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Less Revolution, More Realpolitik China's Foreign Policy in the Early and Middle 1970s

By Zhou Yi, February 2020



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Christian F. Ostermann and Charles Kraus, Series Editors

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China's Foreign Policy in the Early and Middle 1970s

Zhou Yi

It is well known among China historians that archival access in the People's Republic of China has become more difficult since Xi Jinping came to power. Scholars studying China's foreign policy face considerable difficulties in finding Chinese language primary sources to substantiate their research, especially for the post-1949 period.¹ Reliance on published materials only takes us so far: official sources like *nianpu*, *wengao*, and so on often skirt the most sensitive issues in China's domestic and foreign policy. Historians such as Michael Schoenhals, Jeremy Brown, and Sergey Radchenko (among many others) have supplemented their archival endeavours with "garbology," or *lajixue*. Schoenhals, for instance, based his book on the history of Chinese intelligence on formerly top-secret documents that were picked up from flea markets.² Radchenko purchased multiple documents from the online book site Kongfuzi.

One of the documents in Radchenko's collection, which he donated to the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), is a March 1975 speech by Geng Biao, a senior official of the CCP. Geng headed the International Liaison Department of the Communist Party of China from 1971 to 1979 and was in charge of contacting foreign political parties. (He also served in several other positions in the 1980s, such as Minister of National Defense. Xi Jinping was his secretary from 1979 to 1981.) The 1975 speech was delivered at the National Tourism Working Forum, where Geng Biao was likely speaking to CCP cadres in charge of tourism.

Why did Geng speak about foreign policy to tourism officials? It was probably because, as

¹ Charles Kraus, "Researching the History of the People's Republic of China," *Cold War International History Project*, April 2016. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/cwihp_wp_79_researching_history_peoples_republic_of_china_april_2016_1.pdf Due to the difficulty, scholars are also pushed to explore the international archives to research the history of the PRC. See <http://prchistory.org/review-june-2017/>

² Michael Schoenhals, *Spying for the People: Mao's Secret Agents* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2013.

the former director of the Tourism Administration Yang Gongsu put it, during the decade of the Cultural Revolution “tourism work is a part of diplomatic work.”³ The Tourism Administration was an institution led by the Foreign Ministry. Zhou Enlai instructed that the tasks of Tourism Administration were “propagandizing ourselves, understanding others, expanding influences, winning over sympathies, promoting people’s understanding of each other, progressing together and uniting all of our strength to form an international united front.” In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, in order to support world revolution, only leftists, middle and lower-class workers and peasants, and people otherwise friendly to China were allowed to visit the country. Most of the visitors were radicals who admired (or in some cases, worshipped) Mao Zedong. In 1971, Mao instructed that “some rightists can come.” China then began to receive “rightists,” a term that included capitalists/businessmen, nobles, officials from capitalist countries, journalists, and those who had criticized the Cultural Revolution.

Yang often discussed Chinese politics with such foreign tour groups. He recalled: “they [foreign tourists] needed to know not only Chinese domestic politics, economy and the situation of the Cultural Revolution, but also Chinese views on the international situation and Chinese foreign policy. It was a good opportunity to propagandize Chairman Mao’s three worlds theory and the Chinese policy of opposing the two hegemons.” Yang also recalled that Chinese sometimes had disputes with foreign tourists on issues such as China’s opposition to the Soviet Union. The fact that some visitors were only anti-American (and not anti-Soviet) frustrated CCP officials.⁴

These anecdotes help to explain why Geng Biao discussed Chinese foreign policy at the tourism forum in 1975. The cadres in charge of tourism, Geng felt, needed to understand their country’s foreign policy well, so that they could create a positive impression of China and answer questions when communicating with foreign visitors.

Geng Biao’s speech, despite its very informal and colloquial style, exemplified distinctive

³ Yang Gongsu, *Cangsang Jiushi Nian: Yige Waijiao Teshi de Huiyi* [Ninety Years of Vicissitudes: A Diplomatic Envoy’s Memoir] (Haikou: Hainan Chubanshe, 1999), p. 301.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 298-309.

features of Mao Zedong's foreign policy in the mid-1970s. It quoted Mao's favourite assertion about international situation – "chaos under heaven" – and criticized the two superpowers, especially the Soviet Union. It also mentioned Mao's anticipation of a new world war, and emphasized the three worlds theory and unity with Third World countries. These points were frequently expounded upon in CCP leaders' speeches, such as Zhou Enlai's report to the 10th National Congress in 1973 and his report on the work of government in 1975, as well as Deng Xiaoping's speech at UN General Assembly in 1974.⁵ But Geng's talk also conveyed certain information absent in these well-known public speeches. A noticeable aspect of Geng's speech is its underlining of the CCP's relations with other fraternal parties, while at the same time revealing the CCP's cooling passion for exporting revolution. Its tone was also relatively more realistic than high-profile revolutionary public speeches.

Geng, as the director of the International Liaison Department, was responsible for party-to-party relations. We can thus assume that his opinions on this issues were representative and largely reflected a consensus among the CCP leadership. As an internal talk with a "top secret" designation on the front page (which did not necessarily mean it had significant secrets), the 1975 speech divulged some thoughts that the CCP leaders did not want to publicize. The source thus provides a unique angle on China's foreign policy in the mid-1970s.

Opposing the Two Superpowers in Theory, but Only "Soviet Revisionists" in Reality

The year 1972 witnessed rapprochement between the US and China. Since 1949, China and the United States had viewed each other with hostility. However, the US President Richard Nixon visited Beijing on 21 February 1972. This was a landmark development. Described by Nixon as

⁵ See Zhou Enlai, *Zhou Enlai zai Zhongguo Gongchandang Dishici Quanguo Daibiao Dahui shang de Baogao* [Zhou Enlai's Report to the Tenth National Congress of the CCP], Delivered on 24 August 1973, Adopted on 28 August 1973, http://www.gov.cn/test/2007-08/28/content_729616.htm; Zhou Enlai, *1975 Nian Guowuyuan Zhengfu Gongzuo Baogao* [State Council's Report on the Work of Government in 1975], 13 January 1975, http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/23/content_208796.htm; Deng Xiaoping, *Deng Xiaoping zai Lianda Diliujie Tebie Huiyi shang de Fayan* [Deng Xiaoping's Speech at the 6th Special Session of the UN General Assembly], April 1974, <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/6688/6715/20011023/588430.html>

“the week that changed the world,” communist China turned to its erstwhile enemy, the United States. The main reason for this rapprochement was China’s antagonism toward its former ally, the Soviet Union. As Henry Kissinger commented, “Peking needed us to help break out of its isolation and as a counterweight to the potentially mortal threat along its Northern border.”⁶

The Sino-Soviet split began in the late 1950s, largely because Mao Zedong wanted to challenge the leadership of the Soviet Union in the communist bloc.⁷ The Zhenbao Island conflict, in March 1969, was the lowest point in the two communist states’ deteriorating relations. Far from an accidental clash between the border patrols of the two countries, it was, in fact, a pre-calculated action by the CCP leadership, in response to escalating border frictions since 1968. Mao Zedong and his fellow leaders only wanted to teach the Soviets a bitter lesson; thus the planned action was restrained. However, tensions rapidly escalated. Soviet leaders became increasingly apprehensive about the possibility of an outright war against China. In August 1969, there was another border clash, raising tensions further. Soviet diplomats sent out private feelers to gauge US reaction to the possibility of a pre-emptive Soviet strike on China’s nuclear facilities. The CCP was frightened by the threat of war. Many parties and government cadres were evacuated from Beijing. Mao himself went to Wuhan. Only Zhou Enlai stayed in Beijing, having his office moved to an underground command centre.⁸

China’s tense relations with its neighbours and its isolation caused by the Cultural Revolution worsened the situation. Mao perceived the danger of the predicament, “We have the Soviet Union to the north and the west, India to the south, and Japan to the east. If all our enemies were to unite, attacking us from the north, south, east, and west, what do you think we should

⁶ Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1979), p. 1049.

⁷ About the Sino-Soviet relations and split, see Lorenz M. Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia, *Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 1945–1959: A New History* (Lanham: xington Books, 2015); Danhui Li and Yafeng Xia, *Mao and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1959–1973: A New History* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2018); Sergey Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962–1967* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009); Jeremy Friedman, *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World* (Capel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2015).

⁸ About the detailed explanation of Zhenbao Island conflict, see Yang Kuisong “Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-America Rapprochement,” *Cold War History* (2000), 1:1, pp. 21-52.

do?” Mao was thinking about seeking a new alliance with China’s “archenemy,” the United States, the only superpower able to confront the Soviet Union. “Negotiating with faraway countries while fighting with those that are near” (*yuanjiao jingong*), Mao explained his consideration with traditional Chinese thinking.⁹

Even before the Zhenbao Island conflict, Mao Zedong was sending signals about improving relations between China and the United States. When Richard Nixon became the president of the United States in January 1969, *Renmin Ribao* (People’s Daily), *Hongqi* (Red Flag), and other major newspapers in China printed Nixon’s inaugural address, albeit alongside an anti-American editorial. The publication of a US president’s inaugural address was unprecedented, indicating Mao’s special interest in this US president. Mao would later tell Nixon that he had paid attention to the presidential election in 1968 and hoped Nixon would win.¹⁰

Before Nixon’s visit, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger conducted detailed negotiations in his 1971 visit to China. The thorniest issue faced by the two countries was Taiwan. Beijing reaffirmed its position in the Shanghai Communiqué, signed in 1972 during Nixon’s visit: “the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere, and all US forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan.”¹¹ However, the US expressed a different position in the Shanghai Communiqué: it accepted that “all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China,” but did not mention the status of the PRC; the withdrawal of forces and military installations was the “ultimate objective,” but the Communiqué did not make any specific promises. The differences in the Communiqué indicated that both sides shelved their disagreements. Kissinger expressed: “The overwhelming impression left by Chou, as by Mao, was that continuing differences over Taiwan were secondary

⁹ Li Zhisui, *The Private Life of Chairman Mao: The Memoirs of Mao’s Personal Physician*, translated by Tai Hung-chao (New York: Random House, 1994), p. 514.

