The conflict between herders (nomadic and semi-nomadic Fulani pastoralists) and farmers (non-Fulani agrarian communities) has routinely occurred in many African countries for over a century. It has taken more lives than terrorism in Africa and poses a great challenge to human safety and food security.

Herder-farmer conflicts in South East Nigeria, one of the country’s six geopolitical zones and the geographic focus of this paper, are a relatively new phenomenon. Other regions of Nigeria have been harder hit in recent years. However, as outlined below, the problem in South East is set to worsen in the absence of effective government action at all levels. If left to deteriorate, a cascade of negative consequences will follow on the region’s food security, the delicate Christian-Muslim cleavages, and issues related to the legacy of the Nigeria-Biafra Civil War, not least rising secessionism sentiment and the perceived marginalization of South East in the Federal Republic.

Background

Nigeria has over 84 million hectares of arable land. About 40 percent is cultivated, representing over 34 million hectares. Of that, 6.5 million hectares are for permanent crops, and 28.6 million hectares are for...
meadows and pastures.\textsuperscript{2} When conflicts over land arise, the state is virtually absent. Fulani migrants are often taken aback that they are refused access to land in the territories they find themselves in, partly because the conventions of land ownership differ across Nigeria, based on community, ethnic groups, or kin. The confusing, flawed, and mostly ineffective Land Use Act, enacted in Nigeria in 1978, vested all lands in a State to its governor. Custody, control, appropriation, and management are in his or her remit, but there is no effective, overarching system in practice.

The Fulani people are one of the largest ethnic groups in the Sahel and West Africa. Widely dispersed across the region, there are three types of Fulani, differentiated based on their settlement patterns: the nomadic-pastoral or Mbororo; the semi-nomadic; and the settled or “town” Fulani. Out of an estimated total population of 25 million, approximately half are nomadic or semi-nomadic herders of cattle, goats, and sheep who travel across large areas of West Africa to provide grazing land for their livestock.\textsuperscript{3} Fulani livestock sometimes trample on and damage crops planted by farmers, who in turn insist on payment for the damages. Compensation can sometimes settle the rift, but not always. Disputes between herders and farmers generally stem from two contrasting agricultural practices: rearing and maintaining free-range livestock, on one hand, and crop farming on the other. The competition for land resources between the two can rapidly escalate into violent conflict, as is well documented across West Africa.

Failures on both sides to accept responsibility for any misconduct can lead to cyclical violence. Peaceful coexistence between herders and farmers becomes more difficult to obtain where the state is absent or dysfunctional. Within Nigeria, about 70 percent of households that participate in crop farming and roughly 41 percent that own or raise livestock.\textsuperscript{4} The population of the Fulani in Nigeria is about 13 million, representing 6 percent of the country’s population.\textsuperscript{5} The nomadic Muslim Fulani make up about 90 percent of Nigeria’s pastoralists. At the same time, most farmers are Christians of various ethnicities and denominations.\textsuperscript{6} With such a significant proportion of crop farmers affected by herder-farmer issues, the knock-on effect on food production and supply represents a grave threat to human security overall in Nigeria. This is especially acute where the conflict has displaced local farmers, who can no longer access their lands due to persistent insecurity.

In several parts of Nigeria, herder-farmer disputes frequently result in loss of lives, destruction of farms and farm produce, and displacement of local communities and farm settlements. The Middle Belt (North Central), particularly Benue, Taraba, Nasarawa, Plateau, and Niger states, are especially prone. The states in Southwest and South-south, including the North East and North West zones are also affected. In Nigeria’s South East states, the impacts of herder-farmer conflicts are widening. Farm settlements and food hubs in the five states like Adani, Nimbo, Eha-Amufu, Ugbawka, Oduma, Nde-Abbor, and Aawgu in Enugu State; Izzi, Ikwo, Ezza, Ezillo, and Egedegede in Ebonyi State; Igbariam, Ebenebe, Ogbu, Umulum, Omor and Obainam in Anamba State; Ohaji-Egbema in Imo State, and Isuch-Umunochi, Ngwa, Oboro, Ibere and Ariam in Abia State are the epicenters of these herder-farmer conflicts. These communities and farm settlements cultivate rice, yam, cassava, and other crops and cereals in commercial quantities.
Data from NexTier SPD Violent Conflict Database shows that from September 2020 to September 2021, farmer-herder conflicts occurred 71 times, accounting for 406 deaths, 49 injured, and 15 kidnapped people. Except for one death, all the victims were civilians. The North-Central region remains the hotbed for farmer-herder conflicts (in terms of incidents), while the North-West is the most violent in terms of casualties per incident. The North-Central region recorded 58 percent of the incidents and accounted for 61 percent of the casualties. At the same time, the South-West region recorded the second-highest number of incidents (25 percent of the total), only 12 percent of the deaths. The North-West region, on the other hand, recorded 4 percent of the incidents but 15 percent of the deaths. These proportions hold even when comparing all the victims (death, injured, and kidnapped) to the total number of incidents. It is worthy of note that although the South East recorded 6 percent of the incidents, it accounted for 9 percent of the deaths. The South-South had 6 percent of the incidents but only 3 percent of the casualties.

