Japan’s Foreign Policy toward Korean Peninsula in the Détente Era: An Attempt at Multilayered Policy

By Choi Kyungwon
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Japan’s Foreign Policy toward Korean Peninsula in the Détente Era: An Attempt at Multilayered Policy

Choi Kyungwon

President Richard M. Nixon’s February 1972 visit to the People’s Republic of China was a turning point in the Cold War in East Asia. In the wake of the visit, Japan broke off diplomatic relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan and launched the process of normalizing diplomatic relations with the PRC. Soon, demand began to intensify within Japan for the same type of policy shift toward the Korean Peninsula. However, while Japan’s China policy involved the problem of whether to accept the notion of “one China,” the main concern of Japan’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula was the peaceful coexistence of North and South Korea.

As Tanaka Kakuei administration began shifting toward normalizing diplomatic relations with the PRC in July 1972, it sought to balance the US-Japan relationship and the China-Japan relationship. Japan’s central aims were the exclusion of Taiwan from the Far Eastern sphere in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan (1960) and reevaluating the “Taiwan Clause” and the “Korea Clause” of the Sato-Nixon Joint Communiqué (1969) on Okinawa’s reversion. Article 4 of the Joint Communiqué concerning the security of Korea and Taiwan stated that:

The Prime Minister deeply appreciated the peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations in the area and stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan’s own security…The Prime Minister said that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan.1

Through the negotiations for Okinawa reversion, the Japanese administration had to express clearly its own position about the security link between Japan and the East Asia region, especially South Korea and Taiwan, due to its relevance to article 6 in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United

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States and Japan, also called “Far Eastern Clause.”

However, after the reconciliation between US-China in 1972, this decision regarding the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security hindered the autonomy of Japanese diplomacy, and there were concerns that it would obstruct the improvement of the Sino-Japanese relationship.

The United States sought to check Japan’s actions through the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. On December 9, 1971, in a meeting with US ambassador to Japan Armin Meyer, Wakaizumi Kei stated that the situation had changed drastically since the Sato-Nixon Joint Communiqué (1969). He requested a review of the content related to the defense of Taiwan and South Korea. He then stated that the purpose of this was to ensure that Japan had the same freedom to pursue a closer relationship with China as the United States. Meyer responded by comparing the provisions to a “Pandora’s box.” He pointed out that the review of those clauses could influence the US-Japan relationship by “causing a revision of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.”

In the midst of these concerns and disturbances, at the 15th US-Japan Policy Planning Conference in June 1972, following President Nixon’s visit to China, Fukuda Hiroshi, director of the First North American Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, proposed to the United States that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security be revised to eliminate the Far Eastern Clause. In response, US consul to Japan Richard L. Sneider objected, stating that the Nixon Doctrine’s intention was designed to permit a continuing US security role in Asian affairs while drawing closer to public opinion within the United States. Japan’s request, Sneider said, amounted to driving the United States out of Asia. Furthermore, the Japanese side

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was nervous about the possibility of China raising questions about the Far Eastern Clause of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, and stated that it would handle Taiwan separately from Korea and other areas in administering the treaty. This demonstrates that Japan’s approach was to try to eliminate the “Far Eastern Clause” and thus ensure its freedom to conduct foreign diplomacy as it saw fit in a changing East Asia.

When the Tanaka administration came to power, further negotiations took place between Japan and the United States over the handling of the “Far Eastern Clause” of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security as well as the “Taiwan Clause” of the Sato-Nixon Joint Communiqué (1969). In August 1972, at the working-level conference held at the US-Japan summit meeting, the United States continued to protest the changes in Japanese policy, insisting that any changes in the “Far Eastern Clause” and the “Taiwan Clause” would damage the US-Japan relationship. In response to this, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Yasukawa Shō, concerned about China’s reaction and a possible domestic backlash, simply stated at the US-Japan summit meeting that the US-Japan relationship remained important to Japan’s security. Yasukawa also stated that the attempt to review the Sato-Nixon Joint Communiqué (1969) in Japan was “the minimum preventative measure the Japanese government can take to keep the debate within Japan concerning this issue from developing into a debate concerning the dissolution of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.”

Then, on November 8, following the normalization of diplomatic relations with China, Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi made the following announcement concerning the government’s view on the Taiwan Clause: “The Taiwan provisions state the opinions of Japanese and American leaders as of 1969. Since then, the situation with Taiwan has changed, and armed conflict is no longer a possibility. Given these


5 Telegram, China Policy, Ingersoll, American Embassy Tokyo sent to Department of State Secretary POL Japan-US Tokyo 8036, July 27, 1972 (Japan policy documents (1972), 18(8), 72–74.)
circumstances, these opinions have changed.”

The South Korean government watched as the “Taiwan Clause” was hollowed out by the movement toward normalizing Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. They were concerned that the review of the “Korea Clause” could lead to a shift in Japan’s policy toward North Korea. In particular, not only did they express military-related concerns toward the “Korea Clause” during the negotiations over the return of Okinawa, but they were also beginning to pay attention to political aspects. As the “Taiwan Clause” had been hollowed out by the normalization process of Sino-Japanese relations, it was possible that the same would happen to the “Korea Clause” as negotiations between Japan and North Korea proceeded.

Between Japan and the United States, the handling of the “Korea Clause” was closely related to the problem of US troops in South Korea. At the aforementioned January 1972 US-Japan summit meeting, Foreign Minister Fukuda Takeo stated to Secretary of State William P. Rogers that the content of the Sato-Nixon Joint Communiqué was “a matter of course” and requested that the United States refrain from further mentioning the “Taiwan Clause” to avoid an unnecessary dispute in the Diet. Moreover, he again pointed out that it was important to station American troops in South Korea to guarantee the security of Japan and South Korea, and he requested that further reductions be halted until 1975.

