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Convened by the Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies (CIMA); the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Cold War International History Project (CWIHP); Fondazione Craxi; the George Washington University’s National Security Archive; the University of Paris III-Sorbonne Nouvelle; and the University of Paris I-Pantheon Sorbonne; in cooperation with Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt Stiftung; and under the sponsorship of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy of the United States in Rome.
Dear Conference Participants,

We are pleased to present to you this document reader, intended to facilitate discussion at the upcoming conference on the Euromissiles Crisis, to be held in Rome on 10-12 December 2009.

This collection was compiled by the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) and the Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies (CIMA) with indispensable support from conference participants, outside contributors, and institutional sponsors. It is by no means comprehensive. In selecting the documents, we sought to include some of the most important materials available and to provide a broad overview of the Euromissiles Crisis from a variety of perspectives.

This reader is divided into four parts: The Peace Movement highlights the perspective of the grassroots activists from both sides of the Iron Curtain who opposed the Euromissiles deployment and the arms race generally, and the three chronological sections on International Diplomacy focus upon the actions and views of the policy-makers and world leaders who were at the very center of the Euromissiles Crisis.

We are extremely grateful to everyone who contributed documentary evidence to this reader, including Gianni Battimelli, William Burr, Malcolm Byrne, Elizabeth Charles, Lodovica Clavarino, Helge Danielsen, Ruud van Dijk, Matthew Evangelista, Nathan Jones, Holger Nehring, Leopoldo Nuti, Giordana Pulcini, Bernd Rother, Giles Scott-Smith and James Graham Wilson. Piero Craveri, Laura Pizei and Serena Baldari played a key role in making documents from the Craxi Foundation available in this reader.

Once the documents were in hand, a number of people worked to ensure that this collection was ready for dissemination, including Christian Ostermann, Bernd Schaefer, Mircea Munteanu and Kristina Terzieva at CWIHP, the German Historical Institute's German History in Documents and Images Project Manager Kelly McCullough, Lars Unar Stordal Vegstein from the London School of Economics, as well as an extraordinarily capable team of CWIHP Research Assistants, including Pieter Biersteker, Amy Freeman, Ekaterina Radaeva, Elizabeth Schumaecker, and Katarzyna Stempniak.

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Finally, we would also like to recognize the efforts of those whose hard work has made this conference possible, including Matteo Gerlini for his pioneering research at the Fondazione Craxi, and of course Leopoldo Nuti, and his outstanding staff, Giordana Pulcini, Lodovica Clavarino and Flavia Gasbarri, as well as the Wilson Center’s Diana Micheli, who designed the conference poster and program.

Tim McDonnell
Washington, D.C.
November 2009
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Part Two:
International Diplomacy

1975
The report sent to Congress last April on the status and concept for the use of tactical nuclear forces in NATO Europe (the so-called "Nunn Report") established an analytical basis for considering the composition and modernization of those forces. Secretary Schlesinger, at the NPG Ministerial meeting last June, left the Allies in little doubt that modernization would involve a new look at tactical nuclear forces (TNFs), their size and their relationship to conventional forces.

Since then, DOD has developed a working draft on modernization which outlines various options on modernizing TNF concepts, stockpiles and deployments, sets them in the context of NATO's existing and projected nuclear doctrine and concepts, and provides a rationale for each option.

As it now stands, however, on the basis of technical military criteria, the draft proposes a reduction of about 2,000 over several years in the present European stockpile of 6,951 warheads. The reduction proposed would be taken from some combination of the options in Attachment 2.

There are sound technical and military reasons for considering modernization and reductions of the stockpile. However, the projected reductions have substantial political and strategic implications:

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-- The Allies will scrutinize our proposals very carefully. As in the past, their main concern will be with any evidence that the US nuclear deterrent is being decoupled from the defense of Europe. The current DOD study suggests retirement of certain systems, modernization of others, reductions in numbers of warheads and shifts in targeting responsibilities from tactical nuclear aircraft to missiles, including Poseidon submarines. Separately, in response to the Presidential request in NSDM 300, DOD and State are considering the concept of a "SACEUR Deployable Reserve" which involves withdrawing nuclear warheads from Europe and storing them in the US for rapid return to Europe in the event of a crisis. Moreover, the US reply to NATO's 1975 Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) foreshadows a major reduction over the next five years in US nuclear capable tactical aircraft based in Europe.

-- Soviet interpretations of such modernization and reduction actions are uncertain. It might be seen as part of the new nuclear strategy of flexible options and a step toward lowering the nuclear threshold in Europe. It might also be considered a precursor to an eventual US effort to turn over to the Germans and other Allies a larger responsibility for delivering nuclear weapons.

-- All of the foregoing, of course, will have consequences for MBFR. Premature exposure of these ideas would damage severely the utility of Option III. The Germans, in particular, will be concerned about this problem because a prime alternative to Option III would be a reduction in German forces as the necessary ingredient to the successful conclusion in MBFR. The Soviets will be less likely to bargain if they know that the US in any event will be withdrawing substantial nuclear forces.

The DOD draft, at our insistence, takes some of these political concerns into account in that it stresses 1) MBFR will be a "controlling factor" in the pace of any nuclear modernization program involving changes in the stockpile,
SECRET

2) attention will be given to reinforcing NATO cohesion and improving the deterrent, and 3) NATO political and military authorities and staffs must continue to be directly and deeply involved in any process of modernizing NATO's concepts and posture. In contrast to previous years, State on the staff level has been able to participate actively in the DOD discussion and drafting effort. We remain concerned, however, that Secretary Schlesinger may not adequately underscore some of the caveats with Ministers Mason and Leber when he travels to Europe in the last week of September. His discussions with them will serve as a prelude to the November NPG meeting in Hamburg. Accordingly, we recommend that you take an early opportunity to mention our political and strategic concerns to Secretary Schlesinger prior to his departure for Europe.

Recommendation: That you find an early opportunity to convey to Secretary Schlesinger views on TNF modernization along the lines of the Talking Points at Attachment 1.

Approve ____________ Disapprove _________

Attachments:

1. Talking Points

2. Modernization and Reduction Proposal Paper

Drafted by:
EUR/RPM:GBHelman; PM/ISA:LBrown
9/10/75, x 21627
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TALKING POINTS

-- Nuclear modernization proposals that improve our military capabilities and increase deterrence should be pursued, but political factors must be controlling. Deterrence will not be increased if the impact of modernization proposals is to lessen US credibility with our Allies; nor will it be increased if discussion of our proposals undermines MBFR.

-- Any presentation to the Allies must be carefully tailored to:

- stress credible military rationales for suggested changes;
- underscore the importance of MBFR and our commitment not to reduce outside MBFR;
- make clear that our proposals at this stage are options, not final decisions, on which we seek their views;
- avoid discussion of numbers.

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Tactical Nuclear Force Modernization and Reduction Proposals

The Defense Department's working draft proposes reductions in the present European stockpile of 6,951 warheads of about 2,000 over several years. One thousand of these would be part of MBFR Option III. The reduction proposed would be taken from some combination of the following:

Nuclear Capable Aircraft. DOD proposes to target Poseidon and Pershing warheads on fixed targets in SACEUR's General Strike Plan (GSP) now assigned to nuclear strike aircraft in Europe; to replace a large number of nuclear capable F-4s in Europe with non-nuclear F-15 and A-10 aircraft; and to replace older fixed yield nuclear bombs with a new selectable-yield B-61 bomb on a less than one-for-one basis. The net warhead reduction that would result from these proposals is not clear, but it could be substantial (there are currently about 1,600 tactical nuclear bombs in Europe).

Issue. The missile-for-airplane substitution and nuclear bomb reductions raise two special problems: 1) shifting a substantial element of the US theater nuclear deterrent from tactical aircraft in NATO to strategic submarine forces will make the theater deterrent less visible and thus would suggest to the Allies the decoupling of the US nuclear deterrent for Europe's defense; and 2) reductions in the bomb stockpile in Europe could be very substantial, thus raising problems for MBFR.

Air Defense. A 50 percent reduction in Nike-Hercules batteries is proposed by end FY-76, with a gradual removal of all 700-plus nuclear warheads now in Europe. DOD argues that the nuclear Nike-Hercules is useful only against high-altitude massed bomber attacks, whereas the threat is from low-level penetration, which must be dealt with by conventional means.

Issue. Nike system is widely held by Allies and, though obsolete, is the only high-altitude system operational in Europe. Accordingly, the Allies will approach the proposition cautiously and will also see it as a potential negotiating problem in MBFR.

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Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADMs). DOD has scheduled 275 high yield ADMs for early retirement, with 100 low yield ADMs retained pending development and possible deployment of a new earth penetrator system that would not require pre-emplacement. (The weakness of the present system is that it requires an early Presidential decision for use if it is to be effective.)

Issue. Since there is no NATO agreement on the use of ADMs, the removal of the high yield systems should pose no serious political problem with the Allies. Removal does, however, raise the negotiating problem associated with MBFR.

ASW. Retirement of some 400 ASROC anti-submarine rockets and ASTOR nuclear torpedoes in the Atlantic and Mediterranean area is proposed on the grounds that the MK-48 conventional torpedo and other non-nuclear ASW weapons now coming into the inventory are more effective.

Issue. None of these weapons are for use by the Allies, so retirement should pose minimal difficulties for them. None are stored in the NGA.

Nuclear Artillery. Both the 8" and 155 mm nuclear artillery shells have very serious technical limitations. Congress has refused to fund a replacement for the 155 mm, but development of a new 8" shell is underway. It is not clear what Defense proposes to do with the 155 mm inventories.

Issue. Both systems are widely held for use by the Allies and the inventory amounts to 1,525. The numbers involved (755) in retiring the 155 mm warheads will have political consequences, not least in MBFR.

Lance. The Lance missile is now replacing Honest Johns and Sergeants in Europe on a less than one-for-one basis.
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Issue. Potential negotiating problem for MBFR.

Site Consolidation. There are 145 nuclear storage sites in Europe. Fifty-three are Nike-Hercules sites, of which 43 are projected for closure. Other consolidations, mostly on security grounds, are being considered.

Issue. Site consolidation offers benefits for peacetime physical security against the cost of higher vulnerability in wartime. The larger issue for the Alliance, however, is not the number of sites but the number and types of weapons within the sites.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Secretary Schlesinger and Secretary Mason
Plenary Discussion

DATE: September 24, 1975


PARTICIPANTS:

**UK**
- Secretary of State for Defence The Right Honorable Roy Mason, MP
- Minister of State for Defence The Right Honorable William Rodgers, MP
- Chief of the Defence Staff Field Marshall Sir Michael Carver, GCB, CBE, DSO, MC
- Chief Scientific Adviser Professor Sir Hermann Bondi, KCB, FRS, FRAS
- Permanent Under Secretary of State Sir Michael Cary, KCB
- Chief Executive Procurement Executive and Permanent Under Secretary of State E.C. Cornford, CB
- Private Secretary (Assistant Secretary) John F. Mayne
- Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger
- Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Ambassador Robert Ellsworth
- Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Joseph Laitin
- Assistant to the Secretary for Atomic Energy Donald M. Cotter
- Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and NATO Affairs Harry E. Bergold, Jr.
- Director of Net Assessment Andrew W. Marshall
- Defense Adviser, US Mission to NATO, Dr. Laurence J. Legere
- Military Assistant to the Secretary Major General John A. Wickham, Jr., USA
PARTICIPANTS (CONT'D)


Secretary Mason began the discussion by saying that he and Secretary Schlesinger had just had a very frank and useful exchange of views on problems facing the Alliance, and that in the Plenary Session they would touch on some of the issues to enable others to give their views.

Mr. Mason mentioned the pressures on the MOD to cut defense spending. He said he had resisted such pressures vigorously; particularly since the Defence Review had taken place and MOD had contributed a fair share to cutbacks in public expenditure already. But if events compelled a significant reduction of public expenditure, the MOD would have to make some cutbacks. Mr. Mason assured the group that there would be no reductions "to the core", but that he may have to make some cuts by deferring expenditure programs in public works, buildings and R&D for the 1977/78 time frame. He said that he was going to do everything possible to "hold the line".

Mr. Mason said that SecDef's visit came at a most opportune time as far as he was concerned, and that his trip to other capitals "would do a power of good in Western Europe". He thought the Secretary's visit would help to stiffen "European spines" and that it was the political symbol of the recent Nimitz Nuclear Task Force visit.

SecDef noted that the US also has political problems concerning support for defense, but that he was hopeful that Congress and the public would respond to the current situation with a growing awareness of the importance of maintaining an adequate defense posture. He felt that now the US public was beginning to support NATO once more, and it is important that the US public not perceive the US as carrying the burden of defending the West alone. The "spill-over" from the S.E. Asian experience was, fortunately, less than might have been anticipated. Senators, such as Mansfield, are making speeches strongly in favor of NATO.

In terms of the Alliance he thought that the UK position was "reasonably solid", the Dutch "needed pushing", the German contribution is solid and we now see the first hopeful signs of movement on the French front. Overall the Alliance position
looks reasonably good except for the instabilities in the Southern Region. Looking to the Northern Flank, SecDef noted that "as long as the Center is firm, the flanks get the benefit of spill-over deterrence".

The two Secretaries discussed the Greek/Turkish situation and the implications of the Greco-Turkish confrontation in Cyprus. SecDef and Mr. Bergold noted that a number of factors threaten further destabilization of NATO's Southern Flank and the changes taking place in most of the countries of this region point to inevitable changes in our security arrangements. At present, the US is engaged in base negotiations or is about to face them with every country from the Iberian Peninsula, across the northern littoral of the Mediterranean to Turkey (except France and Italy). SecDef felt that in both Greece and Turkey there is now a growing desire to reduce significantly "the US presence", particularly in Turkey. SecDef said that US/Turkey bilateral relations in defense matters would never again be restored to the previously high level of cooperation and trust, and the actions of the US Congress in imposing the arms embargo had forced the Turkish Government's hand. The situation was not one of strategic retreat and the US would be able to maintain some bases and a presence, and thus we should be able to keep some of the benefits enjoyed in the past. Certainly, the US can reduce its presence "without it implying strategic withdrawal". Mr. Mason agreed that the picture was "not as black as it has been painted". SecDef said he felt Congress now had the votes to repeal the arms ban on Turkey. However, serious difficulties would occur if in repealing the embargo Congress tied it to Turkish movement on the Cyprus issue and the Turks failed to move.

Turning to Spain Mr. Mason noted that "Jim had fought a good battle" and that the Monterey DPC had probably given the US what it wanted, but that the UK could not give more than it did "until after Franco". After Franco it should be possible for NATO to have better links with Spain.

The discussions touched on a number of specific items:

NORTHAG - The US has sought over the past year a solution to the NORTHAG brigade stationing problem. SecDef noted that the Allies with forces in NORTHAG were initially less than enthusiastic about the US proposal to station a US brigade as an advance element of a US corps. This whole concept is essential to gaining support from Bonn and, hopefully, British, Dutch and Belgium acquiescence in the brigade stationing.
BAOR - Mr. Mason noted what British are doing in BAOR to be helpful to NATO and to get the "best value per man" through improved man/weapon ratios, pruned logistic support, etc. The new British plan should double the British reinforcement capability in a 24-day period from 55,000 to over 100,000 men deployed. Field Marshall Sir Michael Carver said that among the benefits from the British Army's reorganization will be an improved ability to meet SACEUR's operational commitments through enhanced combat capability in terms of fire power (introduction of new weapons systems) and effective logistic support. The thrust has been to achieve manpower reductions (in non-NATO commitments) and to man equipment with fewer men proportionately to achieve improved weapon to man ratio. Also, the aim is to improve teeth-to-tail ratios by increasing the number of men in combat units and decreasing headquarters.

A new field force (larger and better equipped and with more fire power than today's airportable brigade) will consist of five new style infantry battalions each of four rifle companies. A limited parachute capability will be retained. The present brigade command level is to be abolished and replaced by a new divisional level of command having direct command over the battle groups. To achieve a cost effective solution the new division commands the maximum number of combat and logistic units possible. Throughout planning for reorganization emphasis has been consistently placed on increasing where possible the numbers and types of weapons systems and on obsolete systems being replaced.

He believed that the reorganization will enable the UK to provide an extra infantry formation of 5000 men in BAOR and an extra 5000 reinforcement capability from UKFL to BAOR.

DIEGO GARCIA - Mr. Mason raised the matter of Diego Garcia saying that he felt the British "had nothing to be ashamed about" in their handling of the resettlement responsibilities. He felt that he can defend the MOD against the assertion that Diego Garcia inhabitants were forcibly moved to Mauritius to make room for the communications station. Mr. Mason believes

TWO-WAY STREET - Mr. Mason noted that progress had been made -- the signing of the US/UK MOU was an element -- but in the context of rationalization/standardization, an important question is "how to deal with the French". SecDef commented that he felt the French were moving in the right direction. Mr. Mason agreed and said that losing the F-104 replacement battle had given the French a shock. They are now thinking about Eurogroup and how they might play a part in defense industrial collaboration.
SecDef was pleased with progress but felt that it was desirable to improve the organizational mechanism in Europe for weapons selection/production. The relative disparity in R&D efforts between Europe and the US (and between European NATO countries themselves) does create difficulties but the US will do its part to help narrow the gaps. Europe simply had to concentrate its efforts and see to it that everyone involved gets a benefit. "The trouble is that if there are 5 items perhaps you can only choose one, and if you choose one then either 4 countries or 4 companies are disappointed".

Mr. Mason said that the right kind of reorganization would evolve from the decisions that are being made. Already some good steps have been taken -- the F-16 program, the Trilateral Tank Gun Evaluation to select a common main gun and ammunition for the US, UK and FRG's future needs, the selection of MILAN and sub-HARPOON for UK forces, etc. Mr. Mason felt that better future progress would come through the two-way street notion if target figures were established and the goals used to force progress. Mr. Mason felt it important that we should not diverge from the objective of the two-way street by "setting up a new European bureaucratic organization which will only talk". The CNAD already has sufficient Terms of Reference "to do the job" and what is wanted is to strengthen it and "to involve the French". The French had a "big shock when they lost the F-104 replacement battle" and are beginning to realize that by not participating in the Eurogroup they are missing out.

Mr. Mason felt sure that there are bound to be European equipments that the US is interested in; what is essential now "is to start the traffic on the two-way street flowing". He accepted that the "spirit of this competition must be competitive".

SecDef said that he "did not see it entirely differently" and that we should start to proceed "both ways". He had not looked on CNAD "with vast enthusiasm" and the purpose of the US initiative in the NAC was to get a policy framework which would allow the rationalization/standardization problems to be worked more effectively. In the DOD, DDR&E has responsibility for looking at the long-range outlook of high technology weapons requirements but he felt that part of the problem is also "to push international cooperation; hence the US has put part of the decision-making responsibility into ISA". Our present purpose -- through the US initiative -- is to bring "the NAC itself into the picture" and to have the Council "over and above CNAD" on matters of principle and overall policy. Mr. Mason said he thought "we are not far apart on our thinking" and that "a permanent cell" on rationalization/standardization/two-way street matters is worthwhile considering.
Mr. Mason observed further that in taking his decision on MILAN and sub-HARPOON, not duplicating R&D was an important factor. SecDef agreed and noted this point had relevance to AWACS/NIMROD and also to tanks, trucks, and other items "not necessarily of high technological content". Mr. Mason said SecDef should not give the impression abroad that the US is only interested in doing the high technology things itself and buying low technology items from Europe. SecDef replied he agreed but we must recognize that there are huge requirements for tanks and trucks, etc. He assured Mr. Mason that "the US must look across the board". Certainly, the RAF's Airfield Attack Munitions is a case where the R&D effort is secondary but where the bomb's effectiveness is first rate. In looking at the whole picture, if a purchase is made, SecDef said, we must consider not only the R&D cost but the production cost and the procurement and life cycle cost as well. SecDef emphasized that he did not want the criterion to be the cost of R&D alone but the overall cost of what one buys versus its military effectiveness.

AWACS - SecDef unhesitatingly gave his full support to AWACS. Mr. Mason said the UK is fully prepared to help provided that "between us we can get other NATO nations involved". He indicated that if one or two other NATO nations would join the program, the UK "would play its part". He noted that if the UK joined AWACS it meant "ditching Nimrod and all that entails". SecDef felt that since the benefits would come to all NATO nations if AWACS were deployed, the UK should be prepared to save duplication R&D costs involved in the Nimrod program and instead help fund the more advanced AWACS program. SecDef emphasized that the US would strive for significant European co-production opportunities.

HARRIER - SecDef suggested if the US placed enough advanced work in the UK, that would help the UK on funding an AWACS purchase. Mr. Mason said he could "not link HARRIER and AWACS at this stage" and asked SecDef for his view of the likelihood of Congressional approval for AWACS. SecDef said that he could sell AWACS better if he could get a collective NATO commitment. The Congress is going to require evidence of other nations' intentions before authorizing FY77 funding. Returning to HARRIER, Mr. Mason said he had talked with Secretary of the Navy Middendorf, and he was pleased to learn from him that many improvements had been made to HARRIER performance. SecDef agreed the improvements were substantial, but in answer to Mr. Mason's question whether the US was likely to buy the improved HARRIER, SecDef said it is being considered, but he could not say more at present. Mr. Mason mentioned the UK decision on the maritime HARRIER and asked whether the US is interested in it. SecDef said that we are following it with interest.
Cruise Missiles - SecDef said the Soviet position on Cruise Missiles that those of greater than 600Km range be included in the aggregate of 2400 missiles "is a phoney one." The Russians are being very insistent on Cruise Missile limitations and the U.S. is also being insistent that only ballistic and not cruise missiles be included in the aggregate. SecDef said development of a cruise missile is part of the U.S. attempt to provide insurance against improvements which the Soviets are making in their missile force. The cruise missile will force the Soviet Union to greater defensive efforts particularly against high or low-level attacks. An attractive aspect of cruise missiles is that they increase the problems of verification. Certainly, for NATO cruise missiles are attractive: they will complicate enemy defense plans; they can be armed with either non-nuclear or nuclear warheads, and they are relatively invulnerable. Cruise missiles would provide NATO with an option for selective strike. On the BACKFIRE bomber, SecDef said the U.S. is under "heavy pressure" from the Soviets in the SALT II negotiations not to include it. He felt the aircraft had clearly been designed for "the peripheral mission" even though its range exceeded the FB-111 (but was less than the B-1) and the U.S. argued BACKFIRE should be counted. SecDef observed that it is essential, in fact, to underscore the legitimacy of the peripheral role of weapon systems and "not just their central strategic role." However, you cannot trade-off forward base systems against central strategic systems.

MBFR - SecDef said that on MBFR if the Soviet "peace offensive" grows, then it became increasingly important for them to make progress in MBFR. Certainly, the U.S. can hold deployment in Europe without prospect of MBFR reductions. The price of MBFR to the Warsaw Pact is a reduction of their forward offensive power against Western Europe.

TACTICAL NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION - SecDef spent a considerable time discussing his concerns about this subject, noting the need for early defeat of a Warsaw Pact attack requiring emphasis on planning for combined conventional and nuclear operations; and included emphasis on Pershing and strategic
forces. SecDef felt strongly that we must emphasize the need for a modernized tactical bomb stockpile; modernized nuclear artillery stockpile; and that we should de-emphasize the modernization of such defensive systems as ADM, ASW and Nike-Hercules. Continuing his general observations on tactical nuclear weapons, SecDef said that the deterrence value and war fighting value of tactical nuclear weapons comes from their offensive use. In aiming to modernize NATO's tactical nuclear weapons stockpile, we should look at ASW weapons. ASW weapons fall under the general heading of "the wrong kind of nuclear weapons" and the subject deserves "a good hard look in light of the progress of the last twenty years."

SecDef felt that as weapons became more accurate it became more important for NATO to consider the relationship between nuclear and conventional forces. Nuclear and conventional weapons are closely interrelated in the triad and the development of precision-guided conventional weapons gives the U.S. its greatest advantage relative to the Soviet Union. Precision-guided conventional weapons today can do considerably more than earlier conventional systems, and we are well ahead of the Soviet Union. In any event, NATO must evolve a tactical nuclear weapons strategy based on a modern force structure and a modern doctrine. We have inherited a stockpile of nuclear weapons from the past and our aim should be to modernize NATO's tactical nuclear weapons and not simply hope that obsolete nuclear weapons deployed in Europe by themselves will provide deterrence. NIKE-HERCULES, SecDef noted, is not effective as a conventional weapon and he does not think much of it for other reasons in its nuclear role. It is a high cost system with only marginal effectiveness. The whole business of air defense needs to be examined carefully as today's situation is quite different from ten to twenty years ago. The Soviets have simple ways for circumventing weapons like NIKE-HERCULES, such as low altitude attack and stand-off missiles.

SecDef said that the U.S. would consult fully with the Allies before making any changes in the NIKE-HERCULES posture, but restructuring must be considered. SecDef said it is important to rationalize our nuclear weapons deployment. If we do not, we run the danger in Congress of Congressional over-reaction which could lead to pressures for withdrawal of nuclear weapons. The danger with obsolete weapons like NIKE-HERCULES is that they give no substantial nuclear pay-off but instead "give you the wrong feeling about what you can accomplish." Nuclear air defense looked good at one time but not since the Soviets got missiles. Reliance on the present obsolete nuclear stockpile in Europe, SecDef said, is an inhibition to thinking about the future--and that is dangerous.
SecDef observed that he expected strong opposition to his wish to change

Mr. Mason agreed and he was hopeful that at the next DPC meeting "we can help to bring Leber along" on this matter. SecDef said he was not impatient but he could not expect "progress that soon anyway." FM Sir Michael Carver felt it prudent not to discuss the issue at the DPC but simply take the line that "we have studied it and this should be the doctrine for use of tactical nuclear weapons." He thought that "after a little muttering here and there" NATO would accept SecDef's formulation. The real tragedy is that we are caught "on the hook of Option III of MBFR."

MOU - SecDef and Mr. Mason signed at the beginning of the Plenary Discussion the US/UK MOU, the thrust of which would put defense procurement offset on a long-term basis and eliminate the need to negotiate in "offset" on a case-by-case basis. It was recognized that this bilateral MOU should in no way impair the possibility in the future of getting a larger multi-national arrangement covering the kinds of principles incorporated into the present US/UK bilateral MOU.

N.B. This MemCon has not been submitted for approval.

Prepared by: Michael G. Macdonald
Political/Military Attaché

October 5, 1975
SECRET

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SECRET SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 15901

STADIS

EXDIS

EYES ONLY FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARTMAN FROM AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: GW, MBFR, NATO, MPOL
SUBJECT: SCHLESINGER DISCUSSIONS WITH LEBER

1. SECRETARY SCHLESINGER MET FOR ABOUT NINE HOURS YESTERDAY WITH MINISTER LEBER. ISA WILL PRESUMABLY BE GIVING YOU A REPORT OF THE DISCUSSIONS.

2. HOWEVER, BY WAY OF SUCH URGENT BACKGROUND INFORMATION AS YOU MAY NEED FOR THE SCHMIDT VISIT I AM REPORTING SOME HIGHLIGHTS BELOW. THOSE HIGHLIGHTS ONLY COVER THE FIVE HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN DELEGATIONS, AND NOT THE ALMOST FOUR HOURS OF PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE MINISTERS IN WHICH MAJOR GENERAL WICKHAM WAS THE ONLY OTHER AMERICAN PRESENT.

3. I ASSUME YOU HAVE ALREADY SEEN YESTERDAY'S US INFO CABLE REPORTING THE JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE HELD BY SCHLESINGER AND LEBER.

BRIGADE 76.

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AT THE END OF THE MORNING DELEGATION'S SESSION,
LEBER ANNOUNCED THAT HE AND SCHLESINGER HAD REACHED AGREEMENT IN THEIR PRIVATE TALKS TO STUDY HOW THE STATIONING FUNDS FOR BRIGADE 76 CAN BE TAKEN OUT OF THE UNSPENT CIRCA 300 MILLION D-MARKS OFFSET FUNDS. HE SAID THIS WOULD BE DONE TEMPORARILY IN ORDER TO GET BRIGADE 76 STARTED, AND THAT BOTH MINISTERS WOULD JOINTLY MAKE EFFORTS TO RETURN THE MONEY TO THE SEVENTH ARMY OUT OF NATO INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDS OR FROM SOME OTHER SOURCE.

STANDORIZATION.

LEBER PRESSED HARD FOR CONCRETE PROGRESS. HE URGED DEVELOPMENT OF ALLIANCE-WIDE CONCEPT AND MISSION WITH COMMON MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. HE URGED SCHLESINGER TO TALK TO THE FRENCH AND TO TELL THEM THAT MORE MULTILATERAL RATHER THAN BILATERAL PROJECTS SHOULD BE DEVELOPED. HE SAID THIS IS WHAT THE GERMANS WERE TELLING THE FRENCH. AT THE VERY LEAST, LEBER SAID, WE SHOULD MOVE TO SOME CONCRETE STEPS LIKE IDENTICAL MUNITIONS CALIBERS.

SCHLESINGER AGREED WE SHOULD BE MORE CONCRETE AND SUGGESTED WE MOVE TOWARD PROTOTYPING AND COMPETITION AMONG PROTOTYPES. HE EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE THIRD COUNTRY EXPORT ISSUE POINTING OUT THAT THIS—AS WELL AS OUR WORLD-WIDE MILITARY OBLIGATIONS—COMPELLED US TO EXPAND OUR REQUIREMENTS TO A DEGREE THAT NATO MIGHT FIND TOO COSTLY.

LEBER SAID THAT GERMANY WAS REVIEWING ITS ARMS EXPORTS POLICY AND THAT "THE POLICIES OF THIS GOVERNMENT WILL SOON NOT BE A PROBLEM."

MBFR.

LEBER EXPRESSED THE GERMAN RESERVATIONS FORCEFULLY. HE WARNED THAT, SINCE THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE STARTED TWO YEARS AGO, WESTERN FORCES IN THE NATO AREA HAD ALREADY BEEN REDUCED UNILATERALLY. HE INSISTED THAT SECRET

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OPTION III SHOULD BE A ONE-TIME OFFER OF US NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION, NOT THE BEGINNING OF A PROCESS. FOR THE EUROPEANS AND THE GERMANS, HE SAID, THERE MUST BE NO NATIONAL LIMITATIONS, NO REDUCTION OF EUROPEAN EQUIPMENT, AND NO REDUCTION OF EUROPEAN UNITS REPEATING UNITS. (HE FAVORED THINNING OUT RATHER THAN ELIMINATING UNITS).
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SCHLESINGER DIFFERED WITH LEBER'S APPRAISAL REGARDING THE DECLINING STRENGTH OF NATO BUT AGREED ABOUT THE DANGERS IMPLICIT IN MBFR. HE SAID THAT THERE WAS NO INTERNAL LOGIC TO OPTION III, ITS ONLY PURPOSE BEING TO GET THE ADEQUATE RESPONSE OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY FROM EAST GERMANY. HE SAID THAT WE DID NOT HAVE TO ACCEPT PROPOSALS THAT JEOPARDIZED OUR SECURITY, AND WERE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE A LONG TIME UNLESS AND UNTIL ACCEPTABLE PROPOSALS WERE FORTHCOMING.

AWACS.

SCHLESINGER EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE FRG MIGHT ASSOCIATE ITSELF WITH THE AWACS PROGRAM. LEBER EXPRESS-ED AN INTEREST BUT SAID HE HOPED THAT OTHER EUROPEANS WOULD JOIN IN TO PREVENT ITS BECOMING SIMPLY A US-FRG MATTER. HE SAID WE SHOULD KEEP IN TOUCH ON THIS. SCHLESINGER WONDERED WHETHER THE ALLIANCE COULD ACT IN TIME.

NIKE-HERCULES.

THERE WAS A LONG DISCUSSION ON THIS SUBJECT GROW-ING OUT OF THE DPQ LETTER THAT SCHLESINGER HAD SENT TO LEBER.
DURING THAT DISCUSSION, SCHLESINGER STRESSED THE MARGINAL MILITARY VALUE OF THE NIKE-HERCULES. HE POINTED OUT THAT WE NOW HAVE MUCH BETTER WEAPONS FOR AIR DEFENSE, SUCH AS THE F-15 AND F-16, AND THAT WE ARE WORKING ON A SAM D SYSTEM THAT WILL BE VASTLY SUPERIOR. HE SAID THAT WE HAD TO MAKE OUR STRATEGIC DECISIONS ON THE BASIS OF OUR ANALYSIS OF OUR NEEDS RATHER THAN ON THE BASIS OF HISTORY. WHAT WE WANT, HE SAID, IS AN UNAMBIGUOUS, WELL-PROTECTED, DISCRIMINATING OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY WITH REAL DETERRENT VALUE. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE US WAS USING FIVE THOUSAND MEN TO PROTECT 45 NIKE-HERCULES BATTERIES, AND THAT THEY COULD BE BETTER USED ELSEWHERE. HE SUGGESTED THINKING OUT THE UNITS IF THEY COULD NOT BE COMPLETELY REMOVED.


LEBER SAID SEVERAL TIMES THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO HASTY ACTION AND THAT A WAY COULD BE FOUND SLOWLY, AS THE FRG WAS PREPARED TO LOOK AT THIS IN A FLEXIBLE MANNER. SCHLESINGER SAID HE COULD REASSURE LEBER THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE HASTY SOLUTIONS.
S H C L E S I N G E R S A I D T H A T  L O C K H E E D H A D T O L D  D O D T H E PRODUCTION LINE WOULD BE TERMINATED IF NO GERMAN PURCHASE DECISION WERE MADE BY NOVEMBER 1 AND THAT THE SYSTEM WOULD COST MORE LATER. SCHLESINGER SAID THIS WAS THE INFORMATION HE HAD BEEN GIVEN AND HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO ADVISE THE GERMANS WHAT TO DO. STATE SECRETARY MANN, REPLYING FOR LEBER, SAID THE FRG HOPED TO MAKE A DECISION BY THEN BUT THERE WERE MANY PARLIAMENTARY HURDLES AHEAD WHICH MIGHT MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE.

4. COMMENT: THE MOST NOTEWORTHY ELEMENT OF THE DISCUSSION WAS OBVIOUSLY THE AGREEMENT TO PROCEED WITH UNOBLIGATED OFFSET FUNDS TO COVER INITIAL BRIGADE 76 DEPLOYMENT COSTS AS FAR AS POSSIBLE. THIS TAKES SOME URGENCY OUT OF THE ISSUE BUT IT WILL LEAVE UNRESOLVED WHAT WE DO ABOUT LATER OFFSET FUNDS, A QUESTION THAT SCHMIDT WILL PRESUMABLY BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITH THE PRESIDENT. I ASSUME THAT, BY ACCEPTING THE GERMAN SECRET

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POSITION, WE ARE NOW A STEP NEARER TO BRIGADE 76 DEPLOYMENT BUT THERE ARE OBVIOUSLY MANY OTHER COSTS TO COME. AS I URGED IN MY 15834 I HOPE YOU CAN KEEP US POSTED.
THE OTHER NOTABLE ELEMENT WAS LEBER'S SUGGESTION,
WHICH HAS BEEN FORESHADOWED ELSEWHERE, THAT GERMANY
MAY MOVE MORE ACTIVELY TO EXPORT ARMS. CURIOUSLY, THIS
COINCIDES WITH THE DRIVE TO STANDARDIZATION, SINCE BOTH
STANDARDIZATION AND EXPORT AMBITIONS WILL MOVE THE
GERMANS TO DEVELOP WEAPONS THAT ARE NOT EXCLUSIVELY
SUITED FOR EUROPEAN CONDITIONS. END COMMENT.
HILLENDREND

SECRET

NNN
The Euromissiles Crisis and the End of the Cold War, 1977-1987

Part Two:
International Diplomacy

1978
NPG – HIGH LEVEL GROUP ON TNF MODERNIZATION – MAIN POINTS OF THE MEETING AT LOS ALAMOS 16-17 FEBRUARY 1978

1. Summary

NPG\(^1\) HLG (Task Force 10)\(^2\) was established at the NPG Ministerial meeting in the fall of 1977. The first meeting took place in Brussels December 8-9, 1977 (see report of 12.2.77). During the second meeting, it was decided that the next meeting would take place in Brussels on March 17, 1978.

On the agenda was the following:

1. Introductory Remarks
   a. Opening Remarks by the Chairman
   b. Discussion

2. Illustrative Alternatives
   a. Review of Comments on the “Conceptual Framework” Paper
   b. Elements of Posture and Their Combination in Alternatives: Remarks by the US
   c. Discussion of Alternatives
      i. Views on Adequacy of Range of Alternatives
      ii. Discussion of Each Alternative

3. Special Briefings
   (Will include, \textit{inter alia}, briefing on short-term measures by SHAPE and a review of technical opportunities for TNF modernization by the Hon. D. R. Cotter)

4. Next steps

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\(^1\) The Nuclear Planning Group.

\(^2\) The HLG was set up as a task force under NATO’s long-term defence program (LTDP).
a. Report to the Ministers

b. Future work

The first day meeting covered point 3 and most of the discussion of the four alternatives sketched out for TNF modernization (based on the US paper of February 7, 78)

The discussion of the principles of modernization was completed on day two, before a review of the established consensus was given, and the delegates agreed on a tentative plan for a HLG report for presentation to the NPG ministerial meeting on April 18-19, 78.

Finally, the US considers is beneficial that the NPG-HLG continues its work within the framework of the NPG after the task force 10 report is delivered.
2. **Day One**

In his introductory remarks, the HLG chairman, Assistant Secretary of Defence Mr. McGiffert, remarked that the HLG had reached a broad consensus about the main points of the American paper of December 5, 1977, concerning the “conceptual framework for TNF Modernization.” The paper, which had been revised in the light of discussions during the first meeting and later national contributions, was circulated during the meeting on February 16, 1978.

The American paper of February 7, 1978 on “Alternative TNF postures,” would serve as the primary basis of the discussions. The discussions aimed at creating consensus about the political guidelines underlying the TNF enhancement.

The sections on conceptual framework and political guidelines will constitute the main contents of the report from the NPG-HLG to the NPG ministerial meeting on April 18-19, 1978.

The Americans will prepare and circulate a draft report before the next HLG meeting on March 17, 78.

2.1. Before the discussion got underway, the SHAPE representative gave a short presentation of SHAPE’s short term measures report.

The considerations and recommendations of the report were based on the established political guidelines for NATO’s TNF.

A set of proposals for short-term improvement of the Alliance TNF posture, based on available TNF and relevant objectives, had been worked out.

The deficiencies were located in five main areas:

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3 David McGiffert.
After a review the report, SHAPE underlined that its proposals did not imply a change in NATO’s TNF posture, but that the proposed measures were a necessary step in the efforts to maintain the military foundation for the Alliance overall strategy of flexible response.

The SHAPE report will be forwarded to the NPG ministerial through the MC and the NPG. The HLG, moreover, will refer to the proposals in its final report.

2.2. In their introduction to the discussion of the “Alternative TNF postures,” the Americans underlined that the four alternatives were designed for the purpose of illustrating the problems and opportunities pertaining to various principles of TNF modernization.

The Alternatives aimed at:

I. Continuation of emphases [sic] in current posture.
II. Increased emphasis on the engaged battle area and its immediate support.
III. Increased emphasis on targeting the deep support to Warsaw Pact aggression
IV. Balanced emphasis on engaged battle area and deep support.

Alternative 1 and 4 would represent a continuation of the existing posture, but that alt. 4 could involve some new initiatives, possibly at the expense of SHAPE’s short term measures.

While alt. 2 emphasized battlefield use, alt. 3 would prioritize so-called deep-strike systems.

As discussions got underway, the Canadian delegation raised the question of what a “deep

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4 The Military Committee.
strike” really constituted and of what geographic area the TNF would cover.

SHAPE’s representative, supported by Germany, held that a “deep strike” primarily covered TNF long range systems, which, incidentally, should be able to cover the western parts of the USSR.

The Norwegian delegation, represented by Deputy Minister of Defence [Johan Jørgen] Holst, pointed out that what was to be considered a “deep strike” depended on the location from which the weapon is launched. It would not be in Allied interest to plan and develop the TNF weapons on the premise that the western border of the U.S.S.R. cannot be crossed; the options should however cover the border as a firebreak. The HLG report should discuss the arms control implications explicitly.

The Dutch representative held that the report must emphasize the need to improve the conventional forces. It was not desirable to widen the role of TNF in the overall Alliance strategy. The report needed to distinguish between issues directly and presently pressing for the ministers on the one hand, and complicated long-term measures/principles on the other. As for “deep strike,” it was important also to clarify the relevant targets.

The Turkish delegation, pointed out that special geographical factors were relevant to the issues on the table.

The Danish delegation expressed a desire for alternative 1 or 4 or a combination of the two. It was also necessary for the Alliance to maintain the conventional force.

The Belgian representative underlined the need to emphasize that the strategy was valid and that the Alliance did not aim to alter the balance within the triad.\

The British delegation held that the ministers should receive a general briefing emphasizing the character of change.

With regard to “deep strike”, the UK did not wish to establish Soviet territory as an

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5 The NATO Triad of strategic, theatre nuclear and conventional forces.
insurmountable boundary in Alliance TNF planning.

With regard to the public relation aspect of the present discussions, the Norwegian delegation underlined the need to be able to explain and defend the general guidelines for the TNF modernization. This issue was particularly relevant in the event of a decision giving more weight to “deep strike”.

The German delegation considered that the consensus with respect to the alternatives would be somewhere between 1 og 4 – the Germans preferred either 1+ or 4-. One hoped that the Alliance would achieve the necessary consensus and subsequently develop the TNF forces on that basis.

SHAPE pointed out that the TNF would have to provide “flexible options” and cover the entire area from short-range battlefield systems to general nuclear war. With regard to short-range systems (maximum 100 km), the Alliance was in a fairly good position. For medium and long-range systems, the Alliance depended on dual-capable aircraft, Pershing missiles and SLBMs.

Aircraft were first of all highly vulnerable, and furthermore, the long range Vulcan would soon be replaced by the Tornado, which has only medium range.

With respect to SLBMs, SHAPE’s representative called attention to the problem the opponent would be facing with respect to establishing whether strategic or TNF weapons had been employed.

If the Alliance decided on alternative 1, the politicians would lose the option of graduated escalation of a conflict.

The Dutch delegation underlined that alternative 1 had to be a basis for further discussions and the starting point of future improvements. It was out of the question to ask the Alliance to make far-reaching decisions with respect to the TNF during the ministerial meeting and summit this spring.
The **Norwegian** delegation pointed out that the Dutch considered alternative 1 to be uncontroversial because this modernization model was very closely connected to what NATO already possessed in the TNF area. However, it was important to underline that the characteristics of both alternative 1 and NATO’s existing posture within Alliance overall defence [alliansens totalforsvar] would be lost if necessary modernizations were not undertaken.

The **British** delegation supported this and pointed out that NATO’s TNF posture was in a state of perpetual change and that it was influenced by changes in technology and threat perception.

The **American** delegation pointed out that the maintenance of NATO’s existing TNF posture and its role in the triad presupposed gradual modernizations such as ERRB\(^6\), Pershing II and the B-61 bomb.

It was also necessary to consider ADM\(^7\) and Air Defence questions relevant to the issues on the table.

2.3. In the American presentation of “technical opportunities for TNF modernization,” D.R. Cotter put particular emphasis on modernization options that would improve the security, safety and survivability of the TNF weapons.

The development of so-called insensitive high explosives and the use of such nuclear weapons (including B-61 and Cruise missiles) would decrease the possibility of unintended detonation substantially.

Recently developed protective materials for storage and transport for nuclear weapons would allow for storage of bombs underground in QRA\(^8\) aircraft hangars as well as more

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\(^6\) Enhanced radiation, reduced blast weapon, also known as the the enhanced radiation weapon (ERW) or the neutron bomb.

\(^7\) Atomic demolition munitions (?).

\(^8\) Quick reaction alert.
effective and flexible transport of warheads, including trucks with custom-designed control devices.

The implications of this new warhead security for allied strategy and doctrine would be considered more closely.

Several representatives expressed a wish for the to be circulated unclassified materials on the development in this area.

2.4. During the last part of the discussion of alternatives on day one, several countries warned that both alternative 2 and 3 could possibly lead to a danger of unintended decoupling.

The Norwegian delegation underlined that NATO must not signal that it is focusing on specific and limited “response options” in the development of its TNF weapons. Alternative 2 would possibly be seen as a suicide strategy, especially from a West German point of view.

The American delegation raised the question of whether the fundamental problem with regard to “deep strike” was political or military.

The British and the Germans held that there were obvious military reasons why the TNF should include “deep strike”. The Germans, moreover, were strongly against alternative 2, and they considered what had been said concerning “deep strike” to be very important. In this context, one considered cruise missiles to be a fitting option as a political counterweight to SS-20.

The Norwegian delegation pointed out that cruise missiles were intended for a general response role. The transfer of forces that a cruise missile deployment would free out could nonetheless strengthen the NATO TNF posture. Deputy Minister Holst also raised the question of the arguments for the wish for Cruise missiles. Was this because other options were closed through SALT, or was system considered a fitting new option vis-à-vis the Soviet Union?
3. **Day Two**

3.1. Towards the end of discussion of the options, the Norwegian delegation suggested that instead of using the term “deep strike,” one could use “long range systems,” which seemed less dramatic.

The proposal gained general support.

SHAPE underlined that NATO’s TNF posture was militarily at its weakest when it came to long-range systems.

The Norwegian delegation supported alternative 1-4. It was to a high extent a question of available technology and economic resources.

The report should inform the ministers about the art of modernization and which direction any possible changes would take.

The German delegation underlined that one saw the German participation in NATO’s TNF as satisfying. There was no wish for an increase in the German role. As for the alternatives, the preference went clearly in direction of 4.

The British delegation wanted an increase of emphasis on long-range systems, possibly at the expense of shorter-range battlefield systems.

The Norwegian delegation underlined that the report should treat the question of the size of the TNF stockpiles in Western Europe. The number, however, should not be fixed; more detailed discussions later could decide the stockpile mix.

Several representatives pointed to the necessity of including relevant problems in relation to Air Defence and ADM in future discussions of the Alliance TNF posture.
3.2. There existed both a British and an American draft work schedule for the preparation of the HLG report to the NPG ministerial meeting. The majority supported the British draft, which was considered to be most suitable to transmit to the ministers. The report will be based on consensus about the following main points:

– A need for modernization of TNF so that they can fill their role in the overall defence

– Excessive emphasis on battlefield or long range systems leads to a danger of decoupling.

– In light of the development in the Soviet Union, a need for a balanced development of TNF with increased emphasis on long range systems.

– Land-based systems must be survivable

– With respect to NATO policy for the TNF – no firebreak for Western USSR.

– NATO planning must take into account the special position of the flanks.

– Survivability, security and safety in addition to C3 and TIES⁹ are of central importance to the modernization work.

– The number of weapons will have political implications.

– The relationship with press and public of great need.

– The defensive character of the TNF forces will be emphasized.

– The arms control implications must be considered.

– The role of TNF within NATO’s overall defence will not be increased.

⁹ Tactical imagery exploitation system (??).
– SACEUR’s short-term measures are regarded to be in accordance with the guidelines of the HLG.

– Air Defence and ADM require further discussions.

– Broad allied participation in TNF will be maintained.
August 18, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR:
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: SCC Meeting, PRM-38, Tuesday, August 22, 1978

Attached is the final draft of the response to PRM/NSC-38. This draft will form the basis of the August 22nd SCC meeting scheduled at 3:00-4:30 PM in the White House Situation Room.

Christine Dodson
Staff Secretary
Response to PRM-38

Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces

August 19, 1978
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PRM-38 Annex: Current and Projected NATO/Warsaw Pact Forces Available for Theater Use
A. **What is the nature of the theater nuclear problem?**

The evolution of Soviet theater and strategic nuclear forces has revived or created new military and political questions about the structure of nuclear deterrence for the defense of Europe. (See Chart I for summary of current forces.)

Since the early 60s, the Soviets have been able to devastate Europe with long-range theater nuclear systems (SS-4/5, etc.). Soviet doctrine and force posture reflected such a massive use of nuclear weapons that the Soviets would have to reckon with a US strategic response. The US was perceived to have superiority in strategic and theater nuclear weapons.

Three changes have brought this deterrent posture into question:

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First, qualitative and quantitative improvements in Soviet theater nuclear capabilities have brought the Soviets closer to more credible responses to NATO nuclear use at lower levels (e.g., nuclear-capable aircraft, Frog follow-on).

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Second, the Soviets have introduced new long-range theater nuclear systems — SS-20 and Backfire. While this will not significantly alter Soviet capacity to devastate Western Europe with major employment of long-range TNF, it has revived European concern about the threat that has long been posed by these systems. — especially since they are unconstrained in SALT, while some possible US response options could be constrained by SALT and MBFR.

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Third, US acceptance of strategic parity, in SALT terms, has deepened concerns in Europe about the credibility of US strategic use in the defense of Europe.

The FRM has identified two competing US views about the military and deterrent consequences of these changes: Some believe that the mobility of SS-20 has made limited nuclear strikes on Western Europe more credible because the Soviets could execute such strikes without fear that a NATO response would eliminate the remaining force. They also believe that in the context of strategic parity, the Soviet improvement of long-range theater nuclear forces has highlighted NATO’s lack of a comparable capability in the theater, having relied mainly on
strategic forces to deter nuclear strikes from the Soviet Union on Europe. This "gap" deprives NATO of an escalation option, below strategic use, and thus undermines deterrence. Finally, they think that US TNF modernization programs lack dynamism and rely excessively on short-range battlefield systems and on vulnerable dual-capable aircraft for longer-range missions.

Others feel that limited SS-20 options are not credible, since the three SS-20 RVs each have high yield and since the Soviets would invite attacks on the USSR by using it as a base for attack on Europe. They also point out that the Soviets have long had parity in assured destruction capability and despite this, the US strategic deterrent remains coupled to Europe by the US presence and strong interests there, by the fact that any Soviet attack on Europe would be devastating, and by continued commitments by American leaders. They doubt that in their response the Soviets would differentiate between US-controlled attacks on the USSR from Europe or from outside Europe. They also point out that the US has some capability for a limited response against the USSR from European territory (F-111), and that NATO has roughly the same range capability to attack into Pact territory as the Pact has into NATO territory, when basing is taken into account. In sum, they believe that the current mix of short- and long-range systems is adequate, though modernization is needed, especially a reduction in vulnerability.

These considerations aside, the views of our Allies are of critical importance to the future solidarity of the Alliance, and our response to their concerns must be carefully weighed. Because their interests are not identical to ours, our Allies do not necessarily see the problem as we do. As the only major NATO power to have renounced nuclear weapons, the Germans have a special stake in the credibility of the US deterrent. The Germans are concerned with the adequacy of the NATO deterrent in light of strategic parity. They also feel that the US is preoccupied with the homeland—homeland strategic balance at the expense of those aspects of the strategic balance that impact more directly on European security — the Soviet long-range theater nuclear systems. The Germans have expressed a primary interest in controlling the Soviet threat through arms control while improving NATO's own long-range capabilities.

The other Allies share these concerns to varying degrees, though are less vocal. The British are concerned that US interests in SALT and the US-Soviet relationship could be to the detriment of their nuclear relationship with us. The British and French are, however, wary that a significant shift toward more long-range systems in Europe could appear to be an attempt to "decouple" the US strategic deterrent from Europe; and they are concerned that arms control negotiations could constrain their own independent nuclear options. Still, both want to maintain FRG confidence in the NATO deterrent posture.
B. What are possible strategies and approaches?

Two broad strategies are possible: (1) to attempt to solve the problem through new initiatives that do not include significant steps toward new hardware modernization or arms control approaches; (2) to go further and respond to the European interest by pursuing a twin strategy toward hardware modernization and arms control proposals.

Those who believe that there is a military and deterrence problem believe that NATO should acquire an increased capability for selective nuclear strikes on the Soviet Union from Western Europe and for enhancement of the in-theater contribution to the NATO general nuclear response against the USSR. The aim would be to deter limited use of the SS-20 and strengthen the coupling of the strategic deterrent. Survivability, good penetration capability, and high political visibility with the Allies would be important characteristics.

— A force as small as 100 systems could contribute to selective use and provide a visible link to US strategic forces, but whether selective use of such a force would be adequate to halt Soviet aggression is scenario-dependent. This force would not change heavy reliance on US strategic systems for strikes into the Soviet Union in the general nuclear response.

— A force as large as 1,000 or more systems would provide NATO with most of the capability it needs for the General Nuclear Response without US strategic systems, but could suggest notions of a separate theater balance and appear to be an attempt to decouple the US strategic deterrent.

Some believe, however, that the present European problem is a recurrence of long-standing European concerns about the US commitment to nuclear deterrence in Europe. They believe that this concern has been intensified by certain US decisions — B-1, ERW and perhaps international economics. They note that the US has been able to deal with these concerns in the past through political, institutional and other measures, and that the present problem may also be susceptible to new demonstrations of US leadership and commitment to the security of Europe, before taking significant steps toward new hardware or arms control solutions; e.g., commitment of more Poseidon/Trident, institutional arrangements to strengthen strategic planning, modernization of the shorter-range forces, increased consultations on US arms control positions, etc.
Others believe that attempts to treat the problem without moving on hardware and arms control will not suffice and will raise suspicions about American intentions and commitment. These suspicions could harm Alliance solidarity and undermine attempts to improve the conventional balance in the LTDP.

There are risks that a purely hardware route, especially with large deployments in Germany, could cause the Soviets to react in ways that could have a negative impact on both US and Allied security, e.g., in SALT and in force deployments against Europe.

A purely hardware approach also risks political opposition on the Left in Europe, opposition that could be fired by a Soviet propaganda campaign and that could threaten to undermine Western Europe’s coalition governments.

Arms control could help stabilize and regulate long-range theater nuclear competition in Europe, control the Soviet threat, and build Allied confidence in long-term stability. However, there are technical and political problems that arise in seeking control of theater nuclear arms. Nonetheless, it may be difficult to avoid the arms control issue since it is likely to arise in SALT III.

Arms control could serve to mitigate the risks of a purely hardware approach — with the Soviets and domestic audiences in Europe and the US. At the same time, clear US willingness to enhance long-range strike capability could be an added inducement for the Soviets to negotiate about their systems. Without such apparent willingness, arms control alone would be unlikely to produce agreement on any effective limitation on Soviet systems.

We cannot yet tell whether an arms control agreement that is effective and acceptable can be negotiated, nor whether such an agreement would preclude the need for additional Western deployments of long-range theater nuclear systems.

Some of these objectives for hardware and arms control could create public presentation problems. The public may not support purchase of systems if these are perceived as intended for use only as bargaining chips, though it may be willing to support a force designed to match the SS-20. Similarly, an arms control approach whose only objective is to provide political support for hardware is likely to be seen as cynical. On the other hand, public support for carefully selected force deployments in support of our NATO Allies and for a serious related arms control effort can be forthcoming, especially in Europe.
If purely political solutions are not sufficient, the problem is not "whether arms control or hardware," but rather how to manage a combination of both approaches.

C. What decisions are needed at this point, prior to the Fall consultations?

There will be a number of stages in the modernization and arms control consultations through the end of this year which could affect how we orchestrate our positions. The schedule for arms control consultations will begin with bilateral talks early this Fall, which could be followed by an NAC on the same themes later in the Fall, and probably another round of bilateral talks before the end of the year as our thinking unfolds. The HLG will meet in early Fall prior to the NPG Ministerial in mid-October. We need to begin work almost immediately on a paper for this phase of the HLG. While these consultations proceed, long-range theater nuclear programs will be bringing critical decision points nearer and shaping both the hardware and arms control options that are realistically available.

In consultations so far, the US has been ambivalent toward both hardware modernization and arms control in order to preserve options pending future study. We have stressed that both approaches need to be examined together. This study has not reached a point where we can agree to a well defined integrated hardware/arms control approach. But it does raise the question of whether we want now to take a more definitive stance toward the concept of an integrated strategy without making a final decision. It also suggests that further analytical work could be simplified by the elimination of infeasible or undesirable options.

1. How should the US approach the HLG meeting?

Although the HLG supported "an evolutionary adjustment" toward "somewhat more" long-range in-theater strike capability, subject to a detailed examination of the political and military issues involved, the USG has not endorsed this conclusion. The President was non-committal at the Summit. The Allies will be watching closely to see how the US approaches this problem in the Fall meeting. The issue now is whether we embrace this HLG conclusion and continue the process of detailed examination, or whether we remain non-committal, while proceeding with the examination.

On the one hand, embracing the HLG conclusion would not represent a final decision for a new long-range force posture,
but would be the first step toward additional hardware. Embracing the conclusion would allow us to concentrate on the political and military issues. However, it may take us further toward long-range systems than the political leaders in some Allied governments are ready to go.

On the other hand, we may prefer to remain non-committal because we may need more time for either USG analysis of credible alternative integrated strategies for both arms control and hardware, or to decide whether a purely political initiative is feasible, or both. The question is whether the Allies can help us with our analyses — especially the political and military dimensions — without forcing us into commitments we are unready to make. In this case, we would rely on sustaining our programs as a sign of good faith. However, continued ambivalence could stand in the way of the detailed examination of the issues that we and our Allies need before coming to a final conclusion, and over the long run would raise questions about US sincerity to examine the issue, thus exacerbating the political problem.

In any event, we will want to use the HLC meetings to discuss with our Allies some of the military and political implications of certain long-range theater nuclear options. We will want eventually to raise questions of domestic politics and public presentation and of possible Soviet responses. We do not want the Allies to choose a specific hardware approach at this point.

2. How should the US approach the arms control bilaterals?

The working level has largely agreed that any hardware and arms control approaches should proceed simultaneously and be closely integrated. If the SCC agrees, we would want to indicate this view to the Allies in both the arms control bilaterals and the HLC. Also, we should indicate a positive attitude towards arms control if we associate ourselves with the HLC conclusion. In this case, it would be important to stress that we have not yet defined a specific arms control approach that we are comfortable with.

Our initial round of bilateral consultations on arms control should probably be used to discuss and agree with the Allies what our objectives might be in entering into arms control negotiations, and to go into the technical problems that we see. We may want to give them a paper along the lines of Section III of this study.
Section II

POSSIBLE LONG RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION

August 16, 1978

DOWNGRADED
Per E.O. 12958, Section 3.1 (g)
by National Security Council
I. INTRODUCTION

This section examines the military issues and related political issues associated with a potential decision to proceed with the deployment of improved long-range nuclear delivery systems in Europe.

First, this section describes the candidate systems for such improvement and the military rationale for providing more long-range capability. Then the section defines the potential European target sets for such systems and lays out the survivability, range and basing considerations applicable to these targets. Next, the section discusses various force levels and the potential for Allies' participation and cost sharing. The section concludes with a qualitative evaluation of eight alternative force postures to illustrate the range of options available and the tradeoffs among those options.

Assumptions and Constraints

Existing NATO documents and the NPG High Level Group Report develop several assumptions and constraints which, if accepted by the U.S. government, would guide or limit the choices of improved systems. With respect to long-range systems:

- There is a need for an "evolutionary" adjustment in NATO TNF that would provide somewhat more in-theater long-range capability than at present.

- NATO's TNF should continue to be modernized consistent with agreed NATO strategy in order that they may continue their essential role in the NATO TRIAD and continuum of deterrence.

- An excessive emphasis on a longer-range strike capability could convey a perception of decoupling, signaling an intention to seek a balance independent of the other elements of the NATO TRIAD.

- There should be no perception of sanctuary as regards attacks into the Soviet Union.

- There should be no implication of increased roles for NATO TNF's.

- NATO should seek to maintain the widespread participation of NATO nations in the TNF role.

- Modernization of the TNF must not divert resources from the conventional improvements.

- NATO's long-term modernized NATO TNF can be accomplished within the numbers of warheads associated with the present TNF.
Although existing policies and the views of the HLG provide an extremely important point of departure, and reflect the carefully considered views of the Allies, the systems, targets and alternative force postures examined in this section are not necessarily constrained by this guidance on the presumption that policy makers may wish to examine a broader range of potential improvements.
II. LONG RANGE TNF SYSTEMS

There are seven candidate NATO TNF systems which could meet the requirement of 1000km or greater range capability. These are:

**Cruise Missiles**
- Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM)
- Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) (Sub & Surface)
- Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCH)

**Ballistic Missiles**
- Pershing II Extended Range Ballistic Missile (PIXR)
- Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM)
- Sub-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM)

**Dual Capable Aircraft**
- F-111, A-6, A-7 (Particularly with standoff armament such as a or longer-range ALCH)

Discussion:

A. CRUISE MISSILES:

Cruise missiles are in some ways similar to manned aircraft. However, because many of the airplane multi-weapon delivery and human engineering requirements can be eliminated, the cruise missile can be made less complex and considerably smaller than manned aircraft. In addition, pre-launch survivability is better because its deployment during periods of crisis and conflict is not tied to fixed bases.

Other features of the cruise missile include its very small radar cross section, very low-altitude flight, relatively high accuracy at long ranges, and an all-weather capability. In addition, because they are relatively inexpensive, they may be deployed in large numbers to complicate and saturate the enemy's defenses. The land-attack cruise missile, whether air, sea, or ground-launched, will carry a single nuclear warhead with a selectable yield capability. US cruise missiles are currently planned to have a system operational range to . Due to necessary evasive and navigational in-flight maneuvers a range allowance is being built into the missile beyond .

(b)(1)
The cruise missile should be survivable in all but the most severe threat environments. Cruise missile survivability against present and future defenses derives from its capability to navigate accurately over long range, fly at very low (terrain clearance) altitudes, and remain relatively undetectable due to its low observables (radar cross section, infrared or visual).

Additionally, the effects of saturation or precision attacks would substantially reduce the capability of these sophisticated air defenses.

- **SLCM**: A land-attack Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) is currently in full scale development with an IOC of 1982. SLCM survivability and flexibility will be determined by the launch platform. They have the advantage of being able to deploy to other theaters within a relatively short time and without requiring land-based platforms. SLCMs will require minimal force structure overhead as the delivery platforms already exist. They could also not be included in NATO's preplanned strike programs without constraining other activities of the platform.

- **GLCM**: The Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) will be similar to the TOMAHAWK Sea-Launched Cruise Missile, except it will be land-based. As presently envisioned the missile will be carried in centrally-based mobile launchers, each with four tubes. During peacetime, the launchers may be housed in protective shelters at existing MOBs. Each operating base might have 36 launchers with a total of 144 missiles. Operational launchers will have the capability for rapid load-out and dispersal to remote locations. The launch vehicle is accompanied by a mobile communication vehicle and launch control vehicle, and the unit will be self-sustaining for short periods to ensure readiness at dispersed locations.

- **ALCM**: For the strategic mission, the US has programmed the long range Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) to be carried on B-52s and is also looking at the possible use of wide-body transport aircraft as additional cruise missile carriers (CMC). Strategic ALCMs could be launched from outside the Warsaw Pact radar perimeter and still cover more than 50 percent of the total Warsaw Pact target area. Launch points would be selected to utilize ALCM range and numbers to overcome area defenses and to enhance the penetration capability of the manned bomber force. Small numbers of CMCs would be required because of their capacity to carry a large number of cruise missiles. For this reason, however, CMCs would become high value targets. Because of the heavy Soviet air defenses in Europe, and because CMCs would be accountable in the SALT II aggregates, if the ALCM's range was less than their usefulness as a NATO system might be limited. Moreover, because of their low number and high cost, CMCs do not readily lend themselves to broad Alliance participation. Dual-capable tactical aircraft could also carry ALCMs; however, the draft SALT II Treaty limits deployment of
ALCMs with a range of over 2,000 to heavy bombers; consequently, an F-14 equipped with ALCM's would count as a heavy bomber.

B. BALLISTIC MISSILES:

Ballistic missiles such as the Extended Range Pershing II (PIIXR), the Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) and the Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) would have shorter flight time and higher penetration probability than cruise missiles and could in principle be employed against time-urgent targets. At the same time, they are relatively more expensive than cruise missiles. As with the cruise missile, the ballistic missile would rely on mobility for pre-launch survivability. In terms of escalation control, ballistic missiles may have advantages over cruise missiles by producing an unambiguous signature which would indicate both their origin and their ultimate target, and not requiring as large attack sizes in order to ensure penetration.

Pershing II Extended Range (PIIXR): PIIXR is a long-range variant of the basic Pershing II missile and is currently in the conceptual stage with a projected IOC of no earlier than 1985-1986. Its accuracy would be increased by maneuvering reentry vehicles and an all-weather radar activated in the terminal phase of the trajectory. At the same time, mobility and survivability would be improved somewhat.

MRBM: The MRBM is currently in the early conceptual phase. The MRBM could be operated in a mobile mode similar to GLCM or Pershing. It should be possible to produce a lightweight, accurate ballistic missile whose transporter could be operated on the existing Western European highway system, similar to GLCM and Pershing, by the late 1980s. With an MRBM System of this size, dispersion and pre-launch survivability should be similar to that of GLCM. The MRBM could be MIRVed.

SLBM: The Poseidon SLBM weapon system carries sixteen missiles in the 1980s.* The SLBM is the most survivable of the TNF strike systems, since SSBNs on patrol are virtually immune from detection. The characteristics of the system make SLBM a good general nuclear response vector, in their ability to carry out selective theater nuclear strike. As with SLCM, they are not a visible sign of NATO's TNF capability.

C. DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT (DCA):

DCA can, attack mobile or multiple targets, be retargeted or recalled in flight, fly a number of sorties and evade enemy defenses. In addition,

* France has its own SSBN force, with 64 SLBMs.
DCA have a self-defense capability. DCA also have some limited capability for immediate bomb damage assessment or verification of delivery. However, DCA generally have a lower probability of penetration than other systems and are influenced by severe weather and enemy defenses. Land-based DCA would be less survivable than ballistic or cruise missiles which had been dispersed in a crisis situation. Currently some land-based DCA are on 15 minute alert in order to respond to enemy attack or, in the case of US aircraft, to disperse rapidly to avoid destruction. The land-based DCA presently provide a visible tie between strategic and tactical nuclear forces. Additionally, sea-based A-6 and A-7 have the advantage of moveable launch platforms to enhance their capabilities (but not necessarily their survivability).

D. EFFECT OF SYSTEM MIXES ON MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS.

While each of the systems previously described has specific operational characteristics, their military utility and survivability by designing force postures can be enhanced by employing a mix of different weapons systems, but the costs could increase.

For example:

- Ballistic missiles have a greater capability against mobile and/or time-sensitive targets. DCA, because of the presence of an on-the-scene observer, can within limits carry out terminal aim point selection, mission abort, or bomb damage assessment of earlier strikes.

- Mobile systems on land and at sea substantially complicate the planning of preemptive attacks.

- Fixed land-based systems probably provide the highest degree of responsiveness, in terms of timeliness.

Any improvement to the long-range element of theater nuclear forces must meet SACEUR requirements for a balanced mix of systems to deny the enemy a simple response options against varying targets needed for escalation control. Through more costly, a multi-system force provides the highest assurance of success and the greatest perceived "balance", once it is regained.

E. ALLIED REACTIONS TO LONG-RANGE CANDIDATE TNF SYSTEMS

While the primary purpose of the next meetings of the High Level Group will be to hear Allied views, we do have some idea as to their potential reactions.
III. MILITARY RATIONALE, OPERATIONAL FACTORS, BASING, SURVIVABILITY AND RANGE CONSIDERATIONS

A. MILITARY RATIONALE

NATO's fundamental objective is to deter Warsaw Pact aggression. To achieve a credible deterrent it is essential that rational and feasible military options be available, which are founded on responsive, survivable, and militarily effective forces sufficient to meet any type or level of aggression. In addition, this force capability must be clearly recognizable by the Warsaw Pact as evidence of NATO's resolve to escalate the conflict to general nuclear war, if necessary.

The NATO TRIAD with its component parts of conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces has been developed to enable the Alliance to execute the strategy of flexible response. Within the TNF leg of the TRIAD, NATO maintains a mix in both quality and quantity of battlefield, maritime, medium, and long-range strike systems to serve as bridge between conventional and strategic forces.

Survivable, accurate, reliable, long-range, TNF contribute to a full range of NATO options:

-- by conveying to the Soviets the message that they cannot employ nuclear systems from their own territory or other peripheral sanctuary areas against NATO with impunity.
by threatening enemy conventional force concentrations and key support installations throughout Warsaw Pact territory, including the USSR, thus diminishing the likelihood of a quick Warsaw Pact victory;

by complicating enemy planning and making him operate in a nuclear survivable posture to the full depth of the theater even in a conventional attack;

by providing a counterbalance to possible Soviet first use of chemical weapons;

by providing a capability for the deliberate and discrete use of nuclear weapons to signal NATO determination to escalate the war beyond the ongoing level of conflict, unless the Pact acts to terminate the fighting;

by ensuring the unquestioned ability, even following a Soviet first strike, to execute a General Nuclear Response in conjunction with the SIOP;

by reducing the need for cross-targeting to achieve SACEUR's military damage requirements.
B. OPERATIONAL FACTORS

The underlying principles for determining operational factors/considerations are the capability to place reliably a weapon on a target and the effect that capability or weapon can have on the political and military situation as well as force sizing requirements. Many of these factors/considerations are common to both selective use and general nuclear response, while some are unique to the particular use.

1. Common Factors

The long range systems currently scheduled to carry out NATO's Selective and General Nuclear Response include POSEIDON, POLARIS, PERSHING, and aircraft (F-111, Vulcan, F-4, F-104, F-100, Jaguar, A-6, A-7, Buccaneer). These systems are limited in their ability to strike all types of fixed targets in SACEUR's Scheduled Program or for certain uses in Selective Employment Plans. PERSHING 1A is not, of course, available against most of the targets facing the Northern and Southern Region nor does it cover targets in the Soviet Union. POSEIDON could be used in any region provided selective release targeting objectives could be accommodated within the
MIRV characteristics of the system (footprint) and that the fixed yield and accuracy of the system enable target damage objectives to be achieved without unacceptable collateral effects. For example, POSEIDON would not be suitable against hard targets or targets requiring low yields. In addition, the disclosure of a submarine’s position by the launch of a missile could jeopardize the survivability of the submarine and its remaining missile systems. The DCA in the theater nuclear role are subject to attrition while carrying out their conventional missions, and subject to further losses when penetrating Warsaw Pact air defenses while executing long-range missions.

In considering the kinds of future long range systems, NATO needs to consider a number of operational requirements: 1) Damage Expectancy; 2) the Target Base; and 3) the Soviet response.

Damage Expectancy (DE) is the probability of damage to be expected in an attack on an installation with the planned weapons. It is based on the product of probability of arrival and probability of damage. The probability of arrival is essentially the reliability of placing a weapon on a target and includes such factors as pre-launch survivability, weapon system reliability, penetration capability, and weather/darkness factors. The probability of damage considers only the accuracy of the delivery system (CEP), the hardness and size of the target, and the yield and burst height of the weapon. To insure application, the required Damage Expectancy requires a larger number delivery system than one weapon for one target.
2 exempt pages
4. Unique Advantage of Land-Based, Long Range TNF

European continental-based long-range TNF systems, though perhaps more vulnerable than sea-based systems, nonetheless, offer inherent political and military advantages to NATO, by:

- Serving as a direct and visible link between NATO's territorial integrity and risk to the Soviet homeland in the event of armed aggression by the Warsaw Pact.

- Attacking more efficiently mobile second and third echelon targets of opportunity.

- Providing expanded opportunities for Allied participation and risk sharing in deterrence or the conduct of the war.

- Reducing Soviet opportunity to limit damage in Western Europe in a nuclear first strike, thus reducing the value of an occupied Western
Europe as a Soviet objective while at the same time placing the Soviet Union at risk.

- Enhancing SACEUR capability to target more fully opposing threat in the scheduled programs.

- Providing additional options which can prevent the enemy from predicting with confidence NATO's specific response, thus encouraging him to conclude that an unacceptable degree of risk would be involved regardless of the nature of his attack.
4 exempt pages
D. RANGE/BASING CONSIDERATIONS

This section will consider three principal issues associated with the potential deployment of long range systems: 1) Target coverage; 2) survivability and basing considerations; and 3) political/arms control constraints.
5 exempt pages
E. Political Considerations of TNF Range and Basing

(b)(1)
2 exempt pages
IV. FORCE SIZE

If a decision were made in principle to deploy a long-range theater nuclear capability in Europe which can strike the USSR, the question of the size of that capability would have a major impact on its deterrent value, its military contribution, its cost, its effect on political perceptions, and possibly its impact upon arms control prospects.

A. SOME BROAD APPROACHES TO SIZING THE FORCE OF LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS

1. Match Soviet Forces. One approach would be for NATO to match Soviet long-range theater nuclear forces. The degree to which NATO TFN should balance, quantitatively and qualitatively, the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union is primarily a political question. The candidate levels to be matched are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Launchers</th>
<th>Missiles</th>
<th>RVs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Longer-range</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-20</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>3750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backfire (LRA)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fencer</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Range</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scaleboard</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>240?</td>
<td>240?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCUD follow-on</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>800?</td>
<td>800?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tac Aircraft</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not all of the Soviet longer-range systems would be directed against NATO. If force-matching is mostly a political and perceptual matter, the question is raised whether it should be done against launchers, which are countable and fewer, against missiles or RVs, which are controllable and larger, or against reload missiles, which are unknown. Costs would vary considerably depending on the choice.

* This section does not discuss the intricacies of cross-targeting or various other ways in which SACEUR's military requirements might be met.
2. **Target coverage.** A second approach is to hold at hostage a certain number of Warsaw Pact targets. SACEUR's present target base includes:

(b)(1),(b)(3) 42 USC §2168(a)(1)(C)–(FRD)
3. Replace current systems on a one-for-one basis. A third approach is to replace on a one-for-one basis current launchers with improved systems. Such an approach would achieve greater survivability and greater penetration probabilities while nominally maintaining the same TNF force levels. If dual capable aircraft were freed up for other roles, their replacements would have to be additive to current force structure. MRBMs could replace Pershings on their current launchers; however, this raises the question of the availability of systems for shorter-range missions.

The current NATO force structure includes:

Possible replacement alternatives are:

(1) F-111s, Vulcans, and Pershings (about 400 Launchers).

(II) F-111s, Vulcans, Pershings, and SLBM RVs (about 550 launchers)

5. Attain size to permit Allied participation. A fifth approach would be to acquire sufficient launchers to insure widespread Allied participation. Current NATO longer-range systems are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Launchers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>492</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(F-111, Pershing, Poseidon tubes)

(SSBN Tubes, Vulcan)

(Pershing)

At this stage, it is doubtful that any of the smaller countries could afford to buy any launchers. The US, UK and FRG will continue to be the three most likely countries to be involved in owning long range theater nuclear systems.

6. Size forces within the overall TNF posture. If the roles of theater nuclear forces within the overall NATO posture are not to be changed and priority is still devoted to conventional force improvements, certain restraints on the size of new long-range forces will be introduced.
B. ILLUSTRATIVE FORCE SIZE.

What would be the effect of adding increments of long-range forces to the existing TNF of: less than 100 systems; a few hundred to a thousand; and over a thousand?

1. Less than 100 long-range weapons. In general, procurement of complex weapons requiring supporting systems tends toward excessive unit cost when they are purchased in limited quantities. A preliminary analysis of where the cost plateau occurs in the candidate systems indicates that it is above a force size of approximately 100-200 weapons (see chart, next page). Of course, total cost for smaller options would be less since total procurement would be less. Furthermore, while such limited numbers would have some utility in the execution of selective employment options, the overall numbers would appear to be very low, in view of the large numbers of SIOP and other forces. This is not to suggest that the initial operational capability represented by a few tens of longer-range systems would not be an important response to the Alliance political and strategic concerns, or provide arms control bargaining leverage vis-a-vis the Soviets.

2. From a few hundred weapons to less than a thousand. Such a force would be easily achievable within existing TNF force levels. The size seems to be large enough to provide adequate survivability and flexibility, given care in the force/system design. A force of this size might be able to relieve NATO of the need to generate up to

3. Over a thousand to few thousand.

There are certainly sufficient targets to justify a force of this size and such a force would obviate many of the concerns which arise regarding pre-launch survivability and penetration probability. However, it would seem excessive for the following reasons:

-- Considered in the context of a modernization to be carried out within the general TNF force levels it would convey a fairly
clear message that the role of TNF in NATO strategy had significantly changed.

-- The cost of such a large force would almost certainly have to be at the expense of improving NATO's conventional capability.

-- This range of force size begins to approach levels similar to SIOP forces which could convey an implication, to both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, of a decoupling of US strategic forces from the NATO Triad.

C. SUMMARY

The higher the costs, the less politically saleable the package. Moreover, even if we were to say that the costs should be paid at the expense of other programs in NATO (with total defense expenditures kept relatively constant), there would be reluctance to unbalance Alliance efforts under the LTDP. The larger and more rapid the deployment -- even if money were not a major issue -- the more conspicuous would be the departure from earlier practices in the Alliance, and the greater the political difficulties would be for each ally. Finally, the larger the deployment, the more concerned our Allies -- including the FRG -- would be that we were, in fact, creating the means to decouple: to fight a nuclear war entirely with resources located in or near the continent, holding US strategic systems aloof.

At the other extreme, a minuscule deployment of new systems would probably also be unacceptable to Bonn, since it would not constitute a credible psychological offset to the SS-20, nor would it represent a credible bargaining chip for arms control purposes.

Military consideration--i.e., the operational problem of providing for viable escalation control at each potential level of theater nuclear war--support rejection of a small or token force. The need for survivability against the threat posed by Soviet TNF systems at all ranges indicates a mix of systems for force effectiveness somewhere in the middle range of deployment size. Therefore, we would expect to find a package of systems which is militarily effective and big enough to be impressive; not too big and too costly to be repugnant; reasonably explainable in terms of military rationale; and therefore the right vehicle for political consensus in the Alliance.
V. PARTICIPATION AND COST-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS

As a general principle, NATO seeks widespread participation in the theater nuclear forces. This principle was expressed in the 1969 Provisional Political Guidelines (PPG), in NATO Ministerial Guidance, and in the recent HLG Summary. The main advantage is that of shared risks, as an expression of the solidarity of the Alliance. There can be other advantages, such as shared costs and the economics of more than one nation sharing development and acquisition costs of a given system versus independent national developments of similar systems.

There are several qualifications to the general principle. All nations do not participate in all the Alliance nuclear weapons systems, e.g. (b)(1)

The smaller countries face obvious problems of costs and economics especially for the more expensive, nuclear-capable-only, long-range systems. Secondly, with the exception of the UK, the US must supply (and thus bear the costs of) the nuclear warheads and control the release of all the warheads. Thirdly, the US seeks to avoid nuclear proliferation and the emergence of independent national forces, thus limiting the kind of sharing arrangements available.

A. COUNTRY POSITIONS

Inevitable differences among the several nations of the Alliance will influence what sharing arrangements would be possible for long-range nuclear systems.
B. KINDS OF ARRANGEMENTS.

There could be many kinds of participation and cost-sharing arrangements for new long-range systems. The following four probably bracket the possibilities:

1. US unilateral deployments. Systems would be developed, procured, manned, and supported entirely by the US and would remain entirely under US control (though targeted by SACEUR under existing arrangements). Nations would provide basing, including, presumably, land acquisition and local construction costs and perhaps share in OEM costs. This type of arrangement is used for the UK based F-111s. It has merit in that it provides a visible commitment of US forces to NATO and the force itself is clearly and unambiguously tied into US C3 channels. This would have the advantage of augmenting NATO’s long range TNF capability while retaining control in US hands and thus placing the main political and SALT non-circumvention burden on the US. This option would open up the clearest opportunity to negotiate bilateral limits on long-range theater systems and in the broader sense to soften the probable sharp Soviet reaction that NATO acquisition of a long-range TNF capability is likely to produce. It would also offset potential objections to FNG access to long-range systems.

However, this arrangement would have several disadvantages:

- Cost-sharing schemes would probably be limited to infrastructure funding.
- Basing opportunities and Allied participation would be limited. Even with the F-111 and SSBN precedents.

(b)(1)

- U.S. Congress would object to a unilateral US contribution to the Alliance.

(b)(1)
3. National Development and Production of Long-Range Systems. The various nations would produce the systems themselves, with US technological support and sale of critical components.

4. Multi-national force. Nuclear warheads would remain under US control, but multinational purchase, ownership, and manning of the force (i.e., individual smaller national units in a combined basing and command structure) would be arranged. This arrangement envisions an international force with multinational ownership of the systems and multinational manning of the force. Overall command would likely remain with the US and authority for release would remain unquestionably with the US. Cost-sharing arrangement might be similar to the AWACS formual of national shares.

The advantages of such an arrangement are that it provides for the broadest degree of national participation and visible presence throughout the Alliance, as well as the greatest survivability. The major problem is its political feasibility. Multilateral procurement negotiations have been difficult, witness the 1960's MLF and the present AWACS.
VI. ALTERNATIVE FORCE POSTURES

Nine illustrative TNF force postures have been postulated to illuminate the most important issues associated with a potential US/NATO decision to deploy new long-range systems. For the most part, the alternatives focus on the increment which provides the additional long-range capability with the presently existing components of the TNF remaining essentially unchanged. These alternatives are not proposed as actual candidates for future decision. The numbers and characteristics of the long range systems are illustrative of a general range.

Each of the alternatives illustrates a different set of issues:
**Alternative I (Current Capability)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Characteristic - 1985</th>
<th>Launchers (approx)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lance Missiles</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pershing II</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b)(1)

F-111 and Vulcan            200 A/C
Polaris (UK)                64
Poseidon                    40

Total Number of NATO TNF    2,284

(b)(1),(b)(3) 42 USC §2168(a) (1)(C)--(FRD)

### A. Military and Deterrent Implications

(b)(1)
4. The forces would provide a capability to delay, halt, or defeat enemy forces in contact with NATO forces.

B. Political and Arms Control Implications

The Allied reps in the HLG have expressed their desire to increase NATO's capability to strike targets in the Soviet Union. Although they have supported the US interest in modernizing battlefield and theater support weapons systems, they continue to exhibit an uneasiness. They do not wish to create the impression that an aggressor could hope to confine the conflict to NATO territory (or some portion of Eastern Europe). More importantly, the Allies are concerned with the implications of the Soviet TNF buildup of forces for the continued coupling of US strategic forces.

C. Cost*

The ten year cost of maintaining and modernizing the present NATO TNF force would be approximately 14 billion dollars. This figure serves as a baseline for the cost of the alternatives which follow.

* See Appendix I
NATO would deploy in the theater a MIRVed Mobile MRBM, plus a new "Strategic" aircraft. The survivability of the force, as well as Allied participation and cost sharing, would mirror the Soviet model. With respect to other NATO TNF, little would change.*

A. Military and Deterrent Implications

B. Political and Arms Control Implications

This force could not be deployed until the end of the 1980s.

This alternative would remove any Allied perception of asymmetry between NATO and Warsaw Pact long-range TNF. However, the size of the force might raise serious questions in NATO regarding the coupling of US strategic forces to the NATO Triad and the extent of the US commitment to Western Europe. Moreover, the size and costs could create serious tensions among our Allies as regards cost sharing, participation, and base rights as well as opposition among the US and European publics.

* This alternative force is viewed by the interagency working group as unrealistic both in terms of allied acceptability and of the large size and cost. However, the two sides forces would in essence represent a "Eurostrategic Balance."
C. Costs

The costs of matching the Soviet SS-20 and Backfire would be an estimated 27 billion dollars (10-year life cycle costs)* or 13 billion dollars above the costs for the baseline THF posture. Unless overall defense expenditures were increased or funds were drawn from US strategic programs, this alternative would be accomplished only at the expense of conventional forces. Operations and maintenance costs for this force are also likely to be very expensive, particularly if pre-launch survivability requirements dictate extensive peacetime dispersals. In that case, costs could be prohibitive.

* Assumes 200 MRBM launchers and 200 FB-111 B aircraft.
As the system is intended to be used late in a sequence of escalation, it must be able to survive even a massive Soviet preemptive nuclear strike.

A. Military and Deterrent Implications.

B. Political and Arms Control Implications.

This alternative, by "matching" the Soviet deployment of the SS-20, raises the issue of its effect on Allied perceptions of the coupling of US strategic forces to the NATO Triad and the willingness of the US to share in the risks involved in NATO defense. With respect to arms control, the cruise missile force would remove some of the "hair-trigger" problems associated with ballistic missiles. The threat posed to the Soviet Union would not be a disarming one. On the other hand, NATO could be criticized for introducing a new long-range missile system in the European theater, thus fueling the arms race.
C. Cost.

The 10-year life cycle cost of the incremented force in this alternative is approximately 22 billion dollars, or 8 billion dollars above the baseline, thus potentially requiring trade-offs with conventional force improvements. The degree of peacetime dispersal required could make the additional associated costs and manpower providing security and support prohibitive.
A. Military and Deterrent Implications. NATO would most likely view this alternative as a direct counter to the SS-20, although differences in the demography and relative target values open to each do not necessarily make them equal, politically or militarily. The linkage of this force to US strategic forces would lie in US control and targeting in coordination with SALT. The NATO Allies, on the other hand, might view this force as a decoupling the US strategic deterrent. The dispersal requirements for this force appear to be politically infeasible, as basing an MRBM in any country except the FRG would appear most unlikely; another drawback of this force would be the time it will take before NATO could deploy the MRBM.

B. Political and Arms Control Implications. NATO would most likely view this alternative as a direct counter to the SS-20, although differences in the demography and relative target values open to each do not necessarily make them equal, politically or militarily. The linkage of this force to US strategic forces would lie in US control and targeting in coordination with SALT. The NATO Allies, on the other hand, might view this force as a decoupling the US strategic deterrent. The dispersal requirements for this force appear to be politically infeasible, as basing an MRBM in any country except the FRG would appear most unlikely; another drawback of this force would be the time it will take before NATO could deploy the MRBM.

C. Cost. Investment costs of an MRBM force of this size would be high, something on the order of 24 billion dollars in 10-year life cycle costs, or 10 billion dollars above the cost of the baseline, and likely at the expense conventional improvements. To maintain a mobile system and provide the desired survivability that separates the MRBM from DCA and air bases will entail high costs for maintenance and daily operations. Personnel must be available for multi-shift duty, and new bases would be required in widely dispersed areas for training and logistics functions.
even if one succeeded in keeping most of the missiles and warheads away from those locatable sites. Security costs would be high from the simple multiplication of sites to be kept secure.
There are obviously other ways to structure this force, changing the mix among its elements. This combination sought to field not less than 100 of each new missile and to retain a balance between land and sea-based weapons.
B. Political and Arms Control Implications. Land basing of the Pershing II and GLCM force would insure force visibility and greater survivability than current NATO forces. This force would be a limited response to the SS-20, probably not large enough to raise widespread concern over decoupling, and because it would be introduced beginning in the early 1980s, it might prove an incentive for arms control negotiations.

C. Costs. Pershing investment costs would be in hardware for the missiles and warheads. O&M costs would depend upon the degree to which present field maneuverability is sustained. GLCM would require new facilities and ground equipment as well as missiles and warheads. Unless new ships were to be procured, the SLCM cost would require only an increment to existing fleet costs. The total 10-year life cycle cost of this alternative would be approximately 18 billion dollars, or 4 billion above the current TNF program costs.
A. Military and Deterrent Implications

B. Political and Arms Control Implications

The Allies would perceive this force as a US commitment to modernize long-range TNF and as visible evidence to the Soviets of NATO's commitment to the nuclear defense of Europe. As a response to the SS-20 and BACKFIRE, the force would provide a near term response and perhaps bargaining leverage in any future arms control negotiation, and leverage in achieving broad arms control objectives. The force would
provide sufficient Allied participation to encourage involvement by all countries in modernizing theater nuclear forces.

c. Costs. For Pershing, the investment costs would be in hardware for the missiles and warheads. GLCM would require new basing facilities, launching equipment, missiles and warheads. FB-111H's costs would be shared with the Allies. The total 10-year life cycle cost of this alternative would be approximately 23 billion dollars or about 9 billion dollars above the base line.
A. Military and Deterrent Implications.

B. Political and Arms Control Implications. The Allies traditionally have been somewhat skeptical regarding the credibility of sea-based nuclear strike forces. This skepticism derives from concerns about the willingness of the US to employ these systems, their capability for rapid withdrawal for use elsewhere, their lack of visibility, and lack of Alliance participation. Whether this predominantly maritime alternative, which includes a small land-based long-range capability, would be a sufficient Allied response to the Soviet TPNF buildup, is uncertain. Whether impact on Allied views would be greater than commitment of more SLOM RVs also in unclear.

C. Cost. The provision for dedicated undersea platforms and additional platforms to permit continuous peacetime dispersal has a potential to increase both the investment and O&M costs over that of similar sized long-range alternatives. The estimated 10-year life cycle cost might be expected to be in the order of 24 billion dollars, including the cost of the ten submarines, or 10 billion over the baseline cost.
With respect to participation and cost sharing, NATO would continue present arrangements with the SLCM probably being

(b)(1)

A. Military and Deterrent Implications.

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

If the present SALT II agreement is accepted the CWC would probably have to be counted against the US sub-ceiling on MIRVed missiles.

The costs associated with the ALCM variant would be largely dependent upon how many CWC were chosen but not be significantly different from the basic alternative.
B. Political and Arms Control Implications. This alternative meets the Allies' desire to respond to Soviet theater nuclear modernization by introducing a visible long-range capability. The quantity is not large enough to suggest decoupling. Whether it would be sufficient as the NATO response to the SS-20 and Backfire is uncertain. The alternative would not significantly change many of the relationships regarding cost and risk-sharing nor pose any need to alter the present nuclear control arrangements.

C. Costs. This alternative could be implemented at or under the cost associated with maintaining or modernizing the UK SLM and Pershing forces both in terms of investment and O&M, since personnel requirements can probably be held at present levels or even reduced. The estimated 10-year life cycle cost would be established at about 17 billion dollars, or 3 billion dollars above the baseline.
A. Military and Deterrent Implications.

B. Political and Arms Control Implications. The Allies reaction will depend upon how they perceive the intended coupling, including the value of a force which provides a continental land-based threat to the Soviet Union but which falls short of a full retaliatory response. One view might be that this change represented a "dangerous tokenism," i.e., provocative to the Soviet Union without providing any substantial benefits to NATO. Another view might be that such a largely symbolic deployment would strengthen the credibility of the US strategic deterrent and contributions to a potential arms control agreement by indicating NATO's willingness to deploy a long range nuclear capability.
C. Costs. The 10 year cost of this alternative would be approximately 15 billion dollars. As it would replace the present Pershing force, NATO could expect to maintain the over-all TNF posture at only slightly greater cost (1 billion dollars) than Alternative I, the "Null Case."
B. Political and Arms Control Implications.

This alternative would alleviate Allied concerns for asymmetry between NATO and Warsaw Pact TNF but may raise the decoupling issue. The balance in NATO/Warsaw Pact theater nuclear forces would be better apportioned. Soviet incentive to engage in negotiations on arms limitations might be enhanced. Political acceptability of some weapon systems
by the Allies might be troublesome unless associated with some arms control objective. On the other hand, this force offers opportunities for Allied participation and risk sharing.

C. Costs. MRBM and GLCM would require new basing facilities, launching equipment, missiles and warheads. A mobility feature in the MRBM could increase costs depending on the mobility deployment concept. SLCM costs include missiles only and installation on surface platforms. Submarine costs were considered sunk costs. FB-IIIH's costs would be shared with the Allies. The total 10-year life cycle cost of this alternative would be approximately 28 billion dollars or about 14 billion dollars above the baseline forces.
ANNUAL COSTS OF U.S. TNF IN NATO
FY 1977 $ (From Army Cost Book & FYDP)

Army

Lance BN $9.4M x 6 BNs = $56 M
8" BN $9.7M x 13 BNs = $126 x 1/3* $42 M
155 mm BN $10.6M x 17 BNs = $180 x 1/3* $59 M
Nike Hercules Btry $2.9M x 15 Btrys $46 M
ADM Team $.06 x 100** $6 M
Pershing Force (3 BN + 1 INF BN) $143 M
Total $352 M

Navy

(b)(1)(b)(3) 42 USC §2168(a)(1)(C)--(FRD)

Poseidon $40.8/SSBN x 2.6 SSBNs $106 M
A6-A7 $1.1/AC x 140 AC $50 M
= $156 M

Air Force

F-4s $1.02M/AC x 300 AC = $306M x 1/3* $100 M
F-111 $1.66M/AC x 156 AC = $259 x 1/3* $85 M
= $185 M

Grand Total $693 M

- Annual Cost of U.S. TNF Based in Europe 700 M/yr x 10 yrs.*** $7 B

- Programmed Procurement (No Impact on G&M Assumed)
  -- (b)(1) $0.5B
  -- PII (108 LCHRS + 90 Reloads) $1.3B
  Total $2.7 B

- Allied TNF Annual Cost 1/2 U.S. $300M - $400M x 10 yrs $3B - 4B

Total $14B

* Arbitrary allocation of 1/3 for nuclear mission.
** 4 men/team @ $15K/man/year.
*** Assume additional TNF in CONUS which could be deployed to NATO
approximate the annual cost of Allied TNF ($300M - $400M).
III. Long-Range Theater Nuclear Systems in Arms Control

A. Background and Objective of Arms Control Negotiations on Long-Range TNF

1. Negotiating Background

There are by now four principal TNF-related negotiating precedents: Soviet attempts to include US forward-based system (FBS) in SALT; cruise missile and Backfire limitations; the agreement in the joint statement of principles to negotiate protocol issues in SALT III; and the NATO "nuclear offer" (Option III) in MBFR.

FBS

Long-range theater nuclear systems were first introduced into the SALT process early in SALT I, when the US briefly argued for the inclusion of Soviet IR/MRBMs. The Soviet Union rejected the inclusion of such systems on the grounds that SALT limits should apply only to systems which threatened the homeland of the other side. According to this criterion, the Soviets then insisted that Allied nuclear systems and US FBS--i.e., US missiles and dual-capable aircraft able to reach Soviet territory from bases in the UK, Continental Europe, and Asia, and from forward-deployed aircraft carriers--be dealt with in SALT.

Soviet proposals on FBS have taken several forms. In their initial SALT I "radical" solution to the FBS issue, the USSR urged that all FBS (both carrier and land-based) be withdrawn some unspecified distance from Soviet territory, that their forward bases be liquidated, and that Allied nuclear systems be included in the limitations. Later, they demanded "compensation": in exchange for systems not withdrawn, the Soviet Union should be allowed to deploy a larger number of strategic missiles.

US responses to these Soviet demands in SALT I were based on the so-called "Helsinki formula" of December 1970, which stated that consideration of "other nuclear delivery systems" (both US and Allied) would have to be deferred until such time as "all the elements of an initial agreement on central systems have been worked out." Although the Soviets clearly viewed this formulation as inadequate, the US successfully resisted the inclusion of US FBS and Allied systems in the 1972 Interim Agreement.

Once the Interim Agreement was signed, the Soviets immediately served notice that the FBS issues would be central to their approach to SALT II, and staked out a maximum negotiating position in the first session. The US firmly rejected any FBS limits in SALT II, and the Soviets agreed not to include FBS in the SALT II guidelines drafted
at Vladivostok in 1974. Subsequently, they proposed non-
transfer provisions which were aimed at constraining FBS.
The US rejected the non-transfer proposal, but offered to
deal with the question through a generalized non-circumvention
provision. In the context of the SALT II agreement now being
negotiated, the Soviets also raised the FBS issue in discussions
of the Joint Statement of Principles for SALT III. Here the
Soviets called for a "radical solution" to the question of US
forward- and carrier-based systems, as well as Allied
systems, as a goal for SALT III negotiations. The US refused
to commit itself to any such discussions, and eventually the
Soviets tabled language which dropped any explicit reference
to Allied systems and US FBS, replacing it with the more
general formulation that future limitations and negotiations
take into account "all relevant factors that determine the
strategic situation."

**Cruise Missiles and Backfire**

Once the FBS question had been removed from
SALT II at Vladivostok, its place as a contentious issue was
taken by the cruise missile and Backfire issues. There are
clear technical differences between these two systems./
However, the two sides have used practically identical argu-
ments (that their own system was primarily a theater system
and thus peripheral to the central strategic balance) in
resisting consideration of Backfire and medium-range cruise
missiles as strategic systems.

Neither issue has yet been resolved. Our major
European Allies see a basis for concern in the different
formal treatment the cruise missile and Backfire have received
in SALT II. In the case of Backfire, the US has indi-
icated a willingness to exclude this system from the overall
aggregate, if the Soviets would provide certain specific
assurances that would limit production to the present rate and
inhibit Backfire's ability to be employed in an intercontin-
ental role. To many Europeans, this formula may be perceived
as heightening Backfire's theater role.

Several of our NATO Allies--especially the FRG--
have expressed concern that the Joint Statement of Principles,
in conjunction with the Protocol, raises the possibility that
SALT III will deal only with central systems and cruise
missiles. The FRG also fears that US agreement to continue
to negotiate on Protocol issues means that the US theater
options (e.g., cruise missiles) will unavoidably be less open,
and they note that no similar potential limitation exists for
Backfire or the SS-20.

To allay these concerns, in February 1978, the
US informed the NAC that it was contemplating handling the

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FBS/cruise missile question by a unilateral declaration outside the Agreement, stating that "any further limitations on US systems primarily designed for theater missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems." After bilateral discussions with the FRG, France, and the UK in June 1978, the US has decided that it will issue the declaration, at an appropriate time after signature of SALT II.

At present, the major cruise missile provisions in the draft SALT II Treaty and Protocol relevant to potential TNF negotiations involve cruise missile definitions and range limitations. The US position is that SALT limits should apply to nuclear and conventionally armed cruise missiles only for the period of the Protocol. After expiration of the Protocol, the US maintains that the numerical and range limits will apply to all armed cruise missiles deployed on heavy bombers, but only to nuclear-armed cruise missiles on other aircraft. Limits on conventionally armed cruise missiles, if any, will be subject to further negotiations. On the other hand, the Soviets maintain that SALT limits apply to all cruise missiles for the full period of the Treaty.

Non-Circumvention

The sides have now agreed to the US-proposed language on non-circumvention, which provides that neither side shall circumvent the agreement "through any other state or states, or in any other manner." There is no explicit non-transfer provision; nevertheless, the existence of a non-circumvention provision referring to "other states" has raised Allied concerns that US flexibility to transfer systems, components, and technology might be restricted. They have consistently urged that this provision be given a narrow interpretation. For instance, the Petrignani Group paper urged (in 1977) that non-circumvention not constrain: (a) systems which are of less than SALT ranges, but which because of European basing could be considered strategic by the Soviets; (b) transfer of technology which is common to strategic and non-strategic systems; and (c) continued US support for the UK. The Allies have also talked of interpreting the non-circumvention commitment as tied exclusively to those systems limited in the Treaty.

In response to these concerns, the US has indicated its willingness to issue, after signature of SALT II, an interpretive statement to the NAC and to Congress about the significance of the non-circumvention provision. In essence, the statement will present the view of the US that: (a) the provision simply makes explicit the inherent obligation any state assumes when party to an international agreement, and does not impose any additional obligation whatever, beyond the specific obligations of the provisions of the Treaty and Protocol; (b) we have made clear in the negotiating record that transfers of weapons or technology...
to our Allies will continue, and cannot, therefore, ipso
facto constitute circumvention; (c) transfers of systems not
numerically limited or prohibited by the agreement would not be
affected; transfers of numerically limited systems would not
necessarily be precluded, but would be dealt with on a case-
to-case basis; transfers of systems prohibited to the US would
be precluded; (d) the provision will not affect existing
patterns of collaboration and cooperation with our Allies,
nor preclude cooperation in modernization; and (e) in accordance
with recognized international practice, no third party can be
bound or legally affected by the obligations the US assumes.

MBFR

The only other current TNF-related negotiating
concern involves the NATO "nuclear offer" (Option III) in
MBFR. However, Option III is a carefully circumscribed offer,
reflecting a "most threatening elements" rationale and is not
designed to deal with the overall theater nuclear balance.
Option III does set a numerical limit on all US nuclear
capable aircraft, and on all US launchers for ballistic SSMs
with a range exceeding 500 km. It thus covers MRBMs and
Pershing II Extended Range systems but not GLCMs, and does
not include European systems.

In the abstract, it is also possible that the
proposed US unilateral statement on theater systems could be
construed as reopening the question of nuclear limits in MBFR;
however, the intended meaning of the statement is that limi-
tation on US systems other than those already proposed in
MBFR should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on
Soviet theater systems.

2. Possible Objectives in Negotiating Long-Range
TNF

There are several hypothetical political and
military objectives that negotiations on long-range theater
nuclear forces could be intended to serve. They are by no
means mutually exclusive; broadly speaking, they could
include:

---responding to European concerns about the
perceived implications of strategic parity, and about Soviet
theater modernization. In this case, negotiations would be
tailored to discourage European (and Soviet) perceptions of
decoupling, maintain US political and strategic leadership,
avoid de facto Soviet oversight of European force planning
and deployment decisions, and maintain future European TNF
hardware options, including national systems.

---improving NATO's nuclear posture relative to
the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact. There are three related aspects:

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limiting the Soviet threat to NATO's deterrent posture, by directly constraining the number or kinds of deployed Soviet long-range nuclear systems.

--reducing the vulnerabilities of NATO's deterrent posture. Except to the extent that it limits the Soviet threat, arms control cannot directly improve the survivability of Western systems. Hence, the objective here is a negative one: negotiating packages should be designed to permit necessary changes in composition and mix that would reduce the overall vulnerability of US/NATO's TNF.

--creating a more favorable political context for Western theater nuclear force improvements. Independent of the outcome of any negotiations, a serious and plausible arms control effort may aid in improving the domestic political acceptability (both in the US and in Europe) of Western TNF modernization.

--stabilizing the European nuclear balance over the long term, by avoiding a bloc-to-bloc competition in long-range theater nuclear systems. While the previous set of objectives seeks to improve the balance, this one seeks to stabilize it. The focus here is on deployment stability. For example, Soviet deployments of such systems as the SS-20 have already created pressures for counter-deployments. Arms control might seek to moderate those pressures (by limiting Soviet deployments), as well as restrain the Soviet response to future Western deployments.

--sustaining the SALT process. The rationale would be that theater systems would become more significant as SALT reductions and other limitations took effect, and that negotiations on at least selected long-range theater systems might be necessary both to enhance the negotiability of other SALT issues with the Soviets, and to enhance European support for the SALT process itself.

--inhibiting nuclear proliferation. Some political leaders in non-nuclear weapons states have argued that US and Soviet nuclear modernization programs, especially those that have become politically prominent, are inconsistent with the nuclear powers' advocacy that other states forego developing nuclear weapons altogether. Large-scale deployments of nuclear-armed cruise missiles, in particular, could be cited as evidence that the nuclear powers had deflected the arms race into a new channel. Whether or not such arguments bear any real relation to national decisions to go nuclear is a matter of dispute, but, to the extent that they do, they reinforce the objective of avoiding a bloc-to-bloc competition in long-range TNF.

It should be noted that, although arms control can in principle serve a variety of objectives, there are also some potential disadvantages of an arms control approach
in general which need to be examined. For example, it is conceivable that an arms control agreement—especially one which establishes equal aggregates at relatively high levels—might propel the US and NATO toward a greater level of deployments than they might otherwise decide is appropriate on military and/or political grounds alone. But a final assessment as to whether an arms control approach would be preferable to no arms control cannot be made in the abstract. Rather, such an assessment would seem to depend upon, first, an agreement as to the military and political criteria against which negotiating outcomes would be measured; second, a judgment as to what kinds of unilateral measures we would wish to take if we were free to do so; and third, the detailed provisions of the agreement.

However, even if no final judgment can be made in advance, it does seem possible to specify some of the general conditions in which an arms control approach would be most attractive:

--cases in which the motives for US/NATO deployments are directly threat-related (i.e., tied to the current or projected level of Soviet deployments, rather than taken to improve intrinsic military or political characteristics of the force);

--cases in which the USSR seems most likely to react to US/NATO TNF deployments with new deployments of its own;

--cases in which the US itself would not choose unilateral force improvements, in the absence of European pressure to do so; and

--cases in which, for political or budgetary reasons, the US and NATO were unwilling or reluctant to make unilateral deployments sufficient to meet military requirements.

B. Issues in Theater Nuclear Arms Control

1. Systems to be Covered

This section describes the systems and forces which are candidates for arms control negotiations on theater nuclear forces. Given the discussion in the preceding section, the primary focus is on US and Soviet theater nuclear forces in Europe. Systems limited by the SALT II Treaty (SLBMs, ALCMs) are not considered. Because issues of compensation and non-circumvention are likely to arise, the theater nuclear forces of the NATO and Warsaw Pact members are also discussed. For tabular data, see page I-39 and the Annex.
The figures given below for long-range forces include the USSR to the Urals; figures for shorter-range forces include only those in the three Western Military Districts (WMDs).

a. Long-Range Systems

For purposes of discussion, ballistic and cruise missiles are categorized according to whether they are land- or sea-based.

Land-Based Missiles

Candidate Soviet land-based systems are the 456 SS-4/SS-5 M/IRBMs deployed in the Western USSR and presumably intended for use against NATO. These systems are being retired concurrent with the introduction of the mobile SS-20 IRBM, of which as many as 200 firing units (a TEL and three missiles) may be deployed in western Russia by the mid-1980s. Additionally, about 100 SS-20 firing units may be deployed against the PRC during this same period. A substantial number of the currently-deployed Soviet ICBMs (SS-11, SS-17, SS-19) have a variable range and retargeting capability, and could be used against either intercontinental or theater targets. But these missiles are presently included in SALT provisions and hence would not be candidates for further negotiation.

The US land-based system which is the primary candidate for inclusion is GLCM, planned for an IOC in 1982. Presently, procurement of 696 GLCMs is planned, providing 600 nuclear-armed GLCMs for unit equipment. The proposed GLCM launch platform is a truck-mounted launcher rack with four missile tubes. (Additionally, the possibility of US deployment of an extended range Pershing or a new MRBM could weigh in any negotiation.

