A KENNAN FOR OUR TIMES:
Revisiting America’s Greatest 20th Century Diplomat in the 21st Century

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CONCLUSION: GEORGE F. KENNAN, CONTAINMENT, AND THE WEST’S CURRENT RUSSIA PROBLEM

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At the core of the Western strategy for managing the Cold War from the late 1940s to the 1980s was an American-led policy of “containment” of Soviet power and influence. Its principal author, George F. Kennan, diagnosed in Soviet foreign policy an expansionist undercurrent, which had the potential to threaten the foundations of economic prosperity and political stability on which vital Western interests depended. Accordingly, Kennan advised “a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies,” not only in Europe, but globally.134

Containment was a mode of East-West relations that many presumed would be relegated to the dustbin of history at the end of the Cold War. Yet the current period might accurately be dubbed the era of “new containment,” as Washington Post columnist Jennifer Rubin has called it, with many urging the United States, NATO, and Europe once again to contain, constrain, and counter what they view as Russia’s expansionist policies and malign influence on the world stage.135
Although circumstances around the conflict between Russia and the West today differ considerably from those of the Cold War, the conflict nonetheless poses a serious threat to European security and stability and demands a careful and comprehensive Western response. Containment is relevant today, if conceived and practiced as Kennan intended—as a primarily non-military strategy focused on recognition of the adversary’s vulnerabilities and on the West’s capacity to solve pressing problems, while inspiring others to do the same. Kennan’s prescription for investment in U.S. expertise on Russia is equally salient in light of today’s renewed conflict.

If the West is to benefit once more from Kennan’s insights, it must balance the collective political will to maintain a credible deterrent with the search for a negotiated settlement of differences, selective cooperation, and even eventual reconciliation in Russia-West relations overall. At a time when European and trans-Atlantic unity has been strained by relentless crises, striking this delicate balance will be no small challenge.

**RUSSIA AND THE WEST IN THE COLD WAR AND TODAY**

Russia’s military interventions in the post-Soviet neighborhood, particularly in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine since 2014, have made other nearby European states nervous about their own security, pushing NATO’s “Article 5” promise of collective defense into the spotlight. Following high-profile spy scandals and allegations of election interference, many in the United States and Europe now think of Russian influence per se as a malign force, in much the same terms that the West construed Soviet influence during the Cold War as inherently threatening. Thus, in addition to imposing economic, diplomatic, and political sanctions as a direct response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine, Western governments have searched out and censured Russian investments, diplomatic and cultural activities, and links with Russian political actors within the borders of Western
countries. All of this is reminiscent of the Cold War’s rivalry not only in arms but in ideologies, economics, and diplomacy.138

There are even surprisingly significant stylistic and structural similarities between the current East-West conflict and the Cold War. On both sides, demonization of the other has largely replaced reasoned dialogue, let alone introspection. As Robert Legvold has argued, both sides are now conditioned to thinking of the other side as entirely culpable for the current crisis. Each side portrays the other as intentionally and nefariously exploiting the situation to damage, disadvantage, and undermine the other’s interests.139 In fact, political leaders have consistently labeled one another as adversaries, and with very few exceptions have embraced simplistic narratives about the other’s hostile intent.140

The reemergence of proxy conflicts between Russia and the West is the most troubling echo of the Cold War today. Armed clashes that involved Russian forces occasionally broke out around the post-Soviet periphery in the 1990s and afterwards, and during the same period Russia and the West disagreed sharply over the handling of crises and conflicts from the Balkans to the Middle East. Yet for the first time in decades, the past five years have witnessed not only direct military conflict between forces supported, equipped, and trained by the West against those backed by Russia in Syria and Ukraine, but also numerous close calls between NATO and Russian forces in the air and at sea. There is even one documented case of direct exchange of fire between U.S. and Russian state-controlled mercenaries in Syria, with hundreds of casualties.141 Rather than isolated incidents in an otherwise harmonious international environment, these episodes illustrate the aspiration on both sides to separate friend from foe globally and to secure favorable international alignments or coalitions reminiscent of the Cold-War geopolitical “blocs.”142