Between 2016 and June 2022, the conflict directly resulted in more than 150 deaths of herders and farmers in the South East. It has also claimed large numbers of injured or missing. Thousands have been displaced—with countless properties burnt and crop farms destroyed. Precise figures are, however, hard to come by; often, casualties are either not reported or under-reported in the main media outlets due to fears that they might spark reprisal attacks in other areas. For their part, herders and farmers are respectively skeptical of the media’s reasoning, believing that any concealment of attacks is designed to limit awareness of the damage done to their communities by the other side.

**Brief History of Fulani Migration**

Fulani pastoralists started migrating into northern Nigeria through the Senegambia region of West Africa around the 13th and 14th centuries. Over time, they integrated into the region’s Hausa culture, especially after the early 19th-century movement led by Fulani scholar Usman dan Fodio, which supplanted traditional Hausa kings through Jihad. Throughout British colonial rule in Nigeria, spanning nearly six decades, Fulani people were not present in the country’s southern parts. Only toward the end of colonial rule and after independence in 1960 did Fulani migrants move south. In recent years, migration has quickened as Nigeria’s arid and semi-arid far north has become even less hospitable. Climate change-related factors, such as desert encroachment and declines in rainfall, which have resulted in the loss of grasslands for pasture and acute bouts of water scarcity, have heavily impacted the livestock rearing in the north. Such factors have exacerbated and merged with various forms of insecurity in northern Nigeria, including the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East and banditry in the Northwest, to force Fulani pastoralists to migrate in large numbers to the savannah and rainforest of the central and southern states, in search of a safer and more profitable environment to continue their traditional way of life. But their arrival caused considerable stress for local farmers, desperate to hold on to their own traditional croplands. Without any effective mechanisms for land administration and conflict resolution in place, the rise of herder-farmer conflicts was inevitable.

**Fulani Migration into South East Nigeria**

The recent migration of Muslim Fulani pastoralists in large numbers into South East (mainly Igboland) Nigeria should be understood in the context of four related challenges:

i. The migration poses inherent threats to farming and human safety. Whilst the violence associated with herder-farmer conflicts in South East Nigeria is not as widespread as in other regions, such as the Middle Belt, there is ample evidence to suggest that it will follow the same course. This would be devastating for the region and beyond. Other countries offer salutary examples. In Mali, for instance, the cycles of herder-farmer violence and reprisals have exploded since 2015: in 2020 alone, nearly 700 fatalities were attributed to the conflict. In the South-South region of Nigeria, especially the Delta and Edo states, more than $40 million of crops are lost annually due to cattle invasion. The International Crisis Group reported recently that the conflict has become Nigeria’s gravest security challenge, now claiming more lives than the Boko Haram insurgency, displacing hundreds of thousands and sharpening ethnic, regional, and religious polarization.

ii. The migration and related disputes with farmers have heightened fears that armed violence could become endemic in a region already grappling with recurrent agitation by secessionist groups and more generalized anger toward the state over the South East’s perceived marginalization in the
Federal Republic. This problem is amplified by statements from some Igbo and Hausa-Fulani groups, often accompanied by threats of eviction or food blockades.

iii. The migration threatens to exacerbate wider religious divisions in Nigeria, namely between Muslims and Christians. To some Christians, the increasing presence of Muslim Fulani herders in Igbo farms and forests amounts to a premeditated siege on Igboland. The concern is mounting in the region that the radical Islamic extremism evident in the northern parts of Nigeria could become a feature of life in South East; others fear a repeat of the Nigerian-Biafra Civil War of the late 1960s, which saw the predominantly-Igbo populated South East in a secessionist war with the Nigerian state. Federal government silence on the threats posed by Fulani herders has reinforced fears that economic migration is a smokescreen for jihad and annexation.