The United States heeded Foreign Minister Fukuda’s statements and calculated that Japan would likely oppose the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea not only for South Korea’s sake, but also for its own. On the basis of this view, Deputy Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson revealed to Korean

7 Telegram, PM Sato statements on Okinawa reversion and ROK security, American Embassy Seoul sent to Department of State Secretary, POLJAPAN-KOR S, Seoul 3928, July 3, 1971 (Japan policy documents (1971), No. 2, 94–95).
8 Memorandum of Conversation, U.S.-Japan Summit Talks, POL 7 JAPAN, Jan 8, 1972 (Japan policy documents (1972), No. 2, 180).
9 Memorandum of Conversation, U.S.-Japan Summit Talks, POL 7 JAPAN, Jan 8, 1972 (Japan policy documents (1972), No. 2, 162–163, 176).
10 Telegram, Sato meeting with Chung-il Kwon, American Embassy Seoul sent to Department of State Secretary, POL JAPAN-KOR S, Seoul 59, January 5, 1972 (Japan policy documents (1972), No. 2, 152–153).
ambassador to the US Kim Dong Jo that Japanese government officials had expressed concern over whether the presence of US troops in South Korea would be maintained. Johnson stated his view that the attempt to change Japan’s policies was limited to the “Taiwan Clause.”

In fact, much of the tension over the review and maintenance of Cold War norms was, ironically, resolved by China. The Chinese government, which had previously been critical of the US-Japan alliance and the “Taiwan Clause,” showed signs of changing its policy toward Japan. On July 27, Premier Zhou Enlai stated at a meeting with Takeiri Yoshikatsu, secretary general of the Komeito party, that he would not object to either the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security or the Sato-Nixon Joint Communiqué (1969). China’s approval of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was based on the theory that if Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations normalized, neither the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security nor the “Taiwan Clause” would affect China, and this removed one of the roadblocks to the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations.

At the US-Japan summit meeting in August, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei requested that further reductions in US troops stationed in South Korea be halted. President Nixon responded that the improvement of US-North Korean relations was premature and that the security of South Korea was critical for the security of Japan, checking the movement on the Japanese side by stating, “If the use of Japanese bases is limited, we will have no choice but to withdraw US troops from South Korea.” Prime Minister Tanaka then promised that “under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the American bases in Japan can

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11 Memorandum of Conversation, ROK/US Relations, January 17, 1972, Subject Numeric File 1970-73, Box 2424, RG59, Nation Archive II.
be used without any restrictions.”

A year later, on July 22, 1973, Prime Minister Tanaka explained at a press conference for foreign correspondents that the “Taiwan Clause” was invalid because Japan and the United States had improved their relations with China since 1969, but he confirmed that the “Korea Clause” remained in effect.

Following the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations, as domestic demand for a stronger relationship with North Korea increased, the Japanese government began a review of policies toward the Korean Peninsula. Amid these developments, the March 1972 telegram sent by Japanese ambassador to Korea Ushiroku Torao to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs entitled “Views on Handling the North Korea Issue” was a notable event. In this telegram, Ambassador Ushiroku pointed out the differences between Japan’s policies toward the Korean Peninsula and its China and Vietnam policies. For Japan, the main issue in China policy was whether or not to accept “one China.” Furthermore, due to the improvement of China’s international position as it joined the UN Security Council and relations warmed between China and the United States, the normalization of relations with China was seen as justified even if it meant sacrificing Taiwan. However, although increased contact with North Korea played a major role in increasing contact with China, there were essential differences. Ambassador Ushiroku gave the following two reasons for this:

(1) Based on the attitude taken by various countries at the time of the approval of the establishment of South Korea, as seen in the United Nations resolution regarding the establishment of South Korea and the Japan-Republic of Korea Basic Relations Treaty, only the South is recognized by law. Regardless of how much power North Korea may gain in the future, it will not replace South Korea’s international position, as was the case with Taiwan, and it is inevitable that North and South Korea will be allowed to coexist as two states within one nation, as in Germany.

15 Memorandum of Conversation, “Prime Minister Tanaka’s Call on President Nixon,” September 1, 1972, Japan and the United States, No. 1637.
(2) Based on population, area, and region within the international community, provided that unification does not occur through armed or violent revolution, it does not appear that North Korea will be able to overpower South Korea and take its position.

For these reasons, Ambassador Ushiroku clarified that increased interaction between Japan and North Korea would not include the normalization of diplomatic relations with North Korea but would be limited to encouraging the reduction of tension in the region. Based on this premise, he suggested taking extreme care concerning the position of South Korea when interacting with North Korea. He recommended not getting caught up in the national sentiment that “North Korea is next”: policy vis-à-vis Korea could not be extrapolated from the cases of China and Vietnam, because the conditions differed. He also stated that there were no serious tensions regarding the Korean Peninsula, and he requested that action be taken cautiously. He said hasty diplomacy would be a mistake if it estranged Japan from South Korea.\(^\text{18}\)

Japan’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula was limited to encouraging the peaceful coexistence of North and South Korea. Its policy toward South Korea meant to encourage a friendly relationship based on economic cooperation. Japan hoped that as South Korean security increased, the country’s democratic foundations would grow stronger. Additionally, concerning interaction with North Korea, Japan pursued an easing of tensions, solidifying a policy of responding in a flexible manner while paying close attention to dialogue between North and South as well as changes in the international situation.\(^\text{19}\)

During this period, due to efforts in Japan to expand interaction with North Korea as well as changes

\(^{18}\) According to Japanese ambassador to Thailand Okazaki Hisahiko, who worked at the Japanese Embassy in South Korea at the time, there was a feeling at the embassy that South Korea and Taiwan would no longer be prioritized as they were in the Kishi/Satō era, because “Taiwan had been cut off and South Korea was next.” Okazaki states, “I told the home office that it was disappointing that some people were saying that our position toward South Korea would change. At that point, people stopped saying those things... we lost the battle in Taiwan but won the battle in South Korea, no matter how you look at it. I encouraged everyone, telling them that if we just tried, we were sure to win.” Interview with Okazaki Hisahiko (December 18, 1995). The National Security Archive, US-Japan Project, Oral History Program. Retrieved from http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv.

