Igarapé Institute, Latin America accounts for only 8 percent of the world’s population, and yet 33 percent of global homicides occur within its jurisdiction. Of the homicides in Latin America, 26 percent are estimated to be the result of gang-related violence.

⁷ Maria De Jesus and Carissa Hernandez, “Generalized Violence as a Threat to Health and Well-Being: A Qualitative Study of Youth Living in Urban Settings in Central America’s “Northern Triangle,”” *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health* 16, no. 18 (September 2018), <https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16183465>, 1.

⁸ WHO, “World Report on Violence and Health,” edited by Etienne G. Krug, Linda L. Dahlberg, James A. Mercy, Anthony B. Zwi and Rafael Lozano, Geneva, 2002, http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2002/9241545615_eng.pdf?ua=1, 215.

⁹ While CBT and the community approach address violence more broadly, because of the nature of the violence that occurs in the Northern Triangle and Mexico, our analysis indicates that the programs will sometimes indirectly address gang affected and involved individuals and related types of violence.

¹⁰ Thomas Abt and Christopher Winship, “What Works in Reducing Community Violence: A Meta-Review and Field Study of the Northern Triangle,” United States Agency for International Development, February 2016, <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/USAID-2016-What-Works-in-Reducing-Community-Violence-Final-Report.pdf>, 12.

¹¹ Thomas Abt and Christopher Winship, “What Works in Reducing Community Violence: A Meta-Review and Field Study of the Northern Triangle,” United States Agency for International Development, February 2016, <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/USAID-2016-What-Works-in-Reducing-Community-Violence-Final-Report.pdf>, 14.

¹² *Ibid*, 21.

¹³ *Ibid*, 14.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 22.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 22.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, 22.

¹⁷ “What Works in Reducing Community Violence: Spotlight on Central America and Mexico,” (Lecture, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., February 22, 2016.), <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/what-works-reducing-community-violence-spotlight-central-america-and-mexico>, 1:16:36.

¹⁸ Ulrich Boser, “Rewriting Chicago’s Violent Narrative with Youth Counseling,” *The Atlantic*, July 13, 2017, <https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/06/inside-the-youth-counseling-program-helping-curb-chicagos-violence/529980/>.

¹⁹ “BAM® – Becoming A Man,” Youth Guidance, accessed April 25, 2020, <https://youth-guidance.org/bam/>.

²⁰ Thomas Abt and Christopher Winship, “What Works in Reducing Community Violence: A Meta-Review and Field Study of the Northern Triangle,” United States Agency for International Development, February 2016, <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/USAID-2016-What-Works-in-Reducing-Community-Violence-Final-Report.pdf>, 24.

²¹ “What Works in Reducing Community Violence: Spotlight on Central America and Mexico,” (Lecture, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., February 22, 2016.) <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/what-works-reducing-community-violence-spotlight-central-america-and-mexico>, 1:16:36.

²² *Ibid*, 1:16:36.

²³ *Ibid*, 1:20:00.

²⁴ Ulrich Boser, “Rewriting Chicago’s Violent Narrative With Youth Counseling,” *The Atlantic*, June 13, 2017, <https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/06/inside-the-youth-counseling-program-helping-curb-chicagos-violence/529980/>.

²⁵ Thomas Abt and Christopher Winship, “What Works in Reducing Community Violence: A Meta-Review and Field Study of the Northern Triangle,” United States Agency for International Development, February 2016,

<https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/USAID-2016-What-Works-in-Reducing-Community-Violence-Final-Report.pdf>, 23.

²⁶ Ibid, 22.

²⁷ Ibid, 22.

²⁸ Ibid, 23.

²⁹ “BAM® – Becoming A Man,” Youth Guidance, accessed April 25, 2020, <https://youth-guidance.org/bam/>.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Katharine “Kay” Andrade-Eekhoff, email to authors, December 15, 2020.

³² “Cognitive Behavioral Therapy Informed Curriculum,” Catholic Relief Services, https://www.crs.org/sites/default/files/tools-research/cbtonepagerenglish_1.pdf, 2019.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Katharine “Kay” Andrade-Eekhoff, email to authors, December 15, 2020.

³⁵ “Cognitive Behavioral Therapy Informed Curriculum,” Catholic Relief Services, https://www.crs.org/sites/default/files/tools-research/cbtonepagerenglish_1.pdf, 2019.

³⁶ Katharine “Kay” Andrade-Eekhoff, interview by Alexia Gardner and Diana Roy, informal interview, video conference, August, 4, 2020.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ “Cognitive Behavioral Therapy Informed Curriculum,” Catholic Relief Services, https://www.crs.org/sites/default/files/tools-research/cbtonepagerenglish_1.pdf, 2019.

³⁹ Katharine “Kay” Andrade-Eekhoff, interview by Alexia Gardner and Diana Roy, informal interview, video conference, August, 4, 2020.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Katharine “Kay” Andrade-Eekhoff, email to authors, December 15, 2020.