iv. The migration heightens competition over scarce land resources. The South East occupies a comparatively small area measuring 29,388 km², out of Nigeria’s total land area of 911,000 km². One of the six geopolitical zones in Nigeria (see maps above), the South East zone comprises five Igbo Christian-dominated states and is sandwiched between states in other zones. The South East was reduced in the aftermath of the Nigerian-Biafra Civil War and the consequent economic recovery programs. Today, the region is hobbled by many failings, including poor land management.

Politics and Herder-Farmer Conflict in the South East

Muhammadu Buhari, born to a Fulani family, was elected President of Nigeria in 2015. In the years prior to his election, Nigeria experienced deepening polarization and hardening of ethno-religious cleavages. In the South East, his election was widely seen as a harbinger of worse to come. As Fulani migration to the South East has increased, fears have grown that Buhari’s administration does not have the political will to mediate in the growing herder-farmer disputes, nor is it a neutral actor. With disputes increasingly morphing into violent conflict, mistrust of the state’s intentions has grown. To date, the federal government has failed to devise a workable policy to mitigate herder-farmer conflicts. Complicating matters in the South East have been criminal gangs who camp alongside, and are often indistinguishable from, forest-dwelling Fulani herders and prey upon local communities. Their actions have further amplified anti-herder and anti-Fulani sentiment. Of note recently are several federal government responses that threaten to deepen the crisis in the South East:

- The presidency’s opposition to the ban on open grazing—enacted into law by the respective State Houses of Assembly by the 5 South East state governors along with other southern state governors, and the Benue state governor in North Central.

- The presidency’s allegation during an interview with Arise TV on Thursday, June 10, 2021, that the intractable herder-farmer conflict is due to non-Nigerian Fulani elements that carry AK-47 rifles. These Fulani militants might have entered Nigeria illegally to unleash violence. Still, even if it were true, it does not explain why the government fails to bolster the nation’s porous borders.

- The president’s appeal to herders and farmers to mutually respect and tolerate the occupation and activity of each other wherever they co-exist in the name of peace.

- The failure of security agencies to adequately protect farmer communities and arrest perpetrators of violence, as ordered by President Buhari.

- The comparison of open grazing and activities of militant Fulani herders with motor spare parts dealers in the north by the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of the Federation. However, motor spare parts dealers (predominantly Igbo in the South East) do not engage in illegal occupation of shops/stalls, destruction of property, or breach of peaceful co-existence in the north like the militant Fulani herders that destroy farms and crops. This uneven comparison could be deciphered as dismissive of militant Fulani.

- The defense of the decision by Fulani herders to carry AK-47 rifles by the Governor of Bauchi State, Bala Mohammed, added to fears that militant Jihadism in the north will spread to the South East.
One of the local responses to the emergence of AK-47-armed Fulani herdsmen is the rise of various self-defense initiatives in the South East. The absence of regular security agencies has created a space for militant non-state actors to fill the gap in the provision of security. One such formation, the Eastern Security Network (ESN), has been especially active in protecting farmer communities, recovering lost lands and forests illegally occupied by Fulani herders, and attempting to shore up the fragile food security situation in the region.

**Threats to Food Security**

Food security in Nigeria is threatened by the continued failure of the national government to resolve herder-farmer conflicts across the country. The emphasis on diversification of agriculture in Nigeria is targeted at improving farming practices by adapting to new technology and crop varieties for adequate food production, food supply, and stable pricing. The Sustainable Development Goals (1 and 2) focus on ending poverty and hunger by ensuring food security. However, between 2018 and 2020, 21.4 percent of the population in Nigeria experienced hunger. People in severe food insecurity live for entire days without food due to a lack of money or other resources.

Largely due to the herder-farmer conflict, the contribution of agriculture to Nigeria’s GDP dropped by 31 percent, from US$113.64 billion in 2013 to US$78.45 billion in 2017. Nigeria has had to rely on food imports to meet the country’s food needs. Trade in food and agricultural products—consisting mostly of wheat, fish, brown sugar, food ingredients, and consumer-oriented food—averages $8 billion annually and has become an important component of the country’s food security strategy. Over the last five years, about 50 percent of Nigerian food and agricultural imports were from the European Union (EU). For its part, the United States exported an average of $600 million (about 70 percent is wheat) to Nigeria. Conversely, Nigeria’s food and agricultural exports (mostly cocoa beans) to the United States reached only $52 million in 2020.