in the status quo in East Asia, North Korea stopped demanding that the Japan-Republic of Korea Basic Relations Treaty be abolished as a precondition to improving Japanese-North Korean relations. Instead, North Korea took a softer position of requesting a policy of equal treatment while allowing the treaty to be maintained. Second Vice Premier Pak Seong-cheol told a group of Japanese newspaper journalists visiting Pyongyang that the one-sided policy favoring South Korea, which served as an obstacle to the unification of Korea, should be abolished and a stance of “equal diplomacy” giving equivalent status to North and South should be adopted. President Kim Il Sung also stated that “equal policies of a non-aggressive nature should be implemented toward the north and south of the Korean Peninsula.” He also stated that Japanese-North Korean diplomatic relations could be established by ignoring Article 3 of the Japan-Republic of Korea Basic Relations Treaty, which stated that South Korea was the only legal government, and that if Japanese-North Korean diplomatic relations were established, Article 3 of the Japan-Republic of Korea would lose 80 percent of its effect. He likely believed that if Japanese-North Korean diplomatic relations were normalized, Japan would cut off diplomatic relations with South Korea, just as it had cut off relations with Taiwan.

Based on North Korea’s actions, among reform-oriented Japanese groups including the Social Democratic Party of Japan, some expressed the view that North and South Korea should be treated equally in terms of diplomacy. At the House of Councilors Budget Committee meeting on November 10, 1972, Diet member Ashika Kaku (Social Democratic Party of Japan) questioned the necessity of adopting a policy of equal treatment based on events that had occurred between Japan and China. Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi responded to this as follows:

The discussion about North and South started under the condition of diplomatic relations and a close relationship between Japan and South Korea… because this discussion started under balanced conditions… to maintain balance in the event that these conditions do not

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20 *Yomiuri Shimbun* (September 12, 1972).
22 Northeast Asia Department, Hokutōa 720035-gō, Kita-Chōsen jōsei ni tsuite(May 23, 1972) [Northeast Asia No. 720035, on the situation in North Korea], *Nihon Gaimushō “Chōsen mondai”* [Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs “Korea issue”] (administrative number 2012–1787). Japanese Foreign Diplomacy Archives.
exist and the policy toward the Korean Peninsula is completely reformulated, and also given that that kind of history does exist and the fact that today the discussion about North and South started under these conditions… I believe it would be extremely dangerous to adopt a policy of equal treatment toward North and South…23

Around the time of the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations, the Tanaka administration attempted to ease South Korea’s anxiety by sending former director general of the Economic Planning Agency Kimura Toshio to South Korea as a special envoy. Foreign Minister Ōhira stated at a meeting with the ambassador to the Asia-Pacific region that although he was concerned about how the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations would change the current situation, he was pleased that China understood Japan’s position, and that although Asia policy was a difficult issue, it was important to avoid acting rashly and to pause before changing the status quo.24

North Korea joined the World Health Organization (WHO) on May 17, 1973, and on June 23 of the same year, South Korea reversed its policy toward North Korea in the “Special Declaration on Foreign Policy for Peaceful Unification (Declaration of 6/23),”25 as a result of which the Social Democratic Party of Japan redoubled its efforts. Diet member Akamatsu Isamu (Social Democratic Party of Japan) submitted a “List of Questions Concerning the Unification of Korea”26 to the government on July 7 and again on July 21. Akamatsu claimed there were signs of the easing of tensions on the Korean Peninsula, that the diplomatic stance favoring the relationship with South Korea should be corrected, and that North Korea should be

23 70th House of Councillors Budget Committee meeting minutes No. 3 (November 10, 1972).
25 This declaration, regarded as a turning point in foreign diplomacy toward Korea during the Cold War, includes content concerning (1) the opening of doors to all countries with differing ideals and systems, (2) support for North and South Korea joining the UN simultaneously, and (3) non-opposition to North Korea joining international organizations. South Korea Territorial Unification Institute (1982). Heiwa tōitsu gaikō seisaku sengen [Declaration on foreign policy for peaceful unification]. Nanboku taiwa hakusho [North/South dialogue white paper], 319–322.
26 Akamatsu, I. Chōsen no tōitsu ni kansuru shitsumon chūigaki (1973.7.7) [List of questions concerning the unification of Korea (July 7, 1973)], Chōsen no tōitsu ni kansuru saishitsumon chūigaki (1973.7.21) [Additional questions concerning the unification of Korea (July 21, 1973)]. In South Korea Foreign Affairs Department, Nihon no tai Kanhantō seisaku, 1973 [Japan’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula, 1973] (administrative number 721.21JA). South Korea Foreign Diplomacy Archives.
acknowledged and diplomatic relations established. In response, the Japanese government stated with regard to treating North and South equally that “various factors such as Japan’s external affairs overall and the influence of the dialogue between North and South should be kept in mind when making a decision,” and that “Japan’s first priority is maintaining and developing a friendly relationship with South Korea, and at present, it seems that we will have to limit our relationship with North Korea.” Here, “Japan’s external affairs overall” refers to the fact that Japan alone could not unilaterally change its policy toward North Korea while socialist countries such as the Soviet Union and China maintained their stances toward South Korea.

Interestingly, Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi stated at the US-Japan summit meeting on August 1 that, looking back on the fact that during the Second World War Japan stationed two army divisions on the Korean Peninsula to assure its security, after the war, as direct military means had been eliminated, the same funding that had been dedicated to maintaining the two army divisions before the war had been applied to economic aid. Ōhira’s statement indicated that Japan’s involvement with the Korean Peninsula for the purpose of assuring security had been consistent since before the war, and the means had shifted from military to economic. This statement is noteworthy as an acknowledgement by the Japanese government of the effects of economic cooperation with Korea on the assurance of security. Ōhira also explained the significance of expanded economic interaction with North Korea as follows:

(1) Gradually expanding the relationship with North Korea will make it easier for Japan to maintain and increase economic aid to South Korea.