Sea-Based Missiles

Candidate sea-based launchers are US SLCM platforms (1982 IOC), Soviet SLCMs, and those Soviet SLBMs not limited by SALT. Presently, six Soviet Golf II class submarines are deployed in the Baltic; each has three SS-N-5 ballistic missiles. (Some Soviet Y-class SSBNs, with SS-N-6 SLBMs, also apparently have theater assignments. They would be covered by SALT II, and are not further considered here.) Possible systems on the US side are planned deployment of land attack sea-launched cruise missiles. The US Navy presently plans to install both nuclear-armed land attack and conventionally-armed anti-ship SLCMs on all submarines of the 594, 637, and 688 classes (about 90 platforms), as well as on cruisers and Spruance-class destroyers (52 platforms). It is anticipated that not more than eight SLCMs (a mix of land attack and anti-ship versions) would be deployed on each SSN, which would result in about 720 deployed
SLCMs on SSNs world-wide (of which perhaps one-third would be at sea on a day-to-day basis). The US also has 400 Poseidon RVs allocated to SACEUR, but these would not be candidates for negotiation because they are included in present SALT limits.

**Long-Range Aircraft**

On the US side, and apart from heavy bombers limited by SALT, the system of greatest concern to the Soviets is the F-111 fighter bomber (and the FB-111, if limits are world-wide or if it is deployed in the theater); 175 (156 UE plus 19 float) are currently based in the UK. Additionally, the Soviets might seek to include US carrier-based aircraft (A-7 and A-6) in the Atlantic and Mediterranean.

Soviet long-range aircraft are currently deployed with the forces of Long Range Aviation (LRA) and Naval Aviation. Available for use in Europe are the bombers of the 1st (Smolensk) and 2nd (Vinnitsa) LRA Armies and those in Naval Aviation deployed in support of the Baltic, Northern, and Black Sea fleets. There are approximately 400 LRA aircraft and 250 Naval Aviation Badger, Blinder, and Backfire medium bombers in these commands. Additionally, LRA bombers deployed with the Far East Bomber Corps (Irkutsk) and Naval Aviation bombers with the Pacific Ocean Fleet Air Force might be included in negotiations.

b. Other US and Soviet Theater Nuclear Systems

Other US and Soviet theater nuclear systems which theoretically might be included in negotiations are nuclear-capable tactical aircraft, tactical ballistic missiles and rockets and nuclear-capable artillery.

**Aircraft**

US aircraft which are considered nuclear-capable and based in Europe are the F-111, discussed earlier, and the F-4. Currently, there are about 490 such aircraft (excluding carrier aircraft) based in Europe.

Because Soviet practices with respect to nuclear delivery aircraft differ from those of the US, almost all contemporary tactical aircraft are judged to be nuclear-capable. These aircraft include Fishbed (Mig 21 J/K/L), Flogger B (Mig 23), Flogger D (Mig 27), Fitter A (SU-7), Fitter C (SU-17), Foxbat (Mig 25), Brewer (Yak-28), and Fencer (SU-24). Approximately 2,500 of these types of aircraft are deployed with Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and in the western Soviet Union. However, only about one-third of Soviet aircraft are nuclear-qualified and assigned.
Missiles

Additionally, both the US and Soviet Union have tactical missiles deployed in Europe. US nuclear-capable systems comprise 115 Pershing Ia launchers (108 UE plus 7 float) with 198 missiles (the more accurate Pershing II is planned to replace the current system on a one-for-one basis) and 40 shorter range Lance launchers (36 UE plus 4 float). US forces also have nuclear-capable Nike Hercules SAM launchers which could be used in a surface-to-surface role.

Soviet forces are presently equipped with the SCUD surface-to-surface missile and the FROG rocket: 60 SCUD and 124 FROG TELs are presently deployed with Soviet forces in eastern Europe, 120/240 including the Western Military Districts (WMDs) of the USSR. Finally, there are an estimated 72 Scaleboard launchers deployed in the western Soviet Union. Replacements for all of these systems are expected in the 1980s. The Soviets have completed development of follow-ons for the FROG (the SS-21) and for Scaleboard (the SS-22). A possible follow-on to the SCUD (presently designated KY-13) is in an early stage of flight testing.

Artillery

Nuclear-capable artillery are also possible candidates for consideration. US forces presently have 155 mm and 203 mm artillery deployed in Europe, of which about 612 tubes are nuclear-certified. Soviet forces in Europe do not have nuclear-capable artillery. It has been estimated that the Soviets have the technology to develop a nuclear projectile for the 152 mm artillery, but no evidence exists that they have fielded such a capability. Soviet 203 mm artillery and 240 mm mortars apparently are nuclear-capable, but these systems are presently deployed only in USSR. Soviet forces in the WMDs have 48 203 mm artillery tubes and 48 240 mm mortars.

c. Other Allied Systems

Other NATO and Warsaw Pact members possess a variety of nuclear delivery vehicles. On the NATO side, as discussed previously, these include national systems as well as those held under dual-key arrangements.

Both the UK and France have national nuclear forces which are not part of the dual-key arrangement. The UK's national forces consist of both long-range and shorter range nuclear systems. Four submarines, each with 16 Polaris missiles, provide an independent long-range strike capability. In addition, the UK controls the warheads for its own tactical aircraft, such as the Buccaneer S-2B, the Jaguar, and, when it enters the inventory, the MRCA Tornado. French national
forces are composed of 18 IRBMs, four submarines each with 16 MSBS ballistic missiles, 36 operationally-assigned Mirage IVA light bombers, 30 Pluton tactical ballistic missile launchers, and some older nuclear-capable Honest John rockets (without nuclear warheads). There are also tactical aircraft (Mirage III E, Jaguar A/E, Vautour IIB, Mirage V-F, and the carrier-based Super-Etendard) which could be used for nuclear delivery.

NATO nuclear systems whose warheads are held in dual-key arrangements encompass tactical aircraft, surface-to-surface missiles, and nuclear-capable artillery. Allied dual-capable aircraft which could be used for nuclear delivery, presently number about 800 and include the Buccaneer, Jaguar, F-4, and F-104. Planned introduction of the F-16 and MRCA Tornado will modernize this force. Also deployed with NATO forces are about 144 Honest John and Lance launchers, 278 nuclear-certified 155 mm and 203 mm artillery tubes plus substantial numbers of these tubes whose crews are not nuclear-trained and with no warheads assigned, and 224 Nike Hercules SAM launchers. FRG forces also have 72 Pershing launchers with 100 missiles.

Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces are equipped with both SCUD and FROG launchers, numbering approximately 125 and 485 respectively, about 400 tactical aircraft which might be capable of nuclear delivery, and substantial numbers of 152 mm artillery.

d. Criteria for Inclusion/Exclusion

Although a wide variety of systems could theoretically be included in theater nuclear force negotiations, one possible focus could be on the most politically "visible" systems. "Visibility" is by no means a clear-cut concept. Political perceptions—including Allied concerns about Soviet theater modernization—do not necessarily correspond to neat analytical categories. Hence, "visibility" neither provides precise and consistent a priori technical criteria for inclusion,* nor necessarily reflects a consistent military

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*The lack of consistent technical criteria for "visible" systems complicates the problem of formulating provisions, in an actual negotiation, to "catch" systems of interest (visible or otherwise). In the case of visible systems, such provisions could include: range thresholds for aircraft and missiles; date of deployment criteria (designed, for instance, to exclude older, less visible systems, such as SS-4/5 and Badger); place of deployment, gross take-off weight for bombers; ALCM-carrying capability; warhead numbers (MIRV or not); and so on.
logic. Rather, "visible" systems appear to be those systems which--by virtue of their long range, modern technology (mobility, accuracy, MIRV capability), and general potential for circumventing SALT--have crystallized European concerns about the dynamic trends in the theater nuclear balance and about the implications of strategic parity. At present, the systems which have attained greatest political visibility are US GLCMs and potential new MRBM, and the Soviet SS-20 IRBM and Backfire bomber.

Political visibility as a criterion for inclusion could reinforce several objectives of any theater nuclear force negotiation. First, the negotiations would be responsive to the interests of some NATO Allies, who have repeatedly expressed concern over the military implications and attendant political impact of Soviet modernization of long-range theater nuclear forces.

Second, some would argue that focusing on these modern systems would directly strengthen the arms control objective of stabilizing the European nuclear balance over the long term, on the grounds that deployments of highly "visible" long-range systems have the greatest likelihood of generating political pressure for counter-deployments. (Indeed, the highly visible systems already deployed by the USSR have already created much of the political pressure that now exists for new Western deployments of in-theater long-range systems.)

Finally, because the visible long-range theater systems are closely intertwined--both politically and militarily--with central systems covered in SALT, focusing on these systems might reinforce the SALT process itself, in two ways. Such a focus could at least maintain, if not actually increase, the support of the NATO Allies for SALT by assuring them that theater asymmetries would be controlled so as not to undermine strategic parity, and that US-Soviet bilateral negotiations would not ignore Alliance concerns. In addition, inclusion of theater nuclear forces might increase the negotiability of other SALT issues. A solution to the GLCM question with acceptable limits on US and Soviet theater systems, for example, may allow progress in other areas of SALT.

But political visibility alone clearly is not a sufficient criterion for determining which systems should be included in any negotiation. In particular, it does not necessarily illuminate the military issues involved. Nor does it address the Soviet sensitivities that will inevitably come into play, or the technical issues (especially verifiability) at stake.
TNF-related military issues would appear to play two roles. First of all, they play an indirect role, in that the military attributes of modern systems constitute one component in perceptions, which in turn lead to political visibility. Secondly, military criteria play a direct role in determining: (a) what limits would be acceptable on Western systems; and (b) the overall acceptability of a negotiated outcome, especially in comparison with the outcomes expected in the absence of any negotiations. In sum, the military acceptability of a negotiated outcome will be a bedrock requirement, even if some of the particular features of an arms control approach are determined by other criteria.

Although political visibility and military significance are related, the fit is far from perfect. First, while shorter-range Soviet/Warsaw Pact theater nuclear systems are being rapidly modernized, and could in some respects pose as great a threat to Western strike forces as do longer-range systems based in the USSR, they have so far attracted relatively little political attention in Europe.* On the other hand, there is no guarantee that systems which are relatively "invisible" today will remain so in the future. European concerns about the shorter-range nuclear systems could certainly increase, especially if important limitations were placed on systems of longer range, and if the Soviets chose to accelerate the modernization and deployment of lower level systems as a means of circumventing a long-range TNF agreement. In fact, this is a general problem with arms control agreements: they often tend to attract increased political attention to, and military interest in, those systems not subject to limitation.

Second, there is some debate as to the extent to which the newer and more "visible" Soviet/Warsaw Pact long-range theater nuclear systems in themselves pose a qualitatively new threat to NATO, above and beyond the threat already posed by older and less "visible" forces. For example, the vulnerability of NATO main operating air bases (like that of other "soft" targets) is much less dependent upon the accuracy of Eastern systems than upon Eastern capability for target acquisition. Hence, the modernization of the Soviet IRBM force with the SS-20 may not significantly increase the first-strike threat to those bases, since the higher yield of the SS-4/5s compared to the SS-20 compensates, at least in part, for their lower accuracy and single RV. On the other hand, the SS-20 may

*The relative lack of political attention to Soviet/Warsaw Pact shorter-range missiles and new tactical nuclear–capable aircraft indicates that modernity alone does not make for visibility; i.e., the visible systems are modern systems, but not all modern systems are, at present, politically visible.
significantly increase Soviet flexibility for limited and selective escalation. This is due to its mobility, which complicates NATO targeting, may enhance the credibility of the SS-20s reload capability, and, it is argued, provide an enhanced second-strike capability against NATO forces below the level of a strategic exchange.

In addition, negotiating on only the most visible systems may not adequately address the accepted arms control objective of enhancing crisis stability. "Crisis stability" is, of course, a concept of strategic origin, which may not have the same meaning in a theater context. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that stability is promoted by the reduction of vulnerable systems, thus lessening incentives for pre-emptive attack.* But mobile GLCMs and SS-20s are among the most survivable theater nuclear systems. Negotiating reductions or specific limitations solely on these systems, while possibly supporting most of our objectives, may limit Western ability to reduce the vulnerability of its TNF. Similarly, limiting replacement of Soviet SS-4/5s with SS-20s would keep Soviet theater strike capability concentrated in a relatively vulnerable form. (Just how concentrated will depend upon permitted deployment levels.) This is not, in all respects, to NATO's advantage, since that very vulnerability could create pressures to "use or lose" the systems.

Moreover, Western sensitivities are not likely to be identical with Soviet concerns about particular systems. For example, when SALT began, the US Pershing I theater ballistic missile (which is neither long in range nor very modern in its technology), was identified by the Soviets as a candidate for negotiations in SALT. It seems unlikely that Soviet demands to include Pershing will abate, given the improvements to the system since (Pershing Ia, Pershing II development program), and given the known capability to increase Pershing's range, which would permit it to strike Soviet territory. (This capability, however, will enhance its potential importance in Western eyes as well.) Soviet criteria for inclusion or exclusion will be an important factor in theater negotiations.

* Determining whether theater nuclear forces are vulnerable or survivable is neither clear-cut nor susceptible to static exchange analyses. "Vulnerability" in the theater varies with circumstances, and does not depend only on actual system characteristics. It is also subject to such factors as employment doctrines, warning, mobility, the type of conflict, the opponent's capabilities, and the relationship of theater to central strategic forces. For example, if there is an extended period of conventional conflict, then cumulative vulnerability to repeated conventional attacks could probably be as destabilizing as vulnerability to nuclear attack.
Finally, negotiating packages will have to be assessed for their technical feasibility—i.e., their verifiability. Verification questions are likely to be very complicated; they are discussed in section 3b, below.
2. Geographic Scope

The primary focus of theater arms control negotiations will be on Warsaw Pact weapons which are capable of striking NATO territory, and on US and other NATO nuclear systems which are capable of striking Warsaw Pact territory. However, many of the theater range nuclear delivery systems on the Pact side which pose a direct threat to Europe are Soviet weapons deployed in the USSR, west of the Ural mountains. Consequently, if geographic constraints are to be applied to threatening Pact weapons, then the geographic area would have to include at least part of the USSR.

Therefore, a useful agreement will have to include both eastern European and most of western Russia (by convention, "to the Urals," though it could be defined by longitude or distance from the western border).* For reciprocity, the Western side would have to include all of western Europe (for forces of the type and nationality covered). It would be possible not to include any further areas, and not to impose world-wide limits on testing, production, or deployment.

There are several possible problems with such a restricted geographic focus. First, most of the weapons under consideration are more-or-less mobile; even if removed from a specific area, they could be reintroduced into the area (and would be, once hostilities began in a NATO conflict). This is particularly true of aircraft; long-distance movement of mobile missile launchers would take somewhat longer. In addition, most such missiles are also dependent upon ground support facilities which are both extensive and fixed. Nevertheless, the effects of such an agreement would be on peacetime deployments only (as is the case for MBFR). This has both advantages and disadvantages. It allows R&D flexibility and avoids limits both on Soviet PRC-oriented forces and on US world-wide deployments. It may therefore be suitable for an initial agreement. On the other hand, the military impact would be less, and the Soviets might have some "reinforcement" advantage in a crisis.

A second problem could be the asymmetry which the Soviets could see in including Soviet territory in a European limit. They might resist such an approach unless the US were willing also to restrict the deployment of similar nuclear weapons in a corresponding geographic area of the continental US. On the other hand, the Soviets would be glad to exempt the PRC-oriented forces in the eastern USSR.

Sea-based systems could also present problems. Although world-wide inventories of either surface or submarine-

*The SS-20 poses a particular problem, in that it can be based somewhat East of the Urals and still strike FRG territory.
based systems are reasonably verifiable, deployments within limited areas (e.g., the North, Norwegian, and Mediterranean Seas) would be hard to verify for surface systems, and impossible for submarines.

Another problem is whether to seek an agreed basing/range criterion for inclusion (to identify the territories at risk) or only to discuss specific systems in an agreed area. Under the Soviet FBS criterion, for example, weapons located so as to strike the territory of the other side would be subject to limitation. This criterion is clearly unacceptable if applied only to the territory of the USSR and US, since it excludes Soviet theater systems from limitation. A modified and extended version of this criterion might be acceptable, however, if Allied territory (or some proxy category, such as territory where US theater forces are based) were included. Alternatively, it might be simpler only to limit particular classes of systems in a defined area, without any further rationale.

3. Types of Limits

a. Possible Form of Controls

The forms of controls which might be placed on long-range theater nuclear forces are generally well understood. They include:

--quantitative limitations, such as ceilings, freezes, and reductions. A common approach is to establish an overall numerical ceiling on the limited systems, and allow flexibility within that ceiling. Thus, the SALT I Interim Agreement established a ceiling on the number of SLBM launchers on each side, and the SALT II aggregates are ceilings and subceilings on various types of launchers. Freezes are sometimes proposed as an initial step in preparation for more comprehensive measures in the future; they are most useful as a temporary cap on impending deployments, especially when the systems and forces to be covered have not been rigorously defined.

--geographic deployment limitations. These are essentially quantitative limits applied to specified areas. As discussed above, they present special problems in the case of mobile systems such as ships, aircraft, or air-transportable systems.

--qualitative restraints, including range limitations, restrictions on testing, limits on payload and launch weight, and limits on modernization and "new types." Qualitative restrictions can apply to the characteristics of the systems, to the activities associated with the system, or to both (as in restrictions or prohibitions on the employment of a weapons system in a nuclear role). SALT experience has shown the difficulties in defining and negotiating
qualitative restraints that are both effective and equitable.

--supplemental measures to reinforce the
effects of other limitations or to enhance verifiability.
Such measures include non-circumvention provisions, production
limitations, and cooperative measures of verification.

A key question in determining what types
of controls should be sought on long-range theater nuclear
forces is whether the actual item limited should be the
launcher (or aircraft, as appropriate), the missile, or the
warhead. The last two (and especially warheads) are extremely
difficult to verify in a theater context. Moreover, SALT
precedents will argue for a focus on delivery systems. Hence,
with the possible exceptions noted below, this section assumes
that limits would apply to aircraft and missile launchers (in
the case of mobile missiles, the transporter-erector-launcher
or TEL) rather than missiles or warheads. (In the case of a
US-Soviet agreement in which the Allies would not accept
obligations, this would mean that Allied systems would not be
directly limited, even where we supply the warheads, except
through the effects of non-circumvention clauses, or if Allied
systems were to be used in calculating ceilings.*)

b. Problems of Verification

The general implications of and verifica-
tion problems raised by given limits will depend not only on
the systems to which they are applied but also on the nature
of the overall package. Nevertheless, there are a number of
general observations which can be made.

--quantitative limits on land-mobile systems
could prove difficult to verify with national technical means,
depending primarily upon how the systems are deployed. Most
mobile theater missiles have thus far been deployed during
peacetime in reasonably sized units (not autonomous launchers)
based at known secure locations. Such peacetime deployments
provide the opportunity to monitor missile activities over
time, and, if continued, would considerably enhance the
verifiability of deployment limits. (Thus, for example, we
have a good idea of the number of SS-20 launchers being
deployed.) Verifiability might also be enhanced somewhat by
cooperative measures, where negotiable. However, if deceptive
deployment practices were used, then quantitative limits on
land-mobile missiles--both ballistic and cruise--would present
serious verification problems. Quantitative limits on battle-
field systems (short-range missiles and nuclear-capable
artillery) would be particularly difficult to verify under
these conditions.

*This is the approach taken in MBFR, where the West proposes
that French forces in Germany be counted in calculating the
manpower ceiling, though not themselves reduced or limited.
--quantitative limits on Soviet theater nuclear aircraft. Verification might require agreement on a mutual base of data and definition, in view of the differences between Western and Soviet approaches to aircraft nuclear capability.

--nuclear vs. non-nuclear capability cannot be distinguished for missiles, nor are there any technical requirements for nuclear-capable aircraft that produce externally observable differences. Crew training activity and storage site signatures can be indicators of nuclear capability for Soviet aircraft, but they are not necessarily reliable or consistently available indicators of such capability.

--range limitations on ballistic missiles. Verifiability is complicated by the possibility of range enhancement. For example, the Pershing can be made capable of MRBM range by using advanced fuel and a lighter warhead. The testing of such a modified missile could be verified by national (NTM) technical means at least in some cases. We have been able to detect flight testing of Soviet ballistic missiles in the past.

--range limitations on cruise missiles. Given past and current Soviet practices for cruise missile testing, the US has been able to identify many cruise missile programs and to estimate cruise missile ranges, armaments, guidance types, and mission flight profiles.

- Establish a single range limit for all cruise missiles, thus avoiding some fungibility problems.
- Insist that telemetry not be denied.
-Limit the range to which cruise missiles can be tested in an operational mode.

These measures would apply only to a prohibition on cruise missiles which exceed a given range, and not to numerical limits on the production or deployment of such missiles. The negotiability of such measures is uncertain, to say the least.

c. Other General Considerations

Among other factors, the nature of the controls sought would depend on the underlying rationale and objectives for negotiating TNF. However, the implications of broad objectives for the selection of appropriate controls are far from clearcut; put differently, objectives would seem to have more direct implications for the systems to be included than for the specific types of limits to be placed on them.

At a very general level, of course, it seems obvious that the political objective of responding to European political concerns and of enhancing European support for SALT would call for quantitative limits and deployment restrictions on the most visible Soviet systems. Similarly, the objective of preventing a bloc-to-bloc competition in long-range TNF suggests a combination of quantitative and deployment limitations (to inhibit threatening deployment of present Soviet systems) and qualitative constraints (to inhibit the testing and deployment of new ones). Beyond saying this, however, the specific types of limits sought (or required) seem to depend much more directly on previously choices as to forum, geographic area, and systems to be included.

For instance, both a SALT forum and a multilateral Theater Arms Limitation Talks (TALT) would tend to create pressures in the direction of equal aggregates—in the former case because of the precedential effects of SALT limits and the Jackson Amendment, and in the latter because of the implicit identification of theater systems as a discrete negotiating channel. In either forum, the pressures toward equal aggregates would be intensified by the inclusion of a wider, clearly more comprehensive range of theater systems. The ambiguous case, however, is also the most likely one—where a narrow range of theater systems is tied directly to SALT III. A minimal SALT approach seems most likely to avoid Soviet pressures to make the aggregates fully comprehensive by including UK and French systems. If so, the introduction of selected long-range theater nuclear systems into SALT would seem to offer the greatest flexibility for ad hoc provisions.

The definition of the relevant geographic area will also have implications for the types of limits sought. On the one hand, it is theoretically possible to impose limits solely on systems deployed in the European theater. But, given the rapid redeployability of many theater
systems (especially aircraft), such limits on these systems would not limit the threat to Europe once a crisis or actual hostilities caused the agreement to break down. On the other hand, however, an attempt to reduce the Soviet nuclear threat to NATO by imposing strict global ceilings might not be negotiable, particularly since the Chinese would not be restricted. At a minimum, such an approach might require some offsetting asymmetries (such as the exclusion of older systems, or the tolerance of a warhead advantage for the SS-20 vice GLCM, and so on).

It is also far from clear how specific forms of controls can directly enhance crisis stability; it may be that the effects of unilateral force planning decisions will be more important. If so, then this implies, first, that qualitative constraints should not seriously inhibit the modernization of vulnerable Western systems, nor should replacement rules seriously inhibit their elimination. (If a negotiation covered only SS-20 and GLCM and established very low ceilings on them, it would bar one option for the replacement of dual-capable aircraft. The US and NATO would have to assure themselves that adequate alternatives were available.) Secondly, insofar as the survivability of TNF derives not only from the characteristics of specific systems, but also from the mix of the systems, it is desirable that TNF limitations preserve freedom-to-mix.

However, apart from the specific limitations embodied in an agreement, it is worth remembering that past efforts to reduce the vulnerability of NATO theater systems—and in particular to reduce reliance on strike aircraft—have become entangled in European concerns about deterrence and decoupling. If a theater nuclear arms control negotiation can relieve these concerns, either by limiting the perceived threat or by providing a manifest of US concern for European theater nuclear issues, then reduced reliance on strike aircraft may become more feasible.

It should be noted, however, that there is one general complication inherent in the formulation of appropriate controls for long-range theater nuclear forces. This complication derives from the relationship of TNF to strategic and conventional forces—that is, from the roles and missions which long-range systems are asked to perform. So long as arms control agreements focused on central strategic systems, system characteristics seemed intuitively reasonable indicators of appropriate force reductions. Characteristics were surrogates for functions. But the selection of controls on long-range TNF will require attention not only to individual system characteristics and individual force levels, but also to the way in which such systems are likely to be employed.

4. Forums/Modalities; Participation

There are two broad issues at stake in the choice of a forum for potential negotiations on long-range
TNF: the nationalities of the forces covered, and the implications for progress in other ongoing arms control negotiations.

Since most NATO and all Warsaw Pact members possess some nuclear delivery vehicles, arms control negotiations on theater nuclear forces could encompass a variety of national participants. Besides the two extremes of US/USSR bilateral negotiations and full NATO/Warsaw Pact multilateral negotiations, there are a number of different possible combinations, such as multilateral negotiations involving only the US, USSR, UK, FRG, and France.

In practice, however, our major Allies have expressed a clear reluctance to include their own forces in negotiated limitations. This reluctance seems particularly strong for the UK and France, both of whom have force requirements for counter-value targeting that are largely unaffected by limits on Soviet theater systems. Although Allied views on this matter obviously could change over time, at present it appears that the prospects for broader national participation in the future are likely to be contingent upon visible progress in SALT III and perhaps in MBFR, as well as on successful initial experience with US-Soviet theater limits.

The implications of restricting the coverage of negotiable systems to US and Soviet forces are treated in the discussion of alternative forums below, but one in particular should be noted here—that of compensation for Allied nuclear systems not included in the negotiating framework. Soviet pressure for either inclusion of or compensation for Allied systems is likely to be strong, and is likely to focus on the long-range French and British national systems because they are not dependent upon US warheads* and are capable of striking Soviet territory.

Compensation for such systems could conceivably take the form of: larger reductions in US long-range theater systems than in their Soviet counterparts; asymmetrical ceilings; exclusion of older Soviet systems (Badger, Blinder, SS-4/5); or the de facto inclusion of European systems in the calculation of legal limits on US systems (as French forces in Germany are counted in the MBFR common ceiling). In SALT, the US has not agreed to such compensation. For instance, the US rejected the Soviet attempt in SALT I to count increases

*Most NATO and Warsaw Pact members possess nuclear delivery vehicles. The warheads for all non-Soviet Warsaw Pact theater nuclear systems are held in Soviet custody. Similarly, the US maintains control over most, but not all, of its Allies' nuclear delivery systems under the "dual-key" arrangement in which warheads are held in US custody. However, there are exceptions to the dual-key arrangement: the British and French long-range (e.g., French IRBMs and British Polaris SLBMs) and battlefield (e.g., British and French nuclear bombs for tactical aircraft) nuclear systems.
in UK or French strategic forces against the US strategic limits. However, the prospect of obtaining limits on Soviet theater systems directly threatening the Allies introduces a new factor. Therefore, the US and NATO will have to determine whether some form of compensation for bilateral coverage would be politically and militarily acceptable in such conditions.

The US will also have to consider the implications of the negotiating forum for progress in other ongoing arms control efforts. The US could be faced with extremely difficult trade-offs among our negotiating objectives. For example, incorporation of long-range TNF issues into SALT III (or MBFR) could complicate reaching agreement on significant reductions in SNDVs (or in Warsaw Pact conventional capabilities) if the Soviets attempt to offer concessions on TNF issues in exchange for US/NATO concessions in other areas. Even establishment of a separate TALT process could hinder SALT III or MBFR if either side were to link its position in the latter areas to developments in the former, or vice versa.

In general, the US will have to consider the extent to which attempts to forward the objectives of theater nuclear arms control will enhance, complicate or impede progress in SALT III or MBFR, and, if so, whether the objectives to be served by negotiating long-range TNF are sufficiently important to justify the potential costs.

a. In MBFR

MBFR was originally conceived as a means to improve the conventional balance in Central Europe, particularly through substantial reductions of and limitations on Soviet offensive ground forces and tanks. A reduction of US nuclear weapons was added only as a "sweetener" to induce the East to accept the Allied position on manpower, tank, and division reductions. In order to retain US flexibility in theater deployment and to avoid the complication of including UK and French nuclear forces, it was intended that MBFR would address only those armaments which were pertinent to the front line battlefield.

Nevertheless, MBFR could be used as the forum to deal more comprehensively with theater nuclear systems, either concurrently with or following negotiations along current lines.

A major obstacle to doing so is Allied reluctance to include their own armaments in negotiated limitations. Even the Option III offer, which does not seek reciprocal limits on Soviet nuclear systems, has led to Eastern pressure for limits on western European nuclear equipment. The current Eastern proposal is unclear on this issue, and may no longer require a commitment to such limits in an initial agreement. However, an attempt to limit Soviet
nuclear elements, most of which are based in the Soviet Union, not only could revive this issue, but that of the area of reductions as well.

The unwillingness of non-US NATO participants to participate in armament reductions in MBFR derives from real military concerns; they want to retain the flexibility to increase equipment in both active and reserve forces in order to increase overall combat capability and effectiveness. The same reasoning might well apply to their nuclear and nuclear-capable systems. But even if they would be willing to limit their own nuclear or nuclear-capable systems as an offset to limits on Soviet theater nuclear systems, they would be reluctant to do so within the context of MBFR, where such limits could set unavoidable precedents for limiting other types of equipment and possibly for national force limitations generally.

Another immediate implication of handling theater nuclear systems in MBFR concerns the purpose of the MBFR negotiations. Would we now seek to address two objectives—to improve the conventional balance and to control a theater nuclear arms race—or would we be forced to lower our objectives in the conventional field in order to gain our nuclear objectives?

In MBFR, we have advocated a mixed package of US nuclear and conventional reductions to secure Soviet/WP conventional reductions. The only obvious trade-off for Soviet SS-20 reductions would be comparable US (or UK/French or FRG) nuclear systems. A switch to mutual reduction of similar armaments would represent a change of principle for NATO which could obviate Eastern agreement to the mixed package approach. Moreover, we have already offered SSM launcher limits as part of the mixed package to gain asymmetrical Eastern conventional force reductions.

While both these negotiating problems might be surmounted (for example, by simply adding a reciprocal negotiation on long-range systems to the current mixed-package negotiation), the introduction of Soviet theater nuclear systems into the negotiations would cause some rethinking of our conception of the purpose of MBFR.

The most obvious implication of handling theater systems in MBFR would be the expansion of the area of reductions to include Soviet territory. MBFR was originally limited geographically not only to retain US and NATO flexibility in the European theater, but also because of Soviet refusal to include Soviet territory. The ramifications of extending the territory in MBFR are extensive. For the purpose of getting a handle on the SS-20, the simplest approach would be to make a one-time exception to the area rule, to include either all SS-20s wherever deployed, or only those in the western USSR. But, in return for such a concession on
the Soviets' part, they would very likely insist on a US or NATO concession beyond the offer of US SSM launcher limits. A minimum price could be FRG SSM launcher limits, and possibly limits on UK systems as well. To get a handle on other Soviet theater systems would require expansion of the area as a general rule, even if applicability were limited to nuclear systems. We would have to seek verification of such nuclear limits in Soviet territory, and perhaps stabilizing measures to cover nuclear systems in Soviet territory. Conceivably, too, such a Western attempt and Eastern rejection would make it difficult to return the negotiations to their original focus on the conventional balance.

In addition, the Soviets would be likely to seek to balance any extension of MBFR into Soviet territory by a parallel extension westward into France and the UK. The French oppose MBFR as it is; under no foreseeable circumstance is the GOF likely to consent to limit French national nuclear delivery systems in that negotiation.

Moreover, even a one-time exception would encourage our NATO Allies to insist on other exceptions. The Turks have long been seeking the extension of tank limits to Soviet territory. Making the exception for theater nuclear systems might force the other flank states to back these Turkish demands. Even more troubling would be the reaction of the FRG, which has France as an ally in supporting the extension of stabilizing measures and possibly other limits to Soviet territory. The FRG would most likely insist on the extension of stabilizing measures and other limits, e.g., tank limits, to Soviet territory if Soviet theater systems were included—especially if the price for limiting SS-20 launchers were FRG SSM launcher limits.

Unlike the negotiating problems noted earlier, the problems resulting from even a one-time exception to the geographic area of MBFR may well prove unmanageable. The Soviets would undoubtedly raise the price for any limitations on their soil. One exception would lead to demands for other exceptions, and NATO could well be seriously divided among itself. It might be very difficult to retain a negotiating focus on improving the conventional balance in Central Europe, while also seeking mutual limitations on theater systems in a more extended area.

A third implication of discussing theater nuclear systems in MBFR has already been touched on—the Allied factor. In such a forum, the Soviets could more effectively argue against limits on their territory, and on their systems designed at least in part to counter non-US NATO theater systems, without corresponding limits on these Allied systems. We know that the UK would oppose such an approach, and no other Ally has supported it. Even if most NATO Allies were ready to accept such limits as part of MBFR, and even if a suitably extended geographic area could be negotiated, the lack of French participation would probably block agreement. Moreover, it is doubtful that we could still expect to obtain
asymmetrical conventional force reductions in an extended European negotiation. Thus, while it might be possible to consider seeking in MBFR a mutual limit on all ballistic and cruise missiles in Europe, the Allies, and especially France, will not soon accept such an approach.

However, even if MBFR proves to be an inappropriate forum in which to seek limits on the SS-20, the West could at some point consider seeking reciprocal limits on Soviet shorter range nuclear delivery systems in MBFR, to complement negotiations on longer range systems in another forum. The rationale for doing so would be to dampen the long-term potential for displaced competition that an agreement only on long-range systems could create, and, more particularly, to cut off the possibility of Soviet circumvention through shorter range systems. The inclusion of short-range systems in MBFR would certainly complicate the Western objective of obtaining asymmetrical conventional force reductions and in particular would lessen the bargaining leverage of our current nuclear offer. It may therefore prove hard to reconcile with achieving our current negotiating objectives, which focus on asymmetrical manpower reductions, and withdrawal of Soviet armored forces. But it would not require an expansion of the area of reductions, and present Western preponderance in battlefield nuclear systems could provide important negotiating leverage. Under present circumstances, and unless Allied concern about Soviet modernization of short-range systems grows markedly, the Allied reaction would probably be negative, because the leverage of Option III would be reduced, and because pressure for limits on European delivery systems would be greatly increased.

b. In SALT

Using SALT III as the forum for negotiating narrowly focused limits on US and Soviet long-range systems seems to be the lowest common denominator among the major Allies. Given the alternatives, they all seem to accept a bilateral US/USSR forum—even if, like the FRG, they may prefer a more comprehensive effort, or if, like France and the UK, they are reluctant to have theater nuclear systems discussed in any arms control context. Thus, SALT discussions on this subject are unlikely to arouse major Allied opposition on procedural grounds. Moreover, the systems of major Allied concern—the SS-20, the Backfire and, on our side, the GLCM—are those which could most logically be discussed in the SALT forum because of their real or potential ability to substitute for central systems. Shorter range systems would be much harder to discuss in SALT.

Thus, treating theater nuclear systems in SALT might make it easier to negotiate limits only on certain long-range US and Soviet theater systems. There would be no way to impose direct limits on UK and French forces (although the compensation issue, discussed below, would still be a
problem). Finally, if SALT remained focused primarily on strategic systems, it might be easier to avoid a political requirement to achieve precise "equal aggregates" in theater systems (which may be non-negotiable given the current imbalance in favor of the Soviets). However, discussing theater systems in SALT requires Soviet willingness to concede that theater systems (not just FBS) are legitimate subjects of bilateral negotiations. We would also have to deal with predictable Soviet arguments about circumvention/transfer, given Allied non-participation.

Of these last two requirements, the first may be achievable if the Soviets are sufficiently concerned about US GLCMs and SLCMs, or about Allied access to cruise missiles, to be willing to limit some of their theater systems and to renounce their past arguments that Soviet systems not capable of striking the US are outside SALT. (A facesaving means for the Soviets to justify the change of position would be to explain the inclusion in SALT of US and Soviet theater systems as "FBS plus comparable Soviet systems.")

The second requirement (non-circumvention assurances) may be more difficult. The Soviets would surely seek to prevent increases in European systems to offset US limitations, either directly, through a strict non-circumvention/non-transfer provisions, or through an escape clause along the lines of their unilateral statement in SALT I, seeking to retain the right to match European increases. The US would probably have to go at least as far as it has in SALT II—non-circumvention language which could, in some cases, inhibit transfer of systems limited by SALT II.

There might also be Soviet pressure to go further and to include European systems in the SALT aggregates for calculating the legal limits on US systems (similar to the way the West counts French forces in Germany in the MBFR common ceiling). Yet, even indirect inclusion of Allied systems in a bilateral negotiation might be unacceptable to the Allies—the French in particular. Nonetheless, even though we could not hope to achieve comprehensive limitations on Soviet theater systems without constraint—even an indirect one—on equivalent Allied systems, we may be able to achieve more narrowly focused provisions (e.g., limits only on SS-20, Backfire, US FBS and/or cruise missiles) without addressing Allied systems. A limited outcome might meet Allied and Soviet concerns about the SS-20 and FBS, respectively, without arousing the Allied concerns—either about decoupling or about their own force options—that more far-reaching arms control measures might entail. It would probably be easier to keep the outcome narrowly focused if the prospects of Allied (especially FRG) acquisition of cruise missiles were low. At the same time, this possibility may be an incentive for the Soviets to agree to limits on the SS-20.
In purely negotiating terms, a bilateral forum should allow much more flexibility than a multilateral forum, as any comparison of SALT and MBFR shows. Inclusion of selected theater systems in SALT (or in a separate bilateral forum) would, of course, increase the need for consultation with the Allies and, in a considerable number of cases, might require giving the major Allies more opportunities to participate in the formation of US negotiating positions, and to be more informed in detail about the course of the talks. Nonetheless, an expanded consultative process would be more manageable than a multilateral forum. In fact, from the European point of view, this seems to be the least objectionable solution, allowing genuine pre-decision consultation from the US, yet freedom to criticize the outcome and to stress--before domestic audiences and before the Soviets—that they had made no commitments.

There are some possible variations of treatment of theater nuclear issues within SALT. At one extreme, a separate agreement on theater issues could be sought, perhaps not even linked in timing to SALT proper. At the other extreme, theater issues would be an integral part of the negotiations and of a draft agreement, with theater systems even included in SALT aggregates.

In any case, the choice of SALT as a forum could have important implications.

Substantive European security issues would not be much affected by the choice of a negotiating forum per se. Using SALT as the forum might lead to perceptions that US—rather than European—security criteria were being given greater weight. On the other hand, placing long-range theater nuclear systems in a strategic negotiation could help to reinforce the perceived linkage between US strategic forces and NATO forces, or at least avoid the doctrinal decoupling to which a separate theater force negotiation could lead.

In terms of political impact, it would be important to avoid the appearance of negotiating away Allied systems or options without Allied participation. Yet, as noted above, some Allies prefer the bilateral SALT forum—so long as US-Allied consultations were intensive—since they could avoid having to face directly such questions as which Allies should participate in the negotiations, whose forces should be limited, and by how much, etc.

With respect to other arms control negotiations, there would probably be no great impact on MBFR in its current form, unless elements of our Option III package became subject to discussion in SALT. A limited gray area agenda for SALT along the lines suggested above (e.g., limits on Backfire, SS-20, FBS and/or cruise missiles) would not substantially detract from the attractiveness of Option III;
in fact, our willingness to negotiate further cruise missile limits in SALT could assuage Soviet concerns that Option III reductions would be offset by cruise missile deployments, and covering MRBM options in SALT could compensate for restricting the range limit or dropping the Pershing element of Option III. Conversely, the Soviets may view their acceptance of the "mixed package" approach in MBFR as complementing their goals in negotiating on theater systems in SALT.

Prospects for success would depend largely on the nature of the limits being sought. However, as a general proposition, to the extent that Allied systems were excluded, the scope of the negotiating agenda (i.e., the number of systems upon which the Soviets would accept constraints) would be diminished.

c. In a Separate Forum

Instead of including theater nuclear discussions in MBFR or SALT, a separate forum could be established. In most respects, a separate bilateral forum would be similar to SALT; a separate multilateral forum would be similar to MBFR.

One potential advantage of a separate forum is that it would help preserve SALT as the bilateral focus of US-Soviet efforts to control the central strategic competition. If the talks were multilateral, a separate forum would also entail that the Allies accept direct responsibility for any agreed limitations. On the other hand, however, separate Theater Arms Limitation Talks (TALT) would effectively identify theater nuclear systems as a separate issue involving a distinct negotiating channel. This might impede focusing on marginal or potential strategic capabilities of theater systems (as is possible in SALT) or considering the relationship between conventional stability and theater nuclear issues (as is possible in MBFR). Moreover, the "Eurostrategic" concept of a separate balance would be implicit in the forum, and concerns about decoupling would be correspondingly greater.

It should be noted that, if a general conference on disarmament in Europe were to be convened, on the lines of the French proposal at the UN SSOD, and especially if such a conference were to go beyond discussion of stabilizing measures into negotiation of equipment limitations, then it might prove difficult to avoid considering at least some nuclear issues in that forum, in spite of the French insistence that their proposal would not include any nuclear equipment. This may indicate that the French in fact do not expect their Conference proposal to proceed this far; alternatively, successful negotiations on these issues could lead the French to relax their exclusion of nuclear elements.
C. Analysis of Illustrative Arms Control Approaches

In light of the objectives outlined in IIIA, and the issues discussed in IIIB, a number of possible arms control approaches could be devised. Four examples are outlined here:

--US-Soviet Freeze in Modern Theater-Range Missiles--
The US and Soviets would agree to freeze the number of launchers in Europe for fixed or ground-mobile cruise or ballistic missiles with over 1,000 km range at then-existing levels.

--US-Soviet Parity in Modern Theater-Range Missile Launchers--The US and Soviets would agree to limit the worldwide number of GLCM launchers, and mobile ballistic missile launchers with a range greater than 1,000 km to an equal number of between 200 and 300.

--US-Soviet Parity in Theater-Range Systems--The US and Soviets would agree to a ceiling of about 600 to 800 on medium bombers and GLCM/MR/IRBM launchers for missiles with a range of 1,000 km or greater.

--Parity of all NATO and Warsaw Pact Theater-Range Systems--This alternative would be the same as the preceding one except that it would include equivalent Allied and Warsaw Pact systems.

It is worth noting that, in addition to actual arms control negotiations on theater systems, the United States and NATO might wish to consider possible interim political steps for dealing with the Soviet build-up of theater nuclear weapons. Such steps could be taken as a prelude to later hardware and/or arms control initiatives. For instance, one possible interim measure would be a direct political approach to the Soviets, pointing out that Western force improvements in theater range TNF will follow if the SS-20 is not restrained. This approach would establish an explicit and public linkage between Western deployment plans and the size and character of Soviet SS-20 deployments. The utility and feasibility of such interim measures are not analyzed in this paper; relevant considerations would include, inter alia, how the obligations would be defined (i.e., what would be appropriate indicators of restraint, or lack thereof?); the lessons of the ERW precedent, and the impact on Congress and NATO publics.

1. US-Soviet Freeze in Modern Theater-Range Missiles

   a. Rationale--This approach is designed to meet current major European political concerns about Soviet theater nuclear modernization with a relatively quick and relatively uncomplicated bilateral negotiation, as part of SALT III or in separate bilateral negotiations. A minimal approach of this
kind could be undertaken either as a modest end in itself or—more likely—as a prudent first step. It might be particularly well suited to an agreement of limited duration.

b. Description—A bilaterally negotiated freeze on US GLCMs (and a future US MRBM or Pershing XR) would be traded for limits on SS-20s and future Soviet GLCM. The freeze would be set at then-current TEL levels in Europe (about 100 Soviet SS-20 TELs in 1981); for bargaining leverage (and to allow some modernization) we could offer to count 115 Pershing TEL's as upgradable to Pershing XR.* This would set the US limit at about 115 (the Pershing TEL's) plus any GLCM TELs deployed by the date of the agreement. (GLCM currently has a 1982 IOC.)

c. Discussion—This approach focuses on the most politically visible systems of greatest concern to Europe, and would be based on a judgment that the Soviets are sufficiently concerned about US theater modernization options that they would be willing to limit SS-20 deployments. This may be true now or in the near future, as the development of ALCM and SLCM proceeds and deployment begins. Moreover, Soviet concern would increase further as GLCM deployment neared or began.

The approach does not establish comprehensive limits on long-range theater systems or require parity in included systems. Though the covered systems are those most likely to lead to arms race instability through increased competitive modernization, the limits could be circumvented by increases in other systems: Backfire/F-111; Soviet fixed IRMBs; US and Soviet SLCM and Soviet short-range SLBM; shorter range Pershing and Scaleboard follow-ons as well as European systems.

Nevertheless, this approach assumes both that excluded systems are, at least in the short term, roughly off-setting in their military and political impact and that narrowly defined limits have a reasonable likelihood of not leading to displaced competition in excluded systems. This approach has the collateral advantage of not establishing a "Eurostrategic" balance through any attempt at theater parity or comprehensiveness.

The limits are cast in terms of a freeze, to avoid suggesting that a permanent theater balance is being struck. Hence, the most likely outcome would be asymmetrical in terms of limited systems. A freeze might mitigate political pressures to build up to equal limits above the then-current

*If MBFR Option III were implemented, there would be only 79 US Pershing TELs.
level. Nevertheless, the 115 upgradable Pershing TELs will about equal the number of SS-20 TELs in the Western USSR in 1981. It is therefore possible that the agreement could be cast in terms of TEL parity.

Crisis stability would not be improved by such a freeze: the limited systems are relatively survivable for land-based systems, and their limitation could inhibit reduced reliance on aircraft.

The limits would be bilaterally negotiated, most easily as part of SALT III, to stress the narrow focus of this initial attempt to set theater limits. Because of this, and because no other states now possess delivery systems of the type covered (except for FRG Pershings as discussed below and the French IRBM force) the interests of Allied states would be less directly affected than in more comprehensive approaches. Possibly, the current SALT II non-circumvention approach could be applied to cover questions of FRG GLCMs as well as future FRG Pershing XRs and UK ALCMs.

TELs seem to have advantages over launch rails as the item to be limited. Verifiability is greater. While US GLCMs would have four missiles per TEL, these could be rationalized as balancing the 3 MTRV SS-20 and the assured penetration of a ballistic missile. Limiting missiles as such, of course, could not be verified.

The desirability of explicit inclusion of US Pershing TELs in the limit points out the problem of the 72 FRG Pershing launchers. If the US does not pursue an MRBM option, particularly one based on an extended range Pershing, the German launchers may not pose a serious problem. Otherwise, the Soviets might seek compensation or US agreement not to support FRG upgrading of their Pershings to longer range.

The approach would limit only systems in Europe: the Atlantic to the Urals (or enough further East to exclude an SS-20 threat against the FRG), including the UK but excluding related ocean areas. This assumes that SS-20s directed against the PRC could not be dealt with in a simple bilateral agreement; limits on sea-based systems would similarly cause complications, and their exclusion should be tolerable short of a major program of SLCMs on either side. (To improve verifiability, we might agree to limit SLCMs, as well as GLCMs, to the SALT II maximum ALCM range.) For verifiability, conventionally armed systems would not be excluded.
A range floor—a missile range below which TELs for such missiles would not be limited—would need to be defined for covered systems. A minimum limited range of 600 km might be acceptable but would cover current Pershings and might restrict short-range GLCM options. A 1,000 km range floor would exclude current Pershings (if they could be distinguished from Pershing II XR). This would provide more flexibility for shorter range systems, but shrinks the US aggregate if ceilings are placed at then-current levels, thereby limiting our potential long-range TEL force.

This approach would be compatible, with some qualifications, with four of the eight TNF modernization alternatives articulated in the previous chapter—Null Case, Linkage Force, Routine Replacement and Maritime Emphasis. The compatibility of this approach with the latter two options, however, could depend in part on the outcome of discussions about non-circumvention issues. To varying degrees, both involve the sharing of US TNF systems with the Allies, and the heavy emphasis both place on SLCMs could raise Soviet challenges. The approach would be incompatible with the Matching, Mirror Image, Intrawar Deterrent and Flexible Forces modernization alternatives, as well as with the current Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) plan to acquire about 150 GLCM Tels for about 600 missiles. The FYDP plan to acquire some 900 SLCMs could raise non-circumvention problems.

Incompatibility with the Matching and Intrawar Deterrent Forces and with the FYDP is based on the assumption that, given the 1982 GLCM IOC, the US could not deploy forces sufficient to meet these plans before the arms control freeze.

The MRBM deployments envisioned in the Mirror Image and Flexible Forces options would exceed the freeze level as outlined in the postulated arms control proposal. The former option would add about 100 new mobile MRBMs to existing TEL levels; it could be compatible with this approach, however, if the new MRBM replaced Pershings on the existing TELs. The latter option would add some 500 new MRBMs to the existing TEL levels even with replacement of Pershings. This clearly would exceed any GLCM/MRBM TEL freeze established at the near future (e.g., 1981) levels.

2. US-Soviet Parity in Long-Range Missiles

Description

a. Rationale: Establishing parity in an aggregate that includes only a narrow set of systems.

b. Description: The US and Soviets would agree to a world-wide aggregate ceiling on "modern" long-range
theater missile launchers (fixed or ground-mobile launchers for GLCMs, and MR/IRBMs of over 1,000 km range). This ceiling would exclude systems tested before 1965, thus excluding SS-4/5s. Pershings would be included because of their upgrade potential. The ceiling could be set at 100-300 launchers* depending on whether we wished to increase the number of launchers over the 115 Pershing TELS we now deploy; and on the negotiability of low ceilings on the SS-20.

c. Discussion: This approach is likely to be more politically viable as a long-term solution than is approach 1, because it establishes parity (in a narrow category) and because world-wide limits have more military meaning than geographical restrictions. On the other hand, world-wide limits will raise, for the Soviets, the disadvantages of counting and limiting PRC oriented missiles. Approach 2 could also be compatible with additional force modernizations options (Matching Force and Mirror Image Force). In other respects, however, it is generally similar to Approach 1.

3. US-Soviet Parity in Modern Theater-Range Systems

a. Rationale: A more comprehensive bilateral approach could include numerical limits establishing parity in major long-range systems (GLCM, MR/IRBM, and medium bombers). (We might also seek to impose controls on qualitative characteristics and modernization broadly comparable to those achieved in SALT III for central systems.)

b. Description: The content would depend on the approach adopted for the central system aspects of SALT III, but would presumably include at least an equal delivery system aggregate analogous to SALT II covering missile launchers and bombers.

There would be world-wide parity in a "theater nuclear delivery vehicles" aggregate which would include TELs and silos for GLCMs and MR/IRBMs of over 1,000 km range and "medium bombers" (F/FB-111, LRA Backfire, and Blinder, and their successors). The US now has about 500 F/FB-111 worldwide; the Soviets have about 380 more modern systems: SS-20 TELs, SS-5 launchers, LRA Blinders and Backfires, plus about 400 older systems: LRA Badgers and 410 SS-4s. Setting parity at 600 with Badgers and SS-4s excluded under a "grandfather clause," would severely restrict US force improvement options (GLCM/MRBM), but would also limit

*Excluding launchers at declared test ranges.
the Soviet ability to replace SS-4s with SS-20s or Badgers with Backfires. Parity at 800 would allow more modernization on both sides.* Nuclear-capable carrier-based aircraft would not be included, though deployments in the Mediterranean, North and Norwegian Seas might be covered by a "current practices" provision. Numerical limits on SLCMs would be excluded because of lack of verifiability, and because many, if not most, SLCMs will be anti-ship variants not intended for land attack. Moreover, as discussed above, we might agree to a range limit on SLCMs.

As an alternative to establishing parity levels for TNDV in a separate bilateral agreement, a variant of this approach could consist of establishing this parity in the context of a SALT agreement, with higher SNDV and MIRV ceilings set to include TNDV.

c. Discussion: The very narrow focus in Approach 1 may be inadequate if a freeze at asymmetrical levels is judged politically undesirable. Moreover, Europe-only limits would not affect world-wide inventories and massive reintroduction of mobile systems would be possible. Therefore such limits may have too much danger of breaking down in crisis. Also, excluded elements may cause too many instabilities and negotiating problems. Finally, we may want to press reductions in the nuclear role of land-based aircraft for crisis stability reasons. To avoid these problems this approach would limit almost all the major elements of US and Soviet long-range theater nuclear capability.

An agreement on this basis would therefore be more effective than Approach 1 or 2 in controlling theater nuclear modernization and preventing European perceptions of a medium-range imbalance. Moreover, it could allow changes in the US TEL/F-111 mix if aircraft survivability becomes of greater concern. Its greater comprehensiveness, however, raises significant problems. It could be seen as establishing an explicit theater-level aggregate, raising doctrinal issues of decoupling. On the other hand, the limits on US theater improvements help reduce any real decoupling. More immediately, it seems doubtful that such an approach would be acceptable to the Soviets without explicit inclusion of Allied systems.

*Since large numbers of obsolete Soviet systems are excluded from the calculation of parity, but cannot be replaced, this is roughly equivalent to an agreement with initially asymmetrical ceilings, with movement towards parity over time.

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(at least for purposes of calculating limits) and with only a "SALT-like" non-circumvention provision. Yet, the Allies would probably accept limits on their systems, and would likely be reluctant to consider counting Allied systems in calculating US and Soviet ceilings. Any such inclusion would undercut one of the principal reasons for keeping the agreement bilateral.

SLCMs are excluded from numerical limits because of the difficult of verifying SLCM deployments (especially on submarines). (As in Approach 1 and 2, we might agree that SLCMs would have the same maximum range as ALCMs and GLCMs.) Such an exclusion, however, might lead to Soviet pressure for an almost equally hard-to-verify worldwide ban on testing and production; the exclusion might be particularly hard to negotiate if the US (or UK) were to deploy larger numbers of the land attack version of Tomahawk (or a land-attack oriented UK SLCM). Also, this exclusion tends to require a similar exclusion of short-range SLBMs. Carrier aircraft are limited only loosely, to allow normal fluctuation. Soviet medium bombers in naval aviation are not controlled, on the SALT precedent (though provisions to prevent circumvention might be considered).

With this relatively comprehensive list of included systems but with limits only on US and Soviet forces, it would be desirable to limit such systems worldwide, not just in the European area. This would allow more effective restrictions on testing and production, but would raise the complicating issues of Soviet forces directed against the PRC and of US F-111s and carrier aircraft deployed outside Europe.

This broader arms control approach has a different effect on Chapter II's TNF modernization proposals depending on whether the parity level is set at 600 or 800 TNDV's. In the former case, the more restrictive parity level would be compatible with the Null Case, Linkage Force, Routine Replacement and Maritime Emphasis alternatives. However, the Soviets might raise non-circumvention issues about the latter two postures, especially given their heavy reliance on SLCMs. The other force postures and the FYDP proposal would be incompatible.

With the higher parity level, the Matching Force, and Mirror Image Force alternatives also are possible, although the latter's compatibility with the broader arms control approach would require retirement of the US Pershing TELs. The Intrawar Deterrent Force would be compatible now, although its "International Force" could pose non-circumvention

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problems. Routine Replacement and Maritime Emphasis postures still might have non-circumvention problems, and the Flexible Force posture remains incompatible.

The FYDP's current GLCM/SLCM programs would be compatible, however, under the higher parity level.

4. Parity of NATO and Warsaw Pact Theater-Range Systems

a. Rationale: A comprehensive approach to world-wide stability in theater nuclear systems.

b. Description: The elements included in Approach 2 (GLCMs, TELS, MR/IRBM mobile TELs, and fixed silos, medium bombers) would be limited here, but equivalent Allied systems would be controlled or accounted for as well, and the negotiating forum would be multilateral (an extended MBFR or a separate forum). UK and French SLBMs might also be included, allowing coverage of the Soviet SS-N-5 SLBMs. (SS-N-4s would be excluded by a range floor. SS-22s and Scaleboards might also be included.) As in 3, parity in European-based TELs, silos, and medium bombers, would be a principal negotiating objective. However, the inclusion of Allied systems would force parity higher, perhaps to a 1,000 "TNDV" level, allowing more Soviet modernization. Grandfathering older Allied systems, like the UK Vulcan, would reduce this problem.

c. Discussion: A multilateral approach has, for now, the major disadvantage that no Ally supports it. In particular, the UK and France clearly oppose it, and while the FRG has shown tentative interest, it is clearly unwilling to press the point. Moreover, as compared to Approach 3, Allied systems are placed under limitation with no additional Eastern systems covered in return.

Nevertheless, if Allied view change (perhaps in the longer run, after an initial US-Soviet agreement or as a follow-on to MBFR), it might be possible to consider this approach. In that case, direct inclusion of Allied systems would make the focus on parity common to Approaches 3 and 4 more negotiable, might allow more effective limits on Soviet modernization, and might avoid the strains on Alliance cohesion involved in having the US act as intermediary between Soviets and Allies on non-circumvention. Its merit would lie in the Allies' accepting direct responsibility for limits on Western systems principally designed for use in the European theater.
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Under the "multilateral" approach, non-circumvention issues presumably would not be raised, and setting parity at 1,000 TNDVs would be compatible with the Null Case, Linkage Force, Routine Replacement, Maritime Emphasis and FYDP modernization alternatives. The Intrawar Deterrent Force would be compatible if its new MRBM was deployed on existing Pershing TELs. The Matching Force is marginally incompatible, with compatibility dependent on reduction, attrition, or exclusion (i.e., as EF-111's) or about 50 F-111's.

This arms control approach would be incompatible with the Mirror Image and Flexible Forces alternatives.
Section IV -- Choices: Basic Overall Courses of Action

Strategy A: Reinforce the Status Quo

Strategy B: Initial Emphasis on Arms Control

Strategy C: Rely on Deployments

Strategy D: Integrated Force Deployments and Arms Control

Timeframe for Decisions
IV. CHOICES: BASIC OVERALL COURSES OF ACTION, INCLUDING THE
POSSIBILITY OF INTEGRATING DECISIONS ON FORCE
POSTURE AND ARMS CONTROL OPTIONS

For a variety of historic, technological, and political
reasons, the US encounter with the theater nuclear problem
has always tended to be piecemeal and episodic, more a spin-
off from other issues than a central policy focus. Yet,
the latest manifestation of the theater nuclear problem
involves to an unusual degree not only the political and
military aspects of longer-range nuclear systems, but the
interdependent issues of SALT and East-West relations. If
the problem is to be dealt with successfully, it will need
a thorough US strategy, which is capable of handling all of
these dimensions.

The preceding sections of the PRM have attempted to
define the problem and to examine both arms control and
force posture approaches for dealing with it. This section
attempts to put these elements into context with each other
and the political and military environment we will be facing
in the next several years. To do this, four broad alterna-
tive strategies are presented below.

No effort is made here to present specific options, but
rather to identify as intellectual constructs four basic
overall approaches from which options might subsequently be
developed. It should be noted that pursuit of one strategy
would not rule out subsequent pursuit of another; in fact,
one strategy might inevitably evolve into another as a result
of its success or lack thereof.

Strategy A: Reinforce the Status Quo

Under this strategy, we would conclude that the problem
of Allied confidence is primarily political and assume that,
in terms of their purely military aspects, the SS-20
and the Backfire, together with other improvements in Soviet
longer-range nuclear capabilities, marginally increase an
existing threat, but do not require any fundamental shift
in the Alliance's approach to deterrence. We would take
political and other measures in an attempt to enhance Alliance
certainty in the coupling of US strategic systems to the
theater, and we would reject all arguments that strategic
parity created any new conditions with respect to theater
deterrence.
This approach could logically lead the US to reject the HLG's recommendations regarding long-range systems. We would choose to make no new departure -- evolutionary or otherwise -- in the Alliance nuclear posture. Having made this decision, we would also elect against an arms control initiative.

Such an approach would seek to avoid the political, strategic, and negotiating difficulties inherent either to enhancement of long-range TNF or to arms control. One major problem under this course would be to find means other than deployment of additional long-range systems and/or arms control adequately to enhance Allied confidence in the deterrent value of existing TNF, and in the coupling of US strategic forces.

To promote such an outcome, we might consider other forms of TNF modernization focusing primarily on increases in the quality and, perhaps, the quantity of short- and medium-range systems (e.g., deploy new 750km Pershing II, short-range GLCMs, etc.). The military objective would be to strengthen the perceived linkage between conventional forces/battlefield nuclear systems and strategic systems by increasing NATO's capabilities for strikes against second-echelon forces and other medium-range targets in Eastern Europe, but short of Soviet territory. Targets beyond the Soviet border would continue to be covered principally by SIOP forces.

Since upgrading NATO's short- and medium-range capabilities might, in itself, prove to be an insufficient response to Allied concerns about NATO's TNF posture, it might be necessary under this approach to consider a number of non-hardware measures designed to enhance confidence in the coupling of US strategic forces. The common denominator of such measures would be to increase the operational ties between US strategic forces and NATO defense, by way of increased Allied participation in planning for the use of US central systems, and possibly an expansion of the planned role of those forces in applications for the European theater.

There might also be a number of other political or institutional measures we could take to enhance Allied confidence and give them a greater sense of participation in our decisions affecting European security. We might, for example, consider ways of regularizing or intensifying SALT and other arms control consultations in NATO, or take steps to improve the coordinating and force planning roles of the Nuclear Planning Group.
Discussion

This strategy would enhance theater nuclear capabilities at levels of conflict short of attack on the USSR. The possible decoupling effects of increased long-range NATO capabilities would be avoided, and external strategic forces would continue to form the backbone of NATO's threat to targets within the USSR. The West would not enter into a potential race with the Soviets in the deployment of in-theater long-range systems, relying instead on the overall continuum of deterrence provided by the full range of nuclear forces in the NATO Triad.

By eschewing arms control for longer-range systems, this strategy would avoid the need to alter the terms of reference of SALT or MBFR, or to create a new negotiating mechanism. It would permit us to carry through the one-time nuclear reductions of MBFR Option III. Also, in theory, it might enable us to negotiate limits on cruise missile options in SALT III against constraints on Soviet central strategic systems — although this might well produce very grave political stress in NATO. It would also avoid a potential source of intra-Alliance tension between the UK and France, wary of arms control, on the one hand, and the FRG on the other.

The biggest draw-back, of course, is that such an approach — however well founded we might deem it to be — might appear to our Allies, and especially to the FRG, as a completely inadequate response to their concerns about the implications of strategic parity and the Soviet build-up in longer-range systems. It would require NATO to rely on its current range of escalation options — which, in the view of many Allies, suffers from a gap in the area of long-range systems which, in turn, weakens the credibility of NATO's deterrent and the linkage to US strategic systems. Expanding programs in short- and medium-range forces, while serving to increase flexibility at the lower rungs of the escalation ladder, would not offset growing Soviet long-range capabilities. The latter systems, in the absence of arms control, would continue to run entirely free. The strategy might conceivably have the effect of stimulating additional development and deployment of nuclear weapons by the Allies.

Under this circumstance, any US effort to use cruise missile options for bargaining in SALT III would appear to our Allies — all of them, not just the FRG — as a conscious rejection of concerns they have been stressing throughout SALT II. Such an effort would reinforce the opinions in some quarters in the Alliance that the US places greater priority on preserving SALT and its bilateral relations with the USSR than on a strong and cohesive NATO.
Strategy B: Initial Emphasis on Arms Control

Under this approach we would defer a final decision on long-range TNF deployments, while giving top priority to a strong arms control effort to deal with the theater nuclear problem. The arms control initiative might seek a freeze on SS-20 deployment at some level, and/or propose a more formal negotiating approach in SALT, MBFR, or some new forum. The continued development and testing by the US of long-range theater systems and the pending US decision on ERW production, together with the prospect of future deployments at the time of system IOCs in the early-to-mid 1980s, would serve as incentives for Soviet interest in engaging in such negotiations. No commitments to deploy new systems would be made at the outset, however, and NATO's negotiating leverage would come primarily from programs in development, prospective new programs, and warnings to the Soviets that future deployment decisions were a certainty should they not be forthcoming in negotiations. It is implicit in this approach that the Alliance and the US would be prepared to trade constraints on future options for limits on on-going Soviet deployments, as well as future options (e.g., a new generation of Soviet GLCMs).

In the interim, the Alliance might also continue with modernization of short- and medium-range TNFs and political/consultative innovations along the lines discussed under strategy A, as means to bolster Allied confidence and to increase Soviet interest in finding ways to prevent this dynamism from spreading into the area of longer-range systems. Deployment of medium-range systems which could later be upgraded to have a long-range capability (e.g., sub-1000km GLCM, Pershing II) might be one effective way of inducing the Soviets to negotiate under this strategy.

As the IOCs for US long-range TNFs approached, this strategy could evolve either into strategy C, if the arms control initiative were a failure and it was decided to abandon the effort in favor of deployments, or into strategy D, if the arms control effort, while successful in engaging the Soviets in the process, had not produced a satisfactory enough outcome to warrant the foregoing of all long-range deployments.

Discussion

This approach would represent a first step aimed at eliminating the possibility of a theater arms race. An early, strong and sustained arms control effort would be one way to attempt to settle Allied concerns regarding the US commitment to deal with Soviet systems which threaten their territories. Up-going TN modernization in the short
and medium ranges, and/or some new approaches to improving the organizational coupling between US strategic and NATO theater systems, could be useful — aside from their military value — as ways to take up whatever psychological "slack" there might be as the result of our deferral of the decision to procure new, longer-range systems for Europe. If successful in halting or controlling deployment of the SS-20 and Backfire, this approach could eliminate much of Allied anxiety, while avoiding the many risks and intra-Alliance and East/West strains which would be involved in carrying out new NATO deployments. Even if unsuccessful, the approach would not have impeded the development of long-range theater systems, which could be deployed without delay as soon as they achieved IOC, if the Alliance so decided.

This strategy might not be appealing to the principal Allies, for various reasons, however. The Germans, it is true, would prefer for political reasons to emphasize arms control and diplomacy in addressing the theater problem. They believe, however, that some level of increased long-range TNF deployments is necessary regardless, and thus could consider this strategy -- which would defer decisions on new deployments in the fashion of our ERW strategy -- as unlikely to succeed, and worse than the present situation. They would probably prefer an approach which embodied a specific commitment at the outset to some deployments in the event the arms control effort proved unable to significantly limit SS-20 deployments. The more SS-20s and Backfire the Soviet Union actually deployed while NATO was striving to avoid a theater arms race by exercising self-restraint, the more disturbed the Germans and the other Allies would likely grow about an approach based on arms control alone. Many Allies would fear that in the end, the Soviets would accomplish their entire projected theater deployments without any corresponding NATO response, save for some improvement of short- and medium-range systems. At the same time, the UK and France would doubtless fear that an arms control approach would be an opening for the Soviets to seek constraints on their own nuclear forces.

As for the Soviets, it is conceivable that they would be sufficiently concerned about potential Allied deployments to pay for constraints on these out of actual Soviet programs. However, nothing in our experience suggests that the Soviets will accept limits on their own programs or systems unless they are faced with the near-certain prospect of deployment of systems of concern to themselves. Moreover, even if the Soviets were to accept arms control under
strategy B, without new NATO deployments of long-range systems, or even with moderate deployments, a likely outcome could be asymmetrical ceilings, codifying a visible Soviet advantage. While arguments for the acceptability of such an outcome in force posture and arms control terms are possible, we would have to reckon on a strong negative political reaction in Europe and here as well.

Strategy C: Rely on Deployments

Under this approach we would accept as necessary a Western response to Soviet long-range nuclear capabilities in the form of offsetting deployments of systems of comparable range and capability. There are many possible mixes of systems which could be deployed, and a variety of methods for sizing this force, ranging from the symbolic to other options of more formidable dimensions. Assuming, however, that we wish to avoid doctrinal and political problems, are realistic about cost, about the impact on other NATO priorities, and about the domestic political saleability of such new deployments, it would be best to think in terms of some relatively moderate step: one which would be consistent with the HLG call for an "evolutionary adjustment" in NATO longer-range capabilities, while at the same time increasing theater escalation options, SACEUR's selective employment capabilities, and, by extension, the credibility of the linkage between theater and strategic forces (even here, of course, there would be many possible combinations).

Such an approach would not rule out an eventual arms control initiative, but rather would reflect a judgment that strong TFN modernization must be accomplished first, before the West could pursue arms control on equal terms and for objectives consistent with overall NATO security. Since a program of new TFN deployments would take several years to complete, arms control involving theater systems would be pushed off into the future. It would thus respond to the UK's concern that the West would have little to gain from engaging at this time in arms control for long-range theater systems.

Discussion

A significant deployment in NATO of new and/or modernized long-range systems would deal with the political and strategic concerns of the FRG and others about the theater balance, the gap in NATO's escalation options, and the implications of strategic parity for deterrence below the strategic level. This kind of commitment would reinforce confidence in the
US nuclear guarantee -- so long as the force were not seen as being so large and self-contained as to raise the coupling problem in a new way. Force mixes would need to be tailored with this concern in mind. The Allies, in the HLG, have made clear they do not wish any TNF modernization program to be of such a size or character that it would itself contribute to decoupling or signify a new role for TNF.

The military rationale for the force would be to enhance SACEUR's ability to execute a wide range of selective employment options, including small, escalatory, strikes into the Western USSR. In the flexible response strategy, the force would represent greater escalatory potential and deprive the Soviets of any perceived ability to gain escalation dominance through restrained, selective use of the SS-20. Such a force, once deployed, would also add high priority targets which the Soviets would have to cover, and would complicate any Soviet effort to acquire a meaningful first-strike capability against either NATO or US strategic nuclear systems. It could also improve NATO's conventional capabilities by releasing some of the dual-capable aircraft now reserved during the opening stages of conflict, in case of need for nuclear strikes.

With respect to a possible future arms control effort, an ongoing or accomplished NATO program would likely increase Soviet interest. The West's negotiating position would be improved by actual possession of the systems to be limited, as well as the prospect of further deployments, and it would be much more feasible to think of negotiating on the basis of a parity outcome -- more attractive politically than unequal aggregates.

On the other hand, a Western arms buildup to be carried out prior to an arms control effort could easily cause a serious general down-turn in East-West relations. The extent of the deterioration in relations would probably be related to some degree to the level and character of Western deployments, as well as to any NATO declaratory policy about future arms control. Even if the Soviets chose not to react hostilely, which is unlikely, such a program would very likely complicate SALT III, and could be seen by the Soviets as a US effort to circumvent SALT II by exploiting inherent geographic asymmetries between the US and the USSR. A significant sector of European and US public and political opinion might well agree, thereby undermining support for US/NATO deployments. Finally, since the Soviet Union already has programs in being, it is possible that they would respond
by increasing deployments beyond levels we presently anticipate, and/or by developing new systems of their own. The outcome might be a theater action/reaction cycle, leading to new counterdeployments by each side, with an arms control agreement based on parity remaining elusive. NATO security might be the net loser. In addition, this strategy could fail to respond to the perceived political need on the part of some Europeans (especially the FRG) for a parallel arms control effort, as a possible alternative to TNF deployments if the Soviets could be persuaded to limit their deployments, or as a justification for NATO deployments if the effort should fail.

Strategy D: Integrated Force Deployments and Arms Control

Under this approach, NATO would adopt a planned program of force developments and deployments designed to provide a balanced long-range theater nuclear force, as well as to modernize existing short- and medium-range capabilities. The military rationale for this program — as with the deployments under strategy C — would be to increase theater escalation options, to expand SACEUR's selective employment capabilities, to make the linkage from TNF to strategic forces more credible by providing theater responses short of the strategic level, and thereby to strengthen deterrence of Soviet conventional and nuclear attacks.

In combination with this TNF modernization program, the Alliance would also adopt a sustained, realistic arms control effort — presumably involving only US systems on NATO's side and with the US as negotiator. The objective of this initiative would be to establish some form of essential equivalence in long-range theater systems, thereby preventing an action/reaction cycle in theater deployments from taking hold, restraining destabilizing deployments of new systems on both sides, and protecting the viability and focus of SALT as the mechanism for controlling the strategic balance. In the event the initiative were unsuccessful, it would still serve as a political "cushion" for deployments.

Numerous combinations of force posture decisions and arms control outcomes can be devised for such a strategy. The essential objective would be that theater force modernization and arms control efforts be carefully coordinated in an integrated strategy designed to promote theater stability and enhance NATO's overall security. The basic pre-
requisite would be that decisions affecting either branch of the problem be taken with a view toward mutual compatibility.

For example, decisions on the size and characteristics of NATO's long-range force would be based not only on baseline military and doctrinal criteria (force requirements for carrying out a given set of targeting objectives and escalation options; force requirements for purposes of political perceptions, deterrent credibility, etc.) but also on arms control-related factors: compatibility with acceptable and plausible arms control outcomes (conformity with launcher ceilings, range limits, geographic restrictions, possible political requirements for parity, etc.), bargaining effect vis-à-vis the Soviets, impact on Western objectives in other arms control fora, etc. Conversely, the selection of arms control objectives (parity versus asymmetry or "rough equivalence", high versus low aggregates, geographic versus global ceilings, launcher versus missile limits, etc.) would affect decisions taken on the character of NATO deployments while the arms control initiative was underway. Force sizing, deployment rates, and arms control objectives would also be keyed to estimates of the pace of projected Soviet deployments. In addition, choices among systems for deployment in NATO would be influenced by considerations of verifiability in a potential arms control agreement.

Perhaps the most important consideration underlying an integrated strategy would be the need to synchronize NATO decision-making on both force posture and arms control, in order to use timing in a supportive way. For example, it might be feasible to proceed on the basis of a two-phased approach involving an announced initial cycle of deployments, together with a second pending cycle -- the latter contingent on the outcome of arms control efforts. In this context, the types of long-range systems deployed in the first phase could center on those involving modernization of already-deployed TNFs (e.g., Pershing II-XR, FB-1IIIH) and/or shorter ranges (e.g., 1500km) -- the rationale being to induce the Soviets to negotiate seriously to avert deployments in the second phase of new and/or longer-range systems, which Moscow would perceive as even more threatening. Alternatively, the decision on the final size and structure of NATO's projected long-range TNF deployments could be made at the same time the arms control initiative began, with the prospect of limiting NATO's already-programmed, but not yet fielded, deployments serving as the inducement for the Soviets to negotiate. In either case, NATO could decide on a minimal level of force improvements sufficient to meet its perceived security requirements independent of the success or failure of arms control, and these would serve as the irreducible
base beyond which NATO would be prepared to accept limits in return for appropriate limits on Soviet systems.

**Discussion**

This approach would aim to provide a comprehensive strategy taking account of our East-West and arms control, as well as Allied political and military, interests. It would respond both to the High Level Group recommendations and to Allied concerns for detente and interest in arms control. It would reflect the conviction that some new TNF deployments were necessary to deal with Soviet TNF modernization and Allied security concerns, and to make arms control a viable endeavor. It would recognize at the same time that there was no politically practical way to carry out deployments without a parallel arms control effort aimed at limiting the longer-term need for such deployments. Finally, it would reflect the belief that certain arms control outcomes were feasible and could enhance NATO's overall security. It might permit us to decide on a way to deal with cruise missiles in SALT promptly enough so as to facilitate the development of an early ingoing position for SALT III.

There could be considerable flexibility through this strategy for designing force postures and developing arms control objectives. Force planning and TNF programs could be designed to produce an optimum level and mix of deployments, determined in the HLG and based, in part, on the projected Soviet threat. Deployments, however, could be carried out in phases, with Alliance decisions required to move from one milestone to the next (development, testing, procurement, initial deployments, follow-on deployments).

If successful, the effort to impose a ceiling on selected theater systems of both sides and to create an arms control process for these systems could be a major factor in maintaining a stable framework for further negotiations on both strategic and theater systems, and for limiting theater deployments on both sides. Should the approach prove unsuccessful, the West might elect to stop when it had completed its initial rounds of deployments, or it could go beyond these, depending on circumstances.

On the other hand, the complexity of this approach could give rise to serious trouble. The timing of system IOCs would need to be carefully coordinated in a phased deployments approach (GLCM IOC is currently 1982; Pershing II-XR could not be available before the mid-80s). We might
find ourselves compelled to deploy systems which were most difficult to deal with in arms control simply because of program lead-times. Moreover, developing an integrated approach in the Alliance would require a good deal of procedural innovation, and would certainly raise substantive issues among our Allies (or between the US and the Allies) about force size, mix, system characteristics, military rationale, or arms control objectives, which might frustrate the effort at any point along the way.

It is also possible that the integrated approach, rather than promoting necessary force posture decisions in NATO and agreement with the Soviets, might instead tend to jam both processes so that in the end nothing significant was achieved in either track. Moreover, if the negotiating side of the strategy were to be carried out in SALT, the progress of negotiations on central systems might be made more difficult, rather than easier.

Timeframe for Decisions

The foregoing strategies are not presented as vehicles for immediate decision, but as ways to think about the many arms control and force posture issues raised in Sections II and III, and as points of departure for more detailed options which could be developed and analyzed in a subsequent effort.

Judgments about these strategies, and about any options which might be developed for them, will be difficult, and may -- in addition to our own efforts -- require a series of inputs from our allies designed to assure us that our understanding of their perceptions is accurate, and that they, in turn, are reflecting deeply about potential costs and benefits.

At this point, however, it would still be useful to consider one more question: timing.

Any strategy would have to take account of a number of already determined decision points. The most important of these are: program developments (including IOCs and other system milestones); the possible conclusion of SALT TWO later this year and the ratification process extending perhaps to next spring; the opening of SALT THREE, probably in late 1979; the pace of Soviet deployments; the Protocol expiration date; and domestic political considerations, both
here and in Europe (FRG parliamentary election in 1980; French presidential election in 1981; UK parliamentary election possibly this year).

Finally, the issue of in what, if any, forum to negotiate arms control on theater systems will have to be faced sooner rather than later.

-- For example, if SALT TWO were ratified by next spring, the US would have to develop an ongoing SALT THREE position during the second half of 1979; we could encounter pressure to define objectives in the ratification process itself.

-- As another example, the expiration of the Protocol will be a focus of both Allied and Soviet attention, and both will be pressing to see the key issues resolved to their satisfaction before the end of the Protocol period.

-- As a further example, the lead-time necessary to develop and produce new systems stretches over several years, and the degree of emphasis put on particular systems now will determine how soon we will have available options for deployment.

These factors suggest both a relatively short span in which substantive decisions will have to be taken, and an intense interaction between force planning and arms control decisions.
SECTION V: ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR GOALS AND SPECULATIONS ON SOVIET REACTION TO NATO LONG-RANGE TNF INITIATIVES

In attempting to understand possible Soviet responses to a change in NATO's long-range theater nuclear posture or to an initiative by NATO to limit in some way this category of weapons, it is helpful to review the military situation in which the Soviets found themselves vis-a-vis NATO in the mid-to-late 1960's and to describe the evolution since then of both their forces and nuclear war-fighting doctrine. This section is therefore divided into two parts. The first lays out the background aspects of the problem, and the second speculates on possible Soviet responses to a change by NATO of the long-range theater nuclear situation in Europe.

A. REVIEW OF SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE DEVELOPMENTS

The Doctrinal Model of the Mid-1960's

NATO's doctrine in the 1950's and early 1960's was primarily one of massive nuclear response to either a conventional or nuclear attack by the Warsaw Pact. NATO's formal acceptance of the doctrine of "graduated and flexible response" recognized the growing nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union, and represented an attempt to deter an attack on Western Europe through a controlled application of force from conventional defense, to theater-based nuclear weapons, to US strategic weapons if necessary. The doctrine specifically envisioned the first use of nuclear weapons in the direct defense of NATO. An important feature of the doctrinal concept was the incalculability of the risk to the Pact of initiating combat at virtually any level.

* A "long-range" theater nuclear weapon is defined here as one which is capable of reaching the Soviet Union from its most probable launch point. From bases in NATO's Central Region, this is about 1,000 kilometers.

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Soviet doctrine, from the late 1950's and up until the removal of Khrushchev in 1964 held that any war between the USSR and the West would be determined by strategic nuclear weapons. Such a war would either begin with or quickly escalate to a massive nuclear exchange. This emphasis was underlined during the late 1950's and early 1960's by sharp drawdowns in Soviet conventional forces, and the buildup of strategic missile forces. Under this doctrine, the primary mission of assigned theater nuclear forces, including homeland-based, plus the then modest inventory of forward-based nuclear and chemical weapons--was to destroy the nearby nuclear attack assets of the enemy while the intercontinental strategic forces of the Soviet Union were brought to bear on the more distant threat. The doctrine--with respect to the theater at least--was primarily one of preemptive and massive nuclear strikes.

The Soviet Response

To the extent that NATO's new doctrinal concept allowed for a conventional phase of conflict in Europe at the outset of war, it presented the Soviets and the Pact with the opportunity to eliminate through nonnuclear ground and air attacks much of NATO's nuclear war-fighting potential, thus decreasing the impact of the eventual nuclear strike against the Pact which Soviet planners felt would almost inevitably occur. Due, however to the de-emphasis of conventional forces during the Khrushchev years, the Soviets felt unable to exploit fully this opportunity.

Quite aside from the inadequacy of Pact conventional forces though, NATO's tactical nuclear capabilities presented a difficult challenge to the Soviets. NATO's nuclear weapons were varied, widely-based, and sufficiently plentiful as to practically assure the survival of a threatening residual capability--even in the aftermath of nuclear and chemical strikes by forward-based Pact systems. This meant that NATO could credibly threaten to counter a ground attack by the first use of locally-based nuclear systems, at a scope and level of intensity which the Pact could not match. Thus, in order to respond to the employment by NATO of tactical nuclear weapons, the Soviets would at some point have been forced to resort to the medium bombers or missiles of homeland-based strategic forces.
A response with homeland-based weapons would have been highly escalatory, however, and posed the risk of a devastating retaliatory strike on Soviet territory. The dilemma was perhaps complicated by the "use it or lose it" character of the largely soft-pad based SS-4 and SS-5 MR/IRBM force, which was probably viewed as vulnerable to a US/NATO preemptive strike.

Force Modernization

Soviet theater modernization programs since the late 1960's reflect an effort to redress their weaknesses in terms of NATO's new doctrine. In particular, the Soviets were concerned with: (1) The inadequacy of the Pact forward-based conventional and tactical nuclear forces, and (2) the vulnerability and limited flexibility of their homeland-based peripheral attack forces. The size and character of present Soviet theater forces--both conventional and nuclear--mirror these concerns.

The modernization of Pact conventional capabilities will not be discussed in detail. Pact ground and air forces, however, have registered important gains since the mid-sixties. They are larger, and far better equipped than previously. On the whole, they must be regarded as more capable of exploiting the high intensity conventional phase of conflict envisioned by NATO's doctrinal concept.

Important improvements have also taken place--and are continuing--among forward-based Pact tactical nuclear forces located opposite NATO's Central Region. In particular:

-- New types of dual-capable tactical aircraft with improved range, payload, and penetration characteristics have been deployed to Eastern Europe. It is expected that more effective tactical missiles will be deployed there over the next few years.
-- Since 1968, the number of technically nuclear-capable aircraft, and nuclear-qualified aircrews increased fourfold; at the same time, there has been a twofold increase in surface-to-surface missile and rocket launchers.

-- Nuclear weapons allocations for the theater have increased substantially.

-- Warhead yields for tactical missiles have increased substantially, and a wide range of yields—including sub-kiloton—have been noted for air-delivered weapons.

Tactical aircraft—used primarily for battlefield air defense in the early 1960's are now allocated a substantial share of the nuclear weapons of a Pact front. Judging from the limited evidence of sub-kiloton bomb yields, it is possible that Soviet planning calls for aircraft to provide battlefield nuclear support, a task fulfilled by NATO with artillery. This may be only an interim measure though, since the Soviets have demonstrated a resurgence of interest in nuclear artillery, and are developing new weapons. While several such artillery units have been formed in the Soviet Union—equipped primarily with older artillery pieces—none have yet appeared in Eastern Europe.

Until recently, there have been few improvements in Soviet-based peripheral attack forces opposite NATO. The size of the medium bomber force has remained relatively stable since the mid-1960's though small numbers of the newer Blinder aircraft have replaced older models. The survivability of this aging bomber force was incrementally improved by a program begun in the mid-1960's to equip them with nuclear-armed air-to-surface and antiship missiles. The land-based ballistic missile component of those peripheral attack forces oriented on Western Europe actually decreased in numbers since the mid-1960's as over 100 SS-4 ICBM and about 10 of the far less numerous SS-5 ICBM sites were deactivated. As in the mid-to-late 1960's, Soviet homeland-based
peripheral attack forces opposite NATO now are fairly equally divided between medium bombers and MRV/IRBMs.

Perhaps to offset SS-4 and SS-5 follow-on weapons development failures, the Soviets are believed to have sites in the late 1960's some 120 SS-11 ICBM silos in a manner which permitted coverage of targets in Europe. In addition, several G-class ballistic missile submarines were redeployed to the Baltic, while evidence indicates that certain other ballistic missile submarines may also have target assignments in Western Europe.

Two new weapons of pertinent interest have recently begun entering the Soviet strategic inventory. One, the Backfire bomber, with range, payload, and penetrability characteristics much superior to those of the Badger and the Blinder, has assumed both a naval and land-attack role. The Backfire is available in substantial numbers opposite NATO, and barring deployment constraints in SALT II, is expected to comprise by 1985 about 25 percent of the total aviation component of Soviet peripheral attack forces.

The SS-20 IRBM system, now in the early stages of deployment, is superior in several respects to the present SS-4 MIRBM and SS-5 ICBM systems, which it will eventually replace. It possesses a shorter response time--it can be fired within minutes, directly from its storage facility--and has a mobile mode of operation, which enhances survivability of a large portion of the force from a possible NATO preemptive strike. The SS-20 missile itself has three MIRVs, with a significantly improved CEP over that of the SS-4 or SS-5. In addition, SS-20 launchers will eventually have two or three refire missiles. Depending upon the number of launchers and refire missiles actually deployed opposite NATO, it is estimated that the Soviets will have, by the mid-to-late 1980's, about 40 percent more RV's (including refire missiles) than are presently available for employment in the European theater.

Arms Control Efforts

In addition to the above force improvement measures which are now coming to fruition, the Soviets have pursued a parallel strategy of
arms control, at both the intercontinental strategic and lower levels. SALT I, from the Soviet standpoint, registered gains achieved from their buildup and slowed US competition in areas which the Soviets perceived to be to their disadvantage. Equally important, it signified recognition on the part of the US and NATO that rough strategic parity now exists between the intercontinental arsenals of the United States and Soviet Union.

The Soviets are sensitive to any potential threats that might diminish the strategic gains which they have achieved since the mid-1960's, and have attempted to slow down, through diplomatic or political means, the deployment of classes of weapons systems for which they perceive the advantages to lie with the US and NATO. The present generation of long-range cruise missiles may constitute a case in point. Also, and to an unknown extent, the cruise missile, because of its relative low cost and potential ease of production, may impact on the further development of British and French nuclear capabilities, or on another Soviet concern—the development of possible new nuclear powers. The efforts of the Soviet Union to incorporate a nontransfer/noncircumvention clause in SALT II constitute, in part at least, an attempt to utilize an arms control forum to delay or prevent such an eventuality.

The Soviets have not so far succeeded in including in arms negotiations a category of weapons which they regard as threatening—US/NATO forward-based nuclear-capable systems. According to the broad Soviet definition of strategic systems—forces capable of striking homelands—these will continue to interest the Soviets, and they will probably continue to press for their limitation.

New Nuclear Employment Options

Since the late 1960's the Soviets appear to have moved away from theater scenarios calling exclusively for massive nuclear preemptive or retaliatory strikes, and toward greater experimentation with various options and contingencies for conducting a nuclear war. Among the most pertinent of such options are:

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Delivering a response to NATO's first—and limited—use of nuclear weapons, but intensifying an intelligence watch for signs of a transition to a more extensive phase.

Responding to NATO first use at the lower end of the nuclear spectrum with limited intensity strikes by forward-based systems.

Escalating gradually, over a few days, the scope and intensity of nuclear strikes with tactical systems in support of specific defensive or offensive ground force operations.

Preempting massively in the theater when indications appear that NATO is preparing to deliver widespread nuclear strikes. (This differs from the 1960's when massive response was prescribed for a nuclear strike of any scale whatsoever by NATO.)

Targeting policy and readiness are also salient features of the Soviet nuclear posture with respect to Europe. Options and contingencies aside, it appears clear that the primary mission of Soviet nuclear forces remains the destruction of NATO's nuclear warfighting capability. Consequently, the present employment doctrine probably demands assured coverage of all NATO systems capable of striking the Soviet Union.

The Soviet nuclear posture—although less now than in the 1960's—appears predicated on the presumption that political or intelligence indicators will afford them adequate time to disperse nuclear forces. Hence, neither the homeland-based M/IRBMs nor the Soviet forward-based theater nuclear systems are at a high state of peacetime alert. This is in contrast to NATO, which always keeps a substantial fraction of its aircraft and missile systems on alert.

During a period of increased tensions or actual combat, however, it is estimated that the Soviets would withhold up to one-third of their bomber and tactical aircraft for possible escalation to nuclear conflict.
Conventional Counternuclear Operations

In addition to the above nuclear options, the Soviets, in order to take advantage of a conventional phase of warfare lasting at least a few days, have developed plans to conduct coordinated and massive air strikes against NATO military targets, including especially airbases, missile sites, and nuclear depots. In order to maximize the effect of this preemptive counternuclear option, the Soviets have considered it important to operate, both in their forward-based tactical systems and in their homeland-based theater strategic forces, large fleets of aircraft capable of both conventional and nuclear operations. A tactical or strategic force based on mobile missiles would be potentially more survivable, but would lack the conventional flexibility of aircraft delivery systems.

The Current Situation

It is uncertain to what extent the Soviets view the theater force developments undertaken since the mid-to-late 1960's as working to their favor--and in particular, enabling them to exercise some or all of the options described above. On the one hand, Soviet writings and other evidence indicate that Soviet planners see little prospect of limiting escalation once the nuclear threshold is crossed by either side.

On the other hand, however, the improvements in forward-based forces which have so far taken place enhance the Pact's capability to wage nuclear war in Central Europe, at whatever level NATO chooses, without having to resort immediately to strategic forces based on Soviet territory.

The Soviets may reason that intercontinental strategic parity has diminished substantially the threat of escalation to central systems. At the same time, the increased survivability of the new IRBM force--once the SS-20 is deployed in large numbers--will enable the Soviets to behave with greater confidence and restraint in a nuclear or near-nuclear situation and, in the abstract at any rate, enhances Soviet ability to execute some of the above options.
Soviet leaders probably now consider that the military advantages to NATO of using nuclear weapons have been substantially offset and may believe that the Alliance would be more reluctant to use them in response to a conventional attack. If so, Soviet planners might calculate that the risks of a military conflict with NATO escalating to nuclear warfare have been reduced. They would almost certainly still regard the risks as substantial however.

They may believe that if present trends in theater nuclear forces continue, the basis for military dominance in Europe could shift more to conventional forces—an area in which the West has long found certain difficulties in competing.

At the political level, the Soviets probably view their theater nuclear improvements, particularly the Backfire and SS-20, as enhancing their prestige, and as strengthening their influence on Western European affairs. At a higher level of generality, the Soviet goal has for several years been to lever the United States out of Europe. Equally, however, the Soviets are sensitive that in so doing they may galvanize European concerns sufficiently as to initiate closer and more effective defense cooperation, including possibly in nuclear weaponry. Consequently, it is expected that the Soviet Union will be very cautious in exploiting the growing imbalance in long-range theater nuclear forces.
B. SOVIET RESPONSES TO A CHANGE IN THE FORCE TRENDS: 
SOME SPECULATIONS

The Current Outlook

Since the late 1960's, the Soviets have devoted considerable resources to improving their theater nuclear force posture. They are probably satisfied with their accomplishments to date, and may reckon that force developments in train—if allowed to run their foreseeable course and not offset by countervailing NATO developments—will by the mid-to-late 1980's confer on them a variety of military and political advantages.

With the notable exception of the GLOW/SLCM, there are relatively few programmed NATO long-range theater nuclear force improvements which would impact on the situation as the Soviets might see it. The US Tomahawk cruise missile, however, may have an initial operational capability as early as 1982, and will have sufficient range to strike the interior of the Soviet Union from almost any point in European NATO.

While the French are currently replacing their present inventory of SLBMs and IRBMs, none of the new missiles are known to be MIRVed. The British Vulcan long-range bombers are obsolescent even now and will probably be retired without comparable replacement by 1983.

NATO has some medium- and short-range nuclear modernization programs under way which will provide incremental improvements in capability. The F-16 and Tornado dual-capable aircraft will have an increased bomb load, a substantially greater nuclear strike radius, and improved penetrability over the aircraft they are replacing. The US F-16, however, will lack the all weather nuclear delivery capability of its predecessor, the F4C/D. The version of the Pershing II missile currently programmed for deployment, while having much improved accuracy over the Pershing I, will have the same range.

A development to which the Soviets reacted vigorously was the US move to win acceptance for the deployment in Europe of the enhanced

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radiation warhead. To a large extent, Soviet reaction was opportunistic. Real concern may also have been aroused, however, by the weapon's possible effectiveness in the battlefield support role. In addition, the Soviets may have reasoned that, due to its low collateral damage, it was more likely to actually be introduced into combat.

Although the US President decided for a number of reasons not to deploy the weapon at this time, the Soviets may feel that the large-scale public and private campaign which was waged in Europe against the weapon, influenced--if indirectly--the President's decision.

General Considerations

The prospect of any delay or halt in the--to them, favorable--long-range theater nuclear force trends described above would in all likelihood be displeasing to the Soviets. However, the degree of their displeasure--and the character of their response--would depend upon a variety of considerations: the nature and pace of the change, the associated political atmospherics, and the impact on other areas, such as the economy, treaty obligations, etc. In short, the reaction would be highly scenario dependent.

The Soviets have indicated annoyance and some bafflement over Western expressions of concern with respect to the Backfire and the SS-20, both of which they suggest are routine modernization programs. From the Soviet standpoint, their medium bombers and MR/IRBM forces, while long threatening to European NATO, have--for a variety of reasons--been tacitly accepted by both the US and European NATO.

Another consideration touches on China. Given the SALT-imposed ceiling on intercontinental range strategic systems, the most reasonable way to maximize coverage of US targets is to deploy more and better medium bombers and MR/IRBMs opposite China. Hence, Western actions affecting Soviet long-range theater nuclear forces could have considerable backward linkage to SALT.
A possibly important factor in considering Soviet reactions to a theater nuclear force buildup or modernization effort by NATO, is Brezhnev's necessarily limited duration in office. As the matter of leadership succession becomes more urgent, the support of the military will be solicited by all aspirants to the chairmanship. The result of this situation is uncertain, but could conceivably lead to a more vigorous reaction to a NATO nuclear force buildup than otherwise.

It is also important to note—that aside from public pronouncements and political pressure—the Soviets rarely act precipitously or publicly on important issues. Decisions affecting military programs and strategy are usually made in an especially deliberate and integrative way, and their rationale and effect are frequently not known in the West for several years.

Soviet Sensitivities

The two principal options which NATO has in redressing the growing imbalance in long-range theater nuclear systems are: (1) to initiate a weapons development and/or deployment program of its own, of sufficient pace and magnitude to offset Soviet advances in this area; (2) to halt or attenuate Soviet advantages through a specific arms control initiative aimed at this category of weapons, either independently of any NATO weapons program, or in tandem, or sequentially.

Of any possible NATO theater nuclear development, the Soviets would exhibit the greatest sensitivity to programs to enhance NATO's capability to strike Soviet territory—especially in depth. In all probability, the Soviets would be concerned in direct relation to the change in magnitude, general character, and physical direction of the threat.

In addition, to the extent that it added a new degree of risk and instability to the situation, the Soviets would be apprehensive about any increase in British or French capabilities, or a significant change in NATO institutional arrangements which would give the Europeans in
general, and the West Germans in particular, more influence over nuclear planning or employment doctrine.

Soviet military planners have always exhibited respect for large numbers. In all likelihood, therefore, the force which would alarm them most quickly and most certainly would concentrate on magnitudes. Sheer numbers of aircraft delivery systems, air-to-surface missiles, ballistic or cruise missile launchers, reloads, warheads, and the size of individual weapon yields, would all be relevant in this context.

The Soviets would also be sensitive to the technological "state of advancement" of any prospective weapons system. This is particularly true to the extent that it might confer unique advantages to the US or NATO, or represent difficult to duplicate "break-throughs."

General qualitative characteristics in long-range weapon systems to which the Soviets would probably be sensitive are range and targeting versatility, vehicle penetrability, on-target effectiveness, pre-launch weapon and force survivability, and overall force readiness and reaction capability. The various weapon deployment options which the US and NATO have would probably be assessed in terms of these qualities, or combinations thereof.

An IREM or long-range cruise missile system might be most alarming to the Soviets in the real military sense. Their concerns would be heightened by the fact that there is at present no means of defending against ballistic missiles. The new generation of cruise missiles is also practically invulnerable in this regard, although their subsonic mode of flight makes the prospect of defense generally feasible.

The survivability of a ballistic or cruise missile force—particularly if mobile or sea-based—would also be regarded with concern by the Soviets. Such a force would be kept at a higher sustained rate of readiness than dual-capable aircraft and would severely complicate, or make unfeasible conventional or nuclear targeting.
The Soviets have a high regard for US and NATO aircraft, and the deployment of additional or new dual-capable aircraft would enhance both NATO's conventional and nuclear delivery posture. A new aircraft system with enhanced penetrability and possibly armed with medium-range ALCMs, would probably be viewed with particular respect by the Soviets.

However, the bases out of which NATO's dual-capable aircraft presently operate—including the dispersal bases—are relatively few in number. To the extent that new aircraft are deployed to these same bases, it could be viewed by Soviet military planners as simply enriching the target set.

While the Soviets would be concerned at the basing of more nuclear systems in Central Europe, from the military standpoint they might well be more distressed at deployments elsewhere on their periphery. The Soviets might feel especially vulnerable to additional aircraft delivery systems since their air defenses in this direction are not as fully developed as in Eastern Europe and the Western military districts.

The ownership and operational aspects of any new long-range theater nuclear force would concern the Soviets. A NATO-wide force would be most difficult to deal with from the political or negotiating standpoint. An ownership or operational arrangement that gave the West Germans more influence over planning and targeting would be especially provocative in the view of the Soviet leadership. A significant buildup or change in the character of the independent British or especially French long-range nuclear forces would also be worrisome, as it could add an additional degree of unpredictability to any major conflict in Europe.

The composition of a force reflects—theoretically—its doctrinal and employment concept. A vital consideration is that aircraft can be used in either the conventional or nuclear mode, while a missile force is fundamentally nuclear. A discernible shift by NATO toward a theater nuclear force based predominantly on missiles—as opposed to a more flexible mixed aircraft missile force—might be construed by Soviet military planners as a change in doctrine.
Similarly, a shift by NATO toward a more survivable nuclear delivery force—regardless of its composition—could be regarded by Soviet planners as rendering most conventional counternuclear operations impractical. These developments would concern the Soviets.

From the Soviet standpoint, one of the principal benefits of SALT is that it put a rough ceiling on the number of intercontinental strategic systems directed against the Soviet Union. It is probable that the number of forward-based theater nuclear systems directed against the Soviet Union was factored into Soviet calculations as to the overall benefit of SALT. Hence, the prospect of a net increase in the number of forward-based delivery vehicles capable of reaching the Soviet Union would be alarming, and could impact adversely on Soviet willingness to discuss limits on their own intercontinental strategic systems in SALT III. Soviet distress would probably be greatest, though, with those systems whose numbers are least amenable to verification. Cruise missiles, especially SLCM and GLCM types, are especially pertinent in this regard.

Soviet Responses

The Soviet reaction to a decision by NATO to modernize or increase significantly its theater nuclear forces would depend critically upon the scenario. In general, however, almost regardless of the scenario, the Soviets would find the prospect of almost any type of buildup ipso facto objectionable.

In all probability, the most certain and immediate reaction would be to initiate a propaganda campaign, supported by political pressure and other coercive measures wherever applicable. As with what they probably regard as a successful delaying effort against the enhanced radiation weapon, there would very likely be a well orchestrated public and bilateral campaign, with features designed to appeal to the sensitivities of specific audiences and countries. Communist and leftist parties in France, Italy, and elsewhere would doubtless serve as a ready sounding board for a counter-modernization campaign.
A campaign of this kind would be more difficult for the Soviets if long-range theater nuclear modernization were supported NATO-wide, with broad program participation. Any real or imagined increase in German participation would be regarded by the Soviets as a profitable propaganda theme, and might well fall on receptive ears in Western Europe.

The question of basing is certain to be raised in any public and private campaign against theater nuclear modernization, and the Soviets are aware that this is potentially a vexing and divisive issue. "Non first use" and "negative security assurances"* are almost certain to be proposed once more by the Soviets in this connection.

The threat of economic pressure, however, on the more advanced countries of Western Europe would not be generally credible, as the Soviet Union invariably derives at least as much benefit from the economic and technological relationship as do the countries involved.

The initial Soviet military response to an increased NATO theater nuclear modernization program would probably be subdued, as the Soviets assessed the size and character of the program and the likelihood of sustained public and Congressional/Parliamentary support for it.

For the short term, the military response could include minor but visible redeployments, designed more for demonstrative effect than military value. Certain conceivable redeployments would constitute

* Proposed in the SSOD. Basically a variant of non first use, in which the Pact assures a country that nuclear weapons will not be used against it, if it does not tolerate basing by NATO of nuclear weapons on its territory.
significant changes and as such could be counterproductive in terms of impact on US and European publics and governments. An example of the latter might be the home-porting of Soviet ballistic missile submarines, or the basing of Soviet aircraft in Cuba. Another might be an increase in conventional ground or air forces based in Eastern Europe.

Certain actions would have more military than demonstrative effect. A limited number of strategic bombers could be reassigned from the Far East to European USSR. As NATO's theater nuclear buildup progresses, there would almost certainly be readjustments in strategic targeting. While the benefits would not be clear, the Soviets might also establish a limited peacetime alert—similar to NATO's—among some of its dual-capable aircraft units in Eastern Europe.

Over the longer term, the Soviet response would be dominated by the established tendency to at least match the US and NATO at every level of military capability. The drawdown of the older MR/IRBM force, and the decline in the medium bomber force since the mid-sixties as well as the deliberate pace of deployment for the newer systems, suggest that the Soviets have some concept of sufficiency—or at least of force sizing—for these weapons.

If there is a concept of force sizing, it is probably keyed, among other things, to the number of US and NATO nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. An increase in NATO theater nuclear forces which the Soviets perceived as threatening, would almost certainly result in a long-term counterdeployment of peripheral strategic forces. The Soviet medium to long-term reaction will probably depend additionally, however, on their perceptions of the character and priority of the buildup, their assessment of NATO's motives, and a variety of other considerations, including arms control.

Given a relatively low-keyed, gradual buildup of theater-nuclear forces by the US and NATO, with no sharp changes in the composition of the force, the character of threat, or significant new basing or weapon ownership arrangements, it is believed that the Soviet medium- to long-term military reaction would be minimal. Incremental adjustments could be expected, however, in both SS-20 and Backfire deployments, while forward-based lower-level nuclear modernization would continue at approximately its present pace.
In all likelihood, the deployment to Europe of larger long-range forces, including an extended range Pershing, or advanced FB-111 would result in a somewhat stronger reaction, keyed ultimately to the degree of what the Soviets perceived to be the real military threat. The deployment of an entirely new weapon system such as an ICBM or GLCM in meaningful numbers would be regarded by the Soviets as particularly alarming and might well result in a significantly higher level of deployment effort for peripheral strategic forces.

Under these circumstances, it is projected that the number of delivery vehicles deployed in the mid-to-late eighties might exceed by about 50 percent the otherwise more moderate level of deployments projected for forces assumed to develop much as we see them doing at present. The total number of available RV's (including refire missiles) from this high projection might exceed otherwise anticipated deployments by about 75 percent. Such a force could derive from a slowdown in the rate of retirement of older weapons, the speedup of new weapons acquisitions, or possibly a shift in emphasis from forces opposite China to those opposite NATO, or a combination of all three.

To a degree, the increase in this force could be motivated not only by military reasons but by also the desire to accrue additional negotiating capital in anticipation of future negotiations with the US/NATO on these systems.

Defense is also an entrenched Soviet-reactive tendency, and given the deployment by the US or NATO of systems which the Soviets might see as vulnerable to defensive measures, they would almost certainly initiate defense programs. The Soviets are presently working on an advanced surface-to-air missile system, designed to counter very low altitude penetrating aircraft. The deployment by NATO of more or better long-range nuclear capable aircraft would probably justify a higher level of development effort by the Soviets for this system.

The deployment of cruise missiles by NATO would necessitate a particularly expensive and technologically challenging program to defend against them, and might result in the expansion of a ground and airborne detection network, and an intensification of the development of an advanced AWACS, and "look-down/shoot-down" aircraft.
The Soviets and the Pact are also likely to implement improvements in forward based defensive systems, particularly against aircraft. Some improvements, however, are in train regardless. The SA-5, for example, is believed to be scheduled for introduction into Eastern Europe, and possibly will be made available to non-Soviet forces.

Soviet reaction to a Western proposal to negotiate ceilings on long-range theater nuclear systems would depend upon a variety of factors, not the least of which would be the prospect that without negotiations, the US and NATO might deploy threatening numbers of such weapons. In general, the Soviets would be most likely to agree to negotiate in order to delay or block systems which the US or NATO does not yet possess. Conversely, they would probably not negotiate on a category of systems in which they have not yet matched the US or NATO.

The Soviets would almost certainly respond to any Western initiative to place ceilings on its peripheral attack systems with a demand that non-comparable systems—in particular, forward-based medium-range aircraft and Pershing systems—also be incorporated. The Soviets would also be concerned that any negotiations capture in some manner long-range French and British theater nuclear systems, and perhaps inhibit the transfer to these countries of relevant technologies.

Other things equal, the Soviets would probably prefer to deal on these issues bilaterally with the US, perhaps within the framework of SALT, rather than in a less predictable multilateral form. The preference for a negotiating forum, however, would be strongly influenced by the basing and ownership of any prospective US/NATO long-range theater nuclear delivery systems. If located inside the present NATO guidelines area—and especially in the FRG—the Soviets could be attracted to dealing with them in MBFR. If located outside, for example in , then conceivably a third forum might be considered.