Previously, crop production accounted for a huge chunk of activities in the agricultural sector, representing 88 percent of the total industry size, with livestock, forestry, and fishing accounting for 12 percent. The sector achieved a GDP of $US113.64 billion in 2014 but lost the gains from 2015 due to intensifying herder-farmer conflict. In the South East, the decline in supply production affected crops such as corn, cassava, and yam but not vegetables and livestock (poultry and piggery), which are located around homes. The swampy terrain for rice farms obstructs cattle movements (cattle do not eat rice grass).

These crops are staple foods for every household in South East. Their scarcity causes hunger for the larger population. Food insecurity expands rapidly when farmers abandon farms for security reasons and no longer produce what they consume. Unless herder-farmer conflicts are drastically reduced, crop farming will continue to decline in the region.

**Peacebuilding Programs and Efforts**

In January 2016, the federal government presented a new plan to map grazing areas in all states to the Nigerian Governors’ Forum. This was presented as a temporary solution for cattle owners. However, most central and southern states viewed it as favoring Fulani herders and thus rejected the plan. The following year, the agriculture minister sent a bill to the National Assembly to prohibit cattle from roaming in cities and villages, but it was rejected after successful lobbying by the Fulani community.

In 2019, Vice President Yemi Osibanjo inaugurated the National Livestock Transformation Plan (NLTP) to address this impasse. Under the plan, N100 billion naira (approximately $238,095 million) was proposed for the project, with the federal government contributing 80 percent in the form of grants, while states would contribute land, project implementation structures, personnel, and 20 percent of the project’s cost. The plan was made voluntary for state governments. The six key pillars included: economic development (investment); conflict resolution; justice and peace; humanitarian relief to internally displaced persons (IDPs); human capital development; cross-cutting issues such as gender, youth, research, and information, and strategic communication. Yet, despite various commissioning ceremonies, no budgetary allocations have been made to implement the program. It also lacks the inclusive support of some targeted states in the north.
At the state level, managing such scale and intensity of conflict is not easy without federal support. Although the 1999 constitution vests the title of a state’s “Chief Security Officer” on the governor, none exercises control over the law enforcement agencies. This “disconnect” helps explain why the “State Police” can shift the blame for not reducing herder-farmer confrontations onto local administrations. Similarly, other disputes over whether the state or federal authorities have jurisdiction, especially over land allocation and management (namely the 1978 Land Use Act\(^2\)), complicate attempts to bring herder-farmer conflicts under control.

Local governors’ efforts in the South East to reduce tensions between herders and farmers have not fared well. Fundamentally, the governors at different dates between 2019 and 2020 established the Forest Guard to complement the existing Neighborhood Watch Security outfit. Although a regional ban on open grazing of cattle in any part of the South East was announced, and a regional security organization codenamed “Ebube-Agu” was established to enforce the ban, the conflict rages on. Attempts to create a dialogue between leaders of both sides, in conjunction with community-based organizations, have yet to bear fruit.

**Conclusion and the Way Forward**

The herder-farmer conflict poses an existential threat to Nigeria, given its potential to cause wide loss of life, displacement, and destruction of food crops and production in key parts of the country. This brief review of the issue, focusing on the worsening situation in the South East zone, illustrates that the problem is largely man-made. Ultimately, the lack of leadership and political will to address the problem at the national level is responsible for the dire lack of progress on an issue that affects a wide swathe of Nigerian society.

If there is any prospect of bringing the conflict under control and breaking the impasse between herders and farmers. In that case, governments at all levels must address the threat that livestock rearing that relies on open grazing poses to communities. There are ways to meet the needs of both farmers and herders and improve the country’s food security, not least through the establishment of ranches in traditional Fulani areas, but this will take hitherto absent courage and political will from Nigeria’s political establishment.

4. “Nigeria: Prevalence of Severe Food Insecurity.”
6. “Nigeria: Prevalence of Severe Food Insecurity.”
23. “Nigeria: Prevalence of Severe Food Insecurity.”

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