(2) This will help the international community to have an influence over North Korean society.

27 South Korea Foreign Affairs Department. Shūgiin giin Akamatsu Isamu-kun ga teishutsuchosen no tôitsu ni kansuru saishitsumin ni kansuru tôrensho (1973.7.23) [Response concerning additional questions regarding the unification of Korea submitted by Member of the Lower House Akamatsu Isamu (July 23, 1973)]. In South Korea Foreign Affairs Department, Nihon no tai Kanhantō seisaku, 1973 [Japan’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula, 1973] (administrative number 721.211A). South Korea Foreign Diplomacy Archives.
28 Memorandum of Conversation, “Second Meeting between the President and Prime Minister,” August 1, 1973, Japan and the United States, No. 1792.
Although the Japanese government’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula emphasized the security relationship with South Korea, it was intended to develop the relationship with North Korea while respecting the framework of US policy toward the Korean Peninsula, which regarded the expansion of economic interaction and the establishment of political ties with North Korea as premature. This cautious approach was carried out based on the view that it was overly sentimental to promote equal treatment of liberal camp and communist bloc.\textsuperscript{30} In fact, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Asia Bureau councilor Nakae Yōsuke informed South Korea that there was mounting pressure within Japan to change the policy toward North Korea, stating the view of “some in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that it would be advantageous to do with flexibility to North Korea in order to create a closer relationship between Japan and South Korea.”\textsuperscript{31} Moreover, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Högen Shinsaku told Korean ambassador to Japan Lee Ho that “In order for us to assist in building South Korea’s military might, the civil sector cannot stop us from dealing with North Korea.”\textsuperscript{32} Then, on October 29, Uchida Yoshio, director of the Commercial Policy Bureau’s Northeast Asian Department, revealed to South Korea that it would permit import-export bank financing with North Korea for the first time.\textsuperscript{33} This approach reflected the change in the status quo in East Asia and demonstrated the formation of a new policy toward the Korean Peninsula. This indicates an attempt to multilayered foreign diplomacy by achieving a balance between the demands of assurance of security, which necessitated


\textsuperscript{31} South Korea Foreign Affairs Department. JAW-7458 (July 21, 1973), sent by: Ambassador in Japan, received by: Minister of Foreign Affairs. Ilbon ui dae Bukhan Pulant Suchul to Sueun Jageum Sayong Seungin Munje[Issue concerning Japanese exports of manufacturing plants to North Korea and approval of use of import-export bank funds] (classification number 725.6 JA, registration number 6048),91. South Korea Foreign Diplomacy Archive.


\textsuperscript{33} South Korea Foreign Affairs Department. JAW-10445(October 28, 1973), sent by: Ambassador in Japan, received by: Minister of Foreign Affairs]. Forward document binding, 168. South Korea Foreign Diplomacy Archives.
emphasizing the relationship with South Korea, with the political demands of foreign diplomacy, which involved easing tensions in the region.

Amid these new policies, the normalization of relations with North Korea was left by the wayside following the simultaneous entry of both North and South Korea into the United Nations and the acceptance of both countries by the international community. Given that the normalization of diplomatic relations with North Korea posed a severe risk to the relationship with South Korea, Japan could not make the first move, as China, the Soviet Union, and Eastern European countries showed no signs of accepting South Korea. Moreover, whereas South Vietnam had indicated before the fact that it would not oppose the normalization of relations with North Vietnam, the same could not be expected of South Korea. Thus, the Japanese government focused its policies on encouraging the international community to accept a system involving the coexistence of North and South Korea, and on getting North Korea to rule out the possibility of reunifying Korea by military means, rather than on normalizing diplomatic relations with North Korea. In spite of the normalization of diplomatic relations with China, the policy of the Tanaka administration toward the Korean Peninsula did not choose either North or South Korea but sought to achieve peaceful coexistence as in East and West Germany, an acceptance of the international status quo. Concerning the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea, Foreign Minister Kimura Toshio said this needed to wait until “a state of affairs at some point in the future in which both North and South Korea simultaneously join the United Nations, and the international community accepts both North and South Korea, and both North and South agree.”


36 Dai 73-kai Shūgiin Naikaku Inkai gijiroku [73rd House of Representatives Cabinet Committee meeting minutes] No. 4
CHOI Kyungwon is an Associate Professor at the Research Center for Korean Studies, Kyushu University. Dr. Choi received his B.A. and M.A. in North Korean Studies from Dongguk University (South Korea) and his Ph.D. in Political Science from Keio University (Japan). His research focuses on International Relations in East Asia and Japan-Korea relations. His publications include The Formation of the Japan-South Korea Security Relationship during the Cold War (in Japanese, Keio University Press, 2014), and “The Formation of the Japan-ROK Security Relationship: ‘Security Crisis’ of 1968 and Economic Security Cooperation,” World Political Science Review (2014).

(December 6, 1974), retrieved from http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp.
Observations on the Management of North Korea Issues (I)

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The travels of Chongryon-associated Koreans (Chōsenjin) to North Korea have recently provided an opportunity to acknowledge where the issues lie, and how deep they are, in regards to contact between North Korea and Japan. I take this opportunity to provide for your reference my thoughts on contact between Japan and North Korea, particularly the contact of domestic Chongryon-related elements with North Korea.

Firstly, I believe that there should be a fundamental distinctions be made between our contact with North Korea and our contact with Communist China.

1. That is to say that while there are still the usual arguments in regards to Communist China, they have seized legitimacy through their UN membership. We have ended formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan and proclaimed that it is our basic policy to pursue formal relations with Communist China. Given this, contact with Communist China that follows this basic policy will, on the one hand, necessarily increase pressure and difficulty on Taiwan or be conducted at their expense. In other words, this policy would in effect be pursued “AT THE PRICE OF TAIWAN.” At the same time, this is our chosen course of stern and realist diplomacy, and as such we should not continue to take into consideration the injustice of the above. In addition, at this point it appears that Taiwan is prepared to endure heavy burdens.

