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BRITAIN AND THE TRANSCAUCASIAN NATIONALITIES DURING THE RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR
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Nationalities during the Russian Civil War

Compared to her "moment" in the Middle East, the ebb and flow of Britain's influence in Transcaucasia from 1917 to 1921 seemed like a fleeting second. Yet the nationalities of both regions gained similar impressions about British policy: extravagant wartime promises masked a policy of duplicity, exploitation, betrayal and condescension. These feelings were fired by the political and economic implications of British policy which sharply contrasted with the spirit pervading Allied wartime pledges. For the majority of British policy-makers, however, such discrepancies were not serious as they had never believed in the feasibility of open diplomacy, national self-determination and democracy as the solution to world problems. On the contrary, their implementation would create political chaos in many regions as many national groups were not fit to govern themselves. The Transcaucasian nationalities as well as the majority of Arabs fell in this category. Thus, the experience of the Armenians, Georgians and Azerbaijanis was to a certain degree an omen to the other nationalities in the Middle East. And in both cases anti-Western (or anti-British) sentiments stamped the emerging nationalism of the local populations.
Britain is inextricably mixed in Transcaucasian developments during the Russian civil war. In the last year of the World War she helped the local nationalities man the Caucasus front against the Turks. Shortly after the Mudros Armistice a twenty-three thousand man British expeditionary force occupied the Batum-Baku railway and other strategic points. Britain established military governorships in Batum, Baku and in a number of areas disputed by the republics of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Moreover, attempts were made to control the Caspian shipping, the production of oil in Baku and its flow to the Black Sea port of Batum, and the revolutionary fervor of workers in major urban centers. British influence continued even after the bulk of the troops had been withdrawn in the late summer of 1919. The town and province of Batum remained under British military governorship for almost another year; the Paris Peace Conference granted the republics de facto recognition in early 1920 on Britain's recommendation. Moreover, Britain provided Armenia and Georgia with military aid. Perhaps most lastingly, British military authorities in Transcaucasia made several controversial decisions which left smoldering territorial disputes among the rival nationalities. The officers making these decisions had a poor opinion of the local nationalities and rarely considered historic or national rights.

British policy in Transcaucasia quickly aroused bitterness when significant discrepancies were perceived between its proclaimed ideals and real goals. The most obvious contradictions were political; they pertained to the recognition of the local governments and their territorial aspirations. In September 1919, a Georgian paper reminded
the Armenians of the proverbial advice given to the occupants of a boat: "Pray to God, but keep on rowing."\(^1\) The paper had lost its confidence in British goodwill and that of other Western "gods." Numerous other editorial pages expressed a similar disillusionment. An Armenian daily warned its readers that "neither capitalist United States, nor perfidious Albion or egotistic France" would come to their assistance, "for the blood-drained Armenian democracy was of no use to this pack of predatory imperialists."\(^2\) These expressions of bitterness mixed with despair grew louder with the growing Turkish Nationalist and Russian threats to the independence of the republics. That the Armenians were the most disappointed is understandable in the light of wartime pledges made on their behalf by the Allies, especially Britain. In the spring of 1920 a British intelligence source reported that the Armenian press had taken "a very anti-British tone . . . ridiculing the way in which Great Britain fulfills her promises towards Armenia."\(^3\) Georgians and Azerbaijanis too had cause to complain. The British military authorities in charge of the occupation of the Batum-Baku line assured the local governments that they had come to maintain order until the future of the region could be decided by the Paris Peace Conference. These were comforting words to the fledgling republican leadership of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, whose primary aim was the preservation of their independence. After all, the victorious Allies repeatedly announced that the Wilsonian panacea of national self-determination was to be the guiding light of the peacemakers in Paris.

Britain's role in Transcaucasia, however, was not shaped by the interests of the local nationalities. It began in 1917 as wartime resistance to the Ottoman armies and resulted in the unsuccessful
defense of the oil-rich city of Baku in the summer of 1918. Postwar intervention stemmed from real or imaginary threats to India's northern borders from the direction of the Caucasus, and a commitment to support the anti-Bolshevik forces in South Russia against the Bolshevik armies. The Transcausian republics, of course, cared nothing about threats to India and were equally suspicious of all parties in the Russian civil war. Their main concern was to maintain their independence and obtain international recognition. But such recognition Britain was not willing to grant so long as the anti-Bolshevik forces had any chance of winning the Russian civil war. Since none of the White Russian leaders would concede to Transcaucasia the right to detach itself from Russia, Britain hesitated to antagonize them by granting recognition. That hesitation was overcome only after the Volunteer Army in South Russia had been defeated. Diplomatic recognition, arms and ammunition were now assured to induce the republics to resist Bolshevik penetration of Transcaucasia.