Confrontation between Moscow and Washington has also infused the domestic politics and worldviews of both sides. Russia’s inter-
ference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and credible charges of ongoing Russian intelligence activities aimed at manipulating voters and inflaming U.S. public opinion have exacerbated already intense partisan warfare in Washington. Strident voices across the U.S. political spectrum, in the traditional press and in social media echo chambers, seek to score points by denouncing “ties to Russia,” however benign, remote, or implausible, as proof of nefarious, even treasonous, behavior. In and around Capitol Hill, the dissemination of lists of Russian, European, and even U.S. entities and individuals that might be targeted for future sanctions requires that even the most outlandish claims be taken seriously enough to be disproven. The domestic political effects of Russia’s ongoing information, cyber, and intelligence operations do not yet amount to a new “Red Scare” in Washington, but they will do lasting damage.

The current conflict’s domestic political element may be even more pronounced on the Russian side. It is certainly more central to Moscow’s domestic political agenda. For more than a decade, and amid slowing economic growth and rampant corruption, Vladimir Putin has conjured a “siege mentality” of Russia against the hostile, U.S.-led West to justify his authoritarian rule. Especially with Putin’s popularity declining in the years after his invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, the Kremlin beats a constant drum of propaganda to persuade Russians of their distinctly Eurasian values and identity and the need to resist U.S. power. If anything, wave upon wave of U.S. sanctions have dovetailed with Putin’s own goals of “repatriating” Russian wealth and expunging foreign support for Russian NGOs. Severing ties between Russia and the West can be a means of limiting vulnerability to Western pressure. For Putin, it is also an instrument of domestic control.

If mutual isolation is the goal, however, neither side has yet achieved it. Despite hostile political climates, strident media narratives, and
the proliferation of sanctions and counter-sanctions, Russians and Westerners remain more interconnected by trade and by professional, community, and family ties than they were throughout the Cold War. Both are deeply engaged with China and the global economy. Ideological elements of the current conflict, while apparent in debates over human rights, democratic legitimacy, and international law, are still relatively limited by comparison with the Cold War’s all-encompassing struggle of free market capitalism versus communism. Moreover, despite the overall deterioration in relations, Washington and Moscow have maintained some channels of communication and have cooperated successfully on space, Arctic issues, counter-terrorism, and even some regional security challenges like Iran’s nuclear program.

A broad strokes analogy between the current Russia-West conflict and the Cold War clearly fails when one factors in the vast disparity between Russian and Western power today. While Russia has recovered from the economic, demographic, and political collapse it suffered after losing its East European and Soviet empires in 1989–91, it is far from the United States in economic, demographic, or conventional military terms, much less to NATO or the West as a whole. With a far wealthier and more developed China increasingly flexing its diplomatic and political muscles, Russia is no longer even the predominant power in Eurasia. The only geographic areas in which Russia can balance or potentially supersede the West are in its immediate post-Soviet periphery and even then only if it applies overwhelming force against relatively soft targets, while relying on its vast nuclear arsenal to deter a Western response.

Reminders the Cold War is long in the past offer little comfort to governments and societies worried about Russian aggression in Europe. Even for those in the West who reject the new Cold War paradigm and perceive no direct threat from today’s Russia, a new
containment policy might still be justifiable: reassuring nervous European neighbors could outweigh the cost of lost partnership and engagement with post-Soviet Russia, which might well have been illusory from the start. Russia hawks argue that Russian leadership has been habitually dishonest about its intentions in Ukraine, Syria, and elsewhere, while its state-funded media organs are engaged in a systematic global disinformation campaign. How, they ask, can one work with a regime that one cannot trust?

THE NEED FOR CONTAINMENT THEN AND NOW

In both his famous “Long Telegram” of 1946 and his equally famous “Mr. X” article from the following year, Kennan argued for containment as the best form of resistance to Soviet expansionism. Kennan even described Soviet foreign policy in terms not dissimilar to those used in the growing Western consensus about Russian foreign policy today. Kennan assessed that the Soviet leadership was ideologically driven but pragmatic in its inclination to push outward only when “timely and promising,” and to hold back when resistance was encountered.