2. Although the case of Vietnam is slightly different, under the name of Vietnamization, the United States is attempting to maintain the barest minimum in order to save some face. Mirroring the phrase, “après
moi le déluge,” the troops have been withdrawn leaving no trace. For this reason, it is doubtful to all parties involved whether or not South Vietnam can continue to be a viable nation while also retaining its current qualities and identity.

3. To summarize, among Asia’s divided nations, it is difficult to deny that China and Vietnam strongly carry the potential for there to be a situation where “The East Wind Prevails Over the West Wind,” or some other similar situations. In contrast with the above, the situation of the Republic of Korea is completely different from that of countries like Taiwan.

A Following the UN resolution on the establishment of Republic of Korea and the attitudes taken when Korea was officially recognized by various countries, including the Japan-Republic of Korea Treaty, in terms of international law the Republic of Korea is a state limited to the south of the Peninsula; notwithstanding their moral claim to the entire Korean Peninsula. To put it differently, even if North Korea were to improve its international position in the future, unlike the situation of Taiwan, North Korea would not replace the Republic of Korea’s international position. Even if the state of affairs proceeded in the best possible manner for North Korea, it would still result in international recognition of North-South coexistence, like the German ‘One Nation, Two States.’ Similar to the situation for West Germany, considering the factors, such as the Republic of Korea’s population, geographical area, and position in international society, there is more potential for a situation where “The West Wind Prevails Over the East Wind.” It is clear that North Korea will not replace the position of South Korea. In other words, there is no reason to be concerned that the North will grasp legitimacy. As long as this is the case, and barring the North’s use of force or unification through violent revolution, the replacement of international positions is an impossibility.

For this reason, our work to enhance contact with the North requires neither concern about an eventuality where the positions of North and South Korea may become replaced, nor concern that such contact is carried out at the expense of the South. We should proceed with ample consideration paid to our ally, the Republic of Korea’s position, but without guilt. We should also be prepared to not be swayed by some domestic elements that claim that ‘North Korea is next.’ They wrongly draw analogies between the Korean Peninsula and the totally dissimilar cases of China and Vietnam. Concerning North Korea, our acceptance of Republic of Korea is certainly not a losing bet.

4. Enhancing our contact with North Korea would contribute towards decreasing tensions in the region. If tensions were to increase such that it risked war on the Korean peninsula, that would present the
greatest threat to our national interest, and it would necessitate our complete dedication to decreasing tensions. However, at this time the Republic of Korea has neither the capacity nor confidence to invade the North. Similarly, notwithstanding their true intentions, the North is also subject to an international environment that favors peace. Therefore, it appears that at this time there is an absence of serious and imminent tensions that might concern our national security. From the standpoint of our national security, it is sufficient if our measures to decrease tensions with North Korea simply follows the general trend of detente. We should not pursue, so called, detente so diligently that it causes difficulty for our ally, the Republic of Korea, or that it leads to distancing between Japan and South Korea.

5. Even with the basic understanding as described above, détente with North Korea is more likely than not to be at the level of gesturing, rather than one coming from a deep consideration of domestic politics. Be that as it may, implementing détente with North Korea must reflect the above described basic understanding of the situation and be free of flirtation with North Korea. Furthermore, when we are determining the pace (or interval) and timing of such measures, we must do so while being truly an ally to the Republic of Korea and pay close attention to their position and the possible psychological impacts that détente may have. As a neighboring country, we must be more sympathetic to the Republic of Korea, especially since they are worried that their importance may be waning since the Nixon Doctrine and the thawing of Sino-American relations. (The Unite States decision to defer the issuance of passports for North Korea is an object lesson to this point.)

The Red Cross dialogue may serve as a sort of benchmark for when thinking about the pace and timing. In the Red Cross example, care must be taken as to not outshine and deflate the diplomatic measures of the Republic of Korea by going much deeper than surface level détente vis-à-vis North Korea. This would also provide invaluable data on reading the atmosphere ahead of the upcoming discussion and deliberation on the Korea issue at the UN General Assembly.

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Document No. 2  
Northeast Asia Department, Handling of the Korea issue in the United Nations (Draft), 10 May 1972  

Handling the Korea Issue at the UN

Showa 47 May 10
1. The handling of the Korea Issue at the United Nations should be thought of as one part of the Korean Peninsula policy of Japan. It is Japan’s Korean Peninsula policy to encourage the reduction of tensions on the Korean Peninsula by promoting the establishment of a North-South relationship of coexistence. The implementation of this policy can be summarized in the follow way.

I. Regarding the Republic of Korea, promote friendly and cooperative relations focused on economic cooperation so that, through economic development, livelihoods can be stabilized and the foundation of democratic nationhood can be strengthened.

II. Regarding North Korea and various interactions with them, we should observe and flexibly deal with North-South dialogue, such as the North-South Red Cross discussions, and other international developments. This should be done while also promoting friendly and cooperative relations with the Republic of Korea.

III. As far as possible, promote the reduction of tensions on the Korean Peninsula through the promotion of North-South relations. At the very least, Japan should not an obstruction towards the reduction of tensions.

2. The Korea issue vis-à-vis the United Nations should be dealt with in the following way.

1. Proactively shelve the Korea Issue

Through developments in the North-South Red Cross dialogues, it can be seen that there recently is an increasing mutual effort being made between the North and South to solve the Korea Issue on their own without being swayed by great nations or third parties. However, when at the United Nations, both sides inevitably insist on unnecessarily sticking to their principles and assume very confrontational postures.

Given that there is the possibility that direct dialogue may become obstructed, for the time being, strive to postpone UN deliberation on whether or not to entrust the North and South with solving the Korean Issue on their own.