⁴² Katharine “Kay” Andrade-Eekhoff, interview by Alexia Gardner and Diana Roy, informal interview, video conference, August, 4, 2020.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Teresa Welsh, “Data before scale: Glasswing awaits Salvadoran behavior therapy results,” Devex, November 23, 2018, <https://www.devex.com/news/data-before-scale-glasswing-awaits-salvadoran-behavior-therapy-results-93806>.

⁴⁵ “Capacity Statement,” Glasswing International, 2.

⁴⁶ “The Pontifical Catholic University of Chile conducts a rigorous study of Glasswing International’s Community Schools,” Glasswing International, July 2017, <https://glasswing.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Chile-Study-4-Page.pdf>.

⁴⁷ Maritza Trejo, interview by Alexia Gardner and Andrea Kim, informal interview, video conference, October 27, 2020.

⁴⁸ Lelys Dinarte and Pablo Egana-delSol, “Preventing Violence in the Most Violent Contexts: Behavioral and Neurophysiological Evidence,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 8862 (May 2019), <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/31744>, 9.

⁴⁹ Maritza Trejo, interview by Alexia Gardner and Andrea Kim, informal interview, video conference, October 27, 2020.

⁵⁰ Katharine “Kay” Andrade-Eekhoff, email to authors, December 15, 2020.

⁵¹ Lelys Dinarte and Pablo Egana-delSol, “Preventing Violence in the Most Violent Contexts: Behavioral and Neurophysiological Evidence,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 8862 (May 2019), <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/31744>, 4.

⁵² Maritza Trejo, interview by Alexia Gardner and Andrea Kim, informal interview, video conference, October 27, 2020.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ “Why Calm Classroom,” Calm Classroom, accessed October 28, 2020, <https://calmclassroom.com/>.

⁵⁵ Lelys Dinarte and Pablo Egana-delSol, “Preventing Violence in the Most Violent Contexts: Behavioral and Neurophysiological Evidence,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 8862 (May 2019), <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/31744>, 9.

⁵⁶ Maritza Trejo, interview by Alexia Gardner and Andrea Kim, informal interview, video conference, October 27, 2020.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

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- ⁶⁰ Teresa Welsh, “Data before scale: Glasswing awaits Salvadoran behavior therapy results,” Devex, November 23, 2018, <https://www.devex.com/news/data-before-scale-glasswing-awaits-salvadoran-behavior-therapy-results-93806>.
- ⁶¹ Maritza Trejo, interview by Alexia Gardner and Andrea Kim, informal interview, video conference, October 27, 2020.
- ⁶² Ibid.
- ⁶³ “Capacity Statement,” Glasswing International, 3.
- ⁶⁴ Ibid, 3.
- ⁶⁵ Maritza Trejo, interview by Alexia Gardner and Andrea Kim, informal interview, video conference, October 27, 2020.
- ⁶⁶ “What we do,” Catholic Relief Services, accessed September 22, 2020, <https://www.crs.org/our-work-overseas/program-areas/youth/youth-employment/youth-build>.
- ⁶⁷ Katharine “Kay” Andrade-Eekhoff, interview by Alexia Gardner and Diana Roy, informal interview, video Conference, August, 4, 2020.
- ⁶⁸ Kevin C. Rhoades, Bishop, “With Catholic Relief Services in El Salvador Part 2,” *Today’s Catholic*, February 11, 2020, <https://todayscatholic.org/with-catholic-relief-services-in-el-salvador/>.
- ⁶⁹ Katharine “Kay” Andrade-Eekhoff, email to authors, December 15, 2020.
- ⁷⁰ Ibid.
- ⁷¹ Ibid.
- ⁷² Ibid.
- ⁷³ Rosa Anaya, “Segundas Oportunidades: Rehabilitación y Reinserción con apoyo del sector privado en El Salvador,” interviewed by Marta Flores, *Entrevista*, 2018, <https://www.lamjol.info/index.php/reuca/article/view/6110/5830>. “Identificación y Selección: Se aplican diferentes herramientas psicométricas a las PDDL, y se identifican potenciales empleadores. Formación /Transformación: Se llevan a cabo los programas Cultura de Paz, Estoy dispuesto, Soy Autor, Familias Fuertes, Cantando a los Leones, Técnicas de Facilitación, y Habilidades para el Trabajo. Transición: se prepara a la persona para que realice su plan de vida en función de su salida del centro penitenciario y se le da apoyo legal. Reinserción: Se busca que la persona pueda insertarse a la vida laboral, familiar, educativa y social. Gestión Empresarial Inclusiva: Se busca un acercamiento con la empresa que acoge a la persona del programa “Segundas Oportunidades”, para mejorar el clima organizacional con liderazgos positivos. Seguimiento: Se les provee de una red de apoyo, mentoría, manejo de casos, apoyo psicosocial, actividades artístico deportivas.”
- ⁷⁴ Rosa Anaya, “Segundas Oportunidades: Rehabilitación y Reinserción con apoyo del sector privado en El Salvador,” interviewed by Marta Flores, *Entrevista*, 2018, <https://www.lamjol.info/index.php/reuca/article/view/6110/5830>. “El reto de insertar a personas con experiencias de vida difíciles y con características sociales y demográficas diversas. En el marco del programa “Segundas Oportunidades”, se propone el desarrollo de eventos de Reflexión con Empresarios y Dirigentes empresariales al más alto nivel, para crear conciencia y tomar acción en la adopción de modelos de gestión que brinden oportunidades laborales, de formación y desarrollo humano en las empresas que dirigen, es importante que dichos espacios cuenten con actores con credibilidad que permita un intercambio de ideas sobre el tema de rehabilitación de una manera creativa y no convencional.”
- ⁷⁵ “Metodología ¡Estoy DISPUESTO! En Centros Penales,” Catholic Relief Services, 2020.
- ⁷⁶ Ibid.
- ⁷⁷ Kevin C. Rhoades, Bishop, “With Catholic Relief Services in El Salvador Part 2,” *Today’s Catholic*, February 11, 2020, <https://todayscatholic.org/with-catholic-relief-services-in-el-salvador/>.
- ⁷⁸ Ibid.
- ⁷⁹ Katharine “Kay” Andrade-Eekhoff, email to authors, December 15, 2020.
- ⁸⁰ Ibid.
- ⁸¹ Gary Slutkin, “Let’s treat violence like a contagious disease,” October 10, 2013, TEDMED, Washington, D.C., YouTube, 13:56, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CZNRozgNWf4>, 0:20.
- ⁸² Ibid, 5:25.
- ⁸³ Ibid, 6:00.
- ⁸⁴ Ibid, 8:57.
- ⁸⁵ “Where We Work,” Cure Violence, accessed July 7, 2020, <https://cvg.org/where-we-work/>.
- ⁸⁶ “The 5 Required Components of Cure Violence,” Cure Violence, December 2019, <https://1vp6u534z5kr2qmr0w11t7ub-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/2019.12.12-Cure-Violence-Criteria.pdf>.
- ⁸⁷ Ibid.