¹⁰ Chen Jian, *Mao’s China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 238-239.

¹¹ *Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China*, 1972.

to our primary mutual concern over the international equilibrium. The divergence of views on Taiwan would not be allowed to disturb the new relationship that had evolved so dramatically and that was grounded in geopolitical interests.”¹² In order to achieve their common geopolitical interest of confronting the Soviet threat, both sides made concessions, one of which was to postpone the Taiwan question for a later date.

Although China eagerly awaited US resistance on the Soviet threat, it still pursued its anti-American discourse in public. Mao did not want to sacrifice China's revolutionary image. After all, it had denounced the American imperialists vehemently for more than 20 years. The United States was still called “Meidi,” or the “American imperialists,” even after Richard Nixon visited Beijing. Chinese leaders continually denounced American imperialism. They ridiculed the US's unsuccessful military campaign on the Korean Peninsula and were pleased to see the US withdraw from Vietnam.¹³

Geng Biao's 1975 speech revealed this ambivalence. CCP political rhetoric remained anti-American, but the undeniable fact was that China was aligning itself with the US against the Soviet threat. As Geng explained:

Nixon visited China because his policy of isolating China had become bankrupt, not at all because he had positive feelings toward China. He perceived pressure when contending with the Soviet revisionists. He wants to use the Sino-Soviet conflict; Chinese rapprochement is his trump card to overpower the Soviet revisionists. We allowed Nixon's visit, not in the slightest due to positive feelings toward the US, let alone want to derive benefits from it. It is wrong to have such a thought. We don't rely on one imperialist country to oppose another, let alone derive benefits. We are taking advantage of their conflict to strike the Soviet revisionists while simultaneously undermining the American imperialists. The American imperialists also want to take advantage of our conflict with the Soviet revisionists to cope with the Soviets. They are unable to use us. Rather, we can use them.

The CCP leadership knew it would not be easy for the public to accept their long-time enemy as a new friend, so it had to maintain its revolutionary rhetoric. It is important to

¹² Kissinger, *The White House Years*, pp. 1073-1074.

¹³ For example, see Zhou Enlai's speech in 10th National Congress of the CCP in 1973

remember that Geng Biao's comments came at a time of growing frustration in Beijing at what seemed like America's failure to deliver on rapprochement. Therefore, it was important for China to display that it was not a supplicant that asked the US for help. By emphasizing how "we [China] can use them [the Americans]," Geng Biao depicted China as being much more in control of the bilateral relationship than it actually was.

Mao was disappointed that the US and the Soviet Union held several summits after 1972. The two superpowers agreed to control arms and enhance economic ties; hostile relations were gradually replaced by détente. Mao realized the United States was in an advantageous position and its need for China was not as critical. In a meeting with Kissinger in November 1973, when Kissinger commented that "if Europe and Japan and the US hold together, and we are doing in the Middle East what the Chairman discussed with me last time—then the danger of an attack on China will be very low," Mao replied: "We are also holding down a portion of their troops which is favourable to you in Europe and the Middle East."¹⁴ Mao had a deep sense of pride. He refused to make China appear weak and rely on other great power to protect China. This stance had been made explicit before Nixon's trip to China, and continued in the months that followed. In January 1972, Zhou Enlai told Alexander Haig that "No country should rely on outside powers to maintain its independence and survival." Beijing was offended that the US doubted China's ability to survive without help.¹⁵

"Three Worlds" and the Third World Policy: the Anti-Soviet Front

The PRC's contact with non-western countries went back to its formation in 1949. At the end of 1953, China premier Zhou Enlai introduced Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence when meeting an Indian delegation.¹⁶ In 1954, this set of principles was further elaborated on during Zhou's

¹⁴ Kuisong Yang and Yafeng Xia, "Vacillating between Revolution and Détente: Mao's Changing Psyche and Policy toward the United States, 1969-1976," *Diplomatic History*, Volume 34, Issue 2, 1 April 2010, pp. 412-413. William Burr (ed), *The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow* (New York: The New Press, 1998), p.184

¹⁵ *Mao Zedong Nianpu*, 1949-1976 [The Chronicle of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976], vol 6 (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe), p. 423.

¹⁶ "Heping Gongchu Wuxiang Yuanze" [Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence], in *Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan* [Selected works of Zhou Enlai's Diplomacy] (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1990), p. 63.

meeting with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Burmese prime minister U Nu. At the 1955 Bandung Conference, Zhou emphasized China had a common colonial history with other Asian and African countries, and also endeavoured to communicate with the leaders from other countries. These efforts reflected China's attempt to play a more influential role in the international arena, as well as challenge the western powers by introducing new norms into international affairs.¹⁷

The early 1960s, the period before the Cultural Revolution, witnessed Beijing's waxing activism in the Third World. Due to the deeper Sino-Soviet split in this period, China was keen to seek other allies; in 1963 alone, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai visited twenty Third World countries. More cheap loans were provided and more advisers, including military experts, were sent abroad. However, China's diplomatic accomplishment in the Third World was damaged by the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Not only did the chaos it brought hinder China's normal foreign diplomatic activities, but the revolution also propelled China's self-conceit to an apex. Beijing insisted that other countries and parties adopt the Maoist model if they were to succeed, which made others feel encroached upon.¹⁸

In the 1970s, China's radicalism gradually ebbed, and it adopted a more restrained foreign policy. It improved its relations with post-colonial and developing countries. Mao shaped his "three worlds" thesis in this period. In December 1972, Mao said that Western Europe, Japan, China and the Third World were all "meats" that both the two hegemons wanted to grab. He had not yet categorized China as a Third World country, but his rhetoric changed quickly. On 26 March 1973, Mao talked to the President of Cameroon, Ahmadou Ahidjo, stating, "Asia, Africa and Latin America are called the Third World except for Japan." Three months later, on 22 June 1973, Mao said to the President of Mali, Moussa Traoré: "Both of us are called the Third World (countries);

¹⁷ Chen Jian, "China's Changing Policies toward the Third World and the End of the Global Cold War," in Artemy M. Kalinovsky and Sergey Radchenko (eds), *The End of the Cold War and the Third World* (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2011), pp.102-103.

¹⁸ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 161-163.

that is, developing countries.”¹⁹ On 22 February 1974, Mao met Kenneth Kaunda, the president of Zambia. The Chinese chairman explained his elaborated “three worlds” theory to Kaunda:

I hold that the U.S. and the Soviet Union belong to the First World. The middle elements, such as Japan, Europe, Australia and Canada, belong to the Second World. We are the Third World...The U.S. and the Soviet Union have a lot of atomic bombs, and they are richer. Europe, Japan, Australia and Canada, of the Second World, do not possess so many atomic bombs and are not as rich as the First World, but richer than the Third World. The Third World is very populous...All Asian countries, except Japan, belong to the Third World. All of Africa and also Latin America belong to the Third World.²⁰

Mao explained why China was a Third World country: “China belongs to the Third World. China is unable to match the rich and powerful countries in terms of politics, economy, and in all other aspects. [China] can only stay with a number of relatively poor countries.”²¹ Mao’s division of the world was further explained by Deng Xiaoping in April 1974 in the General Assembly of the United Nations. According to Deng, the First World or two superpowers were the biggest exploiters and oppressors. The Second World countries were controlled and dominated by the two hegemons to different degrees but some still maintained colonial policies. The Third World was exploited and oppressed, but they were the main force of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism.²²

It was not the first time for Mao Zedong had talked about the Third World. As early as 1946, Mao had noticed the role of the developing countries in the context of the confrontation between the two superpowers. He used the term “intermediate zone,” referring to all the countries except the two hegemons. Mao said:

There is a vast intermediate zone between the United States and the Soviet Union. Here are the capitalist countries and colonial and semi-colonial countries of the three continents Europe, Asia and Africa. Before the American reactionaries force

¹⁹ *Mao Zedong Nianpu*, vol 6, pp. 461, 473, 483.

²⁰ “Guanyu Sange Shijie Huafen Wenti” [About Diving the Three Worlds], in *Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan* [Selected Works of Mao Zedong’ Diplomacy], (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe), 1994, pp. 600-601.

²¹ “Tong Kawengda, Bumaiding Tanhua Neirong de Tongbao” [The Bulletin of the content of the conversation with Kaunda and Boumédiène], in *Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao* [Mao Zedong’s Documents since the Foundation of the PRC] (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1998), p. 379.

²² “Deng Xiaoping zai Lianda Diliujie Tebie Huiyi shang de Fayan” [Deng Xiaoping’s speech in the 6th Special Session of the UN General Assembly], 10 April 1974.

these countries to submit, the invasion of the Soviet Union is out of question... The American people and all people from the countries, which are threatened by the invasion of the US, should unite together against American reactionaries and their running dogs.²³

When Mao talked about the “intermediate zone,” he regarded the developing countries and the colonial world as potential allies to confront American hegemony. But the background of the “three worlds” theory, developed in the 1970s, was based in the Sino-Soviet split and Sino-American rapprochement. This time, it was the “Soviet revisionists” or “social imperialists” that had become the main threat to China.