Accordingly, Kennan called for “the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points,” in which he included both Western societies themselves, and the wider world in which Soviet and Western interests collided. In Kennan’s view, the danger of an expansionist Soviet foreign policy came not only from the Bolsheviks’ distinct ideology but from their access to the vast power and potential of Russia itself.

Although ideological differences are now much less pronounced, Kennan's assessment of the potential disruptive power of Russian foreign policy for Western interests should be given careful consideration today. “This political force,” Kennan wrote of the Kremlin in his famous telegram, “has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world’s greatest peoples and resources of world’s richest
national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism.”

While today’s Russia may bring to bear more modest resources in terms of wealth, population, and even military potential, it is still a force to be reckoned with, one of the world’s two nuclear superpowers, a major international power broker, and by far the strongest national military present in the European theater. Likewise, Russian “expansionism” today varies from overt seizure and annexation of territory, as in Crimea, to murkier “hybrid” interventions in neighboring states as in Ukraine’s Donbas region or Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia, to the assertion of a right to protect the ethnic Russian diaspora living beyond Russia’s borders, from the Baltics to Central Asia. Just as Kennan argued regarding Soviet expansionism, Russia’s current policy towards its neighborhood is pragmatic and flexible but appears inexorably focused on the establishment of a sphere of influence, at least in its so-called “near abroad.”

The Kremlin today has little interest in promulgating its particular political ideology of state capitalism and a strong “power vertical” or in dominating territory beyond its immediate periphery. Yet it does seek to project influence globally in ways not unlike those described by Kennan during the Cold War. The main goals of Russian policy in the West were, according to Kennan in his “Long Telegram,” “to disrupt national self confidence, to hamstring measures of national defense, to increase social and industrial unrest [and] to stimulate all forms of disunity.” He warned that within Western societies, “poor will be set against rich, black against white, young against old, newcomers against established residents, etc.” As any number of reports from Western governments and experts now confirm, these very approaches are central to Russia’s current information and influence operations in the West and worldwide.

Much has been written in recent years on the topic of Russian-supported broadcast and online media activity around the world, which
Westerners have accused of promoting a deceptive and propagan-
dized narrative.\textsuperscript{157} Some even cite Kremlin-driven media activities
as a core component of the so-called “hybrid” threat to Russia’s
nearest neighbors.\textsuperscript{158} The Russians themselves argue that their
international media activity is no different from that of any other
country and in particular no different from the U.S. media, which has
for decades enjoyed an outsized international footprint.\textsuperscript{159} Either way,
there can be little doubt that Russian-backed TV and radio broadcast-
ing, news agencies and web portals, and apparent armies of paid
internet “trolls” all operate in the West today to “stir the pot” of
anti-government political views, and more broadly to undermine pub-
lic confidence in core Western institutions, from national and local
government to major corporations and prominent NGOs.\textsuperscript{160}

Russia’s media activities in the West are complemented by semi-co-
vert activities aimed at advancing Russia’s interests (i.e. weakening
the Western sanctions regime) and at establishing connections
with fringe political groups on both the right and left of the political
spectrum. These contacts go beyond merely fostering fellow-trav-
eler sentiments among the most vocal critics of the United States,
NATO, and the established European order to include providing
direct financial assistance to political parties, and even payoffs to
individual politicians.\textsuperscript{161} Kennan’s assessment of Soviet interference
in the domestic politics of Western countries could have described
the present conflict: “Where suspicions exist,” he wrote, “they will
be fanned; where not, ignited. No effort will be spared to discredit
and combat all efforts which threaten to lead to any sort of unity or
cohesion.”\textsuperscript{162}

**GETTING CONTAINMENT RIGHT**

To the degree that Kennan’s containment doctrine entailed vigilance,
strength, and readiness to deter Russian expansion, it has already
been widely endorsed and adopted by Western governments, and
even by NATO as a whole. Yet close attention to Kennan’s writings suggests he intended containment to entail much more than deploying countermeasures and closing Western ranks in response to any and every Soviet provocation. Kennan wanted the West, not the Kremlin, to control the agenda, believing that the challenge was “within our power to solve... without recourse to any general military conflict.”