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- ⁸⁸ Ibid.
- ⁸⁹ Jeffrey A. Butts et al. “Cure Violence: A Public Health Model to Reduce Gun Violence,” *Annual Review of Public Health* 36 (2015): 39-53, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-031914-122509>, 40.
- ⁹⁰ Ibid, 41.
- ⁹¹ Ibid, 41.
- ⁹² Ibid, 41.
- ⁹³ Gary Slutkin, “Let’s treat violence like a contagious disease,” October 10, 2013, TEDMED, Washington, D.C., YouTube, 13:56, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CZNRozgNWf4>, 8:42.
- ⁹⁴ Jeffrey A. Butts et al., “Cure Violence: A Public Health Model to Reduce Gun Violence,” *Annual Review of Public Health* 36 (2015): 39-53, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-031914-122509>, 42.
- ⁹⁵ Ibid, 42.
- ⁹⁶ Ibid, 40.
- ⁹⁷ Ibid, 42.
- ⁹⁸ Guadalupe Cruz, interview by Annabronia Ospeck and Andrea Kim, informal interview, phone, July 15, 2020.
- ⁹⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁰ “We Can Cure Violence,” Cure Violence, March 2020, https://cvg.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/CV_International_v18_Eng.pdf.
- ¹⁰¹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰² “We Can Cure Violence,” Cure Violence, March 2020, https://cvg.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/CV_International_v18_Eng.pdf.
- ¹⁰³ Michael “Mikey” Davis, interview by Annabronia Ospeck and Andrea Kim, informal interview, phone, June 30, 2020.
- ¹⁰⁴ Gary Slutkin, “Let’s treat violence like a contagious disease,” October 10, 2013, TEDMED, Washington, D.C., YouTube, 13:56, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CZNRozgNWf4>, 11:35.
- ¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 12:22.
- ¹⁰⁶ Karen Volker, interview by Annabronia Ospeck, Andrea Kim, and Diana Roy, informal interview, video conference, June 24, 2020.
- ¹⁰⁷ Guadalupe Cruz, interview by Annabronia Ospeck and Andrea Kim, informal interview, phone, July 15, 2020.
- ¹⁰⁸ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁹ Michael “Mikey” Davis, interview by Annabronia Ospeck and Andrea Kim, informal interview, phone, June 30, 2020.
- ¹¹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹¹¹ Guadalupe Cruz, interview by Annabronia Ospeck and Andrea Kim, informal interview, phone, July 15, 2020.
- ¹¹² Frank Sanchez, interview by Annabronia Ospeck and Andrea Kim, informal interview, phone, July 15, 2020.
- ¹¹³ Guadalupe Cruz, interview by Annabronia Ospeck and Andrea Kim, informal interview, phone, July 15, 2020.
- ¹¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹¹⁵ Charles Ransford et al. “El Modelo Cure Violence: Reducción de la Violencia en San Pedro Sula (Honduras),” *CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals*, n. 116 (2017): https://www.cidob.org/es/articulos/revista_cidob_d_afers_internacionals/116/el_modelo_cure_violence_reduccion_de_la_violencia_en_san_pedro_sula_honduras, 180-181. “Honduras –un país de renta media con una población de casi ocho millones de habitantes (WHO, 2014)– ha sido clasificado como el país más violento del mundo desde 2008 (UNODC, 2013). En Honduras, las causas de la violencia varían e incluyen la violencia relacionada con los cárteles de la droga, la violencia de la extorsión a altos niveles, los conflictos comunitarios, los asesinatos a sueldo los conflictos interpersonales.”
- ¹¹⁶ Ibid, 181. “La Oficina de las Naciones Unidas contra la Droga y el Delito (UNODC, por sus siglas en inglés) estima que alrededor de un 30% de todos los homicidios en América Latina están vinculados a las bandas o al crimen organizado, aunque hay otras estimaciones que reducen ese porcentaje a tan solo el 7% (Abt y Winship, 2016).”
- ¹¹⁷ Ibid, 187. “En verano y otoño de 2012 un equipo de Cure Violence viajó a Honduras varias veces para determinar la viabilidad de adaptar el modelo al contexto cultural de San Pedro Sula.”
- ¹¹⁸ Guadalupe Cruz, interview by Annabronia Ospeck and Andrea Kim, informal interview, phone, July 15, 2020.
- ¹¹⁹ Ibid.
- ¹²⁰ Charles Ransford et al. “El Modelo Cure Violence: Reducción de la Violencia en San Pedro Sula (Honduras),” *CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals*, n. 116 (2017): 179-204, https://www.cidob.org/es/articulos/revista_cidob_d_afers_internacionals/116/el_modelo_cure_violence_reduccion