Therefore, what China really needed from the Third World in the mid-1970s was to find anti-Soviet allies. Historian Chen Jian points out that when making policies toward a specific Third World country, the CCP leaders paid great attention to countries’ relationship with the Soviet Union. China thus proceeded to improve relations with anti-Soviet, right-wing countries. But its relations with pro-Soviet countries were generally tense.²⁴

“I like rightist,” Mao told Nixon, “People say that you people are rightist—that the Republican Party is on the right—that Prime Minister Heath is also to the right...They also say the Christian Democratic Party of West Germany is also to the right. I am comparatively happy when these people on the right come into power.”²⁵ Not only were rightists preferred in the First and Second World, but China also adopted this rightist-preferring logic in its relations with the Third World countries.

China’s relations with Chile were a notable example. In 1973, the left-wing Salvador Allende’s government was overthrown. Most communist countries denounced this coup d’état and cut off relations with Chile. In contrast, Beijing continued to maintain diplomatic relations with the far-right Augusto Pinochet’s government. In fact, China was one of the only two communist states that did not cut off relations with Chile (the other was Romania)²⁶. Since

²³ *Mao Zedong Xuanji* [Selected Works of Mao Zedong], vol 4 (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1991), pp. 1193-1194.

²⁴ Chen Jian, “China’s Changing Policy toward the Third World,” pp. 108-109

²⁵ Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (London: Arrow Books Ltd., 1978), p. 562.

²⁶ Julio Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela, *Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship and Oppositions* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 316.

Pinochet was anti-Soviet, the Chinese leaders were unwilling to break diplomatic ties.²⁷ Geng Biao defended the Chinese position:

Some people don't understand why we don't sever diplomatic relations with Chile... If we severed relations with them, they would build relations with the Guomindang. Our delegations and our publications are not allowed in. We are unable to contact their people and do not understand the situation. We don't know what the Soviet Revisionists do there either.

China was dissatisfied with Allende and his pursuit of the parliamentary road, which had been supported by the Soviet Union. "Their [the Soviets'] parliamentary road failed in Chile. They don't drop this idea but want to promote Chile's parliamentary road model in Italy, Spain, Peru, and Argentina: unite with six or seven parties and win the majority of votes in parliament and put another Allende in power. It's difficult to succeed. Even if it works, the result will be fascist," said Geng Biao.

Interestingly, despite existing propaganda on solidarity with Asia, Africa, and Latin America, China never truly identified with the Third World. Rather, it was only a strategic consideration. This comes out with particular clarity in Geng Biao's speech. "We say we are in the Third World; this is not to degrade us to the level of a nationalist country. It promotes more efficient working conditions and unity with the Third World; the aim of which is to oppose the two hegemons." He continued: "It is for the need for opposing the two hegemons that China is included in the Third World. This is for internal discussion; we mustn't mention it in public." This somewhat condescending tone reveals the CCP's true perception: communist China was more ideologically advanced, and perhaps economically stronger than the "nationalist countries" as well. It refused to be "degraded" to the level of a nationalist country – in itself a loaded term. Instead, China wanted to take leadership in the Third World without identifying itself with it.

It should be noted that "opposing the two hegemons" was more of a propaganda banality than a real policy. Geng explained: "Some countries are agents of the bourgeoisie, but we mustn't

²⁷ Chen Jian explains China's relations with Chile by Sino-Soviet split, see *ibid* p.109. Other opinions believe because Chile supported a One China Policy. See Juan Diego Montalva and Patricio Navia, "Chile and China: Building Relations Beyond Trade?," *Latin America Task Force*, 2007, p. 3. Geng Biao's speech quoted below proves that both arguments are persuasive.

mention that either. If we want to oppose the two hegemons, we must gather support and unite 95 per cent (of the Third World). We will defeat imperialism. We will also defeat the bourgeoisie. However, there are priorities that are more important than others. Some countries are the agents of bourgeoisie, but we cannot say that. If we want to oppose the two hegemons, we should try to unite with the remaining 95-percent. Imperialism we are going to defeat. The bourgeoisie we are also going to defeat...we should concentrate on striking the Soviet revisionists.” The CCP leadership knew clearly that being anti-Soviet was more urgent than being anti-American. Additionally, “the agents of the bourgeoisie” were no longer an ideological problem. They became China’s potential allies.

Fraternal Parties: Decreasing Support

Mao Zedong regarded himself as the leader of the world revolution, which helped promote revolution in other countries. Supporting other socialist parties, including political endorsement and economic and military aid took an important role in the CCP’s foreign policy from the late 1940s to the early 1970s – especially in Southeast Asia.

Guided by Mao’s three worlds theory, in the 1970s, China made a great breakthrough in Southeast Asia. It normalized its relations with Burma, and established diplomatic relations with non-communist countries: Malaysia (1974), the Philippines (June 1975), and Thailand (July 1975), all of which had been regarded as “lackeys of American imperialism” in the past.²⁸ In the context of confronting the Soviet Union and rapprochement with the United States, China adjusted its attitude towards these Third World countries. Meanwhile, China pursued a “dual-track” policy: it still provided a certain degree of support to anti-government left-wing parties.²⁹ Geng Biao used Sino-Burmese relations as an example: “We have diplomatic relations with Burma. [Prime Minister] Ne Win comes, and we have to welcome him. But the Burmese Communist Party

²⁸ Geng Biao’s speech was delivered in March 1975, before the establishment of diplomatic relations with Philippines and Thailand, but this period saw warming relations with these two countries.

²⁹ “Peking’s ‘Dual-Track’ Policy in Southeast Asia Produces Gains,” 22 August 1975, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86T00608R000200150004-1.pdf>

conducts armed struggle, and we strongly support it. However, we can't sever diplomatic relations with the Burmese government just because we support the Burmese Communist Party."

Although the CCP claimed it strongly supported the armed rebel groups, this support inevitably grew weaker because it needed to maintain relations with their governments. In May 1974, China and Malaysia formally established diplomatic relations. The Prime Minister of Malaysia, Abdul Razak Hussein, in his meeting with Mao Zedong, repeatedly asked the latter to promise that the CCP would not have any relations with militant communists in Malaysia. Mao refused to sever the CCP's relations with the Malaysian communists, but he compromised that "it is your internal affairs; we can't intervene." When Abdul Razak claimed he would "use troops and police to kill them," Mao still said "it is your policy"; "we don't intervene in your internal affairs."³⁰ Later in July 1975, Mao told the Prime Minister of Thailand Kukrit Pramoj: "Someone asked me not to have relations with the communists in their country (Mao meant the rightest governments). I said no. How can communists not support other communists?... As for how you deal with the communists (in your country), we don't intervene. Nothing more than condemning, fighting and killing. We don't and are unable to manage it. (We) can't intervene in other countries' internal affairs."³¹ By reiterating "we don't intervene," Mao implied his declining endorsement to the communist rebellions in Southeast Asia, although he didn't completely abandon them.

Geng's speech also illustrated the subtle change of Mao's foreign policy. "We should not intervene in their internal affairs," said Geng Biao. "Each countries' Marxist-Leninist parties' guidelines, policies, and strategies can only be made by themselves and through the integration of Marxist-Leninist principles and their practical situations. No matter how correct you are, if you don't understand their situations, it will be very dangerous to command them. In the past, the Soviet revisionists always wanted to command us, but we didn't listen to them." Geng's talk justified China's declining support to the fraternal communists in Southeast Asia by referencing

³⁰ *Mao Zedong Nianpu*, vol 6, p. 535. The whole record of the Mao Zedong and Abdul Razak's conversation can be seen in Song Yongyi (ed), *Jimi Dangan zhong Xin Faxian de Mao Zedong Jianghua* [Mao Zedong's Speech Newly Discovered in the Secret Archives], (Guoshi chubanshe, 2018) (It only has an electronic version)

³¹ *Mao Zedong Nianpu*, vol 6, p. 594.

Mao's philosophy, "integrating the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the particular situations." The CCP wanted neither to participate in other communist parties' conferences nor to invite other parties' members to join CCP events. "The meetings we hold are to solve our own problems. What happens if they disagree with us when we are giving a report? If they invite us to attend a conference, we cannot keep silent about what is wrong. The moment we speak, we will disagree with them and quarrel with them. They are the hosts, and we are the guests. It's not good to quarrel with them on their own turf." China was also reluctant to train military personnel for its communist brothers. "We should tell them that fighting is not a big issue; they can learn when they fight. Some always ask to send military cadres to come here to study. We should tell them there is no need to do so," said Geng Biao.

The CCP emphasized the role of "political support" - "political support is primary; economic support is secondary," according to Geng. But in fact, this political support was also decreasing. Propaganda support was one of Beijing's traditional means of political endorsement for the fraternal parties. The left-wing parties' armed struggles were often the focal point in the Chinese media. In the middle of the 1970s, when China had improved its relations with Burma, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, Chinese media gradually reduced its reporting on the revolutionary insurgencies in these countries. It also avoided criticizing the Southeast Asian leaders by name. Additionally, in the past, the Chinese media had underscored the importance of Mao's approach of armed struggles in the countryside when reporting the insurgencies in Southeast Asia, while in the middle of the 1970s, the reporting had to admit the complexity in Southeast Asia and encourage political movements in cities.³² Three China-based clandestine radio stations—the Voice of the People of Thailand, the Voice of the Malayan Revolution, and the Voice of the People of Burma—were still able to pursue different lines from Beijing's media. They continued carrying anti-government propaganda. But, Chinese media references to these clandestine stations became less frequent as the 1970s progressed.³³ The above demonstrated

³²"Peking's 'Dual-Track' Policy in Southeast Asia Produces Gains," pp, 2-3.