2. This argument for proactively shelving the Korean issue is different from the proactive shelving of the UN invitation issue from last year, which was in actuality intended to avoid a disadvantageous vote. For
the reasons given above, in this current case, shelving the issue has merits for both North and South, as well as the respective countries that back them. In cooperation with the Republic of Korea (this must be discussed beforehand with the Republic of Korea), lay the groundwork among the major countries at the UN before striving to convince the North and South to both agree (or at the very least acquiesce) to shelving the issue.

3. Success of shelving the issue at base depends on the attitude of North Korea. The inclinations of North Korea should be sounded out through, for instance, Romania (for example, by making use of the opportunity of Ceausescu’s visit to Japan). In addition, if necessary North Korea is to be reached through the Soviet Union (if possible through the United States during the United States-Soviet Summit) or China (through, for instance, the United States).

4. While laying the groundwork towards proactively shelving the issue, we should work accordingly to bring the members of the UN General Assembly on our side as a way to bolster the effort to shelve the issue and as a precaution in case we cannot gain North Korea’s approval to shelve the issue (to effectively convince North Korea to abandon its insistence on deliberating the Korea issue at the UN by convincing the General Assembly to take our side).

5. In addition, if it is the case that the North and South cannot reach mutual consensus on shelving the issue, changes in the situation should be closely observed and considered.

3. The Korean Issue and the conditions of the Korean Peninsula

A. Conditions on the Korean Peninsula

i. Implementation of the Nixon Doctrine and closer US-China relations have greatly impacted the Korean Peninsula, as a place where the interests of Asian countries, including the United States, China and the Soviet Union, have numerous entangled interests. Both North and South Korea have recognized the new situation and are struggling and groping for measures to deal with the changed circumstances.

Even under the current circumstances of international politics, the winds of détente are blowing and the heightened tensions seen in 1967-1968 no longer exists. Provocations from the North have ceased as such since 1969, and today they are close to none. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula are likely more psychological rather than something that is actual.
While neither the North nor South have strayed from their fundamental posturing, under the backdrop of détente, both sides appear to be gradually becoming more flexible and there are indications that they are searching for an autonomous solution to the Korea issue. The Red Cross dialogues between North and South has progressed since September of last year, and it is not an absolute impossibility that this may lead to governmental talks.

However, for both the North and South, recognizing that there indeed still exists a state of tension appears to take precedence. There is strong, mutual mistrust between the North and South. At this stage, this situation cannot be easily remedied. Therefore, it will require quite a lot of complications and plenty of time for the reduction of tensions to become established on the Korean Peninsula.

ii. The Park Chung Hee government has moved on to implementing the third Five-Year Plan, following after the first and second Five-Year Plans. It is worth paying attention to the achievement of economic development through the government’s maintenance of a stable foundation throughout the implementation of the Five-Year Plans. However, in recent years the many stresses owning to rapid economic development are beginning to show. Pressing issues that must be resolved include disadvantageous balance of payments, faltering business confidence, rising prices, a lagging agricultural industry, and fragile domestic resource mobilization systems. These economic stresses, coupled with the prevailing mood of détente, are factors that contribute to political issues and social uncertainties.

The declaration of a state of emergency of last December was done so with the domestic circumstances described above as a background. It appears that the intention was to effectively tighten domestic control and in doing so overcome varying economic and political difficulties. Since the state of emergency, the Park government has taken a committed posture, as seen, for instance, in the New Village movement. However, it is too early to predict whether it will produce results. Looking ahead to the presidential election scheduled for 1975, the next few years will be a consequential period of trial for the Park government.

On the occasion of China regaining its seat the United Nations, North Korea has determined that international circumstances are shifting in their favor and are placing the utmost effort in continuing this momentum to further increase their international standing. Although North Korea’s diplomatic activities have already been gradually becoming more active since 1971, the scale of their activities between February and March of this year has been unprecedented. North Korea’s enthusiasm in approaching Japan and the United States is more noteworthy than their diplomatic activities in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, which are intended to elevate their international standing.
Since the partial purging of the military clique between 1968-69, the Kim Il Sung government has succeeded in consolidating power and on the whole has achieved stability. At the moment, the greatest obstacles faced by North Korea are economic. North Korea has extended its Seven Year Plan by three years. In actuality, it has taken 10 years to achieve the planned objectives in 1970. It is presumed that the reason for the three-year extension was because they unsparingly prioritized military strengthening. Until now, North Korea has relied on self-reliance and the, so called, ‘Chollima Movement’ to serve as the drivers of economic development. However, this has inherent limits. Reforming North Korea’s industrial structure is unavoidable if its economy is to develop any further. This is why the threefold technological revolution is a central heading under the 1971 Six Year Plan. North Korea cannot help but turn to democratic countries, particularly Japan, for the acquisition of technological innovation, as they cannot rely on communist states, such as China and the Soviets, in this regard.

B. The Korea Issue under the United Nations

i. At the moment, we are primarily exchanging opinions and collecting information with friendly states, especially the Republic of Korea and the United States. We are not at a point where we can make a final determination on how to develop policies to cope with this issue. Given the progress of the North-South Red Cross dialogues and the heightened sense that both sides wish to resolve the Korea issue on their own without being swayed by large or third-party countries, and with the intention of supporting the decrease of tensions on the Korean Peninsula, it is desirable that we try to postpone or adjourn the deliberation on the Korea issue. In addition, we should support, and at the very least not obstruct, the dialogue between North and South. It is also desirable that we avoid as much as possible the usual recriminations that are hurled between the respective supporters of the North and South.

