Some day a historian of child welfare will record this striking contrast between unbelievable efforts to carry out lofty slogans about the happiness of children and the future society, and the harsh reality which sullied them and trampled them into the mud.

M. N. Gernet (1874-1953)

These words of an eminent Russian criminologist looking back over the early Soviet years lead directly to the theme of this account. It is an account of "shining ideals," and "harsh reality," all right. And the point is that much of the "harsh reality which sullied and trampled" ideals grew out of the originally unintended results of the very Bolshevik revolution which nurtured them.

The original Soviet ideals for rehabilitating juvenile criminals and the nature and circumstances of their implementation bring home graphically that revolution serves better to restructure political authority than to re-constitute social authority. Moreover, the ideals and conflicts over these ideals, even the extent of their implementation alone fall short of conveying the full impact of revolution on culture. The ultimate success and failure of revolutionary ideals, their remolding of culture, depends on their relation to existing attitudes but also on the other policies and outcomes of the entire revolutionary process and cannot be understood apart from that broader context.

Between 1917 and 1924 the Soviet regime laid down the foundation in theories, laws and institutions for the battle to establish order-supporting authority over hordes, yes millions of homeless or untended children and adolescents, to form the new man of the future socialist society. This account focusses on Soviet responses to juvenile crime in the context of the Czarist legacy, early Soviet non-punitive approaches, civil war breakdown and
Bolshevik responses to juvenile vagabondage and crime, the juvenile work communes, and, apart from them, the retreat to more punitive alternatives.

An Inauspicious Legacy

Revolution follows political de-authorization. But more than political authority may collapse. Russia's helter-skelter exodus from village to towns and disastrous wars tore the social as well as the political fabric of custom and authority. Peasant in-migration swelled the urban population three-fold during the last 40 years of the 19th century and continued into the 20th to crowd impoverished families into fetid tenements, 5 to 8 persons in a room and to swamp welfare and order-keeping agencies. Out of work but surrounded by stealable goods in the communal apartments, stores, markets, many peasant lads drifted beyond any semblance of a family and community life. The research of Prof. M.N. Gernet's Moscow University seminar on juvenile delinquency found in the dossiers of nearly 3000 cases apparent ample proof of the role of poverty, unemployment and the destruction of peasant culture and authority in fostering crime, and of the corrupting slum environment -- the heavy drinking (a country pastime too), idling in taverns and billiard parlors, prostitution, robbable markets, pickable pockets in city crowds, and the dens for sleeping, carousing, consorting and plotting.

Many city youngsters lived desperately like Ch. His mother, the Moscow court dossier read, worked in a factory; his father lived somewhere around the "Khitrovka" market. Homeless and without steady work, Ch. fell in with some debauched newspaper boys, drank, "defrauded the public by selling old newspapers, shouting sensational headlines: 'Stolypin killed!' Stolypin, the prime minister was assassinated later, in 1911, "bomb explodes!" etc." Finally
as a beggar he broke the window of a storekeeper who refused him a handout and was sent to court.  

Indeed Russia's trials of change and blows from war on the home front hit heaviest at juveniles. Their convictions rose at twice the rate for adults at the turn of the century. Convictions of juveniles after the Russo-Japanese War and 1905 Revolution registered an increase "without equal in the courts of Western Europe." Felony convictions of juveniles again soared in World War I, by 75% in 1914-1916. War, the penologist P.I. Liublinskii wrote, "created millions of orphans... drove masses of refugees with small children from their homes, disrupted children's schooling, undermined their health by prolonged deprivation, forced tens of thousands of children into overtaxing work and subjected the children's delicate psyches to the pathological impact of inflamed wartime passions and the hubbub of black market speculation."  