³³ Ibid., p. 3.

a dimming in Chinese zeal to spread revolution.

Mao Zedong himself was reluctant to give up revolutionary ideals, as well as the endorsement to fraternal parties, but he had no better option. He realized other communist parties did not live up to his expectations because they achieved little and were unable to overthrow their governments. He had to compromise and placate those foreign government leaders.³⁴ Revolutionary ideology declined in Chinese foreign policy in the 1970s.

Conclusion

Geng Biao's speech offers a useful snapshot of China's foreign policy in the early and mid-1970s. As Geng articulated, China perceived a greater Soviet threat, which pushed it to turn to the imperialist United States. The Sino-US rapprochement blurred the ideological divide that underlaid Cold War tensions. Ideological opponents were able to become closer while the former two communist brothers were on the brink of war. The pattern of ideological confrontation changed when China allied with the US against the Soviet Union. Ideological confrontation evolved into a realpolitik of checks and balances. To resist Soviet pressure and create an anti-Soviet front, China also improved relations with the Third World. Meanwhile, its passion for promoting the international communist movement waned in the mid-1970s: though the Chinese continued to pay lip service to fraternal parties, this support became weaker as China began to pay more attention to state-to-state relations. Still, Chinese leaders did not give up the radical revolutionary discourse. It would not be easy to divert from what it had insisted on for a quarter-century; Mao still tried to maintain his status as a world revolutionary leader. It was only with Deng Xiaoping's rise to power that the hopes for a China-led world revolution would finally and irrevocably extinguish.

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³⁴ Yang and Xia, "Vacillating between Revolution and Détente," pp. 420-421.

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Document Appendix

Speech by Comrade Geng Biao of the CCP CC International Liaison Department at the Symposium on National Tourism Work

Contributed by Sergey Radchenko and translated by Zhou Yi.

[Cover Page]

- Top Secret • Tourism Material 5

Speech by the Director of the CCP Central Committee International Liaison Department Comrade Geng Biao at the Symposium on National Tourism Work (Transcript)
-1975 March 6th Morning

[Text]

- Top Secret • Tourism Material 5

Speech by the Director of the CCP Central Committee International Liaison Department Comrade Geng Biao at the Symposium on National Tourism Work (Transcript)

-1975 March 6th Morning

The issues talked about: 1. International situation; 2. the issue of the International Communist Movement

1. International situation

(I will) talk about several substantial issues.

(1) The issue of the epoch: To study the international situation, we must start from the epoch. In the political report of our party's 10th National Congress, we reemphasized that the epoch we live in is an epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolution. When examining the situation, firstly we must establish a correct basic position. Otherwise, it will deviate (from the correct line) or make mistakes. Although the international situation has changed greatly after Lenin's passing, the essential characteristics of the epoch have not changed and are not out of date. Lenin's analysis of the nature and characteristics of imperialism, analysis of the conflicts among imperialists and other basic contradictions in the world, and analysis of the tactics and strategies of the proletarian revolution are still relevant today. This issue is debated among us and revisionist powers including the Soviet Union. . The Soviet revisionists deny the origins of revolution in Leninism. We believe the basic task of the proletarian party, is dependent on each country's concrete situation; the dictatorship of the proletariat is achieved gradually through proletarian revolution. Each country's concrete conditions, phases of revolution and characteristics are different. The strategies are also different, but the fundamental principles are same. The head of modern revisionism, the Soviet revisionists deny that the present time is the epoch that Lenin spoke of. They say it is out of date. Our

country's superspy Lin Biao also said Leninism was out of date. To examine the situation and major world events, we must first make the issue of the epoch clear.

(2) The characteristic of the international situation is chaos under heaven. Where is the chaos? The first problem is the intensification of conflicts. All kinds of conflicts are intensified. Serious economic crises happen in the imperialist and capitalist world. Economic crisis inevitably causes serious political crisis. The main phenomenon are declining production, growing unemployment, inflation and high prices; they are very severe. Our socialist China does not have such problems. In capitalist countries, prices are rising at any time; workers' lives are more and more difficult. The price of gold in the capitalist world is continuously rising; the budget deficit is also increasing. With no money source, they print banknotes, and inflation becomes more severe. In the past, economic crises only occurred in a few countries and it was transferable (to other countries), now all countries are in crises, and debt is non-transferable. Japan has sold all its steel and raw silk and cloth, but is unable to solve the problem. Lenin said: "as capitalism develops, raw materials become increasingly scarce." Japan itself does not have many raw materials but, since the war, has experienced a relatively high speed of economic development. What does (Japan) depend on? It depends on others' raw materials, depends on others' cheap oil and depends on others' markets to sell its products. We do not depend on these. We depend on our own raw materials and our own market, so we have a stable price that is not influenced by economic crises. When Japan established diplomatic relations with us, Tanaka boasted that Japan was a big economic power, but we called it an economic animal. He boasted everywhere that Japan had 18 billion dollars, however its economy was in turmoil and oil price at an increase; within two years it was done for. He wrote *A Plan for Remodelling the Japanese Archipelago*, but the Japanese Archipelago was not remodelled. In the United States, Nixon stepped down and Ford came to power. Is this because of the Watergate Scandal? Tanaka resigned. Is it because *Bungeishunjū*³⁵ disclosed Tanaka's assets? These are not private affairs. The various conflicts inside the imperialist ruling class intensified too seriously to be solved. Their only option was to change leaders. However, this cannot solve the problem. Since the Second World War, Italy has changed 36 prime ministers. Some serving for less than one year or even 8 months. Another issue is trending industrial action. This economic struggle will inevitably be reflected in politics. Economic struggle is a part of political struggle. Political strikes are caused by economic crises. Italy is the country with the most strikes in the capitalist world. As long as there is a strike, it will have hundreds of thousands of people. Imperialism and capitalists want to plunder raw materials and markets; they cause opposition everywhere. Do not think the United States is very powerful. They lack raw materials. There are 66 main kinds of raw materials they need to import. The goods the Soviet revisionists need to import are much more than the Americans. Because of this, there are trade wars all over the world. All imperialist and capitalist countries engage in speculation and profiteering, especially the Soviet revisionists. They are all struggling for raw materials and struggling for the market. Therefore, Chairman Mao said their situations were "nothing can be done when flowers

³⁵ Bungeishunjū is a Japanese magazine.

are falling away (wukennaihe hua luo qu).”³⁶

Chaos under heaven is a good thing not a bad thing. It causes trouble for our enemies not us. It is good for the revolutionary people. In the chaos, the revolutionary people are fortified. Chairman Mao depicted the revolution as “the rising wind forebodes the coming storm.” (shanyu yulai feng man lou)³⁷. Lenin also said “imperialism is the eve of the social revolution of the proletariat”. Thus, for the revolutionary people, the situation is very good. As it is chaos under heaven, just let it go. The more chaos the better.

(3) The American imperialists and the Soviet revisionists are the biggest exploiters and suppressors in the modern world. (They) are the new hotbeds of a new world war. Why are they the hotbeds of a new world war? Because they want to fight; only they will fight not others. If the two hegemons fight, there will be a world war. Lenin said: “an essential feature of imperialism is the rivalry between several great powers in the struggle for hegemony”. At present, their struggle is more and more intense. Those that claim the Americans and the Soviets mainly collude with each other are wrong. Our point of view is that collusion is temporary and superficial; the struggle is long-term and fundamental. How to view the struggle between imperialism and social imperialism is an issue that Lenin and Kautsky argued about. Kautsky believed that if imperialism developed to the stage of hyper imperialism, several imperialist countries would collude with each other, and there would be no fighting. Thus meaning, the situation would ease up. Lenin objected, contending that imperialism was the highest stage of capitalism and that conflict among imperialists could not be reconciled. As long as imperialism existed, there would be a risk of war. So, to examine the situation, we must use Lenin’s stance and point of view. (As long as) imperialism exists, the two hegemons will inevitably engage in conflict. The struggle will be a gradual change to a sudden change. Just like the wearing out of clothes, if the clothes have holes that can be seen, it is the sudden change. But, before the appearance of holes, they have already been worn out; this is the gradual change. The day in which imperialists go to war is the sudden change. Politics does not solve their problems, so they resort to force. Chairman Mao said: “War is the continuation of politics.” When the conflict intensifies to a certain degree, the result is war and the use of force. A good example is the escalation of conflict between two people in a disagreement: First, they will keep their feelings bottled up inside, then they will rant in public;

³⁶ About “wukennaihe hua luo qu”: In the China and Soviet Union’s polemics, Mao Zedong used this quotation in his revision of the letter of 28 July 1964 to the Central Committee of the CPSU. See *Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao*, vol 11 (Beijing:

Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1992), p. 108. Mao meant China can’t do anything to save the Soviet unavoidable failure. Geng Biao wanted to say the imperialists and revisionists’ decline and failure were doomed, and nothing can be done to change.