ii. Whether deliberation can be postponed or not depends on the disposition of North Korea and the actions of the Soviet Union and China. However, last year even the backers of North Korea have expressed their recognition of the importance of the North-South Red Cross dialogue. Given this, it would be favorable that we secure a postponement of deliberation through dialogue between the respective supporters of the North and South. In order to convince North Korea about postponing the deliberation, as well as to prepare for the possibility that a confrontational vote becomes inevitable, it is critically important that we gather general committee members to our side. Similarly, we have become a general member and are running for the chair of the Fifth Committee, which is a committee of national interests as it deals with budgetary and human resources matters. (In this regard, it is encouraging that New Zealand has announced its candidacy as...
the vice-chair.)

iii. If the postponement of deliberation is not successful, the usual debates will inevitably be repeated. At any rate, as long as we do not lose the invitation issue, we can prevail in this issue with a narrow majority vote, although we would be at a slight disadvantage compared to before. However, it should be noted that the current circumstances do not warrant optimism regarding the proposal to unconditionally invite both North and South to the United Nations. Given that, we believe that it may be necessary to take a flexible approach and entertain alternative proposals (reference material attached), such as the New Zealand proposal of last year, or to consider allowing the unconditional invitation of North Korea as circumstances develop. We would like to continue to exchange views on this issue.

iv. In any case, we would like to maintain close coordination centered on the UN, and maintain close collaboration on this issue. (Refer to Reference Material 3)

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Document No. 3
Northeast Asia Department No. 720035, on the Situation in North Korea, 23 May 1972

North Asia 720035

On North Korea

Showa 47 May 23

Summary of (redacted)’s debrief on North Korea following his three-week mission to North Korea from this past mid-April.

1. 60th Birthday Event

We entered Pyongyang by way of Hong Kong and Beijing. It appeared that the majority of those on the flight were the representatives of varying countries that were participating in Premier Kim Il Sung’s 60th birthday festivities.
As soon as we were on the tarmac, a troop of girls handed us flower bouquets and lead us by our arms. This is their way of welcoming us, but it was quite ticklish.

At first, we had planned on leaving with plenty of time ahead of Premier Kim Il Sung’s birthday on April 15. However, we were asked by the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan to delay our departure. It appears that this was to ensure that all the foreign dignitaries could attend events on an equal basis the during the one-month celebration period. Military representatives and intellectuals, among others, from 30 or so countries were invited to attend the 40th anniversary of the establishment of the revolutionary army.

We visited factories, schools, and nurseries, among other facilities. At each of these, the workers or students would line up around us to welcome us and would give us a sort of tour around their facility. It was a somewhat bothersome experience. Our group (redacted) was looked after by Cheong Jun Ki, Chair of the Journalists Union (Chief Editor of the Rodong Sinmun), and a new Benz was provided for us. It appeared that Premier Kim Il Sung heard that (redacted) was provided a Benz, and one day, the Benz was suddenly replaced by a Soviet ZIM. While the ZIM is uncomfortable, it is the vehicle for the Premier, Vice-Premier, the Party cadres, and other high-level officials. Because of its special status, traffic officers and groups of students would become motionless in salute as the car passed. This status also meant that it can ignore traffic signals. For this reason, we had difficulty in following after the ZIM in our Benz. There were 50-60 new Benz’s parked in front of our lodging, the Pyongyang International Hotel. Seeing that none of the cars had been driven more than 35 kilometers, these were probably hurriedly imported for the sake of the foreign dignitaries attending the 60th birthday celebrations.

2. Domestic Circumstances

The cities, including Pyongyang city, appeared to be built in the Soviet-style. It reminded me exactly of the Soviet backwaters. The city and its people were neat and clean, but there were some people that we saw that were dressed raggedly. If we encountered people like this while on site to cover a story, our guides would quickly grab the person’s arm and take them out of our sight. We encountered such things on the street and parks.

Also in Pyongyang, we happened to see what appeared to be a high government official pick up a child on their way home from school and drive off.
It may have been an official picking up their own child or the child of someone they know. It was evidence that the intermingling of public and private matters is also a problem that pervades North Korean society.

The idiom about how the crumbling of embankments start with an ant’s nest came to mind and I was afflicted by an inauspicious feeling. Including the example of the high-class cars running red lights, as well as after observing other things, I felt that the extent to which class distinctions were clear-cut was beyond my initial expectations. It is incomparable with liberal states.

3. China and Soviet relations

Including the time allotted for dining, we spent about four hours speaking with Premier Kim Il Sung. Even when the press corps directed uninhibited questions, the Premier answered clearly and without resorting to notes. When asked if North Korea was surprised by the US-PRC summit meeting as much as Japan and the Republic of Korea were surprised, Premier Kim answered that, “I was not surprised. This was not the first example of an imperialist country joining hands with a socialist country. The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact was exactly such an example. It was from my time running around the mountains during the Anti-Japanese War, but I still cannot forget the photo of the Japanese representative, the then-Foreign Minister Matsuoka, shaking hands with Stalin.”

Regarding tensions between China and the Soviets, he answered that “there will not be a war between China and the Soviets.” He was extremely inarticulate about Sino-Soviet relations. On the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the establishment of the army, the Chinese delegation was led by Chen Xilian, member of the Central Committee Politburo and commander of the Shenyang military region, and the Soviet Union’s delegation was principled by Vice Minister of Defense Moskalenko. While the two sides must have had different circumstances, Kim Il Sung had appeared to treat China more carefully. The North Koreans, sitting opposite the Chinese and Soviet representatives seated in the place of honor, clapped far more for the Chinese than they had done for the Soviets. During his speech, the representative of the North Korean Army had also highlighted China by saying, ‘China, above all else, is an ally joined by blood.’ Overall, I had the impression that the North Koreans appeared to be leaning towards China. On the other hand, all things Soviet or Chinese appeared to be deliberately removed. For instance, the explanatory texts on the military commemorative objects exhibits did not have Chinese or Russian texts. The North Koreans are also now boasting that domestic production is sufficient for everything. Indeed, as far as I can tell, we did not see any
foreign products.