Swarms of these children ended up homeless as Ch. the newspaper boy had. Predecessors of these besprizorniki - untended ones - roamed Russia's streets and highways back at least to Petrine times, but never more numerously than in the wartime twilight of the empire. Because of government inertia and lack of funds, programs against child vagrancy and crime voted at the All-Russian Conference on Wartime Child Care (March 1916) remained mere words. Then war dragged Russia to defeats and collapse in 1916-1917, as crime, mounting ever higher, and the revolutionary outcome of February-October 1917, caught up with and inundated the previously accelerating reform movement in juvenile justice led by jurists like Liublinskii and Gernet. Clearly an inauspicious legacy awaited them and their new Bolshevik governors. But its deep disorder seems idyllic compared with the consequences of the revolutionary conflict to follow.
Bolshevik officials responsible for law and order divided over how to deal with child criminals: treat them outside corrupting jails, as malleable victims of the old order, or punish them as criminal enemies of society? Opponents of reform almost blocked it in the Council of People's Commissars. With Lenin's backing, it got through as the decree of January 14, 1918.12 Thereafter, it proclaimed, "there shall be no courts or prisons for children." The decree raised the lowest age for criminal liability from the Czarist 10 years13 to 17. Child suspects through age 16 were to be referred to newly created Comissions on Juvenile Affairs - CJA's. CJA's were to be educational and welfare as well as sanctioning agencies, unlike the part-educational, part-punitive Czarist children's courts begun in 1910.14 Children then in prison were to be released, and if need be, housed in reformatories. "When the legislators drafted the law," recounted V.I. Kufaev, criminologist and associate of Gernet, "they were more concerned about the harm lawbreaking might do to the child than they were about the harm it might do to the state, for that harm resulted from disorder in the life of the state."15

The new legislation represented at least a paper victory for Soviet reformers, communist and non-communist alike. They hoped to rehabilitate wayward children by making their environment more humane and secure, away from the repressive, punitive and criminogenic surroundings of Czarist correctional institutions, wherein most juveniles ended up housed with the adult criminals, who became their law-opposing authority figures.16

Breakdown

Meanwhile, Lenin's slogan of 1914 - "Change world war into civil war!" - came home to roost in Soviet Russia, but not as a means to communist takeover, rather, as a consequence of it.
Devastation and hunger drastically depopulated large cities. But per capita rates of juvenile convictions rose so high that absolutely, too, they increased. Vorushki, the little thieves were everywhere, it seemed. They stole food from stalls, luggage from travellers, money and property from friends and relatives as well as strangers, they burglarized. They could be dangerously violent, but more so outside Moscow and Petrograd, in the provinces, where crimes other than theft included timber poaching, moonshining, smuggling, horse stealing and arson.

Criminologists found it particularly disturbing that most juvenile criminals came from classes closest to the revolution: workers, peasants, artisans, and other persons of humble occupation, even "under the rule of the proletariat." That things got worse in Soviet Russia after World War I while crime dropped in capitalist countries like England and Germany only made matters worse. But at least in those days, criminologists could make such comparisons.

Out of civil war came the dreadful famine of 1920-1921. Three out of 10 children in the Volga region succumbed to starvation and disease, before Russian and U.S. relief efforts could take effect. Besprizorniki formed marauding bands, joined in acts of cannibalism. Many tried to flee disaster on foot or stowed away on trains, along a doleful route marked by hundreds of thousands of little corpses. Children's crime, up to then typically urban, spread into the countryside, "especially in famine regions and regions of intensified civil war."

The accumulation of war, civil war and famine produced around seven million besprizorniki. But children's shelters could hold only 540,000 at their peak of capacity, and under conditions so horrible that many inmates preferred to take their chances on the street.
Throngs the cities into the 1920s, groups and gangs of begging and pilfering besprizorniki took nocturnal shelter in empty railroad carriages, station closets, foul flophouses, giant tar caldrons still warm from the day's work. Many of them ravaged by syphilis or exposure, addicted to cocaine, besprizorniki accounted for 80 to 90 percent of all lawbreaking by juveniles. Poor city children, too, joined the waifs. "It is not difficult," Kubaev noted, to trace how a child coming from a poverty-stricken proletarian family unable to give him an education and job training, finds himself willy-nilly on the job market and, left to his own devices, becomes a besprizornik." In-migration resumed and again schools lost control as did many families, as authority broke down in the drunken social anarchy of factory barracks and slums which disgorged their neglected or abused child victims onto the streets as in the old days. 

Child vagabondage of the besprizorniki remained a "major social disaster" long after the period 1917-1924. So did juvenile crime. While some jurists in 1917-1924 envisaged broad state programs of "social and legal protection for children," other jurists and the regime initiated steps to liberate women while reinforcing family obligations and assisting mothers, to bolster the child-rearing functions of the temporarily necessary relic, the family and to enforce paternity and support obligations.