³⁷ This sentence means before upheavals there are signs foreshadowing them. Mao used it to describe the international situation on 29 July 1973, in his meeting with the President of People’s Republic of the Congo Marien Ngouabi. Mao said: “Don’t believe that the current world is peaceful. The situation now is ‘the rising wind forebodes the coming storm’ (shanyu yulai feng man lou). The storm has not come but the wind comes. And the wind is very strong!” See *Mao Zedong Nianpu*, (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 2013), vol 6, p. 489. On 30 May 1974 in his meeting with physicist Tsung-Dao Lee, Mao said: “Let’s talk about the situation of the world. How do you think about it? My opinion is chaos under heaven. The storm will come. It is impossible if there will be no war. Because the social systems are different. Even they have the same social system, there will be a war as well. Because they are imperialists.” *Mao Zedong Nianpu*, vol 6, p. 538. In the talk with Lee, Mao further explained he believed a war would break out. Shanyu (storm or rain in the mountain) refers to the war. Geng Biao may wanted to say there would be a war among the imperialists and it would be the chance for revolution.

without resolve, they will resort to fist fighting. The conflict between two will evolve into a group scuffle and escalate from the fighting with fists to stones and sticks, then weapons and atomic bombs. This is world war. When one side is defeated, a new world war will begin. Imperialist wars cannot be finished by one fight. There will be the first, second, and third. If imperialism does not fall, there will always be wars.

(4) The factors of war are growing rapidly. Revolution is developing rapidly as well. Imperialist struggle has many varieties and is ever changing. But their inside is dominated by struggle. Their struggle can be seen not only in one place but can be seen everywhere in the world. There are struggles everywhere. The foreign affairs department should appoint a comrade to read the materials from the *Cankao Xiaoxi* (Reference News) carefully, collecting the questions and categorizing them; then they will see (the situation) clearly. Of course, the (information) is not necessarily correct, there are even rumours. However, we can get rid of the dross and select the essential. For example, the two hegemons, the Americans and the Soviets, held four summits within 3 years. In 1972, Nixon went to Moscow to have the first summit. After the talks, Nixon visited Poland, and the Soviet revisionists sent Gromyko to visit West Germany. What for? Nothing more than to undermine the other (wa qiangjiao / dig at the corner of sb.'s wall). Poland is the Soviet revisionists' running dog, and West Germany is the US' collaborator. Brezhnev went to the United States to have the second talk. Shortly after the summits, the Middle East incident took place. As soon as fighting started, the Soviet Union prepared to send troops to join the war. The US saw that the Soviets would send troops, so it ordered a three-year alert. The two sides were at the swords' points and nearly went to war; the situation was very tense. (haiyou shenme huanhe / what more (could be done) to ease tensions)? For the third summit, Nixon visited Moscow again. Less than two weeks after talks took place, the Cyprus incident broke out. The Soviet revisionists were double-dealing, fomenting trouble and fishing in troubled waters. They were being two-faced; first they enticed Turkey, then they supported Greece. Turkey and the Soviet Union have a hundred years of mutual hostility. The Cyprus event has not reached a conclusion; both sides want to control it. Cyprus is an unsinkable aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean. Cyprus' positioning on the Mediterranean holds strategic significance; it is near the Suez Canal and Israel. It is a strategic location. The fourth summit was held in Vladivostok after Ford's inauguration. Both sides were actively expanding their armed forces before the summit. The Soviet revisionists cried out for enlarging military forces. The American imperialists also said they would increase arms, renew equipment, equip aircrafts with intercontinental missiles and produce this kind of aircraft by any means necessary. Both sides were contending for the most advantageous outcome. . They reached a ten-year nuclear development agreement in name; in reality they just said: you Soviets produce however many (weapons) and we Americans will produce however many (weapons). What kind of agreement is this! In fact, you wanted to make more (weapons), and I wanted to as well. Both sides just wanted to enlarge their nuclear advantage, which was far from a limitation (of arms). The United States said this summit was not satisfactory because it allowed the Soviet Union full advantage, while the US suffered. In the internal circles of the US, there are two factions. The faction led by Kissinger contends for détente with the Soviet Union, while the faction led by Secretary of Defence Schlesinger contends to counter Soviet (aggression) by enhancing strength, making good (military) equipment and maintaining naval, army, and air force advantage. Now it seems as though Schlesinger has somewhat of the advantage. The focus of the

US-Soviet competition is Europe as well as the Middle East and the Mediterranean, which are flanks of Europe and cannot be viewed as different parts. Whomever wants to be the hegemony must hold Europe. We claim that the Soviet Union threatens the east and strikes the west. (We should) unveil the truth; expose the conspiracy located deep within. When looking at an issue, one must view its nature. If we just see the phenomenon, it is wrong. It is as if we stand on the earth to look at the sun. It seems as though the sun travels around the earth, but in fact, it is the earth that travels around the sun. This is the essence (of the issue). . It is true that the Soviet Union has one million troops near the Sino-Soviet border, but it is only 1/4 of the Soviet army. The other 3/4 is in Europe. Besides, the equipment of these one million troops in Asia is not good. The best equipment is in Europe. Europe has the most convenient transportation. Northwest is not a rich region³⁸. The Soviets only have one railway there, and the food cannot (be provided in time) if a war breaks out. Therefore, we should not just believe that they want to attack us. The Soviet revisionists lambaste us furiously every day. In actuality, they play tricks behind our back. They scold us for the US to see. They want to convince the Americans that they want to fight against China, not the west. But the United States is not fooled. This is decided by the interests of the imperialists. Europe is richer and more profitable. China's benefits are also not few, but this bone is too hard to bite. Vietnam has a 30 million population and its material conditions are not rich. The United States uses 500,000 troops and still cannot win. China has an 800 million population and 25-year socialist construction. Imagine how many troops we could resist? We have troops and also militia. Chairman (Mao) advocates we fear neither hardship nor death. We do not fear the enemy's coming. One million (Soviet troops) is nothing. Think about it carefully, the one-million troops there will confront the United States first, then Japan. Although they will cope with China as well, the main (situation) is the two hegemony's struggle. Even so, we cannot relax our vigilance against the Soviets. We must strictly follow Chairman Mao's instructions: "dig deep shelters, store up grain reserves, and don't claim (global) hegemony (shen wa dong, guang ji liang, bu cheng ba)." We are coping with both the Soviet revisionists and the American imperialists. Both the city and the countryside are digging (the shelters), and it will go on. The Soviet revisionist embassy asked why we dug them and whom we would cope with. We said, we would cope with you. The Americans also asked whom would we cope with, and we said we would cope with the Soviet revisionists and also you. If you came together, we would cope with the both of you. Our deep shelter digging is not offensive, but defensive. Scientifically speaking, we can dig neither to Moscow, nor to Washington. The Soviet revisionists concocted rumours that we would fight. Khrushchev attacked us, saying we are like fighting cocks. Chairman Mao said: "We admit it. Our party was established in 1921, and in 1927 Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] forced us to start guerrilla warfare in the mountain and forced us to fight. When the revolution succeeded in 1949, we had already fought for 22 years. Should we not fight? We should absolutely fight. ; Fight well; fight a great cause out. Some western countries, especially Europe, (want to) extend the troubles of the Soviet Union to China, but this does not work. Chairman Mao, Premier Zhou and other comrade leaders in the central committee told the Europeans, you should be careful; the polar bear will eat you.; you should not be unwary. (They) did not quite believe us in the past, now they believe gradually. They are very serious about peace; their national defences are reliant on the United States. Why do we

³⁸ It may refer to China's northwest. Perhaps what Geng Biao wanted to say was the Soviet Central Asia, which borders China's northwest.

tell them this? The Soviet revisionists shout for peace and détente everywhere. The United States speaks of modern-day peace. They conceal the truth. It is a conspiracy and nonsense; don't believe them. Lenin said: "In the market-place, the vendor that shouts loudest and promises the most is the one with the shoddiest goods for sale." They shout for peace when committing evil deeds. You must keep a clear head and not believe their words. In my opinion, there will be a world war. Now the question is not whether to fight, but when to fight. Of course, I do not mean (the war) will be fought immediately or within one or two years. In *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* (Sanguo Yanyi), Zhuge Liang knew (when to fight) by a simple calculation, which is nonsense. His "borrowing the east wind" depended on the season. We should observe the situation. There will be war, but it is nothing to be afraid of; it is not a big deal. After the First World War, the Soviet Union was established. After the Second World War, there were many Eastern European countries established. They were called socialists at that time but now are revisionists. Our China was also founded shortly after the Second World War. If there were a Third World War, it would be Chairman Mao's prediction of war causing revolution. More socialist countries would emerge. Who to fight and with whom? Only the Soviets and Americans will fight. Which one will fight first? It is more likely that the Soviet Union will be the first to fight. The United States has occupied many places, so it has weakness everywhere. The Soviet Union has occupied few places. Theory predicts that the one who want to occupy territory will instigate the conflict. . The Soviet revisionists also say the United States is preparing for war. They are building military bases everywhere. For what purpose? The Soviet Revisionists (are building) military bases in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. The United States Congress last year passed a budget allowing 3 to 4 billion dollars to be used toward Navy and Air Force construction. They also changed car companies into tank- manufacturers. They increased one brigade in Europe last year, and they increased another two brigades this year. They established military bases in India and received British military bases. Kissinger and Gromyko go everywhere, just like ants on a hot pot (sic). Kissinger's office is in the Middle East, and after he finished his work, he went to the Middle East again. Gromyko knew Kissinger would go to the Middle East so he visited Egypt before Kissinger. Then, Kissinger also visited Egypt. Afterward, Kissinger went to Geneva, and Gromyko followed him to Geneva and met him there. Why are they so busy? Chairman Mao said: "The swallows are busy in the dusk (huanghun shihou yanzi mang)³⁹." The bourgeoisie thinks once a world war breaks out, there will be a nuclear war that will destroy humanity. That's just bluster. In the past, the American imperialists blustered a lot, then they said it was not scary. If you encountered (a nuclear explosion) on the street, you can avoid being hurt by covering yourself with