The decision by NATO to proceed with substantial and threatening deployments of long-range theater nuclear forces would result in a reevaluation by the Soviets of their arms control goals and approach. Most foreseeable NATO long-range nuclear force buildup scenarios, however, would probably not result in either the termination of the SALT process or the termination of MBFR talks.
The Soviets would reason that to stop SALT would alarm the US, and possibly initiate a costly and uncertain competition in intercontinental strategic weapons. The continued existence of MBFR would seem to be assured by what would appear to the Soviets as the sheer difficulty of disengaging from the forum without galvanizing the Europeans into closer defense cooperation and perhaps even a major conventional buildup.

With or without negotiated ceilings on the Soviet Backfire and SS-20 force, there are a number of steps the Soviets could take which could tend to offset the worth of a balance between these forces and any long-range theater nuclear force which the US or NATO could deploy. These steps would essentially amount to a diversion of the competition into other military development channels, either within or outside the European theater.

The Soviets could, for example, re-target a limited number of ICBMs or SLBMs from China or the US to Western Europe. Such a possibility may be hastened by the development by the Soviets or more efficient replacement systems, or new, unconstrained systems.

There is in this context evidence that a new long-range heavy bomber and a long-range GLCM are in development. An emphasis by NATO on long-range theater nuclear forces could conceivably result in a faster development and deployment of the new bomber. The same might be said of the cruise missile. The motives for developing the cruise missile—which is perceived as being more advantageous technology for the US/NATO—do not necessarily parallel those of the US. Some feel, however, that if the US deploys the cruise missile, the Soviets will do likewise if for no other reasons than mastering the technology, and maintaining prestige. At present, the Soviets probably prefer to ban it.

Another possible channel of competition into which the Soviets might choose to divert their efforts is the modernization of forward-based lower-level nuclear systems. An extended range Scud tactical missile or the new Scaleboard replacement missile, if based in East Germany, could strike most important military targets in Western Europe.

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In any case, certain programs which will impact on the lower-level nuclear situation are almost certain to occur anyway. It is believed, for example, that by 1983 essentially all tactical aircraft assigned to Eastern Europe will be technically nuclear capable, while the number of nuclear trained pilots will have doubled. Also, new nuclear capable self-propelled artillery has been developed, and is a good candidate for deployment to Europe. If deployed, it will free tactical aircraft from present nuclear battlefield support requirements, thus making them available for longer-range strikes.

It is also conceivable that the Soviets might respond by competing in nonnuclear areas. Depending upon the basing, and types, of new nuclear weapon deployments by NATO, the Soviets and Pact might respond by straightforward improvements in conventional air and ground forces, the intent being to enable such forces to more quickly destroy or overrun these weapon systems.
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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MNUC, UK

SUBJECT: TNF BILATERAL WITH UK

1. BILATERAL DISCUSSION OF TNF MODERNIZATION AND GRAY SECRET

AREA PROBLEM WITH UK TOOK PLACE HERE OCTOBER 5. UK WAS REPRESENTED BY PATRICK MOBERLY, JOHN WILBERFORCE, DESMOND BRYARS AND RICHARD HILL FROM LONDON AND JOHN WESTON AND MICHAEL PACKENHAM FROM THE BRITISH EMBASSY. US SIDE WAS REPRESENTED BY LESLIE GELB, REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW, JOHN NEWHOUSE, WALTER SLOCOMBE, LYNN DAVIS, DAVID GOMPERT, JAMES GOODBY, BRIG. GEN. VESSER AND REAR ADM. WELCH.
2. The discussion lasted all day and substantially improved understanding on both sides of the problems involved, and of particular points of view. Neither side presented national positions: each side made clear that the discussions were exploratory, and that the views expressed at the table would in some instances even reflect personal differences among the participants themselves.

3. At PM Director Gelb’s suggestion, the discussion was led off by briefings by Slocome on the nuclear balance and General Vesser on US strategic and theater nuclear programs. John Newhouse and Gelb made brief presentations on arms control possibilities and the concept of an integrated approach combining TNF modernization and arms control along lines described in the US discussion paper, which had been made available to the British in advance. Davis briefly discussed military issues associated with Hlg’s work. Goodby presented approach for assessing political implications of technical factors such as range, size, type of system, basing modes, etc.

4. UK comments can be broken into two principal categories: force posture and modernization decisions and secret.

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Theater arms control; the main lines are summarized below.

Force posture and modernization

5. British noted that (1) a feature of NATO nuclear force posture for the mid-1980’s was continuing heavy reliance on US central systems (compared to much larger present and projected proportion of theater nuclear forces in overall Soviet/Pact nuclear total); (2) there would be continuing heavy NATO reliance on aircraft, as compared to rising proportion of missile RVs in Warsaw Pact posture; and (3) US projections of force balance did not take into account possible new Western deployments of longer-range TNF, nor the changes these deployments might make on the relative size and composition of nuclear forces by both sides by 1985 — nor especially in the post-1985 period when NATO systems might be coming on line in more substantial numbers.

6. UK drew attention to increasing deployment of new Soviet long-range TNF (SS-20 and Backfire) and noted
That this development has once again aroused European concerns on the question of coupling. UK said that while its views of the emerging situation were less dramatic than those of the FRG, nevertheless, from the UK perspective it seemed clear that such deployments were heightening concern about the nuclear balance, particularly in view of the fact that there were no comparable deployments in NATO to improve the Western position. In the view of many Europeans, SALT has contributed to this problem of confidence by resolving such issues as the SS-16/SS-20 convertibility problem and backfire in ways which underline the theater nuclear question.

7. In the UK participants' view, the FRG has overreacted to the situation, particularly with respect to their secret.

"Drive" to get negotiations on gray area systems. The UK construes the problem as both political and military, and believes that it can best be dealt with by a force modernization program which is consistent with the high level group's consensus in favor of an evolutionary adjustment in NATO long-range TNF capability. This evolutionary improvement, moreover, argued the British, should not be seen specifically as a response to the new Soviet deployments, but as a necessary adjustment in the Alliance's capability, and as a means to strengthen what UK participants termed the weakest part of the coupling linkage (i.e., long-range, land-based TNF).

8. UK representatives did not view the issue as fundamentally new in the history of the Alliance, but rather as a recurrence of concerns which have always been present in greater or lesser degree, and which have recently been aggravated and brought more to the forefront by ongoing Soviet deployments. UK side repeatedly emphasized that the key to the political and military situation is an evolutionary adaptation of NATO forces. When pressed for particulars on such issues as type of forces, numbers, and participation, UK representatives replied along following lines:

-- ALCM are very attractive to the UK as a means to sustain a manned bomber force, in view of aging Vulcan force, and could be presented to parliament, publics and the Soviets as a logical, follow-on replacement of a type of nuclear delivery system the UK has had for many years.
-- GLCM ON THE OTHER HAND IS SOMETHING PEOPLE ARE NOT USED TO AND WOULD PRESENT A DISTINCTLY HIGHER PROFILE. IN THIS CONNECTION, UK SIDE WAS INTERESTED IN US DATA ON PHYSICAL SIZE OF GLCM LAUNCHERS AND IN PLANNED GLCM DISPERAL PATTERNS, NOTING THAT GLCM WOULD BE CONSPICUOUS AND PERHAPS EVEN TOO LARGE FOR MANY ROADS IN PARTS OF UK.

-- SIMILARLY, A COMPLETELY NEW MRBM WOULD PRESENT A HIGHER PROFILE BOTH FOR ALLIED PUBLICS, AND FOR THE SOVIETS, IF ONE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPACT OF WESTERN DEPLOYMENTS ON THEM.

-- PERSHING II-XR, IN CONTRAST, IS ALSO A SYSTEM WHICH COULD BE PRESENTED AS A LOGICAL FOLLOW-ON TO THE EXISTING PERSHING 1A.

-- WITH RESPECT TO BASING, THERE APPEARED TO BE SOME DIFFERENCE OF VIEW WITHIN THE UK DELEGATION, BUT WILBERFORCE, WITHOUT CONTRADICTION FROM MOBERLY, CLEARLY SAID, AND LATER RECONFIRMED, THAT IN HIS VIEW WHAT WAS WANTED WAS: (1) INCREASED LONG-RANGE CAPABILITY IN THE HANDS OF THE PRESENT EUROPEAN NUCLEAR POWERS -- UK AND FRANCE; AND (2) A LARGER US LONG-RANGE PRESENCE IN EUROPE, WHETHER PERSHING OR GLCM -- BUT US ONLY, WITH NO RPT NO FRG PARTICIPATION IN ANY LONG-RANGE SYSTEM CAPABLE OF REACHING THE USSR. WHEN PressED ON HOW TO HANDLE THE FRG INTEREST IN MAINTAINING A NUCLEAR ROLE, WILBERFORCE SAID THIS SHOULD BE IN MODERNIZED SHORTER-RANGE SYSTEMS, SUCH AS AN IMPROVED PERSHING WITH THE SAME RANGE AS THE CURRENT PERSHING 1A. WILBERFORCE STRESSED AGAIN, WITHOUT COUNTER FROM HIS COLLEAGUES, THAT IT SHOULD BE ENOUGH -- IN TERMS OF EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION -- FOR THE UK AND FRANCE TO PROVIDE ENHANCED LONG-RANGE CAPABILITIES.

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-- WITH RESPECT TO NUMBERS OF SYSTEMS, UK SIDE INDICATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT IT FELT DEPLOYMENTS "IN THE HUNDREDS" OF NEW WEAPONS WOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE "EVOLUTIONARY ADJUSTMENT" CALLED FOR BY THE HLG, AND WOULD SATISFY POLITICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY NEEDS OF THE AL-
LIANCE. THIS LEVEL OF DEPLOYMENT WOULD ALSO HAVE THE BEST PROSPECT FOR AVOIDING THE MOST ACUTE FORMS OF REACTION FROM THE USSR, IN UK VIEW.

9. BRITISH PARTICIPANTS REPEATED FREQUENTLY THROUGHOUT THIS DISCUSSION THAT THE HLG SHOULD PROCEED UNHINDERED TO DEFINE A FORCE POSTURE PROGRAM FOR ALLIANCE CONSIDERATION AND APPROVAL.

THEATER ARMS CONTROL

10. BRITISH WERE UNIFORMLY NEGATIVE ABOUT THE PROSPECTS, FEASIBILITY OR NEED FOR ARMS CONTROL ON LONG-RANGE TNF. BRITISH SKEPTICISM SEEMED TO CENTER AROUND THREE MAIN CONCERNS:

-- THEY SEE NO PLAUSIBLE ARMS CONTROL OUTCOME WHICH WOULD BE TO NATO'S ADVANTAGE. SOVIETS ALREADY HAVE ADVANTAGE IN LONG-RANGE TNF AND ARE IN ACT OF DEPLOYING NEW SYSTEMS, WHILE NATO, IN CONTRAST, HAS FEW LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS IN THE THEATER NOW, AND ONLY PAPER PROGRAMS -- WITH DEPLOYMENTS A DISTANT PROSPECT. THEREFORE, NATO'S BARGAINING SITUATION IS TOO WEAK.

TO ACHIEVE AN ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME.

-- THEY FEAR THAT ARMS CONTROL, IF LAUNCHED BEFORE DEPLOYMENTS HAD BEGUN, OR IF TIED IN SOME WAY TO MODERN-SECRET

IZATION, COULD UNDERMINE THE ALLIES' ABILITY TO GAIN PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR MODERNIZATION. THEY ARGUE THAT EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS WILL NEED TO BE ABLE TO POINT TO SOVIET THEATER BUILDUP AS JUSTIFICATION FOR NATO DEPLOYMENTS, AND ARMS CONTROL COULD GIVE OPPONENTS OF MODERNIZATION A POTENT ARGUMENT FOR DOING NOTHING UNTIL ARMS CONTROL HAD RUN ITS COURSE. ARMS CONTROL, IN THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL CONTEXT, WOULD NOT PROVIDE A JUSTIFICATION FOR PROGRAMS, BUT AN EXCUSE NOT TO GO AHEAD WITH THEM.

-- BRITISH BELIEVE TNF MODERNIZATION IS NECESSARY IN ITS OWN RIGHT, INDEPENDENT OF WHAT MIGHT BE ACHIEVABLE IN ARMS CONTROL, AND EVEN INDEPENDENT OF FACT OF SOVIET TNF MODERNIZATION. NATO LONG-RANGE THEATER SYSTEMS ARE AGING AND THE LAND-BASED COMPONENT IS CONCENTRATED IN AIRCRAFT. NATO NEEDS TO REPLACE THESE SYSTEMS, AND SHOULD DO SO IN WAYS WHICH ENHANCE THE
EUROPEAN COMPONENT OF THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT, AND
STRENGTHEN THE LINKAGE BETWEEN US STRATEGIC FORCES
AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES.

11. AT THIS POINT, MOBERLY POSED THREE QUESTIONS, TO
WHICH HE REQUESTED A CONSIDERED US RESPONSE IN DUE COURSE.
BRITISH SUBSEQUENTLY FOLLOWED UP BILATERAL BY PRESENTING
THE QUESTIONS IN WRITING. BEGIN TEXT:

-- (ONE). DOES THE UNITED STATES VIEW THE EXPECTED
SALT TREATY LIMITATIONS ON AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES
(ALCMS) AS PRECLUDING IN PRINCIPLE THE TRANSFER OF
LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR-CAPABLE ALCMS TO THE UNITED KINGDOM
AS PART OF AN AGREED PROGRAMME TO IMPROVE AND MODERNISE
NATO'S THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES?

-- (TWO). IF THE ANSWER TO (ONE) IS YES, WOULD THE POSI-
TION BE CHANGED IF THE UNITED KINGDOM WERE TO ESTABLISH
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THAT IT WAS SEEKING ALCMS ONLY TO REPLACE AN OBSOLETE
THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEM (THE VULCAN FORCE) WITH AN UP-
DATED CAPABILITY?

-- (THREE). WOULD ANY LIMITATIONS UNDER (ONE) AND (TWO)
ABOVE PRECLUDE A PARTIAL TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY RELATED
TO ALCMS? END TEXT

US AGREED TO CONSIDER THE QUESTIONS CAREFULLY AND PROVIDE
UK WITH A WRITTEN RESPONSE.

12. IN THE VIEW OF THE UK PARTICIPANTS, THE WORK OF HLG
IN DEFINING NATO TNF REQUIREMENTS AND IN RESOLVING
QUESTIONS OF BASING, PARTICIPATION, FORCE SIZE, MIX, ETC.,
SHOULD PROCEED UNIMPEDED BY CONSIDERATIONS OF ARMS CONTROL.
WHEN THE ALLIANCE HAS REACHED A CONSENSUS ABOUT TNF
MODERNIZATION, THEN ARMS CONTROL COULD BE EXAMINED. UK
PARTICIPANTS ALSO MADE POINT THAT IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY
TO HOLD OFF ON AN ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE UNTIL NATO
HAD ACTUALLY BEGUN DEPLOYMENTS, ON GROUNDS THAT TRADING
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS AGAINST DEPLOYED SYSTEMS PUT THE WEST
IN A WEAK BARGAINING POSITION.

13. UK PARTICIPANTS' VIEW OF ARMS CONTROL SEEMED NARROWLY
DRAWN -- THEY APPEARED TO BELIEVE ARMS CONTROL MEANT, IN
EFFECT, NATO GIVING UP TNF MODERNIZATION ALTOGETHER
IN RETURN FOR SOME LIMITATION ON SOVIET ONGOING DEPLOY-
MENTS. WHEN THE US SIDE EXPLAINED ONE ARMS CONTROL AP-
PROACH MIGHT SIMPLY BE TO PUT A CAP ON SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS OF SS-20 AND BACKFIRE IN RETURN FOR NATO WILLINGNESS TO LIMIT ITS OWN DEPLOYMENTS TO THE SAME LEVEL, UK PARTICIPANTS SHOWED MORE INTEREST. HOWEVER, THEY EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT IT WOULD BE IN NATO'S INTEREST TO AGREE ON A SECRET LEVEL OF NEEDED MODERNIZATION, AND THEN ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WHICH MIGHT CUT MODERNIZATION BACK TO A LEVEL BELOW THAT PREVIOUSLY DEEMED AS THE NECESSARY MINIMUM. THEY ALSO OBSERVED THAT IF NATO INFLATED ITS MODERNIZATION PLANS IN ORDER TO PROTECT ESSENTIAL MODERNIZATION IN ANY ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, AND NO AGREEMENT WERE REACHED, NATO MIGHT BE COMPelled TO MAKE DEPLOYMENTS IT DID NOT ACTUALLY NEED. UK PARTICIPANTS CLEARLY REMAINED ANXIOUS ABOUT THE POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF THEATER NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL ON NATO TFN MODERNIZATION AND SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE ABILITY OF NATO TO COME UP WITH AN ARMS CONTROL APPROACH THAT WOULD BE FEASIBLE.

14. UK PARTICIPANTS ENDED GENERAL ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSION BY STRESSING THAT THEY BELIEVE MOST URGENT TASK WAS TO GET ON WITH HLG WORK. HOWEVER, THEY RECOGNIZED THAT FRG AND OTHER ALLIES MIGHT HAVE DIFFERENT VIEWS ON NEED FOR ARMS CONTROL, AND THAT NATO MUST CONTINUE TO EXAMINE ARMS CONTROL POSSIBILITIES AND TO STUDY WAYS TO INTEGRATE TFN MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL IN A MANNER THAT WOULD NOT JEOPARDIZE ESSENTIAL MODERNIZATION. THEY DID NOT DISMISS THE IDEA OF ARMS CONTROL, BUT EMPHASIZED THE POINT OF TIMING. THEIR OWN PREFERENCE WOULD BE "APPROACH B" IN THE US DISCUSSION PAPER -- UNDER WHICH, IN THEIR INTERPRETATION, ARMS CONTROL POSSIBILITIES WOULD BE EXAMINED ONLY AFTER NATO'S TOTAL MODERNIZATION REQUIREMENTS HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED.

15. ON MBFR OPTION III, BRITISH ASKED FOR FULL ACCOUNT OF WHAT HAS BEEN SAID TO SOVIETS ON PERSHING LIMITATIONS, NOTING THAT NATO SHOULD EXAMINE CAREFULLY THE ALTERNATIVES FOR USING PERSHING LEVERAGE IN MBFR AND GAS NEGOTIATIONS. WILBERFORCE, SUPPORTED BY MOBERLY, EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT GETTING A HANDLE ON SOVIET CONVENTIONAL ADVANTAGE THROUGH AN MBFR AGREEMENT "ON OUR TERMS" WAS MORE IMPORTANT AT SECRET THAN "CAPPING THE SS-20". BUT, BRITISH
STRESSED WHOLE QUESTION OF MBFR OPTION III/GAS TRADEOFFS NEEDED CAREFUL STUDY. THE US RESPONDED THAT NO FORMAL COMMITMENTS HAD BEEN MADE TO SOVIETS BEYOND THE STRAIGHT-FORWARD PERSHING REDUCTION OFFER, AND THAT WE TOO AGREED THAT THE MBFR OPTION III/GAS CONNECTION NEEDED SERIOUS EXAMINATION.

16. BRITISH ENDED BY RAISING QUESTION OF FURTHER CONSULTATIONS, BOTH IN NAC ON IMMEDIATE ISSUES OF TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL, AND IN LONGER TERM IF GAS IS BROUGHT INTO SALT III. US SAID WE WISHED TO ASSESS BILATERALS AND DETERMINE HOW BEST TO PROCEED WITH ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS, AND THAT WE CONSIDERED THAT A NAC WOULD BE NECESSARY IN NEAR FUTURE ON THESE TOPICS. US SAID IT WAS ALSO CONSIDERING SENDING US DISCUSSION PAPER, PERHAPS WITH SOME MODIFICATIONS, TO THE ALLIANCE. UK WELcomed IDEA OF US SUBMITTING DISCUSSION PAPER, BUT APPEARED CAUTIOUS ON TIMING, WITH WILBERFORCE SUGGESTING THAT EARLY SUBMISSION OF PAPER COULD CAUSE TNF/GAS ISSUE TO DOMINATE DISCUSSION AT DECEMBER MINISTERIALS.

17. ON GAS NEGOTIATIONS, UK REPRESENTATIVES SAID THAT INCLUSION OF ANY THEATER SYSTEMS IN SALT III WOULD TOUCH EUROPEAN SECURITY INTERESTS DIRECTLY, AND EUROPEANS WOULD EXPECT ARRANGEMENTS TO ALLOW THEM TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FORMULATION OF POSITIONS ON SUCH ISSUES. US RESPONDED THAT WE RECOGNIZED IMPORTANCE OF SPECIAL CONSULTATIONS IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, AND THAT WE WERE OPEN TO IDEA ON HOW THIS MIGHT BE DONE. VANCE

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UNCLASSIFIED
1. BILATERAL WITH THE FRG ON TNF ISSUES TOOK PLACE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON OCTOBER 11. FRG SIDE WAS REPRESENTED BY MESSRS. BLECH, RUTH, STUTZLE, ROSSFACH, TANDECKI,
VOLLSTEKT, DAERR, HANSEN, SCHAUER, KELLEIN. THE US SIDE WAS REPRESENTED BY MESSRS. GELB, BARTHOLOMEW, VEST, NEWHOUSE, SLOCOMBE, GOODY, GOPMERT, WELCH, VESSER, AND MS. DAVIS.

2. ORDER OF PRESENTATION AND STRUCTURE OF DISCUSSION WAS ESSENTIALLY SAME AS AT BILATERALS WITH THE UK (REPTEL), AS WAS DIVISION OF LABOR AMONG US PARTICIPANTS. FRG SIDE STRONGLY EMPHASIZED THAT FEDERAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING OF LAST WEEK HAD COMMISSIONED TEAM TO "TRY OUT" AND TO "CHECK" SOME IDEAS WITH THE US AT THE BILATERALS, AND NOT, RPT, NOT TO NEGOTIATE A POSITION.

3. FOLLOWING BRIEFINGS ON BALANCE AT MORNING SESSION, STUTZLE, BLECH AND TANDECKI EVINCE CONCERN THAT US PROJECTIONS OF OVERALL LEVELS OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN INVENTORIES OF NATO AND PACT FORCES BY 1985 TENDED TO EMphasize CONTINUATION OF PARITY, BUT TO DOWNPLAY CONTINUED HEAVY NATO DEPENDENCE ON US CENTRAL SYSTEMS AS COMPARED TO RAPID INCREASE IN PACT RV’S DELIVERABLE BY NEW SYSTEMS OF THEATER RANGE. THEY ARGUED THAT -- APART FROM GROSS NUMBERS -- COMPOSITION OF NATO’S INVENTORY COULD BECOME A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN THE PRESERVATION OF DETERRENCE. AS AN EXAMPLE, BLECH SUGGESTED A SCENARIO IN WHICH, WITH NUCLEAR WAR HAVING COMMENCED AT THEATER LEVEL, THE WEST WOULD RUN OUT OF THEATER-RANGE DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND OPTIONS FIRST, AND BE FORCED TO CONFRONT THE JUMP TO CENTRAL SYSTEMS WELL BEFORE SOVIETS MIGHT HAVE TO MAKE A SIMILAR CHOICE.

4. THERE ALSO APPEARED TO BE SOME FRG APPREHENSION ABOUT SECRET
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US VIEWS CONCERNING THE EARLY AVAILABILITY OF POSEIDON RV’S RESERVED FOR SACEUR. QUESTIONING BROUGHT OUT THAT THIS CONCERN DERIVED FROM READING OF PAGE 12 OF THE BILATERAL DISCUSSION PAPER, WHICH IN DESCRIBING CERTAIN DEFICIENCIES OF EXISTING NATO LONG- AND MEDIUM-RANGE TFM, STATED THAT THE POSEIDON/POLARIS FORCES "ARE GENERALLY REGARDED AS "STRATEGIC" SYSTEMS WHOSE USE PRIOR TO GENERAL NUCLEAR RESPONSE MIGHT CONVEY AN OVERLY ESCALATORY SIGNAL TO THE SOVIET UNION." US SIDE EXPLAINED THIS WAS SIMPLY ATTEMPT TO CHARACTERIZE HOW SOVIETS MIGHT PERCEIVE THESE SYSTEMS, AND NOT A REFLECTION OF US POLICY ON USE OF THESE SYSTEMS. FRG EXPRESSED INTEREST IN CONVENTIONAL CRUISE MISSILES, AND VOICED CONCERNS RE CRUISE MISSILE PENETRATIVITY.

5. IN RESPONSE TO US INVITATION TO PRESENT COMPLETE EXPO-
SITION OF THE PROBLEM FROM GERMAN PERSPECTIVE, BLECH MADE
AN INFORMAL STATEMENT ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

6. BASED ON DISCUSSION IN FEDERAL SECURITY COUNCIL, FRG
SAW PROBLEM NOT AS NEAR-TERM ONE, BUT AS ONE FOR THE 1980' S.
CORE OF PROBLEM WAS THAT, IF WEST'S RELATIVE WEAKNESS IN
THEATER-RANGE SYSTEMS FORCED NATO TO CONFRONT DECISION TO
USE STRATEGIC SYSTEMS BEFORE SOVIETS, THERE COULD BE A
CHANGE IN PERCEPTIONS REGARDING CREDIBILITY OF NATO
DETERRENT. BLECH ADMITTED THIS WAS HIGHLY PSYCHOLOGICAL
AND POLITICAL QUESTION, AND THAT ANSWER TO IT DID NOT
REQUIRE ANYTHING LIKE COMPLETE PARITY IN THEATER-RANGE
SYSTEMS. ON OTHER HAND, HE OBSERVED THAT IF THE "SCISSORS"
(PRESUMABLY, ON A CHART SHOWING TRENDS IN DEPLOYMENTS OF
NATO AND PACT THEATER-RANGE SYSTEMS) WERE TO OPEN "TOO
WIDE," THERE COULD BE A PROBLEM. MILITARILY, DUE TO IN-
CREASES IN SOVIET MID-RANGE CAPABILITIES (SS-20, BACKFIRE),
CAPABILITY OF ALLIANCE TO ESCALATE MAY BE IMPAIRED.

7. BLECH STRESSED THAT BONN HAD NO CRITICISM OF SALT
PROCESS AS SUCH, AND WANTED IT TO CONTINUE. HOWEVER HE
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SAID SALT TENDED TO ACCENTUATE DISPARITIES IN MID-RANGE
SYSTEMS, AND REGISTERED AWARENESS THAT SALT HAD ALREADY BE-
GUN TO ENGAGE MID-RANGE SYSTEMS THROUGH PROTOCOL AND
PLANNED US STATEMENT RE FUTURE LIMITS ON THEATER SYSTEMS.

8. BONN'S OBJECTIVE, BLECH SAID, WAS TO FIND SOLUTIONS
WHICH WOULD TREAT GRAY AREA ISSUE AS ONE OF "STRATEGIC
IMPORTANCE, AFFECTING THE ENTIRE ALLIANCE." BONN WANTED
SOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD PROMOTE A STABLE OVERALL STRATEGIC
BALANCE. IN FRG VIEW, STABILITY OF SUCH A BALANCE SHOULD
HAVE PRIORITY OVER ARMS CONTROL CONCERNS: THAT WE NEED TO
DECIDE ON FORCE POSTURE BEFORE MOVING TO ARMS CONTROL.
FRG, HE ADDED, DID NOT FORESEE ANY SINGLE OVERALL SOLUTION;
RATHER, ALLIANCE MUST PROCEED ON PRAGMATIC, STEP-BY-STEP
BASIS.

9. FRG DID NOT WISH TO SUGGEST THAT ARMS CONTROL SHOULD BE
SLIGHTED, BUT BLECH EMPHASIZED THAT PRIORITY OF BALANCE AND
STABILITY IN THE 1980' S WAS A KEY ELEMENT FOR BONN.

10. BLECH ALSO IDENTIFIED CERTAIN POINTS WITH WHICH BONN
EMPHATICALLY DID NOT WISH TO BE ASSOCIATED: ANY COMPART-
MENTALIZATION OF EUROPE BASED ON THE IDEA OF A EUROSTRATEGIC BALANCE; AND ANY LOOSENING OF THE TRIAD CONTINUUM.

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11. FRG WAS NOT THINKING, BLECH SAID, IN TERMS OF AN INDEPENDENT, SELF-RELIANT EUROPEAN (AND STILL LESS AN FRG) NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. FRG WANTED SOLUTION WHICH TOOK ACCOUNT OF NEEDS OF ALL (WITH SPECIAL STRESS ON WORD "ALL") ALLIANCE MEMBERS, BUT WHICH GAVE PLACE TO "PECULARITIES" OF FRG'S SITUATION. IN ELLIPTICAL REFERENCE TO QUESTION OF FRG PARTICIPATION IN ALLIANCE NUCLEAR MISSION, BLECH

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STRESSED PRINCIPLE OF RISK SHARING, NOTING THAT ROUGHLY HALF OF NATO TNF IS NOW BASED ON FRG TERRITORY. BLECH STATED THAT IF STATUS OF FRG IN ALLIANCE WERE TO UNDERGO A CHANGE, THERE WOULD BE IMPLICATIONS FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND THE POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL BALANCE IN THE ALLIANCE. IT WAS ETERNAL PROBLEM: FRG HAD TO BE STRONG ENOUGH TO BEAT RUSSIANS, BUT WEAKER THAN LUXEMBOURG. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO WEIGH POLITICALLY WHETHER A CHANGE IN FRG STATUS WOULD LOSE MORE POLITICALLY THAN IT WOULD GAIN IN INCREASED MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE ALLIANCE.

12. BLECH THEN OUTLINED THE FRG CONCEPTION OF AN "OVERALL STRATEGIC APPROACH," GIVING AS ITS MAIN PRINCIPLES THAT:
(1) OVERALL STRATEGIC PARITY IS THE LONG-TERM AIM;
(2) PARITY OF MID-RANGE SYSTEMS IS NOT NEEDED FOR OVERALL STRATEGIC PARITY;
(3) DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL MEASURES SHOULD BE MESHED; AND
(4) THE DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC SHOULD BE ALTERED FOR PURPOSES OF THE FRG CONCEPT TO INCLUDE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WITH A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 1000 KM. THIS, HE SAID, WOULD FACILITATE A CALCULATION OF THE RELATIVE SIGNIFICANCE FOR NATO OF SYSTEMS OF DIFFERENT KINDS, AND WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO USE SALT III AS A MEANS TO SEEK A REDUCTION OF THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN MEDIUM-RANGE SYSTEMS.

13. SPELLING OUT DETAILS, BLECH SAID THAT:

--IN SUCH AN APPROACH, WEST WOULD AIM TO AVOID UNILATERAL LIMITS ON WESTERN POTENTIAL, AND TO START ENGAGING SOVIETS IN TERMS OF PRESENT DISPARITIES IN THE MID-RANGE AREA.

--FRENCH AND UK FORCES MUST BE LEFT OUT "FOR THE TIME BEING." BUT, BLECH SAID, THIS QUESTION SHOULD BE EXAMINED FURTHER IN THE ALLIANCE, "ESPECIALLY IN CONNECTION WITH
--IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO KEEP OPEN CRUISE MISSILE OPTIONS, (BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL) WITH RANGES IN EXCESS OF 600 KM, BOTH FROM A DEFENSE AND AN ARMS CONTROL PERSPECTIVE.

14. BLECH SAID THAT SUCH NEGOTIATION SHOULD BE IN SALT. IT OUGHT NOT -- IN FRG VIEW -- REQUIRE CREATION OF NEW COORDINATING OR CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS IN THE ALLIANCE. ON OTHER HAND, INTENSIFIED CONTACTS WITH FRANCE, UK AND FRG WOULD CERTAINLY BE NEEDED ON A BILATERAL BASIS, AS WELL AS MORE INTENSIFIED CONSULTATIONS WITHIN NATO.

15. AS TO SPECIFICS OF A FORCE DEPLOYMENT PACKAGE, BLECH SAID HE COULD NOT SAY MUCH BEYOND WHAT ALREADY APPEARS IN THE HLG REPORT. HE REEMPHASIZED FRG’S CONTRIBUTION TO NATO TNF POSTURE, BOTH AS HOST TO WEAPONS STORED ON GERMAN TERRITORY, AND IN “MAKING AVAILABLE NUCLEAR CARRIERS.” IN THIS CONNECTION, BLECH SAID HE RECOGNIZED THERE EXISTED A QUESTION OF WHETHER ANY FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF FRG’S ROLE IN THE NUCLEAR AREA, OR A QUALITATIVE SHIFT IN THE NATURE OF ITS ROLE, WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE. THE FRG, HE SAID, IS OPEN TO PROPOSALS COVERING THE QUESTION OF GERMAN PARTICIPATION. HOWEVER, BLECH THEN LAID DOWN AN IMPORTANT MARKER: DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL GROUND-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WOULD POSE TREMENDOUS PROBLEMS FOR THE FRG IF LIMITED TO FRG TERRITORY SINCE, HE SUGGESTED, POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ISOLATION SINCE, HE SUGGESTED, POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ISOLATION COULD RESULT -- BOTH FROM THE EAST AND FROM THE WEST. A SPECIFIC NUCLEAR ROLE FOR FRG COULD CAUSE PROBLEMS IN FRG RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS WHICH MIGHT INDICATE THIS WOULD NOT BE WORTHWHILE FROM STANDPOINT OF OVERALL ALLIANCE INTERESTS.

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--Establish the parallelism between defense and arms control in the alliance's approach:

--Make visible the connection of the NATO triad and the unity of alliance territory;

--Help deal with one-sided Soviet claims on FBS in SALT; and

--Avoid regional (read eurostrategic) or "layered" (system-by-system) forms of parity.

17. Afternoon session dealt principally with arms control aspects of TNF issue, although it frequently turned back to discussion of German "overall strategic balance" concept. FRG participants refused to be pinned down on concrete arms control objectives or strategies, arguing that a conceptual framework for SALT III had to be devised within alliance before hypothetical negotiating trade-offs could be assessed.

18. US side questioned need for new conceptual framework -- which could, despite FRG intention, lead to notion of eurostrategic balance. A new concept implied a changed reality, yet US thought FRG agreed strategic situation was not fundamentally changed. Problem was primarily one of perceptions, and dictated a pragmatic approach. Question was: How to handle SALT III -- which could begin as soon as 6-9 months from now and which would relate to gray area issues because of protocol and US statement on theater systems -- given fact that US TNF programs would not reach IOC for 3-4 years?

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19. Stutzle argued reality was changed, and that pieces of deterrence were being negotiated in isolation. Therefore, a new conceptual framework was justified. He asked two questions: What did the US want the nuclear balance to look like after SALT III, given the specific facts which were already in existence (central systems were being negotiated separately -- a fact which Soviets must perceive, and likely hope to maintain in SALT III; Soviet TNF capabilities were increasing; FBS were already part of SALT II)? How did the US want the FRG to perceive the
THEATER NUCLEAR BALANCE? IT WAS THE US, NOT THE FRG, WHICH DETERMINED THAT NUCLEAR BALANCE, AND SO IT WAS ONLY THE US WHICH COULD SPECULATE ON THE LIKELY EVOLUTION OF SALT.

20. BLECH SAID FRG HARBORED NO DOUBTS ABOUT US CAPABILITIES OR COMMITMENT. NUCLEAR BALANCE AS WHOLE WAS ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT. BUT, FOR FRG, STRUCTURE OF BALANCE WAS ESSENTIAL ELEMENT. IT WAS NECESSARY TO AVOID CREATING UNCERTAINTY IN OTHER SIDE'S MIND ABOUT NATO'S WILL TO ESCALATE. SUCH UNCERTAINTY WOULD MEAN NOT SO MUCH HIGHER PROBABILITY OF WAR, AS HIGHER PROBABILITY OF POLITICAL PRESSURE. THIS PROBLEM WAS ONE FOR THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE, NOT JUST THE EUROPEANS, SINCE IT COULD LEAD TO POLITICAL DESTABILIZATION IN EUROPE.

21. GENERAL TANDECKI THEN OFFERED WHAT HE CALLED A MILITARY VIEW OF THE SITUATION. SALT AGENDA HAD PROGRESSIVELY WIDENED SINCE SALT I. WITH AN AMBIGUOUS SYSTEM (THE CRUISE MISSILE) INCLUDED ONLY ON ONE SIDE, IT WAS A MATTER OF LOGIC THAT DISPARITIES NOT COVERED BY SALT II MUST GAIN IN IMPORTANCE. EXCLUSION OF BACKFIRE BY MEANS OF "DEDICATING EUROPE AS ITS TARGET AREA" COULD BE SEEN AS DRIFT AWAY SECRET

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FROM NOTION OF ALLIANCE AS SINGLE ENTITY. GOAL FOR SALT III, GIVEN INEVITABILITY THAT AGENDA WOULD WIDEN STILL FURTHER, SHOULD BE OVERALL PARITY, NOT REGIONAL PARITY. THE FRG "OVERALL STRATEGIC BALANCE" CONCEPT WOULD NOT SINGLE OUT ANY REGION, AND WOULD NOT INCLUDE UK/FRENCH FORCES. AGREEMENT BASED ON IT WOULD PRESERVE COUPLING, DEMONSTRATE ALLIANCE IS AN ENTITY IN BOTH SECURITY AND RISK TERMS. FRG WANTED TO PURSUE ARMS CONTROL IN GRAY AREA, ALTHOUGH RECOGNIZED UK HAD OPPOSING VIEWS. BUT FRG WANTED UK/FRENCH SYSTEMS EXCLUDED, AND WHOLE MATTER HANDLED BY US.

22. BLECH SAID THE "OVERALL STRATEGIC BALANCE" CONCEPT WAS NEEDED FOR ARMS CONTROL, NOT FOR NATO STRATEGY. THE ALLIANCE HAD TO DEVISE AN EQUATION WITH WHICH TO COMPARE THE SIDES' FORCES, AND WHICH RECOGNIZED THE CONTRIBUTION OF TNI TO THE STRATEGIC BALANCE AND TO DETERRENCE. RUTH NOTED US-FRG DIFFERENCES WERE OVER DEFINING A MATTER WHICH BOTH SAW IN THE SAME WAY. THE PROBLEM REALLY WAS THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE TO BE IN SALT: IF SYSTEMS NOT PREVIOUSLY DEFINED AS "STRATEGIC" WERE TO BE COVERED, THEN
"STRATEGIC" HAD TO BE REDEFINED. DEFINING "STRATEGIC"
WAS NOT A NEW QUESTION; IT WAS AN INEVITABLE MEANS TO
DECIDING WHAT YOU WANTED TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT.

23. US PARTICIPANTS NOTED PROBLEMS WITH 1000 KM RANGE CUT-OFF. IT COULD PLAY TO SOVIET NOTION OF "EQUAL SECURITY", AND IN TURN PLACE UK AND FRENCH FORCES AT RISK IN A NEGOTIATION. IT WOULD PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO EXPLOIT TERRITORIAL ASYMMETRIES THROUGH INCREASED DEPLOYMENTS OF SHORT-RANGE TNFS, SUCH AS SCALEBOARD, AN AREA WHERE THEIR MODERNIZATION COULD ALREADY BE TERMED "REVOLUTIONARY". STUTZLE REPLIED THAT EUROPEAN CONCERNS ABOUT SCALEBOARD WOULD INCREASE IN STRATEGIC TERMS TO THE EXTENT THAT THE SOVIETS PERCEIVED NATO TO BE NEGLECTING A COUNTER TO THE SS-20.
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24. AFTER NEWHOUSE'S PRESENTATION ON ISSUES INVOLVED IN THEATER ARMS CONTROL, US ATTEMPTED TO ELICIT FRG REACTION TO ILLUSTRATIVE ARMS CONTROL TRADE-OFFS: WHAT WOULD BE FRG VIEW ON AN OFFER TO LIMIT US DEPLOYMENTS OF GLCM AND PERSHING II-XR TO "X" IF SOVIETS CAPPED BACKFIRE AND SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS AT "Y" AND "Z"? RUTH SAID THE EXAMPLE UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR A SCHEMA TO COMPARE THE SIDES' CAP-ABILITIES. ONLY THEN COULD NATO KNOW WHAT TO "CAP" IN RETURN FOR CAP ON SOVIET TNF. US OFFERED HYPOTHETICAL NUMBERS FOR "X" AND "Y". BLECH REPLIED THAT FRG COULD STILL NOT EVALUATE EXAMPLE WITHOUT PARAMETERS WITH WHICH TO EVALUATE BALANCE.

25. RUTH ASKED WHEN THE ILLUSTRATIVE PROPOSAL TO CAP THE SS-20 WOULD BE MADE. US PARTICIPANTS OUTLINED LIKELY SALT III SCENARIO, WITH SOVIETS RAISING FBS AND CRUISE MISSELS, AND US RESPONDING BY RAISING SOVIET TNF. QUESTION WAS WHETHER US SHOULD RAISE ONLY LONG-RANGE TNF'S, OR BROADER SET OF SYSTEMS. SOVIETS WOULD LIKELY COUNTER WITH DEMANDS TO INCLUDE US TNF'S DOWN TO F-4'S, AND NEGOTIATIONS COULD BOG DOWN. STUTZLE SUGGESTED THAT, IN SUCH A CASE, "STRATEGIC" SHOULD BE DEFINED AS INCLUDING ALL SOVIET SYSTEMS WHICH CAN REACH THE US AND FRG. BLECH SAID AN IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE WAS FOR ALLIANCE TO DECIDE ON SCOPE OF NEGOTIATIONS BEFOREHAND, AND NOT LET IT BE DONE IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS ITSELF.

26. RUTH SAID A WESTERN ARMS CONTROL POSITION SHOULD NOT BE DEVELOPED AS A REACTION TO THE OTHER SIDE'S PROPOSALS.
Rather, Alliance should take HLG recommendations on TNF modernization and then develop arms control strategy which secret.

Secret.

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Would "complement and safeguard" the necessary modernization. But first, the Alliance needed to draw up a balance sheet of capabilities on both sides. Ruth also indicated Alliance might wish to propose a limited-scope arrangement, constraining only modern long-range systems.

27. US posed another example. Assume Alliance decided in favor of Pershing II-XR over GLCM. What could we get in the way of constraints on the Soviets in exchange for a renunciation of GLCM (which would be developed as pure bargaining chip)? Ruth said question could not be answered until Alliance decided on role of long-range systems -- which could lead to mix of different systems -- and on criteria for negotiations, noting FRG preference for 1000 km criterion.

28. On question of further consultations, US side laid out scenario of a NAC in November, bilaterals with smaller allies soon after, and further bilaterals with the big three, leading to the NAC ministerial in December. US would accordingly give discussion paper to other allies. FRG participants were chary of giving paper to other allies, since it was too detailed and could have negative "shock" effect. US argued that fact of paper's existence would become known and, in any case, it was important to involve whole Alliance in TNF issue. December ministerial would not reach any decisions, but merely discuss issues in general terms.

29. FRG concluded by noting productive character of consultation, and their hope that there would be a continuing dialogue rather than structured series of formal rounds. Christopher.

Secret.

NNN
Vår ref: 5454/76/JAL/KT

Brussel, 20 oktober 1978

Det kgl Forsvarsdepartementet
v/statssekretær Johan Jørgen Holst m/ekspl 1 av 7 og HEMMELIG vedlegg nr 1 av 5

v/byråsjef O.M. Engsh m/ekspl 2 av 7 og HEMMELIG vedlegg nr 2 av 5

Forsvarets overkommando
v/Generalløytnant Sven Hauge m/ekspl 3 av 7 og HEMMELIG vedlegg nr 3 av 5

NPG - HLG MØTE BRUSSEL 16-17 OKTOBER 1978

Vedlagt innsendes kopi av referat fra ovennevnte møte.

Etter fullmakt

[Signature]
John A. Lunde

1 vedlegg

FORSVARESDEPARTEMENTET
AVGRAADRET
15 Sept 2009

[Stamp] FORDRER
1.2.2009

[Stamp] HEMMELIG

[Stamp] HEMMELIG
NPG – HIGH LEVEL GROUP ON TNF MODERNIZATION
MAIN POINTS FROM THE FOURTH MEETING, BRUSSELS 16-17 OCTOBER, 1978

1. Summary

The American discussion paper concerning the need for modernization of long-range TNF systems distributed prior to the meeting served as a point of departure for the proceedings.

Without the Americans drawing conclusions, the document contained a presentation and discussion of several elements of different long-range TNF systems:

– political and military significance within NATO overall defence (alliansens totalforsvar);

– scale, force mix, basing, range and target selection;

– arrangements for participation and financing

Two special briefings based on the viewgraphs “Balance of Nuclear Forces” and “Status of TNF long range weapon systems” were given during the meeting.

Generally, the US seemed more genuinely open to European views and appears to aim for as broad allied support as possible for the long-range TNF modernization programmes that the High Level Group will find suitable.

Among the Europeans, the UK continued to underline principally the need for long-range TNF systems, while the FRG held that such weapons systems would not be acquired/operated (in a “dual key” role) by German forces without this unconditionally ruling out basing of for example American forces with such weapons in Western Germany.

Although the majority of the participants were not prepared for detailed discussions on the
basis of the American paper during the meeting, nobody objected to a tentative agreement that there would be need for a long-range force (with a range up to 2 500 km), numbering ca. 2-400 delivery devices, in addition to existing weapons systems. A force of such a scale is likely to provide the necessary political and military flexibility, and at the same time be too small to lead to perceptions of decoupling.

The modernization programme needed to proceed within the total number of nuclear warheads stockpiled in Europe.

There was a general agreement that the development of and guidelines for the possible use of such weapons needed to be considered within an arms control perspective, and that they required an extremely thorough political justification.

The question of funding arrangements was touched upon without the majority being able to give final points of view. The Norwegian delegation referred to the “nuclear ban policy” and held that contributions to alliance overall defence had to be considered in a broader perspective, including LTDP,¹ so as to avoid funding arrangements designed specially for nuclear weapons.

The following Norwegians participated:
– Deputy Minister of Defence Johan Jørgen Holst
– Lieutenant general Sven Hauge
– Director O.M. Engh
– Assistant Defence Counsellor John A Lunde

The subsequent succeeding meeting was set to November 30–December 1 in Brussels. The Chairman, Assistant Secretary of State, Mr McGiffert, assumed that there would be need for 2-3 further meetings to clarify final recommendations to the NPG ministerial meeting in the spring of 79.

¹ NATO's Long-Term Defence Program.
2. Day One

The chairman referred to the broad consensus reached during the three earlier HLG meetings with regard to the need for some increase in the number of long-range TNF weapons, based on more general discussions of long-term TNF modernization. This consensus was reflected in the HLG report for the NPG ministerial meeting in the spring of 78. The present American discussion paper was written in line with the desire of the NPG ministers for a further and more concrete clarification in the HLG of possible modernization programmes for different types of long-range TNF weapons systems.

In the light of this, the chairman drew attention to the 6 main questions that were raised in part one of the discussion paper. He assumed that the discussion could begin with questions III and IV:

III. To what depth of Soviet territory should targets be put at risk? Where and how should candidate systems be based to satisfy shared risk, survivability, and other considerations?

IV. What should be the governing military considerations in determining a suitable size for the new long range theater [sic] nuclear force? Is NATO-Warsaw Pact numerical equivalence in long-range TNFs military or politically desirable or would it lead to perceptions of decoupling?

Canada held that in the light of the role and importance of strategic weapons within the alliance overall defence, any possible TNF force should only cover a proportion (for example 10-20 per cent) of prioritized targets on Soviet territory. The range of the weapons systems were an important issue not only because of the possibility of striking targets in the USSR, but also because it would provide the possibility to base the weapons in more withdrawn locations in Western Europe.

GRG considered that the task was now to fill a gap in the alliance TNF structure. There were several options, and the work with phase 3 guidelines needed to proceed in parallel with the long-term TNF modernization.
The range should be sufficient to strike targets all the way to Moscow without the capital itself being a target. There would probably be a need for a composite force with different long-range systems.

SHAPE raised the question of the political and military role of the new force – was it to be used as “selective use,” what were the prospective targets? These questions would go a long way in deciding the scale and range of the weapons.

The Netherlands underlined that one was facing a complex problem of both political and military nature. Nuclear weapons that could reach the territory of the USSR would have a particularly sensitive character.

Norway pointed out that one could only make preliminary judgements:

– there seemed to be agreement that the USSR had to be within range of the TNF forces of the alliance.
– fire breaks, escalation control, targeting doctrine were likely to be more important than the actual range of the weapons
– basing/launching location and mobility important also with respect to range
– necessary to maintain a link between TNF and strategic weapons
– range requirements would also have great importance for determining the scale of the weapons as well as for the link to the strategic weapons

The UK pointed to obvious political implications and emphasized that the issue also needed to be viewed in an arms control perspective. However, there was no discrepancy between TNF modernization and arms control.

The link to strategic weapons needed to be maintained, and a certain overlap [between TNF targets and strategic ones] was not in itself unfavourable. The question range could hardly be settled in an isolated manner, target doctrine would be the crucial issue and target selection must no be based solely on the basis of the range of the available weapon. The Basing options would give increased survivability and possibility for deployment in [the] depth [of
Western Europe].

The FRG pointed out that a range of political and military factors determined the basing issue.

The American nuclear umbrella protected the whole of NATO, and there was need for real contributions from all countries in the efforts to maintain the deterrent.

Flexibility and possibility for controlled escalation would act as a deterrent, whereas a fundamental change in NATO reasoning with respect to these questions would be harmful both externally and internally in NATO.

As for Western Germany, one could say that [in the case of war] one would supply the battlefield. Furthermore, about 50 per cent of the stockpile was based in the FRG and German forces furnished about 20 per cent of the TNF delivery systems.

Now, other countries needed to reconsider their position on TNF.

Responding to a question from the chairman of whether basing of long-range TNF in Western Germany now was out of the question, the FRG held that the Bundeswehr at any rate was contributing sufficiently to the total TNF force of the alliance.

Planning for and actual use of nuclear weapons on USSR territory called for extremely careful consideration within NATO.

The NATO partners had no be aware that it would create particularly disturbing Soviet reactions if German forces were equipped with TNF weapons on a “dual key” basis.

These issues would be discussed further on the highest political levels in the Federal Republic.

From a German viewpoint, a threat to use TNF weapons against Moscow would lack credibility.

On the issue of range, SHAPE said that even though the city of Moscow was not seen as a target for TNF weapons, there was a clear need to be able to strike a number of targets in the Soviet Union that were within a range that did not automatically exclude Moscow.

This was seen as necessary to establish a balance in the threat perception in Europe.
Increased diffusion of means of delivery and participation from NATO countries would, generally speaking, boost the survivability of the TNF.

The Netherlands underlined particularly the necessity to distinguish between the issues of targeting and capabilities of the weapons in future discussions.

Norway pointed to the principles of its nuclear policy, which ruled out basing in Norway, and underlined that while the USSR possessed a considerable buffer zone [fortereng] in Central Europe, the situation was practically reversed in the North. This circumstance complicated the question of whether a target in this area could be characterized as tactical or strategic.

It was important, in a political perspective, to avoid that special countries were singled out as unacceptable host countries – one had the FRG in mind. When considering the basing issue, one could not exclude West Germany on the grounds that it would cause sensitive Soviet reactions.

If employment in Germany were out of the question, the alternative would perhaps be not to employ weapons of this category on the European continent at all.

With respect to the issue of targeting, Norway warned against planning that the weapons could be used only in Eastern Europe. In many situations, it would perhaps be more suitable to be able to “threaten” targets in the USSR – particularly in light of the fact that NATO and the WP were not comparable groupings.

Arms control considerations must be taken into account in the shaping of NATO’s long-range TNF. However, it seems unclear exactly when it would be most beneficial to bring such factors into the equation.

The UK supported the notion that participation should be as broad as possible. This was important not only with regard to operative participation or/and hosting, but to the same
extent with regard to political and economic support.

On the question of whether long-range TNF should be based at sea and/or on land, the FRG said that earlier European concerns about sea-based systems were primarily related to SLBMs used in a “selective role.” There was no general opposition against sea-based systems, despite weaker “visibility” (political and military credibility based on the plain presence of the weapons system) compared to land-based systems.

The UK supported the German views and held that there would probably be a need for a force composed of both land- and sea-based systems.

In the discussion of the importance of survivability, Germany remarked that the force would not be a “second strike” unit, which was required to survive a surprise attack. The use of long-range TNF in a controlled escalation by NATO would need to carry a political message as strong as the military one.

Survivability was important, but not the top priority in developing long-range TNF in NATO.

There was nevertheless general agreement that the force must not be organized in such a manner that it invited surprise attacks.

The FRG underlined the need to consider the force in an escalation perspective. The long-range TNFs would provide NATO with the possibility to strike USSR territory with nuclear weapons in a conflict that would primarily be in the conventional phase. The development of and guidelines for any possible use of such weapons called for a very thorough political justification.

During the discussion of question IV (force size), the UK held that the issue was not to develop new long-range TNFs to meet a particular threat. There was however a need for some more long-range TNF weapons for selective use. A force of less than 100 would probably be too little and one of more than 1000 would be
too much – slightly less than 500 weapons seemed appropriate.

**Norway** pointed to the agreement that the development of such a force would proceed as an evolutionary adjustment. The force ought to be sufficient to give certain political options. However, a force that was too big would increase the danger of decoupling – the number should probably closer to 100 than 1000.

The **Netherlands** supported the British and Norwegian remarks, but reminded the others of the well-known Dutch view that NATO's dependence on nuclear weapons should be reduced.

**Italy** stated that for the time being, the only thing about which there was consensus was the need for some more long-range TNF weapons.

**SHAPE** underlined that the question of force scale was closely connected to the ongoing discussions of the political guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons by NATO (phase 3).

– What was the real goal of NATO's TNF weapons?

– Which tasks should this particular part of the TNF force have?

– What options were desired/needed?

These were political questions that needed to be settled before one could proceed with the military part of the planning.

The **FRG** emphasized the need for clear guidelines for the military authorities in NATO on this field. If one, for the sake of analysis, assumed that the long-range TNF would comprise 300 weapons, it would enable SHAPE to work out illustrative selective employment plans in the light of different conditions, but within the current stockpile. Such a study would be very useful in the coming discussions on force scale and composition.
Canada viewed a number around 2-300 to be suitable – but the point was for the force to fill the gap between the traditional TNFs and the strategic weapons.

In light of parity with respect to strategic weapons, the UK emphasized that the force size should not be set with a view to achieve parity in TNF weapons. The size of the force had to be considered in light of its role and function.

The majority supported the British views.

With respect to the question of force mix, the UK stated that NATO already possessed a composite force, and that it would be appropriate to build on this basis in carrying out the evolutionary adjustment. Pershing II XR (with increased range) seemed to be a good evolutionary starter.

Norway agreed that planning ought to take place in evolutionary terms. At the same time, it was critical to maintain as many options as possible, for example with regard to cruise missiles.

SHAPE emphasized that different IOCs (initial operational capability) for the candidate systems made possible an evolutionary adjustment of the new force.

The FRG underlined the need to consider the force in a long-term perspective. In light of their different IOCs, there was really a need for Pershing II XR, different cruise missiles and a new medium-range missile. Cost-effectiveness considerations and possible funding options also required consideration.

Referring to the varying IOCs, the US raised the question of how soon the build-up of NATO’s long-range TNF should begin from political and military points of view.

The majority emphasized that it would be unfortunate if it took too long for long-term TNF modernization to begin. Phase-out dates for existing systems and IOC for new ones provided a certain basis with respect to time. The evolutionary character of the
modernization work had to be maintained.

3. Day Two

The discussions on day two covered question V in the American discussion paper:

V: What kinds of participation and cost-sharing arrangements should be considered for new long-range systems, and what should be the governing considerations?

The US pointed out that there were two sides to participation

– participation in a dual operation (dual keys) sense;

– participation through funding arrangements

With respect to funding arrangements, there were several different solutions, ranging from unilateral American funding to some or all allies sharing the cost (like with AWACS\(^2\)).

Whereas the Americans would have to invest substantial amounts money on strategic nuclear weapons in the modernization process, the question of funding arrangements for the long-term modernization of TNF would be considerably more sensitive in Congress.

Canada emphasized the need to meet the special problems faced by different countries with respect to the issue.

The “dual key” system had worked out excellently and was still acceptable in principle.

With respect to cost sharing, however, the Canadians were slightly embarrassed.

Denmark agreed, in principle, about the need and desire for the broadest participation possible.

The question of various funding arrangements was still something entirely new in this area and one was hardly able to give one’s opinion at the present moment.

\(^2\) Airborne Warning and Control System.
The **FRG** did not wish to say anything about “dual key” arrangements at the present moment.

With respect to cost sharing, one assumed that this could be solved in a number of different ways.

The **Netherlands** considered that were good arguments for both broad participation and cost sharing. However, these were difficult and sensitive questions in a problem area that already seemed complicated and complex enough.

**Norway** emphasized that one must not forget the principle of evolutionary change – in any event, the modernization plans must not be presented as something new and dramatic. Generally, one should probably use funding arrangements based on ones already in place. This related as much to the question of financial participation. While all countries should contribute its share to the overall defence of the alliance, it would probably not be suitable to establish special funding arrangements for the nuclear forces of the alliance. Contributions to the overall defence ought to be seen in a broader perspective – modernization projects such as LTDP seemed relevant in this respect.

The **UK** pointed out that Great Britain already participated in the alliance TNF political, physical and economical, and UK would probably prefer to continue its participation based on existing arrangements.

On the question of a possible cost sharing between TNF and conventional forces, the **FRG** stated that all member states must display solidarity through contributions not only to NATO’s conventional defence but also to TNF.

The **Netherlands** pointed out that it would have unfortunate external consequences if NATO seemed to be emphasizing modernization of TNF weapons more than conventional ones.

**Norway** pointed to the problem NATO was facing in this respect. TNF and conventional
weapons should not, however, be seen as opposites; the alliance needed to consider for possibilities for mutually beneficial solutions.

It was pointed out in this perspective that a TNF force in Northern Norway would be regarded completely different than such forces based in Central Europe.

The meeting concluded with a brief discussion based on the following list of issues:

“Some possible candidate military rationales

In formulating the detailed military rationale which ultimately must be developed, we might wish to consider some combination of the following arguments in justification for the introduction of “somewhat more long-range capability.”

A. Evolutionary improvements to existing forces through routine modernization.

B. Reinforce the deterrent value of the NATO Triad in view of Soviet modernization of both short-range and long-range theater nuclear forces.

C. Provide military counter to Soviet deployment of the SS-20 and Backfire.

D. Improve NATO capability to execute limited and deliberate escalation.

E. Provide a “warfighting” capability against deep military targets.”

FRG, with support from SHAPE, warned against the inclusion of point E.

The Netherlands remarked that the deterrent value of the forces and that the modernization process concerned an evolutionary adjustment should be emphasized.
The UK was concerned about point E and unsure about point C.

The main questions of the discussion paper, I, II and VI, were not discussed more closely at the HLG meeting of Oct 16-17, 78.
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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SAS-02 SP-02 SMS-01 H-01
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GENEVA FOR USALTTWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MNUC, MPOL
SUBJECT: NOV 20 NAC ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

REF: STATE 292218

1. AT NOVEMBER 20 "OPEN-ENDED PERMREP MEETING" (USNATO 10740) AMBASSADOR DELIVERED STATEMENT ON TNF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AND DISTRIBUTED CHARTS PER REFTEL. (WE WILL COMMENT SEPTEL ON THE MEETING WHICH WE CONSIDERED EXTREMELY USEFUL.) PATRICK MOBERLY, FCO ASSISTANT UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, OPENED THE DISCUSSION; TEXT OF HIS COMMENTS FOLLOW IN PARA 2 BELOW.

2.

BEGIN TEXT:

SPEAKING NOTE USED BY MR. MOBERLY ON 20 NOV 1978
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GREY AREA SYSTEMS

NOTE THIS IS FREE EXCHANGE, NOT COMMITTING GOVERNMENTS.
BUT CONFIDENT MY GOVERNMENT BESIDES WELCOMING THIS DISCUSSION TODAY WOULD ENDORSE ONE FEATURE OF THE US PRESENTATION, NAMELY THAT WE ARE DEALING NOT WITH ONE PROBLEM BUT TWO: I MEAN ARMS CONTROL AND TNF MODERNIZATION. IT BECOMES INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT THEY ARE CLOSELY INTER-RELATED AND EACH HAS MAJOR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE OTHER. AMBASSADOR BENNETT’S PRESENTATION HAS COVERED MUCH GROUND AND RAISED MANY IMPORTANT QUESTIONS TO WHICH THERE ARE NO EASY ANSWERS. LIKE TO COMMENT ON JUST A FEW OF THEM.

THE STRATEGIC SETTING

. (A) NATO STRATEGY Requires A CONTINUOUS CHAIN OF GRADUATED RESPONSES TO AGGRESSION. HENCE NEED FOR LINKAGE BETWEEN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES AND TNF. BELIEVE THIS IS COMMON GROUND. WOULD BE DANGEROUS IF GAPS IN THIS LINKAGE BEGAN TO APPEAR.

. (B) WE KNOW SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR CAPABILITY ALREADY MORE THAN ENOUGH TO DESTROY WESTERN EUROPE. THIS NOW BEING MODERNIZED AND IMPROVED - PARTICULARLY SS20, BACKFIRE. INTRODUCTION OF THESE SYSTEMS DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY ALTER THE OVERALL BALANCE IN OUR VIEW. BUT UNDOUBTEDLY SS20 MORE ACCURATE THAN PREVIOUS SYSTEMS AS WELL AS BEING MOBILE AND HAVING LONGER RANGE AND THEREFORE POSES A POTENTIALLY GREATER THREAT TO OUR OWN TNF.

. (C) WE DO NOT NEED TO TRY AND MATCH THE RUSSIANS IN EVERY RESPECT, NOR TO ESTABLISH ANY KIND OF EURO-STRATEGIC SECRET

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BALANCE. INDEED TO DO SO COULD LEAD TO DOUBTS ABOUT THE LINKAGE BETWEEN IN-THEATRE FORCES AND US CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS ON WHICH WE IN EUROPE GREATLY DEPEND.

TNF MODERNIZATION

WORK OF HIGH LEVEL GROUP (HLG) SET UP UNDER LTDP CLOSELY RELATED TO THE ABOVE. QUITE INDEPENDENTLY OF DEVELOPMENTS ON THE SOVIET SIDE, THERE IS A CASE FOR CONSIDERING SOME UP-DATING OF NATO’S IN-THEATRE LONGER-RANGE TNF CAPABILITY AS OUR EXISTING SYSTEMS BECOME OLDER AND SOVIET AIR DEFENSES IMPROVE. OTHERWISE COULD BE DANGER OF GAPS IN OUR CONTINUOUS CHAIN OF DETERRENCE AND GRADUATED RESPONSE. I THEREFORE WELCOME REFERENCES TO HLG AND ITS PROGRAMME IN TODAY’S DISCUSSION AS BEING AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE
TOTAL PICTURE.

UNCLASSIFIED

ARMS CONTROL

SO FAR AS OBJECTIVES GO, IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO IMPOSE
RESTRAINSTS ON SOVIET SYSTEMS TARGETED AT EUROPE, THIS
WOULD CLEARLY RESPOND TO CERTAIN EUROPEAN CONCERNS.

THE QUESTION IS WHETHER ANY RESTRRAINTS COULD BE NEGOTIATED
WHICH MADE A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE, GIVEN THE DEGREE OF
EXISTING SOVIET OVERKILL; AND MORE PARTICULARLY WHETHER
THE ALLIANCE COULD AFFORD RESTRRAINTS ON NATO'S NUCLEAR
FORCES WHICH WERE ACCEPTABLE IN RETURN.

OUR PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION AT THIS STAGE (ALREADY MENTIONED
IN EARLIER DISCUSSION) IS TO DOUBT WHETHER ON BALANCE IT
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GENEVA FOR USSALTTOO

WOULD BE TO OUR ADVANTAGE FOR GREY AREA SYSTEMS TO BE
BROUGHT INTO SALT III: AT LEAST WE HAVE YET TO BE
CONVINCED.

ANOTHER CONCLUSION I WOULD DRAW IS THAT IF ANY NATO GREY
AREA SYSTEMS WERE TO BE BROUGHT INTO SALT III (AND CRUISE MISSILES HAVE A PARTICULAR STATUS IN THIS REGARD AS AMBASSADOR BENNETT HAS MENTIONED) THEN WE SHOULD CERTAINLY WANT TO BE SURE THAT APPROPRIATE SOVIET SYSTEMS WERE LIKELY Brought UNDER NEGOTIATION. HENCE, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROPOSED US UNILATERAL STATEMENT IN KEEPING OPTIONS OPEN.

SYNTHESIS

I BELIEVE WE ARE ONLY AT THE BEGINNING OF A LONG PROCESS OF EXAMING ALL THESE ISSUES. FOR OUR PART WE ARE WILLING TO LISTEN, AND TO KEEP OWN POSITION UNDER REVIEW IN THE LIGHT OF VIEWS EXPRESSED BY OTHERS.

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WE HAVE BEEN ASKED HOW WE SEE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL. IN VIEW OF WHAT I HAVE SAID, I CAN ONLY REPLY THAT IT IS PREMATURE TO ANSWER. BUT HYPOTHETICALLY IT IS POSSIBLE TO IMAGINE A LINK BETWEEN THE TWO TAKING SEVERAL ALTERNATIVE FORMS, PERHAPS AIMED AT SOME KIND OF NUMERICAL LIMITATION ON ONE OR MORE OF EACH SIDE'S SYSTEMS. NATO COUNTRIES COULD DECIDE TO NEGOTIATE BEFORE EMBARKING ON ANY TNF MODERNIZATION; OR THEY COULD ANNOUNCE THEIR INTENTION TO MODERNIZE AND THEN NEGOTIATE; OR THEY COULD NEGOTIATE ONCE THEY HAD STARTED PRODUCTION; OR THEY COULD NEGOTIATE AFTER THEY HAD BEGUN TO DEPLOY NEW SYSTEMS. THE EARLIER ANY NEGOTIATION WAS ATTEMPTED, THE WEAKER OUR HAND MIGHT BE; BUT THE LONGER WE WAITED, THE STRONGER THE RUSSIANS MIGHT HAVE BECOME.

THIS BRINGS ME TO MY FINAL CONCLUSION. IT SEEMS DOUBTFUL IF WE SHOULD REACH FIRM VIEWS ABOUT POSSIBLE ARMS CONTROL OPTIONS BEFORE GOVERNMENTS HAVE A CLEARER IDEA OF POSSIBLE REQUIREMENTS FOR TNF MODERNIZATION IN THE LIGHT OF HLG'S WORK AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH OVERALL NATO STRATEGY. AS I SAID AT THE OUTSET, WE ARE DEALING WITH TWO INTER-RELATED PROBLEMS WHICH NEED TO BE SEEN AND CONSIDERED TOGETHER: I MEAN TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN. END TEXT.

3. READ A VERY GENERAL STATEMENT STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE CONSULTATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE TNF SYSTEMS AND IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT SALT II ALREADY DEALT WITH
CRUISE MISSILES, "A WESTERN SYSTEM OF IMPORTANCE FOR GAS."

ALSO REFERRED AGAIN TO SUGGESTION AT THE NOVEMBER 7 SALT NAC CONSULTATION (USNATO 10395) THAT UPON THE CONCLUSION OF SALT A NATO CO-ORDINATED STATEMENT SECRET

BE ISSUED IN ALLIED CAPITALS. SUGGESTED THIS STATEMENT INCLUDE LANGUAGE ON GAS.

4. ALSO COMMENTED BRIEFLY ON THE US PRESENTATION. HE, TOO, SAW DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS AND ARMS CONTROL AS "TWO SIDES OF ONE COIN." IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT GAS PROBLEMS AWAIT THE ALLIANCE: IT IS CERTAIN THAT SOVIETS WILL INTRODUCE THIS ISSUE EARLY IN SALT III AND THUS THE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE PROPOSED US UNILATERAL STATEMENT.

5. SAID THE WEST SHOULD EXAMINE HOW TO DECREASE THE DISPARITY IN MEDIUM-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES AND AIRCRAFT (BACKFIRE). THIS SHOULD BE DONE IN THE BILATERAL SALT CONTEXT AND IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD NOT CONSTRAIN OUR FLEXIBILITY TO MODERNIZE TNF. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE FIRST TASK WAS TO ANALYZE THE EAST-WEST BALANCE, COMPARING ALL SIGNIFICANT SYSTEMS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OVERALL BALANCE AND UNDERLINING THE LINKAGE BETWEEN ALL THE COMPONENTS OF THIS BALANCE.

6. CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE ZEINER GUNDERSEN THEN MADE THE FOLLOWING REMARKS:

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7. **MADE THE FOLLOWING** PRELIMINARY REMARKS**:

BEGIN TEXT: WE WARMLY WELCOME THE INITIATIVE TAKEN BY THE AMERICAN AUTHORITIES, WHICH ENABLES US TO HAVE THIS PRELIMINARY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON A SUBJECT WHICH IS TODAY AT THE VERY CORE OF ALLIED SECURITY CONCERNS.
IT IS IN FACT NOT ONLY WISE BUT ESSENTIAL TO START EXAMINING IN ONE COMPREHENSIVE CONTEXT ALL THE RELEVANT ASPECTS OF OUR NUCLEAR POLICY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL THEIR POSSIBLE INTERCONNECTIONS.

THE RECENT WIDE DEVELOPMENT OF ARMS CONTROL IN MANY FIELDS REQUIRES ON ONE HAND THAT ARMS CONTROL BE REGARDED AS A FUNDAMENTAL INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, THAT ITS OBJECTIVES BE DEFINED WITH DUE CONSIDERATION TO THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE ALLIANCE.

IT IS THEREFORE CLEAR THAT BOTH STRATEGIC AND THEATRE NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROLS SHOULD BE STRICTLY RELATED TO THE FORCE MODERNISATION PROGRAMMES.

MOREOVER, ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES MUST BE CONSIDERED GLOBALLY AND BE CONTINUOUSLY REASSESSED IN THE LIGHT OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE SINGLE ELEMENTS OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE.

IN FACT, THE STRONG BUILD UP OF THE SOVIET MEDIUM RANGE CAPABILITIES, PARALLEL TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF SALT NEGOTIA-

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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
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GENEVA FOR USSALTWO

TIONS, HAS CALLED FOR AN INCREASED ATTENTION ON THE GREY
AREAS PROBLEM, WHILE IT HAS ALSO CHANGED AT SOME EXTENT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NUCLEAR ASPECTS OF VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS.

IT IS ALSO VERY IMPORTANT TO GIVE ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION TO THE POLITICAL PRESSURE WHICH WILL BE MOST PROBABLY EXERCISED BY THE EAST IN ORDER TO PREVENT OUR MODERNISATION PROGRAM AND TO MAINTAIN THEIR MEDIUM AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE SUPERIORITY.

ON THE BASIS OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS, IT IS HIGHLY DESIRABLE THAT THE ALLIES DEVELOP A COMMON COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH, BOTH ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUES ADDRESSED AND ON THE NECESSARY ADEQUATE PRESENTATION OF THEIR LINE OF ACTION TO PUBLIC OPINION.

AS FAR AS THE SUBSTANCE IS CONCERNED, TODAY WE CAN ONLY FORMULATE SOME PRELIMINARY REMARKS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT MANY IMPORTANT ELEMENTS WILL BE CLARIFIED BY THE RESULTS OF THE WORKS OF THE "HIGH LEVEL GROUP".

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IN ANY CASE, IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE THAT THEATRE NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROLS BE EXAMINED IN CLOSE CONNECTION WITH STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL. OTHERWISE A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TOWARDS A REGIONALISATION APPROACH COULD ARISE, WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE BASIC ALLIED DOCTRINE. ON THE OTHER HAND, WHILE IT IS UNCONCEIVABLE TO ACCEPT A CODIFICATION OF THE EXISTING INTERMEDIATE AND MEDIUM RANGE DISPARITY, IT SHOULD ALSO BE KEPT IN MIND THAT THE REESTABLISHMENT OF THE STRICT SYMETRICAL PARITY IN ALL THEATRE SYSTEMS MIGHT ALSO IMPLY SOME RISKS OF DECOUPLING.

MR. CHAIRMAN, THESE WERE ONLY SOME INFORMAL REMARKS OF A VERY GENERAL NATURE. BUT THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WE HAD TODAY AND THE VERY INTERESTING STATEMENTS MADE BY THE AMERICAN DELEGATION WILL HELP US TO ANALYZE FURTHER IN DEPTH THESE ISSUES, WHICH ARE OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE FOR THE ALLIANCE. WE HOPE THEREFORE TO HAVE ALSO IN THE FUTURE SIMILAR OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONSTRUCTIVE CONSULTATIONS.

END TEXT.

8. STRESSED THAT LONG-RANGE TNF SYSTEMS RAISED "SENSITIVE POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS" AND THAT ANY DECISIONS ON TNF SHOULD BE MADE ONLY AFTER THE
MOST CAREFUL EVALUATION OF ALL FACTORS, E.G., SECURITY, DETERRENCE AND THE OVERALL BALANCE. NOTED THAT THE US-PROPOSED STUDY OF ARMS CONTROL POSSIBILITIES COINCIDED WITH PROPOSALS AND THAT EXAMINATION OF THESE ISSUES SHOULD PROCEED "SIDE-BY-SIDE WITH THE HLG." WHILE IT WAS TOO EARLY TO DETERMINE WHETHER TO ENTER INTO ANY ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, IF WE WERE TO DO SO THEY SHOULD BE KEPT WITHIN THE (BILATERAL) SALT FRAMEWORK.

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CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT THE HAGUE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE ER/RB WEAPON BROUGHT INTO THE ARMS-CONTROL PROCESS.

9. MADE THE FOLLOWING INTERVENTION:

BEGIN TEXT:

SPEAKING NOTES

THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ARMS CONTROL

THE OPEN ENDED MEETING, 20 NOVEMBER 1978

MR. CHAIRMAN,

I WOULD LIKE TO JOIN PRECEEDING SPEAKERS IN THANKING AMBASSADOR BENNETT FOR HIS MOST INTERESTING AND COMPREHENSIVE PRESENTATION OF PRELIMINARY US CONSIDERATIONS OF THE MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY COMPLICATED SUBJECT MATTER BEFORE US.

MY AUTHORITIES CONSIDER THE QUESTIONS RELATED TO TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL AS TWO ASPECTS OF THE SAME BASIC SECURITY PROBLEM AND OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE.

I KNOW THAT THE MANY THOUGHT PROVOKING QUESTIONS AND IDEAS RAISED TODAY IN AMBASSADOR BENNETT'S STATEMENT WILL BE STUDIED WITH GREAT INTEREST AND ATTENTION BY MY AUTHORITIES.

I REALIZE, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT WE ARE ONLY AT THE BEGINNING OF A SERIES OF CONSULTATIONS WHICH WILL BE RATHER TIME-CONSUMING. I HAVE, HOWEVER, BEEN ASKED TO MAKE TODAY SOME

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ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SAS-02 SP-02 SMS-01 H-01
INR-10 L-03 PM-05 INRE-00 EUR-12 NSCE-00 CIAE-00
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FM USMISSION USNATO
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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
USMISSION GENEVA
USDEL MBFR VIENNA

S E C R E T SECTION 05 OF 06 USNATO 10805

GENEVA FOR USSALTWO

PRELIMINARY REMARKS WHICH WILL BE OF VERY GENERAL NATURE,
FOCUSBING ON THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE TNF MODERNIZATION
AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO ARMS CONTROL.

EUROPEAN STABILITY WOULD IN OUR VIEW NOT BE SERVED BY ANY
CHANGE IN THE BASIC PARAMETERS OF THE STATUS QUO.

THE MILITARY AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF TNF MODERNIZATION
HAVE BEEN EXPLORED IN THE NPG HIGH LEVEL GROUP. MY
AUTHORITIES CONSIDER THE OPEN AND EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS
WITHIN THAT GROUP AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE CONTINUOUS
PROCESS OF CONSULTATION AND EXAMINATION WITHIN OUR
ALLIANCE WITH THE AIM OF UPHOLDING A CREDIBLE DETERRENT
IN THE LIGHT OF THE TNF BUILD UP STEADILY TAKING PLACE
ON THE SOVIET SIDE.
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THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS OF CONSULTATION HAS EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO VIEW THE ISSUES RELATED TO TNF MODERNIZATION IN A BROAD POLITICAL CONTEXT. WE HAVE EMPHASIZED CERTAIN KEY CRITERIA. THEY MAY BE ENCAPSULATED IN THE FOLLOWING PROPOSITIONS:

- A CLEAR DISTINCTION SHOULD BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS.

- THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AT A HIGH LEVEL AND NOT BE LOWERED.

- NO EFFORT SHOULD BE SPARED FOR ENSURING POSITIVE POLITICAL CONTROL OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

- WE SHOULD STRIVE TO REDUCE OUR DEPENDENCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

- WE SHOULD EMPHASIZE CONVENTIONAL OPTIONS AS ALTERNATIVES TO NUCLEAR USE.

- NATO'S DEFENSE POSTURE SHOULD UPHOLD A MARKED DEFENSIVE ACCENT.

- MODERNIZATION OF NATO'S TNF POSTURE SHOULD NOT PROVIDE OBSTACLES TO NEGOTIATED ARMS CONTROL WITH THE EASTERN STATES.

IN OUR APPROACH TO MODERNIZATION WE SHOULD ADOPT AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH AVOIDING BOTH THE REALITY AND IMPRESSION OF DRAMATIC DEPARTURES. NO ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO ESTABLISH A SEPARATE EURO-STRATEGIC BALANCE AS SUCH SECRET

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AN APPROACH WOULD TEND TO WEAKEN EXTENDED DETERRENCE AND CREATE IMPRESSIONS OF DECOUPLING BETWEEN THE USA AND WESTERN EUROPE.

MY AUTHORITIES FEEL THERE IS A NEED FOR CONCEPTUALIZATION. NPG PHASE III WORK SHOULD BE COMPLETED SO AS TO PROVIDE A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATION OF CONCRETE FORCE POSTURE ISSUES. IT IS IN THEIR OPINION MUCH TOO EARLY TO POSE QUESTIONS ABOUT NUMBERS AND STRUCTURE AT THIS POINT.
MY AUTHORITIES CONSIDER IT TOO EARLY TO DETERMINE THE NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK FOR BRINGING TNF INTO THE PROCESS OF ARMS CONTROL. HOWEVER, WE ARE IN FAVOUR OF INCORPORATING SUCH WEAPONS INTO THE PROCESS OF EAST/WEST NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD SEEM REASONABLE THAT ISSUES RELATING TO CRUISE MISSILES AND OTHER LONG RANGE TNF STRIKE SYSTEMS BE INCLUDED IN THE SALT PROCESS. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT INTRO-ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS WILL ENSURE SUFFICIENT AND PROPER CONSIDERATION OF THE EUROPEAN INTERESTS BY THE AMERICAN NEGOTIATORS.

VIEW ON A PARTICULAR MODERNIZATION ISSUE, I.E., THE ERW IS WELL KNOWN. MY GOVERNMENT IS OPPOSED TO PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THIS WEAPON. NO EFFORT SHOULD BE SPARED IN TRYING TO BRING THE ERW EFFECTIVELY INTO AN ARMS CONTROL FRAMEWORK. IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT MY AUTHORITIES ARE AGAINST PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE WEAPON. WE SHOULD CALL UPON THE SOVIET UNION TO BE FORTHCOMING. WITH RESPECT TO MODALITIES AND COUNTER-PARTS WE SHOULD REMAIN FLEXIBLE.

IT SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED ALSO THAT THE HISTORY OF HOW THE ERW ISSUE HAS BEEN HANDLED IN THE PAST CONSTRAIN FUTURE OPTIONS. IT CONSTITUTES AN EMOTIONAL ISSUE IN MANY

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GENEVA FOR USSALTWO

COUNTRIES AND CERTAINLY IN MY COUNTRY. WE SHOULD EVALUATE
VERY SERIOUSLY WHETHER THE POLITICAL COSTS INVOLVED IN A
DEPLOYMENT DECISION COULD POSSIBLY BE JUSTIFIED BY THE
MILITARY GAINS. IT IS THE VIEW THAT THE COSTS
OUTWEIGH THE GAINS. END TEXT. 1.4(B)

10. SAID IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT TNF
MODERNIZATION HAD POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS WHICH NEEDED
ALLIANCE CONSIDERATION. GENERALLY,
VIEW OF THE DANGER OF ESTABLISHING A EURO-
STRATEGIC BALANCE. THEN REFERRED TO THE NOVEMBER 9
IHT PINCUS ARTICLE ABOUT CURRENT US CONSIDERATION OF AN
MBFR SYSTEM WHICH WOULD STRIKE THE SOVIET HOMELAND. HE
STRESSED THAT ANY PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF ULTIMATE TNF
DECISIONS MUST BE WELL-PREPARED AND WELL-TIMED IN ORDER
TO GAIN MAXIMUM PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING. WE MUST AVOID ANY
CLAIM THAT WE ARE NOT MODERNIZING, BUT STEPPING UP THE
ARMS RACE. CONCLUDED BY REMARKING THAT THE ALLIANCE
SHOULD EXPLORE "THE NEGOTIATING VALUE" OF NEW TNF SYSTEMS
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AND WHETHER THEY SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN SALT III.

11. MADE THREE POINTS:

--WHILE TNF REPRESENTED A NECESSARY LINK TO THE
CENTRAL DETERRENT, WE MUST NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE CONVEN-
TIONAL THREAT;

--THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARMS CONTROL AND FORWARD
DEFENSE PLANNING MUST BE STUDIED AND WE MUST BE CAREFUL
NOT TO INHIBIT REPLACEMENT AND MODERNIZATION; AND

--WE MUST BE CLEAR AS TO WHAT FORUM, NPG OR THE
COUNCIL, WOULD EXAMINE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARMS
CONTROL AND TNF MODERNIZATION.

12. AMBASSADOR BENNETT INTERVENED AT THIS POINT TO
INDICATE THAT WE CONSIDERED THE COUNCIL THE APPROPRIATE
FORUM FOR CONSIDERATION OF TNF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES.

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13. The final remarks of the session were delivered by UNCLASSIFIED who stressed the importance of arms control and alluded once again to it and TNF modernization as "two sides of the same coin." GILTMAN

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Summary

The results of the HLG meeting in Brussels on October 16-17, 1978 served as basis of the discussions.

There were three special presentations based on the viewgraphs “Cruise missile survivability tests,” “Basing concepts for GLCM’s [sic]” and “Illustrative selective employment options.” (The latter orientation will be expanded for a new presentation at the next HLG meeting).

The special presentations and the succeeding discussion provided useful extra information with significance both for future HLG discussions and with respect to the conclusion of the cost effectiveness study on long-term TNF weapons systems.

The German views with respect to participation and basing was received, while the Dutch and the Belgians pointed out that the possibility of basing on a rotational basis granted further study.

The Norwegian viewpoints on basing and risk sharing can be found in a separate attachment.¹

The Americans pointed out that the question of GLCM basing required a relatively quick settlement for the projected IOC (1982) to be met.

To secure continuous funding for the [TNF] programme, Congress required adequate information on basing opportunities already by the winter of 1979.

From Norway, the following participated:

¹ For this, please refer to the original document (in English).
Before the cost effectiveness study is finalised by the Americans (mid-February), experts from the countries participating in the HLG will get together in Washington towards the end of January 79 to familiarise themselves with the contents and suggest any possible additional comments.

The next HLG meeting at the end of February, which will be hosted by the USA, will, in addition to discussing the cost-effectiveness study, draw up guidelines for preparation of the HLG report for this spring’s HLG ministerial meeting in April 24-25, 1979.

A HLG draft report will possibly be discussed at a HLG meeting in March 1979.
Day One

At the beginning of the meeting, the Americans gave two special briefings on cruise missile (CM) survivability and penetrability. The presentation was based on results of seven CM survivability tests at American test sites during 1978. The programme aimed to give the best possible knowledge of CM effectiveness in the event of use of various components of the Soviet strategic air defence.

The development and build-up of an effective Soviet air defence against the current (first generation) CMs would likely demand about 30-50 billion US dollars over a period of ten years.

It had been established that preparations for developing such a weapons system was underway in the Soviet Union. The Americans were continuously considering the status and trends of USSR strategic air defence in relation to the progression of the CM programmes.

The development of first generation CMs was going forward, “pen-aids” would substantially increase penetrability.

More long-term research and development for a second generation CM was underway, aiming for a smaller, faster and more manoeuvrable cruise missile.

In the subsequent discussion, it was emphasized that even though CMs would have a central role (ALCMs)² in a general nuclear response (GNR), this did not make selective use of CMs dangerous because of the risk of misperceptions with respect to the character of the use. In this perspective, the use of CMs would not be different from other TNF weapons systems such as dual capable aircraft and Pershing, which could be used selectively and/or in a GNR.

Available material suggested at CMs would be more vulnerable when flying over sea than over hilly areas.

² Air-launched cruise missile.
The Norwegian delegation pointed out that this factor might result in the Soviets considering the possibility of establishing “forward defence” against SLCMs.3

Responding to a question from the Netherlands on the relative effectiveness of Soviet CMs, the American team of experts said that the West, with AWACs, F-14, F-15 and PATRIOT, was capable of meeting first generation CMs from the East.

With reference to the discussion of the basing issue and risk sharing at the previous meeting, the Norwegian position was specified in a statement, which is attached to this report.

During the review of the American report of the previous meeting, several countries underlined that any viewpoints advanced in the HLG did not represent final national viewpoints.

NPG HLG would present its recommendations to the NPG on ministerial level, but the countries were not committed [to specific positions] through the discussions in the HLG.

The Americans pointed out that one assumed that the participant stayed closely in touch with capitals.

The German delegation underlined that several arguments called for “widespread basing.” From a purely military point of view, this would increase flexibility and survivability – from a purely political point of view it would underline Alliance solidarity.

Visibility of solidarity and risk sharing could not be operationalised economically. It was necessary to settle these fundamental questions before the final conclusions of the cost-effectiveness study were drawn.

Afterwards, a working group chaired by SHAPE’s representative gave a presentation (CTS4) of “illustrative selective employment options.”

There was a general consensus that the orientation had great importance and relevance for

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3 Submarine-launched cruise missile.
4 Cosmic Top Secret.
the future work.

The Norwegian delegation nevertheless pointed out that the lack of political guidelines for any possible use of alliance nuclear weapons (phase 3) made it difficult for the HLG to make judgements on long-range TNF.

The majority supported the Norwegian call for better progress on phase 3, but underlined that this could not be allowed halt the work of the HLG.

In light of the inadequate basis with respect to determining the scale of the TNF, it was agreed that the “selective employment options” study should be extended to illustrate the possibilities and limitations of TNF forces of different scales.

Day Two

The Americans began by giving a presentation on alternative basing concepts for GLCMs.

In relation to the presentation, the Americans underlined the necessity of settling the basing question for GLCMs relatively quickly out of consideration for the schedule of the CM programmes. To meet the IOC in 1982 for GLCM, the American administration had to present information on basing options to Congress (a precondition for funding) as early as the winter of 1979.

The Dutch delegation pointed out that the basing issue probably was the most difficult problem one was now facing in the HLG discussions.

Participation in a long-range TNF programme could include:
– political support within the alliance
– participation in funding arrangements
– physical basing, including basing on a rotational basis.

The opportunities for basing mobile GLCMs on a rotational basis granted further study. One also needed to consider the need to take a step-by-step approach to the question.
The **FRG** expressed gratitude for the Dutch viewpoints and stated that there was now a dialogue in this vital question. The possibilities for air transport of GLCMs called for closer consideration in light of the fact that there so far was no final settlement of the basing question.

The **Belgian** delegation pointed out that with respect to participation, the Belgian government would probably adopt the same policy as the Netherlands.

In the **UK**, existing military sites, airports etc. would probably turn out to be most suitable.

The British paper “Rationale for TNF modernization,” which had been circulated prior to the meeting, gave political, strategic and military reasons for the need for some increase in the number of long-range TNF.

All representatives supported, on the whole, the British views.

The Norwegian delegation underlined that the West must not try to copy the Soviet TNF build-up (SS 20 and Backfire), but rather that Western requirements (spectrum of deterrence) must be the basis of the modernization work. Modernization efforts that could be perceived as steps in the direction of a “Eurostrategic balance” and decoupling must be avoided.
HMG-NEP NOVEMBER 30, 1978

J.J. Holst, State Secretary, MOD, Norway

Mr Chairman,

The concept of risk sharing is a complex one indeed. We should be aware of the ambiguities as well as the limitations involved. It clearly should not lead to the conclusion that all countries should carry the same burden in the sense of constituting deployment zones for the same weapons. We would then surely create a ridiculous situation from the point of view of military efficiency. Furthermore, it should be recognized that some countries, my own included, have adhered to a policy of not permitting the stationing or deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories. Such policies have been based on evaluations of domestic and external equilibria. It would not be in the interest of the Alliance, I submit, to upset such equilibria.

It is neither possible nor desirable to establish general rules. However, certain broad criteria may be useful. Thus it would not be useful for the Alliance to define any one of its members in such a way as to disqualify it as a deployment zone, thus singling it out negatively. It must be for the country concerned to make such political assessments. It should be recognized that any member of the Alliance may so view the political implications of nuclear deployment that it will resist being put in the position of being singled out positively as the only deployment zone.
Part Two: International Diplomacy

1979
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Dr. Brzezinski's meeting with the Italian Ambassador, Paolo Pansa Cedonio

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
James M. Rentschler, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
The Honorable Paolo Pansa Cedonio, Italian Ambassador
Mr. Pier Luigi Rachele, Embassy Counselor

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: January 12, 1979; 4:30 to 5:15 p.m.
Dr. Brzezinski's office

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting by noting that he had had a good session the preceding day with DC Political Secretary Zaccagnini and had found him extremely impressive. Dr. Brzezinski added that he was delighted that Zaccagnini had been able to meet the President; a meeting of that kind was very unusual and a sign of the importance we attached to Italy. (U)

Ambassador Pansa said that he too was gratified by that meeting and hoped Dr. Brzezinski would understand why he himself had not accompanied Zaccagnini; the Ambassador explained that he didn't want to create constraints on either his side or ours. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski told Ambassador Pansa that he wanted to tell him briefly what had transpired at Guadeloupe. The four leaders addressed themselves essentially to three broad areas. The first of these involved international relationships and the extent to which these overlapped with domestic considerations. Dr. Brzezinski noted that he was not present at that initial session (thereafter an advisor for each side

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Classified by James M. Rentschler
Review January 12, 2009
Extended by: Zbigniew Brzezinski
Reason for extension: NSC 1.13 (a)

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PER 3/14/77 NAR DUE 6/6/78

BY
NARS DATE 1/11/88

-Contributed by Leopoldo Nuti-
attended the meetings with the heads of government) but it appeared that there had been general agreement on a number of positive developments, notably the move toward wider relations with China and the declining appeal of Soviet ideology. The second broad area of concern dealt much more specifically with strategic problems, especially the gap between the strategic equation and the conventional equation -- that is, the question of theatre nuclear forces -- in the context of overall security. The leaders, Dr. Brzezinski pointed out, exchanged views on what was the best way to respond to strategic problems in the area; their discussion was informal, and the format was much like one might find in an evening seminar or social occasion. There was no crystallization of any particular point of view (Dr. Brzezinski noted that the question of arms sales to the PRC had come up in the earlier session; from a purely professional point of view, he said, he had to admire the way Callaghan had handled that issue, the latter having made sure the press people aboard his plane were briefed beforehand on his intention to tell the other leaders about his decision to sell the Harrier, then embargoing that information only until the end of the first session). (C)

Ambassador Pansa asked if SALT had been discussed in any detail. Dr. Brzezinski replied not really; the President briefed his colleagues generally along the lines which Vance followed in December with the press. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski went on to say that the third and final session covered what the French called points chauds. It was during this meeting that the leaders focused on Iran, with the President sharing with them our view that the situation had moved to a point where a solution would be difficult with the Shah's presence and that conditions might be more propitious if he were to absent himself for awhile. The leaders also discussed the Middle East and the OPEC decision to raise oil prices; concerning the latter, Dr. Brzezinski said there was a general feeling that this decision was premature, that a raising in price of that magnitude was too rapid. In that session too the leaders discussed the situation in southern Africa. (C)

Ambassador Pansa asked Dr. Brzezinski if he could elaborate a bit on the substance of the first meeting; what was meant by the overlap between international and domestic matters?
Dr. Brzezinski reiterated that he had not been present during that session but he supposed the leaders had in mind the interrelationship between foreign and domestic politics, the extent to which developments abroad affect political issues in each of their respective countries. (C)

Ambassador Pansa said that he was grateful for Dr. Brzezinski's briefing. He wished to underline the importance he attached to the fact that Dr. Brzezinski had called him in especially for that purpose; he knew that we were not doing that for a lot of other people. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski acknowledged that this was so and that he had briefed only one other Ambassador about Guadeloupe, the Japanese.

Ambassador Pansa stated that he would be insincere if he didn't emphasize the unfortunate effect the fact of the Guadeloupe meeting had on Italian public opinion. He knew that it was not our intention to constitute an Allied "directorate", but it was hard to convince public opinion of our good faith when it is known that the four leaders in question discussed matters of common defense outside a NATO framework. Giscard, Ambassador Pansa noted, sent Jacques Wahl to brief Prime Minister Andreotti, but speaking personally, because of the special relationship between the U.S. and Italy, Pansa would have preferred that Dr. Brzezinski be the briefer. In any event, Ambassador Pansa continued, it was important that such exercises as Guadeloupe be avoided in the future. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski replied that he understood the sentiment from which that view sprang. On the other hand, Ambassador Pansa had to understand the circumstances of the Guadeloupe Summit in the context of a German nexus involving strategic, theater, and conventional forces -- to which could be added a special Berlin problem as a historical legacy. Dr. Brzezinski underlined the affinity of language which linked the four leaders -- each of them was able to converse with the others without interpreters -- and the time it takes to get to know each other. We live in a modern, changing world, as Ambassador Pansa himself had stressed, and the question of who meets whom and where cannot be considered with rigidity. For that reason, Dr. Brzezinski explained, while he simply could not say and will not say that such a meeting will be

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repeated, he cannot flatly say that it won't be. Schmidt and Giscard, he pointed out, often meet without Andreotti. (C)

Ambassador Pansa replied that a question of logic was involved; public opinion could accept such meetings between Schmidt and Giscard because they were part of a different framework, whereas the number of participants and the subject matter at Guadeloupe led to a logical connection in the public mind that Italy was being left out. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski stressed the importance of the Guadeloupe meeting from the "educational" point of view: there was no doubt that the four leaders had found it a good experience as human beings, and in such circumstances he was simply not prepared to argue against that type of meeting. He understood the sensitivities Ambassador Pansa had cited, but these didn't mean that Giscard, Carter, Callaghan, and Schmidt or some combination thereof couldn't talk on an island when they felt like it.

Ambassador Pansa acknowledged that this was so; he merely wished to note that from a standpoint of a certain "cadence" the Guadeloupe meeting seemed ominous, given the existence of the Seven. It worried Italy.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the seven-power summit was a formal forum. The question is, can certain leaders meet under informal circumstances outside that forum?

Ambassador Pansa responded that of course they can. But such meetings give ammunition to those who would like to undermine the stability of our Atlantic and European relationships. This is a sensitivity which is perhaps felt more acutely in Italy than anywhere else -- more so, for example, than in Japan. Italy believes it has certain special relationships and interests concerning some of the areas and subjects discussed at Guadeloupe and therefore it would be relevant to include Italy in such meetings. Given the fragility of the situation in Italy, the instability, the fact that Italy was not invited gives ammunition to those who are against us. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski noted that Ambassador Pansa had mentioned governmental instability. That is a fact. And that fact makes it difficult for an Italian leader to establish the

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long-term personal relationships which were one of the objectives at Guadeloupe. In this connection, Dr. Brzezinski asked Ambassador Pansa to consider, for example, the effect of a change in British leadership; it would take a good deal of time to develop a personal relationship with a new leader there. (C)

Ambassador Pansa said that he understood that point but it was difficult to get across to public opinion. The presentational aspect is very important. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that this was perhaps a healthy aspect, too, in the sense that the public could ask itself why Italy had not been present at Guadeloupe and then take the appropriate steps to see that next time Italy is present. (C)

Ambassador Pansa replied that the problem lies in making the Italian people more assertive; Italians need American help in that process. He said that he was happy to have these assurances from Dr. Brzezinski. What is past is past, but very frankly he wished to express Italian feelings so that we will know what the impact on his government will be in the future. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski said that Ambassador Pansa's views were helpful and asked him to bear in mind that the reception accorded Zaccagnini is symptomatic of our feelings about Italy. Zaccagnini is not likely to become Prime Minister; yet he was received by the President, something that had not been done for either Chirac or Kohl. (C)

Another exchange of cordialities concluded the meeting. (U)
MEMORANDUM FOR:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

Also: The Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Report on Consultations with Belgian,
Dutch and Italian Governments (U)

In my recent informal consultations on long-range TNF in the
Netherlands, Belgium and Italy, I met with Dutch MFA van der
Klaauw, Belgian MFA Chef de Cabinet Alfred Cahan, and Italian
MFA Forlani and MOD Ruffini. These officials were aware that
their governments will be called upon to take part in new
long-range TNF deployments. They recognized the military
arguments in favor of new long-range TNF and the importance
of not singling out West Germany for deployment. All
approached the issue in a constructive way, with stress on
the importance of maintaining NATO solidarity. (S)

Despite these generally positive inclinations, all said that
the decision will be extremely difficult politically and
that they need considerable help from us to overcome these
difficulties. The Dutch government, which has only a
two-vote majority and declining popularity in the polls,
must face a large and vocal anti-nuclear element in the
public. The Italian and Belgian governments are already in
political crises. The key specific issues that emerged are
as follows. (S)

Public Opinion

In all three capitals, public presentation is a key problem.
The public must be shown that there is a real danger, and

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Classified & extended by D. Aaron
Review March 20, 2009
Reason: NSC 1.13(a)
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that it is necessary to do something now when for 15 years we have not found it necessary to deploy long-range missiles in Europe. Several officials requested commonly agreed statements and data to use in public and to educate political leaders. (S)

In this connection, the Italians welcomed our offer of a threat briefing, and I believe the others would as well. All agreed that we should also use the upcoming NPG, DPC and NAC Ministerials to raise public consciousness on the Soviet long-range TNF modernization effort. (S)

Long-Range TNF Arms Control

All felt that a parallel arms control effort would be politically important in their countries. In this connection, they all supported the idea of a special group in NATO to deal with theater nuclear arms control, as well as US chairmanship of the group. (S)

The specifics of the linkage of arms control to modernization could prove troublesome. All agreed that successful arms control can only occur if we have concrete deployment programs. But the Dutch and Italians said that politically there would be pressure to try to limit the Soviet threat through arms control negotiations first, and to agree to deployment programs only if these efforts fail. (S)

Short vs. Long-Range TNF

The Dutch raised an issue that could find resonance elsewhere. They want some reduction in short-range systems (such as dropping F-16 dual-capability or reducing the total number of warheads in Europe) to offset politically an increase in long-range capability. These reductions would enable the Dutch government to be faithful to its announced policy of reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. The Dutch also said that ERW should be kept on the back burner because the combination of long-range TNF and ERW would be "fatal." (S)

Nuclear Release

Both the Belgians and Italians raised the question of participation in the release authority for any new long-range TNF deployed on their soil. The Italians said it would be important to be able to assure their public that Italy has a say in any decision to attack Soviet territory from Italian soil. (S)

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Cost-Sharing

Financial questions were raised in both Belgium and Italy. The Italians in particular said that it would be politically difficult to obtain funding for long-range TNF in view of Italian efforts to improve conventional capability. They asked about the feasibility of some cost-sharing arrangement for long-range TNF that would ease the burden on some poorer countries (à la AWACS). *(S)*

Decision Track

No country objected to the December 1979 target for decision. However, the Italians stressed the need for "gradual movement," particularly to avoid this becoming an issue in their likely June 10 election. They also want to orchestrate the NPG and May DPC/NAC so as to avoid bringing the issue to a head then. The Dutch asked that we remain flexible on the date because of the complexities of the issues, in particular arms control. They were also concerned that the May NAC and Fall NPG meetings, both to be held in the Hague, lead to results -- such as NPG expansion -- that will help with their public opinion problem. *(S)*

The Italians said that the participation issue should be discussed bilaterally in order to "lubricate" the NATO decision-making process. Minister Ruffini suggested that the Alliance strive for an agreement "in principle" on new deployments with participation and basing to be arranged subsequently through bilateral channels so that the national qualifications and reservations of others would not be expressed openly -- something that would give the Italians great political problems. *(S)*

SCC Meeting

At its next meeting, I suggest that the SCC address the issues raised by these consultations, including the public presentation issue and its relationship to the upcoming Ministerials. There are additionally at least three outstanding questions that we should consider in the context of our overall approach to the long-range TNF question:
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-- The joint DOD/State proposal to scale-back our commitment to operate three SSBNs in the Mediterranean: We need to consider how will this be seen, especially in Italy, at a time that we are considering new land based deployments, given the history of the commitment (including the removal of Jupiters). We also should address the timing and modalities of further consultations on this question.

-- The DOD proposal to replace with non-obsolete warheads some of the obsolete warheads currently held in the NATO Guidelines Area for MBFR purposes. Since most of the new warheads would be for short-range systems, we need to consider how this move fits with Dutch (and possibly other countries') interest in reducing reliance on short-range systems.

-- The question of expanding the permanent membership of the NPG: We should examine how we can tie any agreement to NPG expansion to Dutch and Belgian participation in new long-range TNF, without at the same time creating greater political obstacles to Italian participation. (S)

[Signature]
David Aaron
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

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1. Summary

– All representatives could endorse the American draft for an HLG report with attachments.
– The review of the separate chapters/attachments led for the most part to editorial changes
– The approval of the chapters “Rationale,” “Participation,” and “Arms Control,” however, lead to more substantial exchanges.
– The Norwegian presentation is included at the end of this message

From Norway, the following participated:

– Deputy Minister of Defence Johan Jørgen Holst
– Director Ole M. Engh
– Director Vidar Wikberg
– Assistant Defence Counsellor John A. Lunde

2. Main points of the meeting on April 3

At the beginning of the meeting, the HLG Chairman pointed out that the aim was to approve the draft HLG report with attachments (a-f) during the course of the meeting, to make it ready for dispatch to the NPG ministerial meeting in Florida, April 24-25, 1979.

During a round of general remarks, all representatives could endorse the draft report in principle. The majority nevertheless had detailed remarks to specific chapters in the rapport and/or the attachments.

The German delegation underlined that ministers needed more background information on how the HLG had arrived at a tentative consensus about the suitable size of the long-range TNF. One should furthermore seek to avoid war fighting considerations and to a larger extent focus on the deterrent value.

The Dutch delegation called for clearer guidelines for the future work of the HLG. One

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1 For this, please refer to the original document (in English)
assumed moreover that there would only be discussions and not decisions on the NPG ministerial meeting in Florida.

The Norwegian general statement follows at the end of this message.

The British delegation considered the draft report to provide a very good basis for necessary final adjustments. The “Rationale” text still seemed to be characterized by an excessively military focus. Clear guidelines should be drawn up for the future work of the HLG after the Florida meeting. It should also be specified more closely what ministers need to direct their attention towards at the upcoming NPR ministerial meeting.

The review of the separate chapters/attachments led for the most part to editorial changes. Remarks and suggestions connected to chapter III, “Rationale,” chapter V “Participation,” and Chapter VI “arms control,” however, led to more substantial exchanges.

The British delegation presented a proposal with a somewhat expanded text on “Rationale” for TNF modernization. It was particularly emphasized that the need for modernization had to be placed in a general political frame.

The Norwegian delegation supported the British proposal, aiming for a more general “Rationale,” and underlining that TNF modernization first of all had to be justified on the basis of the need to maintain a deterrent capability on all levels of conflict, and less so as a response to the TNF build-up in the East.

The proposal to combine the original text in the draft report and the British suggestion gained general support.

With reference to the remarks concerning participation in the Norwegian statement at the opening of the meeting, the Norwegian delegation specified that the draft text had to be revised so as not to appear to support the idea that the more widespread the basing the better. There was an indirect lack of recognition of the particularly restrictive nuclear policies of certain countries.
In connection with this, the Turkish delegation requested the inclusion of a reference to the importance of geographical considerations with respect to the question of stationing.

The Norwegian delegation expressed understanding of the Turkish point, and pointed out that the Norwegian nuclear policy to a large extent had been formulated because of geographical considerations.

The German delegation could understand the Turkish arguments in light of the fact that TNF weapons in Turkey would be able to strike targets inside the USSR. Nevertheless, one supported a formula that encouraged widespread participation/basing as strongly as the HLG could accept.

SHAPE’s representative underlined the military arguments for widespread basing of the TNF.

The American delegation was not necessarily prepared for a revision of the text in line with the Norwegian/Turkish wishes. Even though the allies to a certain extent recognized the Danish and Norwegian nuclear policy, there was a fear that other countries would use the formula concerning “participation” as an excuse to distance themselves from the TNF modernization project.

The Norwegian delegation pointed out that it could not understand the American hesitation with respect to the inclusion of a reference to the special nuclear policy of certain countries. If it proved impossible to reach a satisfying compromise on this point, the Norwegian HLG representative would be forced to distance himself [reservere seg mot] the report.

After an informal collation of Norwegian and American drafts on the basis of an exchange of notes between the two delegations, the HLG chairman presented a compromise proposal that was acceptable to all representatives.

The German delegation opened the discussion of arms control with reference to a letter
circulated by the German NATO ambassador the same day, containing more information about the German proposal for a “Special Group on Arms Control and Related Matters.”

The British delegation underlined that the arms control group had to work in harmony with the HLG and that it could not in any even slow down decisions concerning TNF modernization.

The Norwegian delegation welcomed the German proposal, but at the same time warned against organizing the discussion of these two questions in a manner that would transfer inter-agency conflicts in each capital to the international level. One had preferred if the HLG discussions had covered the arms control aspects of the TNF modernization as well.

The American delegation underlined the need to coordinate the two groups. Therefore, several HLG members would also participate in the Special Group work.