Kennan’s restraint derived from his analysis of the basic Russian approach to power projection. Because the Russians were inclined to think of geopolitical competition as a long-term struggle and were thus potentially prepared to cede ground on any given issue in the face of firm opposition, Kennan thought that deterrence could prevent divergent interests from sliding into general conflict between Russia and the West. “If the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so,” Kennan reasoned, so that “if situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns.”

By the same token, Kennan warned against needlessly bombastic, blustering responses to the Soviet threat, which he worried the Soviets might perceive as weakness. Un-strategic action from the West might push the Kremlin into a domestic political corner where it was forced to escalate:

While the Kremlin is basically flexible in its reaction to political realities, it is by no means unamenable to considerations of prestige. Like almost any other government, it can be placed by tactless and threatening gestures in a position where it cannot afford to yield even though this might be dictated by its sense of realism. The Russian leaders are keen judges of human psychology, and as such they are highly conscious that loss of temper and of self-control is never a source of strength in political affairs. They are quick to exploit such evidences of weakness. For these reasons, it is a sine qua non of successful
dealing with Russia that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige.166

The most difficult dimension of a successful containment strategy may also be the most often forgotten or misconstrued from Kennan’s original writings. Kennan flipped on its head the Marxist-Leninist contention that capitalism contained the “seeds of its own destruction” to argue that internal contradictions, reactionary leadership, and fundamental structural flaws would eventually destroy the Soviet system from within.167 Rather than be provoked into rash action in the name of preventive security, or pursuing adventurist interventions inside Russia itself, Kennan advised the West to practice strategic patience. He was confident that much of what was threatening about Soviet power would be the cause of its own ultimate demise.

Here Kennan’s insights offer vitally important lessons for Russia-West relations today. The Soviet leadership’s innate hostility toward the West and the wider capitalist world—what Kennan referred to as the Kremlin’s “aggressive intransigence”—betrayed the Bolshevik regime’s paranoia and self-isolation.168 Moreover, Kennan wrote, “the very disrespect of Russians for objective truth—indeed, their disbelief in its existence—leads them to view all stated facts as instruments for furtherance of one ulterior purpose or another.”169 Western politicians have lamented similar strains of self-isolating and deliberately dishonest or manipulative behavior on the part of the current Russian leadership.170

Even if it weathers the storm of economic and political isolation it has stirred up by its hostile actions in Ukraine, the Russian state in the coming decades faces existential challenges entirely of its own
making. The first among these is the lack of opportunity for Russia’s best and brightest citizens within the current political and economic system, which causes continuing emigration of talent and capital, and is especially problematic in view of Russia’s low birth rate and aging population. The second is the endemic corruption of Russian officialdom, from the obscenely wealthy inner circles of the Kremlin and the high echelons of state-supported industries, to regional elites and even street-level law enforcement. Finally, there is what Russians now call the “problem of 2024,” how Vladimir Putin will manage to retain or transfer power at the end of his final term as president without provoking a succession crisis or even a revolution.

Kennan’s version of containment took account of these very problems. He judged the Soviet regime as fundamentally weak, despite its outwardly strong appearance, arguing that its weakness would become evident as it attempted to perpetuate itself and propagate new leadership. Of Russians, he wrote: “That they can keep power themselves, they have demonstrated. That they can quietly and easily turn it over to others remains to be proved. Meanwhile, the hardships of their rule and the vicissitudes of international life have taken a heavy toll of the strength and hopes of the great people on whom their power rests.”

If the objective of Western policy is to achieve a radical transformation in Russian policy by altering the composition or the mindset of the Russian leadership today, it is doomed to fail. Such an approach would clearly overreach in terms of the West’s actual capacity to influence events within Russia and its immediate neighborhood. As Kennan observed of the Soviet Union in the Cold War, the Russians are “still by far the weaker force” when gauged against the West as a whole. He argued in his telegram that “their success will really depend on [the] degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor which Western World can muster. And this is [a] factor which it is within our power to influence.”
Effective containment, in Kennan’s view, required not only cohesion for the sake of resisting the Kremlin’s “divide and conquer” tactics within the Western camp, but also consistency over time and across many related areas of national life and state policy. He advised the United States to “formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of [the] sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in [the] past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of [the] past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security.”173 Far from a dated reference to Europe’s exhaustion and vulnerability in the aftermath of World War II, Kennan’s words capture the renewed sense of vulnerability to internal and external threats in Europe today. They also underscore the continuing indispensability of U.S. leadership.