³⁹ Mao Zedong used "huanghun shihou yanzi mang" in his meeting with the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago Eric Williams, on 6 November 1974. Mao said: "Now the earth is sick, so they talk about détente of the intensity, easing the international intensity and talk about peace. Now they are curing the earth. I'm suspicious of it. There are so many international conferences, and the US Secretary of State goes everywhere. It's quite strange! The swallows are busy in the dusk (huanghun shihou yanzi mang) They fly low, and it's going to rain!" *Mao Zedong Nianpu*, vol 6, p.556. The low-flying swallows is a sign of rain, therefore probably Mao wanted to say that a busy US State of Secretary is a sign of international intensity, perhaps a sign of war. Mao often used the metaphor swallow referring to Henry Kissinger. On 17 February 1973, Mao talked to Kissinger: "You did a god job, flying everywhere. Are you a swallow or a pigeon?" *Mao Zedong Nianpu*, vol 6, p. 468. On 21 October 1975, Mao said to Kissinger: "You are very busy, and it seems you can't stop being busy. When the wind and rain are coming, the swallows are busy. Now the world is not peaceful, the wind and rain coming, so the swallow is busy. You may postpone the wind and rain but very difficult to stop it." *Mao Zedong Nianpu*, vol 6, p. 616.

newspapers. An American wrote a book called "Tomorrow's War", saying the atomic bomb was not very useful. When attacking Japan with atomic bombs, one was used in Hiroshima and another in Nagasaki. Now, there are many countries with atomic bombs and the situation is more complex. If there is a war, (in general) it will be a conventional war. (Some) say a nuclear war will destroy humanity (so there will not be a nuclear war). I think that is not necessarily the case. Nuclear war is possible, and conventional war is also possible. The imperialists wage war in order to occupy lands and populations. The United States and the Soviet Union are the biggest exploiters and oppressors. If they destroy mankind, whom will they exploit and oppress? Why did the United States not drop atomic bombs on Tokyo and Osaka?!

(See the next page)

The Third World has become the main force against the hegemony. Let me give several examples to prove why it is the main force. In 1973, there was a non-aligned countries conference. The April 1974 Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly, the Middle East war, where oil was used as a weapon, the Conference on the Law of the Sea⁴⁰, population conference⁴¹, and food conference⁴² were all struggles against hegemonies.. This promoted the gradual unity of the Third World, and proved the power of the Third World against hegemony again and again. The Third World suffers relatively high due to exploitation and oppression. It has the largest population, vast area, and the world's richest resources. Both the American and the Soviet hegemonies depend on its raw materials. They exploit the Third World; the Third World needs to defend national independence. The Shanghai Communiqué of China and the US said that "countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution--this has become the irresistible trend of history." The struggle of the Third World further proves this point.

Different countries in the Third World have different situations, which is a very complicated aspect. Most countries are agents of the bourgeoisie. There are conflicts and disunity among them. But we need to look at the inevitable general trend. They have similar stances on anti-imperialism, anti-hegemony and anti-colonialism. The Second World has duality. On one hand, it oppresses and exploits the Third World countries; some of them conduct colonialism in the Third World to different degrees and in different forms. On the other hand, third world countries are controlled, threatened and oppressed by the two hegemonies to different degrees. Similar to Japan and some European countries, they have conflicts with the two hegemonies and want to be free of their control and become independent. Additionally, they want to get rid of American control. The United States has military forces within Western Europe and also has conflicts with it. The US says: "My military forces are stationed in your area; you should cover the expenses." Western Europe says: "we will not pay." They say the United States is the leader of the "free world". The US (should) protect them, but if it wants them to pay, they won't. The US has conflicts with Western Europe. Lenin said: "the bourgeoisie only thinks of money." (Western Europe) has conflicts with the US pertaining to money. The US was angry for a period of time, claiming it would withdraw all US troops; this caused conflict within the US government. The Soviet Revisionists also have conflicts but with Eastern Europe.

⁴⁰ The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was convened in 1973 in New York.

⁴¹ It refers to The World Population Conference in 1974 in Bucharest.

⁴² It refers to The World Food Conference in 1974 in Rome.

They want to control, exploit, and oppress (Eastern Europe). If (the Eastern European countries) do not listen to it, it will send troops to subvert and occupy these countries. For example, Czechoslovakia and Mongolia were occupied. Their sense of alienation was enhanced. The Eastern European countries don't have oil; they depend on Soviet revisionist imports. The Soviet revisionists double the price of oil and sell it to the small revisionists. Eastern Europe finds this intolerable so turns to Western Europe. There are several political jokes. Czechoslovakian Husák had his coat made in Moscow. It was cold so the coat was made longer. The size was very long when measuring. When he arrived back at the airport in Czechoslovakia, his wife asked why the coat was so short. His assistant said it was because in Moscow people kneel down to get measured. It is a political joke but is representative. Bulgaria bought a car from the Soviet Union, which had no steering wheel. Bulgaria asked Moscow to give it the steering wheel. Moscow said: "You don't understand. This car is electronically controlled. It goes automatically once you sit in it. It is controlled by Moscow. There is no need for you to control it, I will control it for you." People in Hungary were chatting; a man asked which country was the largest in the world. Some said the Soviet Union; some said the United States, and some said China. The man said none of them were correct. The largest country was Hungary. This is because the Soviet troops began to withdraw from Hungary 20 years ago, however they still haven't left the country. See how large Hungary is! These jokes are representative of their dissatisfaction with Soviet control and subversion. Currently, both hegemons are our main enemies; we must strike down both targets. This point can't be shaken. But, we have policies and guidelines. Our guideline is unity with the Third World, winning over the Third World, and opposing the two hegemons, the United States and the Soviet Union. This is our strategic guideline. We say we are a Third World country; this is not to degrade us to the level of a nationalist country. It promotes more efficient working conditions and unity with the Third World; the aim of which, is to oppose the two hegemons. How can China alone defeat the two hegemons? Some claim the division of the three worlds is unreasonable. The First World only has the American imperialists and the Soviet revisionists, which is too little; more countries should be included. But if we do this, they will not be striking an isolated minority but one unified majority. This is not Marxist-Leninist. Some said the First World and the Second World should be combined and that the Second World should be the socialist countries: the two countries China and Albania. This is also not correct. This would isolate ourselves. Some say the division of the three worlds is according to the economy. This is not correct either. (The division) is not based on class. (The Third World includes) poor friends, rich friends, the left, the middle, the right, the oppressors, the oppressed; some are even agents of the bourgeoisie. It is for the need of opposing the two hegemons that China is included in the Third World. This is for internal discussion; we mustn't mention it in public. Talking about it internally will help us work more efficiently. Some countries are the agents of the bourgeoisie, but we mustn't mention that either. If we want to oppose the two hegemons, we must gather support and unite 95 percent (of the Third World). We will defeat imperialism. We will also defeat the bourgeoisie. However, there are priorities that are more important than others. . Eat your meal bit by bit; do not eat everything in one mouthful. There are issues of greater and lesser urgency. The most important issue is the two hegemons, the Americans and the Soviets. Among the two hegemons, we should concentrate on striking the Soviet revisionists. We should take advantage of their conflicts when struggling with enemies. Win over the majority, isolate the minority, then crush them one by one. Lenin said: "To defeat mighty enemies, we should use all the cracks

of our enemies, even very small cracks.” In fact, enemies are not a monolithic whole. When doing work, you should insert in a pin wherever there's a crack (jian feng cha zhen). You can't insert in a stick in one go. We should consider different situations, collecting all the cracks in our enemy's camp, in order to oppose our current main enemy. It is an objective fact that the United States and the Soviet Union are in conflict with each other. The US initiated reconciliation with us. Nixon visited China because his policy of isolating China had become bankrupt, not at all because he had a good feeling about China. He perceived pressure when contending with the Soviet revisionists. He wants to use the Sino-Soviet conflict; Chinese rapprochement is his trump card to overpower the Soviet revisionists. We allowed Nixon's visit, not in the slightest due to positive feelings toward the US, let alone a want to derive benefits from it. It is wrong to have such a thought. We don't rely on one imperialist country to oppose another, let alone derive benefits. We are taking advantage of their conflict to strike the Soviet revisionists while simultaneously undermining the American imperialists. The American imperialists also want to take advantage of our conflict with Soviet revisionists to cope with the Soviets. They are unable to use us. Rather, we can use them. Chairman Mao taught us: “Our foreign work should focus on the people, rely on the people, and pin hopes on the people, rather than rely on the ones in authority.” Some don't understand why we don't sever diplomatic relations with Chile and why we establish diplomatic relations with Spain. Some Marxist-Leninist governments and organizations often talk about these issues to us. If we severed relations with them, they would build relations with the Guomindang. Our delegations and our publications are not allowed in. We are unable to contact their people and do not understand the situation. We don't know what the Soviet Revisionists do there either. Some self-proclaimed Marxists-Leninists also oppose our establishment of diplomatic relations with Spain. We ask them if it would be better if Spain built foreign relations with the Guomindang. They say no. If that is not the reason, then why do you oppose us? They are unable to give a reason. Without the establishment of diplomatic relations with Turkey, our planes would be unable to fly to Albania. One must pass through Iran, Turkey, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Romania, to finally reach Albania. Some people are very naïve when thinking about these issues. They don't understand some matters, but we don't blame them. In the past, when we were not in power, we didn't understand world affairs as clearly as we do today. Before the Long March, our understanding was even worse. Some Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations don't quite understand this point. There is a Hollywood Film Studio [sic] in America that produced 48 films within two decades that accused our China of being murderous, totalitarian, without freedom, and all such things. After Nixon's visit was broadcasted, there was no market for these Hollywood films. Now, the Soviets published dozens of articles lambasting us every month, and if we count both newspapers and broadcasts, the number (of criticism) may exceed 300 times per month. They say that we earn 15 billion US dollars per year from selling Opium. Our total trade volume in one year is less than 10 billion US dollars. This is complete slander! It is Jiang Jieshi's bandit group that (grow and sell opium in) the regions bordering Thailand and Burma. The Soviet revisionists are very vicious, vilifying us everywhere. Some people are impacted because they listen to them (the Soviets) every day. I didn't talk much about the concrete situations of the American imperialists and the Soviet revisionists. You can read *Cankao Xiaoxi* (Reference News) to learn more. Someone asks whether the Soviet revisionists are affected by economic crises. The Soviet Union is social imperialist and is also affected by economic crises. Last year, its announced grain output exceeded 190 million tons. If we regard its population as 240 million, then grain per person was more than 800 kg. Such a large amount (of grain) would have been too great to