In light of the establishment of the new special group for arms control discussions, the HLG found it suitable to limit the arms control paragraph in the report to a reference that these questions would be treated in other forums.

In closing, all representatives endorsed the draft for a transmittal letter to the general secretary. This included an agreement that the letter should draw up a tentative framework for the discussions at the ministerial meeting in Florida on April 24-25, 1979.

At the very end, the Norwegian HLG representative, on behalf of the group, expressed gratitude for the big and valuable effort that the American support team had laid down for the HLG.

[See original doc for attached statement]
or fattet rustningskontrollaspektene ved tnf moderniseringen.

fra amerikansk side ble det understreket at det var et klart behov for aa samkjoere de to gruppene. man tok derfor sikte paa aa la flere av delegasjonsmedlemmene i hlg ogsaa delta i 'special group' arbeidet.

I lys av etableringen av den nye spesialgruppen for rustningskontrollavklaringer fant hlg det hensiktsmessig aa begrense rustningskontrollavsnittet i rapporten til en henvisning til at disse spørsmalene ville bli tatt opp i andre fora.

avslutningsvis ga samtlig sine tilslutning til utkastet til oversendelsesbrev for hlg rapporten til generalsekretæren. det var herunder enighet om at det i oversendelsesbrevet burde trekkes opp en tentativ ramme for ministrenes droeftelser paa nrg ministermoetet i florida 24 - 25 april 1979.

helt til slutt takket den norske hlg representanten paa vegne av gruppen formannen og det amerikanske 'support team'et for den store og verdifulle innsats de hadde gjort for hlg.

..............

HEMMELIG
I h.t. Sikkerhetsinstruksen

statement by johan j holst, norwegian state secretary for defence at the hlg/nrg meeting in brussels, april 3, 1979

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Mr chairman,

in general, we consider the draft report a balanced and fair summary of the deliberations and conclusions of the hlg.

it ought to be emphasized however, that we have not completed
completed the work and that we are not asking for approval of a specific program, but rather for general endorsement of a line of approach. Such endorsement should be followed up by the elaboration of a specific program proposal. The report should contain a clear indication of the decisions ministers are invited to take.

It is our opinion that the rationale section of the report is too narrowly confined to the military dimension. A broader political outlook should constitute the structuring framework. With respect to the military rationale itself, the point of reference should be NATO strategy rather than narrow calculations of a quantitative balance. In this context the potential of the SS-20 for neutralizing preemptively the option of controlled escalation, particularly if employed against NATO forces, should be noted. There is also the psychological factor of countering Soviet force modernization at the continental force levels in the context of approximate equivalence at the level of intercontinental forces.

With respect to participation I agree with the principle of risk- and burden-sharing. However, as I have pointed out throughout our process of deliberations, some of the member states have adhered to policies of restraint with respect to the stationing and storage of nuclear weapons. Such restraints have become integral elements in domestic and regional equilibria, which should not be upset by the substance or presentation of our decisions with respect to modernization.

With respect to the draft, I think that the reference in para 14 to what should be supported privately should be deleted. We are considering public and official decisions.

As concerns para 15, I am unhappy with some of the phraseology.
phraseology. Thus I am not sure that we really want to state that widespread permanent basing is the most important form of participation. I would rather prefer a formulation which took as a point of departure that no member state should be excluded from participation and that no member state should be asked to carry exclusive risks. It is not clear that the more widespread the participation the better the solution from the point of view of deterrence and stability. We do not want to create a condition which would maximize domestic and international controversy. In this area as well it is important that our approach be an evolutionary one.

The reference to the established policy of some HLG countries should not be confined to permanent peacetime basing as no distinction has been drawn between temporary and permanent basing in the policies of the countries involved. The HLG should not introduce such distinctions a posteriori. I also think that the use of the word 'nonetheless' in the following sentence introduces an element of dissatisfaction or lack of agreement with the policies of restraint expressed in the previous sentence which we cannot accept.

It is important in this context to arrive at conclusions which can command a broad political consensus, and that includes the views of the countries where policies of restraint have become an element in the strategic status quo.

With respect to arms control, it is our strong opinion that
opinion that the draft as it now stands is lamentably weak. It does not even identify the potential problems and trade-off consideration. It needs to be considerably strengthened for the report to constitute a political document which can be put before ministers of defence for their approval.

Avoiding the issues now will make it much harder to arrive at an integrated assessment later and may create false dichotomies and conflicts. It is clear that from a presentational point of view one of our major problems will be to align the decisions concerning the modernization with the SALT II-agreement which, hopefully, will be a reality in the near future, and with our stance in MBFR. The current appendix does little to identify the issues.

HEMMELIG
i h.t. Sikkerhetsinstruksen
BRIEFING BOOK

SCC MEETING

12 April 1979

White House Situation Room

BRIEFING NOTE

A - SCC AGENDA
B - SCC WORK PROGRAM
C - US OBJECTIVES
D - CIA THREAT/BALANCE BRIEFING
E - DIA THREAT BRIEFING
F - ARMS CONTROL ISSUES
G - SOVIET OBJECTIVES
H - DECISION/TRACK
I - BILATERALS/HLG CONCLUSIONS
J - HLG CONSENSUS
K - HLG/NPG

State Dept., DIA reviews completed
BRIEFING NOTE

SCC MEETING
12 April 1979

This SCC meeting follows the decision last Friday by the NAC to accept a proposal that a Special Group be established under US chairmanship to deal with Theater Nuclear Forces arms control and related matters.

The purpose of the meeting is to discuss:

-- the proposed work program for the Special Group (Tab B)

-- a State paper outlining possible US objectives and principles in TNF arms control (Tab C).

The main issues for discussion are marked in the SCC agenda (Tab A) and cross referenced to the text of the State paper (Tab C).

CIA has two papers in the works that are proposed for transmittal to the Special Group at the 19 April meeting. One deals with the Soviet TNF threat and the European balance (Tab D); the other with possible Soviet objectives and approaches to TNF (being drafted).

JCS (DIA) has prepared a threat briefing (Tab E) which focuses only on principal Soviet theater nuclear delivery systems (MR/IRBMs, SLBMs, and LRA bombers), all systems with ranges in excess of 1000km. The CIA threat/balance briefing treats TNF systems more systematically, because Soviet/Pact systems with ranges of 100-1000km are capable of striking strategic targets in Europe, and includes force comparisons with US/NATO systems.

An issue requiring your decision relates to a request that CIA consider how its clandestine service might be employed to publicize the Soviet TNF threat in order to improve the political climate for NATO TNF deployments. We believe this proposal is out of keeping with present Agency policies and should be rejected.

Agreed - would be propagandizing? Americans & Allies

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 - CIA-RDP81B00401R001500010001-7
MEMORANDUM FOR:

DCI's Book
SCC on TNF
12 April 79

DCI attended w/N
N10/CF (Acting)

Date
<table>
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<tr>
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<td>16 Apr 79</td>
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**REMARKS:**

Please insert this in DCL copy of TNF Briefer book.

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**FORM NO.:** 241

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.
CONFIDENTIAL—entire text

MEMORANDUM TO: NSC - Mr. Thomson  
DOD - Mr. Woodworth  
JCS - BGen. Vesser  
ACDA - Mr. Clinard  
EUR - Mr. Fuerth  
CIA - 

FROM: PM/ISP - Eric D. Newsom

SUBJECT: Issue Paper on TNF Arms Control Objectives and Principles

April 11, 1979

The attached is a first cut at the issue paper we plan to circulate to the Allies in the Special Group to stimulate discussion of broad TNF arms control issues. It is derived from the State paper "TNF Arms Control Objectives and Principles," which will be the subject of the SCC discussion tomorrow.

This draft is circulated to give agencies a sense of how we plan to structure the paper, in order that Principals may approve presentation to the Allies of a version of it for the Special Group discussion. We would appreciate your comments on this version by COB Thursday, April 12, in order that we might circulate a new draft on Friday for interagency review.

CONFIDENTIAL  
GDS 4/11/83
One of the most difficult tasks for the Special Group will be to produce in a relatively short period a realistic and comprehensive stance on TNF arms control. We believe the most sensible and expeditious way to do this would be by suggesting some broad TNF arms control issues for discussion. As we shape and refine these issues in our deliberations, they should eventually emerge as basic objectives and principles which might be adopted by Ministers this fall as the basis for dealing with theater systems in arms control.

This preliminary paper does not represent US positions. It is offered as a vehicle for discussion. It could be successively revised after each meeting of the Special Group, leading to the development of a consensus on TNF arms control principles and objectives, which could be the core of the Special Group's Report to Ministers.

1. Should our objective be primarily to constrain, and if possible, reduce the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe, or should we aim for more ambitious, comprehensive objectives?

TNF arms control should have a reduction of the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe as its paramount objective. An unconstrained TNF competition in Europe could result in continued Soviet preponderance with much higher levels of TNF on both sides. Larger numbers of NATO long-range systems would imply a changed role for TNF as part of the NATO deterrent, and increased perceptions of the decoupling of US strategic forces from Europe. Limiting the Soviet long-range theater nuclear threat would deprive the Soviets of political and military leverage stemming from perceptions of unconstrained Soviet theater deployments, against which the West lacked the will to respond.

2. How can we use a TNF arms control approach to strengthen Alliance cohesion and coupling through active Allied participation in the arms control component of Alliance security?

TNF arms control enhances Allied security to the extent that it is a common policy, worked out together.
on the basis of a common framework. No single ally can pursue that policy without the active support and participation of the others. An Allied consensus is an essential outcome. It cannot be imposed, but must be the result of thorough discussion. Such a consensus would have an ancillary benefit, allaying fears of decoupling, whether through modernization or arms control.

3. How can we manage the relationships among TNF, SALT and MBFR in ways that will improve the prospects for SALT and MBFR?

Direct relationships exist between TNF modernization and arms control on the one hand, and SALT and MBFR on the other. Recognizing these relationships in advance may help managing them with care.

There may be no way to disconnect TNF arms control from SALT. The Soviets, despite recent hints to the contrary, may insist on securing limitations on US "FRS" as a precondition for further reductions in its central systems. We have made it clear to the Soviets that any limitations on US TNF must be accompanied by appropriate limitations on related Soviet systems.

MBFR remains the negotiation with the potential for having a direct impact on the conventional threat to NATO security in Central Europe. The conventional balance is crucial and must be calibrated in careful coordination with the theater nuclear balance. Negotiations on TNF must be handled so that the MBFR process is sustained.

4. How should TNF arms control relate to TNF modernization; are they elements of an overall strategy or is it possible to pursue them independently?

Our TNF arms control effort must be serious and aim at constraining the Soviet long-range TNF threat. Yet the fundamental instrument for coping with the political and military problems posed by this threat is an evolutionary deployment by NATO of additional long-range TNF. TNF arms control should not be allowed to impede those deployments which we decide are necessary to restore confidence in the viability of NATO's spectrum of deterrence.

TNF arms control must be a complement to, not a substitute for, TNF modernization. We must avoid the dangers of making actual deployments hostage to the outcome of arms control negotiations or of choosing an arms control posture simply to camouflage modernization.
Either position would give the Soviets less incentive to negotiate in good faith over constraints in its deployments. Both positions would engender divisive political controversy in the Alliance. Development of a realistic TNF arms control posture should not lag behind decisions on a TNF modernization program. A credible Allied TNF arms control stance will be essential for improving the political climate for initial NATO deployments. If successful, it could reduce the need for still further deployments in order to sustain a credible deterrent in Europe.

5. As Allies with common interests in the security of all, how can we best share responsibility for developing a TNF arms control posture?

TNF arms control cuts to the heart of security interests in Europe. In the long run, no single country can carry the burden of developing an arms control posture on its own. While some Allies may be content to see others take the lead and others may be impatient with the indecision and confusion of reaching a common stance, all must be willing to share in decision-making.

6. Does maximum bargaining leverage require that decisions on TNF modernization be taken in a way that holds open the prospect of further deployments?

NATO's initial TNF modernization program will be "evolutionary" in character. It will satisfy intrinsic requirements of deterrence, within current policy and doctrine; it could only be cut back to the extent that the Soviet TNF threat was constrained.

Some systems currently under development probably will not be included in the initial modernization package. The size of deployments will also be modest. Yet, if we are to maximize bargaining leverage against Soviet TNF, decisions on the initial modernization program will have to be taken in a way that does not rule out additional systems or increments in the future. This has implications both for the public promulgation of the decisions and for ongoing development programs. We want to be able to link subsequent NATO restraint in deploying additional systems or larger numbers of TNF to equivalent Soviet restraint.

7. Should our TNF arms control approach stress simplicity, or is it possible to negotiate and reach comprehensive agreement on a broad range of TNF systems?
always commensurable in capabilities and numbers, make
TNF arms control negotiations an exceptionally complex
undertaking. Attempting to include every system in
those negotiations may prevent agreed limits on the
most threatening developments from being reach in a
timely way.

Focusing the negotiations only on the modern
long-range theater systems of both sides which have
caused the greatest political and military concerns
should provide the most manageable framework for
negotiations and an agreement, and would lessen per-
ceptions of decoupling inherent in a more sweeping
"Eurostrategic" negotiation.

There are some potential problems with this ap-
proach: it would leave out a lot of old long-range
TNF on the Soviet side, as well as all of the short-
range systems which the Soviets could move forward to
increase coverage of Western Europe and which are
expanding and modernizing along with long-range Soviet
TNF; if the limitations applied to European-based systems
only, the Soviets would have a large breakout
potential in their non-European deployments of modern,
mobile systems such as the SS-20.

8. Should Allied systems be excluded from theater
ceilings or limits? If so, should there be any com-
ensation for Allied systems in any negotiated ceilings?

Excluding Allied systems without compensation for
them will keep TNF negotiations more manageable. Yet
there are difficulties with this approach: the Soviets
will likely argue that their long-range TNF are a
counter to Allied nuclear systems, and that they cannot
agree to limit such systems in the absence of limits
on French and British systems, or at least numerical
compensation for them via a larger Soviet ceiling. If
Allied systems are excluded, this will raise non-circum-
vention and non-transfer issues, which will inevitably
be more complex and difficult than in SALT II.

9. Must TNF ceilings be equal, without any de jure
asymmetries?

Politically, parity of ceilings and right is
essential. Yet there are difficulties with parity. For
one thing, parity could be perceived as establishing a
formal "Eurostrategic" balance, and therefore be de-
coupling. If the focus were on a narrow class of modern
long-range systems, however, the decoupling connotations of formal parity would be smaller than in a broader negotiation. Moreover, formal parity in rights need not imply actual numerical parity in deployments. The ceilings would be on a narrow class of modern systems; older Soviet systems would be excluded (though over time, as older systems were retired, equal ceilings in modern systems could lead to actual parity). Moreover, were NATO not to exercise its right to deploy up to the permitted ceiling, that could make the exclusion of UK and French forces more palatable to the Soviets. Conversely, the existence of those excluded Allied systems could relieve political problems arising from actual inequality of deployed forces.

10. Should our aim be to negotiate a ceiling on Soviet deployments of modern long-range TNF at a realistic level?

If our goal is to be modest and realistic, while we could press for some reductions, we probably should not expect to reduce deployments of modern Soviet systems significantly below what we believe are planned levels. In any case, we will need to preserve room for carrying out our own modernization plans. Setting a ceiling would be an important achievement in enhancing NATO security. It would avoid an unlimited regional competition in which the Soviets would have many geographic and political advantages. An unconstrained Soviet build-up could undermine the strategic balance, change completely the role of theater forces in NATO's deterrent posture by necessitating deployments going beyond an "evolutionary" adjustment, and alter the character of SALT. A ceiling, perhaps with some reduction in the level of anticipated Soviet deployments, could set the stage for future, more constraining TNF limitations.

The difficulty with pursuing the modest objective of a ceiling on deployment of only certain modern Soviet long-range systems is that it might be seen by some of our Allies and by arms control supporters here as arms control tokenism, doing nothing to reduce the threat to Europe or to control the deployment of new, destabilizing systems. The Soviets, too, might see a ceiling -- combined with unconstrained UK and French forces -- as merely codifying a NATO TNF buildup of a dangerous new strategic threat to the Soviet homeland, while constraining their ability to respond through larger deployments than planned.
Should we be prepared to discuss our theater systems in SALT III only if the Soviets are prepared to negotiate on their theater systems?

We will need a posture on theater systems at the opening of SALT III negotiations. The Soviets are almost certain to raise Protocol-limited cruise missiles, FBS and Allied systems. Our basic posture should be to "put into action" our formulation on theater systems ("Any future limitations on US systems principally designed for theater missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems"). We would indicate that we were prepared to discuss our own theater systems (not Allied systems), but only if the Soviets were prepared to discuss their theater systems. This would establish a direct linkage between our TNF and Soviet theater systems. This posture would at least allow us to respond to a Soviet initiative.

The Soviets may be prepared to agree to our formulation at the outset and propose that negotiations begin immediately, before we had agreement in the Alliance on a negotiating approach. This tactical difficulty could be managed by focusing early discussions in SALT III on the objectives and principles for negotiations on this new class of systems, and on the structure and modalities of negotiations. Moreover, we can put the burden on the Soviets to come up with the opening proposals. But, we will also retain the option of initiating a proposal near the outset if we are ready.
Table 1

Long-Range Theater Delivery Systems
(Over 1,000 Kilometers Range)
Deployed or Deployable by 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Radius/</th>
<th>1978</th>
<th>1978</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missle Range</td>
<td>US/NATO (KM)</td>
<td>USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25X4</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some ICBMs (Incl SS-11)</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bear Bomber/ASM Carrier</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bison Bomber</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-20 IRBM</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-5 IRBM</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backfire Bomber/ASM Carrier</td>
<td>411</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some SS-N-6 SLBMs</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badger Bomber/ASM Carrier</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blinder Bomber/ASM Carrier</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-4 MRBM</td>
<td>168</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-N-3 SLBM</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probable New ALCM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Summary: 10 current systems including France: as many as 176 SLBMs, 18 IRBMs, and 271 aircraft.

Summary: At least II current systems: 492 M/IRBMs, at least 659 bombers (of which 533 are ASM-capable), at least 30 SLBMs, and an unknown number of ICBMs.

1. Designated "central systems" in strategic arms limitations talks.
2. Approximately 48 SLBMs.
3. At one time, about 120 SS-11 variants were assessed as being targeted on Western Europe.
4. DIA designates its Polaris SLBMs as its only strategic force.
5. The range of these aircraft does not take into consideration the intrinsic range of the ASMs which they carry. See Table 2 for this information.
6. French. All IRBMs and SLBMs have adequate range to reach far into the USSR, however.
7. The role and range of the Backfire is subject to some disagreement. Hence the number of aircraft here represents those aircraft which would be available if all were assigned to the theater strike role.
8. These are based in the UK. The Strategic Air Command variant, the FR-111, is based in the US. It is designated a "non-central" system in the SALT context, however.
9. The totals for Backfire, Badger, and Blinder include Soviet Naval Aviation aircraft.
10. This is a US carrier-based system, and as such its launch point cannot be determined.
11. The total for bombers is considerably smaller than the number of ASMs which many carry as their principal weapon. The number of ASMs is provided on Table 2.
### Table 2

**Medium-Range Theater Delivery Systems**

(1,000 to 3,000 Kilometers Range)

Deployed or Deployable by 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1978 No.</th>
<th>US/ NATO</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Radius/ Missle Range (Km)</th>
<th>USSR/Pact</th>
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<tr>
<td>25X4</td>
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<td>Fencer A Ftlhr</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SS-12/22 SSNM</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Foxbat B Ftlhr</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Fitter C D Ftlhr</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Flogger Ftlhr</td>
<td>315</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AS-3 ALCM (on Bear)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>SS-N-4 SSM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SS-N-12 SSM</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Brewer B/C</td>
<td>45</td>
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<td>Prob. New Antiship SLM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AS-4 SSM (Rockfire, Blinder)</td>
<td>306</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SS-N-3 SSM</td>
<td>196</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fishbed Ftlhr</td>
<td>225</td>
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<td>Fitter A Ftlhr</td>
<td>110</td>
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<td></td>
<td>AS-6 ALCM (on Badger)</td>
<td>540</td>
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<td>SU-25 New Ftlhr</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SS-1C (Scud) SSM</td>
<td>456</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AS-5 ALCM (on Badger)</td>
<td>3,6,8</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AS-2 ALCM (on Badger)</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SS-21 SSM</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SS-N-9 SSM</td>
<td>122</td>
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</table>

**Summary:** 19 current systems: 885 aircraft, and 534 SSMs, with the potential for as many as 963 ALCMs and 350 SLCMs (many in secondary land strike role).

1. A carrier-based aircraft.
2. Poland is believed to operate 10 Fitter A and 10 Fitter C/D, and Czechoslovakia 25 Fitter A, in the nuclear role.
3. ALCM range is based upon launch from optimal altitude. The number of ALCMs is the maximum potential launch rail capacity of all aircraft assessed as ALCM-capable.
4. The Soviet LRA and SHA bombers appearing on Table 2 are the only aircraft which carry the ALCMs listed here.
5. These missiles may have been withdrawn from service.
6. All but 16 SS-N-3Cs are assessed as having a primary anti-ship role.
7. As-6s are assessed as having a primary anti-ship role.
8. It is assumed for the purposes of these tables, that the longer-range AS-6 will be carried in preference to the AS-5, or AS-2, except for one model of the Badger, which can carry only AS-2s. The AS-5 and additional AS-2 missiles remain in the inventory.
9. All ALCMs are carried as primary armament on long-range aircraft delivery systems listed on Table 1.
Table 3

Short-Range Nuclear Systems and Artillery
(Less than 1000 Kilometers Range)
Deployed or Deployable by 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1978 No.</th>
<th>Missile/Projectile Range (km)</th>
<th>USSR/Pact No.</th>
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<tr>
<td>25X4</td>
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<tr>
<th>1. 25X4</th>
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<tr>
<td>Summary: 3 current delivery means:</td>
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1. No Soviet nuclear capable artillery is known to be deployed outside the USSR.
2. It is assumed that all FROG-7s, regardless of Pact users will be operated in a nuclear role.

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<th>DIA25X6</th>
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<th>4. 25X4</th>
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<tr>
<td>Summary: 4 current delivery means: 670 rockets and missiles, and 288 artillery tubes.</td>
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Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP81B00401R001500010001-7
AGENDA PAPER

SCC Meeting — TNF Arms Control

Thurs., Apr. 12, 1979, 2:30

PURPOSE

The first meeting of the new US-chaired NATO Special Group will be held April 19 and 20. This initial meeting of the NATO Group is intended to set in motion a process leading to Alliance agreement on a set of TNF arms control objectives and principles to guide the US in SALT III. (S)

The primary purpose of this SCC meeting is to have an initial discussion of possible US principles and objectives in TNF arms control. The State April 5th paper, "TNF Arms Control Objectives/Principles," forms the basis of the SCC discussion. (S)

It is not intended that the US would table the State paper in the NATO Group; rather, we would table an issues paper derived from the State paper and based on the SCC discussion. Each objective/principle would be reformulated as an issue and appropriately modified for European consumption; some might be dropped. US participants in the NATO meeting would deal with these issues at NATO on the basis of this SCC discussion. (S)

AGENDA

I. Work program for the initial Special Group meeting.

II. Objectives/Principles

For each of the following objectives and principles, two questions arise:

- Does this reflect current US thinking?
- How should the US deal with this issue at the initial Special Group meeting?
1. Constrain, and if possible reduce, the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe.

2. Help improve the political climate for NATO deployments.

3. Exercise US leadership and reinforce European confidence in the existing NATO security framework.

4. Strengthen Alliance cohesion and coupling through Allied participation in managing the arms control component of Alliance security.

5. Improve the prospects for SALT and MBFR.

**Principles**

1. Our goals in SALT III central-system reductions, TNF modernization and TNF arms control should be moderate in scope and mutually supportive.

2. TNF arms control should complement TNF modernization.

3. The Allies must share the responsibility for developing a TNF arms control posture.

4. Maximizing bargaining leverage requires that decisions on modernization be taken in a way that holds open the prospect of further deployments.

5. Our TNF arms control approach should stress simplicity.

6. Allied systems should be excluded from theater ceilings or limits, and there should be no compensation for Allied systems in any negotiated ceilings.

7. TNF ceilings must be equal; no de jure asymmetries.
8. The aim should be to negotiate a ceiling on Soviet deployments of modern long-range TNF at a realistic level.

9. We should be prepared to discuss our theater systems in SALT III only if the Soviets are prepared to negotiate on their theater systems.

10. We should seek to avoid negotiating linkages between central-system issues and TNF issues.

11. If the Soviets seek to link central-system issues to TNF issues, or refuse to agree to a TNF-for-TNF linkage, we should propose that TNF issues be postponed while negotiations on central systems proceed. (3)
Work Program for the Special Group

The following is a suggested work program leading to a final report to Ministers in the fall of this year. It is based on the main lines of analysis now underway in the USG. Obviously, the Special Group can agree on such other work as it deems necessary, and individual participants can present additional material for discussion.

1st Meeting of the SG (April 19)

A. Agreement on this work program and agenda.

B. US briefing on projected Soviet TNF threat and an update of NATO/Warsaw Pact nuclear forces drawing on ACL/NPG information.

C. Discussion of a preliminary US issue paper on possible objectives and principles relating to arms control involving theater nuclear systems.

D. In addition, the US will attempt to provide at this meeting, for discussion at subsequent meetings, two other papers:


2. A preliminary US paper on possible Soviet objectives and approaches to involvement of theater systems in arms control.

E. Tasking of additional work.

2nd Meeting of the SG (Week before May Ministerials)

A. Discussion of a refined version of US paper on TNF arms control principles and objectives presented at April 19 session.

B. Discussion of an expanded US paper on TNF arms control issues which would:

CONFIDENTIAL
1. consider the political, military and negotiating implications of some alternative illustrative arms control packages, in light of the work of the HLG;

2. illuminate and support further detailed consideration of the TNF arms control issues paper presented on April 19.

C. Discussion of the US paper on possible Soviet objectives and approaches to arms control negotiations involving theater nuclear systems.

D. Discussion of tactical issues and public opinion, including the question of the Alliance's public stance on TNF arms control.

E. Tasking of additional work.

3rd and 4th Meetings of the SG (mid-June and mid-July)

A. Discussion of revised and refined paper on arms control objectives/principles. The aim would be to reach an SG agreement on a set of objectives and principles which could be recommended to Ministers for dealing with TNF issues in SALT III.

B. Discussion of a paper defining the public rationale for pursuing arms control involving theater nuclear systems, including its relationship to TNF modernization and its role in the detente process.

C. Further discussion of the US paper on arms control issues and illustrative arms control packages.

D. Consideration of the relationship between SALT, theater nuclear systems and MBFR.

E. Update SG work program, including discussion of the form and content of a draft report to Ministers.

5th Meeting of the SG (early September)

Discussion of draft report to Ministers, encompassing:

CONFIDENTIAL
A. Conclusions on objectives/principles drawn from SG's analysis and discussion, for dealing with TNF in SALT III.

B. Assessment of likely Soviet posture on involving theater systems in arms control negotiations.

6th Meeting of the SG (mid-September)

Discussion and approval of final SG report to Ministers.

December Ministerials

Discussion of SG report and objectives and principles for dealing with TNF in SALT III.
MEMORANDUM TO: NSC - Mr. Bartholomew
- Mr. Emarth
DOD - Mr. Slocombe
- Dr. Davis
JCS - BGen. Vesser
ACDA - Mr. Newhouse
CIA - 
EUR - Mr. Goodby

FROM: PM - David C. Gompert

SUBJECT: (S) TNF Arms Control Objectives/Principles

(S) Attached is a revision of the TNF Arms Control Objectives and Principles paper, taking into account interagency comments. The paper is still cast as an internal US document intended for discussion by the Principals. As noted in the text, it would have to be appropriately revised for use with the Allies.
TNF Arms Control Objectives/Principles

In its present form, this paper is a candid statement of US objectives and principles in pursuing TNF arms control. Most of these objectives and principles would be suitable for discussion with the Allies—though perhaps they would better be advanced as "propositions" or "issues" for discussion in the newly-formed NATO Special Group on Arms Control. In certain cases, it could be inappropriate or tactically unwise to pursue specific objectives or principles in discussions with the Allies, at least until we determine how their thinking is developing. After appropriate revision, the paper would be a major vehicle for discussions with the Allies of the elements which could form the basis of an Alliance-supported TNF arms control policy.

The paper briefly outlines the military and political components of the theater nuclear problem, and describes some basic political and negotiating objectives the US might pursue in managing the theater nuclear arms control question in the Alliance and in SALT. This is then followed by a set of substantive and tactical principles which should guide and inform the US approach to theater nuclear arms control.

TNF Military/Political Problem

The basic military problem in the theater concerns deterrence and escalation control. It stems from perceptions that in the era of strategic parity US use of its strategic forces in defense of Europe is less credible than before; NATO therefore requires more credible in-theater escalatory options to strike Soviet territory in order to deter Soviet use of its long-range theater nuclear systems and other forces. The absence of an appropriate NATO theater nuclear capability to respond might lead the Soviets to believe they could use their perceived advantage in long-range TNF to dominate a theater nuclear conflict, in which both the US and the Soviet Union were deterred from using strategic nuclear weapons. This possibility has been increased by Soviet deployment of the SS-20 and Backfire.

NATO's main means to deal with this military problem is the linked continuum of conventional, theater nuclear and strategic nuclear forces. We are moving toward enhancing NATO's escalatory capability through a modest, evolutionary deployment of long-range TNF. This would afford greater credibility to NATO's capability to threaten effectively
the Soviet Union with limited nuclear strikes without having only recourse to US strategic systems, whose use might be thought less credible -- and therefore less deterring.

The political problem is more complex. The principal concern in the Alliance is that the existing "gap" in NATO's theater nuclear capabilities could expose Europe to nuclear intimidation by the Soviets during a crisis. There is also concern that failure of NATO to respond to the continuing Soviet deployment of new long-range theater systems could weaken NATO's political will and solidarity. Behind these concerns lies the more fundamental political problem of the long-term health of the US-European security connection, stemming from questions about the steadiness and determination of US leadership on the one hand, and worry about the consequences of strategic parity and the credibility of the US nuclear guarantee on the other. There is also a conflicting fear expressed by some that a determined NATO military response to Soviet deployments could jeopardize détente, result in decoupling, set off an unconstrained theater nuclear arms race, and upset the political and military equilibrium among the Western European states. TNF arms control could contribute to a strategy for managing these problems, if undertaken in conjunction with an appropriate TNF modernization response, and if US leadership and Alliance unity are sustained.

The following is a discussion of broad objectives the US should pursue in developing a TNF arms control policy, and of a set of principles which could provide the initial basis for discussions with the Allies, leading ultimately to the development of an agreed Alliance TNF arms control approach.

Political and Military Objectives

1. Constrain, and if possible reduce, the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe

TNF arms control should have as its central objective to constrain, and if possible reduce, the growth of the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe. If we can limit Soviet deployments, we will have achieved an important political and military goal of setting boundaries on a significant part of the TNF threat to NATO. The net result of an unrestrained competition in Europe could be continued Soviet TNF preponderance at much higher levels on both sides, a changed role for TNF in the NATO deterrent, and, with a
large number of NATO long-range systems, increased perceptions of the decoupling of US strategic forces from Europe. Limiting the Soviet long-range theater nuclear threat would also deprive the Soviets of political and military leverage over our European Allies which would arise from perceptions of unconstrained Soviet theater nuclear deployments, against which the West lacked the will to respond.

2. Help improve the political climate for NATO deployments

A credible TNF arms control approach is a sine qua non for virtually all European governments in being able to build domestic support for TNF modernization. Nearly all Allied leaders have told us that a TNF arms control approach which complements -- and protects -- essential TNF modernization offers the best chance they have to convince their Parliaments and publics that a new and destabilizing regional nuclear arms race is not being launched.

3. Exercise US leadership and reinforce European confidence in the existing NATO security framework

Events over the last several years--Vietnam, Watergate, economic problems, recognition of strategic parity, Allied perceptions that the US accords priority to the US-Soviet bilateral relationship over NATO, the ERW matter--have damaged the US-European security tie. Allied unease over perceived US indecisiveness or uncertainty about its role as leader of the West has made positive Alliance action in the security field -- particularly in the nuclear area -- more difficult. Many of these doubts are manifest in the TNF issue. If this issue is not resolved successfully, which will take US leadership, Alliance cohesion could be shaken. European confidence in US leadership could suffer a significant decline. The greatest danger is the FRG could begin to question the reliability of the US and NATO as the basis of its security.

4. Strengthen Alliance cohesion and coupling through Allied participation in managing the arms control component of Alliance security

Much of the European unease and concern over the theater nuclear balance has come from the perception of some that the US is managing its security through its own strategic force developments and the bilateral SALT process,
without sufficient concern for Europe's security, which is deeply affected by decisions in both these areas. The FRG in particular has been concerned that negotiations on central systems in isolation from other elements of the NATO deterrent are inherently decoupling and politically divisive. The Europeans want to be active participants in this security structure, and arms control is a vital part of it. We have seen this most clearly in the last two years of SALT II, where there has been steadily growing Allied, particularly German, pressure to be consulted more clearly in the SALT process. To maintain a strong security relationship between Europe and the US, we must be prepared to accede to greater European participation in the management of the East-West arms control as it extends increasingly into areas directly affecting Allied security. We should, consistent with our own national interest in preserving a leading role in directing the overall process, aim through negotiations on TNF to bring the Europeans more directly into managing the East-West strategic relationship in SALT III.

5. Improve the prospects for SALT and MBFR

There are direct relationships between TNF modernization and arms control, on the one hand, and SALT and MBFR on the other. These relationships must be recognized in advance and managed carefully.

TNF connects with SALT very directly. The Soviets, despite recent hints to the contrary, may insist on securing limitations on US "FBS" as a requirement for further reductions of central systems. We have made it clear to our Allies that any limitations on US TNF should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems. However, the expansion of SALT III beyond the central-system issues dealt with in SALT II promises to complicate the negotiations. We must seek to avoid a situation in which further reductions from SALT II levels are held hostage to the very difficult issues involved in the TNF area.

MBFR Option III could place a numerical limitation at a relatively low level on US Pershing missile launchers -- a principal option for TNF modernization. Similarly, a codified Option III would place limits on US DCA and warhead levels in the NGA, while analogous Soviet systems would be unconstrained. Thus, MBFR has clear implications for TNF modernization.
MBFR remains the core negotiation with the potential for direct impact on the conventional threat to NATO security in central Europe. In the context of the strategic and TNF situation, the conventional balance is crucial and must be codified in careful coordination with the evolution of the theater nuclear equation. Negotiations on TNF must be handled in such a manner that the basic MBFR process is sustained while reconciling the dilemma posed by the non-reciprocal nature of MBFR Option III.

TNF Arms Control Principles

1. Our goals in SALT III central-system reductions, TNF modernization and TNF arms control should be moderate in scope and mutually supportive.

Two components of our national security policy--Allied cohesion and a stable strategic balance--converge most conspicuously in the area of SALT and theater nuclear modernization. The interrelationship of these two important areas of US foreign policy bears directly on planning for SALT III and TNF modernization and arms control issues.

On the one hand, it seems that US willingness to accept some limits on our theater nuclear systems which can strike the Soviet homeland will probably be a precondition to Soviet agreement to any substantial reductions of central strategic systems. But our ability to meet this precondition is bounded by the need to respond to Soviet theater-range force improvements--especially the SS-20 and Backfire. If we fail to take adequate steps to bolster NATO's own long-range theater systems, we will stand accused of allowing one rung of the escalation ladder to weaken so unacceptably as to place the continuum of deterrence in doubt.

Yet there are doctrinal, as well as practical, limits on our freedom of action here, as well. For if we exploit our TNF modernization options to a degree which seems to point toward matching Soviet theater forces, we run the risk, at least in European perceptions, of decoupling our strategic forces from those based in Europe. Further, if in SALT III we seek sweeping reductions in central systems, Europeans may fear a different sort of decoupling; they could see the US and the Soviets as shifting the emphasis in nuclear forces from central to theater systems. This fear would be particularly acute if we accompanied deep central-system
reductions with a major build-up of long-range US systems on the continent of Europe.

The interrelationships outlined above seem to point toward moderation in the relevant aspects of US policy. Steps taken to improve the long-range component of US theater nuclear forces should be modest in scope so as to avoid creating perceptions of decoupling among our NATO Allies. (The implication is perhaps our central-system goals in SALT III ought to be moderate also to help avoid the risk of being seen to move the focus of nuclear confrontation to Europe). Finally, we should be prepared to accept some limits in SALT III on US long-range TNF, both so as to make it possible to limit Soviet theater forces such as the SS-20 and to meet the inevitable Soviet demand for some limits on US "forward based systems" as a probable condition on acceptance of meaningful central-system reductions.

2. TNF arms control should complement TNF modernization

The fundamental instrument for coping with the political and military problems caused by Soviet long-range TNF deployments must reside in an evolutionary deployment of additional long-range TNF. TNF arms control will be a complement to modernization, not a substitute. It should not be allowed to impede those deployments deemed necessary to restore confidence in the viability of NATO's deterrent continuum. However, our TNF arms control effort should be serious, and aimed at constraining the Soviet long-range TNF threat. Development of a realistic TNF arms control approach should not lag behind decision on a TNF modernization program. A credible TNF arms control position will be essential in improving the political climate for initial NATO deployments. If successful, it would prevent the need for still further deployments to sustain a credible deterrent in Europe. A danger is that some Allies, in an effort to cope with internal political debate over modernization, will seek to make actual deployments hostage to the outcome of arms control negotiations. If this course were adopted, the result could be no modernization at all. Also, there is a danger that an arms control position could be chosen only for political camouflage; such a position would probably be non-negotiable, damage or delay SALT negotiations on central systems, and engender further political controversy in the Alliance.
3. The Allies must share the responsibility for developing a TNF arms control posture

The temptation for us to cut through indecision and confusion by simply "laying it all out" for the Allies will be strong; there have been indications that some Allies would like us to do this and give them political cover. However, this question goes to the heart of European security interests, and in the long run we cannot carry the burden alone. The political risks in pursuing TNF arms control (and modernization) are too great for us to appear to have induced the Allies to go along. Even in following our lead, the Allies must clearly accept a share of the decision-making. This necessarily will entail increased Allied involvement in SALT III -- assuming TNF negotiations will take place in the SALT framework -- and in our decisions on US theater nuclear programs.
4. Maximizing bargaining leverage requires that decisions on modernization be taken in a way that holds open the prospect of further deployments.

NATO’s initial modernization program will be "evolutionary" in size and character. It will be a floor, intended to satisfy intrinsic deterrent requirements, within current policy and doctrine; it could only be cut back to the extent that the Soviet threat was constrained. Some systems probably will not be included in the initial modernization package; the numbers will also be modest. If we are to have maximum bargaining leverage against Soviet TNF, the decision on the initial modernization program will have to be taken in a way that does not rule out additional systems or larger numbers in the future. We want to be able to link subsequent NATO deployments of additional systems or larger numbers to Soviet restraint. This will require a US willingness to continue at least some programs for systems which were not included in the initial program, or only in limited numbers. Since we cannot know whether TNF arms control will successfully limit Soviet deployments, or how the Soviets might react in force posture terms to NATO deployments, preserving the capability -- and the presumption of Alliance readiness -- to deploy additional long-range theater systems will be necessary in any case.

5. Our TNF arms control approach should stress simplicity.

The simpler our arms control approach, the more manageable the negotiations should be. We have no indications so far that the Allies would object to keeping negotiations bilateral and the Soviets will probably favor a bilateral negotiation as well. Moreover, the more theater systems involved in the negotiations, the less chance of success and the more likely that central-system negotiations would be delayed. Focusing the negotiations only on the modern long-range theater systems of both sides which have caused the greatest political and military concerns should provide the most manageable framework for negotiations and an agreement, and would lessen perceptions of decoupling inherent in a more sweeping "Eurostrategic" negotiation.

There are potential problems with this approach: it would leave out a lot of old long-range TNF on the Soviet
side, and all of the short-range systems which the Soviets could move forward to increase coverage of Western Europe and which are expanding and modernizing along with long-range Soviet TNF; if the limitations applied to European-based systems only, the Soviets would have a large breakout potential in their non-European deployments of modern, mobile systems such as the SS-20.

6. Allied systems should be excluded from theater ceilings or limits, and there should be no compensation for Allied systems in any negotiated ceilings.

This relates directly to the aim of keeping TNF negotiations manageable, and our desire to preserve the bilateral character of SALT. Politically, there is no present possibility of including French systems, and the price for including UK systems would be British participation in the negotiations. Moreover, we may have strong reasons for excluding Allied systems as a counterweight to excluded older Soviet systems such as the SS-4s and 5s. Formal compensation for Allied systems in the US totals is equally unacceptable.

There are difficulties with this approach: the Soviets will likely argue that their long-range TNF are a counter to Allied nuclear systems, and that they cannot agree to limit such systems in the absence of limits on French and British systems, or at least numerical compensation for them via a larger Soviet ceiling. If Allied systems are excluded, we must be able to resolve satisfactorily for ourselves and for the Allies the non-circumvention and non-transfer issues, which will inevitably be more complex and difficult than in SALT II.

7. TNF ceilings must be equal: no de jure asymmetries.

Politically, parity of ceilings and rights is essential. However, there are difficulties with parity. For one thing, parity could be perceived as establishing a formal "Euro-strategic" balance, and therefore decoupling. This has been a strong French and British fear, and the HLG itself has declared that parity in numbers should not be an objective in TNF modernization.

However, if the focus were on a narrow class of modern long-range systems, the decoupling connotations of formal parity would be smaller than in a broader negotiation. More-
over, formal parity in rights need not imply actual numerical parity in deployments. The ceilings would be on a narrow class of modern systems; older Soviet systems would be excluded (though over time, as older systems were retired, equal ceilings in modern systems could lead to actual parity). Moreover, NATO might not exercise its right to deploy up to the permitted ceiling, which could make the exclusion of UK and French forces more palatable to the Soviets. Conversely, the existence of those excluded Allied systems could relieve political problems arising from actual inequality of deployed forces.

8. The aim should be to negotiate a ceiling on Soviet deployments of modern long-range TNF at a realistic level.

Our goal should be modest and realistic, in order to promote the prospect of agreement and thus to protect negotiations on central systems from being blocked by TNF negotiations. Although we should press for some reductions, we probably should not expect to reduce deployments of modern Soviet systems significantly below what we believe are planned levels. In any case, we will need to preserve room for carrying out our own modernization plans. Setting a ceiling would be an important achievement in enhancing NATO security. It would avoid an unlimited regional competition in which the Soviets would have many geographic and political advantages. An unconstrained Soviet build-up could undermine the strategic balance, change completely the role of theater forces in NATO's deterrent posture by necessitating deployments going beyond an "evolutionary" adjustment, and alter the character of SALT. A ceiling, perhaps with some reduction in the level of anticipated Soviet deployments, could set the stage for future, more constraining TNF limitations.

The difficulty with pursuing the modest objective of a ceiling on deployment of only certain modern Soviet long-range systems is that it might be seen by some of our Allies and by arms control supporters here as arms control tokenism, doing nothing to reduce the nuclear threat to Europe or to control the deployment of new, destabilizing systems. The Soviets, too, might see a ceiling -- combined with unconstrained UK and French forces -- as merely codifying a NATO TNF buildup of a dangerous new strategic threat to the Soviet homeland, while constraining their ability to respond through larger deployments than planned.

9. We should be prepared to discuss our theater systems in SALT III only if the Soviets are prepared to negotiate on their theater systems.
We will need a posture on theater systems at the opening of SALT III negotiations. The Soviets are almost certain to raise Protocol-limited cruise missiles, FBS and Allied systems. Our basic posture should be to "put into action" our formulation on theater systems ("Any future limitations on US systems principally designed for theater missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems"). We would indicate that we were prepared to discuss our own theater systems (not Allied systems), but only if the Soviets were prepared to discuss their theater systems. This would establish a direct linkage between our TNF and Soviet theater systems.

This posture would have at least three important advantages:

-- A consensus on it in the Alliance might be possible by the opening of SALT III.

-- It would afford us an Alliance-endorsed posture on TNF arms control by the beginning of SALT III even if we had not developed a detailed TNF negotiating package by that time.

-- It would put the burden on the Soviets to reply to our position, rather than leave us with no response to their opening demands.

The Soviets may be prepared to agree to our formulation at the outset and propose that negotiations begin immediately, before we had agreement in the Alliance on a negotiating approach. This tactical difficulty could be managed by focusing early discussions in SALT III on the objectives and principles for negotiations on this new class of systems, and on the structure and modalities of negotiations. Moreover, we can put the burden on the Soviets to come up with the opening proposals. But, we will also retain the option of initiating a proposal near the outset if we are ready.

10. We should seek to avoid negotiating linkages between central-system issues and TNF issues.

We do not know how to relate or make tradeoffs between central and theater systems and there are serious risks in attempting to do so. The issues inherent in further central-system limitations will be difficult and complex enough without trying to deal with negotiating linkages between central and theater systems. We have important goals for central systems that we do not want to have held hostage to limits.
on theater systems, and vice versa. Separating the issues would tend to strengthen the link between our TNF and Soviet TNF. We also want to keep Allied involvement in developing negotiating approaches confined to TNF issues, and avoiding negotiating linkages between TNF and central systems will facilitate this. The Soviets may also have this concern; but it is far more likely that they will want to predicate further reductions in central systems on limits on our theater systems (and possibly Allied systems). Discussion of TNF in SALT III may be centered for some time on this question.

There are many obvious difficulties with avoiding TNF and central system negotiating linkages. Obviously, the Soviets, and we also, will relate the two aspects of the negotiation in formulating positions. The Soviets will doubtless link the timing of resolution of issues and of agreement in one area to resolution of issues in the other. Our Allies will also relate developments in these two negotiating areas. Indeed, the very idea of not linking TNF and central system issues could cause difficulties with the Allies, who would be concerned that such an agreement would codify a separate European theater balance and lead to decoupling. Avoiding TNF and central system linkages also runs directly contrary to recent German thinking about an "overall strategic balance" including long-range TNF, and the notion of using US central-system advantages, such as warheads, to negotiate limits on Soviet TNF. Despite these problems, because of the importance of protecting negotiations on central systems, and of facilitating the prospects for TNF-TNF linkage, establishing a negotiating framework which avoids TNF-central system linkages should be a US objective. But, because of the strong crosscurrents of interests involved, it is not an idea which we can thrust on the Allies and the Soviets. We should maneuver to bring this about, using Soviet interest in preserving SALT and Allied interest in achieving limits on Soviet TNF. This principle should not be included in the discussion paper for the Allies. It should be allowed to develop out of the arms control analysis in the NATO Special Group, where consideration of the practicalities of negotiations and political realism should lead to it.

11. If the Soviets seek to link central-system issues to TNF issues, or refuse to agree to a TNF-for-TNF linkage, we should propose that TNF issues be postponed while negotiations on central systems proceed.

This tactic would be driven by our interest in not allowing negotiations on central systems to be delayed while
the TNF question is sorted out. It may be difficult to put into practice, because of our own TNF objectives and because of the strong linkage we can expect the Soviets to make between further central-system limits and US PBS. It could also result in little progress on both clusters of issues for a time. Nevertheless the TNF-for-TNF linkage is of sufficient importance that we must have an answer to Soviet delaying tactics. And, we have important levers to build pressure on the Soviets not to delay resolution of these questions too long:

-- The Alliance will be making concrete modernization decisions.

-- US theater programs will be continuing (and in some cases, e.g., Pershing II) may be accelerated.

-- The Protocol clock on cruise missiles will be running.

These factors will confront the Soviets with the prospect of an unconstrained NATO deployment of long-range theater systems in Europe targeted on the Soviet Union. We will be holding out to them the opportunity of negotiating some limits on such deployments. If the Soviets have any intention of seeking to constrain NATO deployments through arms control, they cannot wait too long. But, how serious the Soviets would regard such pressures would depend critically on how the Alliance shapes decisions on modernization: if the decision is such that it is clear to the Soviets that future deployments of larger numbers or of new systems is highly unlikely for political reasons, pressure on them for early agreement to our basic TNF approach in SALT III would be far less.

There are also Alliance problems with this tactic. Offering to set aside temporarily TNF issues could heighten fears that the theater nuclear question is a peripheral one for the US, and that we accord greatest priority to progress on central-system issues. Moreover, using the prospect of growing NATO TNF deployments as a lever over the Soviets may create severe political strains for some NATO countries, who will be having difficulty enough adhering to a NATO consensus for modest deployments without having also to support such a hard-nosed, "stonewall" approach to TNF in SALT III. Therefore, this principle is not one which should be raised with the Allies at this stage, and would not be included in a "principles" paper for the Allies.
Soviet Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces

--Soviet long-range nuclear forces have long constituted an important part of the Warsaw Pact's capability to execute nuclear strikes against European NATO. Ten years ago these forces--measured both in numbers of delivery systems and on-target weapons--were comparable in magnitude to Soviet intercontinental range "central systems."

Graphic I

Trends 1969-1979:

--The present mix of nuclear systems which the Soviets can bring to bear on the continental United States and European NATO, reflects the emphasis they have placed on the deployment of modern intercontinental range weapons. Dramatic growth has also taken place, however, in Pact medium-range theater nuclear forces, which have doubled since 1969.

--Growth in LRTNF over the past 10 years has been less dramatic. In fact, the number of delivery systems oriented on European NATO has actually declined since 1969 and currently stands at a level of almost 1200 missiles and medium bombers. However, the number of deliverable bombs, air-to-surface missiles and warheads has increased somewhat and currently totals nearly 2000.

* PRM-38 and subsequent working groups have employed the NATO Nuclear Planning Group usage with respect to theater nuclear forces. According, throughout this text, Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) are those theater nuclear systems with missile range or aircraft radius of over 1000 kilometers. Medium-range systems (MRTNF) are those with range or radius of between 100-1000 kilometers, and short-range systems (SRTNF) are those with ranges of less than 100 kilometers.

- Delivery Systems
- Weapons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MRTNF</td>
<td>3563</td>
<td>1779</td>
<td>2920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRTNF</td>
<td>893</td>
<td>1193</td>
<td>6077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>1374</td>
<td>5660</td>
<td>9951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4178</td>
<td>5464</td>
<td>1192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Includes "central systems" plus those medium and long-range (> 1,000 km) theater nuclear forces oriented on Europe.
2. Projections are consistent with NIE 11-3/8-78 and NIE 11-6-78.

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Comparison with NATO:

- The magnitude of Soviet LRTNF with respect to NATO forces has not changed significantly, since 1969 even though the Allies—notably the French—have deployed several ballistic missile submarines. The US has also deployed F-111 aircraft to bases in the UK.

25X4

- Currently the number of in-place Soviet LRTNF delivery systems—as well as weapons—exceeds NATO's by a ratio of about [fill in]. The composition of the NATO and Soviet force differs greatly, however, as exemplified by the relatively large share of Soviet weapons carried by land-based ballistic missiles.

- It is this specific set of Soviet LRTNF which concern the US and NATO and will be the focus of arms control efforts. In addition, it is the NATO LRTNF set represented on this graphic which is presently being considered for enlargement and modernization.

25X4

- In addition to the in-place NATO LRTNF, the US has committed [fill in] to SACEUR. The missiles which carry these weapons are already SALT constrained, however, and would therefore not be the subject of any LRTNF negotiations.

- Other long-range forces not represented on this graphic include the FB-111 medium bomber force, based in the US, as well as SAACLANT-assigned and other US aircraft carrier nuclear strike forces.

Importance of Pact MRTNF:

- Soviet and Eastern European operated medium and short-range forces opposite NATO have recently exhibited substantial growth. They are of increasing importance in considering the numerical balance of Pact and NATO theater nuclear forces.
### Comparison of Pact and NATO Theatre Nuclear Forces in Europe in 1979

**NOTE:** For all line items, the first figure indicates number of delivery systems, and the second ( ) the number of weapons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Long-Range (Systems Over 1000 KM)</th>
<th>Medium-Range (Systems 100 KM to 1000 KM)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Soviet</strong></td>
<td><strong>Pact</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>SSBM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR/IRBM</td>
<td>Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>Short-Range (Systems Under 1000 KM)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30(30)</td>
<td>534(534)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>469(595)</td>
<td>885(945)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>694(1363)</td>
<td>350(350)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>Pact</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1193(1988)</td>
<td>1779(1839)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Concept used is that of an unreinforced “one-time only” exchange. Aircraft and missile launcher receiving are not included.

2. Geographic area included in European NATO, Eastern Europe, the eight westernmost military districts of the Soviet Union, the two western LRA commands, and the three western Soviet fleet areas.

3. Includes French systems.

4. Some “central system” missile tubes—Soviet UK and French.

5. Excludes SAC/EUR, but already taken account of as central systems.

6. In accordance with FRR-39, only SAC/EUR nuclear-taxed aircraft are counted rather than nominally nuclear capable. For the Pact, only those aircraft for which nuclear trained pilots are currently available are counted. Counting based upon nominally nuclear capable aircraft would result in Pact/NATO totals of 543/4140 delivery systems, respectively.

7. SLCM launch rails on Soviet ships, submarines and missile fast-boats.

8. Nike-Hercules SAMs modified to be secondarily capable of surface-to-surface strikes.
With the recent Soviet deployment of nuclear artillery, the Pact has enhanced its short-range theater nuclear forces, which now slightly outnumber those of NATO.

Soviet and Pact MRTNF now exceed the in-place medium-range forces of NATO by a ratio of about [ ] in delivery systems and in weapons. In numbers, the Pact possesses nearly 1,800 delivery systems capable of delivering about the same number of weapons. About half the delivery systems are dual-capable tactical aircraft, most of which have been deployed within the past 10 years.

The significance of asymmetrical geographic circumstances is illustrated by the fact that, from forward bases in Eastern Europe, Pact MRTNF can strike practically every target of consequence in Western Europe, while NATO MRTNF can reach only a few major targets on the fringes of the Soviet Union.

These Soviet and Pact medium range systems will not be considered in arms negotiations which are definitionally restricted to LRTNF. In addition, most of the Soviet tactical aircraft are deployed within the Soviet Union, and are hence not presently treated in the MBFR forum.

Projections in Soviet LRTNF

Refocusing on Soviet LRTNF... As noted earlier, the actual number of delivery systems in this category has decreased since 1969. This decrease will continue, and it is projected that by 1985 only about 900 systems will be operational opposite Europe.*

*These projections are based upon the moderate level of effort deployment pattern described in NIE 11-6-78. A larger 1985 force could result from a higher level of effort than anticipated, or the retention of SS-4/5's in the force for arms control bargaining purposes.
Composition of Soviet LRTNF Operational and by Type of Weapon, in 1969, and Projected 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delivery Systems</th>
<th>Weapons by Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Bombs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1296</td>
<td>1796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1193</td>
<td>478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>251</td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>ALCMs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>470</td>
<td>885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>440</td>
<td>610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233</td>
<td>1004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRF</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile RVs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>575</td>
<td>625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>469</td>
<td>691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>229</td>
<td>596</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Includes only those LRTNF forces oriented on European NATO.
2. Projections are consistent with NIE 11-6-78.
These relatively modest quantitative changes in Soviet LRTNF are overshadowed, however, by significant, concurrent qualitative changes in the Soviet force. Principal among these are continued deployments of the Backfire medium bomber and the SS-20 IRBM.

There are presently about 100 Backfires operational with the Soviet Northwest and Southwest bomber commands and the three Western fleet areas. Some 230 will probably be operationally deployed in these areas by 1985, and will be distributed about equally between Soviet naval and long-range aviation, largely as replacements for older aircraft.

The low altitude and supersonic capabilities of the Backfire, as well as its improved avionics, and its stand-off ALCM armament, render it particularly suitable in the naval strike role, or as a complement to ballistic missiles in the land attack role.

The first SS-20 IRBM launchers probably became operational in 1977, and about 60 are now thought to be oriented against Europe. It is projected that almost 200 will be arrayed against NATO by 1985.

Its three to four independently targetable warheads are significantly more accurate than the single SS-4/5 warhead, and its mobile-basing mode renders it vastly more survivable. It uses solid fuel, and for this and other reasons has a faster reaction time than the SS-4/5. The system probably will ultimately be deployed with two refire missiles.

Importance of SS-20 Refires

Given currently planned NATO TNF modernization programs, Soviet LRTNF—even without SS-20 refire missiles—will by 1985 exceed NATO’s by a factor.
Comparison of Soviet ATO LRNF in Europe in 1985, With and Without SS-20 Reires

NOTE: For all line items, the first figure indicates the number of delivery systems, and the second (in parentheses) the number of weapons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SLM</th>
<th>Pact</th>
<th>NATO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MR/IRBM</td>
<td>3 (3)</td>
<td>229 (688)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>675 (1406)</td>
<td>675 (1406)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRINF</td>
<td>907 (2097)</td>
<td>1303 (3411)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central System Supplements</td>
<td>UHR</td>
<td>UHR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>907 (2097)</td>
<td>2303 (3411)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With SS-20 Reires

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SLM</th>
<th>Pact</th>
<th>NATO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MR/IRBM</td>
<td>3 (3)</td>
<td>625 (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>675 (1406)</td>
<td>675 (1406)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRINF</td>
<td>1303 (3411)</td>
<td>1303 (3411)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central System Supplements</td>
<td>UHR</td>
<td>UHR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2303 (3411)</td>
<td>2303 (3411)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Soviet Projections are based upon NIE 11-6-78.
2. Assumes NATO TNF modernization programs of currently feasible character and pace.
3. A projection of 2 reires per SS-20 launcher. It is felt that that about one-third of the SS-20 force will be equipped with 4-MIRV warheads.
4. Reflects projected changes in French theater nuclear inventories. In 1986 a sixth French SSBN will probably be operational, and will provide an additional 16 missiles.
5. An unknown number of Soviet ICBMs and intercontinental range SLMs may be targeted on Europe.
in on-target weapons. When refire missiles are incorporated into the analysis, this ratio increases to

--The inclusion of the unknown degree into this comparison is offset to a unknown degree by the "central system" ICBMs and SLBMs which the Soviets are believed to have targetted against Europe.

**Graphic V**

**Implications**

--Improvements in Soviet and Pact theater nuclear forces at all levels are important in several ways...

--The growth and modernization of medium-range TNF enhance the Pact's ability to wage war in Central Europe at whatever level NATO or they themselves choose, without having to resort to USSR based bomber or missile forces.

--Once the mobile SS-20 is deployed in larger numbers, the increased survivability characteristics of this force will render it practically impossible to launch nuclear conflict, with greater confidence and restraint in a nuclear or near-nuclear conflict.

--If USSR-based TNF are employed, the large number of SS-20 warheads--including refires--and the high accuracy characteristics of that weapon would insulate a high probability of prompt destruction of targets in Western Europe.

--In theory these developments increase substantially the Soviet/Pact ability to execute a variety of limited nuclear warfare options--in contrast to previous strategic doctrine which visualized a massive nuclear pre-emptive strike, or response to NATO's first use. In recent years, Soviet planners have been examining such nuclear options and contingencies.
These doctrinal reviews notwithstanding, Soviet writings and other evidence indicate that Soviet planners see little prospect of containing the intensity and geographic scope of a conflict once the nuclear threshold has been crossed by either side.

Perhaps the most significant implication of the growing Soviet and Pact nuclear superiority—at all levels—is the prospect that the military advantages to NATO of introducing nuclear weapons into combat have decreased. Consequently, the Soviets may believe—increasingly—that NATO might be reluctant to employ nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack.

Currently programmed NATO modernization steps would probably not be viewed as altering these foreseeable and—for the Soviets—favorable nuclear force trends.

Pretty true ever since 1970.

One explosion.
Implications of Soviet TNF Improvements

- Increased ability to wage nuclear war in Europe without escalating to USSR-based forces.
- If USSR-based TNF are considered...
  * High survivability characteristics of SS-20 will permit the Soviets to behave with greater confidence and restraint.
  * Large numbers of SS-20 warheads/refires and high accuracy characteristics insure high probability of prompt target destruction.
- In theory these developments...
  * Enhance Soviet capabilities to execute limited nuclear options.
  * The Soviets are presently exploring such options.
- Currently, however, Soviet planners appear pessimistic about prospects of containing intensity and geographic scope of any nuclear conflict.
- Growing Soviet/Pact nuclear superiority at all levels could cause Soviets to believe that NATO might be reluctant to employ nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack.
  * Current NATO TNF modernization programs would not be viewed as altering these trends.
*MY BRIEFING WILL ADDRESS SOVIET NUCLEAR FORCES OPPOSITE US, AND IS CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET. I WILL BE DISCUSSING SOVIET DELIVERY SYSTEMS WHICH COULD BE USED DURING A NUCLEAR CONFLICT IN EUROPE, FOCUSING IN TODAY'S PRESENTATION UPON THE LONGER RANGE SOVIET SYSTEMS. *I WILL HIGHLIGHT THE QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS WHICH ARE UNDERWAY, PRESENT OUR CURRENT ESTIMATE ON THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (BOMBS AND WARHEADS) ASSOCIATED WITH THESE DELIVERY SYSTEMS, AND PROVIDE SOME BRIEF COMMENTS ON THE SOVIET CONCEPTS ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE.


4. *I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THE STRATEGIC FORCES TODAY. THE LONGER RANGE STRATEGIC SYSTEMS CONSIST OF THE USSR-BASED MEDIUM RANGE AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCE...
WHICH IS DEDICATED TO NUCLEAR ATTACKS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER;
T, THE USSR-BASED BOMBER FORCE WHICH IS INTENDED PRIMARILY
FOR THEATER EMPLOYMENT; AND LASTLY AT THOSE NAVAL BALLISTIC
MISSILE SUBMARINES WHICH APPEAR TO HAVE A PRIMARY MISSION OF
STRIKING EUROPEAN TARGETS.

90% OF THE SOVIET MR AND IRBM LAUNCHERS ARE DEPLOYED
IN THE WESTERN USSR AND ARE CAPABLE OF LAUNCHING AGAINST
WESTERN EUROPE. THE REMAINDER ARE TARGETED AGAINST EITHER
THE PRC OR OTHER PERIPHERAL TARGETS. THIS MAP SHOWS THE
GENERAL LOCATION IN WHICH MOST OF THE MR/IRBM LAUNCH COMPLEXES
ARE DEPLOYED.

THE SS-4 MRBM WAS INITIALLY DEPLOYED IN LATE 1958, AND
IS LAUNCHED FROM EITHER A SOFT OR HARDENED SITE. ITS RANGE
OF COVERAGE AGAINST NATO TARGETS IS INDICATED.

THE SS-5 IRBM BECAME OPERATIONAL IN 1961, AND, LIKE THE
SS-4, IS LAUNCHED FROM EITHER SOFT OR HARDENED LOCATIONS. IN
FACT, APPROXIMATELY 80 PERCENT OF THE SS-4S AND SS-5S ARE
DEPLOYED AT SOFT SITES, EACH OF WHICH HAS THE CAPABILITY TO
FIRE A SECOND MISSILE 2-4 HOURS AFTER THE FIRST MISSILE HAS

BEEN LAUNCHED. *A NEW MISSILE, THE SS-20, HAS BEEN DEVELOPED
AND THE FIRST BASE OPPOSITE NATO ATTAINED AN OPERATIONAL
CAPABILITY IN THE SUMMER OF 78. THIS SYSTEM HAS A GREATER
RANGE THAN THE SS-5, BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY: IT IS MORE ACCURATE,
IT IS A ROAD-MOBILE SYSTEM WITH AT LEAST A LIMITED OFF-ROAD
CAPABILITY ON FIRM, REASONABLY LEVEL TERRAIN; IT HAS A
MULTIPLE REFIRE CAPABILITY, AND HAS A MIRV'ED WARHEAD WITH
THREE REENTRY VEHICLES. WE EXPECT THAT EVENTUALLY THE SS-20

*SEVEN OPERATIONAL SS-20 MOBILE MISSILE BASES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED TO DATE LOCATED IN THE WESTERN HALF OF THE USSR, AS SHOWN. (PAUSE)

*THE CURRENT NUMBER OF OPERATIONAL MR/IRBM LAUNCHERS IS SHOWN HERE. (PAUSE)


HERE IS A MORE DETAILED TABLE SHOWING THE NUMBER OF REENTRY VEHICLES ASSOCIATED WITH THE MR/IRBM FORCE. THE TOTAL INCLUDES A REFIRE MISSILE FOR EACH OF THE SOFT-SITE SS-4 AND SS-5 LAUNCHERS AND A REFIRE MISSILE FOR EACH SS-20 LAUNCHER. ADDITIONALLY, THE SS-20 Figure ACCOUNTS FOR THE THREE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES ON EACH MISSILE.

IN ADDITION TO THE MR/IRBM FORCE, THE SOVIETS HAVE ABOUT 1,400 ICBMS, SOME OF WHICH COULD BE BROUGHT TO BEAR AGAINST EUROPEAN TARGETS IF NECESSARY. IN THE LATE 1960s, THEY BUILT 120 SS-11 LAUNCHERS WHICH WERE ORIENTED SO AS TO PROVIDE BETTER COVERAGE OF WEST EUROPEAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN TARGETS. ALTHOUGH SOME OF THESE MISSILES HAVE BEEN REPLACED WITH NEWER SYSTEMS, THE SOVIETS MAY CONTINUE TO ALLOCATE SOME OF THE ICBM FORCE TO EUROPEAN TARGETS. ALL THE USSR'S NEW

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ICBMS have the capability to be launched in nearly any direction in addition, all but the SS-18 ICBM have been tested at reduced ranges.

*The large Soviet Intermediate Range Bomber fleet of Long Range Aviation (LRA) has existed primarily for operations against NATO forces. Indicative of this is the fact that 75% of this fleet is deployed in the Western USSR, within the combat radius of European targets without aerial refueling or staging.*

The badger, which accounts for about two-thirds of the force, entered service over 20 years ago and has not been produced since 1959. Nevertheless, the Soviets are seeking to extend the useful life of these aircraft by equipping them with improved air-to-surface missiles.

*The blinder, a design of the late 1950s, began to enter the force in 1962 and went out of production in 1969.*

*The force based opposite NATO now consists of about 139 blinders and 237 badgers. 168 badgers opposite NATO are equipped with AS-5 or AS-6 missiles but can also be used as freefall bombers. The other 69 strike-configured badgers have only a freefall bombing capability. About 64 of the blinders carry the AS-4 air-to-surface missile and do not have a bombing capability. 75 blinders are configured as gravity bombers only.*

The LRA force is being upgraded with the introduction of the new backfire bomber, which became operational in 1974; 50 currently operational within LRA.*
THE BACKFIRE HAS SWINGWINGS WHICH ENABLE IT TO CRUISE AT SUPERSONIC SPEEDS AT HIGHER ALTITUDES AND AT SUBSONIC SPEEDS AT LOW ALTITUDES. IT IS EQUIPPED WITH ECM EQUIPMENT TO FACILITATE PENETRATION OF MODERN AIR DEFENSES. THE BACKFIRE CAN CARRY EITHER NUCLEAR BOMBS OR AS-4 AMS.

BACKFires, such as the ones based at Poltava in the USSR would be able to fly a high-speed, low-level penetration mission, with the flexibility to strike a greater number of more distant targets in Europe than either the Badger or Blinder.

Shown here are the respective ranges of Backfire and Badger ASM carriers. Note that the Backfire mission profile includes a 200 mile low altitude penetration while the Badger is an all high altitude profile.

This table presents our current estimate of the number of nuclear weapons (bombs and ASMs) which might be carried by the Soviet long range aviation aircraft. The representative weapons loadings used to compute the totals shown vary from one ASM on the Blinder "B" up to four nuclear bombs which could be carried by the Backfire.

Turning now to submarines: Ballistic missile submarines having missiles with ranges of up 1600 NM are probably assigned targets in Western Europe as their primary mission. The Gulf-II (Pause) and Hotel-II class submarines initially served as part of the Soviet intercontinental attack force, but by the mid-1970s the availability of newer, more modern Yankee & Delta class submarines allowed the Soviets to begin relieving these older units of their intercontinental mission. Recent patrol
PATTERNS SUGGEST THAT ALMOST ALL OPERATIONAL GOLF-II AND H-II CLASS BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES HAVE SHIFTED TO THEATER ATTACK MISSIONS.

*IN 1976, THE SOVIETS TRANSFERRED SIX GOLF-II CLASS SUBMARINES FROM THE NORTHERN FLEET TO THE LIEPAJA NAVAL BASE ON THE BALTIC SEA--THE FIRST DEPLOYMENT OF BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES TO THAT OPERATING AREA. FROM THE PORT, ITSELF, G-II CLASS SUBMARINES FITTED WITH THEIR 750 NM SS-N-5 MISSILES COULD COVER TARGETS IN WEST GERMANY, THE BENELUX COUNTRIES, AND SCANDINAVIA WITHOUT LEAVING LOCAL WATERS. BY MOVING TO THE AREA OFF THE COAST OF POLAND, AS SHOWN, THEY COULD EXTEND MISSILE COVERAGE TO INCLUDE MUCH OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, AND ITALY. THERE ARE FOUR HOTEL II CLASS SSBNS BASED *THE SOVIET NORTHERN FLEET. IT WOULD TAKE THESE UNITS SOME TIME TO DEPLOY TO A POSITION WHERE THEIR SS-N-5 MISSILES WOULD BE WITHIN RANGE OF ALL WEST EUROPEAN TARGETS.

THE 1600 NM RANGE ARC, SHOWN, DEPICTS THE RANGE OF THE SS-N-6 MISSILE CARRIED BY THE GOLF IV SSBN ASSIGNED TO THE NORTHERN FLEET. *IN ADDITION TO THE GOLF AND HOTEL SUBMARINES, YANKEE AND DELTA CLASS SSBN'S COULD ALSO BE EMPLOYED AGAINST EUROPE.

*SHOWN HERE IS A SUMMARY OF THE LONG RANGE SOVIET WEAPONS WHICH WE ESTIMATE COULD BE USED IN A EUROPEAN CONFLICT. IN ADDITION TO THE WEAPONS DEDICATED FOR USE IN THE THEATER, THE SOVIETS CAN ALSO EMPLOY SOME OF THEIR ICBMS, INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE BOMBERS, AND THEIR YANKEE AND DELTA CLASS SUBMARINES INST EUROPEAN TARGETS AS THEY DEEM NECESSARY. (PAUSE)
I would like to turn now briefly to the question of Soviet concepts for the employment of their nuclear forces. The Soviets apparently believe that a war in Europe will probably begin with both sides using only conventional weapons; however, they are clear in stating that this should be viewed as only a phase of operations. The military objectives of defeating NATO military forces and seizing and occupying NATO territory and resources would be achieved through the execution of a rapidly advancing combined arms offensive. A primary objective of military operations, during the conventional and/or a nuclear phase of conflict, would be the destruction or neutralization of NATO's nuclear forces.

Finally, but perhaps most important for today's discussion, the Soviets believe that even if the war begins conventionally, escalation to nuclear conflict is very likely. Thus we see a major concern over the transition from conventional to nuclear operations, with a stress upon the need for forces to be constantly prepared to make the transition while retaining the initiative in offensive operations. In this regard, the Soviets believe that nuclear weapons are militarily important and advantages will accrue to the side which first uses them decisively. Thus there is considerable emphasis upon being prepared to preempt NATO in the large scale use of nuclear weapons.
IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT LARGE-SCALE PREEMPTION DOES NOT NECESSARILY EQUATE TO INDISCRIMINATE TOTAL DESTRUCTION OF WESTERN EUROPE. ON THE CONTRARY, CURRENT SOVIET NUCLEAR TARGETING STRATEGY APPEARS TO BE BASED ON COUNTER-MILITARY OR COUNTER-FORCE TARGETING. SUCH A STRATEGY IS A LOGICAL OUTGROWTH OF THEIR MILITARY AND POLITICAL GOALS WHICH WOULD BE THE DESTRUCTION OF NATO MILITARY FORCES AND THE OCCUPATION OF WESTERN EUROPE. IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE ACQUISITION OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC-INDUSTRIAL BASE WOULD OFFER THE SOVIETS A MAJOR ADVANTAGE IN THE POST-WAR BALANCE OF POWER RELATIONSHIPS.

ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS EMPHASIZE LARGE-SCALE PREEMPTIVE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THEY DO HAVE OTHER OPTIONS AVAILABLE. APPARENTLY BEGINNING AS EARLY AS 1971, THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZED THAT EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS OTHER THAN RELIANCE UPON A LARGE-SCALE, THEATER-WIDE STRIKE MIGHT BE NECESSARY.

THE ON-GOING IMPROVEMENTS IN SOVIET NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL FLEXIBILITY ARE SUCH THAT THESE NUCLEAR OPTIONS COULD BE EFFECTIVELY EMPLOYED IN A EUROPEAN CONFLICT. HOWEVER, PREEMPTION, DECISIVE LARGE-SCALE USE, AND DISBELIEF IN THE CONCEPT OF GRADUATED ESCALATION REMAIN AS MAJOR TENETS OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE.

IN CONCLUSION, THE SOVIETS CLEARLY BELIEVE THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE DECISIVE AND THAT THEY MUST BE PREPARED TO WAGE NUCLEAR WAR EFFECTIVELY IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER SHOULD IT BE NECESSARY. THE LONGER RANGE SYSTEMS WHICH I HAVE ADDRESSED
TODAY (AS WELL AS THE SHORTER RANGE TACTICAL NUCLEAR SYSTEMS) ARE BEING IMPROVED BOTH QUANTITATIVELY AND QUALITATIVELY AND THE SOVIETS ARE CONTINUING TO EXAMINE THEIR CONCEPTS FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF THESE FORCES.
EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR FORCES

ESTIMATE OF TOTAL WEAPONS

IMPROVEMENTS

QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE

SECRET DELIVERY SYSTEMS

OVERVIEW
NUCLEAR FORCES
FOR
EUROPEAN CONFLICT

- STRATEGIC FORCES
  - IN USSR OR ADJACENT WATERS

- TACTICAL FORCES
  - IN EASTERN EUROPE
  - IN WESTERN USSR
  - IN ADJACENT WATERS
STRATEGIC FORCES
IN USSR OR ADJACENT WATERS.

USSR-BASED MRBM AND IRBM FORCE

USSR-BASED INTERMEDIATE AND LONG RANGE BOMBER FORCE

NAVAL BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE FORCE
SS-20 MOBILE IRBM

RANGE: 5,000 KM

CEP: 385 M

ADVANTAGES

INCREASED SURVIVABILITY

MORE ACCURATE THAN CURRENT IRBM/MRBМ FORCE

REDUCES NEED FOR DEPENDENCE ON ICBM FOR PERIPHERAL ATTACK

MULTIPLE REFIRE CAPABILITY
CURRENT SOVIET
OPERATIONAL MR/IRBM
DEPLOYMENT AGAINST EUR.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MB/IRBM Launchers</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>RANGE</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>1,950 KM</td>
<td>SS-4</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SOFT</td>
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<td>4,100 KM</td>
<td>SS-5</td>
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<td></td>
<td>HARD</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>5,000 KM</td>
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SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGIC CONCEPTS
EUROPEAN CONFLICT

- OPENING CONVENTIONAL PHASE
- COMBINED ARMS OFFENSIVE
  - DEFEAT MILITARY FORCES
  - SEIZE AND OCCUPY TERRITORY/RESOURCES
- DESTROY ENEMY NUCLEAR MEANS
- ESCALATION LIKELY
  - CONCERN OVER TRANSITION
  - EMPHASIS ON PREEMPTION
TARGETING STRATEGY IS
OUTGROWTH OF
MILITARY-POLITICAL GOALS

CURRENT SOVIET TARGETING STRATEGY IS
COUNTER-FORCE

OCCUPATION OF EUROPE AND ACQUISITION OF
ECONOMIC-INDUSTRIAL BASE A MAJOR GOAL
SOVIETS SKEPTICAL OF LIMITED NUCLEAR USE

- LIMITED OPTIONS COULD BE EMPLOYED BY SOVIETS
- PREEMPTION, LARGE-SCALE USE, AND DISBELIEF IN GRADUATED ESCALATION CHARACTERIZE SOVIET DOCTRINE
MEMORANDUM

TO: See Distribution

FROM: ACDA/ISP - John Newhouse

SUBJECT: TNF Arms Control Issues Paper

(C) Attached is a draft paper entitled "Issues in Theater Nuclear Arms Control." It is intended for presentation to the Allies at the April meeting of the SG, along with the papers from State and CIA. Much of the language of this paper was taken from the interagency-cleared State/ACDA paper of last October, which was prepared for (but never presented to) the November 20 NAC.

(C) Because the paper will be discussed at this Thursday's SCC meeting, we would appreciate it if you would send your comments to Robert Nurick (Room 4494, 632-7439) by COB Wednesday, April 11.

Attachment: as stated

Distribution

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CONFIDENTIAL/STRICTLY SECRET ATTACHMENT
I. Introduction

The accompanying paper outlines some preliminary US thinking about the general objectives which TNF arms control might serve, and about some principles which might guide the Alliance in considering specific negotiating approaches. The thinking in that paper reflects in part a US working-level assessment of larger political, military, and arms control considerations, but also of the underlying technical issues which would be involved in negotiations on theater nuclear systems.

This paper describes these latter issues and presents important analytical considerations bearing on them. In a few cases, tentative conclusions are suggested. These represent US working level views only. More often, our analysis has narrowed the range of plausible outcomes but has not yet led to firm judgments.

II. Major Issues

A. Systems to be Covered

This section describes the systems and forces which might be candidates for arms control negotiations on theater nuclear forces. The focus is on long-range US and Soviet theater nuclear forces in Europe. Systems limited by the SALT TWO Treaty, as well as British and French nuclear systems, are not considered.

The figures given below for long-range forces include those deployed in all of Europe, including the USSR to the Urals;
figures for shorter-range forces include only those in the three Western Military Districts (WMDs). The issue of distinguishing long-range systems from other systems is considered later.

1. Long-Range Systems

For purposes of discussion, ballistic and cruise missiles are categorized according to whether they are land- or sea-based.

**Land-Based Missiles**

The primary candidate Soviet land-based missile system is the mobile SS-20 IRBM, of which over 200 firing units (a transporter-erector-launcher, or TEL, and three missiles) may be deployed in the western USSR by the mid-1980s. Additionally, about 100 SS-20 firing units may be deployed in the eastern Soviet Union in this same period. Other candidate systems are older SS-4/SS-5 M/IRBMs deployed in the western USSR and intended for use against NATO; these systems are being retired concurrent with the introduction of the SS-20. Any future Soviet long-range GLCM would also be a candidate for limitation.

The primary US candidates for inclusion are the GLCM and the PIIIXR, both with a 1983 IOC.

**Sea-Based Missiles**

Candidate Soviet systems in this category are current and future SLCMs, and older SLBMs not limited by SALT. At present, six Soviet Golf II class submarines are deployed in the Baltic, each with three SS-N-5 ballistic missiles. Candidate US systems include possible future land-attack SLCMs.

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Soviet long-range theater aircraft are currently deployed with the forces of Long-Range Aviation (LRA) and Naval Aviation (SNA). Available for use in Europe are the Backfire medium bombers and the older Badgers and Blinders of the 1st (Smolensk) and 2nd (Vinnitsa) LRA Armies, and those in SNA deployed in support of the Baltic, Northern, and Black Sea fleets. Additionally, LRA bombers deployed with the Far East Bomber Corps (Irkutsk) and SNA bombers with the Pacific Ocean Fleet Air Force might be considered.

On the US side, and apart from heavy bombers limited by SALT, the system of greatest concern to the Soviets is the F-111 fighter bomber (and the FB-111, if limits are world-wide or if it is deployed in the theater); 175 F-111s (156 UE plus 19 float) are currently based in the UK, with a larger number based in the US.

2. Other US and Soviet Theater Nuclear Systems

Other US and Soviet theater nuclear systems which might theoretically be included in negotiations are nuclear-capable tactical aircraft, tactical ballistic missiles and rockets, and nuclear-capable artillery.

US aircraft which are considered nuclear-capable and based in Europe are the F-111 (discussed earlier), the F-4, and the carrier-based A-6 and A-7. These are the aircraft which the Soviets have explicitly identified as "forward-based systems" in the SALT context. Because Soviet practices with respect to nuclear delivery aircraft differ from those of the

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nuclear-capable. These aircraft include Fishbed (Mig-21 J/K/L), Flogger B (Mig 23), Flogger D (Mig 27), Fitter A (SU-7), Fitter C (SU-17), Foxbat (Mig-28), Brewer (Yak-28), and Fencer (SU-24). Approximately 2,500 of these types of aircraft are deployed with Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and the Western Soviet Union. Only about one-third of these aircraft are presently nuclear-qualified and assigned, although the percentage is expected to rise steadily through the 1980s.

Both the US and the USSR have tactical missiles deployed in Europe. US nuclear-capable systems comprise 115 Pershing Ia launchers (108 UE plus 7 float) with 198 missiles (the more accurate long-range PIIXR could replace the current system on a one-for-one basis), and 40 shorter-range Lance launchers, as well as nuclear-capable Nike Hercules SAM launchers which could be used in a surface-to-surface role. Soviet forces are presently equipped with the SCUD SSM, the FROG rocket, and Scaleboard launchers. Replacements for all of these systems are expected in the 1980s. The Soviets have completed development of follow-ons for the FROG (the SS-21) and for Scaleboard (the SS-22). A possible follow-on to the SCUD is in an early stage of flight testing.

US forces presently have 155 mm and 203 mm artillery deployed in Europe, of which about 612 tubes are nuclear-certified. Soviet forces in Europe do not have
nuclear forces. This has been estimated that the Soviets have the technology to develop a nuclear projectile for the 152 mm artillery, but no evidence exists that they have fielded such a capability. Soviet 203 mm artillery and 240 mm mortars apparently are nuclear-capable, but these systems are presently deployed only in USSR.

3. Factors Influencing Inclusion/Exclusion of Systems

Decisions as to which systems should be included in, or excluded from, actual negotiations on theater nuclear forces will reflect both political and military considerations.

Political Factors

Political considerations could center on those longer-range and more modern systems which have been the principal source of concern in the Alliance about the dynamic trends in theater nuclear deployments, and which have acquired significant political "visibility" as a result. Immediately obvious examples include the Soviet SS-20 IRBM and Backfire bomber, and US ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles and PIIXXR. These systems are not only the focus of current political attention, but also--by virtue of their long-range and technological sophistication--represent qualitatively new factors in the overall nuclear balance. Appropriate limitations on this relatively narrow set of systems would thus be responsive to the military implications and attendant political impact of Soviet TNF modernization. Moreover,
focusing on these modern systems could directly strengthen
the arms control objective of stabilizing the European nuclear
balance over the long term, on the grounds that it is precisely
these highly "visible" long-range systems which have the
greatest potential to generate an uncontrolled action/reaction
cycle. Finally, such a focus might reinforce the SALT process
by seeking to control theater asymmetries which could otherwise
undermine strategic parity.
Although the particular features of an arms control approach may also be determined by political criteria, fundamental to the consideration of TNF arms control approaches would be the military desirability of possible negotiated outcomes. Military criteria will play a central role in determining: (a) what limits would be acceptable on what Western systems; and (b) the overall acceptability of a negotiated outcome, especially in comparison with the outcomes expected in the absence of any negotiated limitations.

Important military factors include: (a) the adequacy of permitted US and NATO forces to fulfill the requirements of NATO doctrine; and (b) the degree of threat posed by specific Soviet/Warsaw Pact weapons systems, including those not limited in an agreement.

For instance, military effectiveness criteria (similar to those applied by the HLG to its consideration of TNF modernization) will bear on the assessment of what limits would be acceptable on what US systems. These criteria include inter alia: the maintenance of a broad range of escalation options; adequate target coverage; the suitability of permitted systems for escalation control; ability to penetrate defenses; adequacy in numbers; and survivability.

With respect to candidate Soviet systems, it will be important to evaluate the military and political significance of systems not covered by an agreement. For
example, if important limitations were placed on systems above a given range (e.g., 1,000 km), the Soviets might increase deployments in Eastern Europe of shorter-range systems, or redeploy current shorter-range systems to provide greater coverage of NATO territory. These systems could in some respects pose as great threat to targets in NATO Europe as do longer-range systems based in the USSR, even though they have so far attracted relatively little political attention.

Choices among alternative range thresholds are thus likely to be of central importance. To illustrate some of the considerations bearing on this choice, two arbitrarily-chosen range thresholds are briefly examined here:

1,000 km: A range floor (below which a nuclear delivery system would not be limited) of 1,000 km would, in the case of missiles, catch principal modern systems on both sides, and exclude current Pershings and Scaleboards. Such a threshold would probably be easier to verify than a lower threshold, and would provide greater flexibility for shorter-range systems. It would also include fewer US systems for which there are Allied analogues, thereby making it more difficult for the Soviets to argue for compensation/for, or inclusion of, Allied systems.

By the same token, however, it would tend to shrink the US aggregate if applied at an early date, and since the USSR can place West European targets at risk with systems of relatively short range, if they are deployed in Eastern Europe, would increase Soviet potential to circumvent the limitations. In this case, the Alliance might want to consider whether some kind...
of separate ceiling on NGA deployments of sub-1,000 km missiles would be feasible or desirable.

500 km: A 500 km range floor would bring such systems as Scaleboard and current Pershing under limitations, thus increasing the US aggregate and offering greater negotiating leverage in an early negotiation. It might also somewhat reduce Soviet ability to exploit geographical asymmetries through East European deployments of shorter-range systems, although by the same token it might reduce US flexibility as well. It would also probably pose greater verification problems, however.

Other Factors

There are two major additional factors which will affect which systems are included in or excluded from potential TFN arms control negotiations. First is Soviet criteria for inclusion/exclusion; Soviet perspectives on TFN arms control are discussed in an accompanying paper. Second, negotiating approaches will have to be assessed for their verifiability. Verification questions are likely to be very complicated; they are discussed in section II-D below.

Technical Criteria

Finally, there is the question of developing appropriate criteria to identify systems for inclusion in the...
limits. In theory, this could be done for aircraft and missiles by means of a simple range criterion, by range/take-off weight or range/payload formulae, or by means of a generic listing (as for "heavy bombers" in SALT). A 1,000-km range floor would create many ambiguities: there are many systems having an assessed operational radius of close to 1,000 km, and the nominal range estimates for aircraft are very sensitive to profile and load assumptions. It is possible to eliminate these ambiguities for aircraft, and still catch major systems of interest, by raising the range floor to 2,000 km, but this could create the presentational problem of justifying different range criteria for missiles and aircraft. (If PIIs are to be used for negotiating leverage, then the range floor cannot be set higher than about 1,500 km.) In any case, explicit agreement as to what systems are to be limited would probably be necessary to avoid misunderstanding. A generic listing on the SALT precedent, with agreement on what types are covered, may thus be preferable.

B. Geographic Scope

There are several types of geographic constraints which could be applied to theater nuclear arms control limitations, e.g., Western Europe and Eastern Europe, excluding the USSR; Europe to the Urals; or constraints which encompass US and Soviet territory, either explicitly or in terms of limits on world-wide inventories. A related question is whether specific
ocean areas should be included in any arms control approach involving sea-based systems. Although the geographic scope of an agreement would be linked to the types of systems that would be covered, an important consideration would be that a significant portion of Soviet theater nuclear forces are stationed on Soviet territory.

Therefore, an agreement would have to include at least Eastern Europe and most of Western Russia (by convention, "to the Urals," though it could be defined by longitude or distance from the western border).* For reciprocity, the Western side would have to include at least all of Western Europe (for forces of the type and nationality covered). This "Europe-only" focus would not include any further geographic areas, nor impose world-wide limits on testing, production, or deployment.

There are several possible problems with a restricted geographic focus. First, most of the weapons under consideration are more-or-less mobile; even if removed from a specific area, they could rapidly be reintroduced. This is particularly true of aircraft; long-distance movement of mobile missile launchers would take somewhat longer. (In addition, most such missiles are also dependent upon ground support facilities which are both extensive and fixed).

Nevertheless, much of the effects of such an agreement would be on peacetime deployments only (as is the case for MBFR). This has both advantages and disadvantages.

*The SS-20 poses a particular problem, in that it can be based somewhat east of the Urals and still strike NATO territory.

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Limitations on sea-based systems could also present problems. Although world-wide inventories of either surface or submarine-based systems are reasonably verifiable, restrictions on deployments within limited areas (e.g., the North, Norwegian, and Mediterranean seas) would be hard to verify for surface systems, impossible for submarines, and circumventable in a crisis.

One possible approach to deal with these problems would be to seek global limits in combination with regional sub-limits. Such an approach might be particularly attractive if aircraft are to be limited, or if the agreement is to be of relatively long duration. For example, there could be a global limit on aircraft plus missiles, with a sub-limit on missile deployments in Europe.

C. Types of Limits

1. Possible Form of Controls

The forms of controls which might be placed on long-range theater nuclear forces include:

- quantitative limitations, such as ceilings, freezes, and reductions. One approach would be to establish an overall numerical ceiling on the limited systems, and allow flexibility within that ceiling. Thus, the SALT I Interim Agreement set limits on the number of SLBM launchers on each side, and the SALT II aggregates are ceilings and sub-ceilings on various types of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

- geographic deployments limitations. These would essentially be quantitative limits applied to specified areas. As noted above, they would present special problems in the case of mobile systems such as ships, aircraft, or air-transportable systems.
limitations, restrictions on testing, limits on payload and launch weight, and limits on modernization and "new types." Qualitative restrictions could apply to the characteristics of the systems (size, throw weight, fractionation, missiles-per-launcher, etc.) to the activities associated with the system, or to both. SALT experience has shown both the difficulties and the potential of defining and negotiating qualitative restraints.

-- supplemental measures to reinforce the effects of other limitations or to enhance verifiability. Such measures could include production limitations and cooperative measures to assist in verification.

2. Equal vs Asymmetrical Outcomes

An issue of great importance in formulating a negotiating approach is whether or not the Alliance should seek equal aggregate outcomes. Factors to be considered include the following:

-- An outcome which appeared to contractualize a large Soviet numerical superiority might be very difficult to sustain politically.

-- Given the numerical asymmetries between US and Soviet LRTNF, equal ceiling levels which might be both acceptable to the West and negotiable with the USSR may be difficult to set. In addition, given Soviet deployments against
China, strict equal aggregates would have been especially difficult to negotiate.

--Equal aggregate outcomes at relatively high levels might create political pressures for additional and otherwise unnecessary US deployments. On the other hand, the fact that the agreement permitted this option might be an important political asset, even if the option were not exercised.

--It might be argued that equal aggregate approaches--even when applied to a limited number of systems--would risk creating perceptions of a separate "Eurostrategic" balance.

A major issue related to an equal aggregates approach is the treatment of the numerous older Soviet systems, especially SS-4/5s and Badgers. To include these systems in the limits would, in most cases, drive the ceilings to extremely high levels, while to exclude them by means of an age cut-off would appear to concede a near-term advantage to the Soviets.

However, although the near-term effect of such exclusion ("grandfathering") would be roughly equivalent to an agreement with asymmetrical ceilings, the resulting balance would move toward parity over time. (This effect can be reinforced by replacement rules, if negotiable, to contractualize the retirement and dismantling of older systems.) Thus, the lower ceilings which grandfathering allows would inhibit Soviet modernization over the long run, while focusing our negotiating leverage on limiting the modern Soviet systems of greatest concern.

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In addition to the general issues noted above, a key question in determining what types of controls should be sought on LRTNF is whether the actual item limited should be the launcher (or aircraft, as appropriate), the missile, or the warhead. For reasons of verifiability, it may be desirable to limit missile launchers rather than the missiles themselves. Both SALT and MBFR have taken this approach. However, the Alliance may also wish to consider the desirability and feasibility of collateral provisions to limit reloads, MIRV fractionation, etc.

D. Problems of Verification

The verification problems raised by given limits would depend not only on the systems to which they are applied but also on the nature of the overall agreement. Nevertheless, there are a number of general observations which can be made.

--Quantitative limits on land-mobile systems could pose problems of verification with national technical means, depending primarily upon how the systems are deployed. Most mobile theater missiles have thus far been deployed during peacetime in reasonably-sized units (not autonomous launchers) based at known secure locations. Such peacetime deployments provide the opportunity to monitor missile activities over time, and, if continued, would considerably enhance the verifiability of deployment limits. (Thus, for example, we have a good idea of the number of SS-20 launchers being deployed.) Verifiability
might be negotiable. However, if deceptive deployment practices were used then quantitative limits on land-mobile missiles—both ballistic and cruise—would present serious verification problems.

--- verifying quantitative limits on Soviet theater nuclear aircraft might require agreement on definitions and a mutual database, in view of the differences between Western and Soviet approaches to aircraft nuclear capability and assumption-dependent range estimates.

--- nuclear vs. non-nuclear capability cannot be distinguished for missiles, nor are there any technical requirements for nuclear-capable aircraft that produce externally observable differences. Crew training activity and storage site signatures can be indicators of nuclear mission for Soviet aircraft, which in turn implies capability, but they are not necessarily reliable or consistently available indicators of such capability.

E. Participation: Forums

1. Participation

There are two broad issues involved in the choice of a forum for potential negotiations on long-range TNF: the nationalities of the forces covered, and the implications for progress in other on-going arms control negotiations.

We have assumed that only the US and the Soviet Union would negotiate on theater nuclear issues and consider limits on their forces. We recognize, of course, that Soviet pressure for either inclusion of or "compensation" for Allied
systems is likely to be costly. They are present in the long-range French and British national systems because they are not dependent upon US warheads and are capable of striking Soviet territory. Apart from direct Soviet efforts to seek Allied negotiating participation, Soviet proposals for "compensation" for such systems could conceivably take other forms. In SALT, the US has not agreed to such compensation. For instance, the US rejected the Soviet attempt in SALT I to count increases in UK or French strategic forces against the US strategic limits.

We will also have to consider the implications of TNF negotiations for progress in other on-going arms control efforts. In general, the SG will have to consider the extent to which attempts to advance the objectives of theater nuclear arms control are likely to enhance, complicate or impede progress in SALT III or MBFR.

2. Forums

Limiting the scope of TNF arms control negotiations to US-Soviet systems argues strongly for using SALT III as the forum:

--the issues are likely, in any case, to arise there.

--using a separate forum could appear to isolate TNF issues from broader strategic questions.

--using MBFR would greatly complicate the problem of limiting Soviet systems on Soviet territory, while avoiding limits on non-US Allied forces.

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SALT might make it easier to negotiate limits restricted to certain long-range US and Soviet theater systems.

However, we would have to achieve Soviet acceptance of our unilateral statement that their TNP, not just ours, must be subject to any limits. We would also have to deal with predictable Soviet arguments about circumvention/transfer, given Allied non-participation.
SOVIET OBJECTIVES

Being Drafted.
1. Following Aaron's informal consultations with Belgian, Dutch and Italian governments, an SCC meeting to assess the prospects for positive Alliance action on TNF by modernization and arms control by December 1979. Assuming a judgment that we should proceed on schedule, the track would be as follows:

2. Trilateral Consultations with British and Germans (already scheduled for March 29) to review Terms of Reference for new NATO Special Policy Group to deal with TNF arms control and related political issues. We might also air the Terms of Reference with Belgians, Dutch and Italians in advance of NAC discussion.

3. A reinforced NAC meeting (April 6) to receive reactions to US TNF arms control presentation of November 20, 1978, to review current thinking on TNF issues, and to establish the new Special Policy Group (SPG).

4. A High Level Group meeting to put the finishing touches on its report to the NPG. (April 3)

5. The NPG Ministers would discuss the long-range TNF modernization issue at their April 23 – 24 Ministerial meeting. The DPC and NAC Ministers will meet May 15 – 16 and May 30 – 31, respectively, and also discuss the issue.

6. The SPG would work through the spring and summer and prepare a report to be considered by the reinforced NAC in July. The aim of the SPG report would be to reach Alliance agreement on general objectives and principles of TNF arms control. A preliminary internal Alliance consensus at this point would serve two purposes: it would provide the intellectual framework for subsequent US proposals to the Alliance on TNF arms control. It would also put us in a position to respond to an aggressive Soviet TNF position in SALT III in the event this occurs before December 1979.
7. **Approved For Release 2002/09/04**

To develop an official US view on the specifics of an Alliance long-range TNF modernization program and on the contents of an Alliance statement on principles and objectives of TNF arms control. The latter would effectively provide a US mandate for TNF arms control in SALT III.

8. In the summer — after completion of the SPG report and development of a US view — the US would initiate bilateral discussions with Allied governments to discuss details of US thinking, especially on participation and basing — looking toward obtaining commitments before December 1979.

9. An Alliance consensus of TNF modernization and arms control at the December 1979 NAC / DFC Ministerials. Ideally, we would obtain a statement of Alliance approval of a TNF modernization program involving long-range TNF systems, with countries prepared to state individually how they intend to participate; we would also obtain a statement of Alliance support for negotiation in SALT III on long-range TNF, with a description of common Alliance objectives and principles, to provide the US a framework to develop a specific SALT III TNF negotiating position.
Spoken notes for the talks with Vice President Mondale on TNF (Grey Area)

1. We do appreciate the seriousness of the Grey Area issue. It is up to the Alliance to come up with the right response.

2. As it concerns a threat to the Alliance as a whole, it is imperative that a solution be found which implies a maximum of solidarity of the allies.

3. Therefore the importance of participation is underlined and we understand that in this connection the allies are looking also at the Netherlands.

4. It is too early to take any decisions. In order to enable us to do so we need to have at our disposal an overall view of on the one hand the possibilities for the TNF modernization (weapon systems) and on the other hand those for arms control. It is satisfactory indeed that now for this second aspect a special working group has been formed too.

5. In the context of the special Netherlands considerations it should be pointed out that it is my government's policy to reduce the role of nuclear weapons. This means that modernization of TNF shall not even give the impression of extending that overall role but it can mean that a certain shift in accentuation takes place within the field of the TNF. If that happens it is important that the number of nuclear warheads is not increased.

6. Finally it would like to point out that any further stop regarding the WBX weapon would have a disastrous influence on the decision making on TNF modernization.

7. Summarizing I would like to state that decisions concerning this very complicated issue can at the very earliest only be taken at the end of this year. These decisions should be based on both recommendations concerning TNF one on modernization one on arms control, which will then be submitted to the Minister of the NATO countries.
Speaking notes for the talks with Vice President Mondale on the NPG membership

The Netherlands Minister of Defence will at the following ministerial meeting at the Nuclear Planning Group, a formal proposal to modify the existing membership arrangements in order to make it possible for any NPG member to be represented at ministerial level on a permanent basis.

At the time of the creation of the NPG, the Netherlands already pointed out clearly the inconveniences of a restrictive participation, which in itself is at variance with the principle of the equality of the allies. The U.S. argument that, in the light of the special and restrictive character of NPG matters, discussion in a more reduced composition was to be preferred, induced at that stage the Netherlands Government to accept the arrangements for a rotating membership of some of the NPG nations.

The nature of the subjects treated in those years helped to overcome our objections.

But since 1966 great changes have taken place. The whole question of nuclear defence has acquired enormous political importance. I mention SALT, and the growth of Soviet nuclear strength. We have now all kinds of questions in NATO dealing with the possible modernization of theater nuclear forces in particular, but not only those concerned with the so-called grey area. It is also clear that parliament and public opinion are acutely aware of the problem of nuclear weaponry and governments are required all the time to give the most specific explanations on the matters of nuclear policy to parliament.

As it is the responsibility of the Nuclear Planning Group to deal with these crucial issues which are so much in the forefront of our attention, it is really no longer acceptable that we are not full members at the ministerial level.
Memorandum of conversation Vice-President Mondale - Prime-Minister Van Agt and others during Mondale's visit to The Hague, April 21 & 22.
Archive of the Foreign Ministry of the Netherlands, apa/gs/1975-1984/1121
Translated by Ruud van Dijk

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Memorandum

From: Dr. C.A. van der Klaauw   Date 23 April 1979
To: Mr. A.A.M. van Agt    No. 18/79  SECRET

Following a report prepared by Ambassador Tammenoms Bakker and approved by me of the discussions in limited circle with Vice-President Mondale.

Present from the American side: Vice-President Mondale, Ambassador Joseph, National Security Advisor Clift.
Present from the Dutch side: Prime-Minister Van Agt, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Van der Klaauw, and Ambassador Tammenoms Bakker.

The Prime-Minister opens the discussions and underlines the confidential and informal character of the meeting. He announces to want to raise three connected subjects:

1) production and deployment of Enhanced Radiation Weapons,
2) Grey Areas,
3) Dutch demand for a change in the composition of the Nuclear Planning Group.

Vice-President Mondale states that on American side too there is a desire to discuss these subjects, and he announces he'd like to add two other points: SALT and the Middle-East.

He begins the discussion with a survey of SALT, this at the special request of President Carter. He reports that the second SALT-agreement is practically ready. It mainly comes down to it that both sides involved can only design one new type of missile. Furthermore, satisfactory arrangements are envisioned to enable each side to observe what the other does and to determine if it keeps to the agreements. It appears the signing can take place very soon. President Carter has appealed to President Brezhnev in writing on the importance of having the signing by both heads of state, in the context of a more general summit meeting. That it has not come to a summit meeting between the two heads of state so far is the consequence of the fact that early on the Soviet side formed an incorrect judgment of President Carter. Now a better understanding has been established, and a meeting between the two heads of state can therefore be envisioned. It has not yet been decided where the meeting will take place. President Brezhnev's health probably makes it
difficult for him to undertake a long trip. For the U.S. it is unacceptable, however, to have
the meeting take place in the Soviet Union, this both for reasons of prestige and with an
eye on practical aspects which tend to occur in Moscow, like bugging and dividing the
American delegation between several locations. During the visit to Stockholm a few days
ago the Swedish prime-minister announced to Vice-President Mondale that the summit
meeting would be held in Stockholm, but Mondale said that he had not received any
information about this.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs says that he has heard from a French source--this with an
eye on the coming visit to Moscow by President Giscard d'Estaing--that Brezhnev's
health would have improved. He notes the general impression of the difficulties
ratification of SALT II could encounter in the American Congress and announces that
any Dutch help that would be welcome will gladly be given.

The Vice-President confirms that there are Congressional difficulties. The right wing
uses, among other things, the argument that SALT II would be at the expense of the
security of Western Europe. He rejects this representation, referring to the fact that there
have been constant consultations with West European partners. He believes the idea is
justified rather that SALT II will contribute to more security for the North Atlantic Treaty
region. The more European leaders could speak about this aspect, the better. As a
politician with a lot of experience in the Senate he has the feeling that the pessimism over
the ratification of SALT II is exaggerated. He recalls that according to estimates initially
only 8% of the American people was inclined toward ratification of the Panama-canal
treaties, and this eventually did get through the Senate. Currently estimates point out that
70-75% of the American people wants ratification of SALT II. This mood can only have
been reinforced by the recent occurrence at the nuclear plant in Pennsylvania. As a result
of this the awareness of the need to reduce nuclear risks must have increased. He
therefore foresees that the Senate will have to orient itself toward the national mood. An
important aspect furthermore is that in an international negotiation over a matter as
essential as nuclear arms the authority and the prestige of the President and the American
system of government are at stake. At the moment however nothing can be taken as
settled and the American Government would therefore be grateful for any help it could
get from Europe.

The Prime-Minister notes that there can be no doubt over the expression of the Dutch
position because Dutch public opinion practically unanimously is convinced of the
importance of SALT II. He next brings up the issue that has become known under the
keyword "neutron bomb." His government has constantly taken the position that
production and deployment of Enhanced Radiation Weapons do not get rejected
unconditionally. They do, however, have to be elements in arms control discussions with
the Soviet Union and decisions have to depend on the course of these discussions. This
has been the position thusfar. The attitude of the Dutch Parliament toward the neutron
bomb, however, becomes ever more rejecting and the government is "fighting a losing
battle." If premature decisions were to be taken a situation could develop which the
government could not survive. He recognizes that in essence a decision over production
and deployment falls under the sovereign prerogatives of the U.S., but points out that the
response of his government to a query from the side of the American President about a
decision for production of the neutrom bomb would be negative. Naturally this would
also be the case concerning a question about deployment of the weapon on European
territory. The Dutch government is especially worried about the following. On the one
hand it acknowledges the importance and the complexity of the problem and of the
arguments which can be used in favor of a positive decision. On the other hand a positive
decision about production, let alone deployment, of Enhanced Radiation Weapons would
make it extremely difficult to get parliamentary approval for the issue of modernization
of Theater Nuclear Forces. The mood in the Netherlands was undergoing a change. In the
past there only tended to be a small minority arguing for a complete removal of nuclear
weapons from Dutch territory. This group, however, was growing. In part this was a
reflection of a thought process, and subsequent positions, in the Dutch churches. A
complication like a premature decision over the neutron bomb would accelerate this
process and thus become a risk for the TNF-matter.

The Vice-President recalls that in the U.S. there is no lack of elements feeling emotional
aversion to the neutron bomb and the entire idea of nuclear arms. President Carter
himself belongs to these elements. Fact remained, however, that one has to counter one
way or another the large Soviet increase in other areas, like e.g. tanks. Some measures
have been taken in connection to the possibility that at some point there would have to be
a positive decision in regard to the neutron bomb. He underlined, however, that about
production itself no decision had been taken and that the ultimate decision would depend
in part on the behavior of the Soviets. The latter could also influence the European
positions. The American Government took the politically explosive character of the
question into account and hoped that the current stage of the decisionmaking could be
continued ("stabilised"). An aspect of the current situation was that a sword continued to
hang over the Russians' head and hopefully bring them to reasonable behavior.

The Prime-Minister says to realize that a negative decision cannot be had from the
American Government at this time. He adds, however, that in the Netherlands the
political pressure is considerable to reach that kind of a decision. The Minister of Foreign
Affairs adds that the government has maintained throughout that the issue of Enhanced
Radiation Weapons had to be employed in the context of general arms reduction talks.
Public opinion, however, began to wonder if anything was happening there. The pressing
political problem for the Dutch government consisted of the difficulty the issue of the
Enhanced Radiation Weapons could form during the discussion of the modernization of
Theater Nuclear Forces.