[de la violencia en san pedro sula honduras](#), 188. “Finalmente, se eligió Chamelecón como la primera área de implementación”

¹²¹ Ibid, 188.

¹²² Ibid, 188. “Después de muchas reuniones y debates con los actores clave, el equipo de Cure Violence identificó a un grupo religioso como la organización comunitaria local con mayor capacidad para implementar el programa. Esta organización tiene una misión que concuerda con Cure Violence, fuertes vínculos con la comunidad en la que se iba a implementar el modelo, experiencia previa con la población objetivo y la capacidad para contratar y trabajar con personas con antecedentes criminales. Además, el estatus religioso de la organización contribuiría a aumentar la credibilidad del programa, pues las instituciones religiosas son ampliamente respetadas en la comunidad.”

¹²³ Guadalupe Cruz, interview by Annabronia Ospeck and Andrea Kim, informal interview, phone, July 15, 2020.

¹²⁴ Charles Ransford et al. “El Modelo Cure Violence: Reducción de la Violencia en San Pedro Sula (Honduras),” *CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals*, n. 116 (2017): 179-204,

https://www.cidob.org/es/articulos/revista_cidob_d_afers_internacionals/116/el_modelo_cure_violence_reduccion_de_la_violencia_en_san_pedro_sula_honduras, 190. “Se desarrollaron e incorporaron los criterios iniciales para ser considerado de alto riesgo de involucración en la violencia: ser hombre, tener entre 14 y 44 años, pertenecer a una banda, pertenecer a una barra, participar en la economía informal (venta de narcóticos, extorsión, secuestros), tener antecedentes de violencia, llevar armas, tener un nivel educativo bajo, haber sido excarcelado recientemente y haber sido deportado de Estados Unidos recientemente.”

¹²⁵ Guadalupe Cruz, interview by Annabronia Ospeck and Andrea Kim, informal interview, phone, July 15, 2020.

¹²⁶ Charles Ransford et al. “El Modelo Cure Violence: Reducción de la Violencia en San Pedro Sula (Honduras),” *CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals*, n. 116 (2017): 179-204,

https://www.cidob.org/es/articulos/revista_cidob_d_afers_internacionals/116/el_modelo_cure_violence_reduccion_de_la_violencia_en_san_pedro_sula_honduras, 187. “Por el contrario, los tipos de violencia tratados por el programa tienen su base en la comunidad y son perpetrados por individuos locales.”

¹²⁷ Ibid, 187.