Thus, the contrast between British and Allied wartime pledges, together with the high-sounding principles of the "Archangel Woodrow" and the peacemakers in Paris, and the stark realities of their post-war policy quickly disillusioned the Transcaucasian nationalities. "Humanitarian feelings have been overtaken in Paris by diplomatic intrigues and conflicting cold political interests," declared Nor Ashkhatavor. Ertoba exhorted the republics to stop looking for outside help in their diplomatic and territorial aspirations: "In this matter German troops did not give us [Georgians] much, the Turks did not fulfill Azerbaijan's hopes, neither did the British Armenia's." This feeling was most forcefully vented in an
Ashkhatavor editorial:

... All these foreign powers came to Transcaucasia without taking the will of the local populations into consideration, disregarded the freedom and sovereignty of the local republics and very often they impudently violated the laws of these countries. In matters political and more general they did things, in a brazen and lewd manner, in Transcaucasia that they could not do or even dare imagine doing in their own countries. ⁷

The editorial attacked all foreign powers involved in Transcaucasian affairs since the outbreak of the war. However, its specific targets were France and England.

Disappointments caused by British diplomacy were reenforced by economic policy. There is no evidence to support the accusations by Soviet historians that British policy simply amounted to oil and manganese imperialism. The British government expected commercial and other economic advantages by occupying Transcaucasia. But these were secondary considerations in the decision to intervene. ⁸

The important point is that once in control of Transcaucasia exploitation went forward with little concern for local interests. One reason for the continuation of the British governorship of Batum town and province after the withdrawal of troops was the desire to ensure the supply of oil from Batum to Britain and her Allies and to "prevent the [Transcaucasian] oil industry [from] getting into the hands of hostile interests such as Nobels and other German firms." ⁹ British military authorities pressured Azerbaijan to produce and transport oil (mazout) to Batum at lower
than world market prices to build up a stockpile of twenty thousand tons for British and Allied naval use. Twelve thousand tons had already been dispatched from Baku by the time it fell to Bolsheviks. Meanwhile ten thousand tons of kerosene in the British pumping station in Batum belonging to Azerbaijan were confiscated; Azerbaijan was credited, but never paid, 5s per ton. The kerosene was subsequently sold at higher prices.\(^\text{10}\) The British military command in Transcaucasia methodically postponed payment for oil purchased in Azerbaijan. A similar fate befell the thousands of pounds sterling and millions of rubles due to the Azerbaijani Railway Department for transporting British troops. These delays created a "very bad impression" and aroused hostility, suspicion and mistrust in Azerbaijan.\(^\text{11}\)

The British Treasury provided the greatest obstruction to the payment of these debts by continuously objecting to the exchange rates and currencies for making the transactions. The Treasury wanted to pay in devalued Russian rubles at rates of exchange established at the time of the Volunteer Army's peak of success! With the sovietization of Azerbaijan, the Treasury and the Foreign Office agreed that all monies owed should be kept in British trust "until such time as stable government has been established in Azerbaijan."\(^\text{12}\) A similar decision affected a credit of £90,000 at Constantinople due to the Azerbaijani government for oil supplied to the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company and an estimated 900 million rubles in mostly negotiable securities belonging to the Baku branch of the Russian Bank. When evacuating Baku the British military authorities had transferred these securities -- mostly belonging to private bands and individuals in Baku -- to Constantinople.
Later they promised to return them to Azerbaijan. 13

The policy of "deliberate evasion" of financial obligations was also tried out in Georgia. 14 On the basis of an agreement with the British military authorities the Georgian government provided material, troop transport, locomotives and various other services valued at about £78,000. While the agreement called for a partial payment in pounds sterling, the Treasury insisted on paying the whole debt in devalued rubles. Because of the disagreement the Georgians were denied payment despite their dire need for credit to buy flour. Georgia rather clumsily tried to sue the British government in the English courts. 15 Someone in the Foreign Office remarked that the Treasury's policy was "scandalous, but I suppose it is economical. No action." 16

However, Britain's most "economical" decision took the form of an oil administration in Transcaucasia which taxed all oil exported from the port of Batum. The funds thus raised paid for the British administration of the province and town of Batum, including all expenditures on food, supplies, cost of military and administrative personnel. Actually, the British military governorship of Batum yielded a net gain, in excess of all costs, of £49,027 mainly because of the profits of the British oil administration. 17 If the documents of the British oil administration were studied outside of the larger context of concerns which triggered the British involvement in Transcaucasia the temptation to discuss British postwar policy in terms of oil imperialism would be irresistible.