The Vice-President points out that for years he has presented himself as an arms
reductionist. However, since he has been able to observe the Soviet Union from a
position of responsibility for ten years he has become convinced that unilateral
disarmament from the side of the West would only encourage the Russians in their
ambitions. Persistent military pressure formed one of the means with which the Soviets
constantly tried to exploit other possibilities in Western countries. During his recent visit
to Norway he had received striking examples of this again. One further needed to
recognize the fact that the Soviets constantly continued with the development of new
guns. The Intelligence-reports of the U.S. point out that practically no month
passes without a new development from Soviet side. As examples he mentions the
appearance of a new generation of SS 20 and the fact that the Soviets are busy placing
more warheads inside the missiles than is permitted under the treaties. Since 15 years the
West has not introduced modernization in the Theater Nuclear Forces. The Soviets do
this all the time and apparently seek to realize a breakthrough in this field.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs again underlines the increasing emotional character of
the difficulties in the Netherlands. The campaign against the neutron bomb was initially
started on the communist side but has since been taken up by other groups. At the
moment a large majority of Parliament is concerned about the prospect of a new wave in
the area of nuclear weapons, regardless of the form it takes.

The Vice-President recalls that he himself has agitated against anti-ballistic missile
systems. Today he has to state to be glad to have lost this struggle. If the U.S. had not
developed ABM the Soviets would have continued unilaterally in this area. The U.S.
would then have had to take compensating measures later. The result is that now a
balance has been established at the cost of 5 billion dollars, which otherwise would have
cost 75 billion dollars. He did not expect however that from the American side a
connection would be made between Enhanced Radiation Weapons and modernization of
Theater Nuclear Forces and therefore did not foresee any reason for concern for the
Netherlands.

The Prime-Minister notes that the time has not come yet for a decision on the
modernization of TNF. One statement does need to be made by him in all clarity: the
modernization of TNF could not even give the impression that the role of nuclear
weapons systems is being increased. The Dutch government would argue for certain
shifts within the area of TNF. The number of warheads could not be increased and he
hoped very much that an approach like that would prove to be possible.

The Vice-President states that the U.S. in principle certainly is not inclined against the
reduction of nuclear arms. It wanted however to see the level go down on both sides. At
the same time the necessity of modernization remained, this as a result of the West being
behind. Naturally there was a connection to the question of arms reduction in a more
general sense. The urgent issue of modernization would preferably be approached in
connection with the general matter usually referred to as détente.

The Prime-Minister notes again that he has not stated any personal opinions. He has
painted for the Vice-President a precise picture of existing moods in the Netherlands and
of the limits of the possibilities which manifest themselves for his government.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs adds to this that there is still a majority in Parliament that
recognizes that nuclear arms remain necessary, but that the preference of this majority is
for the concentration of efforts toward a few weapons-types. As far as the air force was
concerned there was no problem yet, neither for the Lance; nuclear artillery however was
doubtful already. It was absolutely mandatory to maintain this majority, but in order to
achieve this it would be necessary to be able to demonstrate that in overall terms a reduction and not an increase of nuclear arms was envisioned.

The Vice-President says to know from his parliamentary experience that time can often be gained by bringing several points together in one package. Could the Dutch Government not keep things quiet by emphasizing as much as possible the connection between détente/arms reduction and modernization? He acknowledged that discussions between the Netherlands and the U.S. about the entire complex of issues ought to be much closer. On the American side there had been a beginning already with the intensification of these discussions.

The Vice-President next asked for the Dutch opinion on the membership of the Nuclear Planning Group.

The Prime-Minister recalls that around this time discussions take place in Miami between the Ministers of Defense, where this subject is on the agenda. The issue is that circumstances have changed since the Netherlands accepted a rotating membership of the NPG years ago. Then nuclear armaments were practically entirely of a strategic nature; Theater Nuclear Forces at the most were at a beginning level. As a result of technological developments and increased emotional involvements, a country like the Netherlands nowadays felt connected territorially in every respect to the question of nuclear armament and its consequences. Hardly a week passed without the government having to answer questions in Parliament about nuclear issues. It had become essential now for the Netherlands to be involved in a credible way to all sides and in every respect with allied decisionmaking on nuclear arms. There was an additional aspect of a practical political nature. The current Dutch Minister of Defense enjoyed great respect in Parliament. But he would have to be able to demonstrate therefore to be able to achieve something vis-a-vis the allies. On this issue seen by the entire nation as so important, he had to be spared a defeat.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs gives several examples of the important contributions which the Dutch Government has made to allied defense and its modernization: the nuclearization of the Lance, the ordering of large numbers of new tanks, the ordering of navy aircraft, modernization and renovation in other areas. Against this background the Netherlands really should be able to claim a role in the overall thinking and decisionmaking process, especially in the most sensitive area.

The Vice-President says to be impressed by the Dutch presentation and promises to take up the issue of a revision of the membership of the NPG with Secretary of Defense Brown, in the sense that the Netherlands could become a member.

[next, there was a discussion of the Middle East; the meeting concluded with a brief comment by the Prime-Minister about a recent statement by Finnish President Kekkonen]
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ACTION H-03

1. SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR AND MEMBERS OF THE SENATOR’S STAFF, MET WITH UNDERSECRETARY OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ADOLFO BATTAGLIA ON FRIDAY MORNING, JUNE 29. FOLLOWING THE DISCUSSION AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THE PARTY CALLED ON MINISTER OF DEFENSE ATILIO RUFFINI. THIS MESSAGE REPORTS THE SENATOR’S CONVERSATIONS WITH BOTH HIGH ITALIAN OFFICIALS.

2. SENATOR BYRD TOLD UNDERSECRETARY BATTAGLIA (WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HEAD OF MFA DISARMAMENT OFFICE FERRETTI) THAT BEFORE VISITING MOSCOW HE WAS MAKING ONLY ONE STOP AND THAT IN ROME. HE WISHED IN SO DOING TO UNDERSCORE HIS APPRECIATION FOR ITALY’S SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. HE POSED FOUR QUESTIONS: (1) HOW DOES ITALY VIEW THE SALT II TREATY; (2) HOW DOES ITALY VIEW THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS; (3) HOW DOES ITALY VIEW THE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE (TNF) MODERNIZATION QUESTION; AND (4) WHAT IS ITALY’S VIEW OF THE TURKISH PROBLEM.

3. SALT II - BATTAGLIA, IN REPLY TO THE SENATOR’S FIRST
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QUESTION, STATED THAT ITALY SUPPORTS THE SALT II TREATY; IT HAS NO PROBLEM WHATSOEVER WITH IT. WHILE THE AGREE-

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE SELLIN
DATE/CASE ID: 17 MAY 2002 200200765

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MENT COULD BE CRITICIZED ON SOME POINTS, IT IS A GREAT
IMPROVEMENT OVER HAVING NOTHING. ITALY HOPES, HE
CONTINUED, THAT THE SENATE WILL APPROVE THE TREATY AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE. DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS TWO ISSUES,
THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE AND THE CRUISE MISSILE
PROTOCOL, HAD WORRIED THE ITALIANS, BUT BOTH HAD BEEN
RESOLVED. THE ITALIANS WERE PLEASED WITH THE U.S.
STATEMENT ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION. THEY FEELT, HOWEVER,
THAT ITS REAFFIRMATION BY THE SENATE WOULD BE HELPFUL.
THE PROTOCOL PRESENTED NO DIFFICULTIES. IT SHOULD NOT
BE PROLONGED, AND A SENATE RESOLUTION IN THAT REGARD
WOULD NOT BE TAKEN AMISS BY THE GOI. BATTAGLIA COM-
MENTED THAT ITALY IS NOT WORRIED ABOUT THE VERIFICATION
PROBLEM. HE ADDED THAT THE SALT TREATY IS VERY MUCH IN
THE USSR'S OWN INTEREST, AND HENCE THE SOVIET UNION
WOULD NOT RISK VIOLATING THE TREATY SECRETLY.

4. AMBASSADOR GARDNER ASKED BATTAGLIA FOR HIS VIEW OF
ITALIAN REACTIONS SHOULD THE TREATY NOT BE RATIFIED OR
BE RATIFIED WITH Eviscerating AMENDMENTS. BATTAGLIA
REPLIED THAT THAT WOULD BE A "DISASTER." "YOU COULD NOT
Find," HE REMARKED, "A POLITICIAN IN ITALY OR IN EUROPE
WHO WOULD VIEW SUCH AN OUTCOME POSITIVELY." DETENTE,
IN THAT EVENT, HE THOUGHT, WOULD BE STYMIED AND THE
GERMANS COULD BE PROVOKED INTO DANGEROUS ADVENTURES WITH
THE EAST.

5. SALT III. BATTAGLIA HAD COMMENTED EARLIER IN THE
CONVERSATION THAT IF ITALY SAW ANY PROBLEMS AT ALL WITH
THE SALT II TREATY THEY WERE IN CONNECTION WITH ITS
SUCCESSOR NEGOTIATION, SALT III. IN THOSE FOLLOW-ON

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TALKS, HE ADDED, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR EUROPE TO
PLAY A GREATER ROLE THAN IT HAD IN SALT II -- A ROLE
WHICH WOULD ENABLE IT TO INFLUENCE THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE
SUGGESTED THAT GIVEN EUROPEAN CONCERN WITH SALT III, THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AD HOC GROUP OF EUROPEAN ALLIES
LOCATED IN THE CITY WHERE THE NEGOTIATIONS TAKE PLACE
MIGHT BE CONSIDERED. THAT GROUP WOULD THEN BE ABLE TO
CONSULT REGULARLY WITH ITS U.S. ALLY.

6. MBFR. BATTAGLIA HAD LITTLE TO SAY ON THE MBFR
NEGOTIATIONS EXCEPT TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF RESOLVING
THE DATA BASE QUESTION AND TO INSIST ON COLLECTIVE TROOP
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7. TNI. ITALY FAVORS TNI MODERNIZATION, FAVORS A
SUBSTANTIAL MODERNIZATION PROPOSAL AND FAVORS A
SUBSTANTIAL ARMS CONTROL OFFER. SINCE, HE NOTED, THE
SALT AGREEMENT ACHIEVES A BALANCE IN STRATEGIC SYSTEMS,
THE IMBALANCE IN THEATER SYSTEMS BECOMES MORE WORRISOME.
WHILE THAT IS OF CONCERN, ANY MOVEMENT TOWARDS DE-
COUPLING SHOULD BE AVOIDED. ITALIAN POLICY WITH REGARD
TO TNI DEPLOYMENT IS STILL NOT FINALIZED. THE GOVERN-
MENT REGARDS DEPLOYMENT A NECESSITY "FROM A TECHNICAL
POINT OF VIEW" BUT HAS NOT TAKEN A DECISION ON IT FROM
A "POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW."

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8. IN A MORE TECHNICAL VEIN, HE ADDED THAT ITALY WAS
MORE CONCERNED OVER THE SS-20 THAN OVER THE BACKFIRE
BOMBER. WHILE HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO GET
THE SOVIETS TO RENOUNCE THE SS-20'S, PERHAPS NEGOTI-
ATIONS COULD INDUCE THEM TO SET CEILINGS ON THE
MISSILE'S DEPLOYMENT.

9. TURKEY: ITALY WAS FOR VARIOUS HISTORICAL AND
GEOGRAPHICAL REASONS CONSIDERABLY WORRIED ABOUT THE
COURSE OF EVENTS IN TURKEY. THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT, HE
MENTIONED, HAD GRANTED $40 MILLION WORTH OF CREDITS TO

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10. SENATOR BYRD OPENED HIS CONVERSATION WITH MINISTER OF DEFENSE RUFINI (WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY GENERAL PISANO, THE ITALIAN MOD DELEGATE TO THE NPG) BY PAYING TRIBUTE TO ITALY'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATO AND TO RUFINI'S PERSONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THAT PARTICIPATION. HE ASKED THE SAME QUESTIONS OF RUFINI AS HE HAD OF UNDERSECRETARY BATTAGLIA.

11. SALT. RUFINI REITERATED THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT FOR APPROVAL OF THE SALT II TREATY. HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE "FOLLY" FOR THE SENATE TO FAIL TO CONFIDENTIAL.

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RATIFY IT. WHY? FIRST BECAUSE POLITICALLY SALT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN DETENTE. SECOND, MILITARILY SALT SERVED THE REAL INTERESTS OF THE WEST. RUFINI NOTED A RECENT ARTICLE IN "LE FIGARO" WHICH REPORTED THAT EVEN THE FRENCH VIEW SALT II POSITIVELY. THE CRUISE MISSILE PROTOCOL WAS NOT A CAUSE OF CONCERN TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT.

12. ON THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE, HE ECHOED THE LINE AND THE SUGGESTIONS OF HIS FOREIGN MINISTRY COLLEAGUE, SAYING THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO STRESS THE ASSURANCES ALREADY GIVEN THAT SALT WILL NOT SET OBSTACLES IN THE PATH OF MILITARY COOPERATION AMONGST THE ALLIES. HE HINTED THAT A SENATE STATEMENT ALONG THOSE LINES WOULD BE WELCOME.

13. TNF. THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT FEELS THAT TNF MODERNIZATION IS VERY MUCH NEEDED FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW TO BALANCE THE SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR BUILD-UP, FROM A POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW, HOWEVER, THE GOI HAD NOT YET TAKEN A DECISION ON DEPLOYMENT. HE ADDED, BY WAY OF EXPLANATION, THAT PARLIAMENT HAD BEEN DISSOLVED UNTIL JUNE 20, NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN ELECTIONS HAD OCCURRED; FOR THOSE AND OTHER EASONS, ITALIAN PUBLIC OPINION IS NOT PREPARED, HOWEVER, AND THAT PREPARATION MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE GREAT SENSITIVITY OF ALL NUCLEAR MATTERS IN THIS COUNTRY. THE EXPLANATION MUST BE WELL DONE AND WELL COORDINATED AMONGST ALL THE ALLIES. AT ALL COSTS, HE UNDERLINED, WE MUST AVOID A REPETITION OF THE N-BOMB AFFAIR. HE EMPHASIZED THAT A UNANIMOUS
DECISION ON TNF MODERNIZATION WAS CRUCIAL. HE REFERRED TO SIGNS OF DISCONTENT IN NORWAY AND DENMARK, WHOSE POSITION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THEIR COUNTRIES IS WELL KNOWN. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE ALLIANCE NEEDS TO TAKE A UNANIMOUS POLITICAL DECISION IN FAVOR OF DEPLOYMENT. ONCE THAT IS TAKEN BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS CAN THEN ENSUE ON DEPLOYMENT MODALITIES.

14. TURKEY. ITALY AS A MEMBER OF NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK WAS SERIOUSLY CONCERNED WITH TURKISH DIFFICULTIES. ITALY RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL AID TO ANKARA. TURKEY'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FRAILTIES POSED MOST SERIOUS THREATS TO MEDITERRANEAN AND ALLIANCE SECURITY.

15. COMMENT. SENATOR BYRD MADE CLEAR TO BOTH OFFICIALS THAT SENATE RATIFICATION OF SALT WAS BY NO MEANS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION. END COMMENT.

16. THIS CABLE WAS CLEARED BY SENATOR BYRD.
GARDNER
SECRET

July 12, 1979.

His Excellency
Andreas van Agt
Prime Minister of the Netherlands
The Hague

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Alliance consultations on theater nuclear forces have reached a stage where I believe it would be useful to supplement those consultations with bilateral discussions. Accordingly, I would like to send my personal emissary on these issues, David Aaron, to meet with you or with your appropriate Cabinet members the week of July 16, 1979. He will also consult with the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the United Kingdom.

Alliance consultations so far reveal a broad consensus that Soviet nuclear efforts, especially such long-range theater nuclear forces as the SS-20, pose a military and political challenge to the Alliance. To meet this challenge, the Alliance needs to modernize by deploying long-range nuclear systems in Europe capable of reaching Soviet territory, and by being prepared to negotiate viable arms control agreements. This would demonstrate Alliance unity, strengthen the spectrum of deterrence, and maintain the perception in both East and West of a firm U.S. and Allied commitment to the defense of Europe.

TNF modernization can only be undertaken on the basis of Alliance consensus, and broad participation in this effort. It will require steadfastness and determination to obtain an Alliance consensus on theater nuclear modernization and arms control, which I hope can be achieved by the end of the year. The work of the High Level Group on TNF Modernization and the Special Group on TNF Arms Control is putting the Alliance in a position where such decisions are possible.

SECRET
I am ready to do my part to lead the Alliance to a consensus, but I will need your support. David Aaron will be prepared to discuss with you in detail our thoughts on how a common Alliance TNF modernization and arms control approach can be achieved. In particular, he will be prepared to discuss possible specific roles which the Netherlands might play in Alliance TNF modernization. The U.S. has under development the weapons systems appropriate for TNF modernization and is prepared both to suggest the force mix and to make the systems available. On the basis of his discussions with you, we can move forward with full Alliance consideration leading to concrete TNF modernization and arms control decisions.

Sincerely,

/s/ Jimmy Carter
The Soviets may try to preempt the anticipated NATO proposal for theater nuclear arms control, due this December, with a prior initiative of their own. Their aim will be to rally West European opposition to NATO plans to deploy new long-range theater systems. Moscow likely will calculate that, to have the desired political appeal, the initial Soviet proposal should be simple in content and focus on first steps, not ultimate outcomes.

Moscow might open with a proposal to freeze deployment (but not production) "in Europe" of all new types of missiles of more than, say, 1,000-km. range. This freeze might be agreed by the conference of all CSCE participants on "military detente" that the Warsaw Pact has already suggested should meet this year. After taking this concrete first step, the participants should then, in Moscow's view, negotiate comprehensive reductions of nuclear weapons in Europe.

The impracticality of this proposal (impossibility of serious negotiations among 35 participants; likely NATO rejection) would be irrelevant to Moscow's immediate purposes—to throw sand in NATO's decisionmaking machinery by offering negotiations as a plausible alternative to new nuclear deployments in Western Europe. And NATO could decline the invitation only at political cost, given its likely appeal to many smaller prospective participants, inside and outside the Alliance.
If this postulated opening gambit failed, Moscow likely would fall back fairly promptly (but with a show of reluctance) to the bilateral (US-USSR) negotiating mode—which most NATO members currently prefer for theater nuclear arms control.Stubborn insistence on Soviet procedural preferences would become self-defeating, on the premise that the USSR will see arms control talks as a promising means to slow or block new NATO deployments.

Whatever the precise form of Moscow’s opening arms control move, it will be fashioned to advance basic Soviet objectives: to protect deployment programs of the new Soviet systems, especially the SS-20; to seize the political/propaganda high ground on the theater nuclear force issue; and to impede the development of an added NATO long-range theater nuclear capability.

Moscow probably has not yet sorted out its thinking on the best tactical means to these ends; there are signs of muddle in the Soviet leaders’ efforts to position themselves to deal with the problem. They have, for the first time, agreed that their medium-range nuclear forces, including the SS-20 and the Backfire, could be the subject of arms control negotiations (e.g., Brezhnev’s speech of March 2). Brezhnev in March asserted that the bargain should cover US forward-based systems (FBS) in Europe, but Gromyko in June reiterated that US FBS must figure in SALT III. Yet Brezhnev implied a preference for keeping theater nuclear negotiations outside the SALT framework, although he did not say what the alternative forum should be or who should participate.

Moscow is doubtless even further from resolving the basic substantive complexities of theater nuclear arms control: interface between central and peripheral nuclear systems; interface between longer and shorter range theater weaponry; global vs. regional approach; and formulas for covering PRC, French, and UK forces. These uncertainties about ultimate outcomes give Moscow added reasons for making a simple opening move in the European context, shaped to address the immediate problem without foreclosing longer term options.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Scope

Moscow recognizes that NATO may well decide in December to: 1) deploy long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF--land-based systems capable of striking well into the USSR from Western Europe); and 2) propose arms control negotiations about those forces and comparable Soviet nuclear weaponry targeted on NATO Europe (particularly the new SS-20 missile and the Backfire bomber). The Soviets have already begun, in official statements and media commentary, to position themselves for that eventuality. No doubt they are reflecting on their own arms control proposal to preempt or respond to whatever NATO decides to put forward.

This paper:

--describes Moscow's current posture on theater nuclear force (TNF)* arms control;

--sets out basic Soviet objectives that will determine Moscow's approach;

--assesses, against that background, possible Soviet gambits prior to or during the opening rounds of any TNF arms control talks; but

--does not attempt to estimate the detailed Soviet negotiating position that would unfold as such talks progressed.

3. Current Soviet Posture

In authoritative statements to date, the Soviets have:

--agreed that their medium-range nuclear forces, including the SS-20 and the Backfire, could be the subject of arms control negotiations.

* Note on terminology: This paper uses the term "long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF)" to describe NATO weapons systems--existing or projected, capable of hitting the USSR from Western Europe--and the analogous Soviet forces (especially the SS-20 and Backfire), which have been at the center of current controversy and debate. The shorter label of "theater nuclear forces" is employed in the arms control context to conform with general usage and in recognition of the fact that arms control negotiations may eventually treat shorter range systems as well.
indicated indirectly a preference for holding the negotiations outside the SALT III framework but have not categorically refused to open them in a bilateral SALT context; yet

not said what the forum should be or who should take part; and

made conflicting statements about how the subject matter should be addressed.

It appears that Moscow has not yet sorted out its thinking on the form and content of eventual TNF talks.

The first expression of willingness to negotiate about Soviet LRTNF was elicited from Brezhnev by FRG Chancellor Schmidt during the former's visit to Bonn in May 1978. Brezhnev's statement was in response to FRG anxiety, conveyed to him by Schmidt, over new Soviet LRTNF deployments, the Backfire bomber, and the mobile SS-20. Those private assurances to Schmidt were later confirmed in Brezhnev's public statements. In Prague, shortly after his talks with Schmidt, Brezhnev said publicly, but without specific reference to LRTNF:

"There is no type of armaments which the USSR would not be ready to limit, to ban on a mutual basis...on condition of full reciprocity of the states possessing respective armaments."

The Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee made essentially the same points in its declaration of November 1978.

Brezhnev picked up this theme in his electoral speech of March 2, 1979, but this time he directly linked the matter to prospective NATO LRTNF deployments. He reiterated that the USSR would reduce nuclear weapons "on the basis of complete reciprocity," adding, "this concerns also medium-range weapons in Europe, but with due account, of course, for the existence there of American military bases as well."

Neither Brezhnev's statements nor other official Soviet commentary have said what Moscow would expect to take part in such negotiations. But the sequence of topics in Brezhnev's March 2 speech—first SALT, then MBFR, then the TNF issue—suggests that the bilateral SALT framework is not Moscow's preferred forum for negotiations. Later, the Soviets apparently were more explicit on this point. Gromyko told Schmidt, during the Chancellor's stopover in Moscow in late June 1979, en route to Tokyo, that the SS-20 should not be negotiated in
SALT III because it was not a strategic weapon as defined in SALT I—this according to several FRG accounts of the conversation.

While Soviet statements have been vague on the forum, they have been contradictory on the content of any TNF negotiations. Soviet spokesmen have long insisted that US foreign-based systems must figure on the SALT III agenda—a position confirmed by Gromyko during his press conference in Vienna after signature of SALT II. Yet Brezhnev’s March 8 speech, together with Gromyko’s reported remark to Schmidt on the SS-20, points instead toward a bargain of Soviet ICBMF for US PBS.

It is barely conceivable that the Soviets would divide US PBS into two segments, proposing to negotiate about some of these systems in SALT III and others in the still unspecified TNF forum. More likely, Moscow has not yet thoroughly thought its way through the issue.

To fill in the remainder of this blurred picture, authoritative Soviet spokesmen have also said repeatedly that, at some (undefined) point, other nuclear powers must also participate in SALT III—a position Gromyko confirmed during his Vienna summit press conference. The underlying military rationale undoubtedly is that Moscow sees the level of Soviet central systems as a function partly of the French, UK, and PRC nuclear forces (as well as of US PBS) capable of reaching the USSR. Yet the level of Soviet peripheral attack systems also relates to the level of those same adversary forces. (These issues are treated in more detail in Section III below.)

... Soviet tactical options

Moscow will have several tactical choices to make in fashioning its opening TNF arms control position including whether:

-- to take the initiative or to adopt a reactive stance, waiting to see what NATO comes up with before making a first move;

-- in either case, to open with a comprehensive draft arms control process or to move a simpler initial offer, perhaps as a first step in a longer process; and

-- with respect to forum, to keep pressing for a multi-national framework or to settle for bilateral US-Sov.

The US spokesmen apparently prefer:

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The Soviet leaders will make their choices in light both of their basic objectives, described in Section II below, and of their analysis of the inherent complexities of the problems, dealt with in Section III.

II. SOVIET OBJECTIVES

In rough order of priority, Soviet objectives are for:

A) keep open Soviet LRTNF deployment plans;

B) block, delay, or reduce the extent of any new NATO LRTNF deployments; and

C) (partly to further B above) seize the political/propaganda high ground.

A. To Protect Soviet LRTNF Options

Deployment of both the SS-20 and the Backfire responds to deep-seated and traditional Soviet views about defense of the homeland. Moscow's calculus begins with the premise, that NATO has superiority, in technology, industrial base, and manpower. It follows that, if war breaks out, the Soviets should have, in their view, forces powerful enough to overrun NATO Europe quickly, before latent Western strength can be mobilized and brought to bear militarily.

Early destruction of NATO's nuclear potential and other key targets in Western Europe will be crucial, in Soviet thinking, to early success of the Warsaw Pact ground offensive. There is good evidence that the Soviets assume that a period of tension and crisis would precede a major European conflict. They also calculate that NATO would use the political and strategic warning time to disperse targets and bring its air defenses, which the Soviet military regards as effective, to a high state of readiness.

Thus Soviet planners lack high confidence that their attack aircraft could effectively penetrate NATO defenses in the crucial central region, acquire and destroy their targets given the inherent difficulty of target acquisition in the low-level attack mode, and recover to home bases without heavy losses.

But should the initial, conventional air offensive fall well short of accomplishing its mission, and also suffer
heavy losses, the Warsaw Pact ground offensive would be in grave jeopardy. (The evidence suggests that a Soviet attack on NATO Europe would be conventional, rather than nuclear, in its initial phase. The Soviets probably have little confidence that the fighting, once begun, would remain at the conventional level. They nevertheless have an obvious self-interest in keeping the battle below the nuclear threshold if at all possible and apparently have geared their war planning accordingly.)

The Soviets’ risk assessment with respect to the initial air offensive, cited above, gives them compelling reasons to improve the quality of their attack aircraft (hence backfire, among other new, higher capability models) and to deploy more effective nuclear missilery (the SS-20) for peripheral attack missions. The SS-20 provides, in Soviet thinking, an essential insurance factor to be called upon to destroy NATO’s theater nuclear potential if the Soviet air offensive falls short. Recognizing the uncertainty of target location in many cases (e.g., mobile Lance and Pershing missiles), Soviet planning apparently involves nuclear barrage rather than point attacks.

Hence the perceived Soviet need for large numbers of accurate, relatively high-yield reentry vehicles, which the SS-20 system especially is designed to provide (four missiles per transport erector launcher, three MIRV’s per missile, rapid reload capability, high-yield warheads). The Soviets, of course, also prize the relatively invulnerability of the mobile SS-20 to preemptive attack.

Western opinion reads these characteristics of the SS-20 as providing a threatening nuclear capability well beyond rational defensive needs. Moscow, however, sees the capacity quickly to overwhelm NATO as essential to homeland defense—and the SS-20 as a vital element of that capability.

Thus one may expect stout Soviet resistance to any proposed reductions in the Soviet SS-20 deployment program or to constraining demands upon it. And if NATO itself deploys new long-range systems in Europe, this will increase the set of targets that the Soviet military will believe it needs the capability to destroy. This judgment is not offered to contest the soundness of the NATO arguments that new Western deployments are militarily justified or that the prospect of such deployments is essential to the credibility of NATO arms control proposals covering this category of weapons. Rather, the estimate is that new NATO deployments will tend to increase Soviet’s likely considerable resistance to curtail SS-20 deployments much below the planned level. If at that level
may be) and could even drive upward the number currently considered sufficient.

Much of the same reasoning applies to Backfire. As a multipurpose system, however, Backfire presents a more complex case, for reasons addressed in section III.

B. To Impede or Delay New NATO Deployments

The Soviets see NATO moving toward a possible decision by year's end to deploy new nuclear systems in Western Europe capable of striking the western USSR. Their media commentary on the NATO spring ministerials showed an uncharacteristically accurate reading of the tenor of the LRTNF discussions, the decisions they foreshadowed, and the hesitancy that still persists in some Allied countries.

Yet the tone of Soviet media commentary has stayed in the middle register, deploring NATO's allegedly misguided militarism but avoiding shrill denunciation. Why such moderation? Partly, no doubt, because (in contrast to the enhanced radiation weapons episode) no large and vocal body of Western opinion has so far emerged to attack the proposed deployments. Possibly also, Moscow simply is resigned to something it regards as inevitable. It is more likely, however, that Soviet restraint on this issue reflects both a disinclination to roll the waters before the US Senate finishes the SALT II debate and a calculated decision to hold back a while longer to see whether NATO can work its way around the nervous reticence within some member-states.

In any event, Moscow probably recognizes that a decision in principle to deploy would be one thing, actual deployment quite another, and that in the interim, there would be time to forestall, delay, or reduce the extent of the latter.

Thus, the Soviets likely will remain alert for any opportunity to retard or block the actual deployments. They undoubtedly will put forward in due course an arms control proposal designed to strengthen the hand of NATO's "doves," who prefer negotiation to deployment (see below for further discussion).

The Soviets have both political and military reasons for trying to hold off NATO's projected additions to its nuclear arsenal. Historically, the USSR has always shown particular sensitivity toward nuclear deployments in the FRG, even if the systems are "owned" and have no "German finger on the trigger." And the Soviets cannot assume that, if NATO's
Militarily, new NATO/LRTNF-current American missiles of extended-range Pershing ballistic missiles and Gallin-launched cruise missiles (GLCM's). Although a Soviet cruise missile component is not excluded, there is capability for deep interdiction strikes against Soviet reinforce-ments moving from the western military districts toward the central front. The Soviets assume, in the event of a future conflict, that the ground forces bearing the brunt of the initial Warsaw Pact assault would quickly infiltrate the civilianities. They would therefore rely on rapid reinforcement by fresh units from the USSR to sustain the momentum of the offensive. The Soviets of course would have no effective defense against extended-range Pershing ballistic missiles and virtually none, for several years at least, against cruise missiles.

One can only speculate on how much weight the Soviet military would ascribe to the incremental addition to NATO's capacity in this area. It probably reckons that nuclear strikes designed to slow Soviet reinforcement of the central front already figure in SACEUR's General Strike Plan and in the US SIOP.

Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that Soviet military threat analysis tends to make worst-case assumptions about NATO capabilities. Moreover, the new systems (if deployed) would add an array of relatively mobile targets to what the Soviet military probably considers an already formidable NATO Europe target list. Finally, Moscow may have an uneasy sense that NATO is now preparing, for the first time, to confront the USSR on a terrain (land-based theater nuclear weaponry of longer range) where the Soviet advantage had previously gone unchallenged.

Hence one may conclude that the Soviets would ascribe a far more significant significance to NATO's projected new systems—even though the numbers of warheads (1000-5000) now being considered by the Allies for these forces does not appear that formidable to the US military, or even the US military war planners.

Once a deployment decision is taken, Moscow undoubtedly will act with flair and élanment to sap Allied military and political support for the projected increase in NATO's
LRTNF. The Soviets will bluster about the dangers to peace and the added military risks to candidate host countries while simultaneously putting forward arms control proposals that would allegedly remove any political or military stale for the new systems.

C. To Seize Political High Ground

This objective will be essential, in Soviet terms, due to the carefully nurtured climate of European defense, in which the regime already has a very considerable investment, and to a strategy of undercutting NATO's projected interests in LRTNF. An arms control proposal probably will become the centerpiece of this effort. Soviet media tirelessly recite the inventory of the regime's "peace initiatives" which already clutter the international and European political agendas. The Kremlin undoubtedly will concoct a peace initiative to fit this issue, by conditioned reflex as much as from rational calculation of political advantage.

III. COMPLEXITIES OF THE PROBLEM, AS SEEN FROM MOSCOW

The analysis that follows suggests that Moscow will prefer to open with a simple, straightforward initiative, contrived to appear as a plausible first step in a long-term negotiation, rather than with the outline of a comprehensive "solution." The almost intractable substantive complexities of TNF arms control will likely persuade Moscow that the simpler the opening gambit, the more effectively it will serve Soviet purposes.

A. The LRTNF-Central Systems Interface

Moscow cannot easily separate, either for military threat analysis or for arms control purposes, the peripheral nuclear strike forces—those deployed by the Soviets and those aimed at the USSR—from US and Soviet central systems. In fact, the very notion of theater as distinct from global conflict is alien to Soviet historical experience. The Russian homeland was very nearly overrun during two "theater" wars in this century.

Moreover, some Soviet central systems are assigned peripheral, not intercontinental targets. Hence, substantial cuts in Soviet central systems would, in Moscow's view, require commensurate reductions in US central systems.
and in the peripheral systems targeted or the more constituent, increases in adversary peripheral systems would add to the military requirements placed upon Soviet central systems, peripheral systems, or both.

Yet the Soviet arms control apparatus was, perhaps, pressed to produce in short order even the broad outlines of a comprehensive proposal striking an ostensibly more balanced among the widely divergent security interests in their weapons systems of all the nuclear powers. The apparent fusion between Brezhnev's recently suggested trade of Soviet LRTNF for US PBS, outside SALT III, and Gromyko's insistence shortly thereafter that the latter systems must figure in SALT III, suggests that systematic analysis of the matter at a politically relevant level had hardly begun in Moscow.

B. The Interface Between LRTNF and Shorter Range Theater Systems

Once arms control negotiations begin to deal with theater nuclear systems, there is no logical stopping place anywhere along the range spectrum—between, for example, the SS-20 at one end and the FROG missile (organic to Soviet divisions; range about 70 km.) at the other. Each system can wreak enormous havoc and decimate large cities. Any cutoff point, based on operational range, automatically establishes an invidious distinction between the populated areas within and those outside the "privileged" zones thus created. Moreover, a state that is party to agreed constraints on LRTNF might circumvent those limitations by increases in its shorter range weaponry.

Any comprehensive proposal for LRTNF limits probably would have to address this circumvention issue, at least in rough outline, yet there is no evidence that Moscow has even begun to reflect seriously on the matter. Admittedly, the problem is more troublesome for Western (and Eastern) Europeans than for the Soviets; few of NATO's shorter range, land-based systems can effectively reach the USSR.

C. Whose Forces Should Be Counted?

This question would arise immediately if Moscow ultimately decided to accept a bilateral negotiating forum for theater nuclear forces. Specific rules or general criteria for dealing with the forces of the nonparticipant nuclear powers would be exceptionally difficult to devise. Any conceivable concrete Soviet proposal for resolving this problem would be subject to challenge over its database (in the
case of PRC forces) and over the criteria for judging the military weight of disparate national systems.

The Soviets probably would see that in the United States as a settlement that would deal seriously with this problem. To them, a conventional arms control proposal, the effort would lead them into further, unproductive confusion and controversy—rather than toward the psychological high ground they would prefer to occupy.

D. Regional Constraints vs. National Inventories

Dealing with TNF arms control regionally rather than globally would simplify matters in some respects and complicate them in others. PRC and Soviet far eastern forces would not be directly addressed, but the puzzle of how to treat French and UK forces would remain.

Moreover, Soviet planners would also recognize that a regional approach, if presented as a long-term solution, would lack credibility because their own aircraft could be flown very quickly from the far eastern to the western military districts of the USSR, or even into Eastern Europe (and American aircraft from CONUS to the European theater). The missiles in question (the SS-20 and probably the extended-range Pershing plus GLCM on the Western side) are also mobile but, as a general rule, would take more time and effort to move over long distances than aircraft.

Another problem the Soviets might foresee in the inclusion of aircraft would be disputes over the counting rule applying to their own medium-range models. They would doubtless wish to exclude, and expect the West to insist on including, Backfires (as well as the older Badgers and Blinders) assigned to Soviet Naval Aviation. Those aircraft have external characteristics not significantly different from aircraft of the same model assigned to Soviet Long-Range Aviation, with a primarily land attack role.

Yet a proposed long-term regional "solution" without aircraft would be open to challenge because it left out of account so much of each side's nuclear potential.

... ... ... ...

If the above description of the likely evolution of Soviet thinking on TNF arms control comes fairly close to the mark, then Moscow will be tempted to evade the more rubber-stampable problems by deferring them. The Soviets would
see more immediate political advantage in a limited but appealing first step that could be taken soon, coupled with a commitment to good faith but necessarily non-binding subsequent negotiations on a comprehensive TNF arms control package.

IV. LIKELY INITIAL SOVIET POSTURE

A. Assumptions

This discussion assumes that either NATO will take a decision in principle to deploy new LRTNF or that Moscow, in all probability, will judge such a decision to be imminent. The Soviets would then take it as given that NATO would, at minimum, simultaneously proclaim its desire for early TNF arms control negotiations or even accompany announcement of the deployment decision with the outline of an arms control approach.

B. Soviet Tactics

Under these circumstances, the Soviets would almost certainly try to seize the initiative by preempting NATO and putting forward first their own arms control proposal (for reasons set out in Section III). Failing that, Moscow would wish at least to respond promptly to the NATO arms control offer.

The Soviet proposal would almost certainly be uncomplicated in substance and portrayed as a first step in a longer negotiating process. A more specific and comprehensive arms control scheme, foreshadowing an outcome consonant with ultimate Soviet military objectives, would unavoidably stir up considerable controversy. Most Western capitals would find much to quarrel with in it.

But the Soviets, in advancing their proposal, would try not to touch off an East-West controversy. Rather, they would aim at intensifying the internal West European debate on the immediate issue of whether NATO's LRDN weapons development—deployment-deployment process need begin before arms control possibilities have been thoroughly explored. Moscow probably would reason that this could best be accomplished by a proposal that contained enough details to be enticing, but not enough to provoke distracting arguments, and which focused in first steps, not ultimate outcomes.
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C. What Forum?

The Soviets would certainly prefer to negotiate on theater nuclear arms control in a broader than bilateral forum. They have said that they cannot continue the SALT process indefinitely with the US alone. Given the military overlay between central and peripheral systems, this preference no doubt would extend to arms control talks dealing with theater weaponry. (The Soviets have implied, as noted in Section I, that these talks should have their own procedural identity, distinct from the SALT process.)

Theoretically, four options are available:

1. A broad multilateral conference (e.g., all CSCE participants);
2. A five-power conference (US, USSR, France, UK, PRC);
3. A four-power conference (the above, less the PRC);

Moscow's position of record favors 2, implies a preference for 2 over 3, and has prepared the ground, at least, for opening with 1.

Moscow might see advantages in a "nuclear CSCE," calculating that the presence of the neutrals and non-aligned and NATO's "Joves" (the Netherlands and the Scandinavian members) plus, of course, all the Warsaw Pact states, would assure a tilt in the "right" direction. Indeed, the Soviets have already called for a conference in 1979* of CSCE participants to discuss "military defense." They might welcome an opportunity to add a fresh and crucial issue to the rather stale agenda already suggested for that meeting.

*The CSCE is the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers meeting in Budapest last week.
The Soviets would recognize that a meeting of some 15 countries could do little or no serious negotiating. But this would be irrelevant to Moscow's purposes—the simulation of West European resistance to NATO-LRTNF deployment. And if NATO declined the invitation, it would bear the sense of excluding the smaller European governments from a discussion of important nuclear issues. A number of these governments, including some NATO members, would happily attend a gathering where they could exert some influence on nuclear arms control or at least be seen to be attempting to do so.

Thus NATO could not reject such an initiative except at some political cost. Yet participation by NATO members would slow, or perhaps arrest altogether, the momentum of the Allied LRTNF deployment program. The Soviets would not be unaware of the discomfort that such a proposal would cause on the Western side.

Moscow would also calculate that France would refuse to attend a nuclear CSCE; that the UK would also join the US in opposing it; and that, whatever their own inclinations, the smaller NATO powers would not take part in the absence of the larger ones. Even so, Moscow might decide to advance the proposal to demonstrate its own benign intentions and to throw some sand into NATO's LRTNF decision-making machinery.

A call for a five-power conference on theater nuclear issues would not impress the audience Moscow most wants to impress—the influential, serious-minded peace and disarmament constituencies in some West European countries. It is common knowledge that the PRC and France, and almost certainly the UK as well, would refuse to attend. Moreover, the Soviet arms control apparatus, one can safely assume, could not fashion the outlines of a persuasive limitations and reductions proposal to accompany the purely procedural initiative of suggesting that the conference convene. This would reinforce the inclination, in Western Europe, to dismiss the five-power conference idea as mere propaganda. Moscow probably is pursuing it only to realize this.

Each of these considerations would apply to any proposal for a European-based or unspecified LRTNF constraints for the European region. Given the current French attitudes, this seems unlikely to come to anything within the Western Pact.
the US-USSR bilateral mode, which most NATO members currently prefer. This judgment is based on the premise that the USSR will attach importance to blocking or slowing NATO deployments and will see arms control talks as a promising means to that end. Long and stubborn insistence on Moscow's procedural preferences would then become self-defeating.

Even so, the four options are not mutually exclusive and could be orchestrated into a single score, modulated to suit different circumstances. For example, an initial call for a broadly multilateral negotiation might have tactical and propaganda advantages. When that failed, stressing the need for a five- (or four-) power approach would help establish the USSR's claim to compensation for the forces of other nuclear powers—a claim Soviet negotiators would certainly press in any bilateral talks. By moving down the scale from broader to narrow forums, Moscow could dress up as concessions its recognition of reality.

Even after bilateral talks had begun, the multilateral themes would allow Moscow to go on dangling the prospect of ambitious nuclear disarmament programs, either in the European region or globally, if the absent nuclear powers agreed to join in. Finally, if the bilateral talks tended to focus on INF constraints applying to the European region (including the western USSR), this could alarm Peking and Tokyo. The two capitals might worry that any constraints that the Soviets accepted for the western USSR would be translated into even larger far eastern deployments of the systems concerned. In that case, Moscow could play its five-power conference mood music.

V. CONTENT OF A SOVIET ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL:
A FREEZE ON NEW MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS?

A. Description

Conceivably, the Soviets could call for:

--agreement to an immediate freeze on deployments "in Europe" of new types of land-based missiles of more than say, 1,000-km. conventional radius;

--subsequent negotiations on limitation and comprehensive reductions of all nuclear weapons and delivery systems in the European region.

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A move of this sort might, in Moscow's judgment, add confusion and perplexity within NATO. It would also:

-- put the USSR on the right side of the "peace" issue;

-- fit neatly with Moscow's general detente strategy, past disarmament proposals, and recent "peace initiatives";

-- serve as a rallying point for those, inside and outside certain Western European governments, who are uneasy about NATO's projected new deployments; and

-- give Moscow the diplomatic initiative and also room to maneuver in response to the reactions evoked by its opening gambit.

B. Analysis

This type of proposal would entail a Soviet decision to open with a regional rather than a global approach to theater nuclear arms control. It would play to the West European audience and address an immediate problem—NATO's LRTNF deployment plans. Yet it would close no doors and could be shaped in various ways, depending on the responses it stimulated.

It would be uncharacteristic of Moscow to neglect a chance to reaffirm the older, more ambitious disarmament initiatives cherished by the Soviet arms control bureaucracy and repeatedly blessed in high-level Soviet and Warsaw Pact pronouncements. Hence the judgment that Moscow would wish to couple its first-step proposal (the deployment freeze) with something pointing toward nother long-range "solutions."

1. Choice of Forum

It is possible, even likely, that Moscow would suggest a "nuclear CSCE" as the forum of choice. The procedural ground has been prepared (Warsaw Pact call for a meeting in 1979 of all CSCE participants to discuss military détente). The proposal would have enough political appeal to be troublesome for NATO. And it would avoid (in contrast to a call for a four-power conference) a direct challenge to the French, which would be out of harmony with Moscow's broader European policy.
2. System Coverage

The Soviets would justify the narrow scope of the freeze proposal by emphasizing that they were offering to halt deployments of the weapon system (the SS-20) that had raised much anxiety in the West. They might explain exclusions of medium-range bombers on the grounds that the mobility of aircraft raises difficult problems for a regionally focused negotiation, problems that would require lengthy discussions to resolve. The freeze was suggested merely as a prelude to broader negotiations, which could encompass aircraft as well as missiles.

3. Range

A limit fixed at about 1,000 kilometers would catch the extended-range Pershing and GLCM's, the central elements in the projected NATO program, and of course the SS-20 on the Soviet side. It might also constrain the SS-22, the follow-on version of the Sickleboard missile, but the Soviets seem to feel no pressure to accelerate the SS-22 program.

4. Area

The crucial issue would be the precise definition of "the European region" and how much of the USSR was covered by it. Brezhnev's public offer to negotiate about "medium-range" weapons systems implies necessarily the inclusion of some Soviet territory. Obviously, in the Soviet view, the less the better. The Soviets might open by proposing to define "Europe," for purposes of TNF arms control, as the area fixed in CSCE for prior notification of maneuvers (which, on the Soviet side, includes a band 250 kilometers in width along the western Soviet border). They might also hint at some flexibility here, recognizing that more Soviet territory would have to be covered to make the offer attractive to Western opinion.

5. Effects on the SS-20 Deployment Program

Under the proposal posited above, the effect would be null at the outset and perhaps quite limited over the longer run. In the first place, the proposal would ban deployment in the European region, but not production. Moreover, the Soviets could meet a deployment freeze to be approximated relatively in quantity, if in principle is the key to all negotiations. If talks began, Moscow could negotiate to limit tests or a variety of substantive or procedural measures. In all likelihood, it would continue until agreement

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was reached. Even then, a ban on European deployment would not, of itself, block production for deployment elsewhere.

The Soviets, of course, would not enter upon such talks expecting to have everything their way. They would recognize the possibility of reaching a point where they would have to choose between unacceptable constraints on their systems or no constraints on NATO. But that would be a problem of middle- or end-game strategy and should not deter the Soviets from the opening gambit postulated here.
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE NEGOTIATIONS: 
THE INITIAL SOVIET APPROACH

Page i, Paragraph 3

The impracticality of this proposal (impossibility of serious negotiations among 35 participants; likely NATO rejection) would be irrelevant to Moscow's immediate purposes—to throw sand in NATO's decisionmaking machinery by offering negotiations as a plausible alternative to new nuclear deployments in Western Europe. And NATO could decline the invitation only at political cost, given its likely appeal to many smaller prospective participants, inside and outside the alliance.
Moscow is doubtless even further from resolving the basic substantive complexities of theater nuclear arms control: interface between central and peripheral nuclear systems; interface between longer and shorter range theater weaponry; global vs. regional approach; and formulas for covering PRC, French, and UK forces. These uncertainties about ultimate outcomes give Moscow added reasons for making a simple opening move in the European context, shapes to address the immediate problems without foreclosing longer term options.
This paper:

--describes Moscow's current posture on theater nuclear force (TNF)* arms control;

--sets out basic Soviet objectives that will determine Moscow's approach;

--assesses, against that background, possible Soviet gambits, prior to or during the opening rounds of any TNF arms control talks; but

--does not attempt to estimate the detailed Soviet negotiating position that would unfold as such talks progressed.

3. Current Soviet Posture

In authoritative statements to date, the Soviets have:

--agreed that their medium-range nuclear forces, including the SS-20 and the Backfire, could be the subject of arms control negotiations.

Note on terminology: This paper uses the term "long-range theater nuclear forces" (LRTNF) to describe NATO weapons systems—existing or projected, capable of hitting the USSR from NATO Europe—and the analogous Soviet forces (especially the SS-20 and Backfire), which have been at the center of recent controversy and debate. The shorter label of "theater nuclear forces" is employed in the arms control context to conform with general [illeg] and in recognition of the fact that arms control negotiations may eventually treat shorter [illeg] systems [illeg].
Neither Brezhnev's statements nor other official Soviet commentary have said whom Moscow would expect to take part in such negotiations. But the sequence of topics in Brezhnev's March 2 speech—first SALT, then MBFR, then the TNF issue—suggests that the bilateral SALT framework is not Moscow's preferred forum for negotiations. Later, the Soviets apparently were more explicit on this point. Gromyko told Schmidt, during the Chancellor's stopover in Moscow in late June 1979, en route to Tokyo. That the SS-20 should not be negotiated in
Soviet tactical options

Moscow will have several tactical choices to make in fashioning its opening TNF arms control positions including whether:

--to take the initiative or to adopt a reactive stance, waiting to see what NATO comes up with before making a first move;

--in either case; to open with a comprehensive draft arms control proposal or to make a simpler initial offer, [illeg] as a first step in a longer process; and

--with respect to forum, to keep pressing for a [2 words illeg] framework or to settle for bilateral SS-20 [words illeg] when most NATO members apparently prefer.
Page 4, Paragraphs 4 and 5

Thus Soviet planners lack high confidence that their attack aircraft could effectively penetrate NATO defenses in the crucial central region, acquire and destroy their targets given the inherent difficulty of target acquisition in the low-level attack model, and recover to home bases without heavy losses.

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* [Illeg] of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers meeting [words illeg] last May.
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It is possible, even likely, that Moscow would suggest a "nuclear CSCE" as the forum of choice. The procedural ground has been prepared (Warsaw Pact call for a meeting in 1979 of all CSCE participants to discuss military détente.) The proposal would have enough political appeal to be troublesome for NATO. And it would avoid (in contrast to a call for a four-power conference) a direct challenge to the French, [illeg] would be out of harmony with Moscow's broader European [illeg].
4. **Area**

The crucial issue would be the precise definition of "the European region" and how much of the USSR was covered by it. Brezhnev's public offer to negotiate about "medium-range" weapons systems implies necessarily the inclusion of some weapons systems implies necessarily the inclusion of some Soviet territory. Obviously, in the Soviet view, the less the better. The Soviets might open by proposing to define "Europe," for purposes of TNF arms control, as the area fixed in CSCE for prior notification of maneuvers (which, on the Soviet side, includes a band 250 kilometers in width along the western Soviet [illeg.] They might also hint at some flexibility here, recognizing that more Soviet territory would have to be covered to make the offer attractive to Western opinion.

5. **Effects on the SS-20 Deployment Program**

Under the proposal postulated above, the effect would be all at the outset and perhaps quite limited over the longer run. In the first place, the proposal would ban deployment in the European region, but not production. Moreover, the Soviets would not expect a deployment freeze to be promptly accepted and would [illeg] the proposal as the [words illeg] negotiations [words illeg] Moscow could [words illeg] or procedural [words illeg] continue until agreement.
NORWEGIAN DELEGATION TO NATO
B 1110 BRUSSELS

Vår ref
5305/79/JAL/JM

Brussel, 18 september 1979

Det kongelige forsvarsdepartement
v/Statssekretær Johan Jørgen Holst

v/19 kontor

Forsvarets overkommando
v/STSJ Generalløytnant Sven Hauge

Det kongelige utenriksdepartement
v/3 politiske kontor

NPG - HLG MØTE 10 - 11 SEPTEMBER 1979

Vedlagt innsendes i kopi:

- referat fra ovennevnte HLG møte

- brev m/vedlegg fra den kanadiske HLG representant vedrørende "Common data base for HLG and SG".

Etter fullmakt

John A Lunde
NPG - HIGH LEVEL GROUP ON TNF MODERNIZATION - HOVEDPUNKTENE
FRA GRUPPENS 8. MØTE, BRUSSEL, 10 - 11 SEPTEMBER 1979

1. Sammendrag

- Samtlige delegasjoner kunne i prinsippet slutte opp om utkastet til rapport fra HLG.

- Gjennomgåelsen av rapportutkastets enkelte paragrafer medførte i tillegg til redaksjonelle endringer mer substansiell drøftelse av deltagelsesspørsmålet, omfanget av LRTNF-styrken, presentasjonen av moderniseringsprogrammet i HLG-rapporten og finansieringsspørsmålet.

- Mens man fra tysk side ga uttrykk for tilfredshet med bredden i den foreslåtte deltagelsen i LRTNF styrken, gikk man fra nederlandsk side inn for å dempe presentasjonen av moderniseringsprogrammet i HLG-rapporten med sikte på å legge forholdene til rette for en prinsippbeslutning om LRTNF modernisering i første omgang. USA og Nederland vil søke å avklare dette spørsmålet bilateralt forut for neste HLG møte.

- Kopi av de norske hovedinnlegg følger vedlagt.

- Fra norsk side deltak:
  FD: Statssekretær Johan Jørgen Holst
  Førstekonsulent Jan Monsen
  FO: Generalløytnant Sven Hauge
  UD: Underdirektør Leif Mevik
  Byråsjef Vidar Wikberg
  NORDEL: Ass forsvarsråd John A Lunde

- Neste HLG møte ble fastsatt til onsdag 26 september. Det tas dessuten sikte på et fellesmøte med Special Group on TNF Arms Control på formiddagen fredag 28 i h.t. sikkerhetssamarbeid.
september og eventuelt et orienterende ettermiddagsmøte for berørte NATO ambassadører samme dag.

2. Første møtedag 10 september

HLG formannen, Assistant Secretary of Defence McGiffert, viste innledningsvis til at det i det foreliggende utkast til rapport fra HLG var innarbeidet et relativt detaljert forslag med sikte på modernisering av NATO's langtrekkende TNF våpen (LRTNF) basert på utplassering av Persing II XR raketter i Forbundsrepublikken og GLCM enheter (landbaserte cruise missiles) i UK, Italia, Belgia, Nederland og Forbundsrepublikker.

Omfanget av det foreslåtte moderniseringsprogrammet, angitt i antall 'kjernefysiske krigshoder' (572), hadde man kommet frem til på bakgrunn av vurderinger av faktorer som:

- operative hensyn, styrkenes rolle i NATO's overordnede strategi;
- behov for å demonstrere overfor Sovjetunionen at man anser utbyggingen av kjernefysiske våpenystemer som SS 20 og Backfire som en alvorlig utfordring ovenfor Alliansen som helhet, og at NATO's moderniseringsprogram sikter mot mer enn en symbolisk LRTNF styrke;
- behov for å demonstrere en holdning og besluttsomhet med TNF moderniseringsbehovet som ville medvirke til å styrke Sovjetrusserisk vilje til reelle rustningskontrollforhandlinger;
- behov for LRTNF styrker i NATO med høy overlevelsessevne (i lys av muligheten for kjernefysisk angrep spesielt mot disse våpen fra østlig side);
- politisk og militært behov for så bred deltagelse som mulig i LRTNF styrken.

Samtlige representanter uttalte seg under en runde med generelle merkander anerkjennende overfor det utkast til rapport som var sirkulert forut før møtet.
Fra britisk side ble det vist til at man hadde hatt foreløpige drøftelser av LRTNF problematikken på regjeringsplan uten at det var truffet beslutninger. Man var klar til å støtte fremsendelse av forslaget om et LRTNF moderniseringsprogram slik dette var skissert i rapportutkastet.

Det norske generelle innlegg følger vedlagt (I).

Fra nederlandsk side ble det understreket at moderniseringsforslaget var bygget ut for detaljert i rapportutkastet når det gjaldt selve deltagelsen i LRTNF styrken (antall våpen til det enkelte land). Av hensyn til avklaringsprosessen i Nederland ville det være hensiktsmessig om HLG rapporten ikke gikk såvidt detaljert inn på dette punktet.

Begrunnelsen for omfanget av den foreslåtte LRTNF styrken burde utbygges, og det burde understrekes klarere at det ikke var tale om å gi kjernefysiske våpen noen øket rolle i NATO's totalforsvar. Man ville senere komme tilbake til de nederlandskes synspunkter vedrørende forholdet mellom allerede utplasserte, mer kortrekkende og de nye langtrekkende TNF våpen innen NATO på bakgrunn av et nederlandsk diskusjonspapir som var sirkulert forut for møtet.

Fra tysk side ble det etterlyst fyldigere begrunnelse for styrkenes omfang, forslagets kostnadsmessige sider og avklaring m h t det nederlandske papir.

Fra dansk side ble viktigheten av hensiktsmessig presentasjon overfor publikum av saksområdet TNF modernisering og rustningskontroll spesielt understreket.

På kanadisk side var man i hovedsak fornøyd med rapportutkastet - behovet for utbygging av begrunnelsen var størst m h t det foreslåtte styrkeomfang.
Fra belgisk side ble det understreket at man la spesiell vekt på bredest mulig deltagelse i LRTNF styrken, herunder deltagelse i finansieringsordningen. Bidrag til finansieringen måtte gjøres "synlig" med sikte på utad å understreke bred deltagelse.

Gjennomgåelsen av rapportutkastets enkelte paragrafer medførte i tillegg til redaksjonelle endringer mer substansiell drøftelse av følgende hovedpunkter:

Paragraf 8 (deltagelsesspørsmålet)

Italia, Belgia og Nederland som viste til at moderniseringsprogrammet var politisk sensitivt i alle NATO landene, gikk inn for at HLG rapporten i første rekke burde slå fast den helt sentrale ønskeligheten av bredest mulig deltagelse i LRTNF styrken, mens det spesielt fra norsk side ble understreket at HLG måtte erkjenne/respektere medlemslandenes etablerte atompolitikk.

Fra tysk side ble det i denne forbindelse understreket at forslaget som innebar at LRTNF enheter eventuelt ville bli utplassert i 5 NATO land fullt ut imøtekom det tyske "krav" om at flere land enn Forbundsrepublikken måtte tillate stasjonering av LRTNF våpen i Europa som en del av TNF moderniseringsprogrammet.

Det norske innlegg vedrørende paragraf 8 følger vedlagt (II).

Etter at en spesiell undergruppe hadde utarbeidet et revidert utkast til tekst for paragraf 8, kom man etter visse justeringer frem til en omforent tekst som kunne aksepteres av alle. Det norske innlegg til den reviderte paragraf 8 følger vedlagt (III).
Paragraf 9 (omfanget av LRTNF styrken)

Det var alminnelig enighet om at begrunnelsen for omfanget måtte utdypes.
Dette var spesielt nødvendig i lys av at forslaget på ialt 572 krigshoder lå såvidt nær opp mot taket i det tidligere antydede styrkeomfanget på 200 - 600 krigshoder.

FRA KANADISK SIDE BLE DET PEKT PÅ AT ET STYRKEOMFANG PÅ 200 IKKE VILLE HA NØDVENDIG OVERLEVELSESDEVNE, MENS EN STYRKE MED OPP IMOT 600 KRIGSHODER VILLE KUNNE IMØTEKOMME BÅDE POLITISKE SÅVEL SOM MILITÆRE BEHOV TIL NATO'S LRTNF STYRKE.

Det norske innlegg vedrørende paragraf 9 følger vedlagt (IV).

Paragraf 19 (Presentasjonen av moderniseringsprogrammet)

Fra NEDERLANDSK SIDE BLE DET UNDERSTREKET AT PRINSIPPIELL ENIGHET OM LRTNF MODERNISERING VAR DET VIKTIGSTE POENG PÅ DET NÅVÆRENDE STADIUM I AVKLARINGSPROSessen. En for detaljert fremstilling av forslaget til moderniseringsprogram i HLG-rapporten ville kunne gi inntrykk av at beslutningene i realiteten var truffet før saken ble lagt frem på ministerplan og derved virke mot sin hensikt. På denne bakgrunn gikk man inn for at de detaljerte tabellene som illustrerte det foreslåtte moderniseringsprogrammet ikke ble tatt med i rapportutkastet, men eventuelt i et vedlegg som så kunne vurderes nærmere etter at prinsippbeslutningen var tatt.

Fleraltet ga uttrykk for forståelse for det problem man syntes å stå overfor på nederlandsk side.
HLG formannen viste imidlertid til det mandat som var gitt HLG av NPG ministrene, og fremholdt at en rapport i tråd med de nederlandske synspunktene ikke ville kunne sies å være en endelig og fullstendig tilrådning fra ekspertgruppen (HLG).

Mens det fra belgisk side ble gitt generell støtte til de nederlandske merknadene, ble det fra tysk side understreket at en omredigering av HLG rapporten som antydet ville skape vanskeligheter i og med at det fortsatt ville fremgå relativt klart at Persing II XR ville bli utplassert i Forbundsrepublikken mens utplasseringen av GLCM enheter ville være usikker.

Det norske innlegget vedrørende paragraf 19 følger vedlagt (V).

Fra italiensk og britisk side ble det understreket at selv om det ville være mulig å begrense omtalen av utplasseringsplanene til bare å nevne de fem aktuelle landene uten å angi det foreslåtte antall LRTNF enheter for utplassering i de respektive land, ville ikke dette gi tilstrekkelig grunnlag for ministrene til å treffe de nødvendige beslutningene innen årets utgang.

Man besluttet å komme tilbake til spørsmålet senere under HLG møtet.

Avslutningsvis under åriftelsen av denne paragrafen ble det fra tysk side presisert at Bonn anså at utplassering av 108 Persing II XR i Forbundsrepublikken ville være militært betydningsfullt og politisk passende. Imidlertid ville man vurdere noe nærmere hvorvidt det foreslåtte antall GLCM på tysk jord eventuelt kunne reduseres noe. Bonn ville i dette spørsmålet legge vekt på den betydning avgjørelsen hadde i de andre utplasseringslandene.
Paragraf 21 - 22 (Finansieringsordningen/kostnadsfordelingen)

Flertallet fremholdt at man ikke var kommet langt nok i avklaringsprosessen til at det kunne tas stilling til konkrete finansierings- kostnadsfordelingsforslag.

Mens Nederland gjentok ønsket om minst mulig detaljerte tilrådninger også i denne sammenheng, ble det fra tysk side opplyst at moderniseringsprogrammet og finansieringen måtte vurderes nærmere i lys av det totale langtidsprogrammet for NATO forsvaret (LTDP).

Det norske innlegg vedrørende infrastrukturfinansiering følger vedlagt (VI).

Det nederlandske diskusjonspapir

I introduksjonen av papiret viste den nederlandske representant til at man i Haag vurderte det foreslåtte moderniseringsprogrammet på bakgrunn av to hovedprinsipper:

- kjernefysiske våpen måtte ikke gis noen øket rolle innen NATO's totalforsvar;
- TNF moderniseringen måtte ikke medføre økning i antallet kjernefysiske stridshoder lagret i Europa (stockpile).

På nederlandsk side anså man i denne sammenheng at den økningen av antallet langtrekkende TNF våpen som var foreslått i moderniseringsprogrammet, måtte kompenseres ved en reduksjon av NATO's TNF våpen med kort og middels rekkevidde.

Man hadde utarbeidet endringsforslag til paragraf 29 med sikte på å få innarbeidet dette poengen.

Fra britisk og norsk side ble det fremholdt at det ville være uheldig å låse valget av reduksjonskandidater allerede på dette tidspunkt. Det ville f eks kunne vise seg mer aktuelt og hensiktsmessig å skjære ned på kjernefysiske luftforsvarsvåpen istedenfor tradisjonelle TNF våpen med kortere rekkevidde.
Fra tysk side ble det understreket at det ville være nyttig å få de nederlandske synspunkter grundig drøftet. Det var enighet om at behov for senere avklaring av spørsmålet kunne reflekteres i rapporten.

SHAPE viste til at det ikke hastet med å ta stilling til eventuelle reduksjoner i lys av at de foreslåtte LRTNF enhetene først ville kunne utplasseres i 1983-84. Det ble samtidig understreket at det egentlig ikke var tale om å styrke LRTNF komponenten i NATO's totalforsvar, men derimot om å fylle et tomrom i den kjeden av forsvarsmidler som Alliansen måtte ha til rådighet for å kunne opprettholde den krigsforebyggende evnen.

3. Annen møtedag 11 september

Innledningsvis drøftet man reviderte tekstforslag for paragrafene 9 (styrkenes omfang), 16 (landbasering) og 19 ("stockpile"), som ble klarert med mindre justeringer.

Når det gjeldt det nederlandske forslaget om å begrense presentasjonen av moderniseringsforslagets enkelte deler i HLG rapporten med sikte på at man i første omgang kunne treffe en prinsippslutning om LRTNF modernisering, gikk HLG formannen inn for at dette spørsmålet hensiktsmessig burde kunne avklares bilateralt mellom Nederland og USA forut for neste HLG møte.

Han viste samtidig til at de nederlandske synspunktene i dette spørsmålet bare var blitt støttet fra belgisk side. På amerikansk side hadde man betydelige motforestillinger, og McGiffert antok at US ville kunne representere flertallet i de bilaterale konsultasjonene.

Dersom det var ønske om det kunne Belgia også delta i dette arbeidet.
Italia som understreket at man hadde forståelse for det nederlandske problem, ønsket også å delta i de "bilaterale" avklaringene.

Avslutningsvis viste HLG formannen til at "Spesialgruppen for rustningskontroll" ville holde sitt avsluttende møte torsdag 27 september. Han antok at det ville være hensiktsmessig om HLG kunne avslutte arbeidet med sin rapport på et møte onsdag 26 september, og at de to gruppene deretter kunne komme sammen til et fellesmøte på formiddagen fredag 28 september for å avklare prosedyrespørsmål i forbindelse med den videre saksbehandling med sikte på endelige beslutninger på ministerplan innen årets utgang.

Eventuelt kunne de faste representantene (NATO ambassadørene) gis en orientering om de to gruppene arbeid og rapporter i et ettermiddagsmøte fredag 28 september.

Ingen reiste innvendinger mot forslag om at de endelige HLG og SG rapportene i tråd med praksis ville bli over- sendt Generalsekretæren som på sin side ville la dem distribuere som PO-dokumenter.

HLG formannen anmodet delegasjonene om såvidt mulig å sirkulere eventuelle mærknader til HLG rapportutkastet forut for neste møte 26 september.

Den kanadiske representant reiste helt til slutt under møtet spørsmålet om det ikke burde utarbeides en ugradert oversikt over TNF styrkeforholdet i lys av forventet interesse i offentlig opinion.

Det var alminnelig enighet om at en slik oversikt ville ha stor betydning i forbindelse med presentasjonen av både HLG og SG's tilrådninger.
Mr Chairman,

I am of the view that the draft which is laid before us summarizes the deliberations of the HLG both adequately and crisply.

The rationale for modernization which is outlined in the draft report is now better balanced than in previous documents. It highlights the SS-20 challenge. That is important, particularly in public presentation, but hardly sufficient. We could perhaps emphasize somewhat more strongly the strategic need to maintain a coherent chain of deterrence providing options for escalation control. Furthermore, attention should be drawn to the operational implications of the broad spectrum of the Soviet TNF modernization which is currently underway, and which includes in addition to the SS-20 and BACKFIRE also the SS-21, 22 and 23.

We think it important that the program as outlined will be implemented within existing numbers of nuclear warheads deployed in Western Europe and that an increased rôle of nuclear weapons in the strategy of the alliance is not envisaged. Furthermore, we attribute importance to our accompanying a decision on modernization with a credible invitation to initiate arms control negotiations which will serve also to bring Soviet TNF onto the bargaining table.

With respect to the numerical size of the program involved, I have noted what you stated in your initial remarks. It is to a large measure an issue which will have to reflect the concerted views of the US and the host nations involved.
Mr Chairman,

Para 8. It would be preferable in our view that we retain original formulations with respect to the position of those countries which for reasons of national policy and established regional equilibria are not candidates for basing. The current formulation of the second sentence could be read to imply an expectation or desire of a change in policy. It will be important for our ability to mobilize public support for our political endorsement of the modernization program that we are able to state that there is recognition and understanding in the alliance for our special policy with respect to the stationing of nuclear weapons. I recognize, of course, that the northern and southern flank members are in somewhat different positions. However, the language which was used in para 18 in the report to the April ministerial meeting in Florida tried to encompass the position of both and would from our point of view be preferable. It stated: "The HLG recognizes the established policy of some NATO countries regarding peacetime basing and that each Ally will view the manner of its participation against a background of factors unique to it".

Alternatively we could accept the Belgian proposal that the second sentence in para 8 be dropped all together, assuming that the political conditions which prevail are in fact recognized by all.
Mr Chairman,

Redrafted Para 8.

We would have strongly preferred to retain the language from the April interim report. However, I recognize that it could produce problems and ambiguities for others and hence I shall not insist on its inclusion. We can live with the new proposal but would prefer deletion of the last sentence so as to avoid assertions or speculations concerning pressures or expectations that we would change a policy which has been a permanent feature of the situation in Northern Europe since the creation of our alliance. It is necessary to avoid suggestions that we are embarking upon an open-ended programme. Perhaps we could overcome the difficulties by rewriting the last sentence to read: "Should additional members of the Alliance wish to host LRTNF deployment, the programme could be adjusted to accommodate such participation".
Mr Chairman,

Para 9. With respect to sizing considerations mission requirements should be included emanating from targeting needs and the vulnerability of existing and prospective systems to counterforce attacks.

As far as the counting rules as concerned we should strive for consistency in the sense of applying the same rules to Soviet and NATO forces, e.g. with respect to reloads. We should be aware also of the need not to interfere with the established counting rules under SALT. Hence, I do not think SLBM force loads should be counted in the TNF context. Their inclusion will complicate the presentation of a manageable arms control proposal. As far as the aggregate numbers are concerned we should not invite the expectation that the program is but the first down-payment on a more extensive and ambitious undertaking. It must be militarily meaningful, not merely symbolic. This is important also from the point of view of establishing credibility for an arms control invitation. The program must be given a quality of credibility and stability.

As a non-host country we do not consider it appropriate to comment on the specific force allocations. That will have to be a matter for particular discussion between the US and the host countries involved.
Mr Chairman,

Para 19. I am speaking somewhat reluctantly on this subject and want to emphasize the need for everyone to be sympathetic to the political considerations and constraints which apply in various capitals and polities.

I believe it important for all of us that we avoid as much uncertainty as possible. Hence, it would be important to avoid speculations with respect to the distribution of systems envisaged for deployment. Specificity is important also from the point of view of a recognition of the interdependent nature of the decision problem. Finally, it should be a report from the HLG not from the United States. Nor should the report be divided into some collective sections and some sections attributed only to the United States. It goes without saying that the HLG report is but a recommendation to Ministers.
Mr Chairman,

Para 22. With respect to infrastructure planning, I think it is important that we keep in mind our chosen approach of implementing the TNF modernization in an evolutionary manner. Hence we have preferred the chosen approach which will integrate the TNF infrastructure into the regular infrastructure program in consonance with previous practice with regard to NIKE/HAWK, etc. The alternative of a separate program of joint financing with respect to TNF infrastructure would have constituted a more dramatic break with previous practice and complicated our ability to mobilize public support. Therefore, from a presentational point of view it would in our case be preferable that the financing arrangement not be selected for particular highlighting, but presented in a low key business-as-usual manner. Decisions with respect to the size of the Infrastructure programme should be taken in due course and perhaps not preempted in connection with the decision on TNF modernization.

Let me state also that we view TNF modernization as part of the LTDP and that Norway is intent on acting in concert with her allies to improve our total defence capabilities within the framework of an annual increase of 3% in real terms.
O 210142Z SEP 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE
INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
USNMR SHAPE BE IMMEDIATE

STATE 247871

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/20/79 (GOODBY, JAMES E.)

TAGS: NATO, PARM, MNUC, PFOR

SUBJECT: HLG: US DRAFT REPORT

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. PARA 4 BEGINS LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL FROM HLG CHAIRMAN.
   PARA 5 BEGINS TEXT OF DRAFT. APPENDICES C AND D WILL BE
   HAND-CARRIED TO NATO HQ.
3. EMBASSIES AND MISSION PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATELY TO HLG

STATE 247871

PARTICIPANTS: ANKARA-MR. A.H. ALP (MFA); ATHENS-MR.
HARLAFTIS (MOD); BONN-BG TANDECKI (MOD); BRUSSELS-MR.
WILLOT (MFA); COPENHAGEN-MR. J. WAHL (MOD); HAGUE-MR. E.J. VAN VLOTEN (MFA); LONDON-MR. M. QUINLAN (MOD); OSLO-MR. J.J. HOLST (MOD); OTTAWA-DR. G.R. LINDSEY (DND); ROME-B.G. ,ISA'O (MOD); USNATO-HLG PARTICIPANTS. IN ABSENCE OF DESIGNATED HLG POINTS OF CONTACT, PLEASE PASS TO APPROPRIATE DEPUTY. TABLES DELETED FROM MESSAGE TEXT WILL BE PROVIDED TO USNATO FOR DISTRIBUTION.

4. FOR ROME: IN PASSING THE HLG REPORT TO GOI, YOU SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO THE HEAD OF THE ITALIAN DELEGATION, GENERAL PISANO, ON BEHALF OF HLG CHAIRMAN MCGIFFERT

-- DURING THE LAST HLG MEETING, THE DUTCH REPRESENTATIVE ARGUED FOR PUTTING IN AN APPENDIX THE BASING SCHEME SPECIFYING THE FORCES PROPOSED TO BE STATIONED IN PARTICULAR COUNTRIES. WE INDICATED THAT WE WOULD TRY TO WORK OUT A WAY OF HANDLING THIS SUGGESTION WITH THE DUTCH. IF A SOLUTION COULD BE REACHED, WE OFFERED TO DISCUSS IT WITH THE ITALIAN DELEGATION BEFORE PUTTING IT IN THE HLG REPORT.

-- WE SUBSEQUENTLY WORKED OUT A COMPROMISE WHICH SATISFIED BOTH THE DUTCH AND OURSELVES. IT ENTAILS MOVING THE BASING SCHEME FOR THE HLG RECOMMEND PROGRAM TO AN APPENDIX, BUT SPECIFYING IN THE REPORT'S BODY THAT THE APPENDIX SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS PART OF THE HLG RECOMMEND PROGRAM AND SUBJECT TO DECISION BY MINISTERS. THIS FORMULATION SOLVES THE DUTCH PROBLEM AND PRESERVES THE SPECIFICITY WE DESIRE IN TERMS OF NUMBERS OF SYSTEMS BASED IN PARTICULAR COUNTRIES.

-- WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THE ITALIAN

DELEGATION TO DISCUSS OUR APPROACH. RATHER THAN DELAY CIRCULATION OF THE REPORT FURTHER, WE ARE CIRCULATING IT WITH THE US/DUTCH COMPROMISE. IF THE ITALIAN HLG DELEGATION FINDS THIS COMPROMISE UNACCEPTABLE, WE WILL BE HAPPY TO DISCUSS IT EITHER PRIVATELY BEFORE NEXT WEEK'S MEETING OR DURING THE HLG MEETING ITSELF.

5. BEGIN LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL:

DEAR COLLEAGUE:

I AM SENDING YOU HEREWITH A REVISED DRAFT OF THE HLG
REPORT DESIGNED TO REFLECT THE DELIBERATIONS OF OUR LAST MEETING. THE DEPLOYMENT PLAN, WHICH NOW APPEARS AS APPENDIX A, CONTAINS A MINOR ADJUSTMENT WITHIN THE OVER-ALL PROGRAM IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF GLCM DEPLOYMENTS AS BETWEEN THE FRG AND THE UK; THIS ADJUSTMENT HAS BEEN MADE WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE TWO NATIONS CONCERNED.

PLEASE CONSIDER NEXT WEDNESDAY'S MEETING AS ONE DESIGNED TO COMPLETE OUR REPORT FOR FORWARDING BY THE HLG TO THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP. THIS WILL ENABLE US TO STAY IN PARALLEL WITH THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL GROUP.

SIGNED: DAVID MCGIFFERT. END TEXT.

6. BEGIN TEXT

NATO LONG-RANGE TNF MODERNIZATION

I. INTRODUCTION

1. THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP (NPG) AT ITS BARI MINISTERIAL IN 1977 DIRECTED THAT A HIGH LEVEL GROUP (HLG) STUDY NATO'S LONG-TERM NEEDS FOR THEATER NUCLEAR

FORCE (TNF) MODERNIZATION. THE HLG WAS SUBSEQUENTLY ESTABLISHED AS A GROUP OF SENIOR LEVEL EXPERTS FROM NPG COUNTRIES, SPEAKING WITH AN APPRECIATION OF THEIR GOVERNMENT'S POSITIONS WITHOUT COMMITTING THEM. THIS REPORT BY THE HLG IS THE THIRD IN A SERIES DEALING WITH THE QUESTION OF MODERNIZATION OF NATO'S LONG-RANGE TNF (LRTNF). IT AND ITS APPENDICES CONTAIN THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HLG FOR AN LRTNF MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.

2. IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING THE PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HLG, THIS REPORT REVIEWS THE RATIONALE FOR TNF MODERNIZATION, INCLUDING AN EVOLUTIONARY UPWARD ADJUSTMENT OF NATO'S LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES, DEVELOPS THE STRUCTURAL BASIS OF THE PROGRAM AND EVALUATES IT FOR CONSISTENCY WITH THE CRITERIA ESTABLISHED BY THE HLG -- SYSTEM RANGE, FORCE SIZE, LAND-BASING, PARTICIPATION, AND BALLISTIC/Cruise MISSILE MIX. FOLLOWING THIS, SUCH FACTORS AS COST, MANNING PARTICIPATION, TIMING ASPECTS, AND EFFECTS ON THE
OVERALL NATO TNF STOCKPILE ARE DEFINED MORE FULLY.

3. THE RECOMMENDED ADJUSTMENT OF LRTNF IS FULLY
CONSISTENT WITH THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE DOCTRINE OF
THE ALLIANCE (MC 14/3) AND WITH THE IMPROVEMENTS
-CONVENTIONAL FORCES OUTLINED IN THE LONG TERM
DEFENSE PLAN (LTDP). JUST AS THE LTDP WILL IMPROVE
THE CONVENTIONAL LEG OF THE NATO TRIAD, THE IMPROVE-
MENTS CALLED FOR HERE WILL STRENGTHEN THE

DETERRENT VALUE OF THE THEATER NUCLEAR LEG AND REINFORCE
THE LINKAGE TO THE STRATEGIC LEG OF THE NATO TRIAD.

II. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

4. BASED ON THE DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS IN THE BODY
OF THIS REPORT AND ITS APPENDICES, THE HLG RECOMMENDS
THAT NATO’S LRTNF MODERNIZATION GOALS CAN BEST BE MET
BY A DEPLOYMENT OF

5. THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM WOULD PROVIDE FOR WIDESPREAD
PARTICIPATION THROUGH DEPLOYMENTS OF LRTNF IN A NUMBER
OF COUNTRIES. ON THIS BASIS, THE PATTERN OF DEPLOYMENTS
ENVISIONED HERE WILL DEMONSTRATE BROAD, CONCRETE
PARTICIPATION. SHOULD ADDITIONAL ALLIANCE MEMBERS DESIRE
TO PARTICIPATE IN TNF MODERNIZATION THROUGH HOSTING
LRTNF DEPLOYMENTS ON THEIR SOIL, THE PROGRAM COULD BE
ADJUSTED TO ACCOMMODATE SUCH PARTICIPATION. IN ADDITION,
THE HLG BELIEVES THAT -- CONSISTENT WITH THE ALLIANCE
PRINCIPLE OF SHARED BURDENS AND BENEFITS FOR NUCLEAR
DETERRENCE -- ALL ALLIANCE MEMBERS SHOULD DEMONSTRATE
BROAD ALLIANCE CONSENSUS ON LRTNF MODERNIZATION THROUGH
PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE PROGRAM THAT IS ULTIMATELY
AGREED BY THE ALLIANCE AND THROUGH SOME LIMITED SHARING
IN THE FINANCIAL COSTS OF THE PROGRAM.

III. RATIONALE

6. THE HLG REAFFIRMS THE COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR
TNF MODERNIZATION PRESENTED IN ITS APRIL 1978 REPORT: THE PRIMARY AIM OF DETERRENCE; THE IMPORTANCE FOR DETERRENCE OF A TRIAD OF FORCES AND THE COUPLING BETWEEN THEM; AND IN THE EVENT DETERRENCE FAILS, THE NEED FOR A TNF CAPABILITY TO RESPOND FLEXIBLY, TO DEFEND FORWARD, TO ESCALATE IN A DELIBERATE MANNER, AND TO PARTICIPATE, IF NECESSARY, IN GENERAL NUCLEAR RESPONSE.

WHILE PRIORITY SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE GIVEN TO IMPROVEMENTS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES, OVERALL NATO STRATEGY AND THE EVOLVING WARSaw Pact CAPABILITY REQUIRE THAT NATO'S TNF CONTINUE TO BE MODERNIZED IN ORDER THAT THEY MAY CONTINUE THEIR ESSENTIAL ROLE IN THE NATO TRIAD AND CONTINUUM OF DETERRENCE. THERE IS A NEED FOR AN EVOLUTIONARY UPWARD ADJUSTMENT IN NATO'S LRTNF; THAT ADJUSTMENT CARRIES NO IMPLICATION OF INCREASED ROLES FOR NATO THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES BUT RATHER IS DESIGNED TO ARREST A GROWING GAP IN THE SPECTRUM OF DETERRENCE.

THE HLG ALSO AFFIRMS THE FOLLOWING RATIONALE SET FORTH IN ITS APRIL 1979 REPORT.

-- A STRONG LINKAGE BETWEEN THEATER AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE" IS REQUIRED BY THE AGREED STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE.

-- WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK, CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT, SPECIFICALLY PARITY IN INTERCONTINENTAL NUCLEAR FORCES AND SOVIET TNF MODERNIZATION EFFORTS SUCH AS THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE SS-20 AND BACKFIRE, LEAD DECISIVELY IN THE HLG VIEW TO THE NEED FOR STRENGTHENING NATO'S OWN FORCES.

-- THE PURPOSE OF AN UPWARD ADJUSTMENT IN LRTNF IS TO MINIMIZE THE RISK THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT BELIEVE -- HOWEVR INCORRECTLY -- THAT THEY COULD USE LONG-RANGE FORCES TO MAKE OR THREATEN LIMITED STRIKES AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE FROM A "SANCTUARY" IN THE SOVIET UNION, IN THE MISPERCEPTION THAT WITHOUT STRONG THEATER BASED SYSTEMS OF ITS OWN CAPABLE OF REACHING SOVIET TERRITORY, AND IN AN ERA OF PARITY AT THE STRATEGIC
NUCLEAR LEVEL, NATO LACKED CREDIBLE AND APPROPRIATE MEANS OF RESPONSE.

-- AUGMENTATION OF NATO LRTNF BASED IN EUROPE WOULD THEREFORE CLOSE THIS GAP IN THE ESCALATION SPECTRUM AND PROVIDE INCREASED OPTIONS FOR RESTRAINED AND CONTROLLED RESPONSES, THEREBY REDUCING THE RISK OF SOVIET MISPERCEPTION AND STRENGTHENING DETERRENCE.

-- LRTNF AUGMENTATION WOULD ALSO CORRECT AN EMERGING IMBALANCE IN NATO’S THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURE: AFTER UK VULCANS ARE PHASED OUT, UK POLARIS SLBMS WOULD BE THE ONLY REMAINING NON-US COMPONENT OF LRTNF AVAILABLE TO SACEUR AND US F-111S WOULD BE THE ONLY LAND-BASED COMPONENT OF THE LRTNF FORCE. T;US, THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO MODERNIZE COULD BE A PERCEPTION THAT NATO WAS SHIFTING ITS EMPHASIS TOWARD SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS WHILE EMPHASIZING OFF-SHORE COMPONENTS TO SUSTAIN SYSTEMS WHILE EMPHASIZING OFF-SHORE COMPONENTS TO SUSTAIN THE LRTNF.

-- SPIN-OFF EFFECTS INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: INCREASING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE FACE OF SOVIET LRTNF MODERNIZATION; PROVIDING A BETTER PROSPECT FOR MEANINGFUL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING LRTNF; AND IMPROVING FLEXIBILITY IN THE USE OF DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT (DCA), THUS COMPLICATING WARSAW PACT PLANNING.

-- FINALLY, A COLLECTIVE ALLIANCE DECISION ON A COORDINATED PROGRAM OF ACTION IN THIS FIELD WOULD HAVE A MAJOR VALUE IN DEMONSTRATING AND REINFORCING ALLIANCE COHESION AND RESOLVE.

7. THUS, AS THE HLG CONCLUDED IN ITS APRIL 1979 REPORT, LRTNF MODERNIZATION WILL STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE BY REDUCING THE POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET MISPERCEPTIONS ABOUT NATO’S CAPABILITIES OR ITS WILL TO EMPLOY NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES. IN ADDITION, SHOULD DETERRENCE FAIL, STRENGTHENED MODERNIZATION INVOLVING LRTNF WOULD INCREASE NATO’S CAPABILITY TO RESPOND FLEXIBLY, TO PROVIDE FOR FORWARD
DEFENSE, TO ESCALATE IN A DELIBERATE MANNER AND TO
PARTICIPATE, IF NECESSARY, IN A GENERAL NUCLEAR RESPONSE.

IV. STRUCTURAL BASIS FOR THE PROGRAM

8. A MIX OF BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILES IN THE HLG
RECOMMENDED PROGRAM PROFITS FROM THE FEATURES OF EACH
SYSTEM. BEING LAND-BASED, PERSHING II AND GLCM WOULD
VISIBLY DEMONSTRATE ALLIANCE RESOLVE TO PROVIDE CREDIBLE
IN-THEATER RESPONSES TO ANY SOVIET AGGRESSION AND ADDRESS
THE EMERGING GAP IN THE ESCALATION SPECTRUM IDENTIFIED
EARLIER BY THE HLG. BOTH SYSTEMS WILL POSSESS A RANGE
SUFFICIENT TO REACH THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION
FROM AREAS OF NATO EUROPE, THEREBY DENYING THE SOVIETS
A "SANCTUARY" FROM WHICH TO LAUNCH ATTACKS ON NATO
WITH THEIR LRINF, AND PROVIDING THE ALLIANCE WITH THE
CAPABILITY TO TAKE THIS IMPORTANT ESCALATORY STEP BY
MEANS IDENTIFIABLY SEPARATE FROM STRATEGIC SYSTEMS.
BOTH SYSTEMS OFFER HIGH ACCURACY AND VARIABLE YIELD
WARHEADS (WHICH TOGETHER PROVIDE THE POTENTIAL FOR CON-
TROLLING COLLATERAL DAMAGE AND STRIKING HARDENED TARGETS)
AND ARE EXPECTED TO BE HIGHLY RELIABLE AND SURVIVABLE.

9. EACH SYSTEM HAS DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTICS WHICH
COMPLEMENT THOSE OF THE OTHER. PERSHING II OFFERS A
PARTICULARLY HIGH ASSURANCE OF PENETRATING SOVIET
DEFENSES, THE CAPABILITY TO STRIKE TIME-URGENT TARGETS
DEFENSES, THE CAPABILITY TO STRIKE TIME-URGENT TARGETS
AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF EXISTING PER-
SHING IIA INFRASTRUCTURE. GLCMS ARE CHEAPER AND HAVE
LONGER RANGE, SO THAT THEY CAN ATTACK A WIDER RANGE
OF TARGETS AND CAN OFFER A WIDER RANGE OF OPTIONS FOR
BASING, THEREBY INCREASING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PARTICI-
PATION AMONGST THE ALLIES THROUGH BASING AND DEPLOYMENTS
ON THEIR SOIL. IN ADDITION, GLCMS AND PII WOULD NOT COMPETE
WITH CONVENTIONAL MISSIONS AS WOULD ALCMS ON DUAL-CAPABLE
AIRCRAFT OR SLCMs ON MULTIMISSION SH-PS. THE
INTRODUCTION OF A MIXED FORCE OF PERSHING II AND GLCMS
ALSO OFFERS SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ADVANTAGES; IT HEDGES
AGAINST THE FAILURE OF ONE TYPE OF SYSTEM; IT PROVIDES THE
FLEXIBILITY TO SELECT THE BEST WEAPON FOR EACH MISSION; AND
IT GREATLY COMPLICATES ENEMY PLANNING. THE MILITARY
EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM ARE PRESENTED IN APPENDIX B.

10. THE HLG RECOMMENDED PROGRAM EMPHASIZES THE NEED FOR WIDESPREAD BASELING OF THE NEW LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS TO UNDERSCORE ALLIANCE POLITICAL COHESION, RISK-SHARING AND COMMITMENT TO THE FULL TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL MEMBERS. SUCH BASELING WOULD ALSO ENHANCE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS BY DISPERSAL. THE BASELING SCHEME IN THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM WOULD CONTRIBUTE GREATLY TO THESE OBJECTIVES. SHOULD ADDITIONAL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE WISH TO HOST LRTNF DEPLOYMENTS, THE PROGRAM COULD BE ADJUSTED TO ACCOMMODATE SUCH PARTICIPATION.

11. SIZE. THE SIZE OF THE RECOMMENDED NATO LRTNF PROGRAM IS BASED ON A CONVERGENCE OF MILITARY, POLITICAL AND ARMS CONTROL NEEDS. THE SOVIET TNF BUILD-UP, PARTICULARLY IN LONG-RANGE FORCES, POSES A SIGNIFICANT THREAT AND WEAKENS THE SPAN OF NATO MILITARY CAPABILITY IN A WAY THAT NEEDS CONVINCINGLY TO BE REDRESSED. TO DO THIS REQUIRES A RELATIVELY SUBSTANTIAL ADDITION TO NATO LRTNF, AN ADDITION WHICH WILL INSURE THE MILITARY CAPABILITY TO DETER ATTACK, DEMONSTRATE TO THE SOVIETS NATO’S SERIOUS INTENT TO PRESERVE ITS SECURITY, AND PROVIDE MEANINGFUL INCENTIVES FOR ARMS CONTROL. A TOKEN BUILD-UP WILL NOT ACCOMPLISH THESE ESSENTIAL OBJECTIVES.

12. CONSISTENT WITH NATO STRATEGY, THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM IS LARGE ENOUGH TO ENSURE AND MAKE EVIDENT THAT THERE ARE NO WEAK LINKS IN THE SPECTRUM OF MILITARY OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO NATO THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT EXPLOIT. THE PURPOSE OF THE ADJUSTMENT IS TO STRENGTHEN COUPLING BETWEEN STRATEGIC FORCES AND THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE. IT IS NOT SO LARGE AS TO IMPLY A DIMINISHED ROLE FOR STRATEGIC FORCES; BUT IT IS LARGE ENOUGH TO ASSURE A MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY STRONG LINK. NUMBERS SIGNIFICANTLY LESS THAN THE RECOMMENDED LEVEL WOULD NOT GIVE US HIGH CONFIDENCE OVER TIME THAT THE FORCE WOULD BE SEEN AS A MAJOR FACTOR BY THE SOVIETS WHEN COMPARED WITH THE STRATEGIC FORCES OF BOTH SIDES AND THE SOVIETS’ OWN INCREASING LRTNF CAPABILITIES.

13. THE UPWARD ADJUSTMENT IN WARHEADS IN THE RECOMMENDED
PROGRAM, WHEN ADDED TO THE PRESENT NATO BASE OF LAND-BASED LRINF WARHEADS, IS WELL BELOW THE SOVIET PROJECTED FIGURE (SEE APPENDIX C). THIS DEMONSTRATES THAT THE PROGRAM IS NOT DESIGNED TO MATCH THE SOVIET BUILD-UP SYSTEM-BY-SYSTEM OR IN AGGREGATE NUMBERS. BUT A NUMBER MUCH LOWER THAN BOTH BY THE SOVIETS AND IN THE WEST, AS A POLITICAL GESTURE RATHER THAN A STRATEGICALLY MEANINGFUL RESPONSE.

-- MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR SELECTIVE USE

14. A CAPABILITY FOR SELECTIVE NUCLEAR STRIKES AGAINST THE USSR R; INFURSES AND STRENGTHENS THE LINK BETWEEN

NATO LRNF AND US STRATEGIC FORCES. SUCH A CAPABILITY REQUIRE THE ABILITY TO SURVIVE ENEMY CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ATTACKS, TO PénéTRATE TO TARGETS AND TO ATTACK A LARGE ENOUGH SET OF TARGETS TO INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF CONFLICT. THE NEED TO GUARD AGAINST UNCERTAINTIES IN BOTH PRE-LAUNCH AND IN-FLIGHT SURVIVABILITY I THE FACE OF POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET THREAT IMPLIES THAT THE FORCE MUST BE LARGE ENOUGH TO HAVE A CREDIBLE MILITARY EFFECT. THE FORCE OF THE MAGNITUDE CONTAINED IN THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM WOULD GIVE SOVIET POLITICAL LEADERSHIP INCENTIVES EITHER NOT TO BEGIN AN ATTACK IN THE FIRST PLACE, OR TO CEASE THEIR ATTACK AND WITHDRAW IF CONFLICT HAS ALREADY OCCURRED.

-- PARTICIPATION

5. THE RECOMMENDED INCREASE IN FORCE SIZE OF NATO'S AND-BASED LRINF IS WELL SUITED TO WIDESPREAD PARTICIPATION.

UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, NUMBERS SIGNIFICANTLY BELOW THIS LEVEL COULD MAKE WIDESPREAD PARTICIPATION MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE.

-- ARMS CONTROL

16. A SUFFICIENTLY LARGE FORCE IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVE OF PROVIDING THE NECESSARY INCENTIVE FOR THE SOVIETS TO ENTER INTO SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND TO AGREE TO REDUCE; AND LIMIT ITS LRNF. IF THE SIZE OF THE ADJUSTMENT WERE MUCH LESS THAN THE RECOMMENDED LEVEL, THE SOVIETS MIGHT PREFER TO LET
THEIR OWN FORCES GO UNCAPPED SINCE NATO WOULD APPEAR TO HAVE ACCEPTED A UNILATERAL AND RELATIVELY LOW LIMIT ON ITS FORCES. IF THE SOVIETS ARE GIVEN AN INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE, CONCRETE ARMS CONTROL RESULTS COULD LEAD TO MODIFICATIONS TO THIS PROGRAM.

17. THESE CONSIDERATIONS DO NOT PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A DETERMINATION OF THE SPECIFIC SIZE OF UPWARD ADJUSTMENT BUT DO LEAD DECISIVELY TO A FORCE IN THE REGION OF THE PROPOSED LEVEL. IN THIS REGION, FORCE STRUCTURE CONSIDERATIONS PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR THE EXACT CALCULATION OF THE RECOMMENDED LEVEL. THESE CONSIDERATIONS INCLUDE:

-- THE NEED TO STRUCTURE GLCM FORCES BY FLIGHTS INVOLVING 16-MISSILE INCREMENTS;

-- THE ADVANTAGE OF REPLACING ALL "REPLACING ALL" AS TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF EXISTING SYSTEM INFRASTRUCTURE; AND

-- THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF HAVING MORE THAN A FEW GLCM FLIGHTS ASSOCIATED WITH A MAIN OPERATING BASE (MOB) SO AS TO AVOID SPENDING A RELATIVELY LARGE AMOUNT FOR AN MOB TO SUPPORT ONLY A FEW MISSILES.

18. RELATIONSHIP TO SPECIAL GROUP: THE PROPOSED UPWARD ADJUSTMENT FOR LRTNF IS DEVELOPED IN PARALLEL WITH AND IS CONSISTENT WITH THE ARMS CONTROL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL GROUP.

9. COMPARISON WITH SOVIET LRTNF: CURRENT US ESTIMATES (SEE APPENDIX C) INDICATE THAT BY 1985, THE SOVIET UNION WILL HAVE APPROXIMATELY 300 SS-20 LAUNCHERS OF WHICH ABOUT TWO-THIRDS WOULD BE DEPLOYED IN THE WESTERN AND CENTRAL USSR SO AS TO POSE A DIRECT THREAT TO WESTERN EUROPE. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIETS ARE EXPECTED TO HAVE ABOUT 150 LONG RANGE AVIATION (LRA) BACKFIRE BOMBERS OF WHICH APPROXIMATELY 115 WOULD BE BASED IN...
THE WESTERN USSR. IT IS UNCLEAR TO WHAT EXTENT SS-4'S AND SS-5'S MAY BE RETIRED AS SS-20 IS DEPLOYED. SIMILARLY, UNCERTAINTIES EXIST REGARDING THE RETIREMENT RATE OF OLDER LRA BOMBERS. IF ALL THE SS-4'S AND 5'S WERE RETIRED AND BOMBERS ARE RETIRED AT CURRENTLY PROJECTED RATES, THE NUMBER OF SOVIET DELIVERABLE WARHEADS WITHIN RANGE OF NATO WOULD STILL INCREASE FROM APPROPXIMATELY 2100 IN 1979 TO ABOUT 3200 IN 1985, LARGELY BECAUSE OF THE SS-20'S MULTIPLE WARHEADS AND IMPROVED REFIRE CAPABILITIES (SS-20 REFIRE COMPONENTS ABOUT 1300 WARHEADS OF THE 3200 TOTAL IN 1985). WITH NO SS-4 AND SS-5 RETIREMENTS, SOVIET DELIVERABLE WARHEADS WITHIN RANGE OF NATO (INCLUDING ALL BALLISTIC MISSILE RELOADS) TOTAL APPROXIMATELY 3900 IN THE MID-1980'S.

20. CURRENTLY, NATO LRTNF CONSIST OF

EVEN WITH THE UPWARD ADJUSTMENT FROM THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM, NATO LRTNF WOULD STILL REMAIN CONSIDERABLY SMALLER THAN THE SOVIET FORCE.


V. HLG CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM

21. RANGE: THE HLG BELIEVES THAT LRTNF SHOULD HAVE THE RANGE TO REACH THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION SINCE A PRINCIPAL REASON FOR AUGMENTING NATO LRTNF IS TO STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE BY AVOIDING A SOVIET PERCEPTION OF SANCTUARY, WHILE MAINTAINING THE COUPLING OF NATO TNF TO US STRATEGIC FORCES. THE RECOMMENDED

--- GLCM PERSHING II FORCE MIX MEETS THIS CRITERION. THE HLG CONCLUDES THAT SUFFICIENT RANGE TO REACH MOSCOW, WHILE NOT A PREREQUISITE, SHOULD NOT DISQUALIFY A SYSTEM
22. SIZE: THE HLG EARLIER PROPOSED AND THE NPG AT ITS APRIL 1979 MEETING ENDORSED AS A BASIS FOR FURTHER WORK, AN ADDITION OF WHICH WOULD BE MATCHED BY CORRESPONDING REDUCTIONS IN THE EXISTING TNF STOCKPILE. THE UPWARD ADJUSTMENT OF THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM FALLS WITHIN THE RANGE OF ADDITIONAL WARHEADS CONSIDERED BY THE HLG.

23. BASING: THE HEART OF THE DETERRENCE PROBLEM FACING THE ALLIANCE IS A GAP IN THE ALLIANCE DETERRENT SPECTRUM. THE ALLIANCE HAS ONLY A MODEST NUMBER OF LAND-BASED, LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS IN EUROPE CAPABLE OF STRIKING THE SOVIET UNION. MOREOVER, THEY ARE AGING AND VULNERABLE. THE LARGE AND GROWING NUMBER OF MODERN SOVIET SYSTEMS IN A COMPARABLE CATEGORY BOTH PROVIDES THE SOVIET UNION WITH WIDE OPTIONS AND POSES A DIRECT THREAT TO NATO'S SMALLER CAPABILITY. THIS DEVELOPING GAP IN NATO ASSURED RESPONSE OPTIONS TAKES ON INCREASING IMPORTANCE DURING A PERIOD OF STRATEGIC PARITY. HENCE A PRIMARY PURPOSE OF LRTNF MODERNIZATION IS TO FILL THIS GAP. THE SUGGESTED FORCE MIX OF GLCM AND PERSHING II MEETS THIS PROBLEM DIRECTLY. DEPLOYING ADDITIONAL SYSTEMS AT SEA CANNOT FILL THIS IDENTIFIED GAP. FURTHER, SEA-BASED SYSTEMS PROVIDE LITTLE OPPORTUNITY FOR VISIBLE

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NATO ME;BERS' PARTICIPATION IN LRTNF MODERNIZATION AND, IF DEPLOYED ON UNDEDICATED PLATFORMS, WOULD CREATE POTENTIAL CONFLICTS WITH OTHER ROLES. IF DEPLOYED ON DEDICATED PLATFORMS, THE COSTS WOULD BE PROHIBITIVE. ALTHOUGH THE HLG REVIEW INDICATES THE ALLIANCE SHOULD INITIALLY PURSUE DEPLOYMENTS OF LAND-BASED LRTNF, SEA-BASED SYSTEMS MIGHT BE CONSIDERED AS A DEPLOYMENT OPTION IN THE FUTURE TO AUGMENT CURRENT ALLIANCE SEA-BASED ASSETS.

AND THROUGH SHARING IN THE FINANCIAL BURDENS OF THAT PROGRAM.

25 A MIXED FORCE OF CRUISE AND BALLISTIC MISSILES: IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE THE PRE-LAUNCH SURVIVABILITY AND PENETRATIVITY OF NATO’S LAND-BASED LRNTNF, THE HLG RECOMMENDS A MIX OF NEW SYSTEMS COMPRISING BOTH BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILES. A MIXED FORCE CAPTURES AS MANY OF THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL SYSTEMS AS POSSIBLE BY, AMONG OTHER THINGS, ALLOWING MORE CHANCES FOR PARTICIPATION, HEDGING AGAINST FUTURE DEFENSIVE DEVELOPMENTS, COMPLICATING ENEMY PLANNING, PROVIDING FLEXIBILITY IN EMPLOYMENT AND ALLOWING TIME-PHASING. THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM IS DIRECTLY RESPONSIVE TO THESE OBJECTIVES.

VI. PROGRAMMATIC DETAILS

26. THE PROPOSED PROGRAM, WHICH--AS IS THE CASE FOR THIS ENTIRE REPORT--WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF CONSIDERATION BY NATO MINISTERS, WOULD REQUIRE STATIONING A RECOMMENDED DEPLOYMENT SCHEME, WHICH WILL ALSO BE CONSIDERED FOR DECISION BY NATO MINISTERS, IS AT APPENDIX A.

28. COSTS. PRESENT ESTIMATES OF THE LIFE CYCLE COSTS OF THE PROPOSED LRNTNF SYSTEMS ARE SUMMARIZED IN TABLE 1 BELOW.

--- TABLE I/

--- ESTIMATED TOTAL COSTS FOR RECOMMENDED PROGRAM
- **PERSHING II**
  - **R AND D TO COMPLETE PROGRAM**
    - $M (FY 79): 460
  - **GLCM**
    - $M (FY 79): 70

**NEW CONSTRUCTION**

- **NATO INFRASTRUCTURE**
  - $M: 0
  - **GLCM**: 164.4
- **OTHER**
  - $M: 0
  - **GLCM**: 19.6

**PROCUREMENT**

- $M: 616
  - **GLCM**: 1072

**10 YEAR OPERATING AND SUPPORT**

- $M: 1280
  - **GLCM**: 1170

**LIFE CYCLE COST (TOTAL)**

- $M: 2356
  - **GLCM**: 2496

1/ ALL COSTS ARE IN CONSTANT FY 79 US DOLLARS AND
ASSUME THAT COSTS FOR A NATO LRTNF ARE THE SAME AS IF
THE US PROCURED AND MANNED ALL LRTNF SYSTEMS. ALL
COSTS PRIOR TO FY 80 ARE CONSIDERED SUNK.

2/ IF PERSHING 1A WERE RETAINED IN THE FORCE STRUCTURE IN-
STEAD OF BEING REPLACED ON A ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS BY
PERSHING II, ITS TEN YEAR LIFE CYCLE COST WOULD BE $1.5 B.
CONSEQUENTLY, THE COSTS FOR P11 AND GLCM REPRESENT A NEW
COMMITMENT OF ABOUT $3.2 B.

29. THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW FACILITIES WOULD BE FUNDED
THROUGH THE NATO INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM. CONSTRUCTION
COSTS WOULD INVOLVE $164M (FY 79 $) IN INFRASTRUCTURE
FUNDS. DURING THE MID-TERM REVIEW OF THE FIVE YEAR
CEILING IN 1982-83, THE CEILING WOULD BE INCREASED
TO ACCOUNT FOR THE REQUIREMENTS STEMMING FROM LRTNF
MODERNIZATION. TO INSURE THAT OTHER PRIORITY
PROGRAMS ARE NOT UNDULY DELAYED, A POLITICAL COMMITMENT
TO THE NECESSARY INCREASE SHOULD BE PART OF ALLIANCE
TNF DECISIONS. THE FUNDING FOR OTHER CONSTRUCTION
COSTS OUTSIDE THOSE COVERED BY THE INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM
(E.G., TROOP BILLETS, FAMILY HOUSING) WOULD BE FUNDED
EITHER BY THE COUNTRY WHOSE TROOPS MAN THE EQUIPMENT
OR BY THE HOST COUNTRY.
30. MANNING. TABLE 2 AT APPENDIX A PROVIDES MANPOWER DATA BY COUNTRY FOR THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM. A TOTAL

OF 7093 PERSONNEL ARE REQUIRED TO DEPLOY THE NEW LRTNF SYSTEMS. OF THIS NUMBER, 5007 WOULD BE ENGAGED IN OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT ACTIVITIES AND 2086 WOULD PROVIDE SITE SECURITY.

31. IN CASES WHERE US FORCES OWN AND MAN LRTNF SYSTEMS, HOST NATION SUPPORT WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION FOR BURDEN-SHARING AND FOR ACHIEVING THE WIDEST POSSIBLE NATO PARTICIPATION IN THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM. ONE USEFUL FORM OF SUPPORT IS THE PROVIDING OF HOST NATION SECURITY FORCE PERSONNEL TO AUGMENT US SECURITY FORCES. APPENDIX A SHOWS THE POTENTIAL AMOUNT OF MANPOWER INVOLVED IN SECURITY FORCE AUGMENTATION. ALTERNATIVELY, A SIMILAR NUMBER OF PERSONNEL COULD BE PROVIDED FOR OTHER FORMS OF HOST NATION SUPPORT.

32. NATO-WIDE PARTICIPATION. THIS SHOULD BE A NATO PROGRAM. ALL NATO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD EXPRESS PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR IT. NATO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD ALSO PARTICIPATE IN CONSTRUCTION FUNDING THROUGH THE INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM.