finish. But why did they still rush to buy grain everywhere? (The Soviet Union) imports 30 million tons of grain averaging out to 250 kg per person. This proves that (the Soviet Union) can't solve its food problem. (The Soviet Union) has so-called socialism, but it does not invest in agriculture. It gives priority to heavy industry, then agriculture and light industry. Our (priority order) is agriculture, light industry then heavy industry. (The Soviet) way of weighing grain is incorrect. The grain includes 15% water. We get rid of sand and mud and dry the grain in the sun before putting it in storage. The Soviet Union measures the grain tank's capacity in the harvester. Each grain tank is weighted as two tons. However, since this measurement contains sand and mud, the measurement is 30%-35% exaggeration (of the real production). If (these contents) are excluded, (the Soviet) grain production was less than 120 million tons (last year). Its annual steel output is 135 million tons. I don't believe it. (The Soviet Union) does not have that much (steel). They're bragging. How could 200 million people use up so much steel? If (the Soviet Union's) difficulties are not many, why do oil prices increase so much? According to the deal, oil prices can't increase. But now (the deal) does not work; it brings too many disadvantages. The small revisionists in Eastern Europe turn to trade with the West. The small revisionists also raise their prices when trading with the Soviets. They are also unsatisfied toward the Soviets regarding politics. The centrifugal tendency is strong. They can't do anything about it and have to raise the price. They have a series of economic conferences on economic cooperation and economic integration. In the past, they said they would not raise (oil) prices, but now, nothing can be done

2. International communist movement and the relations with the fraternal parties

Currently, the international communist movement is going very well. Marxism-Leninism has widely spread. Revisionism has been deeply criticized. The revisionist bloc, headed by the Soviet revisionists, has many conflicts within and is falling apart. The Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations in each country are developing and growing. Their domestic struggles and international struggles, especially their struggles against revisionism have tested and strengthened them. There are more (parties and organizations) turning to us. They are learning to integrate the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with their own concrete practices of domestic revolution. They are constantly drawing lessons from experiences and are initially shaping a correct Marxist-Leninist line. In general, the Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations in each country are relatively weak, but they have a broad future. This is the hope of the revolution. Chairman Mao said: "A single spark can start a prairie fire (xingxing zhi huo, keyi liaoyuan)." Our party is also very small at the beginning. The first congress was held in Shanghai with only 12 representatives, who represented about 70 party members. Now our party is very big, with over 28 million members. All (parties) develop from zero to one, from small to big, from weak to strong. Of course, some Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations develop more rapidly. The party in Burma developed very fast. In 1968, they started building bases to engage in guerrilla warfare. Now they control more than twenty thousand square kilometers with more than five hundred thousand populations. They overthrew the governments of five counties and defeated local armed forces and regular armies. In a recent fight, they destroyed two battalions of Ne Win's troops killing the deputy commander of the enemies' 99th Division. (The Communist

Party of) Cambodia also fights well. Their enemies claim to have 200,000 (soldiers). In reality, only seventy or eighty thousand of them are able to fight. The force of liberation exceeds the enemy. They fought the battles very fiercely. Now (the communists) are approaching Phnom Penh. Traffic has been cut off; the Americans were forced to use air transportation. Recently, they also attacked Pochentong airport and cut off (transportation on) the Mekong River. Their enemy launched three encirclements against them but failed to defeat them. On the contrary, they are able to develop further. In addition, the Marxist-Leninist organizations in Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand have also developed. Latin America is doing particularly well. In general, the situation is good.

Currently, revisionism is still the main danger to the international communist movement. The head of revisionism, the Soviet Union, is wildly ambitious and wants to expand its power everywhere. But it lacks power, and its battle front stretches too far. We call them poor expansionists. They want to fight, but they have no ability, are very incapable, and very poor. We will struggle against the Soviet revisionists to the end. Chairman Mao said: "We will struggle for ten thousand years." When Kosygin came and said (ten thousand years) was too long, Chairman Mao said: "for your sake, we will subtract one thousand years." The Romanian Communist Party's comrade leaders came and said to Chairman Mao, can you take off even more time? Chairman Mao said, ok, we will subtract another one thousand years, but no more. This being said, we still have eight thousand years of struggle against the Soviet revisionists. The Soviet revisionists are also prepared to struggle against us for a long time. They say we collude with the most reactionary imperialist and damage the socialist camp. If they want to wage an irreconcilable struggle against us, then let's struggle! In the international communist movement, the first thing is to concentrate on striking the Soviet revisionist. We should criticize the revisionist points of view deeply and repeatedly. At present, we should focus on exposing the Soviet revisionists' sabotage and invasion in the name of socialism. We should use the conflicts between the small revisionists and the Soviet revisionists, disintegrating them and isolating the Soviet revisionists. When the wolf is in the way, why do you care about the fox (chailang dangdao, anwen huli)? This is our principle. The Soviet revisionists are very angry about this. Not all of the articles attacking us by the Soviet revisionists are published in the Soviet Union. Some of them are published in small revisionist countries like Mongolia, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. The aim is to lead us into conflict with the small revisionists. We are not fooled. We should focus on the main enemy, focus on the Soviet revisionists. If we struggle against the small revisionists, we will leave the head of revisionism to be at ease. We have criticized the Soviet revisionists, which means we have also criticized the small revisionists. Our power is not distracted. (Located) beside us is the small revisionist Mongolia who incessantly lambasts us; why don't we teach it a lesson? It's not worth it. Mongolia is merely a running dog; it is only natural for it to bark. Ignore it. It just follows the (Soviet) order. Since 1973, the Soviet revisionists have wanted to convene a dirty meeting against us and against the people.. It has been preparing for more than two years, however the meeting has still not been held. Later it wanted to hold meetings in Europe and Asia respectively but failed. In Europe, it held three preparatory meetings and also failed. The small revisionists also opposed these meeting. Even if the meeting is held, nothing will happen. It will only expose the reactionary nature of the Soviet revisionists. If they hold the meeting, they will curse us; if they don't hold the meeting, they will still curse us. A true Marxist-Leninists will not be defeated by verbal abuse. Jiang Jieshi cursed at us for more than fifty years; the more he cursed, the stronger we

became. When Lenin was alive, he was also verbally attacked. He also grew stronger the more he was cursed at.

We firmly support the struggles of the Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations in the world. We support the struggle of the people. Chairman Mao taught us: "Diplomacy obeys the revolution, rather than the revolution obeying diplomacy." We should take advantage of the main conflicts of the enemies, concentrating our forces to strike the main enemy. In different time periods, we can reach certain agreements with certain countries, but we don't require that the struggles of the Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations in these countries comply with our diplomacy. Comrade leaders in the central committee said that, in order to take advantage of the conflict and in order to use our diplomatic footing to benefit the people, we allowed Nixon's visit; we should welcome him. However, if (other Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations) also welcome him, it will be problematic. When the French president Pompidou came to China, because we have diplomatic relations, we welcomed him. But if the French Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations also welcome him, they will fail. We don't require them to be like us. They must act according to their own situations, combine the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and the specific conditions of their own countries, and oppose their own enemies. These are two separate issues; the party's issue is the party's, and the government is a whole other matter.. We have diplomatic relations with Burma. If Ne Win comes, we must welcome him. But the Burmese Communist Party conducts armed struggle, we also firmly support it. However, we can't sever diplomatic relations with Burmese government just because we support the Burmese Communist Party. However, if they initiate severing relations with us, then we have no choice then to cut ties. It is an issue of both sides. The least we can do is to learn more about their situations. We don't require the fraternal parties to comply with our struggle strategies and policies. In regards to ourselves, we should prevent our own Great Chauvinism. For the fraternal parties, we insist that the big parties and the small parties are all equal, independent, and respectful of each other, and that they do not intervene with others' internal affairs. The Soviet revisionist always regards itself as the core. The revolution in each country must rely on its people. Chairman Mao often teaches us and fraternal parties to integrate the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete situations of their own countries. Each countries' Marxist-Leninist parties' guidelines, policies, and strategies can only be made by themselves and through the integration of Marxist-Leninist principles and their practical situations. No matter how correct your Marxism-Leninism is, if you don't understand their situations, it will be very dangerous to command them. In the past, the Soviet revisionists always commanded us, but we didn't listen to them. External causes work through internal causes. You command them, which implies they are incapable. Our party draws lessons from past experiences in this aspect, (because) we have suffered. In the past we copied the Soviet experience; no matter good or bad, we just copied everything. Dogmatism must suffer.