But Russia's poverty dogged child care and rehabilitation at every step. Agencies competed for pittances. Conflicts arose "over whether desperately short funds should go to housing children sleeping in ruins, water conduits, and tar heating cauldrons, or to training guardians competent to supervise children pulled in off the streets." State care of children had been the Marxists' goal for an age of affluence. It was being attempted already in
1919 under conditions of last-ditch conflict and growing hunger. Children's needs for food, clothing, and shelter, even before the famine years, rapidly exceeded the capacity of children's homes.29 There was nothing with which to remedy this. And competing priorities for what resources there were included lavish allotments abroad for purposes of the Bolshevik-controlled Communist International and its member parties.30 Moreover, economies decreed in 1922 as part of economic accountability of the New Economic Policy increased unemployment and forced the closing of over half the children's shelters. Their capacity fell from the already inadequate 540,000 in 1921 to 280,000 by 1924 and lower after.

There was little or no coordination in child care and rehabilitation, at least through 1924. They remained under the competing jurisdictions of a number of agencies exercising Soviet state authority over children. These included the People's Commissariats of Enlightenment (Narkompros), Health (Narkomzdrav), and Social Security; the secret police*; the NKVD; and the People's Commissariat of Justice (Narkomiust). That tangle is a story by itself, best told elsewhere.32 Given the importance of Labor Communes as reforms in rehabilitation, however, a few words are in order about their rival sponsors, Narkompros and the OGPU.

Feliks Dzerzhinsky's command of power and resources gave him an advantage over Anatoly Lunacharsky and the RSFSR Narkompros. Dzerzhinsky headed the Cheka since its founding in December 1917. He took over the NKVD in 1920, the People's Commissariat of Transport in 1921 and in 1924, VSNKh, the Supreme Council of the

*It was known by its acronym Cheka or VCheka until 1922 when it became the GPU in the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) and in 1924 the OGPU, a separate agency again, attached to the Council of People's Commissars.
National Economy. Dzerzhinsky amply earned his reputation as "scourge of the bourgeoisie and faithful knight of the proletariat." But he had professed great love for children and special empathy for the homeless and hungry ones already in his revolutionary youth. On January 21 of the dreadful year 1921 he achieved the formation of an inter-agency Commission to Improve Children's Life. He headed it with another Chekist as his deputy (V. S. Kornev, Chief-of-Staff of the Cheka troops). The other five members of this seven-person agency to coordinate child welfare measures came from concerned agencies including the commissariats of health, food, enlightenment and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (an agency of administrative inspection and control). Dzerzhinsky installed Chekists to head local branches of the commission.

Cheka's entry into the lists as savior of children created tensions with Narkompros. That commissariats pedagogues saw themselves frozen out of influence over child welfare efforts. They associated Cheka with harsh discipline and with the possible intimidation of teachers. A Narkompros report of 1920 stated the credo guiding Narkompros approaches to wayward children: "We do not recognize juvenile crime. We know only sick children, spoilt by an ugly environment and education." Punishment, though was not Cheka policy either, in the early 1920's. Dzerzhinsky himself instructed the Commission to Improve Children's Life: "For children in Soviet Russia there are no trials and no imprisonment." Narkompros girded itself to deal with sick, defective children. The Chekists involved were counselled, rather, to see the children as basically unspoiled victims of a sick society.

Out in the field Cheka used its centralized and pervasive machinery to dominate conflict-ridden attempts at resuing children from the famine in 1921. It *icked* the private Committee for Aid
to the Starving, imprisoning its leaders on charges of intriguing against the Soviet regime.  

Narkompros, meanwhile, had begun to open a series of Children's Labor Communes as part of its program for rehabilitating criminal and derelict juveniles, for rescuing them from the culture of the streets and turning them into carriers of the new culture of the coming socialist society.

Architects of the brighter future drawing up their plans amidst the ruins of the old society their regime's revolution had helped shatter, pedagogues of Narkompros made NEP a period for experimentation and innovation in re-education of a variety and boldness later unequalled in the USSR.

Stanislav Shatsky (1878-1934) personified the close connection Narkompros maintained between education and the rehabilitation of youth. Shatsky set up forerunners of the Labor Communes before the revolution. His "Cheerful Life" summer labor colony, organized in 1911 for working class children, anticipated the later Narkompros combination of socially useful work and general education as the foundation of character building.

Educators shaping policy within Narkompros agreed that communes and schools should combine book learning with work training, that these institutions should not only reflect social change but should actively influence it by helping form the new socialist culture. In the Russian revolutionary tradition the pedagogues extolled the collective side of the educational experience.