33. TIMING ASPECTS: DEPLOYMENT RATES AND IOC'S. PROGRAM DECISIONS ON THE RECOMMENDED PERSHING II-GLCM FORCE MIX, IF TAKEN BY THE END OF 1979, WILL PERMIT THESE SYSTEMS TO ENTER THE FORCE EARLY 1980 AND THE END OF 1983. THE COMMENCEMENT OF THIS PROGRAM SHOULD OCCUR NEARLY SIMULTANEOUSLY IN ALL HOST COUNTRIES TO DEMONSTRATE THE WIDESPREAD PARTICIPATION. PLANNED RATES OF PERSHING II AND GLCM DEPLOYMENTS ARE SHOWN IN APPENDIX D.

34. INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING. PLANNING INFRASTRUCTURE
PERSHING II AND GLCM. SO THAT THE LRTNF PROGRAM WOULD NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT OTHER NATO FORCE IMPROVEMENTS, A POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM INCREASES AT THE MID-TERM REVIEW (1982-83) SHOULD ACCOMPANY THE ALLIANCE CONSENSUS IN DECEMBER ON THE LRTNF PROGRAM.

35. EFFECT ON NATO TNF STOCKPILE. THE HLG STRESSES 35. EFFECT ON NATO TNF STOCKPILE. THE HLG STRESSES THAT ITS RECOMMENDED PROGRAM IS NOT INTENDED TO RESULT IN AN INCREASED ROLE FOR TNF IN NATO’S STRATEGY, OR IN AN INCREASE IN NATO’S STOCKPILE OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS. AS NEW WARHEADS FOR THE LONG- RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS ARE DEPLOYED, THE SAME NUMBER OF WARHEADS WILL BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE EXISTING NUCLEAR STOCKPILE IN EUROPE. TNF MODERNIZATION COULD CONCEIVABLY RESULT IN A REDUCTION OF THE NUCLEAR WARHEAD STOCKPILE IN EUROPE.

36. THE ACCOMMODATION OF THE ADDITIONAL LRTNF WARHEAD REQUIREMENT WITHOUT INCREASE IN THE TOTAL STOCKPILE NECESSARILY IMPLIES A NUMERICAL SHIFT OF EMPHASIS AWAY FROM WARHEADS FOR DELIVERY SYSTEMS OF OTHER TYPES AND SHORTER RANGES. THE PRECISE NATURE, SCOPE AND BASIS OF THE CONSEQUENTIAL ADJUSTMENTS AND THEIR POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALANCE OF ROLES AND SYSTEMS IN NATO’S THEATER NUCLEAR ARMORY AS A WHOLE, SHOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF AN EXAMINATION WHICH WOULD FOLLOW THE DECISION ON THE LRTNF PROGRAM.

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APPENDIX A

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SUMMARY OF DEPLOYMENTS AND MANPOWER

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TABLE 1 BELOW PROVIDES FOR CONSIDERATION BY MINISTERS

THE DEPLOYMENT SCHEME OF THE HLG’S RECOMMENDED PROGRAM FOR MODERNIZATION INVOLVING LRTNF.
1. DATE SHOWN HERE ARE COMPUTED BASED ON US MANNING LEVELS FOR LRTNF UNITS. NUMBERS IN PARENTHESES REPRESENT THAT PORTION OF THE TOTAL SECURITY FORCE WHICH COULD BE HOST COUNTRY PERSONNEL TO AUGMENT THE US SECURITY FORCES. ALTERNATIVELY, SIMILAR NUMBER OF PERSONNEL COULD Undertake SOME OTHER FORM OF HOST NATION SUPPORT.

2. THESE MANPOWER FIGURES ARE BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION

PAGE 22 STATE 247871

3. THESE FIGURES DO NOT INCLUDE GLCM CENTRAL REPAIR FACILITY MANNING WHICH IS ESTIMATED AT 50-150 PERSONNEL.

4. PERSHING 1A REQUIRES 4432 PERSONNEL. IF PERSHING 11 REPLACES PERSHING 1A, THE MANPOWER REQUIREMENT DECREASES TO 3914.

APPENDIX B - MILITARY EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSED TNF MODERNIZATION

1. THE PERSHING II-GLCM FORCE OF 572 WARHEADS WOULD NOTABLY ENHANCE NATO'S OVERALL DETERRENT FORCE POSTURE PRIMARILY BY PROVIDING A BROAD RANGE OF ESCALATION OPTIONS BETWEEN BATTLEFIELD USE AND US EMPLOYMENT OF ITS STRATEGIC
NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SHOULD DETERRENCE FAIL, THE MAJOR ROLE OF THESE NEW LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS WOULD BE TO CONDUCT SELECTIVE NUCLEAR STRIKES AGAINST MILITARY TARGETS, ESPECIALLY AGAINST TARGETS IN THE WESTERN USSR. THE PURPOSE OF SUCH STRIKES WOULD BE PRIMARILY TO SEND AN UNAMBIGUOUS SIGNAL TO THE SOVIET POLITICAL LEADERSHIP THAT NATO WILL NOT TOLERATE FURTHER AGGRESSION, THAT THE THEATER NUCLEAR RESPONSE IS NOT DECOUPLED FROM A

POTENTIAL STRATEGIC RESPONSE, AND THEREFORE, GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR IS IMMINENT UNLESS THE SOVIETS CEASE THEIR AGGRESSION AND WITHDRAW.

2. FURTHERMORE, ADDED BENEFITS ARE DERIVED FROM THE CAPABILITY OF THE NEW LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS TO RELEASE A PORTION OF NATO'S DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT (DCA) ASSIGNED A QUICK REACTION ALERT (QRA) ROLE. AS AN INCREASING NUMBER OF DCA ARE PLACED ON QRA IN ANTICIPATION OF A GENERAL NUCLEAR RESPONSE, A LARGER FRACTION OF NATO'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY WOULD BE VULNERABLE TO A COORDINATED WARSAW PACT ATTACK THUS INVITING PREEMPTION. DEPLOYMENT OF THESE NEW LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS COULD HELP TO MITIGATE THIS PARTICULAR VULNERABILITY.

SELECTIVE EMPLOYMENT OPTION (SEO) TARGET COVERAGE


TABLE 1 -- SEO TARGET COVERAGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERSHING II:</th>
<th>ILLUSTRATIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCENARIO</td>
<td>NO MISSILES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>GLCM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. IN THE CONVENTIONAL SCENARIO, NATO SEO'S ARE EXECUTED AFTER THREE DAYS OF CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT. UNDER THE NUCLEAR SCENARIO, THE SEO'S ARE EXECUTED AFTER THREE DAYS OF CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT AND A WARSAW PACT NUCLEAR STRIKE LIMITED TO NATO'S LONG-RANGE AIRFIELDS AND THOSE MOBILE MISSILE SYSTEMS THAT COULD BE LOCATED.

5. THE WEAPON SYSTEM RELIABILITY FOR GLCM IS .85; THE GLCM PROBABILITY-TO-PENETRATE VALUE IS .93. ASSUMING THAT ONE-THIRD OF THE GLCM DEPLOYMENTS ARE IN THE UK AND THE REMAINING TWO-THIRDS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THE PRE-LAUNCH SURVIVABILITY IN THE CONVENTIONAL SCENARIO IS .84 AND .72 IN THE NUCLEAR SCENARIO. PERSHING II WEAPON SYSTEM RELIABILITY AND PROBABILITY-TO-PENETRATE ARE .89 AND .89, RESPECTIVELY. IN THE CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR SCENARIOS, PERSHING II PRE-LAUNCH SURVIVABILITY IS .75 AND .68, RESPECTIVELY.

6. AS TABLE 1 INDICATES, THE PERSHING II-GLCM FORCE IS CAPABLE OF COVERING 370 SEO TARGETS IN THE CONVENTIONAL SCENARIO AND 330 IN THE NUCLEAR SCENARIO. THE PROPOSED FORCE WOULD THUS REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARD FILLING THE CURRENT SHORTFALLS IN SEO EXECUTION.

7. THE THREE FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THE CALCULATION OF SEO TARGET COVERAGE -- PLS, WSR AND PTP -- ARE ALL UNCERTAIN. FOR EXAMPLE, AS DISCUSSED IN THE APRIL
1979 HLC REPORT, THERE ARE WIDELY DIFFERING VIEWS ON CRUISE MISSILE PTP. DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET AIR DEFENSE BEYOND THOSE WE CURRENTLY ANTICIPATE COULD SIGNIFICANTLY DEGRADE CRUISE MISSILE PTP. SIMILARLY, ESTIMATES OF BOTH PERSHING II AND GLCM PLS ALSO ARE UNCERTAIN. FOR EXAMPLE, FOR A CONVENTIONAL WAR SCENARIO GREATER THAN THREE DAYS’ DURATION ESTIMATED PLS WOULD DECLINE. IN PART, UNCERTAINTIES SUCH AS THESE, COUPLED TO THE NEED TO MAINTAIN A CREDIBL AND ENDURING LAND-BASED CAPABILITY TO CARRY OUT SEO’S AGAINST SOVIET TERRITORY LED TO A PROGRAM IN THE UPPER PORTION OF THE HLC’S RECOMMENDED 200-600 WARHEAD DEPLOYMENT.

EMPLOYMENT OF DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT

SACEUR’S SCHEDULED STRIKE PROGRAM (SSP) USES AVAILABLE WEAPONS AGAINST APPROXIMATELY 860 FIXED TARGETS, A SUBSET OF THE ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE THREAT TARGET LIST CONSISTING OF SOME HIGHER PRIORITY TARGETS. NO MOBILE TARGETS ARE INCLUDED AMONG THE TARGETS IN THE SSP.

THE PROPOSED PROGRAM NOT ONLY INCREASES THE TARGET COVERAGE BY PROVIDING NEW LRTNF, BUT IT REINFORCES THE SSP BY REDUCING PRESSURE ON THE QUICK REACTION ALERT AIRCRAFT WHICH GENERALLY HAVE A LOWER PRE-LAUNCH SURVIVABILITY THAN THE NEW SYSTEMS. THE NEW LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS PROVIDE FOR ENHANCED FLEXIBILITY TO TARGET WITH DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT MOBILE FORMATIONS NOT NOW ADDRESSED IN THE SSP. THIS ADDED FORCE FLEXIBILITY ALSO FACILITATES AN IMPROVEMENT IN DCA CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES BY PROVIDING INCREASED SORTIES IN EITHER ROLE AS THE

CONFLICT MAY REQUIRE. HENCE, THE NEW LRTNF PROGRAM WOULD ALLOW SACEUR GREATER FLEXIBILITY TO USE DCA IN A CONVENTIONAL ROLE OR IN SUPPORTING SEO’S, AND TO CAPITALIZE ON THE BETTER SUITABILITY OF DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT TO ATTACK MOBILE FORMATIONS AND TO PROVIDE, AS NEEDED, A CONTINUOUS RESPONSE IN EITHER MEDIUM-RANGE INTERDICATION OR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT ROLES.

SUMMARY
TAKEN TOGETHER, THE IMPROVEMENTS IN NATO’S CAPABILITY TO EXECUTE SEO’S AND THE POSITIVE SPIN-OFF EFFECTS FOR GENERAL NUCLEAR RELEASE TARGETING, ESPECIALLY THE CAPABILITY TO RELEASE A PORTION OF DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT FROM NUCLEAR QUICK REACTION ALERT, INDICATE THAT THE PERSHING II-G-CM FORCE MIX FULFILLS THE HLG CONCLUSIONS ON THE DESIRED CAPABILITIES NATO’S NEW LRTNF SHOULD POSSESS.

VANCE

NNN
Det kongelige forsvarsdepartement
v/statssekretær J J Holst

v/19 kontor

Forsvarets overkommando
v/STSJ Generalløytnant Sven Hauge

Det kongelige utenriksdepartement
v/3. politiske kontor

NPG - HLG MØTE 26 SEPTEMBER 1979

Vedlagt innsendes kopi av:
- referat fra HLG møtet 26.9.79
- brev fra HLG formannen vedlagt den endelige rapporten fra NPG/HLG.

Etter fullmakt

John A Lunde

NORWEGIAN DELEGATION
TO NATO
B 1110 BRUSSELS

vår ref
5641/79/JAL/JM

NATO SECRET
Eksp nr 2 av 8
Side 1 av 1
Brussels,
28 september 1979

Eksp nr 1 m/NATO SECRET vedl del nr 1 og HEMMELIG vedl del nr 1 av 7
Eksp nr 2 m/NATO SECRET vedl del nr 2 og HEMMELIG vedl del nr 2 av 7
Eksp nr 3 m/NATO SECRET vedl del nr 3 og HEMMELIG vedl del nr 3 av 7
NATO nr: 1078
Eksp nr 4 m/NATO SECRET vedl del nr 4 og HEMMELIG vedl del nr 4 av 7

TA 20/10/79

FORSVARSDEPARTEMENTET
AVGRADERT
0 3 AUG 2009
Ref.
Underskrevet:
NATO SECRET
NPG – HIGH LEVEL GROUP ON TNF MODERNIZATION – MAIN POINTS

1. Summary

– The revised draft of the HLG report was finally approved for presentation at ministerial level
– The review of the specific paragraphs of the draft lead, in addition to editorial changes, to closer discussion of the participation issue, the justification for the proposed LRTNF force size and the issue of funding.
– While the Italians made the case for a justification of deployment, force structure and force size that focused as strongly as possible on military aspects, the Germans in particular underlined that a realistic proposal for TNF modernization presupposed that obvious political facts were taken into account.
– The HLG chairman and the American support staff received praise for excellent leadership during the HLG discussions.
– A copy of the Norwegian general statement is attached [for all attachments, see the original document]
– From Norway, the following took part:
Lieutenant general Sven Hauge (leader of the delegation in the absence of Deputy Minister J.J. Holst), Defence High Command
Acting Director Jan Monsen, MOD
Deputy Director Leif Mevik, MFA
Director Vidar Vikberg [sic], MFA
Assistant Defence Counsellor John A. Lunde, Norwegian Nato Delegation
2. Main points of the HLG meeting, 26.9.79

The HLG Chairman, Assistant Secretary of Defence McGiffert [sic], opened by underlining that the Americans hoped that the group would be able to approve the draft report for presentation at ministerial level. He also said that the task of integrating the HLG and Special Group reports would begin in the joint meeting of the two groups on September 28. Hopefully, the HLG participants would primarily ratify earlier proposals that had been incorporated into the report.

All delegations expressed general satisfaction with the draft for an HLG report that was presented. However, the majority had editorial and more substantial remarks to the specific paragraphs.

At the beginning of the meeting, the Italian delegation circulated a proposal for a comprehensive reorganisation of the HLG report. Since the meeting aimed for final approval of the report, the proposal was not taken up for consideration, in line with the request of the chairman.

The Italian proposal had two main aims:
– give the report a more logical structure
– base the recommendations on arguments that were as military/technical as possible, so as to underline that the final decision were to be taken on a ministerial level.

The Italian delegation, supported by Belgium and the Netherlands, also underlined that approval in the HLG did commit governments, even if one presupposed that the participants worked on the basis of their knowledge of the viewpoints of their respective governments.

The review of the specific paragraphs lead to editorial changes as well as substantial discussions concerning:

Paragraph 5 (the question of participation).

The Italian delegation pointed to the following phrasing in paragraph 5:
“Should additional alliance members desire to participate in TNF modernization through hosting LRTNF deployments on their soil, the program could be adjusted to accommodate such participation,”

and underlined that none of the prospective host countries really “desired to” participate in LRTNF modernization. In this background, the words “desire to” should be dropped.

Norway and Turkey did not support the proposal and final approval was reached only later during the meeting, when all participants could accept replacing the expression “desire to” with “consider”

The Norwegian statement concerning paragraph 5 is attached

Paragraph 17 (justification for the suggested force size)

Several HLG representatives asked to what extent the points listed in paragraph 17, intended to serve as basis for the proposed force size, really could be said to be relevant and suitable. The paragraph was revised entirely following the discussion.

The Norwegian statement concerning paragraph 17 is attached. The majority supported the chairman’s suggestion to transfer the Norwegian point concerning MBFR option 3 to the discussions in the Special Group.

Paragraph 28 (funding arrangements/cost-sharing)

All countries except Norway were generally satisfied with the sections concerning the funding arrangements, including the planned funding through the infrastructure programme. In relation to the Norwegian statement that is attached, the HLG chairman pointed out that the Norwegian proposal seemed superfluous, and that it furthermore could obstruct other countries that wanted to contribute additional funds beyond what would be covered by the infrastructure programme from doing so.
The Americans had not altered their principal view in the funding question, and any form of “open ended” funding for the TNF modernization program was out of the question.

Throughout the meeting, the Italians argued that the arguments for the pattern of deployment, force structure and size out to be, to the highest extent possible, based on purely military considerations.

The German delegation, with support from the Dutch, underlined in this respect that it was considered impossible to reach realistic LRTNF modernization proposals without bringing obvious political facts into consideration. The deployment of LRTNF weapons in the five prospective countries could not be justified on purely military grounds. The lack of will among the other countries to take on the political and military burdens related to stationing of LRTNF weapons had been decisive for the choice of the five host countries.

SHAPE specified on this point that wider participation, which would allow for the proliferation of LRTNF weapons to more countries, would be very desirable from a military point of view. Italy, for its part, underlined that it saw the inadequate arguments for the choice of host countries as a weakness of the HLG report.

In conclusion, the British HLG representative thanked the HLG representative Assistant Secretary McGiffert and the American support team for excellent leadership during the discussions of the many complicated and sensitive questions that related to LRTNF modernization within the NATO alliance.
Mr Chairman,

Para 3 points to the fact that the "Long Term defence program" (LTDP) improves the conventional leg of the NATO Triad. The rest of the paragraph implies that the modernization of the long range TNF is not part of the LTDP. This is of course not correct. The TNF modernization was established as "Task Force no 10" of the Long Term Defence program. We would therefore prefer a rewording of this paragraph which specifically ties the Long range TNF modernization to the rest of the Long Term Defence Program which already is known to the public and which is accepted by the heads of States.
Mr Chairman,

Para 5 and 10 deals with participation and we agreed this morning to drop the words "Desire to" in para 5 and "wish to" in para 10. The point of indicating the voluntary position of some nation not to host LRTNF deployment was discussed during the last meeting. Mr Holst then made a point of avoiding assertions or speculations concerning pressure or expectations that we would change a policy which has been a permanent feature of the situation in Northern Europe since the creation of our alliance. He also stressed the necessity to avoid suggestions that we are embarking upon an open-ended program. He suggested - and it was accepted that this sentence should reflect this. By taking the words "desire to" or "wish to" out this point is being lost. I would therefore ask that the sentences be left as drafted as this takes care of an important point for our country.
Para 6

Mr Chairman,

I would like to refer to para 6 tick no 5 which start with LRTNF augmentation. It implies that the Long range TNF modernization would correct the emerging imbalance after the UK Vulcans are phased out. This statement is not fully consistent with the footnote to table 1 in appendix A which indicate that the modernization program does not reflect the replacement of existing Long range TNF septems such as the UK Vulcans.

We think that the inconsistency could be corrected if the first line of this subparagraph of para 6 was amended to read: LRTNF augmentation would also contribute towards correcting the emerging imbalance in NATO's theater nuclear force posture.
Mr Chairman,

Pkt 17

Mr Holst has asked me to point at a substantive as well as a presentational problem flowing from the formulation under the second tick in paragraph 17. It is argued here about the economy involved in replacing all US PERSHING I launchers with PERSHING II. We have to confront the question what this criterion does to the Option-3 offer which is on the table in Vienna. We are concerned about this issue also because it will inevitably be brought up as a question in the public debate about the compatibility of TNF modernization and the pursuit of arms control.
Para 19

Mr Chairman,

Para 19 - first line refers to current US estimates on Soviet Long range TNF capability. I suggest that reference should be made to MC 161/79 which is as you know NATO agreed intelligence; reference to this document is made later on - in fact in the next paragraph.

I also feel that reference should be made in para 19 to the Golf II submarines in the Baltic since these are often referred to in public presentations in relation to Soviet theater nuclear capability.
Mr Chairman,

Pkt 29

I have been instructed to clarify one issue which appears somewhat obscure in the present draft, viz the issue of cost sharing.

The general principle of some limited sharing of the cost is established in paragraphs 5 and 24. It was our understanding that the specific financial participation of those countries who are not participating in a host-nation rôle would be limited to a sharing of the construction costs under the NATO infrastructure programme. However, in the current draft the whole matter looks somewhat open-ended as a result of the deletion of paragraph 23 in the previous draft which dealt with procurement costs.

The political clearance in Norway of the HLG report has been predicated on the assumption that participation in joint financing would be limited to a sharing of construction costs under the infrastructure programme. Hence, we must ask that the report be written so as to specify the responsibilities with respect to procurement costs which is consistent with the understanding which has prevailed hitherto and with the summary contained in paragraph 32.

We therefore propose a sentence to be added to para 29 after the first sentence in order to clarify this:
"The financial participation of those countries who are not participating in a host-nation rôle would be limited to a sharing of the construction cost under this program only."
Vår ref:
5745/79/JAL/KT

Brussel,
3 oktober 1979

Det kgl Forsvarets overkommando /m HEMMELIG vedl ekspl 4 av 7
v/STSJ Generalløytnant Sven Hauge

Det kgl Utenriksdepartement /m HEMMELIG vedl ekspl 5 av 7
v/3 pol. kontor

NPG/HLG - SPECIAL GROUP, FELLESMØTE 28 SEPTEMBER 1979

Vedlagt innsendes kopi av referat fra ovennevnte møte.

Hovedpunktene fra ambassadørmøtet om ettermiddagen 28 september vedrørende samme sak er oppsummert i egen melding til FD/FO 736/10725 og UD 10397 av 3 oktober 1979.

Etter fullmakt

John A Lunde

1 HEMMELIG vedl.
1. Summary

– At the beginning of the meeting, the HLG and SG chairmen gave a short presentation of the main contents of the respective reports

– All representatives could endorse the outlined framework for the continuation of the discussions [avklaring] concerning LRTNF modernization and arms control, based on the present reports and two integrated documents, which the HLG and SG chairmen will prepare jointly. Drafts for these reports will be circulated in mid-October.

– The first of the two integrated documents will be divided into two parts, one comprising the “rationale” sections and recommendations of each report, and the other a “draft public statement.” It was assumed that the first part of the document would form the basis for the final decisions concerning LRTNF modernization and arms control during the ministerial meeting in NATO in December 1979. It will be discussed at ambassadorial level in late October/early November and finally cleared for presentation on ministerial level in a meeting of ambassadors in the end of November.

– The second integrated document would not be cleared formally within NATO. It would contain an unclassified “public rationale,” prepared on the basis of the “rationale” chapters in the HLG and SG reports, and circulated to capitals as required.

– There was agreement about the necessity of consultations between capitals with a view to avoid that public statements concerning TNF issues in one country caused unintended problems with respect to public opinion in other member states before the December meetings.
– From Norway, the following took part:
Deputy Minister Johan Jørgen Holst, MOD (leader of the HLG delegation)
Lieutenant general Sven Hauge, Defence High Command
Deputy Director Leif Mevik, MFA (leader of the SG delegation)
Acting Director Jan Monsen, MOD
Director Vidar Vikberg [sic], MFA
Assistant Defence Counsellor John A. Lunde, Norwegian Nato Delegation
Fist Secretary Ove Farstad, Norwegian Nato Delegation

2. **MAIN POINTS** of HLG-SG JOINT MEETING 28.9.79

The following agenda was approved:

I. Brief presentation by HLG chairman D. McGiffert of the main contents of the HLG report.

II. A similar presentation by the SG chairman R. Bartholomew

III. Discussion of the framework for the continuation of discussions concerning LRTNF modernization and arms control in the time before the ministerial meeting in December 79.

I. The HLG chairman pointed out that the present report from the HLG contained a concrete proposal with respect to LRTNF modernization in line with the mandate given to the group by the NPG ministers.

The modernization programme was outlined within the principal guidelines for LRTNF modernization drawn up by the defence ministers on the basis on the previous two HLG reports to the NPG ministers.

The program comprised the deployment of 464 GLCMs (ground-launched cruise missiles) in the Federal Republic, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium and 108 Pershing II XR (Pershing missiles with increased range) in the Federal Republic, and was completely in line with the overall strategy of the alliance and the principles of solidarity and risk sharing.
The deployment in the 5 countries complied with both political and military requirements for widespread participation, and all countries were assumed to endorse the modernization decision and contribute funds through NATO’s infrastructure programme for necessary construction work in connection with deployment in the five countries.

II. In his presentation, the SG chairman pointed out that the report from the Special Group contained a concrete programme for an arms control initiative concerning long-range TNF weapons, to be launched in connection with the decision on LRTNF modernization. Like the modernization programme, the arms control initiative was designed with a view to improve overall alliance security. It must not be perceived as a potential alternative to – on the contrary, it was a supplement to – LRTNF modernization.

The Special Group recommended that the USA pursue negotiations with a view to limit long-range TNF weapons within the framework of SALT III, and that the negotiations should cover American and Soviet LRTNF units.

III. The HLG chairman referred to the American view that the two present reports should be integrated as part of the continuation of the discussions concerning LRTNF decision and arms control, with a view to a final decision at ministerial level within the end of the year.

In light of this, the American delegation suggested at the HLG and SG chairmen jointly prepare two integrated documents, the first of which could be circulated in mid-October for discussion and later approved on ambassadorial level within the end of November.

The first integrated document would be divided into two parts, and comprise elements from the HLG and SG reports that together would form the necessary and suitable basis for the decision concerning LRTNF modernization and arms control during the NATO ministerial meeting in December, as well as “draft public statement,” which would be formulated in accordance with the contents of the first part of the document.

As for the second integrated document, there were no plans to present this for formal approval within NATO. It would contain an integrated “rationale” for the agreed-upon
LRTNF programme and would be circulated to capitals as a basis for public statements on the LRTNF issue.
In this connection, specific national considerations and needs would as far as possible be incorporated into the document.

All representatives could endorse the outlined American framework for the continuation of LRTNF discussions.

The German delegation underlined in particular that collective responsibility must be maintained after the HLG and SG discussions were transferred to an integrated and political level.

The British delegation referred to the proposed integrated rationale document and underlined the need to include an agreed-upon data base to ensure harmony between statements from all capitals.

After the Belgian delegation underlined the need to avoid the impression that in reality, decisions had been taken before the issue was presented to the ministers at the December meetings when designing the procedures for the future discussions, all representatives endorsed the American expectation that one would keep this in mind in particular in relation to the NPG ministerial meeting in November.
All facets of the LRTNF issue would presumably be discussed at the meeting, but there was general agreement that any decision at this stage in the process would be out of the question.

Because the HLG and SG reports would be forwarded to the general secretary, it was assumed that future discussions would take place in accordance with regular NATO procedures.

The Norwegian delegation underlined that the different aspects of the HLG and SG reports had to be reflected in the integrated documents. This would be of great importance when it came to mobilizing political support in the capitals.
The rationale material should be expanded so as to cover more short-range Soviet TNF
weapons (SS 21, 22 and 23), which could threaten targets in Western Europe from forward positions as well.

Whereas the focus thus far had been on the internal procedure for the continuation of LRTNF discussions within NATO, there was an obvious need to arrive at guidelines to avoid that statements in one capital caused unintended problems in other member countries. Statements concerning the pattern of deployment (the number of LRTNF weapons to which country) were likely to be the most sensitive.

The Dutch underlined in particular the desirability of declassified versions of the HLG and SG reports.

With reference to the Norwegian statement, the SG chairman expressed that one was aware that two parallel processes were underway. The first comprised NATO discussions, while the other comprised consultation and decision-making processes connected to the governments and parliaments of the separate countries. When it came to the question of what could be said in public statements, the NATO countries already had procedures for necessary consultations on a bilateral basis.
RELEASED IN PART B1, 1.5(A), 1.5(D)

DECAPIED

MILITARY ADDRESSEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: AT 28 SEPTEMBER MEETING OF PERMREPS, SG AND HLG CHAIRMEN BRIEFED ON THE RESULTS OF THEIR STUDIES AND OUTLINED THE SCENARIO FOR ACTION LEADING TO DECISIONS ON TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL DURING THE DECEMBER MINISTERIALS. ALTHOUGH UNINSTRUCTED, PERMREPS WERE ENTHUSIASTIC IN PRAISING SG/HLG WORK WITH SEVERAL (FRG, UK, NETHERLANDS) INDICATING THAT IT FORMED AN ADEQUATE BASIS FOR MINISTERIAL DECISIONS. THE FRG AND UK PERMREPS ALSO STRESSED THE NEED FOR DECISIONS BY THE END OF THIS YEAR.
SIGN. DUTCH, CANADIAN AND DANISH PERMRPS EMPHASIZED THAT NPG MINISTERIAL WAS FOR CONSULTATION/DISCUSSION ON TNF ISSUES WITH DECISIONS RESERVED FOR THE DECEMBER MINISTERIALS. CANADIAN PERMRP SUGGESTED PLACING BOTH HLG AND SG REPORTS AND THE US-DRAFTED INTEGRATED DOCUMENT BEFORE THE NOVEMBER NPG MINISTERIAL SO THAT MEETING COULD BE SEEN AS HAVING "BALANCE" BETWEEN THE TWO ISSUES. END SUMMARY.


A. WE HAVE COMPLETED THE WORK OF THE HLG ON THE MODERNIZATION OF LRINF. AS CHAIRMAN, I HAVE TRANSMITTED OUR REPORT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOR CONSIDERATION BY MINISTERS AT THE NPG MEETING IN THE HAGUE IN NOVEMBER.

... -- OUR WORK IN THE HLG IS TESTAMENT TO THE DEGREE OF COOPERATION AND SOLIDARITY THAT EXISTS IN NATO.

... -- THE SUPPORT, COOPERATION AND ENthusiasm OF MY COLLEAGUES WERE THE INGREDIENTS WHICH ALLOWED THE HLG TO BECOME WHAT I BELIEVE TO BE A MODEL OF CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON THESE MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY SENSITIVE ISSUES.

PAGE 03

I BELIEVE THIS REPORT PROVIDES A BASIS FOR GOVERNMENTS TO REACH DECISIONS BY DECEMBER.

B. LET ME INTRODUCE THIS REPORT WITH A BRIEF REVIEW OF OUR DELIBERATIONS. AS PART OF NATO'S LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM IN 1977, THE ALLIANCE GAVE PROMINENCE TO THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNIZATION BY ESTABLISHING TASK FORCE TEN AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE HLG. AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S SPEECH BEFORE THE IISS PUBLICLY DEFINED THE MAJOR NUCLEAR ISSUES BEFORE THE ALLIANCE AND LENT A DEGREE OF URGENCY TO THE WORK WHICH WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS.
IN PARTICULAR, SALT II, THE ADVENT OF OVERALL PARITY IN US AND SOVIET CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS AND THE MODERNIZATION OF SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES, SPECIFICALLY THE SS-20 AND BACKFIRE, REQUIRED A NATO RESPONSE.

C. WE BEGAN OUR WORK IN THE HLG BY EXAMINING A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR THE MODERNIZATION OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES AND SUBMITTED A REPORT TO NPG MINISTERS IN THE SPRING OF 1978 WITH TWO MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS:

- NATO SHOULD MAINTAIN AND MODERNIZE THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF SHORT, MEDIUM AND LONG RANGE SYSTEMS TO SUPPORT THE STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE.

- PRIORITY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO AN EXAMINATION OF STEPS TO MODERNIZE THE LONG RANGE PORTION OF NATO’S
D. SUBSEQUENTLY, WE EXAMINED THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH AN EVOLUTIONARY UPWARD ADJUSTMENT IN NATO'S LONG RANGE SYSTEMS. IN OUR SECOND REPORT IN APRIL 1979, WE RECOMMENDED THAT ANY UPWARD ADJUSTMENT IN NATO'S LRTNF SHOULD MEET THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA:

- NO INCREASED ROLE FOR NATO TNF. ADJUSTMENTS WILL BE MADE WITHOUT A CHANGE IN CONCEPTUAL BASIS.
- THE INCREASE SHOULD BE WITHIN THE RANGE AND BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN THE NATO TOTAL INVENTORY OF WARHEADS IN-THEATER.
- THE RANGE OF NEW SYSTEMS SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO STRIKE THE SOVIET UNION.

E. IN THE REPORT WE HAVE JUST COMPLETED, WE HAVE MADE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A PROGRAM, SUPPORTED BY GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA, FOR THE MODERNIZATION OF LRTNF, WHICH I PRESENT TO YOU TODAY.

-- THE HLG RECOMMENDS THAT NATO'S LRTNF MODERNIZATION GOALS CAN BEST BE MET BY A DEPLOYMENT OF
-- THE HLG ALSO BELIEVES THAT -- CONSISTENT WITH THE
ALLIANCE PRINCIPLES OF SHARED BURDENS AND BENEFITS
FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE -- ALL NATO MEMBERS SHOULD
DEMONSTRATE BROAD ALLIANCE CONSENSUS ON LRTNF
MODERNIZATION THROUGH PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE PROGRAM
THAT IS ULTIMATELY AGREED UPON BY THE ALLIANCE AND
THROUGH SHARING OF THE FINANCIAL BURDENS.

-- THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM IS CONSISTENT WITH THE
UNDERLYING RATIONALE FOR STRENGTHENING NATO'S LRTNF,
INCLUDING THE NEED FOR:

. - LINKING THEATER AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES;

. - MINIMIZING THE RISKS THAT THE SOVIETS COULD,
HOWEVER INCORRECTLY, COME TO BELIEVE THAT THEY COULD
USE OR THREATEN TO USE LIMITED NUCLEAR STRIKES
AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE FROM A "SANCTUARY" OF THE
SOVIET UNION, THINKING THAT NATO WOULD NOT HAVE AN
APPROPRIATE RESPONSE;

. - AVOIDING THE PERCEPTION WHICH FAILURE TO
MODERNIZE WOULD GIVE THAT NATO WAS SHIFTING ITS
EMPHASIS TOWARD SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS WHILE
EMPHASIZING OFFSHORE COMPONENTS TO SUSTAIN LRTNF;

. - DEMONSTRATING AND REINFORCING ALLIANCE COHESION
AND RESOLVE.

-- THE PROGRAM RECOMMENDED IN THE HLG REPORT, IF
AGREED TO BY NATO, WILL ALSO BE CONSISTENT
WITH A NUMBER OF CRITERIA ESTABLISHED IN EARLIER WORK.

-- THE SIZE OF THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM IS NOT
ANALYTICALLY DERIVED BUT IS BASED ON THE CONVERGENCE
OF A NUMBER OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS,
INCLUDING THE NEED:

. - TO REDRESS CONVINCINGLY WITH MORE THAN A TOKEN
FORCE THE THREAT POSED BY THE SOVIET TNF BUILDUP,
PARTICULARLY IN LONG-RANGE FORCES;
. - TO MAKE EVIDENT THAT THERE ARE NO WEAK LINKS IN NATO'S SPECTRUM OF OPTIONS WHILE NOT IMPLYING A DIMINISHED ROLE FOR STRATEGIC FORCES;

. - TO INTRODUCE A FORCE NOT SO LARGE AS TO LEAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT NATO WILL MATCH THE SOVIETS SYSTEM-BY-SYSTEM BUT NOT SO SMALL THAT IT WOULD BE VIEWED, BY THE SOVIETS AND IN THE WEST, AS A POLITICAL GESTURE RATHER THAN A STRATEGICALLY MEANINGFUL RESPONSE;

. - TO ENSURE WIDESpread PARTICIPATION IN LRTNF BASING;

. - TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY INCENTIVES FOR THE SOVIETS TO ENTER INTO SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND TO AGREE TO REDUCE AND LIMIT THEIR LRTNF.
-- IN ADDITION TO MEETING THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY GOALS FOR LRTNF MODERNIZATION, I FIND THE PROGRAM RECOMMENDED BY THE HLG TO BE ENTIRELY COMPATIBLE WITH OUR ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES AND IN PARTICULAR THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL GROUP. I COMMEND THE HLG REPORT AND THE PROGRAM IT RECOMMENDS TO YOUR ATTENTION.

4. SPECIAL GROUP CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW, AFTER PRAISING WORK OF HIS SG COLLEAGUES, RECALLED THE MANDATE OF THE SPECIAL GROUP AND NOTED THAT IN THE COURSE OF ITS WORK THE GROUP DEVELOPED, AND FORWARDED IN THE FORM OF A FINAL REPORT, THE NECESSARY BASIS FOR ALLIANCE DECISIONS ON ARMS CONTROL IN CONJUNCTION WITH A DECISION ON MODERNIZATION. THE GROUP SET ITS SIGHTS ON CONCEIVING AND ELABORATING A SERIOUS, SUBSTANTIVE APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL INVOLVING TNF WHICH COULD SERIOUSLY CONTRIBUTE TO ALLIANCE GOALS OF DEFENSE AND DETENTE. THIS EFFORT HAS BEEN CLOSELY BOUND TO THE WORK OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP.

. . . BARTHOLOMEW INDICATED THE GROUP BELIEVES ITS MANDATE HAS BEEN FULFILLED BY DEVELOPING AND RECOMMENDING A CONCRETE ARMS CONTROL APPROACH -- AN APPROACH THAT WILL ENJOY THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES. THE SG REPORT CONTAINS THE NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR A FULLY INFORMED DECISION BY MINISTERS AS THE ALLIANCE MOVES FORWARD TO DECISIONS IN DECEMBER.

. . . BARTHOLOMEW THEN REVIEWED THE SG REPORT STATING THAT ITS BASIC CONCLUSION WAS THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD PURSUE ARMS CONTROL INVOLVING THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES ACCORDING TO THE PRINCIPLES DEVELOPED IN THE STUDY. THE

REPORT HAS DEVELOPED OBJECTIVES, RATIONALES AND PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE US EFFORTS IN TNF ARMS CONTROL. THE TWELVE PRINCIPLES TOGETHER FORM THE BASIC OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK AND DESIGN FEATURES OF A NEGOTIATING APPROACH.

DETAILING THE INDIVIDUAL PRINCIPLES, BARTHOLOMEW NOTED THAT THE FIRST MAKES CLEAR THE COMPLEMENTARITY
BETWEEN TNF ARMS CONTROL AND MODERNIZATION. HE STRESSED THE FACT THAT ARMS CONTROL WITHOUT MODERNIZATION IS NEITHER REALISTIC NOR POSSIBLE. ARMS CONTROL, HOWEVER, IS A SERIOUS PROPOSAL SERVING THE PURPOSES OF THE ALLIANCE.

. THE NEXT THREE PRINCIPLES DEAL WITH THE MODALITIES OF ARMS CONTROL INVOLVING TNF AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. THEY INCLUDE THE POINTS THAT NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING TNF SHOULD BE IN THE SALT III FRAMEWORK; THAT SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE NEEDED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE TO SUPPORT SUCH NEGOTIATIONS; AND ALLIANCE NEGOTIATIONS IN MBFR AND SALT III SHOULD BE CONSISTENT AND MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE.

. PRINCIPLES FIVE THROUGH NINE LAY DOWN BASIC GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING TNF. THEY INCLUDE:
  -- US REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE LIMITS ON TNF UNTIL THE SOVIETS AGREE TO NEGOTIATE ON THEIRS;

. -- INCLUSION ONLY OF US FORCES IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS;
. -- THE REQUIREMENT FOR DE JURE EQUALITY IN CEILINGS
AND RIGHTS;
- THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION; AND
- THE REQUIREMENT TO BE GUIDED BY MAINTAINING THE
STRATEGIC UNITY OF THE ALLIANCE.

THE FINAL THREE PRINCIPLES SET OUT THE DESIGN ELEMENTS
FOR THE APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL INVOLVING TNF:

- THAT ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING TNF BE
A STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS.
- THAT THE INITIAL STEP LIMIT/REDUCE THE THREAT BY
THOSE LONG RANGE SYSTEMS ABLE TO STRIKE NATO, ESPECIALLY
THE SS-20.
- THAT THE AIM SHOULD BE TO STOP SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS
SHORT OF THEIR PROJECTED LEVEL, FORCE THE RETIRMENT OF
SS-4/5 AND THEREBY REDUCE THE OVERALL THREAT TO NATO.
- THAT THE APPROPRIATE UNIT OF LIMITATION SHOULD BE
WARHEADS ON LAUNCHERS AND THAT THE GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE SHOULD

BE WORLDWIDE BUT PLACE SPECIAL RESTRAINT ON THOSE SYSTEMS
WITHIN STRIKING RANGE OF NATO.

SUBSEQUENT STEPS WILL PROVIDE THE POSSIBILITY
FOR EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF SYSTEMS COVERED AND
INCREASING STRINGENCY OF LIMITATIONS SOUGHT. LIMITS
ON LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT WILL NOT BE SOUGHT IN THE
FIRST STEP EXCEPT FOR BACKFIRE IN AN APPROPRIATE
MANNER. ALSO, SHORT RANGE SYSTEMS WILL NOT BE
ADDRESSED IN THE FIRST STAGE.

B. THEN NOTED THAT THE US HAD FORMULATED A
PROPOSED STATEMENT FOR RELEASE TO THE PRESS AT
THE CONCLUSION OF THE DAY'S MEETINGS. HE
CONCLUDED BY OBSERVING THAT THE HLG/SG EFFORTS
HAD PRODUCED RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH, IN HIS VIEW,
WOULD FURTHER NATO'S STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE AND
DETENGE. THIS WOULD NOT BE AN EASY BRIEF TO CARRY
OUT, BUT ONE OPENING THE PROSPECT OF SIGNIFICANTLY
ENHANCING ALLIANCE SECURITY.

5. AS-DEAN, CATALANO (ITALY) SPOKE FOR ALL PERMREPS
WHEN HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE EXCELLENT
REPORTS PREPARED BY BOTH GROUPS, WHICH WILL PROVIDE
MUCH "FOOD FOR THOUGHT." HE EXTENDED ESPECIAL
CONGRATULATIONS TO THE TWO CHAIRMEN. CATALANO'S REMARKS WERE ECHOED BY ALL PERMRPS WHO SPOKE.

6. PAULS (FRG) WAS THE NEXT TO SPEAK, AND MADE THE MOST SUBSTANTIVE INTERVENTION OF THE MEETING. PAULS STATED THAT BOTH GROUPS HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN MEETING THEIR MANDATES. HE HOPED THAT, WITH THIS EXCELLENT BEGINNING, THE FURTHER PREPARATION OF PARALLEL DECISIONS ON ARMS CONTROL AND ON IMPROVING NATO'S DEFENCES WOULD BE ABLE TO PROCEED WITHOUT OBSTACLES TO REACH THOSE DECISIONS BY THE END OF THIS YEAR. THE REPORTS OF THE HLG AND SG CONTAIN ALL THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS FOR PARALLEL AND SIMULTANEOUS DECISIONS BY MINISTERS AT THAT TIME. PAULS SAID THAT THE SG'S ARMS CONTROL PRESENTATION IS SUFFICIENTLY CONCRETE TO FORM THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION. PAULS WENT ON TO SUPPORT SUGGESTIONS MADE DURING THE MORNING'S JOINT HLG/SG MEETING FOR A SOLID DATA BASE. HE REFERRED TO THE NEED FOR DATA ON SOVIET SYSTEMS FROM WHICH ALLIES COULD QUOTE. PAULS SAID THAT THE CANADIAN IDEA, EXPRESSED AT THE EARLIER MEETING, WAS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE. A SOLID DATA BASE WAS NEEDED SO THE ALLIANCE COULD MEET THE IMMINENT PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN BY THE SOVIETS AGAINST NATO MODERNIZATION. PAULS CLOSED HIS REMARKS BY STATING THAT SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR NATO WITH RESPECT TO SALT III SHOULD BE WORKED OUT NOW, SO THEY WILL BE READY WHEN ALLIANCE DECISIONS ARE TAKEN IN DECEMBER.

7. OTHER PERMRPS AND CHARGES MADE POINTS ALONG LINES SIMILAR TO FRG COMMENTS. ROSE (UK) ALSO STATED THE REPORTS WERE AN EXTREMELY VALUABLE BASIS FOR DECISION IN DECEMBER AND THAT LONDON BELIEVED IT ESSENTIAL THAT THE ALLIANCE TAKE DECISIONS BY THE END OF THE YEAR ON BOTH TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL INVOLVING TNF. HE NOTED THAT THERE WERE ALWAYS ARGUMENTS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF ANY DECISION BUT THE ALLIANCE WAS ON RECORD AS SEEKING DECEMBER DECISIONS AND CONSEQUENTLY IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR ALLIANCE UNITY THAT
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INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
ALL NATO CAPITALS
USICA WASHDC
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE BE
USCINCOUR VAIHINGEN GER

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EXTREMELY SATISFYING THAT WORK ON BOTH SG AND HLG REPORTS
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IN CAPITALS COULD NOW TAKE PLACE. THE ALLIANCE WAS NOW
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AND THIS APPLIED VERY SPECIFICALLY TO THE NETHERLANDS.
HE SUPPORTED FRG SUGGESTION FOR A COMMON DATA BASE AND
STATED CLEARLY THAT THE NPG MINISTERIAL COULD ONLY DISCUSS
TNF MODERNIZATION/ARMS CONTROL WITH DECISIONS MADE IN THE
DECEMBER MINISTERIALS.

HARDY (CANADA) COMMENDED THE RAPID WORK OF THE SG AND
RECALLED THE SKEPTICISM OVER ITS PROJECTED SCHEDULE WHEN
MANDATED IN THE SPRING. HE NOTED THAT DESPITE GREAT PROGRES
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HE SUPPORTED THE FRG SUGGESTION FOR A NATO CONSISTENT DATA
BASE AND AGREED WITH DUTCH POSITION THAT THE NPG MINISTERIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
MUST NOT PREJUDICE DECEMBER DECISIONS.

VIBE (NORWAY) COMMENTED THAT THE TWO-SIDED ASPECT OF ARMS CONTROL AND MODERNIZATION APPROACHES WOULD BE HELPFUL IN DEALING WITH PUBLICS AND PARLIAMENTS AND SCHUURMANS (BELGIUM) NOTED THAT IN WEEKS TO COME IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO BE ABLE TO PRESENT PUBLICLY A BALANCED RATIONAL FOR BOTH MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL. SVART (DENMARK) APPRECIATED US POSITION THAT THE NPG WOULD IN THIS INSTANCE BE A CONSULTATIVE RATHER THAN A DECISION MAKING BODY.

8. IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST BY ROSE (UK), BARTHOLOMEW OUTLINED THE SCENARIO LEADING TO THE DECEMBER MINISTERIALS PROVIDING DETAILS AS SPECIFIED IN STATE 249189 AND AS DEVELOPED IN THE 28 SEPTEMBER JOINT SG/HLG MEETING.

THERE WERE NO SPECIFIC REACTIONS TO THE SCENARIO BUT BOTH UK AND CANADIAN REPS HAD NOTED GENERAL AGREEMENT EARLIER IN THE DISCUSSION.

9. LUNS SAID HE WOULD PUT OUT A P.O. OUTLINING THE FUTURE PROGRAM OF ALLIANCE MEETING ON THE SUBJECT LEADING UP TO THE DECEMBER MINISTERIALS. (WE HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH SECRETARIAT AND WILL REVIEW P.O. BEFORE IT IS ISSUED. WE UNDERSTAND SECRETARIAT WILL PROPOSE TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 6 AS DATE FOR FIRST REINFORCED PERM REPS DISCUSSION OF INTEGRATING DOCUMENT).

10. IN FOLLOW UP COMMENTS ON THE NPG MINISTERIAL, HARDY COMMENTED THAT THE AGENDA FOR THE NPG CURRENTLY GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE NPG WOULD BE CALLED UPON TO PRONOUNCE ON THE HLG REPORT WHILE THE SG REPORT AND ANY INTEGRATED DOCUMENT AVAILABLE AT THAT TIME WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO THE NPG AS REFERENCE MATERIAL ONLY. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE

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MOST RECENT COMMUNIQUE HAD REFERRED TO BOTH MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL AND THAT THE MINISTERS WOULD PROBABLY WISH TO CONTINUE THIS "BALANCE". CONSEQUENTLY, HARDY SUGGESTED THAT ALL THREE DOCUMENTS BE PRESENTED TO THE NPG ON THE SAME BASIS.

11. FULL TEXTS OF FINAL VERSION OF BOTH HIGH LEVEL GROUP AND SPECIAL GROUP REPORTS WILL BE TRANSMITTED SEPTEL FROM WASHINGTON. FINAL TEXTS OF BOTH DOCUMENTS HAVE, HOWEVER,
12. SYG LUNGS SUGGESTED, IN VIEW OF ALREADY HEAVY PRESS PLAY CONCERNING THE DAY’S MEETINGS, THAT HE MAKE A BRIEF PRESS STATEMENT ALONG FOLLOWING LINES: "ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES, MEETING AT NATO HEADQUARTERS TODAY UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF DR. JOSEPH M.A.H. LUNGS, SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO, WERE BRIEFED ON THE PRESENT STATE OF WORK UNDERTAKEN RECENTLY IN THE ALLIANCE ON THE ISSUES OF TNF MODERNISATION AND ARMS CONTROL.

"AMBASSADORS WERE INFORMED OF THE OUTCOME OF DELIBERATIONS IN THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP, WHICH IS CHARGED WITH PREPARING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NPG ON THE MODERNISATION OF NATO’S THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURE, AND HEARD THE REPORT OF THE ‘SPECIAL GROUP’ OF EXPERTS STUDYING THE ARMS CONTROL ASPECTS OF THEATRE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS." THIS SPARKED CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION, WITH A CONSENSUS FOR NOT OFFERING A PRESS STATEMENT.

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13. SYG LUNS THEN INFORMED THE GROUP OF THE BACKGROUND GUIDANCE HE WAS PROVIDING TO NATO PRESS SPOKESMEN, WHICH DREW ON THE DISCUSSION DURING THE JOINT MEETING OF THE HLG AND SG EARLIER IN THE DAY. BEGIN TEXT.

- AT THEIR MEETING THIS MORNING, THE SPECIAL GROUP AND HIGH LEVEL GROUP DEVELOPED THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO BE USED WITH THE PRESS IF QUESTIONED:

- NO DECISIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN;

- THERE SHOULD BE NO OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION OF THE NUMBER OF SYSTEMS TO BE DEPLOYED OR OF THE COUNTRIES IN WHICH THEY MIGHT BE DEPLOYED AS HAS BEEN REPORTED IN THE PRESS;

- THE PROCESS OF CONSIDERING TNF ISSUES IS CONTINUING;

- DECEMBER IS THE TARGET DATE FOR REACHING DECISIONS;

- IF THE QUESTION IS RAISED RELATING TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A DELAY IN THE RATIFICATION OF SALT II, THE REPLY SHOULD BE "NATO IS PROCEEDING ON THE TRACK SET OUT FOR IT SOME MONTHS AGO; THERE IS NO NEED TO CONSIDER CHANGING THE TRACK." END TEXT. BENNETT

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Aaron began by discussing how the trip had been a good one so far. He was very much impressed with the choice of position of the other allies. That went both for the English and for the Germans and the Italians. He recalled especially that the Germans had now made their decision in line with the recommendations of both reports, and that in Italy even the socialists are supportive. As regards Belgium, he was impressed by Simonet's statement. He said to be aware of our contacts with the Belgians and asked what we knew of their position. Generally therefore, a fairly positive situation has emerged. Brezhnev’s letter has not been able to change this.

In my first reply I have not responded to the question about the Belgians but asked the United States response to the points I have raised with Harold Brown. Aaron replied approximately along the following lines: We have discussed and considered the issues raised by the Netherlands very carefully and all the way to the highest level. "We would like" that the Netherlands will participate in this matter. This is important for the alliance.

To this my side-note that it struck me that this was a fairly weak formulation of the desirability of Dutch participation.

He did here, incidentally, immediately again point to the German position of not being able to act alone.

1 Dutch Defense Minister Willem Scholten.
2 David L. Aaron, Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs.
3 A military airfield, Valkenburg was located slightly to the northwest of the Hague.
4 The reports by NATO’s High Level Group and the Special Group on TNF modernization and negotiations with the Soviet Union, respectively.
5 Foreign minister Henri Simonet.
6 U.S. Secretary of Defense.
7 Items in quotation marks appear in English in the Dutch memorandum.
The United States want to help the Netherlands with its political problems. We want to be "so helpful" as is possible, but there are limits. There is an "emerging" consensus in the alliance and it cannot be endangered by making important changes in the proposed plans at this stage of the decisionmaking.

For my part I have reacted to this immediately with several remarks along the lines of: Until now there has only been decisionmaking at the level of the experts. Second: Several weeks ago I have delivered in a very clear way a political message to our most important ally, the United States. You yourself have determined the order of your trip through Europe, in spite of our request to do it in another way, this request also caused by the fact that today the Prime-Minister and Foreign Minister are not present. Under these circumstances you cannot say there is an emerging consensus at the political level. I have next added to this, that I absolutely do not want to be placed in a position that through this order and this consultation we would be confronted with established facts.

As regards the separate points:

The connection with SALT II.
Aaron pointed out that an official reservation in the decisionmaking would work extremely counterproductively in regard to the ratification of SALT II. I have said that if it would reach a positive decision, the Dutch government in any case would do this on the condition that SALT II would have to be ratified, but I still hope, I have added, that this is a non-problem.

Aaron next explained again, following McGiffert, that there is hope, and also a reasonable expectation that the decisionmaking will be completed this year, or at least early next year. He understood that the Netherlands would have to make a reservation on this point in its agreement, but, he emphasized again, if that would have to be included formally in the decision document it would be a very difficult matter for the United States.

The Dutch nuclear tasks.
Regarding the ADM and the Neptune-task the United States have no problems. Regarding the F-16 they do, but after an internal struggle they have accepted it the way we envision it.

The shift-study.
They are in agreement with the implementation of this study, also as concerns the number. They do note emphatically that the Dutch government should realize clearly that the more concessions were made to the Netherlands, this would also have an impact on the decisionmaking in other countries, e.g. in the Federal Republic, and that this too co-determined the American position.

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8 David McGiffert, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense and chair of NATO's High Level Group.
He believed that we went very far in regard to our nuclear tasks, and that this way we created the danger of undermining our total nuclear position. It is therefore a very difficult step for us, according to Aaron, to agree to this. Therefore, Aaron said, we call on you to help us in turn in the decisionmaking, and this has to happen in regard to the number of 572, because on this point I have to state in all clarity that we cannot accept your proposal to reduce to 50%.

Everyone has agreed to 572 and it would be a fundamental change in the structure of our approach if now we went to 50%. On top of that we do not really understand why you come with it and what is at the basis of you 50% idea. Why can you not live with the Schmidt formula, and where does this 50% come from? For my part, I have explained why we cannot accept such a high number. I have pointed out, among other things, that this production decision as a starting point basically assumes that the arms control talks with the Russians will have no result. It is not a denial of the value of the expert reports, but it is a political judgment in response to these reports.

In defense of his position Aaron has pointed to two effects. In the first place in regard to the American Congress. He explained that in the American budgetary system permission for a purchase such as this one is given all at once and that the Congress will not release funds in phases. Next he explained at length why in his judgment a lower level for the production decision will have a very negative influence on the Soviet Union's willingness to make concessions. And third he pointed out that in his view the President of the United States would lose all respect domestically if he would now come with a decision that was only 50% of what the military experts said it would have to be. The same number as has been proposed is an essential given for the United States.

For my part I have said that I will of course report on this discussion to the Prime-Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but that I did not expect that this would lead to a different position on the Dutch side. On the contrary, if they were in the country today, I said, I would probably bring the message to breakfast tomorrow that I had been instructed to defend our position with our European allies with double emphasis.

I have also pointed to the connection to MBFR. He reported that the United States would like to get to a simplified MBFR-proposal in order to give an impetus to the MBFR-discussions.

Returning to the number, Aaron also pointed out that in his view the 50% will become a ceiling, and he added: What certainty do we have that, when the conditions will not have been met, a next Dutch cabinet will be willing to participate in a raising of that ceiling.

Aaron asked me how I wanted to proceed. I said that I did not have any concrete ideas about that at this moment, but that, as he knew, in the coming days I will have discussions with my European colleagues.
Aaron emphasized at the end once again that there are limits for the United States which cannot be crossed. It is too far now still to be able to go back. If there was something else with which we could help the Netherlands, we'd be happy to do so. Our negative position on this point, according to Aaron, should not give the impression that we do not appreciate the efforts of the Dutch cabinet to come to a positive solution.

For my part I have concluded the matter by noting that in this way a very difficult situation has emerged.

[...]

BREZHNEV: [...]

You have recently informed us about the desire of Chancellor Schmidt to meet with you. We agree with you that it would not be good to avoid such a meeting although the preparations will probably take a certain amount of time. The meeting, of course, would in itself constitute a certain support for Schmidt and the government coalition on the eve of the federal elections. It therefore seems to us to be necessary to utilize such a meeting, possibly even the preparations for such a meeting, in order to influence the chancellor's position in a direction we deem necessary, among other things with regard to the question of plans for the stationing of American medium-range missiles in Europe.

If you wish to consult with us, Comrade Honecker, about the questions relating to this meeting, we are willing to do so.

[...]

Of increasing importance to us is the question relating to the plans to station new American medium-range missiles in Western Europe. It seems that the FRG Government and Federal Chancellor Schmidt personally do not play the smallest role in the preparation of these plans. They are also inducing other NATO countries, especially Holland and Belgium, to station new American missiles on their territories. It is planned to take corresponding decisions at the NATO meeting in December.

In different ways, among others through our contacts with the leadership of the FRG, we are making efforts to actively move against the implementation of the plans. It is important that there is a common front of all Socialist countries in this question.

One has to realize in the FRG and in all of Western Europe that Washington and Bonn have begun a dangerous game, that the implementation of the plans would be a severe blow against détente, which would result in political and strategic measures on the part of the Socialist countries, ultimately also in a growing risk for the Federal Republic itself.

I think that such pressure, supplemented by constructive steps of the Socialist countries in the field of military détente, will achieve some results.
With regard to the constructive measures, after we have researched the problem and consulted with you and the leadership of other allied nations, we intend to do the following: We will declare that we are ready to limit the number of medium-range missiles in the European part of the USSR, if the USA and NATO completely give up their plan of stationing American missiles in Western Europe.

We declare that as a gesture of goodwill the USSR will concede certain arms and force reductions on the territory of the GDR and that it will call upon the Western countries to follow the example of the Soviet Union. I intend to give our view on this question and others at my appearance at the festivities [30th anniversary of the establishment of the GDR] here in Berlin.

I would like to emphasize that such steps will not lead to a weakening of the defense capabilities of our armed forces, among them the troops stationed on GDR territory. You can be sure of that.

Now something on the situation with regard to the ratification of the SALT II Treaty in the USA: It is our impression that until recently those who supported the ratification of this treaty had the upper hand. Now the situation has become more complicated. The hysterical clamor in the United States - in which the Carter administration directly participated - over the stationing of a Soviet brigade in Cuba has become a serious impediment. We as well as the Cubans have taken a firm position against the American blackmail. We have vigorously opposed all attempts on the part of the Americans to coerce concessions or to intervene in our relations with Cuba. Carter was left with nothing else but to retreat. In the defensive, he now attempts to demonstrate strength, especially in the Caribbean region.

But there is still another inconvenient side effect in this question. The situation with regard to the ratification of the SALT-II-Treaty, in which Carter should be interested, has now become a bit worse. Disconcerting is also the open tendency in Washington, regardless of SALT-II, to build up vigorously their own armaments as well as the NATO arsenals as a whole.

Probably our common task will be - so that we will now and even more so after the coming into force of SALT-II-Treaty stand in a broad front - to pursue a vigorous fight against this tendency whereby we have to make use of all means of political, diplomatic and public influence.

In its policy against the Soviet Union and the entire Socialist community, Washington is increasingly actively playing its Chinese card. The American-Chinese rapprochement, one can state, has taken on a demonstrative character. Such a line on the part of the Americans de facto encourages Peking to new adventures in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Here we must especially watch out.

Now the Soviet-Chinese negotiations over the normalization of relations are starting in Moscow. The first meetings were devoted to organizational questions. Therefore it is difficult
to state with some certainty, what the Chinese have brought to the conference table. Our delegation has clear instructions. They are to try to give the negotiations a substantive character. But we do not have any illusions. We are facing a difficult, hard political fight. We will attempt to normalize our relations at least to some degree. It is now hard to tell if it will be possible. Beijing’s policy is today still deeply hostile towards peace and socialism.

Now briefly on the situation in Iran and Afghanistan. - Tendencies of a not particularly positive character have lately surfaced in Iran. The Islamic leaders have begun to persecute the progressive forces. They ruthlessly suppress the activities of national minorities. In addition, they try to blame us for the instigation of the activities.

Our initiatives with regard to the development of good neighborly relations with Iran are currently not gaining any practical results in Tehran. We know all that.

But we also understand something else: The Iranian Revolution has undercut the military alliance between Iran and the USA. With respect to a number of international problems, particularly with respect to the Middle East, Iran is now taking anti-imperialist positions. The imperialism tries to regain its influence in the region. We are trying to counter these efforts. We are patiently working with the current Iranian leadership and moving them to develop cooperation on an equal and mutually beneficial basis.

We have recently briefed you on the latest events in Afghanistan. Supplementing this, I would like to say the following: We have given Afghanistan more than a little economic support. We have sent our advisers there, civilian as well as military, and have supplied them with significant amounts of weapons and military equipment.

The situation in the country has improved. In some provinces, however, military encounters continue with the hordes of rebels who receive direct and indirect support from Pakistan and direct support from Iran, from the USA and from China. In addition, there are tensions within the Afghan leadership. Our efforts were directed to contribute to the unity of the Afghan leadership and not allow for divisions to happen. But Amin has taken advantage of Taraki’s indecisiveness and, as you know, eliminated him; he has achieved the leadership. Amin did this even though he was held as Taraki’s friend. You know that Taraki had a stopover in Moscow on his way from Havana where the Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement took place. I met him and advised him to take measures to stabilize the situation in his country and among other things begin with the work on a constitution and to keep up revolutionary lawfulness etc. We now see that Amin is implementing what I told Taraki.

Frankly, we are not pleased by all of Amin’s methods and actions. He is very power-driven. In the past he repeatedly revealed disproportionate harshness. But with regard to his basic political platform, he has decidedly confirmed to the course of further development of the Revolution, of furthering cooperation with the Soviet Union and other countries of the Socialist community.
It is a fact that many of Amin's followers and partisans are honorable people who are faithful to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and take a good attitude towards us.

By taking into consideration the actual situation, we will continue to support Afghanistan and give it a variety of support and help it in its fight against foreign aggression and the domestic counterrevolution.

[...]
On October 13 discussions took place at the invitation of the new Italian Prime-Minister Cossiga with Prime-Minister Van Agt at hotel Villa l'Este on Lake Como. Both Foreign Ministers were also present at these discussions. Except for an interpreter no other officials participated.

Following Prime-Minister Cossiga's proposal, the first topic of discussion was TNF, to which almost three hours were devoted. The Italian message was clear: Italy accepts conclusions High Level Group, fears a largely orchestrated Soviet propaganda-offensive, particularly aimed at the Netherlands and Italy, and believes it important therefore that the decision regarding modernization will be realized as soon as possible. This approach, therefore, as was clear also during the discussion, diverges from the Dutch one, which after all only wants to enable a decision during the ministerial NAC\(^1\) of December.

Prime-Minister Cossiga began the discussion with an explanation of the Italian decisionmaking process. Within the Italian cabinet there is a committee for defense matters, composed beside the PM of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and the Interior. The State Secretary charged with intelligence matters acts as secretary of the committee. For the TNF-issue a liberal and a social-democratic minister have been added to this committee. In this composition the committee has met for strictly secret discussions. It has decided to accept the modernization proposals. The entire council of ministers has been notified of this in a general sense, also in connection with a parliamentary interpellation from the radical side, which will take place on October 25. The decision is currently being submitted to the High Council of Defense (chair, President of the Republic), which has an advising role. After that, the decision formally comes into the Council of Ministers. Cossiga did not doubt a positive decision in both organs. Public declarations in the matter will only be made after the final decision in the Council of Ministers.

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\(^1\) North Atlantic Council.
Meanwhile consultations with a number of political leaders had taken place, from which had become clear that the Christian-Democrats, Liberals, Social-Democrats, and Republicans will support the decision. The Socialists were in principle in agreement. Contact had also been made with the Communists. The S.G.² of the Communist party was at that moment not yet in a position to have a discussion, but declared himself willing to meet accompanied by experts. As far as the interpellation on October 25 is concerned, the government would respond "low profile."

Cossiga noted that he had conveyed the position of the Italian government to Mrs. Thatcher and Lord Carrington, to Schmidt and Genscher, and to the American government. Now he also wanted to inform us about it. Incidentally, during a meeting in New York, Malfatti³ had left no doubt with Gromyko.

All this does not detract from the fact that Italy is in favor of a continuation of the detente-policy, multilaterally as well as bilaterally. It hopes for a rapid ratification of SALT II. The decision regarding TNF-modernization needs to be accompanied by a credible and serious disarmament offer. A realistic detente policy can however only be based on a genuine restoration of the balance.

This balance, according to Cossiga, is lacking currently. SALT II freezes the strategic component. The conventional armaments component is imbalanced and can't be evened out through negotiations. Restoration of the balance therefore is only possible via TNF. In addition we are confronted by new Soviet weapons. In this context, Cossiga pointed out that although he can understand the U.S. view that the Backfires are a regional weapon, experts had pointed out to him that they quickly could be transformed into strategic weapons. The situation was extremely dangerous. The Soviet Union kept Europe, North-Africa, the Middle-East, and Pakistan over a barrel with weapons of great precision which through their mobility, moreover, are practically invulnerable; and in this conversation Cossiga was not even going to talk about China. It is a situation which politically could be tempting for the S.U.. Military superiority can be translated into diplomatic and political superiority. In this situation the danger of a conventional arms race cannot be eliminated, with a chance for local conflicts.

Added to that is the advanced age of Soviet leaders. What will a change in the Soviet leadership mean? According to Cossiga there are discussions within the Soviet leadership about the future course. What consequences will Tito's death have? All these uncertainties make the situation even more dangerous.

After this general evaluation Cossiga discussed TNF-modernization directly. We should not dramatize the decision. It does not represent a change in the NATO-strategy, more a confirmation of it. A decision not to modernize would on the other hand represent a change in strategy and it would damage the Western negotiating position and the

² Presumably: Secretary-General.
³ Franco Maria Malfatti, foreign minister.
possibilities to achieve disarmament. There has to be a consensus within NATO, with participation at least of the US, the UK, the nuclearized countries (FRG, Italy, Benelux), and Denmark and Norway. Cossiga underlined particularly the great importance of the support of all nuclearized countries for this decision.

To a question of mine whether this general support was a condition for a positive Italian position, Cossiga said that the condition was a unanimous political decision for modernization. Deployment in all concerned countries was not a condition, although extremely important. The goal after all was to maintain the multilateral nature of the alliance; one had to prevent the emergence of a bilateral connection between the US and FRG. This would be an extremely dangerous development. The FRG should not be placed in an isolated position by its European allies.

Italy is also convinced of the importance of the above because in case of a crisis with the FRG it will have to take the first blow. The troops stationed in Hungary are meant to march via Slovenia to Italy (Cossiga said that several years ago a Soviet-delegate to the MBFR-talks said as much to his Italian colleague).

Cossiga next moved to an initial analysis of Brezhnev's speech in Berlin, which he characterized as the beginning of a large propaganda-offensive, aimed particularly at the Netherlands and Italy. The speech was a cocktail of offers, which possibly are a signal for MBFR, but whose concrete significance is difficult to estimate, and of threats (no nuclear weapons against countries that do not deploy them). About TNF Brezhnev had hardly spoken at all; he had walked around the only realistic solution, namely no longer produce and next destroy.

At this point Malfatti intervened and said that NATO ought to respond to Brezhnev's speech and in a non-polemical way. Cossiga reacted by saying that we can't pretend to have understood everything.

Finally Cossiga pointed to the problem of the single or the dual-key regarding nuclear weapons. In contrast to the FRG, Italy continues to attach importance to a dual-key system also for new weapons.

Next, Prime-Minister Van Agt provided a long explanation of the political situation in the Netherlands in regard to the TNF-issue. His remarks about the connection made in the Netherlands between SALT II ratification and the introduction of a decision regarding TNF-modernization provoked a (quasi?) surprised reaction by Cossiga, who viewed an earlier decision regarding modernization as a condition for the ratification of SALT II, otherwise he envisioned the emergence his dreaded bilateral Washington-Bonn axis. I then pointed at the for us essential and central element of arms control in the decisionmaking over TNF, with SALT II ratification a condition.

Following this there ensued a debate over the time when the decisions about TNF-modernization should be taken. Cossiga underlined his concern about increasing Soviet-
pressure directed to the Netherlands, Italy, and the left wing of the SPD, if a decision would be delayed until the December NAC. His preference was for a decision in the NPG. In response, we responded negatively, both for internal political reasons and because of the importance of the disarmament element, for which a clearly demonstrable contribution of the Foreign Ministers is essential. Cossiga wondered what the NPG would be expected to do in that case. He did not agree with us that the NPG only needed to take note of official reports. From our side it was noted that the bridging report's evaluation cannot be done just by the Defense Ministers.

Cossiga's next suggestion, to let the PRs\(^4\) in Brussels decide under instructions from their governments directly following the NPG meeting, we also rejected, both because of the time-element and because of the importance of the matter, whose importance required decisionmaking in the presence of ministers. Cossiga then wondered if the dates of the various meetings could not be advanced. This we also resisted, incidentally supported by Malfatti. In the Netherlands this would be seen as a surprise tactic, with all negative political consequences, and the Soviets could see it as evidence of uncertainty, if not panic. We have maintained the position that the decisionmaking program and the dates fixed for the meetings should be kept without change.

The discussion, which incidentally was conducted in a friendly atmosphere with understanding for each other's problems, did not lead to a joint conclusion; on the contrary, it is clear that the Italian views (we have made our decision, this should be confirmed in the alliance as quickly as possible, because otherwise domestic forces, egged on by the S.U., will become ever stronger) are diametrically opposed to ours (all emphasis on a gradual decisionmaking, where the primary importance given to the arms control element will be realized fully). We decided to continue the contacts, also at the ministerial level, in the near future.

\(^{4}\) Permanent Representatives.
E.D. 12065  GDS 10/15/85  (BARTHOLOMEW, REGINALD)

STATE 269647

DECAPICTONED

TAGS: MNUC, PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: TNF: INTEGRATED DECISION DOCUMENT

1. ENTIRE TEXT.
2. This message provides the US draft text of an integrated decision document for year end action on the LRNTF modernization and arms control programs. Participants in the high level group and the special group anticipate this US draft, which was promised by the HLG and SG Chairmen at their meetings two weeks ago.

3. Posts should note that the five nations in which LRNTF basing is proposed have already received this document for comment. Comments were received from [redacted]. For the most part, those comments were incorporated. The members of the Presidential emissary delegation (Aaron, Bartholomew, McGiffert and Thomson) will be prepared to discuss the comments which were received.

4. Posts which did not receive the text of the first draft should not repeat not reveal any knowledge that the other five capitals had received an earlier edition for comment.

5. Embassies should contact the senior members of the high level group and repeat and the special group delegations and provide them with the draft text as soon as possible. You should ask for comments by the 26th, so that we can turn the draft around in time for the Permreps discussion scheduled for 6 November.

6. [redacted]

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Comments were received too late for incorporation in the text, but will be discussed by the Presidential emissary delegation.

I. Introduction

1. The concerned members of the alliance noted the constructive reports of the NPG high level group on LRNTF modernization and the special group on arms control, circulated by the syg and appended as documents A and B. This document, based on the reports of the HLG and the SG, constitutes the collective decision of the ministers on the subjects raised in those reports.

II. Rationale

1. The Warsaw Pact has over the years developed a large
AND GROWING CAPABILITY IN NUCLEAR SYSTEMS THAT DIRECTLY
THREATEN WESTERN EUROPE AND HAVE A STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE
FOR THE ALLIANCE IN EUROPE. THIS SITUATION HAS BEEN
ESPECIALLY AGGRAVATED OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS BY SOVIET
DECISIONS TO IMPLEMENT PROGRAMS MODERNIZING AND EXPANDING
THEIR LONG-RANGE FORCES SUBSTANTIALLY. IN PARTICULAR, THEY
HAVE DEPLOYED THE SS-20 MISSILE, WHICH OFFERS SIGNIFICANT
IMPROVEMENTS OVER PREVIOUS SYSTEMS IN PROVIDING GREATER
ACCURACY, MORE MOBILITY, AND GREATER RANGE, AS WELL AS HAV-
ING MULTIPLE WARHEADS, AND THE BACKFIRE BOMBER, WHICH HAS
A MUCH BETTER PERFORMANCE THAN OTHER SOVIET AIRCRAFT DEPLOYED
HITHERTO IN A PERIPHERAL ROLE. DURING THIS PERIOD, WHILE
THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN REINFORCING ITS SUPERIORITY IN
LRTNF BOTH QUANTITATIVELY AND QUALITATIVELY, WESTERN LRTNF
CAPABILITIES HAVE REMAINED STATIC. INDEED THESE FORCES ARE
INCREASING IN AGE AND VULNERABILITY AND DO NOT INCLUDE LAND-
BASED, LONG RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR MISSILE SYSTEMS. AT THE
SAME TIME, THE SOVIETS HAVE UNDERTAKEN A MODERNIZATION AND
EXPANSION OF THEIR SHORTER-RANGE TNF AND GREATLY IMPROVED

THE OVERALL QUALITY OF THEIR CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

- 2. THESE DEVELOPMENTS TOOK PLACE AGAINST THE BACKGROUND
OF INCREASING SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC CAPABIL-
ITIES AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PARITY IN INTERCONTINENTAL
WEAPON SYSTEMS WITH THE UNITED STATES. THESE TRENDS HAVE
PROMPTED SERIOUS CONCERN WITHIN THE ALLIANCE BECAUSE, IF
THEY WERE TO CONTINUE, SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN THEATER
NUCLEAR SYSTEMS COULD UNDERMINE THE STABILITY ACHIEVED IN
CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. THE FACT THAT WESTERN LONGER-
RANGE THEATER SYSTEMS ARE AGING COULD ALSO CAST DOUBT ON
THE ALLIANCE'S DETERRENT STRATEGY BY HIGHLIGHTING THE GAP
IN THE SPECTRUM OF NATO'S AVAILABLE NUCLEAR RESPONSES TO
AGGRESSION.

- 3. THIS SITUATION COULD GIVE RISE TO THE RISK THAT
THE SOVIETS MIGHT BELIEVE -- HOWEVER INCORRECTLY -- THAT
THEM COULD USE LONG-RANGE FORCES TO MAKE OR THREATEN
LIMITED STRIKES AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE FROM A 'SANCTUARY'
IN THE SOVIET UNION. THERE COULD BE A Misperception That
WITHOUT STRONG THEATER-BASED SYSTEMS OF ITS OWN CAPABLE
OF REACHING SOVIET TERRITORY AND IN AN ERA OF PARITY AT
THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR LEVEL, NATO LACKED CREDIBLE AND
APPROPRIATE MEANS OF RESPONSE.
4. OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS THE ALLIANCE HAS IDENTIFIED THE NEED TO MODERNIZE ITS OWN LONGER-RANGE TNF CAPABILITY IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE, TO REPLACE OBSELETE WEAPON SYSTEMS, AND TO ENSURE A CREDIBLE CONTINUUM OF DETERRENCE BY BEING ABLE TO STRIKE SOVIET TERRITORY WITH LAND-BASED SYSTEMS IN EUROPE. THIS MODERNIZATION IS PART OF NATO'S CONTINUING EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE ITS CAPABILITIES AND WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT INCREASING THE ALLIANCE'S RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR LOWERING THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD IN EUROPE.


6. TNF MODERNIZATION IS ALSO CONSISTENT WITH THE IMPROVEMENTS IN FORCES OUTLINED IN THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM (LTFDP), WHICH GIVES PRIORITY TO CONVENTIONAL FORCE IMPROVEMENTS BUT ALSO CONSIDERS TNF IMPROVEMENTS. THE RECOMMENDED ADJUSTMENTS OF LRTNF CALLED FOR HERE ARE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF NATO, THEY WILL NOT INCREASE THE ROLE OF TNF IN THIS STRATEGY, BUT WILL STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE AND WILL REINFORCE THE LINKAGE TO THE STRATEGIC LEG OF THE TRIAD. THIS CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS WILL REMAIN THE ULTIMATE DETERRENT. FINALLY, THIS COLLECTIVE DECISION ON A COORDINATED PROGRAM IN THIS FIELD DEMONSTRATES AND REINFORCES ALLIANCE COHESION AND RESOLVE.

WOULD NOT OBVIATE THE NEED FOR SOME LRTNF MODERNIZATION TO MEET THE ALLIANCE'S OWN SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT CAN ADJUST
7. IN PARALLEL WITH TNF MODERNIZATION SPECIAL CONSIDERATION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE ROLE ARMS CONTROL CAN PLAY IN CONTRIBUTING TO A MORE STABLE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, AND IN ADVANCING THE PROCESS OF DETENTE. THE ALLIANCE REGARDS ARMS CONTROL AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF ITS EFFORTS TO ASSURE THE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF ITS MEMBER STATES BY MAKING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION WHICH THE ALLIANCE FACES MORE STABLE, MORE PREDICTABLE, AND MORE MANAGEABLE, AND BY SEEKING LOWER LEVELS OF WEAPONS ON BOTH SIDES.

8. THUS BOTH TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL INVOLVING TNF ARE IN LINE WITH NATO'S BASIC POLICY OF DETERRENCE, DEFENSE AND DETENTE, AS ENUNCIATED IN THE HARMEL REPORT. INDEED, ALLIANCE DEFENSE EFFORTS SUCH AS TNF MODERNIZATION PROVIDE THE FOUNDATION FOR A POLICY OF GENUINE DETENTE WITH THE EAST.

III. DECISIONS

A. GENERAL POLICY


2. A POLICY OF PARALLEL AND INTEGRATED LRTNF DEPLOYMENTS AND ARMS CONTROL WILL BEST ACHIEVE MAXIMUM IMPROVEMENT IN ALLIANCE SECURITY. THIS INTEGRATION IS SOUGHT BOTH TO ENSURE THAT DEFENSE DECISIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THEM ARE NOT MADE HOSTAGE TO EXPECTATIONS OF DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, AND SO THAT ARMS CONTROL ITSELF HAS A REALISTIC CHANCE OF SUCCESS. HOWEVER, NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING LRTNF WILL NOT BE REALISTIC OR POSSIBLE WITHOUT AN AGREED MODERNIZATION PLAN AND A DECISION TO IMPLEMENT IT.

3. SUCCESS OF ARMS CONTROL IN CONSTRAINING THE SOVIET BUILDUP CAN ENHANCE ALLIANCE SECURITY AND MODIFY THE SCALE
OF NATO'S TNF MODERNIZATION REQUIREMENTS. THUS, CONCRETE ARMS CONTROL RESULTS COULD LEAD TO A DOWNWARD ADJUSTMENT IN THE SCALE OF NATO'S TNF REQUIREMENTS. HOWEVER, ANY ACHIEVABLE ARMS CONTROL OUTCOME INVOLVING TNF WOULD NOT, IN THE FIRST STEP, ELIMINATE ENTIRELY THE SOVIET LRNTNF THREAT AND

THE SCALE OF CONCRETE MEASURES AIMED AT MEETING THE CONTINUOUS ARMAMENT EFFORT OF THE WARSAW PACT WILL DEPEND IN PART ON THE DEGREE OF SUCCESS IN ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE AND BALANCED LIMITATIONS ON LRNTNF OF BOTH SIDES THROUGH ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

- B. PROGRAMS

THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE THEREFORE ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING INTEGRATED LRNTNF PROGRAMS, BASED ON THE WORK OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP AND THE SPECIAL GROUP.

LRNTNF MODERNIZATION

- 1. MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE AGREED THAT NATO'S LRNTNF MODERNIZATION GOALS CAN BEST BE MET BY A DEPLOYMENT OF

2. MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE EXPRESSED THEIR INTENT TO PROVIDE CLEAR POLITICAL AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR ALL ASPECTS OF THIS NATO PROGRAM. MINISTERS APPROVED THE DEPLOYMENT SCHEME PRESENTED BELOW TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE PARTICIPATION IN THE HOSTING OF LRNTNF. THIS DEPLOYMENT SCHEME, INVOLVING BASING OF LRNTNF IN A NUMBER OF NATO COUNTRIES, TOGETHER WITH FINANCIAL SUPPORT BY ALL COUNTRIES FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES ELIGIBLE FOR INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM FUNDING, DEMONSTRATES THE ALLIANCE'S SOLIDARITY AND WILLINGNESS TO SHARE RISKS AND WILL ENHANCE THE SURVIVABILITY AND CREDIBILITY OF THE FORCE.

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LRNTNF SYSTEMS DEPLOYMENTS
3. The construction of new facilities will be funded through the NATO infrastructure program. So that the LRTNF program will not adversely affect the NATO force improvements, during the mid-term review of the five-year ceiling in 1982-83 the ceiling will be increased to account for the requirements stemming from LRTNF modernization.

4. The LRTNF modernization program will also involve appropriate host nation manning support on the scale and in the manner recommended by the high level group, in those nations where the US owns and operates LRTNF units.

5. The LRTNF program will not result in an increased role for theater nuclear forces in NATO’s strategy, or in an increase in NATO’s stockpile of nuclear warheads. As new warheads for the long-range theater nuclear systems are deployed, the same number of warheads will be withdrawn from the existing nuclear stockpile in Europe. TNF modernization could conceivably result in a reduction of the nuclear warhead stockpile in Europe. The accommodation of the additional LRTNF warhead requirement, without increase in the total stockpile, necessarily implies a numerical shift of emphasis away from warheads for delivery systems of other types and shorter ranges.

6. Members of the alliance charged the nuclear planning group to undertake an examination of the precise nature, scope and basis of the consequential adjustments and their possible implications for the balance of roles and systems in NATO’s theater nuclear armory as a whole.

Arms Control

In developing and pursuing a policy on arms control involving TNF in parallel with the preparation and implementation of alliance decisions on the modernization of LRTNF, ministers concurred that concrete and realistic arms control proposals should be formulated in order to achieve the following objectives:
1. To maintain and enhance the overall security of the alliance;

2. To reduce the growing disparity in long-range theater nuclear systems, which has been highlighted by Soviet deployments of the SS-20;

3. To avoid unconstrained competition and increasing instability in the theater nuclear field, and to achieve security at balanced lower levels of nuclear weapons on both sides;

4. By means of concrete and realistic arms control proposals, to counter Soviet efforts to interfere in alliance decision-making through vague disarmament offers designed to hinder alliance TNF modernization decisions, and

5. To enhance the strategic unity of the alliance and the coherence of the alliance's strategy of deterrence and defense.

In pursuit of these objectives, the following principles should guide the United States in negotiations with the Soviet Union:

1. Arms control involving TNF must be a complement to, not a substitute for, TNF modernization.

2. Arms control negotiations involving TNF should be conducted within the SALT III framework.

3. Because negotiations in SALT III involving TNF would be of great significance to the overall security of the alliance, there should be special consultative arrangements on positions to be taken in these negotiations.

4. Alliance objectives in SALT III negotiations
INVOLVING TNF AND IN MBFR SHOULD BE CONSISTENT AND MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE.

- 5. NEGOTIATIONS ON TNF IN SALT III MUST BE PREDICATED ON THE US STATEMENT ON GRAY AREA SYSTEMS, "ANY FUTURE LIMITATIONS ON US SYSTEMS PRINCIPALLY DESIGNED FOR THEATER MISSIONS SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY APPROPRIATE LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET THEATER SYSTEMS".

- 6. ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING TNF SHOULD NOT INCLUDE NON-US ALLIED SYSTEMS, NOR SHOULD THE US NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIETS COMPENSATION FOR SUCH SYSTEMS.

- 7. ANY AGREEMENT ON TNF MUST ENSURE DE JURE EQUALITY BOTH IN CEILINGS AND IN RIGHTS.

- 8. ANY ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT INVOLVING TNF SHOULD BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE.


- 10. ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING TNF SHOULD BE A STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS. THE FIRST STEP SHOULD FOCUS ON THE MOST IMMEDIATE THREAT, WITH THE STRINGENCY AND SCOPE OF LIMITATIONS SOUGHT AS AMBITIOUS AS THE ALLIANCE CAN REALISTICALLY EXPECT TO ACHIEVE AND VERIFY. SUBSEQUENT STEPS COULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPAND THE SCOPE OF SYSTEMS COVERED AND TO INCREASE THE STRINGENCY OF LIMITATIONS SOUGHT, INCLUDING REDUCTIONS.

11. THE INITIAL STEP SHOULD FOCUS ON LIMITING AND REDUCING THE THREAT POSED BY THOSE SOVIET LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR MISSILE SYSTEMS IN A POSITION TO STRIKE NATO, ESPECIALLY THE MOST MODERN AND CAPABLE OF THOSE SYSTEMS -- THE SS-20.

- A. THE AIM SHOULD BE TO STOP SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS SHORT OF THEIR PROJECTED LEVEL, FORCE THE RETIREMENT OF SS-4S AND SS-5S, AND THEREBY ACHIEVE A REDUCTION IN THE OVERALL THREAT.

- B. WARHEADS-ON-LAUNCHERS WOULD PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE
UNIT OF LIMITATION ON LONG-RANGE THEATER MISSILES.

- C. THE LIMITATIONS SHOULD APPLY TO WORLDWIDE LONG-RANGE LAND-BASED THEATER NUCLEAR MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS, BUT SHOULD ESPECIALLY RESTRICT THOSE DEPLOYMENTS WITHIN STRIKING RANGE OF NATO.

- 12. WHILE INITIALLY FOCUSING ON LONG-RANGE MISSILES, OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE TNT THREAT SHOULD ALSO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

- A. LIMITS ON LONG-RANGE AIRCRAFT IN GENERAL SHOULD NOT BE SOUGHT IN THE FIRST STEP, EXCEPT FOR BACKFIRE IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER.

- B. SHORT-RANGE SYSTEMS SHOULD NOT BE ADDRESSED IN THE FIRST STEP.

- 13. MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE AGREED THAT SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS OF A CONTINUING NATURE WITHIN THE NATO FRAMEWORK SHOULD THEREFORE BE ESTABLISHED ON THE LINES OF THE SPECIAL GROUP, APPROPRIATELY ADJUSTED, IN SUPPORT OF CONSULTATIONS IN THE NAC.

- 1. MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE MET IN BRUSSELS DECEMBER 1979.

- 2. MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE RECALLED THE MAY 1978 SUMMIT WHERE NATIONS EXPRESSED THE POLITICAL RESOLVE TO MEET THE CHALLENGES TO THEIR SECURITY POSED BY THE CONTINUING MOMENTUM OF THE WARSAW PACT MILITARY BUILDUP.

- 3. THE WARSAW PACT HAS OVER THE YEARS DEVELOPED A LARGE AND GROWING CAPABILITY IN NUCLEAR SYSTEMS THAT DIRECTLY THREATEN WESTERN EUROPE AND HAVE A STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE ALLIANCE IN EUROPE. THIS SITUATION HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY AGGRAVATED OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS BY SOVIET DECISIONS TO IMPLEMENT PROGRAMS MODERNIZING AND EXPANDING THEIR LONG-RANGE FORCES SUBSTANTIALLY. IN PARTICULAR, THEY HAVE DEPLOYED THE SS-20 MISSILE, WHICH OFFERS SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS OVER PREVIOUS SYSTEMS IN PROVIDING GREATER ACCURACY, MORE MOBILITY, AND GREATER RANGE, AS WELL AS HAVING MULTIPLE WARHEADS, AND THE BACKFIRE BOMBER, WHICH HAS A MUCH BETTER PERFORMANCE THAN OTHER SOVIET AIRCRAFT DEPLOYED HITHERTO IN A PERIPHERAL
ROLE. DURING THIS PERIOD, WHILE THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN REINFORCING ITS SUPERIORITY IN LRNF BOTH QUANTITATIVELY AND QUALITATIVELY, WESTERN LRNF CAPABILITIES HAVE REMAINED STATIC. INDEED THESE FORCES ARE INCREASING IN AGE AND VULNERABILITY AND DO NOT INCLUDE LAND-BASED, LONG RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS.

-4. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO UNDERTAKEN A MODERNIZATION AND EXPANSION OF THEIR SHORTER-RANGE TNF AND GREATLY IMPROVED THE OVERALL QUALITY OF THEIR CONVENTIONAL FORCES. THESE DEVELOPMENTS TOOK PLACE AGAINST

THE BACKGROUND OF INCREASING SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES AND ACHIEVEMENT OF PARITY IN INTERCONTINENTAL CAPABILITY WITH THE UNITED STATES.

5. THESE TRENDS HAVE PROMPTED SERIOUS CONCERN WITHIN THE ALLIANCE BECAUSE, IF THEY WERE TO CONTINUE, SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS COULD UNDERMINE THE STABILITY ACHIEVED IN CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. THE FACT THAT WESTERN LONGER-RANGE THEATER SYSTEMS ARE AGING COULD ALSO CAST DOUBT ON THE ALLIANCE’S DETERRENT STRATEGY BY HIGHLIGHTING THE GAP IN THE SPECTRUM OF NATO’S AVAILABLE NUCLEAR RESPONSES TO AGGRESSION.

6. MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE NOTED THAT THESE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS REQUIRE CONCRETE ACTIONS ON THE PART OF THE ALLIANCE IF NATO’S STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE IS TO REMAIN CREDIBLE. SUCH ACTIONS COMPRIS THE ALLIANCE PROGRAMS OF LRNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL.

7. MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE HAVE DECIDED TO MODERNIZE NATO’S LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES BY:
   - PARTICIPATION OF ALL NATIONS CURRENTLY IN THE INTEGRATED DEFENSE STRUCTURE, THROUGH HOSTING
   - DEPLOYMENT OF
   AND THROUGH OTHER ARRANGEMENTS, INCLUDING SHARING IN COSTS, IN THE CASE OF ALL NATIONS.
   THEY AGREED THAT THE PROGRAM WILL NOT INCREASE NATO’S RELIANCE UPON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND IT WILL NOT INCREASE THE SIZE OF NATO’S STOCKPILE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

8. THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE RECOGNIZED THE ROLE OF ARMS
CONTROL IN CONTRIBUTING TO A MORE STABLE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND IN ADVANCING THE PROCESS OF DETENTE. THEY REGARDED ARMS CONTROL AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE ALLIANCE'S EFFORTS TO ASSURE THE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF ITS MEMBER STATES AND TO MAKE THE STRATEGIC SITUATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST MORE STABLE, MORE PREDICTABLE, AND MORE MANAGEABLE AT LOWER LEVELS OF ARMAMENTS ON BOTH SIDES. IN THIS REGARD THEY WELCOMED THE CONTRIBUTION WHICH THE SALT II TREATY MAKES TOWARDS ACHIEVING THESE OBJECTIVES.

9. THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE CONSIDERED THAT BUILDING ON THIS ACCOMPLISHMENT AND TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE EXPANSION OF SOVIET LRTPF CAPABILITIES OF CONCERN TO NATO, ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A MORE STABLE OVERALL NUCLEAR BALANCE AT LOWER LEVELS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BOTH SIDES SHOULD THEREFORE NOW INCLUDE CERTAIN US AND SOVIET LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. THEY FULLY SUPPORTED THE DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES, FOLLOWING CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, TO NEGOTIATE ARMS LIMITATIONS ON LRTPF AND TO PROPOSE TO THE USSR TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS IN A TIMELY WAY ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES WHICH HAVE BEEN ELABORATED IN INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE:

A. ANY FUTURE LIMITATIONS ON US SYSTEMS PRINCIPALLY DESIGNED FOR THEATER MISSIONS SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY APPROPRIATE LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET THEATER SYSTEMS.

B. LIMITATIONS ON US AND SOVIET LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED BILATERALLY IN THE SALT III FRAMEWORK IN A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH.

C. THE IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AGREED LIMITATIONS ON US AND SOVIET LAND-BASED LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR MISSILE SYSTEMS.

D. ANY AGREED LIMITATIONS ON THESE SYSTEMS MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY BETWEEN THE SIDES. THEREFORE, THESE LIMITATIONS SHOULD TAKE THE FORM OF EQUAL CEILINGS.

E. ANY AGREED LIMITATIONS MUST BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE.
GIVEN THE SPECIAL IMPORTANCE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE OVERALL SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE, SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE CONSTITUTED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE TO SUPPORT THE US NEGOTIATING EFFORT.

10. THE ALLIANCE HAS DECIDED TO PURSUE THESE TWO PARALLEL AND COMPLEMENTARY APPROACHES IN ORDER TO AVERT AN ARMS RACE IN EUROPE CAUSED BY THE SOVIET TNF BUILDUP, YET PRESERVE THE VIABILITY OF NATO’S STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE AND THUS ENSURE THE SECURITY OF ITS MEMBER STATES. A MODERNIZATION DECISION, INCLUDING A COMMITMENT TO DEPLOYMENTS, IS NECESSARY TO MEET NATO’S DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE NEEDS, TO PROVIDE A CREDIBLE RESPONSE TO SOVIET TNF DEPLOYMENTS AND TO PROVIDE THE FOUNDATION FOR THE PURSUIT OF SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON TNF. SUCCESS OF ARMS CONTROL IN CONSTRAINING THE SOVIET BUILDUP CAN ENHANCE ALLIANCE SECURITY AND MODIFY THE SCALE OF NATO’S TNF MODERNIZATION REQUIREMENTS. VANCE

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Aaron began by discussing how the trip had been a good one so far. He was very much impressed with the choice of position of the other allies. That went both for the English [sic] and for the Germans and the Italians. He recalled especially that the Germans had now made their decision in line with the recommendations of both reports, and that in Italy even the socialists are supportive. As regards Belgium, he was impressed by Simoet's statement. He said to be aware of our contacts with the Belgians and asked what we knew of their position. Generally therefore, a fairly positive situation has emerged. Brezhnev's letter has not been able to change this.

In my first reply I have not responded to the question about the Belgians but asked the United States response to the points I have raised with Harold Brown. Aaron replied approximately along the following lines: We have discussed and considered the issues raised by the Netherlands very carefully and all the way to the highest level. "We would like" that the Netherlands will participate in this matter. This is important for the alliance.

To this my side-note that it struck me that this was a fairly weak formulation of the desirability of Dutch participation.

He did here, incidentally, immediately again point to the German position of not being able to act alone.

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1 Dutch Defense Minister Willem Scholten.
2 David L. Aaron, Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs.
3 A military airfield, Valkenburg was located slightly to the northwest of the Hague.
4 The reports by NATO's High Level Group and the Special Group on TNF modernization and negotiations with the Soviet Union, respectively.
5 Foreign minister Henri Simonet.
6 U.S. Secretary of Defense.
7 Items in quotation marks appear in English in the Dutch memorandum.
The United States want to help the Netherlands with its political problems. We want to be "so helpful" as is possible, but there are limits. There is an "emerging" consensus in the alliance and it cannot be endangered by making important changes in the proposed plans at this stage of the decisionmaking.

For my part I have reacted to this immediately with several remarks along the lines of: Until now there has only been decisionmaking at the level of the experts. Second: Several weeks ago I have delivered in a very clear way a political message to our most important ally, the United States. You yourself have determined the order of your trip through Europe, in spite of our request to do it in another way, this request also caused by the fact that today the Prime-Minister and Foreign Minister are not present. Under these circumstances you cannot say there is an emerging consensus at the political level. I have next added to this, that I absolutely do not want to be placed in a position that through this order and this consultation we would be confronted with established facts.

As regards the separate points:

The connection with SALT II.
Aaron pointed out that an official reservation in the decisionmaking would work extremely counterproductively in regard to the ratification of SALT II. I have said that if it would reach a positive decision, the Dutch government in any case would do this on the condition that SALT II would have to be ratified, but I still hope, I have added, that this is a non-problem.

Aaron next explained again, following McGiffert, that there is hope, and also a reasonable expectation that the decisionmaking will be completed this year, or at least early next year. He understood that the Netherlands would have to make a reservation on this point in its agreement, but, he emphasized again, if that would have to be included formally in the decision document it would be a very difficult matter for the United States.

The Dutch nuclear tasks.
Regarding the ADM and the Neptune-task the United States have no problems. Regarding the F-16 they do, but after an internal struggle they have accepted it the way we envision it.

The shift-study.
They are in agreement with the implementation of this study, also as concerns the number. They do note emphatically that the Dutch government should realize clearly that the more concessions were made to the Netherlands, this would also have an impact on the decisionmaking in other countries, e.g. in the Federal Republic, and that this too co-determined the American position.

8 David McGiffert, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense and chair of NATO's High Level Group.
He believed that we went very far in regard to our nuclear tasks, and that this way we created the danger of undermining our total nuclear position. It is therefore a very difficult step for us, according to Aaron, to agree to this. Therefore, Aaron said, we call on you to help us in turn in the decisionmaking, and this has to happen in regard to the number of 572, because on this point I have to state in all clarity that we cannot accept your proposal to reduce to 50%.

Everyone has agreed to 572 and it would be a fundamental change in the structure of our approach if now we went to 50%. On top of that we do not really understand why you come with it and what is at the basis of you 50% idea.

Why can you not live with the Schmidt formula, and where does this 50% come from? For my part, I have explained why we cannot accept such a high number. I have pointed out, among other things, that this production decision as a starting point basically assumes that the arms control talks with the Russians will have no result. It is not a denial of the value of the expert reports, but it is a political judgment in response to these reports.

In defense of his position Aaron has pointed to two effects. In the first place in regard to the American Congress. He explained that in the American budgetary system permission for a purchase such as this one is given all at once and that the Congress will not release funds in phases.

Next he explained at length why in his judgment a lower level for the production decision will have a very negative influence on the Soviet Union's willingness to make concessions.

And third he pointed out that in his view the President of the United States would lose all respect domestically if he would now come with a decision that was only 50% of what the military experts said it would have to be. The same number as has been proposed is an essential given for the United States.

For my part I have said that I will of course report on this discussion to the Prime-Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but that I did not expect that this would lead to a different position on the Dutch side. On the contrary, if they were in the country today, I said, I would probably bring the message to breakfast tomorrow that I had been instructed to defend our position with our European allies with double emphasis.

I have also pointed to the connection to MBFR. He reported that the United States would like to get to a simplified MBFR-proposal in order to give an impetus to the MBFR-discussions.

Returning to the number, Aaron also pointed out that in his view the 50% will become a ceiling, and he added: What certainty do we have that, when the conditions will not have been met, a next Dutch cabinet will be willing to participate in a raising of that ceiling.

Aaron asked me how I wanted to proceed. I said that I did not have any concrete ideas about that at this moment, but that, as he knew, in the coming days I will have discussions with my European colleagues.
Aaron emphasized at the end once again that there are limits for the United States which cannot be crossed. It is too far now still to be able to go back. If there was something else with which we could help the Netherlands, we'd be happy to do so. Our negative position on this point, according to Aaron, should not give the impression that we do not appreciate the efforts of the Dutch cabinet to come to a positive solution.

For my part I have concluded the matter by noting that in this way a very difficult situation has emerged.
Sottosottoserie 3: Direzione nazionale ed Esecutivo


ABSTRACT. These are the minutes of the meeting of the National Directorate of the Socialist Party which made the decision to accept the deployment and vote for it in the Parliamentary debate, even if the PSI was not part of the government yet. The minutes contain a long presentation by the future Defense Mnister, Lelio Lagorio, which explains the strategic rational behind the deployment. A lively debate follows, during which Craxi and Lagorio steer the Central Committee towards accepting the deployment.
DIREZIONE DEL 25.10.1979 - ore 17,10

**Rapporto** (Resoconto sommario)

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**Presenti:**

Crazi  
Nenni  
Signorile  
Vittorelli  
Lagorio  
Capria  
Coen  
Cipellini  
Mancini  
Lanolfi  
Achilli  
Pedrazzoli  
Tempestini  
Lombardi  
Aniasi  
Covatta  
De Martino  
Lauricella  
Querci  
Manca  
Martelli  
De Michielis  
Formica  
Cicchitto (ore 19,30)  
Marianetti

**Ordine del giorno**

1) Relazione Scanni sul processo "Carta 77" di Praga. (omissis)

2) Relazione Lagorio su problemi Sicurezza europea ed installazione missili Pershing e Cruise.

**Rapporto Lagorio**

La questione degli euromissili nasce perché si è venuto determinando uno squilibrio notevole, sul teatro europeo, fra gli armamenti sovietici e gli armamenti NATO, soprattutto dopo la comparsa dei nuovi missili sovietici SS 20 che hanno caratteristiche fantastiche di modernità: sono missili a triplice testata nucleare, sono mobili, si lanciano da rampe mobili, trasportabili in autocarri e vagoni ferroviari, sono molto precisi, possono porsi precisi obiettivi militari e non soltanto il bombardamento terroristico sulle grandi città. Il missile SS20 è in più sostenuto dai nuovi bombardieri di eccezionale validità, i cosiddetti Backfire, di grande velocità, grande raggio e volo radente. Il missile SS20 e il Backfire hanno in satura la caratteristica di poter oltrepassare, forare, le barriere difensive elettroniche o convenzionali della NATO.

A fronte di queste nuove armi, nel teatro europeo, la NATO schiera solo un velivolo di buona modernità, l’americano F111 e tre sommergibili americani in Atlantico dotati di missili Poseidon.
Entrambi i mezzi sono armi terribili ma qualitativamente restano al di sotto della soglia minima dell'URSS. Le armi atomiche inglesi e francesi sono antiquate, a breve raggio e largamente imprecise. Lo equilibrio qualitativo è un fatto certo perché è confermato anche da autorevoli fonti sovietiche. Sono i dirigenti sovietici (ultimo Zagladin su "Unità") a dire che l'equilibrio fra le forze si misura a livello planetario e non sui singoli scacchieri.

In questo contesto si inseriscono alcune prese di posizione che vanno attentamente valutate: i due discorsi di Brezhnev nei quali il leader sovietico si dichiara disposto, prima a una riduzione unilaterale di armi convenzionali e, quindi, a una revisione unilaterale del suo stesso arsenale missilistico; la lettera di Brezhnev ai governi europei: lettera che è un atto diplomatico e va perciò gestito diplomaticamente e non a livello di agitazione propagandistica; la posizione del governo tedesco (che ha alle sue spalle uno Strauss che ha già dei contatti con ambienti sovietici e propone un riarmo autonomo della Germania e un contemporaneo accordo diretto tra Germania ed URSS); infine le più recenti iniziative distintive degli USA (confermate anche da Aaron a Roma) secondo cui il paragingimento delle forze è possibile mantenerlo di pari passo con un negoziato con l'URSS, alla condizione che si decida per il paragingimento.

In questo quadro, quale può essere la nostra posizione?

E' superfluo dire che siamo un Partito della pace e del disarmo, che non vogliamo guerre, che non vogliamo prepararci per una guerra. Credo che possiamo innanzitutto dire che, per l'Europa, per noi, non è possibile condividere le tesi di partenza dell'URSS sull'equilibrio globale.

Il ristabilimento dell'equilibrio in Europa diviene dunque una linea obbligata; ma - per una forza di pace, come noi siamo - resta obbligata anche la via del negoziato instancabile. Nei passi di Brezhnev c'è uno spiraglio. Va esplorato.
La nostra azione mi pare possa muoversi su più linee:
1) innanzitutto premere perché il Salt 2 sia ratificato al più presto e si aprano quindi le strade al Salt 3;
2) valorizzare e rafforzare tutti i punti possibili di contatto fra est e ovest dove si può discutere i problemi della riduzione bilanciata e controllata degli armamenti in Europa; in particolare dobbiamo convincere il governo italiano a partecipare alle trattative di Vienna; c'è il Salt 3. In propozizto c'è da osservare che la più parte dei paesi europei non intende parteciparvi; c'è la Conferenza di Madrid, dove intervengono anche i paesi non allineati, forse meno sensibili all'equilibrio militare europeo; c'è la possibilità di pensare ad una conferenza ad hoc fra est ed ovest.
Il problema resta quello dei tempi, che non devono essere lunghi;
3) c'è l'agenda dei lavori NATO; la riunione dell'Aia del 13 - 14 novembre (gruppo pianificazione nucleare); qui si stabilirà il programma di modernizzazione delle armi nucleari già approntato dagli alti gradi in settembre; Qui ci sarà l'incontro fra ministri della Difesa a Bruxelles e in dicembre il Consiglio Atlantico con i ministri degli Esteri.
A questi appuntamenti ci possiamo presentare con una risposta affermativa ad una tabella di marcia dei paesi NATO. Una prima risposta affermativa in dicembre, al progetto di allestimento dei missili Pershing 2 e Cruise. Ciò significa che si avvia il processo di produzione delle armi. Tale processo ha una durata non inferiore ai tre anni. Fra l'avvio della produzione e la installazione degli ordigni c'è un tempo sufficiente per iniziare e portare avanti un serio e serrato negoziato con l'URSS. Al riguardo noi la pensiamo come i capi della SPD, come l'ala più rigorosa di questo partito.
Per preparare tutto ciò è opportuno che il PSI tenga rapporti più stretti con gli altri partiti socialisti europei a cominciare dalla SPD.
C'è infine un ultimo rilievo che non possiamo tacere. Se la risposta del Consiglio Atlantico di dicembre fosse negativa, a parte i contraccolpi fra alleati, si potrebbe determinare una situazione incresciosa e pericolosa proprio per l'Italia, perché se il territorio europeo le rifiuta ci sono sempre i mari e le flotte che li solcano. Di fronte a un no del campo Atlantico, gli USA potrebbero essere indotti a dotare le loro squadre navali dei missili contestati.

**DISCUSSIONE**

Lombardi

Critica ritardo della riunione della Direzione su questo tema, in particolare riferendosi all'articolo di Silvestri - molto duro - apparsop all'Avanti! di domenica scorsa. Diversa la relazione che ha espresso Lagorio. Fa riferimento al punto dell'installazione dei missili e in particolare di quella parte riferentesi al tempo per l'avvio della produzione.