In regards to this or that problem that may arise along their respective journeys, we must believe, that through revolutionary practices and the drawing of lessons from experiences, they can certainly reach the right conclusion. We should encourage them to learn lessons from their experiences. Marx drew lessons from the failure of the Paris Commune in time. Lenin drew lessons from the experience of the year 1909

and why it did not succeed. Chairman Mao, in the period of the Third [sic] Domestic Revolutionary War,⁴³ drew lessons from the struggle experience in the Jinggang Mountains; he wrote *Why is it that Red Political Power Can Exist in China?* and *A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire*. After the Long March, he drew lessons in time, thinking of why we lost so many bases before the Long March; he wrote *Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War*. We encourage the fraternal parties to constantly learn from their experiences. Every new lesson will take you one step further. Draw lessons continually, and you will progress continually. We support our fraternal parties; political support is primary, and economic support is secondary. We maintain that we should keep a bilateral relationship when cooperating with the fraternal parties. We disapprove of several parties holding international conferences or something like a world conference. They are not beneficial. Some support them. First (to support these conferences) is the Soviet revisionist. They call it by the sweet-sounding name of exchanging information, jointly formulating international policies and jointly formulating a plan of action. This is impossible! Each country has different situations, how can they formulate a joint plan of action? Bilateralism is relatively flexible and doesn't impose (decisions) on others. Some Marxist-Leninist parties are unable to leave (their countries)! They are currently conducting armed struggles. If you hold a meeting and invite them, (they will feel that) it is not good to reject (the invitation). Maybe they will be arrested and executed. We didn't invite the fraternal parties to attend our 9th National Congress or 10th National Congress. We won't go to the fraternal parties' meetings either. The meetings we hold are to solve our own problems. What happens if they disagree with us when we are giving a report? If they invite us to attend a conference, we cannot keep silent on what is wrong. As soon as we speak, we will disagree with them and quarrel with them. They are the hosts and we are the guests. It's not good to quarrel with them on their own turf. Chairman Mao decided that we won't engage in multilateral activities. Some countries even have several Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations. For example, in Italy there are more than thirty revolutionary organizations and groups; sixteen or seventeen of them call themselves Marxists-Leninists. Who is a true Marxist-Leninist and who is not? It's difficult to distinguish. For this situation, we should contact them extensively. On the basis of extensive contact, we should focus on assisting some of them. In the process of contact, we should promote them to unite. Otherwise, they will all call themselves Marxists-Leninists, regard themselves as the number one in the world, fight against each other, and claim they are the only correct one. (In their eyes) others are not Marxists-Leninists. Only they are (true Marxists-Leninists); everyone else is wrong. (These behaviours and thoughts) leave the main enemy aside. Japan is like this, and many other countries are like this. We should persuade them to seek common ground while preserving differences and to not attack each other. They should not scold each other; they should denounce and expose the ruling class in their own countries. When they denounce each other vehemently enough, they are very close to collapse. Such a method can't solve problems; it will only lead to failure. They should understand this rationale. There were two parties in Belgium in which we contacted; last year they merged. This is very good. The parties in Brazil and Dominica also merged. Very good!

For the parties who followed the Soviet revisionists in reviling us, if they would like to admit their mistakes,

⁴³ The initial script was incorrect. It should be the Second Domestic Revolutionary War (Dierci Guonei Geming Zhanzheng), from 1927 to 1937. In this period, Mao wrote his three articles. The Third Domestic Revolutionary War (Disanci Guonei Geming Zhanzheng) was from 1945 to 1949.

rectify their errors, and form contact with us, we will consider (establishing good relations with them). For example, Carrillo of the Spanish (communist) party lambasted us in the past then, later on, admitted his mistakes. He wanted to establish contact with us and we welcomed him. The Central Committee asked us to tell them that we had disagreements with them; we still have disagreements now; they needed to think about where the disagreements were and change. However, it was not the case that we had a talk that day then built formal relations immediately. It was up to their actual performance, rather than their self-confession. After they went back, they did not change their actions, so we ignored them. He (Carrillo) visited North Korea and was welcomed by one hundred thousand people. He wanted us to invite him (to visit China again), but we ignored him. He lambasted us in the past and refused to admit his mistakes, so we stopped contact. We lacked the basis of contact. If you want to know whether a party or an organization is a true Marxist-Leninist, you should look at whether or not they integrate the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with their country's concrete situations, which is the main criterion. Also, it depends on whether or not their own people acknowledge them. Just because you are recognized by a foreign party does not make you Marxist-Leninist. Currently, some believe that as long as China and Albania acknowledge it, a party can be Marxist-Leninist. We tell them that's wrong and unreliable. The head of Japanese revisionists Susumu Okano (usually known as Sanzō Nosaka) was trained in Yan'an; after he went back to Japan, he became a revisionist. Thus, we don't acknowledge him either. The Belgium party changed, thus we don't acknowledge it; Albania doesn't acknowledge it either. The parties acknowledged by Albania are not necessarily acknowledged by us. Some parties acknowledged by us are not acknowledged by Albania as well. The ways of doing things are not completely the same in each country. We have a similar predicament with the North Korean party; we also have our differences.

Currently, the Soviet revisionists have a tendency that we need to pay attention to. They emphasize on joint action, such as left-wing alliances and slogans like unity with all anti-imperialist powers. Their aim is (to promote) the parliamentary path. The (Soviets') parliamentary path failed in Chile. They won't drop this idea; but want to promote Chile's parliamentary road model in Italy, Spain, Peru, and Argentina: unite with six or seven parties, win the majority of votes in parliament and put another Allende in power. It's difficult to succeed. Even if it works, the result will be fascism. The Italian (communist) party has a pretty large membership, about 1.6 million. It's possible that several parties can unite to get seats in the parliament. If it is created, it will be Chile's type. However, there are many fascist organizations, such as the Italian Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano), New Order (Ordine Nuovo), Black Order (Ordine Nero), Black Regime*, Democratic Pioneer*, Young Italy (Giovane Italia), Catholic Union*, Black Society*, Youth Front (Fronte della Gioventù), Mussolini Action Team* and so on.⁴⁴ The weapons held by these parties could arm twenty-one thousand people. If the revisionists succeed (in the creation of a parliamentary system), will the fascist parties not make trouble for you? They definitely will. The parliamentary path won't work. The revolution must go step by step and be practical. The success of the Soviet October Revolution was due to Lenin and Stalin's leadership and took decades to succeed. Starting in 1921, the Chinese Revolution, under the leadership of Chairman Mao, took six years to conduct armed struggles and conduct guerilla warfare in the Jingang Mountains. I. Then we took another 28 [sic]

⁴⁴ These names with "*" cannot be found. They are translated verbatim from Chinese to English.

years to engage in armed struggles; we didn't actually come into power until 1949. It was not easy. Of course, there is Cuba's influence (on the revolutions in other countries) to consider. (The type of revolution of) Cuba was neither like Moscow's, nor like China's. It was like Hu Chuankui in *Shajiabang* only with a few people and a few weapons. It was largely by accident or military speculation. Several countries in Latin America were influenced by Cuba and built such guerrilla centers. Guevara with his dozens of people went to Bolivia; having no reason and no policy, they lost their life in the end. Guerrillas in Arabic countries often hijack aircrafts, which is unpopular and wrong. The revolution can't be done in this way. It won't work to alienate the people and the mass; it will ultimately fail. The revolution should be down to earth and rooted within the people, rooted deeply. Only then will the revolution succeed.

We should introduce our experiences to the fraternal parties and (tell them) that our party started with little strength.

On the issue of armed struggles, we should raise our opinions to the fraternal parties. We suggest (1) We must first encourage them.. Our party was also not big thirty years ago. A single spark can start a prairie fire. Make them feel that they have potential. Tell them we succeeded only after more than 20 years (of struggles). Encourage them that if they do well, it probably won't take them so long. On the other hand, we should tell them that the path will be very long.

(2) Tell them that fighting is not a big issue. They can learn while they fight. Some always ask to send military cadres to come here to study. We should tell them there is no need to do so. On July 2, 1964, Chairman Mao, said to the leader of the Colombia (Communist) Party that we understood nothing about fighting in the beginning, but we were able to (learn how to fight) by engaging in fighting. It was Jiang Jieshi and the imperialists who taught us how to fight. They were our teachers in the reverse sense. What they taught us can't be learned from the Marxist-Leninist books. Our men couldn't even load a gun at that time. When they fired the first shot, they closed their eyes. When they fired the second shot, they didn't know where the bullet went. But they knew the direction by the third shot. (Fighting) can be learned. We should encourage them not to belittle themselves too much.

(3) Encourage them to choose the weakness of the enemy to attack, and avoid fighting against the powerful regular army. Reckless fighting won't work. They should focus their force on attacking the enemy from behind.

(4) Encourage them to combine other types of struggle with the armed struggle. Without other types of struggle, the armed struggle is isolated. It will ultimately fail.

(5) Tell them it is the people who decide the outcome of the war, rather than the weapon. They should focus on winning over the people, but should also pay attention to the weapon. Many Marxist-Leninist parties are going to carry out armed struggles, which depend on their conditions. The one whose conditions are most mature can carry out (armed struggle) first, and the one whose conditions are not mature can do it later. Armed struggle is the final form (of struggle), but not the basic form. If you launch

the final form, armed struggle, from the beginning, it won't work. You need a preparation stage. Armed struggle must have peasants' participation. It won't succeed by only relying on several cities. We should make this point clear. These are the issues of the international communist movement.

These above points are what was talked about today.

There are several requirements: (1) what I said today are all issues of policy and strategy. Most of them have not been made public. So, take minutes for yourself, not for others. Losing the minutes is equivalent to disclosing it to our enemies. (2) After taking (the information) back, don't spread it around. Only you the leaders can know it. (3) More importantly, you must not post a big-character poster for the public to see. You should know the party's discipline.