4. Concerning the United Nations

Lately, North Korea seems to be regarding the United Nations and other international organizations as very important. In addition, they are pursuing high-profile diplomatic activities, such as sending large-scale diplomatic missions to various countries, as well as conducting diplomatic activities even with countries that have established relations with the Republic of Korea. During the meeting with Premier Kim Il Sung, he was also asked questions about the UN issue. When asked whether or not North Korea would accept the simultaneous invitation of North and South to the United Nations, the Premier answered that he “would accept.” He added, however, that it would be a precondition that the invitation be. Additionally, he said that North Korea’s participation at the UN is conditional upon the annulment of illegal deliberations. Additionally, when Kim Il Sung was asked what was meant by the ‘valid policy’ that he referred to in his comment “that he would consider annulling the illegal UN deliberations by taking a valid policy” (January 10 1972, Yomiuri Interview), he only responded that “it was currently under considered.” Until the very end, he evaded the press corps’ persistent questions and avoided providing a clear answer.

Kim Il Sung also expressed that the withdrawal of US forces from Korea would not serve as a precondition to opening political negotiations. He explained that this was because if negotiations were to happen, there would no longer be a reason for the US military presence, and withdrawal would then happen sooner.

5. Relations with the Republic of Korea

Regarding the issue of reunification, Kim Il Sung emphasized the importance of North-South political dialogue, the conclusion of a peace treaty, and the issue of federation.

While North Korea has until now derided President Park as ‘Park Chung Hee the puppet,’ this name calling has ceased since January of this year. When asked about this point, the Chairman of the Journalists Union, Cheong Jun Ki, and an assistant announcer from the broadcasting station laughed and answered, “you noticed a fine point.” I personally believe that North Korea has deliberately stopped attacking Park, and that this is a very meaningful observation to keep in mind when contemplating the direction of North-South relations.
6. Japan-North Korea relations

   During the meeting with Kim Il Sung, the topic of the Japan-ROK treaty was raised. Kim Il Sung stated that diplomatic relations between Japan and the DPRK could be concluded if Article 3 of the Japan-ROK Treaty, which provides that the ROK is the only legal government, were to be ignored. He added that if diplomatic relations were to be established, Article 3 would anyhow lose about 80 percent of its force. In other words, diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea is possible even with the Japan-ROK treaty, and that North Korea is taking a very positive view towards Japan.

   The reason that North Korea is approaching Japan is because North Korea cannot improve their technological standards without the help of liberal states and because they are currently facing difficulties in moving forward with their Six Year Plan. Economic cooperation with the Soviet Union and China is tinged by the big powers attitudes of superiority and an air of charity. In addition to this, there are often shortages of parts for equipment being sent to North Korea, and it is not uncommon for there to be three month delays in procuring these parts. Those involved are alluding to the fact that these are indeed factors that underlie North Korea’s increasing proximity to Japan. However, they also said that there have been cases where products from Japan had missing parts or that they had bought Japanese products that were touted as the best quality to only find out later that there were less expensive alternatives.

7. Personality Cult of Kim Il Sung

   (One can interpret the recent marked intensity of the Kim Il Sung personality cult among the citizens as something coming naturally or something being performed)

   From our perspective, the Kim Il Sung personality cult may appear strange. However, there are differences between what we imagine the personality cult to be and what it actually is in its context.

   I believe that the personality cult is a something that is cold and calculated. However, it appears to be true that the people are moved to tears of gratitude when Kim Il Sung approaches even just three meters away, or that if they shake his hand their whole body goes numb. I wonder if there might be no other leader in the world that so diligently conducts onsite visits like Kim Il Sung.

   When asked what about national leadership after the death of Kim Il Sung, people answered that they had never even thought about a North Korea without Premier Kim Il Sung. First Deputy Prime Minister
Kim II is apparently assigned as the successor should anything happen to Kim Il Sung. However, Deputy Prime Minister Kim II does not stand out and is said to lack in personal charisma. It is questionable if he would suffice as a successor. With that said, during the meeting the most noteworthy were First Deputy Prime Minister, Kim II, the Second Deputy Prime Minister, Pak Seong-cheol, and the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly, Choe Yong-geon. Pak Jeong-ae, the deputy prime minister’s wife, was seated towards the back and did not stand out very much.

8. Miscellaneous

a. The screening of ‘Nation of the Chollima,’ which was filmed in (redacted), gave the impression that it only captured the flattering aspects of North Korea. However, it is simply the case that things that rub China and North Korea in the wrong way cannot be broadcast. While they wanted the film to be more praiseful, we could not make something custom ordered to their liking, so (redacted) compromised with an approach that appealed to the humanity of the audience. They selected the characters that appeared on film and we also know that the young girls that appeared on the screen were dressed up in the finest traditional New Year dresses. They remarked that they had found it difficult to deal with Japanese media working in North Korea because they only showed the shameful aspects of North Korea.

Immediately after the screening, we received a telephone call saying that they wanted another screening. We received praise from the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan and people from other North Korea-affiliated groups saying that they watched the television broadcast in absolute silence and that they all shed tears.

b. We met with the youths of the Yodogo Hijacking. As we had decided prior to the meeting, we spoke amiably from the start so as not to make them clam up. The first thing that came out of their mouth was, “It is nice to be able to meet a Japanese.” All of them appeared to want to go home to Japan. They appeared to be uniformly committed to Kim Il Sung’s ideology. The leader, Tamiya, would verbally praise Kim Il Sung’s ideology, but appeared to be somewhat dissatisfied. Kim Il Sung asked if “they would be arrested if sent back to Japan,” to which I responded that that is obvious. He laughed and answered, “then I cannot send them to Japan. I cannot hand them over to the Japanese police.”

c. The North Koreans greatly praise the cadres of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan and their work. Premier Kim Il Sung would often mentioned Chairman Han Duk-su by name. In North Korea, Chairman Han Duk-su is ranked as a Deputy Prime Minister and First Deputy
Minister Kim Pyong-sik holds the rank of a Deputy Prime Minister and Minister.