Riferisce disparità di vedute nella SPD (Bahr) - (Craxi informa contatti SPD e legge parte progetto di risoluzione SPD favorevole avvio produzione, in contemporanea con l'avvio delle trattative Est-Ovest). Insiste sulla possibilità di ricercare preventivamente una trattativa di smilitarizzazione con l'Est.

"Pensiamoci bene rispetto al fatto che nel 1983 ci possano essere piantati in Europa più di 600 missili con testate atomiche".

Chiede una maggiore riflessione su questo punto.

**Vittorelli**

Concorda con relazione Lagorio. Il PSI non può non dar conto all'opinione pubblica su questo argomento della sua posizione.

La presenza degli SS20 modifica, prima della ratifica del Salt 2, il
quadro degli equilibri mondiali e soprattutto il ruolo e la funzione dell'ombrello atomico sull'Europa.

Questo equilibrio è verificabile nella lettera di Breznev ai governi occidentali, che rappresenta il codicillo pratico della vicenda di cui discutiamo.

Il problema della trattativa non può quindi basarsi su elementi tecnico-militari (come il Salt 2) ma deve collocarsi su livelli politici autorevoli. E' favorevole ad aprire questa verifica a partire dal sì alla produzione dei missili.

Sulla richiesta di partecipazione alla conferma di Vienna crede possibile che sia proposta, anche se va verificata nel concreto.

La nostra posizione è determinante sia ai fini della definizione della posizione del PCI (nel senso che se noi fossimo incerti o contrari i comunisti si porterebbero immediatamente su posizioni demagogiche), che di quella tedesca (sia del governo che della SPD).

Coen
Occorre esercitare una pressione sugli americani perché si legghi l'approvazione dell'installazione e costruzione con la ratifica del Salt 2.

Sull'atteggiamento nei confronti del PCI: occorrerebbe, sullo spunto dell'incontro del 20 settembre, avviare una verifica comune.

Achilli
Propone che si tratti immediatamente e che solo da questa posizione si costruisca l'eventuale avvio della costruzione.

Andare a Vienna. Rinvia la decisione del Consiglio Atlantico di dicembre a quando si potrà vedere lo sbocco di una trattativa da realizzare come avvio immediato.
Craxi

Legge testo risoluzione a favore "Charta 77" e di opposizione processo Praga.

(approvato unanimità)

De Martino

E' preoccupato della proliferazione delle armi. Equilibrio del terrore che lo drammatizza. Se fosse possibile avviare una trattativa che duri alcuni mesi e poi decidere.

Comunque, conviene sostenere una tesi di questo tipo:

1) Contro le bombe atomiche e la loro proliferazione: messa al bando;

2) dai dati risulta uno squilibrio e quindi è legittimo, dal punto di vista europeo prima che USA, di far fronte ad esso;

3) da questo non ne trarrei subito la conseguenza di dar via alla costruzione ma direi che occorre aprire una trattativa a termine di tre mesi per decidere poi quello che occorre fare;

4) perché dobbiamo essere noi i primi a decidere: sia nei confronti della Germania che degli altri partiti dell'Internazionale? Aspetterei che altri lo facciano: non dobbiamo fare i primi della classe.

Ricordiamoci della nostra lotta per non entrare in guerra e del nostro internazionalismo.

(Craxi: quando eravate voi al governo avete installato fior di missili).

Non vi furono accordi internazionali allora. Furono fatti degli atti, sulla base di impegni precedenti di cui non eravamo responsabili direttamente.
Craxi
Che differenza c'è tra la decisione di costruire e invitare alla trattativa immediata e quella di aspettare tre mesi, rendendo più debole la posizione di chi chiede il riequilibrio? Il tempo tra la costruzione e la installazione è molto. Si tratta di anni. Si può quindi negoziare.

Noi dobbiamo esprimere un orientamento che sia chiaro. Siamo anche pressati dai tempi. Fa il caso della SPD che ha di fronte il problema di una difficile situazione politica.

De Martino
Autorizzare la costruzione significa poi la installazione alla scadenza. Capisce anche che questa nostra posizione è delicata e presuppon e sviluppo e posizione strategica diversa.

Landolfi
Va bene la posizione che si viene delineando. Dobbiamo però fare un salto di qualità nel senso della responsabilità politica e nella nostra collocazione internazionale. Fa il caso della Jugoslavia: ricorda una sua visita recente in cui i dirigenti di quel paese erano interessati ad una linea da parte nostra per il riequilibrio e per il negoziato.

Non possiamo raccordarci ai comunisti su questo tema: siamo su di una onda diversa.

Signorile
Non dobbiamo decidere tutto noi ma non possiamo distaccarci dalla realtà e ritirarci rispetto alla decisione.

La decisione del governo italiano è influente sulla installazione ma non sulla produzione.
La costruzione dei missili è decisione del Consiglio Atlantico. Noi siamo parte di questa alleanza e dobbiamo darci carico di questa posizione politico-strategica.

Lo equilibrio di cui si parla è un problema di equilibrio europeo che ci impegna ad una riflessione assai attenta.

La scelta di approvare la spesa per la costruzione non presuppong il negozio può introdurre elementi nuovi; mentre il contrario nega entrambe le soluzioni.

Con questa decisione possiamo considerarci attori reali sulla trattativa da avviare.

(Lombardi: sta riproponendosi il problema dell'armamento autonomo dell'Europa, questo è il fatto nuovo)

Le questioni di breve termine vanno quindi risolte in positivo dicendo di sì.

Il rapporto con il PCI: questa questione ci porta ad un rischio di rottura e di ritorno all'indietro.

La posizione PCI riconosce lo equilibrio regionale e pone il problema di ripristinarlo. Occorre capire meglio come si sviluppa questa posizione.

La posizione migliore per l'Europa è quella di avviare la costruzione avendo sempre a disposizione l'acceleratore e il freno.

Tempestini
La posizione Barh è in assoluto la più avanzata in Europa: ma la Germania sa che se tira troppo la corda rischia un rifiuto della presenza degli USA in Europa.

Il rapporto con il SALT 2 è sacrosanto. Come lo è la nostra posizione...
ne nei termini in cui è stata presentata. Dobbiamo accettare la linea della SPD e la posizione di Schmidt.

La trattativa è il fulcro della nostra posizione e in sotanza al PCI questa nostra posizione può essere solo di stimolo benefico.

Craxi
Legge un testo che definisce di orientamento per la conclusione dei lavori:

1. Il processo di distensione deve continuare e deve consolidarsi. Noi dobbiamo pretendere che il governo italiano nei suoi atti e nell'ambito della Alleanza Atlantica, sia sempre impegnato a perseguire e a far avanzare una strategia di pace.

Una strategia di pace si realizza attraverso la riduzione degli armamenti e delle forze armate, e il mantenimento di una condizione di sicurezza certa ed inalterabile per tutti.

Il metodo non può che essere quello negoziale, dei controlli concordati e reciproci, ispirato a quella che i nostri compagni della SPD definiscono come "una politica di pilotaggio cooperativo nel settore degli armamenti".

2. A fondamento di ogni credibilità e durata strategia di pace sta la politica dell'equilibrio. Ogni qualvolta si sono determinati o si determinano equilibri, ovunque vengano introdotti elementi destabilizzanti da essi derivano inevitabilmente tensioni e si riproducono i fattori di un antagonismo rischioso e i pericoli della corsa al riarmo psicologico prima ancora che materiale.

È stato giustamente osservato che nei settori della difesa il problema dell'equilibrio "non è necessariamente un problema di parità numerica".

(È) ciò che importa è raggiungere situazioni di capacità difensiva e di dissuasione che autentino la consistenza della stabilità.
3. Nessun risultato utile ai fini della distensione e del consolidamento della pace può essere raggiunto se si alimenta un clima di diffidenza e di sfiducia nei rapporti tra Est ed Ovest. Anche i problemi militari vanno perciò inquadrati in una cornice politica di miglioramento dei rapporti, di relazioni più intense, di buone convinzioni sulla volontà pacifica degli interlocutori. A questo scopo non servono nè le campagne allarmistiche nè le azioni politiche che assumono un significato intimidatorio. Se si parte dal presupposto dell'esistenza di potenziali volontà aggressive dall'una parte o dall'altra tutto diventa più difficile se non impossibile. Resta il fatto oggettivo, convalidato dalle esperienze della storia, che nessuna potenza che si trovi in posizione di prevalenza militare rinuncia prima o poi a far valere questa supremazia sul terreno politico.

In altre epoche quando più netta era la supremazia nucleare americana proprio negli USA si sviluppò una autorevole tendenza culturale e politica a sostegno di una dottrina che voleva la "vulnerabilità" degli USA come condizione dell'effettiva stabilità della pace nel mondo.

4. In questi anni i problemi degli armamenti e dell'equilibrio si sono sempre più valutati in termini qualitativi. Misure tradizionali di riduzione degli armamenti hanno assunto e assumono così un significato simbolico, che può avere un valore indicativo, può rappresentare una espressione di buona volontà ma non esprimono una efficacia concreta ed affidabile.

Il problema del controllo degli armamenti, dei nuovi processi tecnologici e delle nuove armi si presenta perciò in termini assai complessi.

In ogni caso bisogna porsi in condizione di poter intervenire sulla produzione di nuove armi in modo da poterne decidere l'arresto o la nonassegnazione alle forze armate in relazione con i risultati
delle trattative che si possono sviluppare sul piano politico.

5. Tutte le iniziative in atto per lo sviluppo dei controlli e per la sistemazione negoziale degli armamenti a livelli sempre più bassi devono ricevere un nuovo impulso. C'è da augurarsi che gli accordi già raggiunti (Salt 2) siano presto ratificati. La mancata ratifica del Salt 2 determinerebbe una svolta nel clima e nei rapporti tra le superpotenze. Tutta la situazione subirebbe un colpo negativo non assorbibile nel medio periodo.

Con il Salt 2, con l'accordo circa la non proliferazione delle armi nucleari, con gli impegni politici assunti ad Helsinki, con i negoziati di Vienna sono state gettate le basi per un dialogo di vasta portata ed impegno tra Est ed Ovest, tra NATO e Patto di Varsavia.

6. I problemi non riguardano solo i rapporti tra le due superpotenze, ma anche i rapporti con il terzo mondo e quindi l'argine alla corsa al riarmo di molti dei paesi emergenti e i rischi di proliferazione delle armi nucleari, riguardano i rapporti con la Cina Popolare, riguardano la sicurezza dell'Europa.

Noi non possiamo assumere posizioni velleitarie e demagogiche, non possiamo accettere a coloro che soffiano sul fuoco delle tensioni. Dobbiamo sviluppare una forte iniziativa di pace partendo da basi realistiche e da posizioni costruttive.

La prima considerazione realistica consiste nel giudicare come un obiettivo lunga sedenza il traguardo di un disarmo generale internazionale.

A breve e a medio termine c'è solo lo spazio per una politica prudente e ferma di passi successivi, di riduzione dei rischi di atti negoziati e concordati.

In questa prospettiva l'Italia deve operare tutte le opportune pressioni politiche perché si giunga ad un dialogo istituzionalizzato tra la NATO e il Patto di Varsavia.
Il governo italiano deve chiedere di partecipare alle trattative di Vienna per la riduzione delle forze convenzionali sollecitando una pitampia ripresa, anche in sede politica, del negoziato. Occorre giungere rapidamente ad un primo trattato così come negli auspici delle due parti senza che sino ad ora sia stata affrontata una fase decisamente conclusiva.

Da un primo accordo si potrebbe poi partire per allargare l'area della sicurezza e della stabilità sulla base di nuovi equilibri.

7. La situazione delle armi nucleari in Europa deve essere inclusa in un nuovo negoziato complessivo che deve mirare a ridurre il livello degli armamenti sempre secondo la regola di un corretto equilibrio garantite delle esigenze di sicurezza di tutti.

Un nuovo negoziato (SALT III) deve comprendere i missili nucleari di media gittata e non deve volere estranei i paesi europei. Secondo questi principi e linee generali di azione deve essere affrontato, nella sua oggettività, il problema degli equilibri attuali e potenziali che vengono denunciati da parte occidentale in rapporto alle cosiddette forze di teatro europee.

Le fonti più autorevoli della Alleanza Atlantica giudicano che l'installazione degli SS 20 da parte sovietica e i previsti programmi di nuovi missili e di nuovi vettori aerei configurano già da oggi uno squilibrio oggettivo giacché da parte della Alleanza Atlantica non può essere opposto "nulla di comparabile". Un tale giudizio figura anche nel "libro bianco sui problemi della difesa in Europa" diffuso dal Governo della Repubblica Federale Tedesca.

Noi riteniamo che l'obiettivo principale deve essere quello di giungere attraverso un immediato negoziato alla eliminazione di tutti i fattori di squilibrio e di quindi di instabilità ed alla definizione dei più bassi livelli possibili, o meglio ancora, alla eliminazione di nuove armi nucleari esplorando adeguatamente le positive intenzioni manifestate dall'URSS.
Contemporaneamente appaiono giustificate le misure di ammodernamento e le opzioni necessarie di politica difensiva che vengono proposte. Essere devono poter essere sospese e non rese effettive qualora un approfondito negoziato dovesse giungere a risultati soddisfacenti.

8. Rispetto alle questioni della sicurezza e della politica della distensione in Europa ed in particolare della questione insorgente dell'ammodernamento del sistema missilistico NATO in Europa abbiamo sviluppato consultazioni internazionali e contatti diretti in particolare con i compagni della SPD, data la peculiarità e l'importanza della posizione tedesca nel quadro strategico europeo ed internazionale. Ne è risultata una sostanziale identità di valutazione nell'impegno che è comune ai due partiti ed alla Internazionale socialista di svolgimento con coerenza una strategia di pace e di sicurezza in Europa e nel mondo.

9. La Segreteria del PSI e dei Gruppi Parlamentari socialisti potranno illustrare al Governo ed al Parlamento la posizione dei socialisti e l'austuzio che la politica del nostro Paese possa rappresentare, nel l'ambito delle relazioni internazionali, e nel rapporto tra Est ed Ovest e verso il Terzo Mondo, un fattore propulsivo dei processi di pace, di distensione, di cooperazione nel rispetto e nella sicurezza di tutti.

L'orientamento prevalente della Direzione mi pare favorevole ai punti illustrati e ne prendo atto. Con prudenza occorre procedere nella linea della autorizzazione con l'avvio della trattativa.
Possiamo, credo, concludere in questi termini.

(cosi rimane stabilito)
Chiede di sapere se discuteremo le proposte istituzionali avanzate da Craxi

(se ne discuterà in un'altra riunione)

Achilli
E' apparso che le differenti opinioni si siano anche formalmente espresse. Dichiara quindi che renderà esplicito il suo orientamento differente.

De Martino
Non renderà pubblica la sua opinione differente giacché ritiene che su questioni di questo rilievo occorra dare all'esterno una immagine omogenea.

Si farà una Direzione orientativamente il 7 o 8 novembre.

Conclusione: ore 20,30
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 26, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT: NSC Weekly Report #114

1. Opinion

Status of TNF

David Aaron provides the following results of his visit last week to Europe concerning TNF.

We are much closer to a firm consensus on our proposed TNF program than anyone would have anticipated only a few weeks ago. The UK, FRG and Italy have all taken firm internal government decisions to support the NATO program. In Belgium, the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Defense Minister all support the NATO program and Belgian participation and are prepared to make a vote of confidence in their Parliament. The same is true in the Netherlands except that the Dutch want to change the program significantly and are spending more time trying to modify the NATO decision in an effort to win acceptance than they are trying to defend it.

In my judgment the other allies will be willing to go ahead with the program without the Dutch with the possible exception of the Belgians. We should, however, do our best to get them to participate, otherwise their absence could unravel the support of other countries and create a long-term problem with the West Germans.

Despite the firm government position in the FRG and Italy, both countries will avoid firm public commitments to the NATO TNF program for as long as possible in order to avoid provoking public opposition. However, we must also recognize that this leaves Schmidt and Cossiga an opportunity to back out or trim their commitment. We should not make too much of this, however, because increasingly it's publicly known that the Germans and Italians support the program and backing off would provoke a major political crisis for both leaders. Interestingly, both the Italians and the Belgians are keying their presentation and strategy to the position of the Germans (not the Dutch). If Schmidt stays firm, they will remain firm.
The Belgians have invited Schmidt to come to Belgium in November for the purpose of strengthening the Belgian Socialist support for LRTNF.

There are several other aspects of the trip which deserve comment.

-- The Brezhnev initiative is a dead letter. If anything, it was counterproductive and the current harsh Soviet stance makes clear that the Russians' peace offensive is more offensive than peaceful. Nonetheless, if it continues, there may be second thoughts in various sectors of the German SPD.

-- The Italians have backed off their insistence on some kind of physical veto of LRTNF in Italy. They are prepared for a face-saving device and have suggested we form a committee to consider the problem once NATO has reached its decision in December.

-- The Europeans will not make any formal linkage between TNF and SALT ratification. The Dutch wanted to do this, but David persuaded them that this would be counterproductive for SALT. They will make a unilateral statement that their agreement to TNF will be conditional on SALT.

-- The Dutch proposal to deploy only 286 weapons while we negotiate for three years could prove troublesome, particularly in Belgium. We need to push our own warhead reduction initiative as a counter. I believe we can count on the Allies to support us, but Defense Minister Apel is a little soft on this issue.

We will have an SCC next week to consider next steps to recommend to you.

2. Vance/Brown/Brzezinski Decisions

The following decisions were taken at the VBB luncheon yesterday:

-- Brown Paper: We touched on Harold's paper to you of October 3 on responding to Soviet assertiveness. The original of the memorandum is with you, and I would prefer to have your guidance before we discuss the memo and its recommendations further. Do you have any instructions for us?

-- Czechoslovakia: In response to the sentencing of the six dissidents, the U.S. Ambassador will be recalled for consultations in Washington within a week.
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  

SECRET  

October 31, 1979  

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:  

As you know, the Alliance is entering the final phase of its deliberations on Theater Nuclear Force modernization and arms control. I think we can all be proud of the quality and intensity of Alliance consultations on this subject. In my judgment, the crucial December decisions will mark a watershed in NATO's resolve. They will also test the determination in each of our countries to maintain a credible ladder of deterrence and simultaneously to show our publics that we will take the initiative to negotiate a significant reduction in the level of these weapons.  

With this in mind, I want to express my deep concern about the Dutch proposal to cut NATO's modernization program by half. I am concerned that this proposal could jeopardize all our efforts and unravel the consensus each member of the Alliance has tried so hard to build. In light of the fact that the 572 figure is deemed necessary by NATO's defense experts, a decision to deploy less would seem weak. It would send precisely the wrong signals to the Soviet Union, undermining their incentive to bargain with us seriously, and would create serious political problems in some countries of the Alliance. For all these reasons, I hope you will decide not to introduce your proposal into the Alliance in the upcoming consultations.  

At the same time, I want you to know that I fully understand and share your desire to give the Dutch public vivid evidence of reduced NATO reliance on nuclear weapons and of the Alliance's dedication to the objectives of arms control. That is why I am attracted to the idea that as an integral part
of the NATO decision to deploy 572 Long-Range Theater Nuclear Force warheads in Europe, we could reduce our nuclear stockpile by 1,000 weapons. Such a step would be a concrete demonstration that through TNF modernization, we are not engaging in a nuclear buildup. It would demonstrate our commitment to arms control, provide an opportunity to give MBFR a push forward with a streamlined NATO proposal, and respond to Brezhnev's unilateral steps. This concept has been favorably received by each of the four other countries which will provide basing for our modernized TNF, and I ask that your government also give the most serious consideration to this possibility.

Mr. Prime Minister, we are approaching a crossroads. By working together, I believe we can overcome our problems and move to a decision in December that will provide for needed improvements in Alliance defenses and build a strong foundation for Alliance arms control efforts.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

His Excellency
Andreas A. M. Van Agt
Prime Minister of the Netherlands
The Hague

SECRET
THE FIRST INSTRUCTED EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE INTEGRATED DECISION DOCUMENT. HE CALLED ATTENTION TO THE US PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW 1000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS WHICH HAD BEEN INTEGRATED INTO THE IDD AND REMARKED THAT ADDITIONAL WARHEADS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AS NEW LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR WARHEADS ARE DEPLOYED BEGINNING IN 1983. LUNS WELCOMED REMARKS ON THE IDD AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A SIMPLIFIED MBFR PHASE I BUT COMMENTED THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE ANOTHER NAC TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE IN DETAIL.
4. PRESIDENTIAL REPRESENTATIVE AARON EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION AT ADDRESSING THE NAC (FULL TEXT OF AARON’S REMARKS PARA 33) NOTING THAT THE ALLIANCE HAS FACED "FEW, IF ANY, MORE CRUCIAL CHALLENGES" THAN THOSE ON TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL. NOTING THE CHALLENGE OF SOVIET TNF DEPLOYMENTS, HE SUGGESTED THAT IF LEFT UNANSWERED, THE SOVIETS MIGHT COME TO BELIEVE THEY HAD ACHIEVED MILITARY PREPONDERANCE AND DECOUPLED EUROPEAN DEFENSE FROM THAT OF NORTH AMERICA.

5. AARON NOTED THAT THE SS-20 BUILD-UP HAS CONTINUED WITH ANOTHER SS-20 BASE OBSERVED UNDER INITIAL CONSTRUCTION IN RECENT WEEKS. HOWEVER, THERE MAY BE A NEW, MORE WIDELY DISPERSSED SS-20 DEPLOYMENT CONFIGURATION WHICH WOULD MAKE TRACKING SS-20'S EVEN MORE DIFFICULT. AND AT THE SAME TIME THERE IS MORE EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT RETIRING THE SS 4/5'S WE EXPECTED AND MAY PLAN AN EVEN LARGER MEDIUM AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILE CAPABILITY OPPOSITE WESTERN EUROPE THAN THE 600 WARHEADS EARLIER PROJECTED.

. AARON SUGGESTED WE COULD WELCOME THE BREZHNEV SPEECH AS AN OFFER TO NEGOTIATE BUT NOT AS A PROPOSAL FOR NATO TO DO NOTHING IN LRTNF EXCEPT MEET WITH THE SOVIETS TO RATIFY THEIR SUPERIORITY. CONSEQUENTLY, HE CONCLUDED, THE MAIN MOTIVATION OF BREZHNEV’S SPEECH WAS TO PREVENT ALLIANCE TNF MODERNIZATION.

. NOTING THESE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, AARON STATED THEY HAD STRENGTHENED US RESOLVE TO MOVE FORWARD TO DECISIONS IN DECEMBER ON BOTH TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL. DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING II AND GLCM "WILL CLOSE THE GAP IN THE LADDER OF DETERRENCE" AND "INSURE THE FIRM LINKAGE OF US STRATEGIC FORCES TO EUROPE DEFENSE". ON TNF ARMS CONTROL, THE US SUPPORTED THE SG’S PROPOSAL TO NEGOTIATE A SALT III AGREEMENT FOR EQUAL CEILINGS ON LONG-RANGE MISSILES. WE SHOULD TRY TO CUT THE SOVIET LONG-RANGE MISSILE THREAT TO EUROPE AND WHILE SUCCESS COULD LEAD TO DOWNWARD ADJUSTMENT OF OUR DEPLOYMENT NEEDS, IT DOES NOT MEAN WE CAN POSTPONE A DEPLOYMENT DECISION.

. AARON EMPHASIZED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER FULLY SUPPORTED THE HLG & SG PROGRAM AND SHARED THE BELIEF THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD TAKE DECISIONS IN DECEMBER. WHEN APPROVED BY THE ALLIANCE, THE PRESIDENT WAS READY TO SEEK FUNDS FOR THE PROGRAM AND TO MOVE QUICKLY IN THE SALT III FRAMEWORK TO DEAL WITH TNF ISSUES.
RECALLING THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT TO ARMS CONTROL, AARON STAIZN THAT THE IDD WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE POLICIES OF "MOST OF THE GOVERNMENTS REPRESENTED" SINCE IT WAS THE CONSEQUENCE OF AN INTENSIVE, PERHAPS UNIQUE ALLIANCE CONSULTATION PROCESS. A BROAD POLITICAL Consensus WITHIN AND AMONG GOVERNMENTS HAS DEVELOPED AND IS CAPTURED IN THE IDD.

EXDIS (MILITARY HANDLE AS SPECAT)

. TURNING TO THE ISSUE OF WITHDRAWING 1000 NUCLEAR WAR-HEADS, AARON SUGGESTED THE PROPOSAL IS :
.
. --FEASIBLE AND DESIRABLE MILITARILY IN CONNECTION WITH A DECISION TO MODERNIZE LRTNF;
.
. --APPROPRIATE, AS A WITHDRAWAL WOULD EMPHASIZE TNF MODERNIZATION IS NOT PART OF A NUCLEAR BUILDUP OR A SIGNAL OF GREATER NATO RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS;
.
. --A REPOSTE WHICH WOULD UNDERMINE THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF BREZHVNEV'S SPEECH
.
. --A MOVE, WHICH JUXTAPOSED WITH THE SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT OF UNILATERAL MILITARY WITHDRAWALS, COULD PROVIDE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A SIMPLIFIED MBFR PHASE I PROPOSAL.
.
AARON SUGGESTED THAT A SIMPLIFIED PHASE I APPROACH
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE NAC "ON A PRIORITY BASIS"
AND STATED IT WOULD BE "DESIRABLE, BUT NOT IMPERATIVE"
IF SUCH A PROPOSAL COULD BE AGREED IN THE ALLIANCE IN
DECEMBER. HE SUGGESTED THE NAC TAKE A "FIRM HAND" IN
CONSIDERING ANY SIMPLIFIED PHASE I PROPOSALS AIDED BY
THE SPC AT DCM LEVEL.

5. AFTER THANKING AARON, SYG LUNS NOTED THAT HE HAD
ASKED THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE AND SACEUR
TO PROVIDE THEIR VIEWS ON THE PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW
1000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS DIRECTLY TO NPG MINISTERS.

CMC ZEBINER GUUNDERSEN NOTED THAT HE COUL SEE
POLITICAL ADVANTAGE IN THE OFFER AND THAT IT SEEMED
MILITARILY SUPPORTABLE. HE STATED HE WOULD GIVE THE
DETAILS OF THE PROPOSAL FURTHER THOUGHT FOR PRESENTATION
AT THE 13 NOVEMBER NPG MINISTERIAL.

6. ROSE (UK) AFTER EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR AARON'S
COMMENTS, CHARACTERIZED THE IDD AS AN EXCELLENT BASIS
FOR MINISTERIAL DECISION AND FULLY REFLECTING THE HLG/SG
REPORTS.

CONCERNING THE 1000 NUCLEAR WARHEAD OFFER, ROSE
DESCRIBED IT AS A "CONSTRUCTIVE NEW PROPOSAL WITH A NUMBER
OF ADVANTAGES" WHICH SHOULD BE GIVEN URGENT STUDY IN
THE ALLIANCE TO DETERMINE ITS EFFECT ON MBFR'S OPTION III.
THE MOVE COULD GIVE A POSITIVE DIRECTION TO MBFR IF
MINISTERS WERE ABLE TO AGREE ON IT.

ROSE ALSO STATED THAT WORK ON AMS WAS WELL ADVANCED
AND THE PROPOSAL SHOULD BE PUT FORWARD BEFORE THE END OF
THE ROUND TO REINFORCE THE OTHER INITIATIVES. LIKEWISE

IT MIGHT BE FEASIBLE BY DECEMBER TO GIVE SOME INDICATION
OF A CONSTRUCTIVE ALLIANCE CBMS POSITION BUILDING PERHAPS
ON THE FRENCH CDE PHASE I PROPOSAL. NEVERTHELESS,
ROSE STRESSED THAT THE FIRST AND HIGHEST PRIORITY IS TO
PROCEED TO DECISIONS ON TNF MODERNIZATION WHICH IS AN
ESSENTIAL FOR ANY TNF ARMS CONTROL. THERE IS, HOWEVER,
A PARALLEL NEED TO AGREE ON TNF ARMS CONTROL SO THIS
CAN BE PRESENTED AT THE SAME TIME AS MODERNIZATION.

ROSE CONCLUDED THAT THE NEW US 1000 WARHEAD PROPOSAL
WAS COMPLEMENTARY TO THE ALLIANCE SG/HLG WORK AND
THE ALLIANCE SHOULD SEEK TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THIS
ALSO AT THE DECEMBER MINISTERIAL. MINISTERS WILL ALSO
HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER TO MOVE ON MBFR AND CBMS BUT IF
SUCH DECISIONS COULD BE MADE, THE ALLIANCE WOULD BE
ABLE TO TAKE AND HOLD THE ADVANTAGE ON THE FULL RANGE OF
ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THE BREZHNEV SPEECH. A COHERENT
APPROACH OF THIS NATURE, ROSE CONCLUDED, WOULD INCREASE
PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FOR TNF DEPLOYMENTS.

. IN A SECOND INTERVENTION, ROSE NOTED THAT PARAGRAPH 21
OF THE IDD WOULD NOT BE CORRECT IN DECEMBER, AS HE
EXPECTED THE NPG MINISTERIAL TO SET THE MENTIONED
EXAMINATION IN MOTION.

. TURNING TO PARAGRAPH 18, HE SAID HE WOULD CONSULT WITH
THE CANADIANS AND ATTEMPT TO OFFER A MODIFICATION TO THE
INFRASTRUCTURE PASSAGE WHICH WOULD MEET WITH BOTH US AND
CANADIAN APPROVAL (SEE DISCUSSION BELOW).

ROSE ALSO VOICED RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT THE DUTCH
SUGGESTION TO ADD THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH E OF THE
DISCUSSION OF PRINCIPLE 1 IN THE SPECIAL GROUP REPORT, TO
IDD PARAGRAPH 11, AS THAT LEFT TOO NEGATIVE AN IMPRESSION.
HE SUGGESTED ADDING ALSO THE REMAINING SENTENCE OF
PARAGRAPH E IN ORDER TO PRESENT A MORE BALANCED ARGUMENT.

. REFERRING TO THE GERMAN SUGGESTIONS ON PARAGRAPH 20
OF THE IDD, HE ASKED IF THE PURPOSE OF THE SUGGESTIONS WAS
TO STATE THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE 1000 WARHEADS WOULD
BE STUDIED. THE GERMANS NODDED ASSENT.

. FOLLOWING THE MEETING, THE UK DELEGATION
PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING CLARIFICATIONS:
THE UK SUGGESTS BEGINNING THE FIRST SENTENCE IN PARAGRAPH 21 AS FOLLOWS: "MINISTERS

NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THAT THE NPG HAD SET IN HAND A STUDY OF THE ALLIANCE’S THEATER NUCLEAR WARHEAD STOCKPILE WHICH WOULD, INTER ALIA, EXAMINE THE PRECISE NATURE..." (CONTINUE REMAINDER OF SENTENCE AS CURRENTLY DRAFTED).

IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE COMMUNIQUE, THE UK SUGGESTS THE TERM "EQUIVALENT ROLE" IN REFERRING TO THE BACKFIRE, RATHER THAN "PERIPHERAL ROLE" AS IN THE CURRENT VERSION, OR THE ITALIANS’ SUGGESTED "THEATER ROLE."

IN THE SAME PARAGRAPH, THE UK WOULD MODIFY THE LAST SENTENCE TO READ: "INDEED THESE WESTERN FORCES..."


THE FRG IS FULLY IN AGREEMENT WITH INCLUDING THE 1000 WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL IN THE IDD, AND SEES ADVANTAGES TO THE IDEA AS EXPRESSED BY AARON.

PAULS EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE HLG AND SG CHAIRMEN AND THE QUALITY OF THEIR CONTRIBUTION. PAULS UNDERLINED THAT AGREEMENT ON THE IDD AND THE TWO REPORTS WAS DUE TO A BROAD MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING THE GROUPS HAVE SHOWN FOR EACH OTHER, AND APPEALED TO ALL TO
AVOID RISKING WHAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIET CHALLENGE WAS A TEST OF THE ALLIANCE'S COHESION AND ABILITY TO ACT.

HE UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR SOLIDARITY. HE COMMENTED THAT IF JOINTLY DEVELOPED WORK WERE CHALLENGED AT THIS POINT, THE ALLIANCE'S ABILITY TO ACT AND TO TAKE DECISIONS WOULD BE QUESTIONED.

HE NOTED THAT THE VEHEMENCE AND MEANS BY WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WAS REACTING INDICATED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES, AND CITED SPECIFICALLY THE BREZHNEV SPEECH ON OCTOBER 6 AND THE NEARLY IDENTICAL LETTERS BREZHNEV SENT ALLIED HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS. HE CONTINUED THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES HAD STARTED A CAMPAIGN TO INFLUENCE ALLIANCE DECISIONS. HE CAUTIONED AGAINST GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN WAS INFLUENCING THE DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL POLICIES OF THE ALLIANCE, OR THAT IT COULD THREATEN OR INTIMIDATE THE ALLIANCE IN ITS DECISION-MAKING, OR THAT THE SOVIET UNION CAN ACHIEVE RESULTS OUTSIDE NEGOTIATIONS SO THAT IT WOULD HAVE NO REAL PRICE TO PAY IN NEGOTIATIONS. HE CAUTIONED EVERYONE TO ABSTAIN FROM ANY IDEA OF REDUCING THE MEASURES.

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EXDIS (MILITARY HANDLE AS SPECAT)

TO BE TAKEN.

PAULS CONTINUED THAT THE NPG MINISTERIAL WOULD DEAL WITH AND ENDORSE THE HLG REPORT AND NOTE THE SG REPORT AND THE IDD. THEN PERMRPS OF INTERESTED NATIONS, AS INSTRUCTED BY THEIR GOVERNMENTS, WOULD PUT THE FINISHING
TOUCHES ON THE IDD AT THE 28 NOVEMBER MEETING. THIS ACTION WOULD NOT AT ALL CURTAIL THE MINISTERIAL PREREOGATIVE WHICH SHOULD BE EXERCISED AT THE 12 DECEMBER AFTERNOON MINISTERIAL SESSION.

. IN RELATION TO THE INFLUENCE THE US PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE ON MBFR, PAULS NOTED THE FRG HAD BEEN CONSIDERING THE IDEA OF AN INTERIM AGREEMENT FOR SOME TIME AND INTENDED TO PRESENT A PROPOSAL BEFORE THE END OF THE WEEK. HE NOTED THAT THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS AT A LOWER OVERALL LEVEL ON THE BASIS OF AGREED US-SOVIET DATA. THIS BILATERAL AGREEMENT WOULD BE COUPLED WITH AGREEMENTS OF INTENT BY ALL TO CONTINUE THE NEGOTIATIONS, STATEMENTS BY THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON THE LINKAGE BETWEEN PHASES, AND AN AGREEMENT ON ASSOCIATED MEASURES.

. PAULS SUBSEQUENTLY INTRODUCED RUTH (FRG) WHO MADE SOME DETAILED COMMENTS. HE SUGGESTED, IN PARAGRAPH 1 INTRODUCTION OF THE IDD, ADDING A SENTENCE AT THE END INDICATING THAT TOGETHER WITH THE IDD, THE HLG AND SG REPORTS FORM THE BASIS OF ALLIANCE DECISIONS. HE SAID HE WOULD SUBSEQUENTLY PRESENT IN WRITING OTHER SUGGESTIONS.

. HE FURTHER SUGGESTED (A) THE HEADLINE "LRTNF MODERNIZATION" BE PLACED AFTER PARAGRAPH 14, RATHER THAN BEFORE IT AS AT PRESENT.

. (B) ADDING THE WORD "LIKELY" AT THE BEGINNING OF THE LAST SENTENCE, PARAGRAPH 16.


. (D) MODIFYING THE COMMUNIQUE, PARAGRAPH 7, SENTENCE FOUR, TO READ "IN THIS CONNECTION, MINISTERS AGREED, BASED ON ALLIANCE ANALYSIS, THAT AS AN INTEGRAL...".

. (E) IN PARAGRAPH 7 SHOULD BE SPelled OUT, AND THE NUMBER "572" ADDED TO THE FIFTH SENTENCE REFERENCE TO LRTNF WARHEADS. FINALLY, HE RECOMMENDED BEGINNING THE SIXTH SENTENCE OF
THIS PARAGRAPH WITH "IN ADDITION, THEY NOTED...".

8. CATALANO (ITALY) ECHOED HIS COLLEAGUES IN EXPRESSING APPRECIATION TO AARON AND COMMENDED THE HLG/SG CHAIRMEN FOR THEIR WORK ON THE IDD.

CATALANO NOTED THAT ITALY WAS IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE STRUCTURE OF THE IDD BUT REGARDED THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE AS LONG AND AT TIMES REPETITIOUS. NEVERTHELESS IT WAS ACCEPTABLE AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION. CATALANO ALSO SUGGESTED THAT CLOSE ATTENTION BE PAID TO THE COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE EVEN THOUGH IT WAS NOT TO BE ISSUED TIL MID-DECEMBER AS WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT THE COMMUNIQUE WILL BE THE ONLY OFFICIAL ALLIANCE DOCUMENT ON TFN ARMS CONTROL AND MODERNIZATION TO BE ISSUED FOR THE PUBLIC.

CONCERNING THE PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW 1000 WARHEADS, CATALANO STATED IT WAS BEING GIVEN ACTIVE STUDY IN ALL ASPECTS BUT PRELIMINARY STUDY FOUND MERIT IN THE IDEA. HE NOTED THE PROPOSAL SHOULD TAKE THE PRESENT STATUS OF MBFR INTO ACCOUNT AND, EVEN MORE IMPORTANTLY, BE RELATED TO THE PROBLEM OF AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE TO THE BREZHEV INITIATIVES.

SUBSEQUENTLY CATALANO OFFERED THE FOLLOWING REMARKS
DIRECTED AT THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE:

. PARAGRAPH 3: HE NOTED THE TERM "PERIPHERAL ROLE" IS
. RATHER OBSCURE AND DIFFICULT TO RENDER IN A TRANSLATION
. AND WONDERED IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO SAY, "THEATRE ROLE"
. INSTEAD.

. PARAGRAPH 7: INSTEAD OF:
. HE SUGGESTED IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO SAY:

. PARAGRAPH 9: HE STATED THAT THE CONCEPT UNDERLYING THE
. PHRASE: "FOLLOWING CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE"
. COULD BE BETTER RENDERED WITH THE PHRASE: "TAKEN IN
. CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH THE ALLIES". THE PHRASE:
. "IN A TIMELY WAY" DOES NOT SEEM FORCEFUL ENOUGH: IT
. WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO SAY: "AS SOON AS POSSIBLE".

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9. SCHUURMANS (BELGIUM) OFFERED HIS CONGRATULATIONS TO
THE SG/HLG CHAIRMEN FOR THE QUICK AND EXCELLENT WORK DONE
ON THE IDD. HE STATED THAT THE PROCESS OF MOVING TOWARD A
"DOUBLE DECISION" ON TNP MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL
WAS GOING WELL AND THAT THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE
ITS DECISION OFFICIAL IN THE FIRST WEEK OF DECEMBER IN DUE
TIME FOR THE MINISTERIAL. HE COMMENTED THAT THE IDD WILL
BE OF GREAT ASSISTANCE IN MAKING THIS DECISION.

. REGARDING THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW 1000 NUCLEAR
WARHEADS, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECISION WILL HAVE TO BE
STUDIED IN GREATER DEPTH. AN INITIAL REVIEW, HOWEVER,
HAD CONCLUDED IT WAS A GOOD IDEA AND DEMONSTRATED THE
SPIRIT IN WHICH THE ALLIANCE WAS TAKING DECISIONS ON TNP.

10. VAN VOORST TOT VOORST (CHARGE NETHERLANDS),
EXPRESSED HIS GOVERNMENT'S THANKS TO THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE HLG AND SG. HE NOTED THAT THE ISSUES OF
LRTNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL INVOLVING TNP
WERE MOVING FROM THE SENIOR EXPERTS FORA, WHERE
THEY HAVE BEEN STUDIED UNTIL NOW, INTO THE
POLITICAL ARENA. THE DECISION THE ALLIANCE WILL
TAKE IN DECEMBER IS OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE.
THE IDD, IN ITS FINAL FORM, WILL CONSTITUTE THE
TEXT OF THE FINAL DECISION. IN THIS CONTEXT,
THE TWIN ISSUES OF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS
CONTROL ARE STILL A MATTER OF POLITICAL CONSULTATION
WITHIN THE NETHERLANDS. CONSEQUENTLY, HE STATED

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UNCLASSIFIED
HE COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT COMMENT ON THE
SUBSTANCE OF THE IDD, BUT WOULD ONLY RAISE ONE
ASPECT OF THE ARMS CONTROL PORTION OF THAT
DOCUMENT.

11. VAN VOORST TO VOORST ELABORATED, SAYING THE
SPECIAL GROUP’S REPORT DEVOTES ATTENTION TO THE
POSSIBILITY OF AN ARMS CONTROL SO SUCCESSFUL AS
TO PERMIT NATO TO CONSIDER SUSPENDING ITS OWN
LRTNF MODERNIZATION PLANS. ALTHOUGH THIS "ZERO
DEPLOYMENT" IS UNLIKELY TO PROVE PRACTICAL,
IT REMAINS AT LEAST A THEORETICAL OPTION WHICH
WOULD LEAD TO REMOVAL OF THE SOVIET LONG-RANGE
THREAT. HIS AUTHORITIES BELIEVE IT ADVANTAGEOUS
to recall, in the IDD, this possibility which
COULD BE DONE BY INSERTING ONE SENTENCE IN
PARAGRAPH II 11. AFTER THE SECOND
SENTENCE IN THAT PARAGRAPH, INSERT THE FIRST
SENTENCE FROM PRINCIPAL 1E OF THE SG REPORT
("ONE COULD POSTULATE...SUSPENDING ITS OWN
LRTNF MODERNIZATION PLANS.") BY MAKING THIS
ADDITION, THE IDD WOULD CONTAIN BOTH THE THEORETICAL
NATURE AND THE UNREALISTIC ASPECT OF THE "ZERO
DEPLOYMENT" POSSIBILITY.

12. DUTCH REP THEN TURNED TO THE US "1000 WARHEAD"
SUGGESTION. IN GENERAL, THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT
WELCOMES THIS STEP. IT WOULD FIT IN WELL WITH THE
DECEMBER ANNOUNCEMENT OF PARALLEL DECISIONS ON
MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL. OF COURSE, NATO
MUST BE PREPARED TO MAKE THE APPROPRIATE MBFR
CONNECTION. THE IDEA OF A SIMPLIFIED PHASE I
PROPOSAL TOGETHER WITH APPROPRIATE ASSOCIATED
MEASURES SEEMS ATTRACTIVE AT FIRST GLANCE. HIS
AUTHORITIES ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO THE FRG
MBFR PROPOSAL. NATO WILL NEED MORE DETAILS BEFORE
MAKING SUBSTANTIVE JUDGMENTS AND HE WONDERED
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
ALL NATO CAPITALS
USOSACLANT NORFOLK VA
USNMR SHAPE BE
USCINCBUR VAHINGEN GER

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EXDIS (MILITARY HANDLE AS SPECAT)

WHETHER IT WAS THE INTENT TO DEAL WITH MBFR IN TOTAL
AT THE NEXT NATO MEETING ON MBFR.

13. VAN VOORST TOT VOORST CONCLUDED BY STATING
THAT THE NETHERLANDS ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE
TO THE STUDY OF THE "SHIFT" IN THE NUCLEAR
STOCKPILE WHICH WILL BE CAUSED BY THE ASSIGNMENT
OF A GREATER PART OF THAT STOCKPILE TO LONG-
RANGE ROLES. MOD SCHOLTEN WILL HAVE MORE TO
SAY ABOUT THAT AT THE NPG MINISTERIAL. THE
NETHERLANDS PARTICULARLY APPRECIATES THE IDD'S
REFERENCE TO TIMING OF THE STUDY, WHERE IT
CALLS FOR A REPORT TO MINISTERS IN THE AUTUMN
OF 1980. FINALLY, IN CONSIDERING WORDING FOR
THE COMMUNIQUE, THE NETHERLANDS WOULD PREFER
WORDING CLOSER TO THAT IN THE IDD RATHER THAN
THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE.

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SYG LUNS SUGGESTED THAT THE NETHERLANDS'
INTENT IN DRAWING WORDING FROM THE SG REPORT
WOULD BE CLEARER AND MORE BALANCED IF ALL OF
PARAGRAPHE E OF PRINCIPLE 1 WERE INCLUDED.
THIS POINT WAS PICKED UP BY THE DANISH
AMBASSADOR LATER IN THE MEETING.

14. SVART (DENMARK) STATED THAT NEW DANISH
GOVERNMENT HAS INITIATED AN INTENSIVE REVIEW
OF THIS SUBJECT, WHICH IS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT,
ESPECIALLY FOR THE DANISH PUBLIC. THE
GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE THE ISSUE TO THE PARLIAMENT
. ON 27 NOVEMBER AND EXPECTS A BROAD DEBATE. THE
27 NOVEMBER DEBATE WILL NOT RESULT IN A MOTION
PUT BEFORE THE PARLIAMENT. THE GOVERNMENT'S
POSITION WILL BE DECIDED SUBSEQUENTLY, AND WILL
BE BASED, IN PART, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT
THOSE STATES SLATED FOR BASING LRTNF WILL BE
IN A POSITION TO APPROVE THE BASING AND THAT AN ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL WILL BE PUT FORWARD BY THE ALLIANCE.

15. SVART STATED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES ARE WELL SATISFIED WITH THE US PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF WARHEADS FROM EUROPE. THIS PROPOSAL FALLS NICELY IN LINE WITH NATO’S DESIRE NOT TO INCREASE DEPENDENCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. DANISH AUTHORITIES ALSO WELCOME THE POSITIVE EFFECT OF THIS PROPOSAL IS LIKELY TO HAVE ON MBFR. WITH RESPECT TO THE ARMS CONTROL PORTIONS, THE DANISH GOVERNMENTS BELIEVES THE IDD COULD BE MORE SPECIFIC, PERHAPS BY POINTING TO THE IDEA THAT SUBSTANTIAL RESULTS FROM

ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES COULD LEAD TO REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBERS OF NEW WARHEADS WHICH ARE TO BEGIN DEPLOYMENT IN 1983. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO DISCUSS IN THE IDD THE EFFECT THE DECEMBER DECISION WILL HAVE ON DETENTE.

16. SVART CONTINUED BY OBSERVING THAT THE IDD SHOULD BE MADE AN ANNEX TO A COVER NOTE FROM THE SYG IN ORDER NOT TO BE SEEN AS PRESENTING MINISTERS WITH A DECISION ALREADY TAKEN, WHICH THEY ARE ONLY ASKED TO RATIFY. TURNING TO THE RELATIONSHIP OF TNF DECISIONS WITH SALT II, SVART SAID THAT THE DANISH GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT THE FATE OF SALT II WILL HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DECEMBER DECISION. IF SALT II IS NOT RATIFIED, WE WILL HAVE A NEW SET OF ISSUES TO CONSIDER AND WILL BE FACED WITH A NEW SITUATION.

17. TURNING TO SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON THE IDD, SVART CIRCULATED TWO PROPOSED CHANGES TO PARAGRAPHS 11 AND 12 OF SECTION II (TEXT BELOW). HE ALSO SUGGESTED AMENDING PARAGRAPH 23 IN SECTION III, WHERE IT SAYS "TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS IN A TIMELY WAY" TO READ, INSTEAD, "TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE." SVART ASKED THAT THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE BE BROUGHT INTO CONFORMITY WITH THESE CHANGES. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THE MINISTERS, IN DECEMBER, WILL WISH TO PROVIDE CLEAR POLITICAL, PUBLIC AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT. THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE AT PRESENT SEEMS TO REFER ONLY TO HOSTING AND IT COULD BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE ALL THESE POINTS.

18. BEGIN TEXT OF DANISH REVISIONS OF PARAGRAPHS 11 AND 12 OF SECTION II OF THE IDD:
NEW FORMULATION:

11. SUCCESS OF ARMS CONTROL IN CONSTRAINING THE SOVIET BUILDUP WILL ENHANCE ALLIANCE SECURITY AND REDUCE THE SCALE OF NATO'S TNF MODERNIZATION REQUIREMENTS. THUS, CONCRETE ARMS CONTROL RESULTS WILL LEAD TO A DOWNWARD ADJUSTMENT IN THE SCALE OF NATO'S TNF REQUIREMENTS. HOWEVER, ANY ACHIEVABLE ARMS CONTROL OUTCOME INVOLVING TNF WOULD NOT, IN THE FIRST STEP, ELIMINATE ENTIRELY THE SOVIET LRTNF THREAT AND WOULD NOT OBTIATE THE NEED FOR SOME LRTNF MODERNIZATION TO MEET THE ALLIANCE'S OWN SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT CAN ADJUST THE SCALE OF CONCRETE MEASURES AIMED AT MEETING THE CONTINUOUS ARMAMENT EFFORT OF THE WARSAW PACT WILL THEREFORE DEPEND ON THE DEGREE OF SUCCESS IN ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE AND BALANCED LIMITATIONS ON LRTNF OF BOTH SIDES THROUGH ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

12. THUS BOTH TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL INVOLVING TNF ARE IN LINE WITH NATO'S BASIC POLICY OF DETERRENCE, DEFENSE AND DETENTE, AS ENUNCIATED IN THE HARMEL REPORT. IN MAKING PARALLEL DECISIONS ON TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL THE ALLIANCE HAS TAKEN STEPS TO ENSURE THAT LEGITIMATE MILITARY SECURITY REQUIREMENTS SHOULD NOT IMPEDE THE CONTINUOUS EFFORTS...
OF THE ALLIANCE IN THE FIELD OF DETENTE. THE OVERALL PURPOSE OF SEEKING STABILITY IN THE RELATIONS WITH THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES AND OF ACHIEVING A MORE CONFIDENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST COULD BE STRENGTHENED BY SUCCESSFUL ARMS CONTROL AND THUS GIVE FURTHER MOMENTUM TO THE PROCESS OF DETENTE.

AS TO BREZHNEV’S OCTOBER 6 SPEECH AND HIS OFFER TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN THE WESTERN SOVIET UNION IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THIS OFFER IS GIVEN UNDER THE CONDITION THAT NO ADDITIONAL MEDIUM-RANGE SYSTEMS ARE DEPLOYED IN WESTERN EUROPE. A POSITIVE ELEMENT IN BREZHNEV’S SPEECH IS THAT THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE FIRST TIME IMPLIES THAT TNF ON BOTH SIDES COULD BE INCLUDED IN SALT III.

THESE CONSIDERATIONS, Coupled WITH BREZHNEV’S PRESUMED COMMITMENT TO DETENTE, AMOUNT TO A STRONG INDICATION THAT, IN THE LAST RESORT, DETENTE WOULD NOT SUFFER SERIOUSLY OR PERMANENTLY THROUGH REALIZATION OF NATO’S PLANS, WHICH BEAR, AFTER ALL, ONLY ON ONE ASPECT OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS.

END TEXT.

19. HARDY (CANADA) STATED THAT IT IS THE OPINION OF HIS AUTHORITIES THAT THE IDD FAITHFULLY REFLECTS THE CON-


20. HARDY THEN REFERRED TO PARAGRAPH 18 OF THE IDD, ASKING THAT THE SECOND SENTENCE BE AMENDED TO READ "THE (INFRASTRUCTURE) CEILING WILL BE INCREASED, IF NECESSARY, TO ACCOUNT ...." HARDY SAID THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER "AS MAY BE NECESSARY" IN PLACE OF ADDING "IF NECESSARY." HE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS CHANGE WOULD IN NO WAY AFFECT THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM OR DETRACT FROM THE PROPOSAL THAT NATO’S INFRASTRUCTURE BE THE VEHICLE FOR FUNDING THE NECESSARY CONSTRUCTION FOR THE MODERNIZATION. CANADA WILL PAY ITS SHARE. FUNDS
WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE WHEN REQUIRED. THE CHANGE IN
WORDING IS DESIGNED SOLELY TO LEAVE THE INFRASTRUCTURE
DECISIONS TO THE PROPER FORUM. IN HIS GENERAL RESPONSE,
LATER IN THE MEETING, AARON OBSERVED THAT THE CANADIAN
FORMULA "AS MAY BE NECESSARY" MIGHT BE ADEQUATE, BUT HE
EMPHASIZED THAT THE TOTAL COST OF THE LRTNF MODERNIZATION
PROGRAM TO THE US WOULD BE 4-5 BILLION DOLLARS -- A LARGE
SUM EVEN WHEN COMPARED TO THE US CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE

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EXDIS (MILITARY HANDLE AS SPECAT)

LTDTP. THE US NEEDS THE FIRMEST POSSIBLE COMMITMENT THAT
OUR ALLIES WILL MAKE THEIR OWN CONTRIBUTION, WHICH, BY
THE WAY, IS ONLY ABOUT 165 MILLION DOLLARS. IF A FIRM
ALLIED COMMITMENT IS NOT IN HAND, THE US CONGRESS MAY NOT
PROVIDE THE NECESSARY PREFINANCING. FURTHER, WE DO NOT
WISH TO SEE OTHER VITAL PROGRAMS SLIP OUT OF THE PICTURE.
HARDY RESPONDED TO AARON BY EMPHASIZING THAT CANADA IS
NOT AGAINST FINANCING LRTNF THROUGH INFRASTRUCTURE, BUT
WISHES ONLY TO AVOID DOING SO IN A WAY DIFFERENT FROM
NORMAL. IT WOULD BE UNDESIRABLE TO LINK INFRASTRUCTURE
FUNDING TO ANY SPECIFIC ARMS VENTURE -- THIS IS NOT THE
USUAL PRACTICE. TO SAY NOW, BEFORE THE NEXT FIVE-YEAR
PERIOD EVEN BEGINS, THAT LRTNF WILL REQUIRE AN INCREASE
IN THE CEILING IMPLIES THAT LRTNF HAS PRIORITY OR MUST
SUBSTITUTE FOR OTHER PROGRAMS. WE SHOULD LEAVE TO THE
INFRASTRUCTURE COMMITTEE AT THE MID-TERM REVIEW WHETHER
AND HOW ANY NECESSARY INCREASE COULD BE ACCOMMODATED.
THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT VIEWS THIS AS A FUNDAMENTAL
MATTER.

21. COMMENT: AFTER THE MEETING, ROSE APPROACHED HARDY WITH THE FOLLOWING "COMPROMISE" LANGUAGE FOR PARAGRAPH 18 OF THE IDR:

"SO THAT THE LRTNFP PROGRAM WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE NATO FORCE IMPROVEMENTS, THE MID-TERM REVIEW OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM IN 1982-83 WILL EXAMINE WHAT INCREASE, IF ANY, IS NEEDED IN THE FIVE-YEAR CEILING TO ACCOUNT FOR THE REQUIREMENTS STEMMING FROM LRTNFP MODERNIZATION."

HARDY AGREED TO CONSIDER THE COMPROMISE, WITH THE WORDS "IF ANY" INSERTED BETWEEN "INCREASE" AND "IS NEEDED." ROSE THEN APPROACHED BENNETT, WHO POINTED OUT THAT THE INCLUSION OF "IF ANY" HAD THE SAME DEFECT AS THE ORIGINAL CANADIAN WORDING. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER THIS VERSION IF IT READ "WHAT INCREASE MAY BE NECESSARY IN THE FIVE-YEAR CEILING." ROSE AGREED AND SAID HE WOULD APPROACH HARDY WITH THIS REVISION. END COMMENT.

22. VIBE (NORWAY) STATED THAT THE IDR WAS A CONSTRUCTIVE BASIS FOR DECISIONS AND THAT HE WOULD OFFER NO SPECIFIC AMENDMENTS. HE STATED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES SUPPORTED THE DANISH AMENDMENTS ON IDD SECTION II. THEY ALSO STRONGLY SUPPORT THE WITHDRAWAL OF 1000 WARHEADS AND THINK THAT THIS WOULD CONSIDERABLY IMPROVE THE WESTERN POSITION. HE ADDED THAT, ALTHOUGH THE FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE 1000 WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE MADE IN DECEMBER, THIS WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE MADE PUBLIC BEFORE THE DECEMBER MEETINGS. (RUTH (FRG) SUBSEQUENTLY SUPPORTED THIS POSITION.)

23. VIBE OFFERED THAT AN IMPROVED ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL WOULD RESULT IF THE 1000 WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL WERE A PART OF A WIDER INITIATIVE ON ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE AND THUS A BETTER MATCH FOR THE BREZHNEV PROPOSAL. HE STATED THAT THE ALLIANCE NEEDED A MORE "OFFENSIVE" ARMS CONTROL PLATFORM. HE SUGGESTED A SIMPLIFIED PHASE I PROPOSAL WITH ASSOCIATED MEASURES TO BE INCLUDED IN A COMPREHENSIVE ARMS CONTROL PACKAGE WHICH MIGHT EMANATE FROM THE DECEMBER
MEETINGS. HE ADDED THAT THE ALLIANCE COULD AGREE BY DECEMBER ON AT LEAST A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES LISTING THE KIND OF ADDITIONAL CBMs TO BE RAISED AT THE MADRID OR IN SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS. VIBE SAW CONSIDERABLE MERIT IN COMBINING ALL ARMS CONTROL ITEMS INTO A SINGLE DECLARATION.

24. COMMENTING ON THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE, VIBE SUGGESTED BEGINNING PARAGRAPH 8 WITH THE TERM "MINISTERS ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE" INSTEAD OF THE PRESENT "MINISTERS RECOGNIZE." IN PARAGRAPH 9, HE SUGGESTED SUBSTITUTING "TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE" INSTEAD OF THE PRESENT "TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS IN A TIMELY WAY." AND IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 10, HE SUGGESTED SUBSTITUTING

"SUCCESS OF ARMS CONTROL...CAN...REDUCE THE SCALE" INSTEAD OF THE PRESENT "SUCCESS OF ARMS CONTROL...CAN...MODIFY THE SCALE." LATER IN THE MEETING, VIBE CLARIFIED HIS EARLIER REMARK BY SUGGESTING THAT THE 1000 WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL BE CONFIRMED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO CONVINCE WAVERERS.

25. DE VILLAS-BOAS (PORTUGAL) APPLAUDED THE EXCELLENT QUALITY OF THE IDD. HE STATED THAT PORTUGAL WAS IN A SPECIAL POSITION IN TERMS OF PARTICIPATION. HE NOTED THAT DUE TO THE
INTERNAL SITUATION IN PORTUGAL, IT HAD
ABSTAINED FROM NPG WORK AND, THEREFORE, DID NOT
PARTICIPATE AT THE 1977 MEETING IN BARI AT
WHICH THE HLG HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. BUT, THAT
PORTUGAL HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE WORK OF
THE SPECIAL GROUP. HE SAID HE WAS CONVINCED THE

HLG HAD MADE AN IN-DEPTH STUDY, AND EMPHASIZED
THE IDD WAS CONSISTENT WITH PORTUGAL’S POLICY
ON THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES.
ASSERTING THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT
DISARM UNILATERALLY, DE VILLAS-BOAS NOTED THAT
IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE ALLIANCE TO
BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS FIRST, IN ADVANCE OF A
MODERNIZATION DECISION. THUS, THE MODERNIZATION
DECISION SHOULD BE PHRASED IN SUCH A WAY TO
ENSURE ADAPTABLE TO THE ARMS CONTROL
NEGOTIATION PROCESS. SUCH A DECISION SHOULD
ENHANCE THE CREDIBILITY OF DETERRENCE. HE
SPECIFICALLY SUPPORTED THE IDD STATEMENT ON
THE ALLIANCE’S NEED TO CONVINCE THE SOVIET
UNION OF ITS ABILITY TO RESPOND FLEXIBLY ON
ALL LEVELS. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
POLITICAL COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE WHICH WOULD
BE THREATENED IF NATO WERE NOT TO TAKE A
MODERNIZATION DECISION, NOTING THAT THIS WAS
MORE IMPORTANT TODAY THAN EVER.

26. ATHANASSIOU (GREECE) CONGRATULATED THE
HLG AND SG CHAIRMEN, COMMENTING THAT THEIRS
HAD NOT BEEN AN EASY TASK. HE SAID HIS GOVERN-
MENT HAD BEEN AMONG THE FIRST TO AGREE TO THE
PARALLEL APPROACH ON MODERNIZATION AND ARMS
CONTROL. HE ASSERTED THAT ARMS CONTROL
NEGOTIATIONS WOULD ENHANCE THE OVERALL
LEVEL OF SECURITY, AND THAT THEIR OBJECTIVE
SHOULD BE TO ACHIEVE EQUALITY OR PARITY AT
THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVELS. HE AGREED WITH THE
CONTENT OF THE IDD AS REVISED AND TRANSMITTED
TO HIM ON NOVEMBER 2, AND SPECIFICALLY ON THE

INCLUSION OF THE 1000 WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL.
ATHANASSIOU SAID HE EXPECTED THE FINDINGS OF
THE NPG TO ADDRESS ADJUSTMENTS IN THE
NUCLEAR STOCKPILE, ACCORDING TO IDD PARAGRAPH 21.
HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE GREEK POSITION ON COST
SHARING, PER IDD PARAGRAPH 17, HAD BEEN STATED DURING THE COURSE OF THE HLG WORK. FOR THE RECORD, HE REITERATED THAT GREECE WOULD BE UNABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO LRNTNF UNTIL THE SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF REINTEGRATION OF THE GREEK FORCES.

27. OLCAY (TURKEY) REMARKED THAT THIS WAS NOT THE IDEAL MOMENT FOR HIS GOVERNMENT TO BE TAKING SUCH MOMENTOUS DECISIONS. NONETHELESS, HIS AUTHORITIES WISHED TO STRESS THAT NATO MUST REACT TO SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS AND STRENGTHEN THE LINK BETWEEN THE STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE ALLIANCE. HE ADDED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES WELCOMED THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE 1000 WARHEADS, WHILE COMMENTING THAT THEY WOULD LOOK WITH INTEREST ON THE EFFECT OF THE WITHDRAWAL ON THE FUTURE OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE CONSULTATIONS THE US HAD WITH THE ALLIANCE DURING THE SALT II NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND NOTED THE NEED FOR SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS ON TNF ISSUES IN THE SALT III FRAMEWORK. HE SUGGESTED COMBINING THE SEPARATE SUBPARAGRAPHS IN PARAGRAPH 23 IN ORDER TO REDUCE REPETITION AND SUPPORTED NORWAY’S POSITION ON PARAGRAPH 8.

28. WURTH (LUXEMBOURG) STATED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES COULD ADHERE FULLY TO THE IDD. HE COMMENTED THAT

THE 1000 WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL WAS A "CLEVER"
PROPOSAL AND MIGHT UNBLOCK THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS.
WURTH EMPHASIZED THAT A POSITIVE LRTNF
DECISION IN DECEMBER WAS VITAL TO THE
ALLIANCE. HE STATED HE WAS ABLE TO AGREE TO
ALL PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, BUT SPECIFICALLY
SUPPORTED THE DANISH SUGGESTIONS TO AMEND THE
IDD, ESPECIALLY THOSE ON PARAGRAPH 11.

29. BJORNSSON (ICELAND) EXPRESSED APPRECIATION
FOR US PREPARATIONS TO WITHDRAW 1000 NUCLEAR
WARHEADS. HE REMINDED OTHERS THAT ICELAND HAD
A SEPARATE POSITION ON PARTICIPATION IN THE
NATO INTEGRATED DEFENSE STRUCTURE AND
INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING.

30. AS WELL AS HIS COMMENTS ON THE CANADIAN POSITION
ON INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING RECOUNTED EARLIER, AARON STATED
THAT THE US WOULD ENDEAVOR TO INCORPORATE AS WELL AS

POSSIBLE THE SUBSTANTIVE AND EDITORIAL COMMENTS ON THE
IDD WHICH HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD. HE MADE THE FOLLOWING
OBSERVATIONS IN RESPONSE TO REMARKS RAISED DURING THE
MEETING.

- A. HE WELcomed THE FRG SUGGESTIONS ON A SIMPLIFIED
PHASE I APPROACH AND LOOKED FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THE
PROPOSAL IN GREATER DETAIL;

- B. IN RESPONSE TO THE DUTCH SUGGESTION ON THE "ZERO
OPTION", HE ACCEPTED THE COMMENTS OF THE SYG AND UK TO
BRING SUCH AN ADDITION INTO APPROPRIATE BALANCE. IN
ASSessING THE SOVIET THREAT, AARON REMARKED, IT IS
NECESSARY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE FULL RANGE OF SOVIET
ABILITY TO STRIKE WESTERN EUROPE (AS DID THE HLG REPORT)
AND NOT TO LOSE SIGHT OF THIS FACT.

- C. IN REACTION TO THE DANISH PARAGRAPH 11 SUGGES-
TIONS, AARON EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT TRYING TO BE TOO
CATEGORIC IN PREDICTING THE FUTURE. HE SUGGESTED IT
WouLD BE USEFUL TO RECALL THE SALT I EXAMPLE WHERE IN
TERMS OF POSSIBLE LIMITS ON SOVIET OFFENSIVE FORCES, IT
WAS NOT CLEAR THAT WE HAD CONTROLLED THEM BELOW THE
LIMITS THEY COULD HAVE ACHIEVED, WE HAVE DONE
BETTER IN SALT II. SUCH MIGHT ALSO BE THE CASE FOR
SOVIET THEATER FORCES. WHILE WE WANT TO REDUCE SOVIET
DEPLOYMENTS BELOW THE CURRENT ANTICIPATED LEVELS, WE
CANNOT BE SURE WE WILL BE ABLE TO DO SO BECAUSE WE DO NOT
KNOW THEIR ANTICIPATED DEPLOYMENTS BUT ONLY HAVE OUR
PROJECTIONS OF THESE DEPLOYMENTS. CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS
DIFFICULT TO ASSURE A REDUCTION OF THE THREAT BUT WE
COULD MAKE OUR POSITION MORE CERTAIN.

- D. AARON STATED THE US WOULD ALSO REVIEW PARAGRAPH
12 TO SEE IF COMMENTS COULD BE ACCOMMODATED. PERHAPS
THE DANISH REDRAFT IS TOO DEFENSIVE IN TONE.

- E. CONCERNING CBMS, AARON NOTED THAT OTHER GOVERN-
MENTS WANTED TO SEE ACTION IN THIS AREA.

- F. AARON EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR ALLIANCE SUPPORT
ON THE US PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW 1000 WARHEADS. HE STATED
THAT PUBLIC CONFIRMATION COULD COME IN CONNECTION WITH
THE 13-14 NOVEMBER NPG MINISTERIAL.

- G. CONCERNING A STUDY OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE
ALLIANCE TNF POSTURE AND THE ISSUE OF TRADE OFFS ON
SHORT AND LONG RANGE SYSTEMS, AARON STATED THAT IT WAS
THE US POSITION THAT ANY STUDY SHOULD FOCUS ON THE POSTURE
AFER THE 1000 WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL. THIS 1000 WARHEAD
WITHDRAWAL CAN PROCEED ON THE BASIS PREVIOUSLY SEEN IN
MBFR. AARON MODIFIED, HOWEVER, THE INITIAL US SUGGESTION
THAT THE WITHDRAWAL TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR AND
STATED THAT IT MIGHT BE STRETCHED OUT OVER A LONGER
PERIOD. WITHDRAWALS MIGHT BE LINKED WITH THE TIME OF
IMPLEMENTING MODERNIZATION AND WILL NEED TO BE CONSIDERED
FURTHER.

31. FOLLOWING GUIDANCE WAS USED BY THE NATO PRESS
SPOKESMAN IN RESPONSE TO MEDIA QUESTIONS.
BEGIN TEXT:

PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THOSE MEMBERS CONCERNED,
REINFORCED BY SENIOR OFFICIALS FROM CAPITALS, MET ON NOVEMBER 6 TO CONSIDER FURTHER THE QUESTIONS OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL. THEY REVIEWED THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP AND THE SPECIAL GROUP, IN PARTICULAR THE INTEGRATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TWO GROUPS.

END TEXT.

32. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SYG LUNS’ INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

BEGIN TEXT:

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

"TODAY WE WILL HAVE OUR FIRST EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE PAPER THAT WILL SERVE AS THE BASIC DOCUMENT FOR MINISTERS MEETING IN DECEMBER IN ORDER TO DECIDE ON NATO’S REQUIREMENTS FOR LONG-RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNIZATION AND A PARALLEL ARMS CONTROL APPROACH. THIS PAPER IS CALLED THE DRAFT INTEGRATED DECISION DOCUMENT AND IS THE RESULT OF WORK UNDERTAKEN BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NSC HIGH LEVEL GROUP AND THE SPECIAL GROUP ON ARMS CONTROL, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT SEVERAL COMMENTS MADE BY ALLIES. YOU WILL RECALL THAT IN THE PROCEDURAL TRACK I PROPOSED IN PO 105, I ASKED THAT YOU BE PREPARED TODAY TO COMMENT ON THE PAPER ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR GOVERNMENTS. IN THE LATEST VERSION CIRCULATED LAST FRIDAY, YOU WILL SEE THERE ARE SOME NEW FEATURES. YOU WILL ALL HAVE SEEN THE PROPOSAL OF THE US TO WITHDRAW 1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS WHICH IS ALREADY REFLECTED IN THE REVISED DRAFT INTEGRATED DECISION DOCUMENT ITSELF. (I REFER TO PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 20 OF THE DRAFT AND TO PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE ATTACHED DRAFT DECEMBER COMMUNIQUE.) FURTHERMORE, AS A CONSEQUENCE, IT IS ALSO SUGGESTED IN THE UNITED STATES DRAFT MATERIAL THAT ADDITIONAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AS NEW LONG-RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR WARHEADS WOULD BE DEPLOYED BEGINNING 1983.

"YOUR INITIAL REACTIONS TO THE ADDED PROPOSAL WOULD BE WELCOME. I WOULD EXPECT THAT OUR DISCUSSION TODAY
WOULD COVER THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES WHICH ARE SUMMARIZED IN THE DOCUMENT. YOU MAY ALSO WISH TO COMMENT BRIEFLY ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A SIMPLIFIED PHASE I APPROACH TO MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS, ALTHOUGH I ASSUME WE WILL WANT TO HAVE AN EARLY NATO COUNCIL MEETING TO DISCUSS THE POINT IN DETAIL AS SOON AS NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS ARE AVAILABLE SO THE MBFR ITEM IS NOT ON THE AGENDA TODAY. I WOULD URGE THAT THIS BE DONE EXPEDITIOUSLY.

END TEXT.

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33. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT BY DAVID AARON.

PRESENTATION TO THE NATO PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES

BY DAVID AARON, 6 NOVEMBER 1979

MR. SECRETARY-GENERAL AND MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, IT IS A GREAT PLEASURE TO COME TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT CARTER. I AM SURE THAT YOU WILL AGREE THAT THE ALLIANCE HAS FACED FEW, IF ANY, MORE CRUCIAL CHALLENGES THAN IT FACES TODAY -- A CHALLENGE TO ITS POLITICAL COHESION AND ITS ABILITY TO MAKE DIFFICULT DEFENSE AND POLITICAL DECISIONS. BASED ON THE EXCELLENT PREPARATIONS OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP AND THE SPECIAL GROUP, WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THIS CHALLENGE CAN BE MET.

BEFORE THIS GROUP, I DON'T NEED TO BELABOR THE DETAILS OF THE CHALLENGE POSED BY SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE DEPLOYMENTS. IF THE SOVIET CHALLENGE WERE TO REMAIN UNANSWERED, THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT COME TO BELIEVE THAT THROUGH THEIR MILITARY EFFORTS THEY HAVE ACHIEVED WHAT THEY HAVE LONG SOUGHT -- PREPONDERANCE ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND DECOUPLING THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE FROM US STRATEGIC FORCES AND THE DEFENSE OF NORTH AMERICA.

THE QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER THE US STRATEGIC DETERRENT IS FIRMLY COUPLED WITH THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE. THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT THIS, AS THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE CLEAR MANY TIMES. THE PROBLEM IS RATHER THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT COME TO BELIEVE THAT THEY HAD IN FACT
O 071857Z NOV 79 ZDK
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO SECFACE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3652
SECRET WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
ALL NATO CAPITALS
USLOSAEANT NORFOLK VA
USNMR SHAPE BE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

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ACHIEVED THEIR GOAL OF DECOUPLING AND BEGIN TO ACT
ACCORDINGLY.

. BOTH THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL NATURE OF THE
SOVIET CHALLENGE HAVE TAKEN ON GREATER URGENCY IN RECENT
WEEKS. THE SS-20 BUILD-UP CONTINUES. WE HAVE RECENTLY
NOTED THE ADDITION OF A NEW SS-20 BASE UNDER INITIAL
CONSTRUCTION IN RECENT WEEKS. AND WE HAVE ALSO SEEN
WHAT MAY BE A NEW, MORE WIDELY DISPERSED, CONFIGURATION
OF SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS WHICH COULD MAKE OUR TASK OF
KEEPING TRACK OF THE SS-20S EVEN MORE DIFFICULT. THESE
DEVELOPMENTS BRING THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SS-20 BASES OPERA-
TIONAL OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION TO AT LEAST 21; AND AT LEAST
13 OF THESE ARE WITHIN RANGE OF WESTERN EUROPE.

. AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE CONTINUING TO GATHER MORE
DISTURBING EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT RETIRING
THE SS-4 AND 5 SYSTEMS AS WE HAD EXPECTED THEY WOULD

WHEN THE SS-20S ENTERED THE FORCE. AS A RESULT THE
SOVIETS MAY PLAN AN EVEN LARGER MEDIUM AND INTERMEDIATE
RANGE LAND-BASED MISSILE CAPABILITY THAN THE ROUGHLY
600 WARHEADS OPPOSITE WESTERN EUROPE WE HAD PROJECTED
EARLIER.

. WHILE THESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS GO FORWARD, THE
POLITICAL NATURE OF THE SOVIET CHALLENGE HAS BECOME
INCREASINGLY CLEAR. WE CAN WELCOME PRESIDENT BREZHNEV’S
ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF 20,000 SOVIET SOLDIERS
AND 1,000 TANKS AS A SMALL STEP TOWARD ELIMINATION OF
THE DISPARITY BETWEEN NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES IN
CENTRAL EUROPE. WE CAN WELCOME THE OFFER TO NEGOTIATE
BUT NOT THE PROPOSAL THAT IN ESSENCE IF NATO DOES
NOTHING WE CAN MEET WITH THE SOVIETS TO RATIFY THEIR SUPERIORITY IN LRTPF. MOREOVER, WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE MAIN MOTIVATION OF PRESIDENT BREZHNEV'S SPEECH AND SUBSEQUENT SOVIET ACTIVITIES IS TO PREVENT ALLIANCE TNF MODERNIZATION. THE SPEECH HAS RAISED THE POLITICAL STAKES FOR THE ALLIANCE.

IF ANYTHING, THESE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS STRENGTHEN OUR RESOLVE TO MOVE FORWARD TO ALLIANCE TNF DECISIONS IN DECEMBER -- THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES ON THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP, AND UNDERTAKING PRACTICAL ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES INVOLVING TNF, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE SPECIAL GROUP.

THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PERSHING II AND GROUND- LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES WILL CLOSE THE GAP IN THE LADDER OF DETERRENCE. THUS, THIS STEP WILL ENSURE THE NECESSARY MILITARY CAPABILITY TO DETER ATTACK, DEMONSTRATE TO THE

SOVIETS OUR INTENT TO PRESERVE OUR SECURITY, AND PROVIDE INCENTIVES FOR MEANINGFUL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. MOST IMPORTANTLY, IT WILL ENSURE THE FIRM LINKAGE OF US STRATEGIC FORCES TO EUROPE'S DEFENSE.

EQUALY IMPORTANT, WHILE WE PROCEED WITH DEPLOYMENTS WE MUST MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TO BRING LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER CONTROL. IT WOULD NOT BE IN THE ALLIANCE'S INTEREST TO BE DRAWN INTO AN UNRESTRICTED THEATER NUCLEAR ARMS COMPETITION WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THAT IS WHY THE US SUPPORTS THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL GROUP TO MOVE RAPIDLY IN THE SALT 3 FRAMEWORK TO NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION THAT WOULD SET EQUAL CEILINGS ON THE LAND-BASED LONG-RANGE MISSILE CAPABILITY OF BOTH SIDES.

IT IS PRESIDENT CARTER'S BELIEF THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE TIMID IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. WE SHOULD TRY TO CUT THE SOVIET LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR MISSILE THREAT TO EUROPE. THE OBVIOUS FACT THAT THIS COULD LEAD TO A DOWNWARD ADJUSTMENT IN OUR OWN DEPLOYMENT NEEDS DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE CAN POSTPONE A DEPLOYMENT DECISION WHILE AWAITING THE RESULTS OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. ONLY IF THE SOVIET UNION IS FACED WITH CONCRETE ACTION IN THE DEPLOYMENT AREA WILL THEY AGREE TO REDUCE AND LIMIT THEIR OWN FORCES.

THE PROGRAM OF THE HLG AND SG IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE PRESIDENT. I WANT TO STRESS THAT THE PRESIDENT
SHARES THE BELIEF OF OTHER ALLIANCE LEADERS THAT WE

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SHOULD TAKE THE ALLIANCE TNF DECISIONS IN DECEMBER. ONCE
THE LRTNF PROGRAM IS APPROVED BY NATO MINISTERS IN
DECEMBER, HE IS READY TO MOVE FORWARD TO SEEK THE NECESSARY
FUNDS FROM CONGRESS FOR THIS PROGRAM, WHICH I HARDLY
NEED UNDERLINE WILL BE A COSTLY ONE. THE PRESIDENT IS ALSO
READY TO MOVE QUICKLY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SALT THREE
TO DEAL WITH THEATER NUCLEAR ISSUES, AS RECOMMENDED BY
THE SPECIAL GROUP. HE LOOKS FORWARD TO CLOSE CONSULTA-
TION AMONG THE NATO ALLIES AS WE MOVE TOGETHER INTO THESE
DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS. GIVEN THE PRESIDENT'S EFFORTS
IN SALT TWO ESPECIALLY THE RATIFICATION PROCESS WHICH
IS NOW MOVING FORWARD AGAIN AS A RESULT OF GREAT POLITICAL
EFFORT ON HIS PART THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION ABOUT THE
COMMITMENT OF THE US AND ESPECIALLY PRESIDENT CARTER
TO ARMS CONTROL.

. THESE COMMITMENTS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE DOCUMENTS
BEFORE US TODAY, IT IS NO ACCIDENT THAT THESE DOCUMENTS

ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE POLICIES OF MOST OF THE GOVERN-
MENTS REPRESENTED AROUND THIS TABLE, FOR THEY ARE THE
RESULT OF AN INTENSIVE CONSULTATION PROCESS THAT
MAY BE UNIQUE IN THE ALLIANCE'S HISTORY.

. UNDER DAVE MCGIFFERT'S CHAIRMANSHIP THE HIGH LEVEL
GROUP HAS BEEN WORKING ON THE TNF MODERNIZATION QUESTION FOR ALMOST TWO YEARS. WITH REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW AT THE HELM, THE SPECIAL GROUP HAS BEEN EXAMINING TNF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES SINCE EARLY THIS YEAR. THE ACTIVITIES OF THESE GROUPS EXEMPLARY THE BEST OF THE CONSULTATIVE NATURE OF THE ALLIANCE CONSULTING GENUINELY AMONG OURSELVES TO REACH JOINT POSITIONS. AS THESE GROUPS PROCEEDED STEP-BY-STEP IN THEIR WORK, BEGINNING WITH GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS AND MOVING TO THE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS THAT WE HAVE BEFORE US NOW, WE IN THE US PROCEEDED FORWARD WITH OUR OWN INTERNAL POLICY DELIBERATIONS, AS DID OTHER ALLIANCE GOVERNMENTS. A BROAD POLITICAL CONSENSUS WITHIN AND AMONG OUR GOVERNMENTS HAS DEVELOPED AND IS CAPTURED IN THE INTEGRATED DOCUMENT AND DRAFT COMMUNIQUE.

IN THOSE DOCUMENTS, I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS ONE PARTICULAR ASPECT WHICH WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED IN THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP AND SPECIAL GROUP WORK. THIS IS THE MATTER OF THE 1,000 WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL. ON REVIEWING THE WORK OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP IN WASHINGTON, WE SAW THAT AN ALLIANCE DECISION TO DEPLOY 572 PERSHING II AND GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE WARHEADS PRESENTED AN OPPORTUNITY FOR RATIONALIZATION OF THE THEATER NUCLEAR STOCKPILE IN EUROPE. CONSEQUENTLY, WE FELT THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY THAT AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE DECEMBER TNF DECISIONS THE ALLIANCE COULD AGREE TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF 1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS FROM EUROPE. FOR THIS REASON WE HAVE INCLUDED

IN PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 20 OF THE DECISION DOCUMENT AND IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE COMMUNIQUE NEW LANGUAGE.

WE BELIEVE THAT THIS STEP WOULD HAVE A NUMBER OF ADVANTAGES:

--IN CONNECTION WITH A DECISION TO MODERNIZE LONG-RANGE TNF, THIS STEP IS MILITARILY FEASIBLE. IN FACT, IT IS MILITARILY DESIRABLE SINCE BY THE END OF THE YEAR WE WILL HAVE OVER 1,000 WARHEADS WHICH HAVE BEEN KEPT IN EUROPE FOR SOME TIME PENDING EASTERN AGREEMENT TO AN OFFER TO WITHDRAW THESE 1,000 WARHEADS IN MBFR.

--MOVING FORWARD NOW WITH THIS WITHDRAWAL WOULD UNDERLINE THAT NATO'S TNF DECISION IS NOT PART OF A NUCLEAR BUILD-UP AND DOES NOT ENTAIL AN INCREASE IN NATO'S RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AS SUCH, IT IMPROVES THE POLITICAL CLIMATE FOR TNF DECISIONS.

--IN ADDITION, THIS STEP WOULD UNDERMINE THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF BREZHNEV'S SPEECH AND OTHER SOVIET
ATTEMPTS TO DEPICT NATO AS AN EXPANDING NUCLEAR THREAT WHICH RISKS UPSETTING THE NUCLEAR BALANCE. IN ESSENCE, IT WOULD BE A RESPONSE TO BREZHNEV'S PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE.

--IT WOULD ALSO OPEN THE WAY FOR MOVEMENT IN MBFR BASED ON A SIMPLIFIED PROPOSAL. SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT OF A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF UP TO 20,000 TROOPS AND 1,000 TANKS, AND A NATO AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW THE 1,000 NUCLEAR

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WARHEADS PREVIOUSLY OFFERED IN MBFR, WOULD RAISE THE QUESTION OF APPROPRIATE NEXT STEPS IN MBFR. THESE SEPARATE STEPS BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ALLIANCE PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A SIMPLIFIED PHASE I PROPOSAL. WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH A SIMPLIFIED PHASE I APPROACH TO MBFR SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON A PRIORITY BASIS IN ORDER TO GIVE THE NECESSARY POLITICAL IMPETUS TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE, BUT NOT IMPERATIVE, IF SUCH A PROPOSAL COULD BE AGREED IN THE ALLIANCE IN DECEMBER. WE WOULD WELCOME THE CONTRIBUTION OF OTHER ALLIES ABOUT SUCH AN APPROACH AND WILL BE MAKING OUR OWN CONTRIBUTIONS AS WELL. TO ENSURE SPEEDY CONSIDERATION, WE HOPE THAT THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL WILL TAKE A FIRM HAND, AIDED PERHAPS BY THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE IN ITS DEPUTY PERMREPS CONFIGURATION.

MR. SECRETARY-GENERAL, WE ARE NOW PREPARED TO DISCUSS SECRET
THE DRAFT INTEGRATED DECISION DOCUMENTS AND LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING THE VIEWS OF OUR ALLIES.

END TEXT.
BENNETT

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>
Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Let me first express my gratitude that you deemed it appropriate to resume our exchange of opinions. I note concern in your words that things could move in a wrong direction, and I note the desire to prevent this from happening. I share your concern, and I share your desire.

My reply will be given in the same frank and friendly openness without which we could not have built the relationship between our states we need to preserve and expand.

Obviously you are aware of the advance in information you obtain as the head of a global power – in comparison to myself who no longer is in a position of direct governmental power in my country. However, still working to continue our endeavor and not being a participant in important issues of global events, maybe I can contribute just because of my current position to the prevention of things moving in the wrong direction. I am doing this without expertise in many technical details of arms development. Important this is, it must not, however, be decisive and determining, if statesmen would not want to become the supreme experts.

The situation seems confused: The Americans are telling us after SALT II they need to create a counterbalance in the wake of growing Soviet superiority in the area of intermediate nuclear forces. Our position within the Alliance [NATO] is such that we cannot evade this issue. Your country is telling us it enjoys no superiority, and it does not aspire to achieve it. I believe your country enjoys conventional superiority. I believe your country assembles superiority in the field of medium-range missiles. There the West is lagging behind, and it does not want to be it that way.

I know of nothing to counter the argument that, with the build-up of the SS-20 and the bomber we call “Backfire”, the Soviet Union is changing the balance reached to its own favor. I am a convinced supporter of the position that there only is joint security, that a security partnership must be created - and that a creation of imbalances does prevent all this.

I do not know much to counter the argument that the West with its new plans would not only equalize but create for itself additional security if its plans would be implemented in their entirety – what the Soviet Union would not be willing to accept.
Therefore we are facing the danger of a new arms race that does not create more security but more insecurity. Moreover, it might result in us forgetting, for all those plans pertaining to our military security directed against each other, that we must develop cooperation between ourselves. Otherwise on both sides we do not build more confidence but more mistrust. This must not be our future. Who wants to prevent this from happening has to insist that both sides sit down on a table, in order to put everything on this table what both sides possess.

I see that you want this. The West does desire this as well. I am not ignorant of the fact that there may be forces in the West who want to seize the opportunity to strive for a new superiority over the Soviet Union, or who seriously do not want to achieve a result at all, or who benefit when relations between Bonn and Moscow are worsening. I cannot make these forces disappear with a magic wand; yet one must not surrender to them. I hold the opinion that there is no alternative to negotiations.

You have made interesting and important proposals of good will in [East] Berlin. Later you let follow up with additions and precisions. This way you have set more in motion than certain Soviet statements want to believe. It will have an impact on planned Western decisions. You know my comments and those of my party on this issue. I want to add here: Unilateral measures can also be withdrawn unilaterally; offers for negotiations must be taken. I am happy that the Federal Chancellor [Helmut Schmidt] has also made a unilateral offer. 1,000 nuclear warheads can be considered a match with 1,000 tanks and 20,000 men. Of course, both sides can say this is not about most advanced material. But what does it matter? It is just demonstrating that each side has different superiorities it can reduce without any danger for its own security. Yet even from here we arrive at the same result: There is no alternative to negotiations, and nothing can substitute for internationally binding agreements.

I do not want to discuss developments that led to this situation since it is not productive. I cannot exclude mistakes on our side the same way as mistakes on your side. Everything must be focused on a sobering view of the situation, and how to steer events in the right direction. What is sober? NATO will make decisions on December 12. Yet for certainly three to four years no new weapons systems will be deployed. I read with interest that you focused in your Berlin speech on deployment. This is indeed the important issue. Therefore let us use the time we have.

I also realize that some can only envisage a result that, similarly as in the case of SALT II, will also agree in the field of so-called Euro-strategic arms on a balance, and adding for the West an additional component to the current situation. I am saying it openly: I would not be enthusiastic over such an outcome, yet at least it would be a joint outcome. Better and worthier, though, would be a result that would not lead to additional medium-range missiles on the Western side. Such requires reciprocity from your side. Not only my Soviet interlocutors but also other conversation partner are in doubt whether it is realistic to build these arms first but then do not deploy them. However, this is just what we must undertake, in particular for the global balance you emphasized and whose constant preservation I deem important. Whether we will succeed in reaching a negotiation result with a balance of security and no new missiles on the Western side, depends to major extent on your side.
There is not much we can argue with our American allies as long as they can refer to the ongoing Soviet production. Myself I feel secure with the achieved relative balance and I do not need missiles that can reach Soviet territory from here. Yet in order to avoid the deployment of such missiles, I need the certainty that the existing balance is not further unilaterally changed by the Soviet side.

At no point did the SPD voice any doubts about its position and its determination. Its board has prepared clear resolutions on foreign and security policy certain to pass at our forthcoming party congress. Those passages will certainly be forwarded to you directly. The SPD reiterates the policy of the [Eastern] treaties, the central importance of our relationship with the Soviet Union, the further construction of our long-term cooperation, and the declaration agreed during your visit [to Bonn] that nobody strives for military superiority, and that approximate balance and parity is sufficient to guarantee defense. On questions of security policy the upcoming party congress will probably confirm the Hamburg [SPD previous party congress] resolution on the neutron bomb. Furthermore, there is a proposal to allow for no automatic trigger on the medium-range missile issue. The course of negotiations and expected results must permit at every juncture the option to review and revise decisions. For those reasons, the Federal Government shall only consent to such a decision if it contains a clause to refrain from deploying such weapons if arms control negotiations reach satisfactory results. In our opinion the goal of negotiations is to render the deployment of additional medium-range missiles in Central Europe moot. In other words: In consideration of the Federal Republic of Germany’s obligations to the [NATO] Alliance, and in light of the need to support the Federal Government, the SPD wants even in the [federal German] election year [1980] to continue the policy of peaceful cooperation with peoples of Eastern Europe. Yet the SPD needs partners for this undertaking.

You have referred to the visit by my friends from the Socialist International [to Moscow]. It received attention that you took your time to welcome the delegation. We have accepted a report in Lisbon [at the Socialist International congress] and decided to deal foremost with issues of disarmament and arms control at our congress in fall next year. Party leaders will discuss them already in early February in Vienna. There is growing conviction that increasing expenditures for armaments are economic nonsense, in the East as well as in the West. They are hardly justifiable in the light of problems faced by mankind. We have to draw consequences from that.

Again it becomes clear: the necessary negotiations must take place. I don’t see your fear as justified that they will be conducted from a “position of strength” after NATO’s December decision. In fact, the NATO decision will mean that not just the Soviet Union will continue to produce [medium-range missiles] but the United States as well. If you would have been willing to announce an unilateral stop of production, in my opinion NATO’s intended December decision would not have been further pursued. Yet aside from all other elements, I notice in both your and in the Western position also the desire to do nothing what could impair the ratification of SALT II. I welcome that the four years between the decision to start production and the option for deployment will build up certain time pressure for the negotiations. It affects both sides and ought to be exploited in a positive manner. There is also always the option to ask jointly for further time if negotiations do make progress.
I think it is very important to use this time. I mean this: The coming year need not become a lost year due to elections in the United States and in my country. In practical terms it means not to waste the first months of next year without preparations for negotiations. We have the highest interest in them although we do not possess nuclear weapons and also do not want to acquire them.

I outlined to you in all frankness how I assess the situation. You will therefore be able to see that I share your efforts to save Europe from a relapse into mindless tensions. I believe this is possible. If I would not deem it possible to pursue what I have outlined with prospect for success, I would not want to deceive you.

In all honesty.

Sincerely
Willy Brandt

To the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee
Mr. Leonid I. Brezhnev
Moscow

[Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer].
The Hague, November 26, 1979

Nr. U 1479112626

Dear Mr. President,

The Netherlands government has given very careful consideration to your letter of November 1. Let me assure you, first of all, that we fully share your view that the December decisions on Theatre Nuclear Force Modernisation and Arms Control will be of crucial importance for the Alliance. This is not only a matter of testing the credibility and the capability of taking difficult decisions, but also of demonstrating the central significance that the Alliance attaches to the role of arms control.

You will be aware that the nature of the decisions now before the Alliance places the Netherlands government before very difficult questions. The Netherlands Minister of Defence, Mr. Scholten, has outlined the present position of the government at the meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group in The Hague and he will certainly seek further contact on this matter with Secretary Brown as well as with other colleagues in the Alliance. I should, however, like to draw your particular attention to some aspects of primary importance in our policy considerations. Basic in this respect is that the Netherlands is fully conscious of the need for a firm NATO answer to the new threat posed by the Soviet military build-up in the long range TNF field, but that this firmness should be perfectly reconcilable with exercising restraint in our armaments policy and with giving maximum room to an effective arms control approach.

His Excellency the President
of the United States of America,
Mr. J. Carter,
The White House,
WASHINGTON.
In line with this point of view, the Netherlands government has, in the light of discussions in parliament, undertaken to advocate with the allies that the decision to modernize long range TNF should be limited at this stage to a decision to produce the weapon, while a decision on a possible basing in a number of European countries should be taken at a later stage when we will be able to judge the results of arms control negotiations. I would greatly appreciate if the United States government would give careful consideration to the merits of this approach.

As a very important point for the Netherlands government, I should like to underline our problems with the recommended size of the LRNTNF.

It has always been our understanding that, after the working groups had finished their reports, governments would be fully free to exercise their political judgment concerning the recommendations presented to them. But even the working groups have made clear that the recommended size of the programme was not unassailable, that it was a matter of judgment rather than of calculation, and also, that the size could be smaller or even much smaller if arms control were successful.

In the light of the arguments in your letter, and also taking account of your important offer concerning the unilateral withdrawal of 1,000 warheads, we are prepared not to press our view of halving the programme, but I must submit in all frankness that the proposed size still poses very great difficulties for my government, if we are to find the necessary understanding with our public for the modernisation programme.

In our judgment it is politically very important for us not to create the impression that NATO approaches the coming arms control negotiations with worst case assumptions concerning the possibilities of achieving a positive outcome, by starting out already at this stage with a decision to produce the full number proposed. It would, therefore, in our judgment, be better to begin with a substantially lower number. This would leave open the possibility that NATO could decide at a later stage, for example after two years, to consider going up to the higher number if negotiations would not be sufficiently successful.

A lower number would also help to remove another very difficult aspect from the present proposals. I mean the one-for-one replacement of the Pershing-I by the Pershing-II missiles. Although these systems are not fully comparable, the production of the full 108 systems could not fail to be interpreted as undercutting the so-called Option-3 proposals in MBFR, which call for a reduction of 36 of the 108 Pershing-I missiles.
The Netherlands government and parliament have from the first attached very great importance to the MBFR negotiations as a first start of arms control in the European region, and the nuclear offer of Option-3 has acquired particular importance as a real and genuine step in the direction of reducing the dependence on nuclear weapons, a factor which is of prime importance in the policy programme of the Netherlands government and is strongly supported by all the main parties in this country.

Finally, I should like to emphasize once again that we are fully convinced of the great importance of the decisions which are now before the Alliance and we are also completely aware that it is of very great importance that the decision would be taken by all members collectively. It is for that reason, that political deliberations among the allies in the remaining weeks should lead to decisions, which would be acceptable not only to the Netherlands government, but which also would find adequate support in the Netherlands parliament.

It is with that purpose in mind that I have availed myself of this opportunity to put our views on this vital issue for the Alliance before you in all frankness.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

(A.A.M. van Agt)
MILITARY ADDRESSEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12065; RDS-1 11/29/99 (BENNETT, W. TAPLEY) OR-M
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MNUC, NPG, MPOL
SUBJECT: (S) TFN MODERNIZATION -- DETAILED REPORT OF DISCUSSIONS ON IDD AT 28 NOVEMBER SESSION OF REINFORCED PERMREPS

REFS: (A) STATE 305363, DTG 242225Z NOV 79
(B) COPENHAGEN 7201, DTG 271601Z NOV 79
(C) USNATO 8275, DTG 281914Z NOV 79

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

3. SYG LUNS OPENED THE MEETING STATING THAT HE HOPED AT THE CONCLUSION TO BE ABLE TO SEND THE IDD/COMMUNIQUE WITH THE SUPPORTING HLG AND SG REPORTS TO MINISTERS VIA A PO. THESE WOULD INFORM MINISTERS OF ALL RELEVANT FACTS.

LUNS ALSO STATED HE WOULD CIRCULATE A PO OUTLINING THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE COMBINED MEETING OF DEFENSE AND FOREIGN MINISTERS ON 12 DECEMBER.

4. SVART (DENMARK) OPENED BY RECALLING HIS COMMENTS ON 6 NOVEMBER ON THE INTERNAL AND PARLIAMENTARY REVIEW THAT DENMARK WOULD BE GIVING LRTNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY THE ALLIANCE HAD BEEN WARNED OF THE POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE IN THE DANISH POSITION. HE THEN EXPLAINED THE DANISH PROPOSAL AND, ON INSTRUCTIONS, REQUESTED ITS CONSIDERATION. THE PROPOSAL WAS OUTLINED ON FAMILIAR GROUNDS, I.E., THAT NATO SHOULD POSTPONE ITS TNF DECISION FOR SIX MONTHS DURING WHICH TIME THE SOVIETS SHOULD "INSTANTLY" STOP SS-20 AND BACKFIRE PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIETS MUST DECLARE THEMSELVES READY TO ENTER INTO TALKS ON A FREEZE ON SOVIET LRTNF AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR FURTHER REDUCTION OF WEAPONS ON BOTH SIDES. IF THE SOVIETS DID NOT PROVE RESPONSIVE TO THE NATO MOVE, A TNF DECISION SHOULD BE TAKEN ALONG THE LINES OF THE CURRENT ALLIANCE PROPOSAL. ANY ALLIANCE PROPOSAL SHOULD, HOWEVER, CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE ARMS CONTROL ASPECTS.

SVART FURTHER COMMENDED THE DANISH PROPOSAL AS TIME-LIMITED AND STATED THAT IT WOULD DEMONSTRATE ALLIANCE STRENGTH BY ITS WILLINGNESS TO STRIVE FOR DETENTE. OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS, THIS PROPOSAL COMBINED WITH MOVES IN MBFR, PREPARATIONS FOR MADRID AND CDE WOULD POSITIVELY AFFECT ARMS CONTROL.

AFTER REVIEWING THE RESULTS OF THE DANISH PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON 27 NOVEMBER ALONG THE LINES OF REF B, SVART CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE COULD NOT ADDRESS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE IDD/COMMUNIQUE.

5. PRESIDENTIAL REPRESENTATIVE AARON EXPRESSED HIS PLEASURE AT RETURNING TO BRUSSELS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION OF LRTNF MODERNIZATION AND NOTED PRESIDENT CARter'S ASSESSMENT THAT THE ALLIANCE WOULD SOON BE TAKING A CRUCIAL AND HISTORIC STEP. AARON STATED THAT THE COMBINED DECISIONS TO MODERNIZE TNF AND TO INCLUDE TNF IN OUR ARMS CONTROL AGENDA WILL SHOW THAT THE ALLIANCE REMAINS A VITAL, COURAGEOUS INSTITUTION.
AFTER BRIEFLY REVIEWING THE PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND OF THE IDD, AARON REPEATED THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL: THERE CAN BE NO ARMS CONTROL WITHOUT A MODERNIZATION DECISION BUT WITH SUCH A DECISION, CONCRETE ARMS CONTROL ACHIEVEMENTS WHICH REDUCE THE SOVIET THREAT CAN REDUCE ALLIANCE TNP.

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AARON STATED THAT "TWO DAYS AFTER THE DECEMBER 12 TNF DECISIONS," THE NAC WILL PROBABLY PRESENT A COMPREHENSIVE ARMS CONTROL PROGRAM WHICH HOPEFULLY WILL INCLUDE THE THROST OF THE NEW MBFR PROPOSAL. SUCH A PRESENTATION IN COMBINATION WITH A DECISION TO WITHDRAW 1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS WOULD DEMONSTRATE A MAJOR EFFORT TO ENGAGE THE EAST IN SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL. THIS WILL PROVIDE THE ALLIANCE RESPONSE TO RECENT EASTERN PROPOSALS. AARON NOTED THAT WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. STILL, THEY HAVE ATTEMPTED TO INTERFERE IN ALLIANCE DECISIONS ON STEPS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE NECESSARY BY SOVIET DEPLOYMENT ACTIONS.
SS-20 FORCE, AARON STATED THAT ANOTHER BASE HAD BEEN DISCOVERED BRINGING THE TOTAL OF SS-20 BASES EITHER OPERATIONAL OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION TO 23. THIS WOULD EQUATE TO A SOVIET SS-20 FORCE OF 621 WARHEADS -- A NUMBER EXCEEDING THE TOTAL NATO-PROPOSED LRTNF FORCE WITHOUT COUNTING THE HUNDREDS OF SOVIET SS-4/5'S AND MEDIUM BOMBERS.

FIRMLY REJECTING THE DANISH PROPOSAL, AARON STATED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE ALLIANCE TO TAKE DECISIONS DEMONSTRATING THAT NATO WILL NOT BOW TO THREATS OR BE TEMPTED BY VAGUE INEQUITABLE PROPOSALS. HE CONCLUDED BY CITING THE HARMEL REPORT WHICH DEDICATED THE ALLIANCE TO PURSUING DEFENSE AND DETENTE AND HOPED THAT NATO WOULD HAVE THE COURAGE TO MATCH ITS WISDOM IN TAKING A DECISION ON TTNF MODERNIZATION/ARMS CONTROL WHICH EMBRACES BOTH PRINCIPLES.

(FULL TEXT OF AARON’S REMARKS ARE AT PARAGRAPH 25.)

SEPARATELY LUNS SUGGESTED THAT THE INFORMATION CONCERNING THE 621 SOVIET SS-20 WARHEADS WOULD BE USEFUL IF IT COULD BE MADE PUBLIC AND REQUESTED AARON’S COMMENT. AARON PROMISED TO RESPOND TO THE REQUEST AND HOPED HE WOULD BE ABLE TO REPLY BEFORE THE FIGURE WAS LEAKED.

6. ROSE (UK) STATED STRONGLY THAT POSITIVE DECISIONS ON LRTNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL SHOULD BE TAKEN IN DECEMBER. IT IS OF THE HIGHEST PRIORITY THAT MODERNIZATION BEGIN WITHOUT DELAY AND THAT IN PARALLEL THE SOVIETS BE ENGAGED IN SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. THE SOVIETS HOWEVER WILL NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ONLY IF FACED BY REAL DETERMINATION BY THE ALLIANCE. WITHOUT MODERNIZATION, ROSE ASKED "WHAT ARE WE GOING TO BARGAIN WITH?"

COMMENTING ON THE DUTCH POSITION OF A LIMITED PRODUCTION DECISION LEAVING A DEPLOYMENT DECISION UNTIL LATER, HE LABELED SUCH A POSTURE "WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE" IN PROVIDING THE NECESSARY EVIDENCE OF DETERMINATION. INSTEAD, THE SOVIETS WOULD DRAG OUT THE NEGOTIATIONS, CONTINUE THEIR BUILD-UP AND INCREASE THE IMBALANCE.

REGARDING THE DANISH PROPOSAL, ROSE CHARACTERIZED IT AS "IMPRactical" WITH MAJOR DISADVANTAGES FOR THE ALLIANCE IN MILITARY, POLITICAL AND ARMS CONTROL TERMS. HE SUGGESTED THAT PUTTING OFF DECISIONS FOR SIX MONTHS WOULD CAST DOUBT ON THE ALLIANCE’S ABILITY TO TAKE DIFFICULT DECISIONS AND GIVE THE IMPRESSION WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO MEET OUR MUCH PUBLICIZED, SELF-SET MILITARY TARGETS. MOREOVER, NATO’S FAILURE TO TAKE THESE DECISIONS WOULD BE CREDITED TO SOVIET PRESSURE/PROPAGANDA.
ROSE ALSO BELIEVED THAT DELAY WOULD DAMAGE PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTRODUCE A NEW ELEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY INTO THE SALT II RATIFICATION DEBATE. HE COMMENTED THAT INDECISION NOW WOULD SUGGEST TO THE US THAT EUROPEANS WERE RELUCTANT TO TAKE NECESSARY MEASURES FOR SELF DEFENSE AND THIS COULD ONLY BE HARMFUL TO INTRA- ALLIANCE RELATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, HOWEVER, DELAY WOULD COST THE ALLIANCE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEIZE THE ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE BY PRESENTING A PACKAGE OF PROPOSALS IN PARALLEL WITH THE MODERNIZATION. DELAY WOULD PRESUMABLY AFFECT THE US PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW 1,000 WARHEADS AND RADICALLY CHANGE THE CONTEXT FOR CONSIDERING AN INTERIM PHASE I PROPOSAL IN MBFR.

EXAMINING THE NEGOTIABILITY OF THE DANISH

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PROPOSAL, ROSE FOUND "LITTLE POSSIBILITY" OF ACHIEVING POSITIVE RESULTS WITHIN SIX MONTHS. HE SUGGESTED THAT EVEN WITH A FREEZE THE ALLIANCE WOULD BE FROZEN INTO INFERIORITY. THAT WOULD NOT BE A SATISFACTORY BASIS FOR SECURING SOVIET AGREEMENT TO LIMITATIONS OR REDUCTIONS. ROSE NOTED THE QUESTIONS OF SOVIET ADHERENCE TO ANY FREEZE AND WHEN WITHIN THE SIX MONTH PERIOD IT MIGHT BEGIN. MORE IMPORTANTLY, HOWEVER, HE NOTED THAT A SOVIET FREEZE WITHOUT PRIOR AGREEMENT ON VERIFICATION MEASURES AND A COMMON DATA BASE WOULD BE OF LITTLE VALUE. SALT AND MBFR
EXPERIENCE SUGGEST THAT SUCH COMPLICATED ISSUES COULD NOT BE SOLVED IN SIX MONTHS. 
CONSEQUENTLY, ROSE CONCLUDED THAT THERE IS NO SATISFACTORY SUBSTITUTE FOR PARALLEL DECEMBER DECISIONS ON TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL AND THAT THE IDD PROVIDES A SATISFACTORY BASIS FOR MINISTERIAL DECISION.

(FULL TEXT OF ROSE'S STATEMENT IS AT PARAGRAPH 26.)

7. PAULS (FRG) RECALLED HIS WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE IDD AT THE 6 NOVEMBER MEETING AND STATED THAT THE PRESENT VERSION REFLECTS THE 6 NOVEMBER DISCUSSIONS. HE WENT ON TO NOTE WITH APPROVAL THE NEW ELEMENT -- THE AMERICAN WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW 1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS FROM EUROPE IN CONNECTION WITH DECEMBER DECISIONS, BUT ONLY IF THERE ARE POSITIVE DECEMBER DECISIONS. PAULS AGREED WITHOUT RESERVATION TO THE IDD, TOGETHER WITH THE HLG AND SG REPORTS AS THE BASIS FOR DECISION BY MINISTERS ON 12 DECEMBER.

SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS, PAULS NOTED THAT THE DECEMBER DECISION ON TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL IS OF "FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE" FOR ALLIANCE POSITIONS ON DEFENSE AND DETERRENCE AND AN "ESSENTIAL EXPRESSION" OF NATO'S COHERENCE, SOLIDARITY AND ABILITY TO ACT. LIKewise, THE ABSENCE OF A DECISION WOULD ILLUSTRATE LESS COHERENCE, WEAKENED SOLIDARITY AND INABILITY TO ACT.

PAULS NOTED THAT THE DECEMBER DECISIONS HAVE BEEN PRECEDED BY EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WHICH HAVE ENDED IN FAR-REACHING CONSENSUS. CONSEQUENTLY, HESITATIONS OR ATTEMPTS TO MODIFY/CANCEL THE CONSENSUS WOULD DO VERY SERIOUS DAMAGE TO ALLIANCE COHESION AND SECURITY.

TO MAKE SUCH MOVES AT THE HEIGHT OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA PRESSURE WOULD CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE ALLIANCE IS SENSITIVE TO SUCH PRESSURE IF THE INTERFERENCE IS MASSIVE ENOUGH.

IN AN EXTENDED REVIEW OF THE RECENT TALKS WITH GROMYKO, PAULS CITED ONE ELEMENT OF THE FRG/USSR JOINT COMMUNIQUE AS FOLLOWS:

"THE TALKS ABOUT TOPICAL PROBLEMS WERE CONCENTRATED ON THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND IN THE WORLD. BOTH SIDES REAFFIRM THAT THEY SEE NO REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE POLICY OF DETENTE. THEY EXPRESSED THEIR
DETERMINATION TO EXPAND AND TO INTENSIFY THE PROCESS OF DETENTE AND TO MAKE IT PERMANENT. IN THIS CONTEXT, BOTH SIDES EXPRESSED THE UNANIMOUS VIEW THAT THE PREPARATION OF CONCRETE STEPS IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL SHOULD BE SPEEDED UP."

PAULS NOTED EXPECTED DIFFERENCES OF OPINION DURING THE TALKS ON TNF MODERNIZATION AND ASSUMED THAT THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO CRITICIZE THE PLANNED ALLIANCE DECISION BUT ALSO EXPECT THAT THE DECISION WILL BE TAKEN. IN REGARD TO GROMYKO'S STATEMENT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO NEGOTIATIONS ON THE MATTER ONCE THE ALLIES HAD ADOPTED THE DECISION ON LRTNF MODERNIZATION, PAULS COMMENTED THAT:

-- SUCH A STATEMENT WAS NOT MADE IN THE OFFICIAL TALKS WITH THE FRG;

-- AN INTERPRETATION THAT THERE WOULD BE NO POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS AFTER A DECEMBER DECISION ON LRTNF WOULD BE UNJUSTIFIED AS THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE (CONFIRMED

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AFTER THE GROMYKO PRESS CONFERENCE) EXPLICITLY UNDER-LINES THE CONTINUATION OF DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS;
-- SUCH AN INTERPRETATION WOULD CONFLICT WITH OTHER SOVIET STATEMENTS WHICH APPARENTLY ASSUME THAT NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE POSSIBLE AFTER THE DECEMBER DECISION;

-- IN HIS BONN DISCUSSIONS, GROMYKO REFERRED TO THE BREZHNEV SPEECH PROPOSAL FOR REDUCTIONS IN MEDIUM RANGE SYSTEMS IF NATO DID NOT MAKE A TNF MODERNIZATION DECISION. AS CONFIRMED BY SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH GROMYKO, THE FRG CONCLUDED THAT IT IS THIS SPECIFIC SOVIET PROPOSAL WHICH WILL BE TERMINATED BY AN ALLIANCE TNF DECISION RATHER THAN THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY NEGOTIATIONS FOR TNF ARMS CONTROL.

PAULS CONSEQUENTLY JUDGED THAT THE ALLIANCE'S CURRENT EFFORTS OF INTENSIFICATION OF ARMS CONTROL POLICY IS ALONG THE RIGHT LINES AND THAT WE CAN ASSUME THAT THERE WILL BE NEGOTIATIONS IN ALL FIELDS EVEN AFTER THE ALLIANCE HAS TAKEN DECISIONS IN DECEMBER.

WITH CONSIDERABLE PASSION, PAULS STATED THAT MODIFICATION OR POSTPONEMENT OF THE ALLIANCE TNF DECISION WOULD HARM TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION. HE NOTED THAT IF THE ALLIANCE DID NOT MAKE THE TNF MODERNIZATION DECISION, AMERICANS COULD CONCLUDE THAT EUROPEANS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN DEFENDING EUROPE. CONSEQUENTLY, PAULS CONCLUDED THE ALLIANCE WAS APPROACHING AN HISTORIC MOMENT WITH MUCH MORE AT STAKE THAN MODERNIZING WARHEADS BUT RATHER ITS VERY EXISTENCE.

8. CATALANO (ITALY) STATED THAT ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MALFATI HAS EMPHASIZED THAT A BALANCE OF FORCES IS A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR REAL ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT PROGRESS. HISTORICALLY, MILITARY ASYMMETRIES HAVE LED TO ATTEMPTS TO EXPLOIT THE IMBALANCE AND THUS HAVE BEEN DESTABILIZING. THE CURRENT EMERGING IMBALANCE THUS PROVIDES THE BACKGROUND FOR NATO'S DECISIONS, AND UNDERSCORES THE NEED FOR REAL PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. CATALANO PRAISED THE WORK OF THE HLG AND THE SG IN PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE BASIS FOR THE DECISION, AND AS REFLECTING AN EXPRESSION OF A COMMON ALLIANCE EFFORT. THE IDD ADEQUATELY TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THIS COMMON WORK AND STRIKES A SOUND BALANCE BETWEEN
TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS TO FORM A SUITABLE BASIS FOR MINISTERIAL DECISION. HE ADDED THAT THE COMMUNIQUE ALSO IS ADEQUATE FOR INFORMING PUBLICS. CATALANO THEN STATED THAT, SINCE THE COMMUNIQUE CONVEYS SUCH A SENSITIVE MESSAGE, HIS AUTHORITIES DID NOT YET CONSIDER THE TEXT TO BE FINAL. CATALANO THEN CIRCULATED SEVERAL MINOR CHANGES FOR CONSIDERATION. SUBSEQUENTLY, TWO MINOR WORDING CHANGES WERE ACCEPTED, AS RECOUNTED IN SUMMARY MESSAGE (REF C).

9. SCHUURMANS (BELGIUM), IN A BRIEF INTERVENTION, STATED THAT HE WAS AUTHORIZED, "ON A TECHNICAL PLANE," TO ACCEPT THE IDD FOR FORWARDING TO MINISTERS. HE
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SAID THAT THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT HAS NOT YET TAKEN A
FIRM DECISION, SO ACCEPTANCE OF THE IDD SHOULD NOT BE
INTERPRETED AS A FIRM GOVERNMENT POSITION ON BASING.
SCHUURMANS EXPRESSED REGRET THAT THE DANISH GOVERNMENT
HAD NOT CONSULTED OTHERS BEFORE PUBLICLY ANNOUNCING
ITS PROPOSAL, AND SAID THE DANISH POSITION WILL CAUSE
PROBLEMS FOR OTHER ALLIES. SCHUURMANS CONCLUDED BY
SUPPORTING THE ITALIAN VIEW THAT THE IDD COMMUNIQUE’S
TEXT NOT YET BE CONSIDERED AS FINAL.

10. STATE SECRETARY HOLST SPOKE FOR NORWAY, EMPHASIZING
THAT NORWAY’S BASIC POLICY OF NOT STATIONING NUCLEAR
WEAPONS WAS NOT AFFECTED. DURING FINAL REVIEW OF ITS
POSITION, HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD GIVE PARTICULAR WEIGHT

...
WHICH GOVERNMENTS MAY EXPLAIN THE ALLIANCE DECISION, AND THEREFORE MUST EXPLAIN FULLY THE ALLIANCE'S POLITICAL RATIONALE. HOLST DID NOT PROPOSE ANY CHANGES TO THE COMMUNIQUE, BUT STATED THAT THERE IS A NEED FOR A

CREDIBLE ALIGNMENT OF THE DECISION TO MODERNIZE AND THE OFFER TO NEGOTIATE. TO BE SPECIFIC, HE SAID, THE IDEA THAT THE SCALE OF THE EVENTUAL DEPLOYMENT WILL NEED TO BE CONSIDERED IN LIGHT OF THE RESULTS OF NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE GIVEN A SALIENT PRESENTATION IN THE COMMUNIQUE. ALLIES ALSO SHOULD PAY CLOSE ATTENTION TO THIS POINT IN THE PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF THE DECISIONS AFTER THE MEETING ON 12 DECEMBER.

11. BARKMAN (NETHERLANDS), NOTING THAT THE NETHERLANDS HAS NOT YET TAKEN A DECISION, STATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT DID NOT SHARE DENMARK'S VIEW OF POSTPONING A DECISION IN DECEMBER. BARKMAN STATED THAT THE DUTCH DECISION WILL DEPEND ON THE DEGREE TO WHICH EMPHASIS IS PLACED ON THE NEED TO REDUCE THE ROLE OF AND THE ALLIANCE'S DEPENDENCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE AGAIN ADVANCED THE NETHERLANDS' DESIRE TO SEPARATE PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT DECISIONS, WITH THE DEPLOYMENT DECISION COMING AFTER REVIEWING THE RESULTS OF ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES. HE SAID THAT IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR DESIRE TO REDUCE THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, HIS GOVERNMENT HAD "GREAT DIFFICULTY" WITH THE NUMBER OF 572 WARHEADS. EVERYONE AGREES THAT THE NUMBER IS A JUDGMENT RATHER THAN A PRECISE CALCULATION. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD NOT START INTO NEGOTIATIONS ON A "WORST CASE" BASIS -- THE POINT OF DEPARTURE SHOULD BE A NUMBER LOWER THAN THE RECOMMENDED 572, TO SIGNAL EXPLICITLY THE POSSIBILITY OF REDUCTIONS, WHILE RETAINING THE OPTION TO GO HIGHER IF A SUITABLE RESPONSE IS NOT RECEIVED. ONE ADVANTAGE TO A LOWER LRTNF NUMBER IS THAT PERSHING 1A WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE
REPLACED ON A ONE-TO-ONE BASIS AND OPTION III WOULD REMAIN. HE SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE NETHERLANDS THAT OPTION III NOT BE UNILATERALLY WITHDRAWN FROM MBFR.

. BARKMAN THEN CIRCULATED THE FOLLOWING REVISION TO PARAGRAPH 15 OF THE IDD, AND REQUESTED THAT IT BE PLACED IN BRACKETS. SYG LUNS REJECTED PUTTING THE PROPOSAL INTO THE IDD IN BRACKETS, BUT AGreed TO CIRCULATE THE REWRITING FORMALLY BUT SEPARATELY SO THAT IT WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR CONSIDERATION IN DECEMBER.

. NETHERLANDS’ PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO PARAGRAPH 15 OF INTEGRATIVE DECISION DOCUMENT.

"MINISTERS AGREED THAT NATO’S LRTPF MODERNIZATION GOALS CAN BEST BE MET BY A DECISION ON THE PRODUCTION OF A LIMITED NUMBER OF LAND-BASED PERSHING TWO BALLISTIC MISSILES AND GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES (GLCM) RESPECTIVELY; THE DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE MADE DEPENDENT ON THE RESULTS OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. THE ACTUAL NUMBER TO BE DEPLOYED WILL HAVE TO BE ESTABLISHED ON THE BASIS OF A COMMON ALLIED EVALUATION OF THE OUTCOME OF ARMS CONTROL."

. BARKMAN SUPPORTED THE IDEA OF MAKING PUBLIC THE NEW PROJECTION OF A TOTAL OF 621 SS-20 WARHEADS. HE ALSO REFERRED TO PARAGRAPH 21 OF THE IDD, SUGGESTING THAT THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP SHOULD UNDERTAKE THE "SHIFT STUDY" WHEN DECISIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN DECEMBER. BARKMAN CONCLUDED BY SUPPORTING NORWAY’S CALL FOR A MORE COMPREHENSIVE TREATMENT IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF DOWNWARD ADJUSTMENT OF NATO’S NUMBER.

12. SYG LUNS SUGGESTED THAT THERE WAS A CONTRADICTION IN THE NETHERLANDS’ POSITION. IF IN THE FUTURE, ARMS
CONTROL RESULTS MAKE POSSIBLE A REDUCTION IN THE ALLIANCE'S PLANNED DEPLOYMENT, CERTAINLY ALL ALLIES WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE DECISION TO DO SO. WHY, THEN, SHOULD THE ALLIANCE NOT WAIT UNTIL THEN TO DECIDE ON A REDUCED PROGRAM, RATHER THAN NOW, WHEN THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SUCH A DECISION.

13. ZEINER GUNDERSEN (CMC) STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE APPROACH SET OUT IN THE IDD, AND REITERATED THAT, FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, THE MODERNIZATION DECISION SHOULD BE TAKEN THIS YEAR. ZEINER GUNDERSEN STATED HIS OPPOSITION TO ANY REDUCTION IN THE PROPOSED MODERNIZATION PACKAGE.

14. HARDY (CANADA) AGREED THAT THE IDD FORMS A SUITABLE BASIS FOR DECEMBER DECISIONS. THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT CAN ACCEPT THE IDD AND ITS COMMUNIQUE FOR REFERRAL TO MINISTERS. CANADA, HE SAID, SUPPORTS THE NEED TO DECIDE ON BOTH PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT IN DECEMBER. WITH RESPECT TO THE DANISH PROPOSAL, HARDY STATED HE UNDERSTOOD THE PREDICAMENT FACING DANISH LEADERS, BUT FOR THE ALLIANCE TO DELAY DECISION NOW WOULD BE INTERPRETED BY THE EAST AND BY FRIENDS ALIKE AS WEAKNESS, UNDERMINING THE COHESIVENESS OF THE ALLIANCE.

15. WURTH (LUXEMBOURG) AND DE VILLAS-BOAS (PORTUGAL) SPOKE BRIEFLY IN SUPPORT OF THE IDD.

16. ATHANASSIOU (GREECE), REFERRING TO HIS STATEMENT AT THE 6 NOVEMBER PERMREPS MEETING, STATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT FINDS THE IDD A PERFECTLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR THE ALLIANCE TO TAKE DECISIONS IN TWO WEEKS ON MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WILL JOIN THE ALLIANCE DECISION WITHOUT RESERVATION. HOWEVER, HE ADDED, HE AGREED WITH ITALY AND BELGIUM IN LEAVING OPEN THE COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE UNTIL A TIME CLOSER TO THE ACTUAL DECISION. ATHANASSIOU CIRCULATED A RECOMMENDATION TO CHANGE PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE COMMUNIQUE TO DELETE THE LAST PHRASE "WHICH MINISTERS ALL PLEDGED THEIR GOVERNMENTS TO SUPPORT." ENCOUNTERING NO SUPPORT AND US AND TURKISH RESISTANCE, HE SUBSEQUENTLY WITHDREW HIS RECOMMENDATION.
17. OLCAY (TURKEY) STATED THAT ALTHOUGH HE HAD NO DIFFICULTY WITH THE IDD, FINAL DECISIONS WOULD BE TAKEN ON DECEMBER 12. HE ADDED THAT THE COMMUNIQUE WORDING SHOULD BE LEFT OPEN UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT AND SHARED THE NORWEGIAN VIEW THAT THE STYLE WAS TOO "HIGH-BROW," TOO EXPERTLY WORDED FOR THE LAYMAN.

18. BJORNSSON (ICELAND) SAID THAT THE ICELANDIC POSITION WAS AS STATED AT THE NOVEMBER 6 MEETING. HE ACCEPTED THE IDD AS A BASIS FOR FINAL ACTION BY MINISTERS NEXT MONTH.

19. SYG LUNS, SUMMING UP BEFORE A SHORT BREAK,

Emphatically asserted that it was of the highest importance that there be a consensus on the message the other allies convey to the US about LRNTF production and deployment; that the US had asked that there be such a consensus. However, he strongly emphasized, the decision on production remains an American decision. LUNS added that he had received information from reliable sources that the Soviets would enter into negotiations on LRNTF arms control even if the alliance decides on modernization.

20. THE MEETING RESUMED WITH AARON RESPONDING TO ALLIES' COMMENTS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES TO THE IDD. HE SAID IT WAS
VERY GRATIFYING TO GET SUCH WIDESPREAD AND GENERAL
SUPPORT. HE STATED THAT WHILE THE US SAW NO NEED FOR
CHANGES TO THE IDD AFTER THIS MEETING, OF COURSE IT
WAS THE PREROGATIVE OF MINISTERS TO DO SO IF THEY
SO DECIDED ON DECEMBER 12. AARON ACCEPTED WITH
APPRECIATION THE SYG’S SUGGESTION ON HANDLING THE
NETHERLANDS RECOMMENDED CHANGE TO PARAGRAPH 15 OF THE
IDD.

. AARON WENT ON TO MAKE A STRONG STATEMENT IN REBUTTAL
TO THE NETHERLANDS POSITION:

-- THE EMERGING ALLIANCE CONSENSUS IN FACT MEETS THE
OBJECTIVES OF THE NETHERLANDS’ POSITION. THE ULTIMATE
SCALE OF DEPLOYMENTS WILL DEPEND ON ARMS CONTROL RESULTS.
IT IS VERY CLEAR THAT IF WE SUCCEED IN REDUCING THE
SOVIET THREAT WE CAN REDUCE OUR REQUIREMENTS.

-- THE FORMULA CHOSEN BY THE DUTCH TO GIVE EFFECT TO

THEIR POSITION, THAT ONE CAN AND SHOULD SEPARATE
PRODUCTION FROM DEPLOYMENT DECISIONS IS ARTIFICIAL AND
SIMPLY NOT FEASIBLE.

-- THE US HAS BEEN AS RESPONSIVE AS POSSIBLE TO ALL
ITS ALLIES’ POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS.

-- THE US ALSO IS A DEMOCRACY AND HAS POLITICAL
REQUIREMENTS. WE CANNOT ASK CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE
FUNDS FOR PRODUCTION WITHOUT A DECISION TO DEPLOY --
IT’S SIMPLY A NONSTARTER.

-- IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT ANY PARLIAMENT IN THE
ALLIANCE, CERTAINLY NOT THE US CONGRESS, WOULD TAKE
SUCH AN ACTION.

21. RESPONDING, BARKMAN ACKNOWLEDGED THE ELEMENTS
OF REALISM IN AARON’S INTERVENTION. HE THEN ADDED AS
FURTHER RATIONALE FOR THE DUTCH POSITION, THAT SINCE THE
WEAPONS WERE INTENDED AS A DETERRENT, THE DECISION TO
PRODUCE ALONE WOULD BE A KIND OF DETERRENT AS THE
POSSIBILITY OF SUBSEQUENT DEPLOYMENT COULD THEN BE HELD
OVER THE SOVIET UNION’S HEAD.

22. CATALANO (ITALY), SUPPORTED AARON’S REBUTTAL TO
THE DUTCH. PAULS (FRG) ALSO COMMENTED ON THE DUTCH
PROPOSAL. HE SAID THE NUMBER 572 WAS KNOWN TO THE
PUBLIC, AS WAS NATO’S PROPOSAL TO PRODUCE AND DEPLOY
MODERNIZED LRNF WEAPONS. IF NOW THE ALLIANCE REDUCED
THE NUMBERS AND DECIDED ON PRODUCTION AND NOT DEPLOYMENT,

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IT WOULD CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE ALLIANCE HAD
MODIFIED ITS POSITION UNDER THE IMPACT OF SOVIET
PRESSURE WHICH IN TURN WOULD WEaken THE AllIANCE'S
POSITION IN THE FORTHCOMING ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
WITH THE SOVIETS. PAULS ADDED THAT THE KREMLIN COULD
PLAY ON TIME IF THE NATO DECISION WERE CURTAILED;
THEREFORE, THE DUTCH PROPOSAL IN FACT WEAKENED THE
ALLIANCE POSITION.

23. SYG LUNS REMINDED THE PERMRPEs THAT SECRETARY
BROWN HAD CLEARLY SAID IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO GET THE
SENATE AND HOUSE TO VOTE FUNDS FOR LRNF WITHOUT
EUROPEAN ACCEPTANCE OF DEPLOYMENTS. HOLST (NORWAY)
THEN RECAPITULATED WHAT HE SAW AS THE FOUR MOST

SALIENT ISSUES IN THE LRNF DECISION PROCESS:

(1) IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE STRUCTURE THE DECISION
PROCESS SO THAT IT WILL CONTAIN BUT ONE SALIENT DECISION
POINT. IF WE CREATE MORE WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO OBTAIN
THE POLITICAL QUIET AND CONSENSUS WE NEED IN ORDER TO PURSUE CREDIBLE NEGOTIATIONS.

(2) WE MUST ACCEPT THAT THE DECISION ON PRODUCTION IS ESSENTIALLY AN AMERICAN DECISION.

(3) AN AMERICAN DECISION ON PRODUCTION DOES, WE ARE TOLD, PRESUPPOSE AN EXPRESSED EUROPEAN WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT DEPLOYMENT.

(4) WITH A DECISION ON DEPLOYMENT, NEGOTIATIONS COULD PRODUCE AN OUTCOME WHEREUNDER THE SCALE OF NATO'S TNF DEPLOYMENT COULD BE RECONSIDERED. IT IS OUR OBJECTIVE TO BRING ABOUT THAT SITUATION. THIS IS WHAT HAPPENED WITH RESPECT TO ABM UNDER SALT I. WE HAVE TO PRODUCE OUR DECISIONS IN A MANNER WHICH WILL PROVIDE THE SOVIET UNION WITH THE MAXIMUM INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY WITH A VIEW TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON AN EQUILIBRIUM OF FORCES AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL.

24. SYG LUNS READ A PROPOSED PARAGRAPH TO BE USED AS PRESS GUIDANCE RELATING TO THE MEETING. AFTER A SHORT DISCUSSION, THE FOLLOWING TWO PASSAGES WERE APPROVED AS PRESS GUIDANCE:

- A. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THOSE MEMBERS CONCERNED, REINFORCED BY SENIOR OFFICIALS FROM CAPITALS, MET ON NOVEMBER 28 TO CONSIDER FURTHER THE QUESTIONS

OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL. THEY REVIEWED THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP AND THE SPECIAL GROUP, IN PARTICULAR THE INTEGRATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TWO GROUPS, IN PREPARATION FOR THE DECEMBER 12 MEETING OF MINISTERS.

- B. THE DANISH DELEGATION PRESENTED TO THE ALLIES ITS GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS ON THE TNF ISSUE AND TOOK NOTE OF THEIR REACTIONS.

25. BEGIN TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY AARON'S REMARKS:

I AM PLEASED TO COME TO BRUSSELS AGAIN ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT CARTER TO CONCLUDE AT OUR LEVEL THE ALLIANCE CONSIDERATION OF THE MODERNIZATION OF OUR LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES. DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES OF RECENT WEEKS, THE PRESIDENT HAS CLOSELY FOLLOWED THE ALLIANCE'S WORK ON TNF. I'M SURE YOU AGREE WITH HIS ASSESSMENT THAT IN TWO WEEKS, THE ALLIANCE WILL TAKE A CRUCIAL
AND HISTORIC STEP. THE DECISION TO MODERNIZE TNF WILL
DEMONSTRATE OUR RESOLVE, OUR COHESION, AND OUR DETERMI-
NATION TO PROVIDE FOR THE SECURITY OF OUR NATIONS. THE
DECISION TO EXPAND OUR ARMS CONTROL AGENDA TO INCLUDE TNF
WILL DEMONSTRATE OUR COMMITMENT TO PURSUE WITH VIGOR AND
VISION AGREEMENTS WITH THE EAST AIMED AT ENHANCING
SECURITY AND STABILITY AT LOWER LEVELS OF ARMAMENTS.
TOGETHER, THESE DECISIONS WILL SHOW THAT THE ALLIANCE
REMAINS A VITAL, COURAGEOUS INSTITUTION, CAPABLE OF
ADAPTING TO NEW TIMES AND MEETING NEW CHALLENGES.

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MIITARY ADDRESSEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

OUR PURPOSE TODAY IS TO REACH AGREEMENT THAT THE DOCUMENT
BEFORE US IS A SUITABLE VEHICLE FOR THE DECISIONS OF OUR
MINISTERS. WE WILL CULMINATE THE LONG, INTENSIVE, AND
PRODUCTIVE PROCESS OF CONSULTATION AND PREPARATION THAT
WAS NEEDED TO BRING THE ALLIANCE TO NEXT MONTH’S CRUCIAL
MOMENT. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT TODAY’S MEETING WILL PRO-
DUCE AGREEMENT ON THE IDD, SO THAT THE MINISTERS CAN MAKE
THE APPROPRIATE DECISION TWO WEEKS FROM NOW.

THE IDD REFLECTS THE FINDINGS OF THE HLG AND THE SG, AS
WELL AS THE CAREFUL PROCESS OF INTEGRATION OF THE WORK
OF THOSE TWO GROUPS. IT EXPLAINS THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF
MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL: THERE CAN BE NO ARMS
CONTROL WITHOUT A MODERNIZATION DECISION, BUT WITH A MODERNIZATION DECISION, CONCRETE ARMS CONTROL ACHIEVEMENTS WHICH REDUCE THE SOVIET THREAT CAN REDUCE OUR TNF RE-

quirements.

THE ALLIES HAVE HAD SIX WEEKS TO REVIEW DRAFTS OF THE IDD. IN THIS EXTENSIVE REVIEW PROCESS, WE HAVE INCORPORATED A NUMBER OF USEFUL CHANGES SUGGESTED BY ALLIES. IN OUR VIEW, THE DRAFTING AND EDITING PROCESS IS NOW FINISHED.

IF, NONETHELESS, ANY ALLIES HAVE SPECIFIC CHANGES IN THE IDD TO SUGGEST TODAY, WE ARE READY TO CONTINUE THIS MEETING UNTIL WE ALL AGREE THAT WE HAVE PRODUCED A SUIT-

ABLE DECISION DOCUMENT.

IN THAT CONNECTION, IT IS IMPORTANT TO BEAR IN MIND THAT TWO DAYS AFTER THE DECEMBER 12 TNF DECISIONS, THE NAC WILL, IN ALL LIKELIHOOD, COME FORWARD WITH AN AGGRESSIVE, COMPREHENSIVE ARMS CONTROL PROGRAM. WE HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE AT THAT TIME TO REVEAL THE THRUST OF THE ALLIANCE'S NEW MBFR APPROACH. IN COMBINATION WITH A DECISION TO WITHDRAW 1000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS FROM EUROPE AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF TNF MODERNIZATION, THE ALLIANCE WILL HAVE MUCH TO BE PROUD OF IN ITS EFFORTS TO ENGAGE THE EAST IN SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL. THIS WILL BE OUR RE-

SPE To RECENT EASTERN PROPOSALS. THERE WILL BE NO MISTAKE ABOUT NATO'S DETERMINATION TO PURSUE GENUINE ARMS CONTROL ACROSS A BROAD FRONT.

WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. BUT WE MUST GIVE NO GROUNDS FOR THE SOVIETS TO QUESTION THE DEPTH OF THE ALLIANCE'S COM-

MITMENT TO TNF MODERNIZATION. WE MUST BE CLEAR-EYED

ABOUT CURRENT SOVIET INTENTIONS. WE HAVE WITNESSED AN UNMISTAKEABLE POLITICAL ATTEMPT BY MOSCOW TO INTERFERE IN OUR DECISIONS AND TO PREVENT US FROM TAKING STEPS THAT THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES ARE TAKING -- STEPS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE NECESSARY BY SOVIET DEPLOYMENT ACTIONS.

AT THE SAME TIME, SOVIET ACTIONS UNDERSCORE THE SERIOUS-

NESS OF THE CHALLENGE BEFORE US. I REPORTED TO YOU ON NOVEMBER 6TH RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SS-20 FORCE.

AGAIN, JUST LAST WEEK, WE DISCOVERED YET ANOTHER SS-20 BASE UNDER CONSTRUCTION, BRINGING THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SS-20 BASES OPERATIONAL OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION TO 23, AND

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THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SS-20 WARHEADS WHICH ARE BEING DEPLOYED TO 621 -- A NUMBER WHICH ALONE NOW EXCEEDS THE NATO-PROPOSED PROGRAM OF LRTNF -- EVEN WITHOUT COUNTING THE HUNDREDS OF SS 4'S AND 5'S AND MEDIUM BOMBERS.

BY THEIR RECENT ACTIONS AND WORDS, THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE IT ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT WE MAKE PIRM DECISIONS. THESE DECISIONS WILL SHOW THE SOVIET UNION THAT NATO WILL NOT BOW TO THREATS NOR BE TEMPTED BY VAGUE AND INEQUITABLE PROPOSALS. NATO'S DECISION MUST MAKE CLEAR THAT THE BEST PATH FOR THE SOVIET UNION IS THAT OF SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. FOR THIS REASON THE UNITED STATES CANNOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL OF THE DANISH GOVERNMENT.

TWELVE YEARS AGO, THE ALLIANCE MADE A FUNDAMENTAL DECISION -- THAT NATO WOULD DEDICATE ITSELF BOTH TO DETENTE AND DEFENSE. FOR PERHAPS THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE HARTEL REPORT WAS ADOPTED, THE ALLIANCE IS BEING ASKED TO TAKE
ING EUROPE -- ONE THAT HOLDS OUT THE PROMISE OF LIFTING
FOR THE FIRST TIME THE CLOUD OF NUCLEAR DESTRUCTION THAT
HANGS OVER THIS CONTINENT. BUT THIS OPPORTUNITY WILL BE
REALIZED ONLY IF WE ARE STRONG, ONLY IF WE ARE UNITED,
AND ONLY IF WE MARK WELL THE ADVICE OF THE NATO WISEMEN
OF A DOZEN YEARS AGO -- DETENTE AND DEFENSE ARE IN-
DIVISIBLE.

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END TEXT OF AARON'S REMARKS.

26. THERE FOLLOWS BELOW SIR CLIVE ROSE'S REMARKS.
BEGIN TEXT:

1. ONCE AGAIN I SHOULD LIKE TO WELCOME MR. AARON TO OUR
MEETING. I HAVE LISTENED WITH INTEREST TO HIS STATEMENT.
WHAT HE HAD TO SAY IS VERY MUCH IN LINE WITH THE VIEWS
OF MY OWN AUTHORITIES.

2. WE REMAIN CONVINCED OF THE NEED TO TAKE POSITIVE
DECISIONS IN DECEMBER BOTH ON LRNTF MODERNISATION AND
ON PROPOSALS FOR TNF ARMS CONTROL. WE REGARD IT AS OF THE
HIGHEST PRIORITIY THAT THESE DECISIONS SHOULD BE TAKEN
IN PARALLEL SO THAT THE PRODUCTION AND IN DUE COURSE
DEPLOYMENT OF THE NEW SYSTEMS CAN GO AHEAD WITHOUT DELAY
AND THAT WE CAN, ALONGSIDE THIS, ENGAGE THE SOVIET
UNION IN SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

3. WE DO NOT BELIEVE SUCH NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE PRODUCTIVE
UNLESS THE ALLIANCE HAS FIRST DEMONSTRATED ITS RESOLVE
TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES OF ITS OWN.
ALL OUR EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE ONLY
LIKELY TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY IF THEY ARE FACED WITH
EVIDENCE OF REAL DETERMINATION ON THE PART OF THE
ALLIANCE. FROM THIS WE DRAW THE FIRM CONCLUSION THAT
NATO MUST DECIDE ON ITS MODERNISATION PROGRAMME AND
HOW IT IS TO BE ACHIEVED BEFORE WE ATTEMPT TO BARGAIN
ABOUT LIMITATIONS. IF WE DO NOT DO THIS WHAT ARE WE
GOING TO BARGAIN WITH?

4. I HAVE LISTENED WITH INTEREST TO WHAT THE DANISH
REPRESENTATIVE HAS SAID TODAY. MY AUTHORITIES ARE

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CONCERNED AT THE IDEAS WHICH ARE BEING DISCUSSED FOR
DELAYING DECISIONS. WE BELIEVE THE SUGGESTION IN OTHER
QUARTERS THAT WE SHOULD DECIDE IN DECEMBER ONLY TO GO
AHEAD WITH LIMITED PRODUCTION, LEAVING A DECISION

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ON DEPLOYMENT UNTIL LATER, WOULD BE WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE. IT WOULD NOT PROVIDE THE EVIDENCE OF DETERMINATION WHICH IS NEEDED IF WE ARE TO GET THE RUSSIANS TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ABOUT LIMITATIONS. INDEED IT WOULD GIVE THEM AMPLE SCOPE FOR DRAGGING OUT THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE OBJECT OF DEFERRING NATO DECISIONS ABOUT DEPLOYMENT. MEANWHILE THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTINUE THEIR OWN BUILD-UP. SO THE IMBALANCE WOULD BE INCREASED.

5. WE ARE EQUALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROPOSAL OF THE DANISH GOVERNMENT THAT DECISIONS ON BOTH PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT SHOULD BE DEFERRED FOR SIX MONTHS IN RETURN FOR A FREEZE ON SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS AT THEIR CURRENT LEVELS. I HAVE TO SAY FRANKLY THAT WE REGARD THIS NOT ONLY AS IMPractical BUT ALSO AS HAVING MAJOR DISADVANTAGES FOR THE ALLIANCE IN MILITARY, POLITICAL AND ARMS CONTROL TERMS.

6. TO PUT OFF DECISIONS NOW FOR SIX MONTHS WOULD CAST DOUBT ON THE ALLIANCE's ABILITY TO TAKE DIFFICULT DECISIONS. IT WOULD GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO MEET THE MILITARY TARGETS WHICH WE HAVE SET OURSELVES AND WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN SO MUCH PUBLICIZED. AND OUR FAILURE TO DO THIS WOULD BE WIDELY INTERPRETED AS BEING THE RESULT OF SOVIET PRESSURE AND PROPAGANDA. THIS COULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE

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MILITARY ADDRESSEES TREAT AS SPECCAT EXCLUSIVE
NATO'S CREDIBILITY. IT WOULD SHOW A LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN OURSELVES WHICH WOULD BODE ILL FOR THE FUTURE COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE.

7. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT POSTPONEMENT WOULD DAMAGE THE PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL. WHAT WOULD BE THE EFFECT ON THE SALT II RATIFICATION DEBATE? AT THE LEAST IT WOULD INTRODUCE A NEW ELEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY INTO THE SITUATION. INDECISION AT THIS STAGE WOULD BE INTERPRETED BY MANY PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES AS SHOWING THAT EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE WERE RELUCTANT TO TAKE THE MEASURES NECESSARY FOR THEIR DEFENCE. THIS COULD ONLY BE HARMFUL TO RELATIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

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8. BUT MORE THAN THIS, WE WOULD LOSE THE OPPORTUNITY - TO WHICH I REFERRED IN MY REMARKS ON 6 NOVEMBER - TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE IN THE FIELD OF ARMS CONTROL BY PUTTING FORWARD A NUMBER OF MEASURES WHICH, TAKEN TOGETHER, WOULD ADD UP TO A SIGNIFICANT PACKAGE IN PARALLEL WITH THE MODERNIZATION DECISION. IT WOULD PRESUMABLY NO LONGER BE POSSIBLE TO GO AHEAD WITH THE PROPOSAL FOR WITHDRAWING WARHEADS FROM THE STOCKPILE IN EUROPE. AND THE CONTEXT IN WHICH WE WERE CONSIDERING NEW INITIATIVES IN MBFR WOULD BE RADICALLY CHANGED. IN THE NEW SITUATION WE SHOULD HAVE TO RE-EXAMINE THE BASIS FOR CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR SIMPLIFIED PHASE I AND THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE IMPACT OF ANY PROPOSALS ON WHICH WE WERE ABLE TO AGREE WOULD BE MUCH REDUCED.

9. IN ANY CASE, WE SEE LITTLE POSSIBILITY WITHIN SIX MONTHS OF ACHIEVING ANY POSITIVE RESULTS ON TNF ARMS CONTROL. EVEN IF WE COULD ACHIEVE A FREEZE, THE ALLIANCE WOULD BE FROZEN IN ITS EXISTING POSITION OF INFERIORITY. THAT WOULD BE THE BASIS ON WHICH WE SHOULD HAVE TO EMBARK ON ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND IT IS NOT IN OUR VIEW A SATISFACTORY BASIS FOR SECURING SOVIET AGREEMENT TO LIMITATION OR REDUCTIONS. MOREOVER WHAT ASSURANCE WOULD WE HAVE THAT A FREEZE WOULD BE OBSERVED BY THE RUSSIANS? AS I UNDERSTAND IT, THE PROPOSAL IS THAT IT WOULD BE BASED ON A UNILATERAL SOVIET DECLARATION. IT IS NOT CLEAR TO US AT WHAT POINT WITHIN THE PROPOSED SIX MONTH PERIOD THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE EXPECTED TO GIVE ANY SUCH COMMITMENT. BUT IN ANY CASE IS IT SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE VERIFICATION MEASURES AND AN AGREED DATA BASE BEFORE IT STARTS? THERE WOULD BE LITTLE VALUE IN A SOVIET COMMITMENT TO A FREEZE WITHOUT
AGREEMENT ON THESE TWO POINTS. BUT HAVING IN MIND THE EXPERIENCE OF SALT II AND MBFR - CAN WE CONTEMPLATE THAT AGREEMENT ON THESE POINTS ALONE WOULD BE REACHED EVEN WITHIN THE PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS?

10. MY AUTHORITIES REMAIN CONVINCED THAT THERE CAN BE NO SATISFACTORY SUBSTITUTE FOR PARALLEL DECISIONS IN DECEMBER ON THE MODERNISATION AND ARMS CONTROL. THEY CONSIDER THE REVISED VERSION OF THE IDD PROVIDES A SUITABLE BASIS FOR SUCH DECISIONS.

27.
FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT BY NORWEGIAN STATE SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, JOHAN HOLST

BEGIN TEXT OF FIRST STATEMENT:

. I WANT FIRST OF ALL TO ASSOCIATE MYSELF WITH THOSE WHO HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR APPRECIATION FOR THE SUCCINCT AND IMPORTANT STATEMENT MADE BY MR. AARON AT THIS MEETING.

. ALLOW ME TO INFORM YOU ABOUT THE POSITION AND TIME SCHEDULE OF MY GOVERNMENT IN THIS MATTER. THE NORWEGIAN POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE NON-STATIONING AND NON-STOCK- PILING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY THE NATO DECISIONS ON MODERNIZATION. THEREFORE, MY GOVERNMENT WILL GIVE PARTICULAR WEIGHT TO THE POSITIONS TAKEN BY THOSE COUNTRIES THAT ARE MOST DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY THE DECISIONS. THIS ATTITUDE HAS IMPLICATIONS ALSO FOR THE TIMING OF DECISIONS. NORWAY CANNOT BE UP FRONT IN
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MAKING HER DECISIONS SINCE WE SHALL HAVE TO AWAIT THE CLARIFICATION OF POSITIONS IN THE MOST AFFECTED CAPITALS.

. NORWAY ATTRIBUTES PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THE PRESENTATION OF A CREDIBLE AND PERSUASIVE OFFER TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CONTINENTAL WEAPONS. NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD START AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE PURPOSE OF SUCH NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE TO ESTABLISH EQUILIBRIUM AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE FORCE LEVEL. THE URGENCE OF THIS OBJECTIVE IS underscored BY THE DISTURBING FACT REPORTED BY MR. AARON THIS MORNING, THAT THE NUMBER OF SS-20 WARHEADS OPERATIONAL OR UNDER DEPLOYMENT ALREADY EXCEEDS THE PROJECTED LEVEL OF NATO TNF-DEPLOYMENTS.

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. IT IS THE NORWEGIAN VIEW THAT IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO INCLUDE AS PART OF THE TNF DECISION PACKAGE THE UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF 1000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR DETERMINATION TO PURSUE ARMS CONTROL IN A VIGOROUS MANNER, THE SOONER THIS INITIATIVE BE PLACED ON THE PUBLIC RECORD THE BETTER. IN THE SAME VEIN WE HOPE THE OBSTACLES TO THE PRESENTATION OF THE PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERIM FIRST PHASE MBFR-AGREEMENT CAN BE SPEEDILY REMOVED. THAT PROPOSAL OUGHT TO BE PART OF WHAT WILL IN FACT AMOUNT TO A VIGOROUS AND COMPREHENSIVE NATO DECLARATION ON ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS FROM THE MINISTERIAL MEETINGS IN DECEMBER.


. THEREFORE, MR. CHAIRMAN, I SHALL LIMIT MYSELF AT THIS POINT TO A FEW GENERAL OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE COMMUNIQUE.

. THE COMMUNIQUE WE ARE DISCUSSING TODAY SHOULD BE ASSESSED IN POLITICAL TERMS SINCE IT WILL BE THE MOST
AUTHORITATIVE PRESENTATION OF THE COLLECTIVE DECISION OF
THIS ALLIANCE WITH RESPECT TO MODERNIZATION AND THE OFFER
TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE EAST ABOUT CONTINENTAL WEAPONS.

. FURTHERMORE, THE COMMUNIQUE SHOULD AND DOES
REFLECT THE CONSENSUS OF VIEWS AND CONSIDERATIONS CONTAINED

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IN THE INTEGRATED DOCUMENT BASED ON THE REPORTS OF THE HLG
AND THE SG.

. ALTHOUGH I RECOGNIZE THE COMPLEX NATURE OF THE MATTER
INVOLVED, THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE WE ARE DISCUSSING TODAY IS
PERHAPS SOMewhat TECHNICAL IN CHARACTER, SEEMINGLY
ADDRESSED MORE TO THE EXPERT THAN THE GENERAL PUBLIC. IT
IS NOT EASY TO PENETRATE FOR THE ATTENTIVE LAYMAN. IT
SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT THE COMMUNIQUE SHOULD BE
ADDRESSED TO OUR PUBLICS. HOWEVER, WE SHALL NOT PROPOSE
A REWRITING OF THE COMMUNIQUE AT THIS LATE POINT IN TIME.

. IN POLITICAL TERMS THE COMMUNIQUE MUST CONSTITUTE A
PLATFORM FROM WHICH GOVERNMENTS CAN DRAW IN PRESENTING
AND EXPLAINING THE COLLECTIVE DECISIONS TO THEIR PUBLICS.
IT IS IMPORTANT, THEREFORE, THAT THE STRUCTURE AND CONTENT
OF THE COMMUNIQUE AMPLY REFLECT THE POLITICAL RATIONALE
COLLECTIVELY DEVELOPED AND THE ARGUMENTS DEPLOYED IN
NATIONAL DEBATES. IN THIS CONNECTION I WANT TO DRAW
ATTENTION TO THE NEED FOR A CREDIBLE ALIGNMENT OF
THE DECISION ON MODERNIZATION AND THE OFFER TO NEGOTIATE.
MOST PARTICULARLY, THE POINT THAT THE SCALE OF THE
EVENTUAL DEPLOYMENT WILL NEED TO BE CONSIDERED IN LIGHT
OF THE RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE GIVEN A
SALIENT PRESENTATION IN THE COMMUNIQUE. WE SHOULD PAY
ATTENTION ALSO TO THIS POINT IN THE PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF
THE DECISIONS AFTER THE MEETING ON DECEMBER 12TH.
END TEXT. BENNETT

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>
Dear colleague,

After the discussion we had at last week's ministerial NPG-meeting on the issue of lrrnf-modernisation and arms control I feel it might be useful, if only for the sake of clarity, that I once more explain to you my position on this matter. In doing so I want to come back briefly to some points I raised in my intervention at the NPG-meeting and for which I ask your serious consideration.

The first point concerns the relationship between the production decision and the deployment of the new weapons. As you know the Christian Democratic party, the larger of the two parties supporting the Van Agt-government, favours an alliance decision on production in December, making the actual deployment dependent on the results of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. Though this approach was heavily criticized by some of our colleagues at last week's meeting, I do believe that the real difference between this approach and the one envisaged in the "integrated decision document" is not as big as it may seem. In both cases the number of warheads that will ultimately be deployed will be affected by arms control. In both cases it will be necessary to evaluate the results of arms control negotiations and to reach a consensus about these results before the actual deployment of the new systems. Thus in neither case will the actual deployment automatically result from decisions that are going to be made at the end of this year.

My second point has to do with the size of the programme. In raising this issue I fully recognize the excellent analytical work done by our experts in the "high level group". I want to note, however, that their recommendation as to the size of the programme is based on the assumption that no meaningful results of arms control negotiations will be reached until 1985. I want to stress again that we have to pass a political judgment on the work of our experts. In this respect I believe that the goal of successful arms control can be better pursued by deciding on a programme of a smaller size than recommended with the possibility of upward and downward adjustments in the light of the outcome of arms control negotiations.
Apart from this the proposed number of 572 warheads is clearly in the upper range of the 200 to 600 additional warheads recommended to us as an "evolutionary upward adjustment" in the spring report of the high level group, which - at least in the Netherlands - has a negative political effect.

Without coming forward at this moment with proposals as to the numbers, I want to let you know that my government has the most serious political difficulty in accepting the size of the programme proposed.

Thirdly and finally there is the question of the total Netherlands contribution to NATO's tnf. Any possible participation of my country in the 1FtF-programme will necessarily entail a reconsideration of our present so-called nuclear tasks. When we had our personal contact prior to the NPG-meeting, I provided you with a strictly confidential paper, marked annex B, containing my intentions on this matter. As I told you on that occasion I don't want to take unilateral decisions. In the margin of the NPG-meeting you promised to inform me in time of any objections you might have to my intentions. If you might wish to receive any further explanation on a military or official level I'll be glad to take the necessary steps to arrange this. In any case the adjustments in our contribution will be put before NATO as soon as the Netherlands government has made its decisions. At the present stage of decision-making I must ask you once more to treat this matter on a strictly confidential basis.

Sincerely,
VERZENDLIJST

His Excellency Mr. José Desmares
Minister of National Defence
1000 Brussels
Belgium

His Excellency Mr. Poul Søgaard
Minister of Defence
Ministry of Defence
1216 Copenhagen K.
Denmark

His Excellency Dr. Hans Apel
Federal Minister of Defence
Federal Ministry of Defence
5300 Bonn
Germany

His Excellency Mr. Attilio Ruffini
Minister of Defence
Ministry of Defence
Rome
Italy

His Excellency Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg
Minister of Defence
Ministry of Defence
Oslo
Norway

The Right Honourable Francis Pym M.C. D.L. M.P.
Secretary of State for Defence
Ministry of Defence
London SW1A2HB
United Kingdom
Minister van Defensie
Secr.

Aan: de Minister-President

Bijgaande teksten werden heden om 14.30 uur door de Engelse ambassadeur aan Minister Scholten overhandigd.

De Minister meende er goed aan te doen U een kopie van deze teksten te doen toekomen.

5-12-1979
TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE TO THE NETHERLANDS MINISTER OF DEFENCE

Thank you very much for your personal letter of 23 November about LANTNF modernisation. I have admired the seriousness of the debate on this issue in the Netherlands, even when I have disagreed with particular points made; and I value the opportunity to offer my views on the aspects to which your letter draws attention.

The first is the concept of separating in time the decisions on production and on deployment. Frankly, I believe the distinction between the two is, in all the circumstances of today's situation, an unreal one. A British Prime Minister of past days used to say "it is unwise to cross a chasm in two leaps". That, in my judgement, is what a production/deployment split would be doing. The world, and in particular the Soviet Union, would recognise that NATO had taken only half a decision: more particularly, they would recognise that the missing half was the European half. This would amount to a manifest failure of will and would in my judgement be profoundly damaging to Alliance cohesion, credibility and security - and also to the prospect of real arms control. It could have a major impact on US-European relations.

I fear I cannot agree that to divide the two components of decisions now would amount to the same as is proposed in the integrated decision document. What that document envisages, in effect, is that we should take firm decisions now but should acknowledge that we shall be prepared to modify them later if the other side gives us solid and assured reasons for doing so. This is a fundamentally different political and negotiating proposition from the one which the CSA has indicated - it requires the Russians to react positively to our arms control initiative, rather than leaving the onus on the Alliance: that seems to me to be crucial. We must not set up a pattern in which the burden of fresh decisions lies always upon NATO. I would however be ready when we meet in Brussels on 10-12 December to consider with you whether there was any way in which we might help on presentation.

I believe we should remind ourselves of the reality of the Soviet position. Mr Brezhnev has offered nothing in relation to his own LANTNF programme except a general offer, without any detail of type or number, to withdraw some systems from Western Russia. But given the range of his systems, both old and new, he could easily fulfil such an offer without changing in the least the threat to NATO Europe. He has not offered in any way to halt his own programmes, already larger and far more advanced than NATO's. (Indeed, as Mr Aaron reported to the Alliance on 23 November, the number of SS20 warheads alone deployed or being deployed, quite aside from other Soviet LANTN systems, already exceeds the total proposed Alliance programme.) He has not offered even a moratorium on his new deployments, still less on production. He says in effect "we will not stop our programme but you must not start yours": from those respective positions, we are prepared to talk with you. For my part, I would not be ready to negotiate anything with anyone on such a basis, in politics or my daily affairs.

Those
Those in my view are the central considerations: but let me mention two others. Firstly, I have every sympathy with Harold Brown's point that he cannot reasonably ask the US Congress to fund the provision of weapon systems for which his allies have not committed themselves even to accept deployment. This is reinforced by the fact that the US is taking a notably generous view financially of how to meet what is predominantly, in its MLG origins, a requirement driven by European views. Secondly, there is a real problem of preparation time. Procedures may be different in your country, but in the UK we must begin to take practical steps quite soon - within months - if we are to be ready for basing in 1983. It would be politically and practically impossible for me to embark on these steps if no clear deployment decision had been taken.

You raised also the question of numbers. This has always been a difficult matter, I agree, since the requirement has to be in the end a matter of informed judgement (not the same as a guess, of course) rather than of precise calculation. Any of us might no doubt have reached a rather different judgement. But for my part I regard the figure of 572 as quite reasonable, and I certainly see no significantly lower figure that could be shown to be markedly better based. (The military authorities, as you know, would have preferred a higher one, and even if in the end the programme has to be fully implemented our LANTIRN strength will still be much smaller than its Soviet counterpart.) The figure is now firmly in the public domain, and to cut it would offer no improvement in security, in Alliance credibility, or in any control prospects - if anything rather the reverse in this last respect. No great financial saving would accrue to any of the basing countries. My own country has already and would continue to have based in it a larger number of LANTIRNs than any other: yet we seek no reduction now. As to the idea of taking a lower figure and being ready to increase it if arms control fails, I disagree with this fundamentally as a matter of commonsense negotiating strategy. It would place the onus upon NATO to make a fresh judgement, possibly in confused political circumstances; whereas I endorse the view of almost all those who have experience in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union that the only way to get good results is to make clear that they cannot secure outcomes they want without moving themselves. I do not accept the view that to start with one's full requirement is to assume the failure of arms control; I believe rather that to assume its success prematurely is a very likely way to bring about such failure.

There are a few other general points I should like to make. The concept of the nuclear threshold is of concern to many in our countries. I do not think it has yet been sufficiently understood that the present programme would actually help to raise that threshold. It would, by reducing the pre-launch vulnerability of NATO's land-based LANTIRN, reduce the temptation to an adversary to mount a pre-emptive nuclear strike; and it would help release dual-capable aircraft from nuclear assignments like OHA, in order to reinforce conventional strength. These seem to me significant positive factors.

Finally, I know it is common ground between us that we should ultimately view this in the context of the Alliance which is so vital to us all. The Alliance's collective planning is evolved through
careful discussion and debate, in which we all argue our points: we prevail on some, we concede on others. The INFND work has been a thorough and admirable exercise of precisely this kind. My country has influenced the outcome: so, very clearly, has the Netherlands -
the package before us in December will bear your positive imprint in many ways (the emphasis on arms control, no increase in stockpile, the concept of the "shift" study and a firm date for it, just to take some examples). Not every aspect is precisely as you would wish, or indeed as the UK would. At the end of the day, we each of us have to take our national decisions. We must consider whether it is better for our own and Western security for each of us to be perfectly right (as we see it) in isolation, or to be perhaps imperfectly right together. The Alliance is built on the principle that the latter is better. The Government of which I am a member is determined to go ahead on that view. The practical implications are at least as heavy for us nationally as for other Europeans. But the British Government regards this as a major Alliance issue which we should approach above all as Alliance members. We earnestly hope that our friends - and particularly the Netherlands, which has been our partner in so much - will do the same.
TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE TO THE NETHERLANDS MINISTER OF DEFENCE

I thought it might be helpful, given the especially private basis on which you disclosed to me the ideas you were considering for adjustments in Netherlands nuclear roles, if I replied to you on these separately from my more general comments on the LRTNF issue.

Let me first say that I am most appreciative that you have taken me so fully into your confidence on all this.

I ought to preface my specific comments by three points. Firstly, I assume throughout that any adjustments would be made essentially to complement an affirmative Netherlands decision to participate in LRTNF on the basis of the HIC programme. Secondly, I would even on that assumption still have preferred that your decisions on the precise adjustments elsewhere should wait, as would seem to me logical, upon the outcome of the NATO "shift" study to which you yourselves rightly attach considerable significance. I offer comments in advance of that collective work with some reluctance. Thirdly, I would regard the views of the NATO military authorities as of great importance and I hope they may have an opportunity to give their own professional advice.

With these provisos, I offer the following:

(a) I would not seek to dissuade you from relinquishing the atomic demolition munitions role.

(b) Similarly, we would not regard as seriously damaging your giving up nuclear capability in surface-to-air missiles.

//
(c) We do see considerable value, on present evidence, in your retaining an artillery capability, and I am glad to understand that you envisage no decisions on this in advance of the "shift" study.

(d) We should be extremely sorry to see you give up the nuclear role for your MPA aircraft. The weapons are now stored in the UK, and we are content to continue this arrangement. The NATO maritime authorities, and our own, would be concerned about any reduction in the span and flexibility of Alliance maritime nuclear capability, which is already far from ample. And your withdrawal would sharply narrow the breadth of Alliance participation in this field.

(e) We believe that there is both military and political value in maintaining dual capability for aircraft on a broad basis of Alliance participation, and Saceur has already expressed concern about the dwindling stocks of dual-capable aircraft at his disposal. We recognise however the argument in the HLC report that new LPMs will make it easier to apply dual-capable aircraft effort in the conventional role. Against this background we would regard a Netherlands decision on the basis you described to me - that is, in parallel with GLAM deployment - to withdraw progressively from this area of effort in respect of your F.16s as less damaging than reductions in artillery or MPA.

I hope these indications of the UK standpoint - which I have approached in the desire to be as constructively helpful as I possibly can in your difficult circumstances - will be of value to you in reaching your decisions.

If you felt that an Alliance agreement in December on a positive statement /about

SECRET AND PERSONAL
about adjustments in the Netherlands nuclear role would be of sufficient importance to enable the Netherlands to participate in the TNP modernisation programme, I can give you my personal assurance that to the extent I have described above we would not seek to stand in your way. I hope, though, that you would agree not to let this become known until we achieve agreement in December on this and the many other issues we have to settle. But these private indications may perhaps help you in framing your tactics for your parliamentary debate next week.
Only copy Very Secret 7 pages


PM gives a picture of the possibilities, impossibilities, and risks for the Dutch cabinet in the TNF matter. Between Belgium and the Netherlands at least this parallel exists, that the possibilities of an integral acceptance of the draft decisions submitted to the NATO council of December 12 -- the "IDD" 2 are becoming more limited by the day. The situation in the Netherlands can be summarized as follows. The left parties do not want a decision other than the announcement of a moratorium, that is to say that the proposal is made to the Soviet Union to stop further deployment of new systems and to start negotiations. D'66 too3 -- strongly on the rise according to the most recent opinion polls - - has chosen this course during its party congress last Saturday. Of the parties supporting the cabinet the VVD4 will accept the IDD5 unconditionally, just like several small right-of-center parties, together 30-35 seats out of 150 in the Second Chamber.5 The other governing party, the CDA,6 straddles both sides and is hopelessly divided: 2 of the 49 CDA-delegation members are, as principled atom-pacifists, against any modernization decision whatsoever; they want to see all nuclear weapons removed from the Netherlands. On the other side 10 to 15 CDA-members of parliament believe that the

1 By Prime-Minister Van Agt’s top adviser, J. P. M. H. Merckelbach.
2 Integrated Decision Document, combining the outcomes of NATO's High Level Group and Special Group studies of, respectively, TNF modernization and arms control.
3 A center-left party in the Dutch parliament.
4 A center-right party, and member of van Agt's government
5 that is to say, what one believes to be in the IDD. [note in original]
6 Second Chamber = lower house of parliament. Unless noted otherwise, "parliament" or "members of parliament" refers to this lower house.

6 Christen Democratisch Appel: Christian Democrats, containing both left and right-of-center members.
IDD* will have to be accepted unconditionally, a position, therefore, taken altogether by maximally 50 members of parliament. The other CDA-members (32 to 37) hold the key. For many among them the position to be taken has not yet been determined, but it is certain that they will not accept an unconditional yes to the IDD. In light of this situation it is impossible for the cabinet -- which, with the support of the right-wing parties, will only be able to do without 5 or 6 CDA-votes -- to accept the IDD unconditionally. This would be political suicide. The situation can deteriorate further. The discussion in the Netherlands has reached a state of frenzy the last couple of days displaying para-psychotic characteristics, thus making it practically uncontrollable. The cabinet would be willing to commit political suicide if this would benefit NATO, but the opposite is the case. A new coalition undoubtedly will distance itself further from the IDD and with it from NATO membership. According to the latest opinion polls the Netherlands would have a left majority (PvdA7 + D'66) for the first time in an election now -- albeit a narrow one -- even without the support of the extreme left parties.

Against that background the PM does not feel bad at all about trying to preserve the cabinet no matter what and to make the best of it vis-a-vis the NATO-allies. The cabinet will not let itself be forced to a rejection of the IDD; in that case it will maintain its integrity and resign. An unconditional acceptance of the IDD is, as said, not a realistic possibility either. The point is to find a middle way that deviates as little as possible from the IDD.

FM remarks that the situation in Belgium has become very complicated because -- aside from the normal contradictions -- through the change of the guard a number of prominent officials from the recent past (Tindemans, v.d. Boeynants, Cools, de Clerk) are playing their own part in parliament. As regards the TNF-matter, the Flemish socialists have already taken a position that does not differ much from the position of the P.v.d.A. The Wallonian socialists -- led by Simonet who in regard to NATO continues the tradition of Spaak -- do not share this position so far. They will have a party council meeting about this next Saturday. The Christian Democrats in large majority are in favor of a decision that follows the IDD; a minority, especially on Flemish side, is against this. The opposition -- the liberals -- are in favor. The problems, caused especially by the attitude of the Flemish socialists perhaps followed by the Wallonian socialists, therefore are especially within the coalition and within the cabinet which is under threat anyway as a result of the usual Flemish-Wallonian contradictions. Some speculate that the Flemish socialists will not take risks in the TNF-matter in the interest of a solution of the general internal problems. This is not certain, however. How the Flemish Christian-Democrats will position themselves depends especially on the attitude of Tindemans who, although thusfar always strongly pro-NATO, now takes a more reserved position. Of the 56 Flemish Christian-Democrats 10 are expected to have reservations. The problem for the cabinet lies particularly with the Flemish socialists who will be against the IDD en masse.

EM has understood from PM that the Dutch cabinet does not want to respond with no to the IDD and cannot respond with yes, but that it looks for a middle way that approaches the IDD as closely as possible. That has been considered in Brussels too, with the result that the suggestion has been put to EM to accept the IDD on December 12, but to

7 Partij van de Arbeid: social-democratic party.
postpone implementation -- also the production decision -- by six months. In that period arms control talks should get underway and offer reasonable prospects. 

**MP** remarks that the Dutch cabinet is being moved to a position that does not differ from the EM's suggestion in a fundamental way, although it does in a procedural one. About the six month term the CDA will without doubt note that the negotiations will not be able to develop in such a short time period. On the other hand the decision to deploy will not have to be postponed until 1983 for the CDA if the actual deployment can begin. 

**EM** points out that his suggestion also means that the implementation of the production decision will be postponed for six months. This differs fundamentally from the Danish idea to postpone the decision itself for six months and to negotiate first. In the preliminary Belgian view the decision would have to be implemented automatically if after six months the negotiations have not begun or have progressed insufficiently. This will stimulate the SU quickly to start negotiations and to conduct them seriously.

**MP** believes that a postponement of the implementation can only apply to the production because the deployment can only begin in 1983. In the IDD therefore there only is talk of a decision in regard to deployment; the decision about production is not mentioned there. This follows from the fact that the European NATO-countries do no decide about production. This exclusively an American decision which is fully an American responsibility. PM is happy with this because in the Netherlands there also exist major objections to the large number of 572 warheads. The formulation chosen in the IDD simplifies the political problem for the Dutch cabinet somewhat because it no longer has to rail against the large number. With that, one of the friction points with NATO has been removed. On the other hand this formulation does complicate the preliminary Belgian view.

**EM** argues that a decision for deployment does imply a decision about production. If Belgium agrees to the deployment of 48 GLCMs\(^8\) on its territory the US will produce, otherwise it will not. As known, for political reasons the Federal Republic does not want to take a positive decision about deployment alone. Militarily it makes no difference if 48 GLCMs are deployed in Belgium or whether 48 extra go to the Federal Republic; the issue is the political spread of the deployment. EM has no idea of the intentions of the US if NATO would not be able to come to a positive decision. 

**PM** acknowledges that politically there does indeed exist a clear connection between the production and deployment decisions. 

**EM** repeats that he is positively inclined toward the suggestion made to him to take a decision now but delay implementation for some time. The six-month term he mentioned is negotiable. EM notes that also in the argument of the PM the objective should be a nuanced decision that approaches the IDD as closely as possible and does not affect the cohesion of the alliance.

**PM** believes that for the best possible end-result the procedure from now on is of the greatest importance. It is in everyone's interest to guard against one government getting into even greater difficulties through premature statements by another. It cannot be that a partly negative positition of country A influences the positioning of country B or country C, and vice versa. This is why governments which have difficulties with the IDD have to

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\(^8\) Ground Launched Cruise Missiles.
air these as late as possible. PM has understood that the Belgian cabinet will determine its position next Sunday. He ask if this could also be Monday.

EM confirms that the Belgian cabinet is scheduled to meet next Sunday but adds that technically it is possible only to take the decision on Monday. A practical problem here is that the party boards tend to meet every Monday and afterwards issue communiques. That problem can be met by having the cabinet decide on Monday morning. It has already been announced that the cabinet will decide on Sunday and that day there also is a large demonstration in Brussels with participation also from the Netherlands.

PM thinks it is highly preferable for both to decide in the course of Monday.

EM agrees and would like to agree also, now or later, to do so at the same hour.

PM would most like to see the decisions be taken Monday evening, but he fully understands that this causes problems for EM in connection with the party board meetings.

EM agrees that both cabinets decide Monday evening without making this known ahead of time. EM asks if there can be further contact about the contents of the position to be taken.

PM Supports this. This could happen by telephone or in a new meeting like now. Both agree that Thuysbaert and Merckelbach will keep in contact about this.

EM points out that the core cabinet meets tomorrow to discuss a text being prepared by Min. Simonet. The suggestion EM made is not yet known to the cabinet.

PM remarks that in the Netherlands only ministers v.d. Klaauw and Scholten are aware of all developments. Both agree only to inform the ministers of F.A.\(^9\) and Def. about the content of this discussion.

EM receives the suggestion to organize a meeting of the five directly involved heads of government before December 12. This would have to be a secret meeting, for example in the neighborhood of Aachen. Should Mrs. Thatcher be present too?

PM expects that Schmidt will want this because Mrs. Thatcher has the firmest position vis-a-vis TNF-modernization. It appears to him virtually impossible to keep a meeting of five heads of government a secret. MP certainly does not want to reject the suggestion by EM, but he does want to consider it further and discuss it with the Ministers of F.A. and Def. He will also put the suggestion to colleagues Cossiga and Mrs. Thatcher on Thursday.

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\(^9\) Foreign Affairs
P.C. gives a view of the developments of the past days that have led finally that the Chamber in a secret vote has with a large majority accepted a motion inspired by the government. In the end, it turned out not to be necessary to ask for a vote of confidence. This motion contained the following elements: (1) rapid ratification of SALT II; (2) deliberately strive for detente and disarmament; (3) modernization TNF is necessary in light of the imbalance that has arisen in this area; (4) modernization TNF only to the point required by this imbalance; (5) every Soviet reduction of TNF weapons during or after the negotiations must be followed by reductions in the NATO program, both as concerns production and deployment. Linked to this the desire that it will turn out not to be necessary for NATO to move to deployment of TNF weapons and that NATO will be able to start immediate and courageous negotiations with the SU.
The acceptance of this motion by a large majority (380-220?) meant a major defeat for the communist party. The German SPD-congres has according to PC been a great influence on the course and outcome of this debate. He does not expect significant problems during the debate in the Senate, this coming Monday.
P.M. remarks that his political friends would barely allow him to congratulate the Italian government with the outcome of this debate. His mission in the European capitals and in Washington is a completely different one. Four weeks ago, the CDA has asked of the government that it make the effort to convince the allies that it would be better now to take a decision about the production, and only much later--for example 2 years--a decision about deployment. Back then, this was the view of all 49 CDA members of the Second Chamber. The government has in response declared itself willing to take this message to the allies, adding that, in case the allies are not receptive, a new situation will arise in which the government should reconsider its position. The past four weeks the following developments have occurred. From the allies no positive reaction to the decoupling idea was received initially. Last week, however, a suprising shift has come in the position of Denmark, which however only plays a minor role in this matter. More important is that in the past couple of days shifts are also occurring in the so far firm position of Belgium. One of the factors playing a role here undoubtedly is the influence of the P.v.d.A. on the Flemish socialists. The situation already is such that colleague Martens worries greatly over the conduct of the Flemish socialists in the coalition. In the Netherlands itself the situation gets worse by the day for those who 4 weeks ago were still in favor of decoupling. What is happening in the Netherlands has elements of a mass
psychotic development, fanned by the biggest part of press and tv which is tinted radically. This development washes like a wave over the cabinet and because it is irrational, it is incontrollable also. PM fears therefore that next week the Dutch cabinet will get into great difficulties, both within NATO and in The Hague. Given this situation, the Dutch government could take three positions:

(1) It could decide to agree with the decisions expressed in the IDD, including the high number of 572 warheads. This almost certainly means political suicide; the cabinet will be blown away. Result of that is (a) a political crisis (in itself not interesting to the allies), but also (b) not a yes from the Netherlands to NATO and (c) almost certainly a new Dutch cabinet that will distance itself far from NATO. The way things stand now it is not even certain that PM will get agreement for this position from the entire cabinet. In other words, if he tried to push this through, there is a good chance that even prior to December 12 a crisis will arise within the cabinet, which then will see the departure of the ministers originating in the ARP.

(2) The government could note a majority has grown in the Netherlands, including parliament, which does not allow it to consent to any kind of decision. The government accepts this in sadness as a fact of life, reports this to NATO and remains in power. But NATO is then confronted with a member state distancing itself from the alliance. The consequences of that could sooner or later spread to other allies.

(3) The government can try to find a position in between these first two options, enabling it (a) to survive, and (b) not to have to give NATO a full no. Put differently, a position that partially does, and partially does not accept the draft-decisions by NATO.

To be concrete, PM tries to reach a position--the cabinet is not yet aware of this, but he will give it his best effort--approximately consisting of the following: (1) some grumbling about the in Dutch eyes far too high number of 572 warheads. More than grumbling will not be necessary because NATO does not decide production. The US decides production and also pays for it. (2) The maximum PM perhaps can achieve is a "commitment to commit" in the following sense: the government expresses now that the Netherlands will accept GLCMs on its territory when at the end of 1981 it would have to conclude that the negotiations with the SU, opened in the meantime, have not produced satisfying results. The Netherlands will not answer this question on its own but in consultation with the allies. (3) Finally there will have to be a certain adjustment of the Dutch nuclear tasks already present. This is an issue of secondary importance about which minister Scholten is consulting with his fellow Defense ministers and which, it appears, will be brought to a solution.

PM realizes that this kind of position will signify a serious disappointment for the allies. Nonetheless, even with a position like this it is not yet certain that he will survive politically, although he does give himself a reasonable chance. He is, however, prepared to sacrifice his cabinet if this could yield any kind of advantage for NATO. The opposite unfortunately is the case.

PC asks if the Dutch cabinet will reserve such a position only for itself or plead that all of NATO follows this line.

PM has to continue until next Wednesday to represent with great conviction the message that all NATO countries should decide in this sense, in the interest of his political survival. He realizes, however, very well that this message will not be received. The latter position is therefore in fact that the Netherlands makes a reservation in regard to the
Dutch share of the GLCMs. During the conversation in Villa d'Este\(^1\) PM said that he could not imagine that the Netherlands would get in such a position because we are not a people that lets others carry the load while keeping its own hands clean. To his regret he was wrong in this.

PC points out that the Italian government has the ability to do anything within the limits of the position now approved by the parliament. PM should not expect a hardening toward the Netherlands from Italy. PC thinks it of great importance that the Netherlands does not get into a position where it actually becomes separate from NATO. If a price needs to be paid for that, Italy is willing to do so. The decoupling however is difficult to accept; PC has always been convinced that the SU is only willing to enter realistic negotiations if NATO takes a clear decision both on production and on deployment. The decoupling idea would seriously weaken the chance for real negotiations. PC does think it possible to accept this idea as a Dutch reservation, for two reasons: (1) the limited number of GLCMs assigned to the Netherlands; (2) de geographic position of the Netherlands. The guiding countries here are the FRG and Italy, because of their location and in connection with Austria's neutrality. In case of a conflict, this neutrality will be a formal matter. Not only because Austria itself would then abandon it; also because Italy would then be obligated to keep open the connection with the FRG via Austrian territory. In regard to the Tyrolian minority this will not cause problems; it is strongly anti-SU and more oriented toward the FRG than to Austria. The heart of the matter is the agreement between the FRG and Italy. PC has assured the Bundeskanzler that Italy will not leave the FRG to stand alone. This is not only in the interest of NATO, but of Europe as a whole. An isolated FRG would be obligated to a frightening rearmament or it would have to play the card of German reunification on the basis of neutrality. PC believes that after the acceptance of the IDD by the UK --this is certain-- , by Italy --90% certain-- and the FRG --also certain-- a Dutch reservation in the form of a *pactum de contiatendo* is acceptable. Such a reservation would have to go along with a clear statement that the Netherlands subscribes to NATO and the goal of the TNF-operation, acknowledging this way that given the superiority of the SU in the grey zone, NATO is compelled to restore the balance. In this way, NATO's negotiating strength would not significantly be affected by a Dutch reservation. To take this position, PC does need to be certain of the agreement of the Bundeskanzler. He will also seek confirmation from the US whether this is an acceptable reservation. PC's willingness, therefore, is conditional on the agreement of the FRG and the result of the soundings in the US. PC asks when the Dutch cabinet will decide.

PM considers this a crucial issue. He is determined to have this decision as late as possible, in any case not before next Monday evening. The later the Dutch cabinet decides, the smaller the risk that other governments experience negative consequences from it. Speaker will go to London today for a meeting with colleague Thatcher, and tomorrow to Washington, where at 11:45 am he will have a meeting with President Carter and others. If before that time colleague Cossiga were able to get in contact with the Americans, this would only be welcome.

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\(^1\) *Ruud van Dijk note: Van Agt-Cossiga meeting, October 13, 1979.*
The day before yesterday the PM has spoken with Prime-Minister Martens who wonders if it would not be helpful to organize a secret meeting this coming weekend between the heads of government of the five European countries directly involved with the TNF-modernization. PM has neither accepted, nor rejected this idea, but promised that he would raise this with PC and mrs. Thatcher.

PC cannot react to this immediately. Keeping such a meeting secret is extremely difficult. He also wonders how the US would react to this. PC will evaluate this idea further with his advisors and let PM know.

PM sees the same objections as PC. Such a meeting cannot be kept secret and will perhaps create suspicions with certain parliaments.

PC will have this examined further. Additionally, he will contact Bundeskanzler Schmidt about the Dutch approach, and the Americans, and also--if PM thinks this useful-- the Brits. PM considers the latter not without value, but the key lies primarily with the FRG and US.

There is agreement that PM and PC will keep in touch, directly by telephone or through their advisors Berliguer and Merckelbach.

9/12
handwritten memorandum of conversation

Archive of A.A.A.M. van Agt, box 41, TNF file, Catholic Documentation Centre,
University Nijmegen

translation from the Dutch by Ruud van Dijk

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**Very Secret**

Only copy

Report of the conversation between PM van Agt [MP] and PM Thatcher on Thursday
December 6 1979 in London in the presence of their advisers Merckelbach and
Alexander ...

MP explains that the situation in the Netherlands for NATO gets worse by the day.
Resistance against TNF modernization increases constantly. There is a mass psychotic
movement washing over the country like a wave. Even in the churches there is preaching
against TNF modernization. MP fears that the Dutch cabinet will not survive this
situation, which in itself is of no importance to PM.

PM does have a stake in this, not only because she has the same opinion on many matters
as MP, but especially because the fall of a cabinet over a NATO matter in whichever
country should be considered a serious matter.

MP remarks that in parliament there actually is a majority resisting any decision
whatsoever, only able to agree to a moratorium, that is to say, do nothing and ask the SU
also to do nothing any more, but to negotiate.

PM asks if this majority wants this regardless of what the SU does; so without quid pro
quo.

MP replies that one does not want an endless moratorium; some want it for 1 year, others
for 1/2 year, just like the Danes. In this situation the Dutch cabinet can choose between
three options: (1) accept what is on the table in Brussels. This is only an academic
possibility because it would mean political suicide for the cabinet. NATO then has a
negative reaction from the Netherlands and the next Dutch cabinet will undoubtedly
remove itself much further from NATO than where the current one is being forced to go.

(2) The next option is a position of resignation. The cabinet allows developments to take
their course and does not take a decision on the TNF proposals. In that case, the cabinet
can probably continue to exist, and it will let NATO know that one cannot even expect a
conditional yes from the Netherlands. For NATO this would be an extremely negative
thing; after all, it means the first phase of the Dutch isolation within the alliance. It goes
without saying that speaker is not interested in this solution.

(3) The only option open to the cabinet then is to find a position between these two extremes. The maximum MP
thinks he can reach -- this option has not yet been discussed in the cabinet -- is that the
Netherlands at this time does not agree to the deployment of 48 GLCMs on its territory,
but commits -- "commitment to commit" -- itself to accept GLCMs on its territory in 2
years if at that point it concludes that the negotiations with the SU have not yielded any
concrete results. The Netherlands could only draw the latter conclusion in consultation
with the allies. In light of the fact that many objections have arisen in the Netherlands to
the size of the intended TNF-modernization, the Dutch delegation to the special meeting
next Wednesday will at least have to make some verbal objections. The third element in
this compromise solution is that the Netherlands, accepting a number of GLCMs on its
territory, should be able to drop a number of the current nuclear tasks. About this,
discussions are already taking place between the Defense ministers involved which most
probably will lead to agreement.
MP hopes to find understanding for the difficult position in which the Dutch cabinet finds
itself in spite of his efforts. He is convinced that a firm yes to the NATO proposals, no
matter how heroic, will have no advantage whatsoever but only disadvantages for NATO.
PM asks how the population has come to this attitude and how the more right-wing
parties, like the VVD, which is to her right, position themselves.
MP replies that the VVD wants to accept the NATO proposals unconditionally, just like
the other right-wing parties. This, however, is no help because the cabinet only has a
majority of two seats and will only be able to do without 5 to 7 of the 49 CDA votes. The
CDA is hopelessly divided over this issue.
PM asks if the CDA will remain divided if the government asks for a vote of confidence.
In the UK this is an adequate means to get a rejected proposal through Parliament.
MP replies that a separate vote of confidence is not customary in the Netherlands. The
election over for example the TNF issue counts as a vote of confidence if the government ties
its fate to it. How a large part of the population has come to this view has several
explanations. A deep dislike of everything connected with nuclear energy is growing,
also peaceful applications. This dislike now focuses on TNF-modernization also because
the government here actually has something to decide. The young have no memory any
more of the war; often they do not see why one should object to the Russians. The Dutch
people is a people of theologians, some more so, others less. This also means the
Dutchman is a super individualist; each has his own conscience that is decisive, everyone
reads the Bible and has his own interpretation. MP next points out that since 1977 a
minority of the CDA has been against the current center-right coalition and always has
looked forward to a good opportunity to replace it with a center-left one. This minority
now sees its chance.
PM asks if those who now rail against TNF-modernization never think about the threat
represented by the SS-20 if there was no response from NATO.
MP replies that many of them would prefer a Russian occupation over destruction.
PM remarks that those who prefer being red over being dead ignore the many who are
both red and dead. For many of her generation there is no doubt that Hitler could have
been stopped by timely action. In that case there probably would not have been a world
war with all its horrors. The idea that one could avoid destruction by not resisting is
belied by countless examples from history. The Dutch who think this way, do they also
not want to be defended by the other NATO members. Furthermore, PM does not
understand that people who think so individualistically risk the right to determine their
own fate.
MP points out that one should nonetheless distinguish between several groups. Those
who are principled nuclear pacifists; those who feel safe underneath the American
nuclear umbrella and therefore fail to see why the Netherlands should station nuclear
weapons on its territory, and those who think society so rotten that it does not deserve to
be defended.
PM hopes that the compromise-solution now represented by MP will turn out to be feasible. She assumes that at least the Dutch cabinet has no objection that NATO defends the Netherlands and thus has no objection that NATO modernizes while the Netherlands will decide about its share later, depending on what the SU does. She wonders if the public information of the population cannot be improved. On English TV these days images of Russian tanks pulling back from East Germany were accompanied by commentary stating that this was a psychological trick to keep NATO from modernizing TNF. At the close of this broadcast it was show with the help of a map how the SS-20s cover all of Europe while the old NATO TNF cannot even reach the Russian border. This kind of presentations are convincing, without any commentary.

MP points out that public opinion in the Netherlands is manipulated in a high degree, not so much by the written press as by TV. The government only has access to very limited broadcasting time. MP furthermore points out that after the debate in parliament of November 7, the Dutch cabinet has had to take on the task of convincing the allies that NATO at this time should only decide on production, and not deployment of the new TNF-systems. Next, negotiations with the SU should be brought underway in order to judge in 2 years whether, in light of the course of these negotiations, there should be a decision to deploy after all.

PM remarks that one really cannot expect from the US that it will produce new TNF-systems without knowing whether and where these can be deployed. She believes that where possible the allies should follow one line; otherwise the entire TNF-discussion ends in a victory for the SU. As far as she is concerned MP can tell parliament and the press that the UK sees nothing in the decoupling idea and is willing to defend the Netherlands if it does not object to that.

9/12
Pres. Carter has kept himself up-to-date as much as possible on the developments in the Netherlands. The US-government is determined too to achieve further arms control and arms reduction in Europe, both nuclear and conventional. This objective requires that the allies form one front in regard to TNF-modernization and related proposals for negotiations. Only then will the SU agree to realistic negotiations. The US-government aimst to seize or create every opportunity for negotiations. One of the first tasks facing speaker is to get SALT-II accepted by the Senate. Also for that it is important that the unity of NATO in regard to the TNF-matter is maintained. The Dutch difficulties with this are known to speaker but he is fully determined to go through with TNF-modernization because otherwise negotiations with the SU will not yield any concrete results. He is fully convinced that the SU will not move to reductions in the SS-20 program if NATO does not reach a joint position in regard to TNF-modernization and the related proposals for talks.

MP Van Agt points out that the Second Chamber has held the latest debate yesterday on the TNF-matter; this will not be the final debate. The outcome of this debate is far from favorable for the government or NATO. The chamber has accepted a motion that in essence says that presently no decision on production or deployment should be taken. In the given situation three options are available to the Dutch government: (1) It can bow its head and recognize that there is a majority ruling from parliament against the production and deployment proposals. The government, however, is not prepared to accept this ruling automatically as a fact of life. (2) On the other hand there is the -- theoretical -- option to ignore parliament's stipulation and to say yes to all of the proposals of the IDD. This would mean political suicide, which in itself does not have to be relevant for the US government, but which will as such have severeral negative effects for NATO. In the first place it is a bad thing under all circumstances if a government fell because of a NATO-matter. Next it is highly probable that after the fall of this cabinet a new cabinet will come that will distance itself from NATO. (3) A third option is -- and it [is] highly preferable for NATO -- that an in-between position is found between the two extremes just described. Together with the ministers of foreign affairs and defense -- the other ministers have not yet been fully involved with the preparation of the decision -- speaker envisions a "commitment to commit" in the sense that this coming Wednesday the Netherlands declares itself willing to decide in 2 years -- this period is not set in stone -- about deployment of GLCMs in the Netherlands if the Dutch cabinet would come to the
At that point, this conclusion would not be drawn by the Dutch government alone, but in consultation with the NATO allies.

Min. v.d. Klaauw specifies that in this construction the Dutch government is not bound to decide at that time, but will have to take a decision about deployment.

MP Van Agt says that in any case a new decision will have to be taken at that time. In consultation with the allies the Dutch cabinet will then have to make a judgment on the results of the negotiations with the SU and decide about deployment. Pres. Carter is aware that the Netherlands also has problems with the size of the modernization program of 572 warheads. Following the correspondence on this subject speaker nonetheless feels compelled to raise this here again.

Pres. Carter asks who exactly, after the indicated time period, would have to judge if the negotiations at that point have been adequate.

MP Van Agt replies that legally this will be a national decision, but that it will be taken in consultation with the allies. The Netherlands cannot give up part of its sovereignty. The position now to be taken does make it extremely difficult for the cabinet in power then to reach a conclusion that deviates from that of the allies.

Brzezinski asks if this position means that next Wednesday the Netherlands will not oppose NATO's plans but only delay its own decision.

MP Van Agt replies in the affirmative but adds that the Netherlands will still mount some verbal resistance to the size of the proposed modernization program.

Brzezinski believes that expressing an opinion on the size of the program does not correspond with the delay of one's own decision.

Pres. Carter agrees. Otherwise this would place the other allies in a difficult position. The US will negotiate on behalf of the allies, looking for success. This success will be more difficult to achieve if the Netherlands appears not to be involved with these negotiations by distancing itself -- temporarily -- from NATO's decision. Speaker asks if it can be useful to the Dutch cabinet if the US government confirmed once again in a letter -- for publication -- its commitment to arms control and arms reduction in Europe.

MP Van Agt points out that the in-between position he has outlined goes further than the decision of parliament, which has categorically rejected a production or deployment decision at this time.

Brzezinski asks if it is not possible for the Dutch government just to announce that it wants to postpone its decision in light of the decision by parliament. The SU initially said that in case of a modernization decision by NATO it no longer wishes to negotiate. In the meantime it has become clear that even in that case the SU is willing to open negotiations. This willingness could again be undermined if certain allies cause confusion. The Netherlands should not contribute to that by making critical comments about the modernization program and its size.

Pres. Carter asks if the Dutch government is sufficiently informed about SS-20 deployment.

Aaron replies to this in the affirmative, but this week two more new SS-20 sites have been discovered, bringing the number of SS-20 warheads to 675. This exceeds the proposed NATO program.

Pres. Carter asks to whom the suggested letter should be addressed, perhaps to parliament.
Min. Vance believes that the Netherlands, wanting to postpone its own decision, should refrain from undermining the decision of the other allies.

MP Van Agt would like to point out, without trying to make excuses, that in no other NATO-country there is such an intensive and widespread debate about this matter.

Min. v.d. Klaauw wonders if the letter suggested by pres. Carter could not be counterproductive. The Dutch parliament might feel pressured by this. Speaker will consider this suggestion further and report the outcome via ambassador Tammenoms Bakker.

Pres. Carter confirms again the willingness of the US to take advantage of all opportunities for mutual reduction in the nuclear arsenal. Essential for this is that the SU knows that NATO is determined, and for that a united NATO front is of the utmost importance. He wishes the Dutch government otherwise the best of luck.
Report of the discussion between Min. Vance and Brzezinski and MP Van Agt and Min. Van der Klaauw on Friday, December 7 1979 in Washington in the presence of Aaron, Bartholome, Tammenoms Bakker and Merckelbach

MP Van Agt has understood from the preceding conversation with pres. Carter that the US-government would like to see that the Netherlands, if it wants to postpone its own decision for 2 years, does not make any further criticism of the character and the size of the TNF-modernization program. 

Min. Vance indeed believes that the Netherlands should limit itself to its "commitment to commit" without further commentary on the proposed program. 

Brzezinski argues that it is not the character and size of the program, but the attitude of parliament that is the reason for the position the Dutch government believes it needs to take.

MP Van Agt understands this reaction but points out that parliament no doubt will ask to what number of GLCMs the "commitment to commit" refers; 48 or fewer. 

Min. Vance believes that this point can be left open. After 2 years the Dutch government could also decide on the number of GLCMs to be deployed.

Aaron points out that 5 countries are involved in the deployment plan, which is what production is geared toward. Given the position of the Netherlands, speaker sees two possibilities: the Netherlands can be removed from the IDD, or the Dutch share in the deployment can be left open to be determined in 2 years. 

Min. v.d. Klaauw remarks that Aaron asks less of the Netherlands than it is willing to do. The Netherlands could subscribe to the IDD, but delay the decision on deployment of GLCMs on Dutch territory. Speaker would want to formulate the following: the Dutch parliament asks the government not to take a decision now (a word v.d. Stoel entered into the motion); in other words, later this would be possible. If the government were to follow to the letter the motion accepted by parliament, it will have problems with one of the members of the coalition, the VVD, which has always been prepared to subscribe fully to the IDD.

Aaron says that there can be no doubt that the US rather sees the Netherlands mentioned in the program. 

Bartholome asks if the Dutch statement regarding delay of the decision to deploy in the Netherlands will be made separately or has to be included with the document itself. 

Min. v.d. Klaauw believes the Dutch contribution should continue to be mentioned in the document.

Aaron takes it that the Netherlands therefore wants to remain in the documents with the aforementioned reservation in regard to the deployment in the Netherlands.
Min. v.d. Klaauw needs this for his own party, the VVD. MP van Agt points out that there is much pressure on the Dutch government to make a clear conditional connection between the decisions of this coming Wednesday and the ratification of SALT II. Speaker is aware of how sensitive this is in the American Senate, but this is such a dogma for many Dutch that the government cannot ignore it. The question is how this condition can be mentioned in the Dutch declaration with as little damage as possible for the handling of SALT II in the Senate. Min. v.d. Klaauw believes that the Netherlands could declare to expect that SALT II will be ratified in 2 years. MP van Agt sees besides that the possibility to state that the Dutch decision will be taken 1 year after the ratification of SALT II. Bartholome says that this would help the TNF-modernization but not the handling of SALT II in the Senate. Min. Vance adds that a number of senators sees the TNF-modernization as an impermissible means to win them over for SALT II. On them the second alternative, mentioned by the MP, would have a counterproductive effect. Brzezinski believes that any conditional connection between TNF-modernization and the ratification of SALT II a bad thing. The US-government wants to achieve both; that is why the first alternative is the best. Speaker furthermore points out that the Belgian government too has gotten into difficulties because of the developments in the Netherlands. Against that background the US-government can accept that the Dutch government postpones its decision for 2 years, but it must then remain in the document and make no further criticism of the TNF-modernization program. Min. Vance will underline extra the importance of a rapid ratification of SALT II in his press conference in Brussels. Min. v.d. Klaauw would prefer to state in the Dutch declaration that the Netherlands will take a decision at the December 1981 meeting, instead of in 2 years. In that case it neither has to criticize the size of the program nor make a reservation with regard to the ratification of SALT II. Brzezinski believes that especially the reason for the Dutch delay -- the decision of parliament -- needs to be stated clearly. Speaker asks if the formulation will be "after or within 2 years." MP Van Agt prefers "no later than 2 years." Bartholome proposes "in December 1981." Aaron asks whether it would also be acceptable to leave the communique unchanged and have the Secretary-General explain the Dutch position separately to the press. Min. v.d. Klaauw thinks this less practical because the Netherlands would then still be associated with all proposals. How the passages in the IDD and the communique, where countries are mentioned by name, have to be adjusted to the Dutch position would have to be considered further in Brussels. Brzezinski again points to the possible reactions in Belgium, especially in response to the developments in the Netherlands. MP Van Agt wants, in that light, to delay the decision by the Dutch cabinet as long as possible. Thanks to this visit to the US it has become possible for speaker to have the discussion in the council of ministers in any case only after the weekend. This is now envisioned for Monday evening or Tuesday.
Aaron has understood from premier Martens that he has agreed with MP Van Agt to take the decision at the same time.
MP Van Agt confirms this, but can imagine that, if the situation in Belgium develops favorably, it would be better for the Belgian cabinet to decide earlier.
Aaron asks if one envisions another debate in parliament before Wednesday.
Min. v.d. Klaauw believes it important also for this reason to have the cabinet's decision at the very latest moment.
MP Van Agt asks in connection with the preparations for the debate in parliament following the decision, how the government could best respond to questions about the relationship between the TNF-modernization and option 3 in the MBFR.
Aaron believes that the US has to follow through on its offer unilaterally to withdraw 1000 warheads from Europe now that the SU too is willing to withdraw 1000 tanks. In addition, the entire specter of TNF on both sides should be available for negotiations. This is why it is not wise once more to refer to the initial nuclear offer in option 3.
Bartholome points out that an explanatory note has been drafted in the interest of the public discussion of these issues.
Min. v.d. Klaauw has understood before that option 3 is dead. He does think it of great importance that there will be new proposals quickly for the second phase of MBFR.
Aaron says that these proposals already are being dealt with in the "silent procedure."
MP Van Agt asks the view of the US-government on the proposals of Min. Scholten regarding the reduction of the current nuclear tasks of the Dutch military, which he has discussed also with Min. Vance and Aaron. Some aspects have not yet been resolved.
Min. Vance replies this can always be discussed.
Bartholome points out that so far the US has responded to these proposals in the context of a Dutch participation in the TNF-modernization.
Aaron remarks that the US, also separately from the TNF-issue, has little difficulty with the proposals of Min. Scholten. Only the timing of the implementation of some of them needs to be looked at further. Speaker next makes several suggestions for the presentation of the current discussions to the press, to which the Dutch officials agree.
MP Van Agt finally remarks that he and Min. Van der Klaauw have tried to give a view of the approach they will present to the Dutch cabinet. The remarks made by the US-side will be integrated with that. The US-goverment should however be aware that it is not 100% certain that the entire cabinet will agree to this approach. The first risk speaker runs prior to next Wednesday is a permanent difference of opinion within the cabinet. Next there is the risk of a rejection by parliament of the position the Dutch cabinet will take next Wednesday in Brussels. In that case speaker will consider himself obligated out of solidarity with the allies to force a vote of confidence. However, it is by no means certain then either that the cabinet will be able to survive.
Draft conclusions from the discussions in Washington on December 7, 1979

From the Dutch side, the following has been put forward:

The Dutch government declares itself willing to decide in December 1981 to deploy GLCMs on Dutch territory, if the Dutch government at that time would, in consultation with the allies, come to the conclusion that the disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union have yielded no or insufficient results. This position means that next Wednesday, the Netherlands will not oppose NATO’s plans, but only postpone its own decision. The Dutch side will still express some reservations about the scope of the TNF modernization program and once again underline the connection between this program and the ratification of SALT II. Finally the Dutch side will once again emphasize the urgency of reducing the current number of nuclear tasks of the Dutch military, an issue where a large measure of agreement has been reached between the defense ministers involved.

From the American side, the following response has been made:

If, because of the position the Second Chamber has taken, the Dutch government feels compelled to postpone the decision for two years, it should limit itself to this announcement and refrain from any further commentary on the nature and the scope of the TNF-modernization program. The US in this case will assume that the number of GLCMs possibly to be stationed in the Netherlands will also remain open for the time being. A reference to the relationship between TNF and Salt II ratification is then also considered superfluous, and for the US even undesirable. The Dutch proposals regarding the cancellation of certain nuclear tasks are acceptable in principle for the US, also separate from the position taken by the Netherlands in the matter of TNF-modernization.

The Dutch position will be mentioned in the communique of the special session of this coming Wednesday, Dec. 12.

1 By Van Agt’s top adviser, J. P. M. H. Merckelbach.
2 See Documents 11 and 12.
Very Secret

MP
Me²
concerns Major points from the discussions in Brussels, Rome, London, Washington, Bonn

Brussels 4-12-'79³
- Provisional Belgian view: paired decision⁴ but postpone its implementation by 6 months.
- In agreement with provisional Dutch approach: stay as closely as possible to IDD, but nuanced.
- Watch out for negative mutual influence. Therefore Neth. and Belgium decide as late as possible and simultaneously. MP’s keep in constant contact.

Rome 6-12-'79⁵
- Italian view: in accordance with IDD (90% certain: Senate still needs to decide)
- Reactions to provisional Dutch position:
  * Provided FRG agrees, should not expect any cooling from Italy toward Neth.
  * Willing to pay price to prevent Dutch distancing from NATO.
  * Decoupling of NATO decision not acceptable.
  * Neth. reservation regarding deployment acceptable (provided also for FRG).
- Italy wil plead our case with FRG and US.

London 6-12-'79⁶
- English [sic] view: entirely in accordance with IDD
- Reactions to provisional Dutch position:
  * If NATO can modernize, no objection against later decision on Dutch share depending on what SU does.
  * Decoupling of NATO decision unacceptable.
  * NATO one line as much as possible, otherwise victory for Moscow.
- Presentation Dutch policy can probably be improved
- Willing to defend Neth. if it is not capable to do so itself.
- Entire detailed critique (by Carrington et al) wiped off the table by Thatcher: the Dutch cabinet must survive this crisis!

¹ By Van Agt’s top adviser, J. P. M. H. Merckelbach. No date.
² MP: Prime Minister; Me: J.P.M.H. Merckelbach, top adviser prime minister.
³ See document 8.
⁴ A reference to the two tracks of the NATO decision: deployment and arms control.
⁵ See document 9.
⁶ See document 10.
Washington 7-12-'79²
If Neth. govt., because of the position of the 2nd Chamber, feels compelled to postpone its decision until Dec. ’81, it should make no further commentary on the nature and the scope of the LRTNF modernization program.
- US assumes that the number of GLCMs possibly to be deployed in Neth. will also remain open for the time being.
- Reference to the relationship between LRTNF and Salt II is, in light of Dutch position, superfluous and for US undesirable.
- Dutch proposals regarding cancellation of current nuclear tasks⁸ are in principle acceptable for US, also separate from Neth. position regarding LRTNF. A few problems with the timing are solvable.
- Reconfirmation full commitment US govt. to disarmament in Europe, both nuclear and conventional.

Bonn 10-12-'79²
- FRG view: in accordance with IDD. One line with US, without wanting to continue as US vanguard in Europe.
- Neth. cannot and should not block decisionmaking in NATO.
- No objection to Dutch reservation: deployment decision in Dec. ’81 depending on periodic NATO evaluations (not reappraisal¹⁰!) of the state of the disarmament talks.
- Cancellation current nuclear tasks to be shelved for 2 years.
- FRG does not criticize Dutch position.
- Belgians better, if necessary, make the same reservation as Neth., (at least not a reservation that mentions a 6 month period).
- Danes had better speak last. Their reservation should be buried somewhere in the record.

⁸ Reference to Dutch desire to cancel certain, but not all, nuclear tasks performed by its military.
⁹ No memorandum of conversation found in the TNF file of the Van Agt papers.
¹⁰ In English.
“The decision regarding the modernization of NATO’s intermediate nuclear weapons should be made conditional on the following specifications (qualifications):

1) It should be possible at all times to change or cancel (annuler) the implementation of this decision in response to the progress of the negotiations with the USSR, with the aim to ensure and stabilize the military balance at a level as low as possible. For this reason, no automatic development can be accepted here.

2) NATO’s new intermediate-range weapons have to be developed by the United States under its own responsibility.

3) The implementation of the modernization decision for NATO’s intermediate-range nuclear weapons is being interrupted for a period of 6 months, as far as implementation measures in Europe are concerned.

4) Even after this time period the decision will only be implemented on the abrogating condition that implementation will not take place if the arms control negotiations in this area lead to satisfactory results.

5) At its ministerial meeting in May 1980, NATO will evaluate the state of the Soviet Union’s deployment of intermediate range nuclear weapons and the progress of the negotiations with the aim of achieving mutual arms reduction at a level as low as possible.

6) Based on this evaluation NATO will if necessary (en cas d’écheance) adjust or cancel (annuler) its own program specifically with regard to measures to be implemented on European territory, with the aim to create and stabilize a balance between East and West in this area at a level as low as possible.

7) At every six-month ministerial meeting of NATO there will be an investigation of the state of the negotiations with the USSR, and based on this relevant decisions will be taken immediately regarding the implementation of the decision to modernize NATO’s intermediate-range nuclear weapons.

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1 By Van Agt’s top adviser, J. P. M. H. Merckelbach. Not dated.
2 Initially: 10-12-'79, but 10 changed into 11 (i.e. December 11, 1979). There is no indication of how the Dutch prime minister’s office obtained this information.
3 In spite of this opening quotation mark, there is no closing equivalent in the document.
4 In French.
Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers

(The "Double-Track" Decision on Theatre Nuclear Forces)

Chairman: Mr. J. Luns

Quantitative and qualitative improvements to Soviet long range nuclear capability
- Modernization and expansion of Soviet TNF - Parallel courses of TNF modernization and arms control - European deployment of US ground-launched systems - Withdrawal of 100

1. At a special meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers in Brussels on 12th December 1979:
2. Ministers recalled the May 1978 Summit where governments expressed the political resolve to meet the challenges to their security posed by the continuing momentum of the Warsaw Pact military build-up.
3. The Warsaw Pact has over the years developed a large and growing capability in nuclear systems that directly threaten Western Europe and have a strategic significance for the Alliance in Europe. This situation has been especially aggravated over the last few years by Soviet decisions to implement programmes modernizing and expanding their long-range nuclear capability substantially. In particular, they have deployed the SS-20 missile, which offers significant improvements over previous systems in providing greater accuracy, more mobility, and greater range, as well as having multiple warheads, and the Backfire bomber, which has a much better performance than other Soviet aircraft deployed hitherto in a theatre role. During this period, while the Soviet Union has been reinforcing its superiority in Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) both quantitatively and qualitatively, Western LRTNF capabilities have remained static. Indeed these forces are increasing in age and vulnerability and do not include land-based, long-range theatre nuclear missile systems.
4. At the same time, the Soviets have also undertaken a modernization and expansion of their shorter-range TNF and greatly improved the overall quality of their conventional forces. These developments took place against the background of increasing Soviet inter-continental capabilities and achievement of parity in inter-continental capability with the United States.
5. These trends have prompted serious concern within the Alliance, because, if they were to continue, Soviet superiority in theatre nuclear systems could undermine the stability achieved in inter-continental systems and cast doubt on the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent strategy by
highlighting the gap in the spectrum of NATO's available nuclear response to aggression.

6. Ministers noted that these recent developments require concrete actions on the part of the Alliance if NATO's strategy of flexible response is to remain credible. After intensive consideration, including the merits of alternative approaches, and after taking note of the positions of certain members, Ministers concluded that the overall interest of the Alliance would best be served by pursuing two parallel and complementary approaches of TNF modernization and arms control.

7. Accordingly Ministers have decided to modernize NATO's LRTNF by the deployment in Europe of US ground-launched systems comprising 108 Pershing II launchers, which would replace existing US Pershing I-A, and 464 Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM), all with single warheads. All the nations currently participating in the integrated defence structure will participate in the programme: the missiles will be stationed in selected countries and certain support costs will be met through NATO's existing common funding arrangements. The programme will not increase NATO's reliance upon nuclear weapons. In this connection, Ministers agreed that as an integral part of TNF modernization, 1,000 US nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from Europe as soon as feasible. Further, Ministers decided that the 572 LRTNF warheads should be accommodated within that reduced level, which necessarily implies a numerical shift of emphasis away from warheads for delivery systems of other types and shorter ranges. In addition they noted with satisfaction that the Nuclear Planning Group is undertaking an examination of the precise nature, scope and basis of the adjustments resulting from the LRTNF deployment and their possible implications for the balance of roles and systems in NATO's nuclear armoury as a whole. This examination will form the basis of a substantive report to NPG Ministers in the Autumn of 1980.

8. Ministers attach great importance to the role of arms control in contributing to a more stable military relationship between East and West and in advancing the process of detente. This is reflected in a broad set of initiatives being examined within the Alliance to further the course of arms control and detente in the 1980s. Ministers regard arms control as an integral part of the Alliance's efforts to assure the undiminished security of its member States and to make the strategic situation between East and West more stable, more predictable, and more manageable at lower levels of armaments on both sides. In this regard they welcome the contribution which the SALT II Treaty makes towards achieving these objectives.

9. Ministers consider that, building on this accomplishment and taking account of the expansion of Soviet LRTNF capabilities of concern to NATO, arms control efforts to achieve a more stable overall nuclear balance at lower levels of nuclear weapons on both sides should therefore now include certain US and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems. This would reflect previous Western suggestions to include such Soviet and US systems in arms control negotiations and more recent expressions
by Soviet President Brezhnev of willingness to do so. Ministers fully support the decision taken by the United States following consultations within the Alliance to negotiate arms limitations on LRTNF and to propose to the USSR to begin negotiations as soon as possible along the following lines which have been elaborated in intensive consultations within the Alliance:

A. Any future limitations on US systems principally designed for theatre missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theatre systems.

B. Limitations on US and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems should be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT III framework in a step-by-step approach.

C. The immediate objective of these negotiations should be the establishment of agreed limitations on US and Soviet land-based long-range theatre nuclear missile systems.

D. Any agreed limitations on these systems must be consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. Therefore, the limitations should take the form of de jure equality both in ceilings and in rights.

E. Any agreed limitations must be adequately verifiable.

10. Given the special importance of these negotiations for the overall security of the Alliance, a special consultative body at a high level will be constituted within the Alliance to support the US negotiating effort. This body will follow the negotiations on a continuous basis and report to the Foreign and Defence Ministers who will examine developments in these negotiations as well as in other arms control negotiations at their semi-annual meetings.

11. The Ministers have decided to pursue these two parallel and complementary approaches in order to avert an arms race in Europe caused by the Soviet TNF build-up, yet preserve the viability of NATO's strategy of deterrence and defence and thus maintain the security of its member States.

A. A modernization decision, including a commitment to deployments, is necessary to meet NATO's deterrence and defence needs, to provide a credible response to unilateral Soviet TNF deployments, and to provide the foundation for the pursuit of serious negotiations on TNF.

B. Success of arms control in constraining the Soviet build-up can enhance Alliance security, modify the scale of NATO's TNF requirements, and promote stability and detente in Europe in consonance with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defence and detente as enunciated in the Harmel Report. NATO's TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results reached through negotiations.

1. France did not participate in the Special Meeting
19. Dezember 1979

An den
Präsidenten der sozialistischen
Republik Rumänien
Herrn Nicolae Ceaucescu
- Büro des Präsidenten -
Bukarest / Rumänien

Sehr geehrter Herr Präsident,

für die mir übermittelten freundlichen Wünsche und Grüße danke ich Ihnen sehr und möchte Ihnen meinen Glückwunsch zu Ihrer Wiederwahl als Generalsekretär der Kommunistischen Partei Rumäniens übermitteln.

Gerne erinnere ich mich an unsere interessanten und fruchtbaren Gespräche bei meinem Besuch in Ihrem Land im Sommer des vergangenen Jahres.

Seither sind in einer Reihe von Fragen, die wir damals erörtert haben, Entwicklungen eingetreten, zu denen ich bei dieser Gelegenheit gern einige Bemerkungen machen möchte.


Ich nehme an, daß Sie über den Verlauf des Parteitages der SPD Anfang Dezember in Berlin unterrichtet worden sind. Die deutschen Sozialdemokraten haben im Bereich der Entspannung und der Zusammenarbeit, aufbauend auf der amtlichen Politik, neue und weiterführende Überlegungen entwickelt. Letzte Woche haben nun die zuständigen Gremien des westlichen Bündnissystems die seit langem vorbereiteten Entschlüsse gefaßt.

.../2
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Wie Sie sicher wissen, werden dadurch für drei, wahrscheinlich mehr als drei Jahre noch keine neuen Waffen stationiert. Es ist also Zeit für Verhandlungen, und diese Zeit gilt es zu nutzen.


Ergänzt werden müßten diese Verhandlungen nach unserer Einschätzung durch ein erstes Zwischenergebnis der Wiener Verhandlungen über Truppenbegrenzungen - wozu wir Vorschläge eingebracht haben - und durch die Verabredung zusätzlicher vertrauensbildender Maßnahmen im Rahmen des KSZE-Prozesses.

Ihre Bedenken hinsichtlich einer Verschärfung der Entwicklung in Teilen des Nahen Ostens teile ich. Mit besonderer Sorge betrachten wir die Entwicklungen im Iran, die nicht nur die USA betreffen, sondern weitreichende Konsequenzen für West und Ost haben können.

Was den Meinungsaustausch zwischen unseren beiden Parteien betrifft, an den Sie unseren Beobachter auf Ihrem Parteitag erinnert haben, so glaube ich, daß wir - und hierbei beziehe ich mich auch auf unsere seinerzeitigen Überlegungen in Bukarest - Formen finden sollten und könnten, die es ermöglichen, sich gegenseitig zu informieren und Themen von beiderseitigem Interesse angemessen zu erörtern.

Ich nehme die Gelegenheit wahr, um Ihnen auf diesem Wege meine guten Wünsche für Sie persönlich und für Ihr Land zu übermitteln und verbleibe

mit freundlichen Empfehlungen

gez. Willy Brandt