The West’s challenge in response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, its exploitation of far-right politics throughout Europe, and its influence activities around the globe is not only about defending against such measures. The West must strengthen the bulwarks of healthy and successful politics, security, and commerce, and it must offer a compelling alternative vision. In Kennan’s words, “It is rather a question of the degree to which the United States can create among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problems of its internal life and with the responsibilities of a world power, and which has a spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents of the time.”174 Kennan predicated containment as much on Western power, prosperity and liberty as on the need to devise a direct response to Soviet power.

THE MISSING PIECE: UNDERSTANDING RUSSIA

In the policy recommendations at the conclusion of his telegram Kennan advised Americans to learn much more about Russia, cautioning, “there is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the un-
Those words could hardly be truer or more relevant today. Yet this absolutely central message of Kennan’s work has all but disappeared in the quarter century since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Even with Russia constantly in the headlines, there has been only limited investment in sustaining expertise on Russia in North America and Western Europe over the past two decades.

In the United States, Russian area expertise has fallen victim to trends promoting quantitative methodology in academia; to across-the-board cuts to government programs supporting Russian education and research, including cuts of over 50 percent to critical language training; and to near complete elimination of advanced research fellowships for Americans studying Russia and the region. These reductions in the overall pool of academic expertise have been reflected inside government as well, where analysts and diplomats working in support of policymakers have seen career incentives reoriented in favor of other regions, such as the Middle East; or cross-cutting issues such as counter-terrorism or democracy promotion and development have taken precedent. The situation in Western Europe has been similar, with increasing pressure in recent years for area expertise focused on the South, rather than the East.

As a recent study of Russia expertise in the United States concluded, “Russian studies within the social sciences are facing a crisis.” Political science faculties in the top three-dozen U.S. universities have together awarded an average of only seven PhDs per year with at least a minimum (defined as 25 percent or more) focus on Russian area studies. The situation in economics and sociology is even more dismal, with a grand total of only four economics and five sociology PhDs with a focus on Russia awarded since 2009. Even the broader field of Slavic Studies, which includes language, literature, and culture experts, is in decline, with barely a quarter of its PhD graduates from this decade employed in tenure-track teaching jobs. Given declining interest in Russian studies among incoming
students reported for most of the past decade, and the elimination of many faculty positions that were previously earmarked for Russian specialists, it is no surprise that universities have fewer students enrolled in Russia-focused electives and core courses that might equip America’s future political, social, and business leaders with even a basic knowledge of Russia.

The news is not uniformly negative about Russia expertise in the West. Eastern European, Central European and Scandinavian states have tended to maintain a much stronger capacity to understand and analyze Russia, which has in many cases proven indispensable to NATO and the European Union. In fact, the divergence of expertise between East and West had become so pronounced by the end of the last decade that in many intra-European and Euro-Atlantic forums, a de facto division of labor emerged in which representatives of Central and East European member states assumed primary responsibility for analyzing and developing collective policy recommendations towards Russia and the former Soviet space. Yet for the United States, understanding Russia by proxy is patently inadequate to the task at hand.

If we are to follow Kennan’s advice to study Russia with “courage, detachment [and] objectivity,” what can we now do to enhance Western capacity for developing and implementing an effective, comprehensive policy towards Russia? First, the United States and Western Europe must restore financial support for the development of robust Russian area expertise as a top national security priority.178

Kennan himself underwent his early training in Russian studies at the University of Berlin, and then gained close-up expertise on the Soviet economy while serving at the U.S. legation in Riga, Latvia. Now, as then, universities and research institutions must remain bastions of intellectual freedom, while fostering contacts with government and offering timely and policy-relevant insights through publications, seminars, and media commentary. Kennan’s own academic and
professional experience crisscrossing the United States and Europe reminds us that the development of Western expertise on Russia should be a shared undertaking. Individual institutions and experts from North America and all parts of Europe should be encouraged by their governments to collaborate.