Thus, British diplomatic and economic policies were not geared to the interests of Transcaucasian nationalities and as such they worked to undermine wartime commitments to open diplomacy and national self-determination. While this contradiction caused
disappointments and bitterness among Middle Eastern nationalities aspiring to independence, it did not much bother the British government, mainly because the wartime promises were made for achieving victory, not from sincere convictions or serious concern for the postwar world order.\textsuperscript{18} In reality, many British politicians and an overwhelming number of military leaders believed that the subject people of the former Russian and Ottoman empires were unfit to govern themselves. Moreover, democracy was not necessarily the best suited to these peoples, a conviction which enabled the majority of policy-makers to excuse the inconsistencies between their pledges and their practices. When the Transcaucasian republics fell to invaders many saw in the event confirmation of their views rather than the legacy of any actions by the British government.

These views were most pronounced and consistently held in the military. The decision to occupy the Batum-Baku line was made after a discussion based on a War Office memorandum on Russian policy. The War Office was only concerned with providing material and military aid to Denikin in South Russian and recommended intervention in the Caucasus "to extend a hand to those elements in the Caucasus which tend to make a stable Russian Government [emphasis added]."\textsuperscript{19} In vain did Arthur Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, argue that support should also be given to "the small nationalities of the Caucasus" -- only Denikin and the Baltic States were earmarked as the beneficiaries of British aid.\textsuperscript{20} Although sometime later the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee, in preparation for the Peace Conference, resolved under the proddings of Lord Curzon that "We desire to see strong independent States -- offshoots of the former
Russian Empire -- in the Caucasus," it added that recognition had to await "the march of events and their successful assertion of an autonomous existence." Thus, the outcome of the Russian civil war rather than the right of self-determination was to decide the fate of the republics. The Peace Conference granted de facto recognition only after the collapse of Denikin's movement.

The War Office believed that Britain should follow a policy sympathetic to the Turks and Denikin, for a friendly Turkey and Russia would be the best protection to India with its sizable Moslem population. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff Sir Henry Wilson was not disturbed by the undemocratic traits in the Denikin movement. He actually believed that some sort of autocracy was best for the people in that part of the world as the more one saw "of democracies and republics the more inefficient, callous, and disagreeable they appear[ed] to be." Sir Henry Wilson's claim that the Turks were a "very valuable asset to all our Eastern Empire," struck a favorable cord in the General Staff. Foreign Office criticism of War Office pro-Turkism, "in spite of the abominations committed by the Turks upon British subjects" during the war, was greeted with astonishment. For the British military the Turk, like the Indian native, was a "soldier and a very good soldier," or a child who could easily be looked after. The nineteenth-century myth of the brave and "clean fighting Turk" was alive and doing very well in the corridors of the War Office. Sir Henry Wilson argued that Armenians and Greeks were not more humane and civilized than the Turks: "as regards brutality and bestiality I do not suppose there is a tissue paper between Greeks, Bulgars, Turks, Armenians
and Kurds, and even Boches."²⁵ For the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and numerous other soldiers there was no significant difference between the systematic Turkish massacre and deportation of the bulk of the Armenian nation on the one hand and instances of killing, pillaging and burning of Moslem villages by roaming Armenian bands or even regular military units on the other.

General George Milne, the Commander in Chief of the Army of the Black Sea and responsible for military operations in Transcaucasia, shared and reenforced the views of his superiors.²⁷ He reported that the "so-called" Transcaucasian republics did not deserve Britain's attention or efforts. Their leaders were either illiterate and "dishonest demagogues" or advanced socialists. To the British military, socialism went hand in hand with Bolshevism. Thus, Menshevik Georgia and Dashnakist Armenia which had a socialist platform were regarded by many as Moscow's allies. Milne thought that these republics would be unable to stand on their own unless a "civilised power" administered them for at least one or two generations. It would take that long to educate them "to manage their own affairs." He saw no reason for Britain to undertake such an onerous responsibility and did not care much about the consequences if Britain abandoned the local nationalities:

... I am fully aware that the withdrawal of the British troops would probably lead to anarchy but I cannot see that the world would lose much if the whole of the inhabitants of the country cut each other's throats. They are certainly not worth the life of one British soldier. The Georgians are merely disguised Bolsheviks led by men who overthrew
Kerensky and were friends of Lenin. The Armenians are what the Armenians have always been, a despicable race. The best are the inhabitants of Azerbaijan, though they are in reality uncivilised. 28

This condescending attitude explains why the British military, when arbitrating territorial disputes among the republics, disregarded Transcaucasian arguments based on historic rights or the principle of national self-determination. The following episode shows that such feelings were not confined to the members of the British High Command. The evening before the evacuation of Batum in July 1920 a group of British officers were invited to dine with the Georgian mayor of the city. After dinner the mayor lent the officers his car to take them to their barracks. As the officers drove along they "all rather foolishly" sang the Russian Imperial National Anthem "at the top of our voices" in spite of the well-known Georgian sensitivity about their independence and their fear and hatred of Russians. 29

The English did not confine their arrogant attitude to Transcaucasian nationalities. Sir Henry Wilson totally agreed with the general from Cairo who wrote: "... I dislike them all equally, Arabs, Jews and Christians in Syria and Palestine, they are all alike, a beastly people, the whole lot of them not worth one Englishman." 30 Wilson replied: "... I quite agree with you that the whole lot, Arabs, Jews, Christians, Syrians, Levantines, Greeks, etc. are beastly people and not worth one Englishman." 31 It is significant that both lists omitted the Turks. Their long tradition of imperial rule in the Middle East qualified them as natural administrators -- a traditional justification for British
support of the Ottoman Empire. The Arabs, Armenians and Jews had no such tradition and thus could not be trusted to govern themselves. Moreover, the Turks, like the Kurds, nomadic Arab tribes and the Azerbaijanis, had not been corrupted by the Western influences which had infected the Jews, Greeks and Armenians of the Ottoman Empire and turned them into greedy and cowardly "Levantines." In that respect at least General Milne was backhandedly complementing the Azerbaijanis by calling them "uncivilised."

The Foreign Office, although more sensitive to wartime pledges and commitments to national self-determination, was reluctant to devote the resources of the country for the redemption of these pledges. In vain did junior members of the department like Arnold Toynbee remind their superiors of the promises made to Armenians and the fact that they were "probably as capable of self-government as the Balkan peoples, and certainly more so than the Arabs and Turks." The Foreign Secretary recommended support to Transcaucasian states not because he wanted to champion the idea of national self-determination but because these states were anti-Bolshevik. With few minor exceptions the Foreign Office staff agreed with Balfour that while the national governments in Transcaucasia should be recognized their ultimate fate should await developments in Russia. A memorandum clearly stated the Foreign Office reluctance to adopt a policy of unequivocal support to the aspirations of Transcaucasian nationalities:

... If Russia recovers rapidly, they might conceivably rejoin her in some federal relation; if the anarchy in Russia lasts many years, their present separation from her will probably be permanent. Our policy towards the Caucasus should be framed to meet either eventuality.
This was the argument made by Balfour at the Eastern Committee deliberations. No troops should be sent to defend these republics against Russia as this would be military folly, neither Britain should devote scarce manpower or resources to keep order among the Transcaucasian nationalities. Like the military authorities Balfour too saw no reason why Britain should embark on a civilizing mission in Transcaucasia. Britain should secure the Batum-Baku line and let the rest of the region hang fire:

... if they want to cut their own throats why do we not let them do it. ... as I understand it we do let the tribes of the North-West Frontier [of India], outside our own frontier, cut each other's throats in moderation. We make expeditions, as I understand, of punitive character when they attack us, but when they merely attack each other we leave them alone. We do not try to introduce good order there. ... That is the way I should be inclined to treat these nations. I should say we are not going to spend all our money and men civilising a few people who do not want to be civilised. ... 36

The Foreign Office did not publicly repudiate its adherence to the principle of national self-determination, its pledges to Armenians and avowed support to Georgian independence. However, when some of the Caucasian republics adopted a pro-Bolshevik Russian orientation or established commercial ties with Moscow the Foreign Office no longer recognized British pledges to these countries as binding. 37 For the British the gentleman's word was no longer
binding once a nation determined to establish ties with Bolshevik Russia or determined on its own to adopt a Bolshevik regime.