¹²⁸ Ibid, 187. “No obstante, como el programa era desconocido en la comunidad e implicaba un nuevo abordaje de la violencia, el personal de Cure Violence eligió implementar el programa por fases. El enfoque por fases se consideró esencial para asegurar la seguridad y la credibilidad de los trabajadores. Los socios locales del programa debían establecer relaciones sólidas y acuerdos con los grupos de «más alto riesgo» con objeto de preparar el terreno para mediar en conflictos y cambiar las normas acerca de la violencia. La implementación por fases también facilitó la selección de personal a medida avanzaba el proyecto, lo que permitió superar los problemas iniciales para establecer contacto con mensajeros creíbles.”

¹²⁹ Ibid, 188. “La estrategia para tratar esta cuestión fue la de dejar claro que el marco era antiviolencia –no antibandas o antidrogas, ni siquiera antiextorsión– para no provocar o excluir del programa al grupo «de mayor riesgo».”

¹³⁰ Ibid, 190. “En febrero de 2013 fueron contratados los primeros «interruptores de la violencia» en Chamelecón y varios miembros del personal local visitaron Chicago para aprender sobre el programa y observar su implementación en una comunidad de esta ciudad.”

¹³¹ Guadalupe Cruz, interview by Annabronia Ospeck and Andrea Kim, informal interview, phone, July 15, 2020.

¹³² Frank Sanchez, interview by Annabronia Ospeck and Andrea Kim, informal interview, phone, July 15, 2020.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Guadalupe Cruz, interview by Annabronia Ospeck and Andrea Kim, informal interview, phone, July 15, 2020.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Charles Ransford et al. “El Modelo Cure Violence: Reducción de la Violencia en San Pedro Sula (Honduras),” *CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals*, n. 116 (2017): 179-204,

https://www.cidob.org/es/articulos/revista_cidob_d_afers_internacionals/116/el_modelo_cure_violence_reduccion_de_la_violencia_en_san_pedro_sula_honduras, 190. “La estrategia para tratar esta cuestión fue la de dejar claro que el marco era antiviolencia –no antibandas o antidrogas, ni siquiera antiextorsión– para no provocar o excluir del programa al grupo «de mayor riesgo».”

¹³⁷ Ibid, 190. “La primera formación de los trabajadores, de 80 horas, tuvo lugar en marzo de 2013 e incluyó cursos sobre: introducción a Cure Violence, cambio de comportamientos y normas, detección de sucesos violentos, conexión con los individuos de «alto riesgo», mediación de conflictos, reducción de riesgos, planificación del área objetivo, gestión y planificación de la implementación.”

¹³⁸ Ibid, 190. “Además de la formación inicial, en 2014 el equipo de Cure Violence ofreció otras tres sesiones de refuerzo de formación presenciales de 24 horas; cuatro sesiones de formación a distancia (vía Skype) y dos talleres de planificación de un día.”

¹³⁹ Ibid, 190. “Por el contexto de violencia en San Pedro Sula se decidió que las mediaciones personalizadas serían más seguras y productivas que las reuniones o mediaciones de grupo.”

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, 192. “La fase de implementación completa (fase 3) empezó una vez que los interruptores establecieron relaciones sólidas y de confianza con los individuos y grupos de «alto riesgo» de las áreas objetivo. El modelo Cure Violence empezó su implementación en San Pedro Sula en abril de 2013, en tres zonas, con seis interruptores y dos gestores. El programa se amplió a dos nuevas zonas en enero de 2014 y añadió dos zonas más en agosto de 2014, llegando así a un total de siete zonas.”

¹⁴¹ Ibid, 192.

¹⁴² Ibid, 190. “En febrero de 2015, los miembros senior del equipo de Cure Violence viajaron de nuevo a San Pedro Sula para realizar, para el conjunto de la plantilla del programa, la formación necesaria para la tercera fase, que incluía los aspectos de participación y movilización comunitaria, para que los eventos fueran más estratégicos y estuvieran mejor conectados con la labor de cambiar las normas comunitarias.”

¹⁴³ Ibid, 191. “los interruptores de la violencia en Chamelecón fueron capaces de mediar en un promedio de 14 conflictos por mes y zona, y en dos de estas zonas (la 2 y la 3) hubo una media de más de 20 mediaciones por mes.”

¹⁴⁴ Charles Ransford et al. “El Modelo Cure Violence: Reducción de la Violencia en San Pedro Sula (Honduras),” *CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals*, n. 116 (2017): 179-204,

https://www.cidob.org/es/articulos/revista_cidob_d_afers_internacionals/116/el_modelo_cure_violence_reduccion_de_la_violencia_en_san_pedro_sula_honduras, 191. “Se observó que, de los conflictos en los que se me dió, un 16%

tenía una alta probabilidad de desembocar en tiroteos o asesinatos, mientras que en un 59% de los casos los conflictos presentaban una alta probabilidad o eran potencialmente susceptibles de acabar en tiroteos o asesinatos.”