The educators disagreed among themselves, however, over questions as to whether the school would "wither away" entirely, and as to the relationship between the individual and the collective. What was the proper balance between individual self development and
and a collective's ideals? Anatoly Lunacharsky (1875-1933), Head of the RSFSR Narkompros, hence the leading ministerial figure for education and culture in the USSR, depicted the struggle against "individualism" and for the new culture as the pursuit of an ideal "communal life based not on compulsion and the need of mankind to herd together for mere self-preservation, as it has in the past, but on a free and natural merging of personalities into superpersonal entities." 40 Quite in line with this vision of spontaneous collectivism was the child-centered, psychologised approach to ex-besprizorniki undergoing rehabilitation as sick and sometimes dangerous defectives to be isolated from society and cured after proper diagnosis with the assistance of psychological techniques from the West.

Among the holdouts against this method was the most famous commune leader of all, the Ukrainian communist ex-schoolteacher Anton Makarenko (1888-1939). Makarenko is so well-known relative to other commune leaders and so untypical of Narkompros' pedagogues that I shall touch only lightly on him here, devoting this account mainly to lesser known figures and methods. It is worth pointing out, though, that Makarenko's method of rehabilitation featured tight, group-imposed discipline (ranging from persuasion to shaming, non-corporal punishment and the ultimate penalty, expulsion from his Gorky Commune), a core nucleus of dedicated communards loyal to Makarenko, that leader's own firm back-up and fatherly presence, quasi-military ritualism (drums, bugles, marching, guard watches and ceremoniality), a contempt for foreign pedagogy and for Narkompros methods, and a refusal to delve into the past or the psyche of a new recruit to the commune. Eventually this difference of method led Makarenko to bitter conflict with Narkompros and to his departure
from Narkompros in 1927-1928 to open and head the OGPU's Dzerzhinsky Commune. After ten successful years, it was liquidated under Stalin along with all other communes.41

Away from the rarified atmosphere of pedagogical debate, commune founders out in the field had to improvise, to make a go of it in half-ruined estates, dilapidated former Czarist juvenile colonies, and converted jails. Because as a rule they functioned as closed institutions, the Narkompros communes tended to be hard to distinguish from the juvenile colonies of imperial Russia. This changed in 1924-1925 as a result of gains made in Narkompros by environmentalists. One of them cited to the Second Psychoneurological Congress in 1924 the rehabilitation of 4,500 "defective" lawbreaking children in Petrograd simply by giving them decent housing, clothing, food, and schooling. These alleged criminals were not defective at all, she said, but "children warped by the abnormal life they had to lead and their abnormal upbringing."42

Indeed, 1924, the last year of the time period for this account, marked a turning point in Narkompros policy. It brought about by 1925 the opening up of closed communes and orders also to introduce vocational training everywhere. All institutions for "difficult" children were to resemble communes as closely as possible. That is, they were to feature maximum possible voluntary recruitment, self-government, and socially useful work as part of training for life. Behind these ideals, but still apparent to Narkompros, one must not forget, lay the hard facts of poverty. They rendered it impossible often "to satisfy the most basic needs of youngsters" let alone provide "the proper means of labor training." Moreover, the conditions, practices and effectiveness of communes varied widely.43

One of the first, and apparently more successful communes appeared in 1919, the year before Makarenko's. Its director, Mirandov,
set up the Ulyanovsk Labor School-Commune on a ruined estate along the Volga. He and his counselors faced nightmarish difficulties alongside their first charges, ten criminals whose youth belied their long prison records. The staff had also to contend with local hostility, and the famine of 1920-21 from which their farm never quite recovered. By 1925 they would have four workshops and 50 communards - all full or half orphans. Material difficulties prevented them from taking in their full quota of 65. Mirandov, as Makarenko, insisted on complete trust between counselors and inmates. He had open doors from the beginning in 1919 and "neither guards nor watchmen, wardens, nor solitary confinement." He directed the wifs' street-developed initiative into a form of goal-directed participatory democracy. Also to hold the communards' trust as in the Ulyanovsk Commune became, then, through Mirandov's report, a model for other communes. From Mirandov they heard:

Cut off from the city, situated in the remote countryside, we live as a close-knit family. Here we discuss all school matters and often private ones at general meetings. In the communal milieu nobody hesitates to seek support and sympathy when beset by personal troubles or grief. But the most potent source of revolutionary influence on the children we find to be organized collective work.