A few rules of thumb should inform government programs supporting scholarship on Russia, and should likewise guide the policy-oriented work of Russia experts themselves. Far too often, the call for expertise on Russia from the press, civic groups, private grant-makers, and government agencies is focused primarily on “understanding Putin” or explaining some specific aspect of “Putin’s Russia.” This preoccupation with Putin is echoed in what might be called the “new Kremlinology” of think tanks and universities. As one prominent Russian observer has pointed out, the focus by Westerners on “Putin’s Russia” gets it exactly backwards, because the current occupant of the Kremlin would be much better understood as “Russia’s Putin.”

Though he is certainly an authoritarian ruler, Putin holds onto power by coopting and giving voice to broadly held views in Russian society, reflective of current and past experiences shared by millions of Russians.

Finally, while close study of Russia can cast considerable light on the trends and context influencing elite decision-making, there is generally little basis for the type of palantir-gazing “Kremlinology” depicted in films and spy novels. These approaches also seem to neglect a vital lesson of the Cold War, during which not even the most ingenious Russia watchers had much success reading the minds of the Kremlin elite, much less predicting the most consequential developments in Soviet foreign policy or within the Soviet Union itself. As a former senior U.S. diplomat recalled, even by the summer of 1991, most Russia experts in government and universities were expecting that during the following year, Moscow would at most slightly relax
its control over the Baltic republics, but that the Soviet Union would remain intact for a long time to come.¹⁸¹

THE LONG ROAD AHEAD

Kennan’s firsthand analysis of Russia in the early years of the Cold War, and his recipe for a sophisticated, sustained containment policy, have enjoyed renewed relevance to key elements of the recent Western policy response to Russia. Faced with the Russian annexation of Crimea and invasion of Eastern Ukraine, the West has imposed punitive economic, political, and diplomatic sanctions, maintaining a broadly united front against considerable political countercurrents, thereby deepening Russia’s self-imposed isolation from much of the global economy. Western government assistance has also strengthened Ukraine’s ability to defend its sovereignty and to conduct extremely difficult but vital reforms aimed at rooting out corruption and breaking the monopoly on power of a few oligarchic cliques.

These efforts have hardly had a transformative impact on either Russian policy or Ukraine’s political, social, and economic hardships, but if considered in terms of Kennan’s containment doctrine, they need not do so. Rather, Western policy toward Russia today, just as in the Cold War, should be oriented towards success over the longer term. Strengthening the pillars of the West’s manifold economic, political, and cultural accomplishments will attract individuals and whole societies caught between the geopolitical forces of Russia and the West, and by the same token blunt Russian interventions designed to exploit internal weakness, to manipulate civilizational divides (such as the divide between Latin and Orthodox Christianity in Europe) or to sow divisions within NATO or the European Union.

The West can also choose not to let Russia set the agenda of tit-for-tat competition worldwide. This will deny the Kremlin one of its most powerful fonts of anti-Western propaganda and leave Russians to
decide for themselves whether they are satisfied with their political leaders and their country’s role in the world. Targeted and sustained investments in enhancing the West’s capacity to understand Russia can help divorce fact from fantasy and illuminate not only what Russians think about their own country and the world, but why they think it.

Today, some in the West might find Kennan’s vision of containment unsatisfying. Many already argue that Russia’s military aggression, defiance of basic international norms, and attempts at geopolitical and even historical revisionism deserve a tougher and more immediate response.¹⁸² Kennan faced strenuous opposition from more hawkish colleagues, most famously Paul Nitze, who thought about the Cold War as “a battle of will and numbers,” and argued for overwhelming the Soviets with superior capabilities and deployments across the board.¹⁸³

A policy of containment will not succeed if it is perceived as the path of least resistance, or if the term is invoked merely to paper over internal political differences. If the West is to revive containment as a guiding principle of its Russia policy, then it is essential to give it the full and consistent application Kennan intended. Only a new containment doctrine of this kind is the right response to Russia’s current challenge.