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, 191. “También reciben solicitudes de asistencia de personas directamente involucradas en el conflicto, de familiares o amigos de estas personas implicadas, y de miembros de la comunidad que se muestran preocupados.”

¹⁴⁶ Guadalupe Cruz, interview by Annabronia Ospeck and Andrea Kim, informal interview, phone, July 15, 2020.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Charles Ransford et al. “El Modelo Cure Violence: Reducción de la Violencia en San Pedro Sula (Honduras),” *CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals*, n. 116 (2017): 179-204,

https://www.cidob.org/es/articulos/revista_cidob_d_afers_internacionals/116/el_modelo_cure_violence_reduccion_de_la_violencia_en_san_pedro_sula_honduras, 192. “Los datos sobre violencia y crimen en Honduras son realmente difíciles de obtener (Insight Crime y Asociación para una Sociedad más Justa, 2015).”

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, 192. “Los datos utilizados en este informe fueron recopilados por el personal del programa Cure Violence sobre el terreno y abarcan el período que va desde la implementación en 2013 hasta mayo del 2015. Para registrar los datos, se estableció un protocolo por el cual los interruptores de la violencia informaban a diario sobre los tiroteos y asesinatos en la comunidad de los que tenían conocimiento. Antes de introducir un suceso en el registro de violencia comunitaria, el supervisor de la zona procuraba confirmar cada suceso con la comunidad, a través de las noticias publicadas en los medios o mediante otros métodos.”

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, 198. “Considerables reducciones de violencia tuvieron lugar en todas las zonas del programa, con un promedio de reducciones en los tiroteos del 88% en 2014 y del 94% en 2015.”

¹⁵¹ Guadalupe Cruz, interview by Annabronia Ospeck and Andrea Kim, informal interview, phone, July 15, 2020.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ David Kennedy, interview by Sophie Goguichvili, Diana Roy, and Sam Romano, informal interview, phone, April 21, 2020.

¹⁵⁵ “Group Violence Intervention,” National Network for Safe Communities, accessed September 22, 2020, <https://nnscommunities.org/strategies/group-violence-intervention/>.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ “Procedural Justice,” The Justice Collaboratory, Yale Law School, <https://law.yale.edu/justice-collaboratory/procedural-justice>.

¹⁵⁸ David Muhammad, “Oakland’s Successful Gun Violence Reduction Strategy,” National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform, January 2018, <https://nicjr.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Oakland%E2%80%99s-Successful-Gun-Violence-Reduction-Strategy-NICJR-Jan-2018.pdf>.

¹⁵⁹ David Muhammad, interview by Alexia Gardner and Alyson Woolley, informal interview, phone, May 1, 2020.

¹⁶⁰ National Institute of Justice, “Practice Profile: Focused Deterrence Strategies,” U.S. Department of Justice, September 2013, <https://crimesolutions.ojp.gov/ratedpractices/11>. “Focused deterrence strategies (also referred to as “pulling levers” policing) are problem-oriented policing strategies that follow the core principles of deterrence theory. The strategies target specific criminal behavior committed by a small number of chronic offenders who are vulnerable to sanctions and punishment. Offenders are directly confronted and informed that continued criminal

behavior will not be tolerated. Targeted offenders are also told how the criminal justice system (such as the police and prosecutors) will respond to continued criminal behavior; mainly that all potential sanctions, or levers, will be applied.”

¹⁶¹ Samantha Michaels, “The Surprising Way to Stop Shootings That Doesn’t Involve More Cops and Arrests,” Mother Jones, July 31, 2020, <https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2020/07/oakland-ceasefire-shootings-murder-rate-social-services-life-coach-boston-miracle-thomas-abt-david-kennedy-cat-brooks/>.

¹⁶² Mike McLiverly and Brittany Nieto, “A Case Study in Hope: Lessons From Oakland’s Remarkable Reduction in Gun Violence,” Giffords Law Center, April 23, 2019, <https://giffords.org/lawcenter/report/a-case-study-in-hope-lessons-from-oaklands-remarkable-reduction-in-gun-violence/>, 30. “In April 2012, the Oakland City Council’s Public Safety Committee directed Chief Jordan to implement Ceasefire. California Partnership for Safe Communities signed a one-year contract with the city in June 2012. In September 2012, Oakland hosted its first night walk, and in October 2012, its first official call-in. Measure Y rebrands as Oakland Unite. Oakland is named the third most dangerous city in the nation, ending 2012 with 126 homicides and 561 nonfatal shootings.”

¹⁶³ Samantha Michaels, “The Surprising Way to Stop Shootings That Doesn’t Involve More Cops and Arrests,” Mother Jones, July 31, 2020, <https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2020/07/oakland-ceasefire-shootings-murder-rate-social-services-life-coach-boston-miracle-thomas-abt-david-kennedy-cat-brooks/>. “‘What Oakland’s doing is certainly the Ceasefire strategy, but it’s a very evolved version,’ says Mike McLiverly, an attorney at the San Francisco-based Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence. Life coaches, clergy, and victims’ family members all play important roles in reaching out to at-risk men. Oakland ‘paid much more attention to a strong community voice and to providing a more robust set of social services,’ says researcher Thomas Abt, a Justice Department official during the Obama administration and author of the 2019 book *Bleeding Out*.”