British policy in Transcaucasia during the Russian civil war disappointed the hopes and expectations of Armenians, Georgians and Azerbaijanis who felt betrayed, exploited and looked down upon. A Foreign Office report stated that British policy

... caused violent dissatisfaction in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Daghestan, and seriously affected the confidence of their people in the word and good faith of His Majesty's Government. The republics, it was said, were to be sacrificed to the Russian reactionaries; their nearest interest counted for little, their future for nothing, when weighed by Great Britain against her own immediate convenience. She was charged, indeed with having broken faith with the republic. 38

Most likely British policy helped demoralize the armed forces of the republics, thereby easing or hastening their fall to the Bolsheviks. The same Foreign Office assessment points out that in November 1920 the Republic of Armenia was living one of its darkest hours in its unhappy history. Armenia was being pressed by the Turkish Nationalists and in her army, which was full of recruits without training, "utmost demoralisation" prevailed.

... Bolshevik propaganda, too, had been busy with army and people alike, demonstrating to all the folly of relying upon any external aid except Russia or Turkey. In the light of recent experiences, this advice found many Armenians in agreement. Amid these conditions Bolshevik agents did not find revolution a difficult movement to organise and carry through. It was effected in a few days, and the Dashnak Government [of Armenia] were removed. 39
This, with some significant differences in detail, was the story of all three Transcaucasian republics.
Notes

1. The leader of Ertoba, the organ of the Georgian Social Democratic Party, as reprinted in Nor Ashkhatavor (Tiflis), 14 September 1919, no. 191. Nor Ashkhatavor was the organ of the Georgian Central Committee of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutiun), the ruling party in the Republic of Armenia. This daily also appeared at different times under the titles of Ashkhatavor and Haradj. This paper is a valuable source for the history of Transcaucasia in the period under discussion as it reprinted and replied to the editorials of the major Georgian and Azerbaijani newspapers.

2. Nor Ashkhatavor, editorial of 7 September 1920, no. 124 (196).


5. 24 August 1919, no. 173.

6. Editorial as reprinted in Nor Ashkhatavor, 14 September 1919, no. 191.

7. 16 July 1920, no. 81 (153).
8. See the minutes and verbatim notes of the Eastern Committee deliberations in December, 1918, CAB. 27/24.


16. Osborne's minute of 16 March 1921 on Treasury to F.O., 15 March 1921, ibid.

17. W.O. to F.O., 1 April 1921 (enclosing B.B. Cubitt to Treasury, 1 April 1921), F.O. 371/6278,E3970/1829/58. See also W.O. to F.O., 27 August 1920, F.O. 371/4945,E10645/1/58.

18. This topic is discussed at some length in Artin H. Arslanian, "British Wartime Pledges, 1917-18: The Armenian Case," *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 13, no. 3 (July, 1978), 517-530.


20. "Minutes of the Proceedings of a Conference held at the Foreign Office on November 13th, 1918 at 3:30 p.m."
W.O. 106/1560, no. 18.

21. Minutes and verbatim notes, Eastern Committee 43rd meeting, 16 December 1918, CAB. 27/24.


25. See note 23 above.
27. Milne to Wilson, 16 December 1919, ibid., File 37, no. 11.
28. Milne "private" to Wilson, 22 January 1919, ibid., File 37, no. 5.
30. Lt.-General Sir W.N. Congreve to Wilson, 1 April 1920, Wilson Papers, File 52A, no. 16.
32. These themes are elaborated in Elie Kedourie, England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire 1914-1921 (London, 1956), 69-82.
33. F.O., Political Intelligence Department, "Memorandum on Changes in the General International Situation since the Date of the main British Commitments regarding the Middle East," n.d. [November, 1918], F.O. 371/3385,W44/191700/747/18.
34. A.J.B., "Notes on our Policy in Russia, 1st November, 1918," CAB.1/27, file 23.
35. Eyre A. Crowe, "Memorandum on a Possible Territorial Policy in the Caucasus Regions," 7 November 1918, CAB. 27/36, E.C. 2359. This position paper was the result of detailed discussions with at least two other members of the Foreign Office. See E.H. Carr's minute of 7 November 1918, F.O. 371/3301,W38/186203/2242/18.
36. Minutes and verbatim notes, Eastern Committee 43rd meeting, 16 December 1918. See also the verbatim notes of the 42nd meeting of the Eastern Committee, 9 December 1918, CAB. 27/24.

39. Ibid.