¹⁶⁴ Scott Blake, interview by Alexia Gardner, informal interview, phone, April 24, 2020.

¹⁶⁵ Mike McLiverly and Brittany Nieto, “A Case Study in Hope: Lessons From Oakland’s Remarkable Reduction in Gun Violence,” Giffords Law Center, April 23, 2019, <https://giffords.org/lawcenter/report/a-case-study-in-hope-lessons-from-oaklands-remarkable-reduction-in-gun-violence/>, 30.

¹⁶⁶ Anthony A. Braga et al., “Street Gangs, Gun Violence, and Focused Deterrence: Comparing Place-Based and Group-Based Evaluation Methods to Estimate Direct and Spillover Deterrent Effects,” *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 56, no. 4 (July 2019): 524–62, <https://doi.org/10.1177/02F0022427818821716>, 537.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 537.

¹⁶⁸ Guillermo Céspedes, interview by Alexia Gardner, informal interview, phone, April 13, 2020.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰ “Oakland’s Ceasefire Strategy,” City of Oakland, accessed 2020, <https://www.oaklandca.gov/topics/oaklands-ceasefire-strategy>.

¹⁷¹ Senior Member of the Oakland Police Department, interview by Alexia Gardner and Andrea Kim, informal interview, phone, April 22, 2020.

¹⁷² “Home,” ShotSpotter, accessed April 25, 2020, <https://www.shotspotter.com/>.

¹⁷³ Senior Member of the Oakland Police Department, interview by Alexia Gardner and Andrea Kim, informal interview, phone, April 22, 2020.

¹⁷⁴ Rodrigo Canales, email to Alexia Gardner, October 23, 2020.

¹⁷⁵ Thomas Abt, “My Eight-Year Plan to Dramatically Reduce Urban Gun Violence,” *The Guardian*, Guardian News and Media, December 10, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/dec/10/us-gun-violence-thomas-abt>.

¹⁷⁶ Kitty te Riele, “Youth ‘at Risk’: Further Marginalizing the Marginalized?” *Journal of Education Policy* 21, no. 2, March 1, 2006: 129, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02680930500499968>. Valerie Strauss, “Analysis | Why We Should Stop Labeling Students as ‘at Risk’ - and the Best Alternative,” *Washington Post*, accessed March 15, 2021, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2019/01/23/why-we-should-stop-labeling-students-risk-best-alternative/>. The concept of labeling someone “at-risk” can be harmful, as it is typically laden with unconscious bias and often targets Black and Brown youth or individuals who have experienced significant trauma. In the study entitled “Youth ‘at risk’: further marginalizing the marginalized,” Kitty te Riele writes, “this identification has set up a false distinction between a supposed problematic minority versus a ‘normal’ majority.” In addition to marginalized population targeting, violence reduction programs can unintentionally follow a trauma-informed approach. As discussed by Professor Toldson of Howard University, individuals have both protective and risk factors. When practitioners of violence reduction programming label individuals “at-risk” because of ideas of “us vs. them” or the frequency of trauma experienced, there is more concentration on someone’s risk factors rather than his or her protective factors, which can be misguided in addressing the root causes of violence.

¹⁷⁷ Darren Allison, interview by Alexia Gardner and Andrea Kim, informal interview, phone, April 22, 2020.

¹⁷⁸ Mike McLiverly and Brittany Nieto, “A Case Study in Hope: Lessons From Oakland’s Remarkable Reduction in Gun Violence,” Giffords Law Center, April 23, 2019, <https://giffords.org/lawcenter/report/a-case-study-in-hope-lessons-from-oaklands-remarkable-reduction-in-gun-violence/>, 30.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, 34.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, 35. “In addition to call-ins, CPSC also instituted custom notifications, a highly personalized form of call-ins used to head off imminent violence, such as a threat of retaliation. “When time is of the essence,” a CPSC report explains, “the Ceasefire message is compressed into a one-on-one conversation with a police officer, ideally in partnership with a community or clergy leader, and delivered wherever is most convenient.”

¹⁸¹ Guillermo Cespedes, interview by Alexia Gardner, informal interview, phone, April 13, 2020.

¹⁸² Scott Blake, interview by Alexia Gardner, informal interview, phone, April 24, 2020

¹⁸³ Pablo Vázquez, interview by Alexia Gardner, informal interview, video conference, July 24, 2020.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Rodrigo Canales, interview by Alexia Gardner, informal interview, video conference, November 11, 2020.

¹⁸⁶ Rodrigo Canales, interview by Alexia Gardner, informal interview, video conference, July 31, 2020.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Rodrigo Canales, interview by Alexia Gardner, informal interview, video conference, November 11, 2020.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Pablo Vázquez, email to authors, December 16, 2020.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ National Institute of Justice. “Practice Profile: Focused Deterrence,” U.S. Department of Justice. September 2013. <https://crimesolutions.ojp.gov/ratedpractices/11>.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Pablo Vázquez, interview by Alexia Gardner and Andrea Kim, informal interview, video conference, January 15, 2021. “Es una iniciativa de atención multidisciplinaria que busca proporcionar acompañamiento y apoyos institucionales que permitan satisfacer las necesidades inmediatas de las víctimas y víctimas indirectas de lesiones provocadas por arma de fuego u homicidios dolosos, generando un vínculo de confianza para transmitir el mensaje de “no violencia”, a la vez que se le acercan oportunidades de vida, para con ello, evitar espirales y escaladas de violencia a nivel comunitario.”

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Pablo Vázquez, email to Alexia Gardner, February 23, 2021.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Pablo Vázquez, interview by Alexia Gardner and Andrea Kim, informal interview, video conference, January 15, 2021.

²⁰⁴ Lelys Dinarte, letter to Celina de Sola, March 23, 2020.

²⁰⁵ Rodrigo Canales, interview by Alexia Gardner, informal interview, video conference, November 11, 2020.

²⁰⁶ See the following cited source for additional information on Thinking for a Change. “Thinking for a Change.”

National Institute of Corrections, U.S. Department of Justice, June 27, 2018, <https://nicic.gov/thinking-for-a-change>.

²⁰⁷ Pablo Vázquez, interview by Alexia Gardner and Andrea Kim, informal interview, video conference, January 15, 2021.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Pablo Vázquez, interview by Alexia Gardner and Andrea Kim, informal interview, video conference, January 15, 2021.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Vaughn Crandall, interview by Alexia Gardner and Samantha Romano, informal interview, video conference, July 30, 2020.

²¹⁷ Rodrigo Canales, interview by Alexia Gardner, informal interview, video conference, July 31, 2020.

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- ²¹⁸ Rodrigo Canales, “To Stop Violent Policing, Build Effective Police Organizations,” Innovations for Poverty Action, June 12, 2020, <https://www.poverty-action.org/blog/stop-violent-policing-build-effective-police-organizations>.
- ²¹⁹ Vaughn Crandall, interview by Alexia Gardner and Samantha Romano, informal interview, video conference, July 30, 2020.
- ²²⁰ Rodrigo Canales, interview by Alexia Gardner, informal interview, video conference, November 11, 2020.
- ²²¹ Ibid.
- ²²² Ibid.
- ²²³ Ibid.
- ²²⁴ Vaughn Crandall, interview by Alexia Gardner and Samantha Romano, informal interview, video conference, July 30, 2020.
- ²²⁵ Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, November 12, 2018, <https://www.inegi.org.mx/contenidos/saladeprensa/boletines/2018/EstSegPub/ENECAP2017.pdf>. “Tasa de actos de corrupción por cada mil elementos de policía durante el desempeño de sus funciones, 2017.” “Primera Encuesta Nacional De Estándares y Capacitación Profesional Policial (First National Survey on the Standards and Capacity of Police Officers).”
- ²²⁶ Vaughn Crandall, interview by Alexia Gardner and Samantha Romano, informal interview, video conference, July 30, 2020.
- ²²⁷ Rodrigo Canales, interview by Alexia Gardner, informal interview, video conference, July 21, 2020.
- ²²⁸ Ibid.
- ²²⁹ Rodrigo Canales, interview by Alexia Gardner, informal interview, video conference, November 11, 2020.
- ²³⁰ Ibid.
- ²³¹ Vanda Felbab-Brown. “Focused Deterrence, Selective Targeting, Drug Trafficking and Organised Crime: Concepts and Practicalities,” Modernising Drug Law Enforcement. International Drug Policy Consortium. February 28, 2013, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/focused-deterrence-selective-targeting-drug-trafficking-and-organized-crime-concepts-and-practicalities/>, 1-20.
- ²³² Rodrigo Canales, interview by Alexia Gardner, informal interview, video conference, November 11, 2020.
- ²³³ Ibid.
- ²³⁴ WHO, “World Report on Violence and Health,” edited by Etienne G. Krug, Linda L. Dahlberg, James A. Mercy, Anthony B. Zwi and Rafael Lozano, Geneva, 2002, http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2002/9241545615_eng.pdf?ua=1, 215.
- ²³⁵ Ibid, 220.
- ²³⁶ Rodrigo Canales, interview by Alexia Gardner, informal interview, video conference, November 11, 2020.
- ²³⁷ Ibid.
- ²³⁸ Ibid.
- ²³⁹ Ibid.