The communes of Narkompros accepted children 12 to 16 years old sent them by the Commissions on Juvenile Affairs, also straight from the street and orphanages, keeping them up to the maximum age of 18. Labor Communes of the OGPU would be taking an older contingent, 16 to 23 years old, but actually younger recruits too. Their boys and girls came from prison, labor camps, despairing Commissions on Juvenile Affairs, and from among stowaways on trains. Their ampler funds and older contingent would enable them to flourish on the basis of regular factories of their own, not just rudimentary
workshops, and farms. Dzerzhinsky began the OGPU commune program in 1924. To initiate it he called on Matvei Pogrebinsky, an intense, dark young man, always, it seemed, in a black karakul fur hat, Pogrebinsky's reputation for working well with youth went back to his civil war service as a military commissar on the Siberian front against Kolchak. While working out plans for a commune, Pogrebinsky visited besprizorniki in their night-time haunts to gauge their outlooks and organization. He opened the first OGPU commune on August 18, 1924 in Bolshevo, the beautiful estate of chocolate manufacturer Kraft. Before its liquidation in 1937, along with Pogrebinsky, the Bolshevo commune would grow to over 1500 communards, a self-contained youth town with factories for shoes, knitted goods and skates. All differences of resources and methods aside, OGPU and Narkompros each, in its own way contributed to the movement of the first Soviet years away from "coercive placement in institutions and coercive retention of an adolescent in them by such physical means as locks, bars, etc., which contradict principles of Soviet pedagogy and do not achieve their purpose." But bars, locks, and fences of adult prisons and camps run by the NKVD and Cheka-GPU-OGPU awaited most juvenile criminals sentenced by the courts. The ideals and innovations of of the communes reached only a small proportion of all besprizorniki and juvenile criminals. Moreover, by 1924, law enforcement authorities had taken over from the educators the disposition of more and more cases involving minors. Even as the commune system expanded, criminal law retreated from the principle of "no courts or prisons for children." No account of rehabilitation would be complete without at least a brief glimpse of that retreat in criminal policy.
By 1919 new legislation dropped the minimum age of juvenile criminal liability from 17 to 14. Three years later the first RSFSR Criminal Code incorporated revisions made after 1919 including the reduction of the minimum age for unconditional criminal liability from the 18 years it was raised to in 1919 to 16. All minors 16 and 17 years old accused of crimes, the code read, were thereafter to go straight to the courts instead of first to Commissions on Juvenile Affairs. The CJA's up to then had sent to the courts only incorrigible minors.

The case of "Bulldog" (a street gang sobriquet) will illustrate both procedure and a typical background of a juvenile criminal. Bulldog migrated before the revolution from his village to Moscow with his parents. But his father died in a workers' demonstration in 1917. The death of his mother from TB orphaned Bulldog in 1923. He then ran away from a children's shelter where his brother had placed him, taking up the life of a besprizornik and professional thief. Several times the police ("militia") picked him up at the railroad station where he preyed on passengers, registered him, and took him to a "reception and distribution center" of Narkompros, where he appeared before a CJA. CJA's sat as three-person boards made up of a pedagogue from the education department of the borough soviet, a doctor from its health department and a local People's Court judge.

Eventually the CJA sent Bulldog to court under a provision of the 1922 Code that CJA's send to court juveniles 14 and 15 years old as well, when they were stubborn repeaters, habitual runaways from children's homes, or had committed homicide, aggravated assault, rape, robbery, arson, counterfeiting money or documents, bribery, large scale theft of socialist or cooperative property,
and speculation. After conviction for theft, Bulldog, because in the age group 14-15, rather than 16-17, went not to imprisonment but to a closed reformatory, Mostruddom (the Moscow Labor Home for Juveniles), run by the RSFSR NKVD.

The purpose of Mostruddom was "to train minors in a work skill, make them morally aware, develop their higher cultural interests, broaden their mental horizons through schooling and vocational training" (shoemaking, bookbinding, tailoring, etc.) "and make them self-reliant citizens of the Soviet republic aware of their rights and obligations." But from the moment a black maria or guarded foot convoy delivered Bulldog, Little Gypsy, Camel, Nikitka, and other ragged and vermin-ridden youngsters, they resisted these ideals and clung to street mores. Many of these youngsters sent to court by CJA's as incorrigible were "completely homeless, semi-literate, lacking work skills, with serious congenital deficiencies and the social maladjustment of abandoned, vagrant half-children half-adults, deformed by the life experiences and sharing a thieves' code of honor." A favorite drink among them was vodka mixed with cocaine and gulped down. Many bore tattoos of their fantasy-women, on their arms or, even in one case, on the penis, a psychiatrist of Mostruddom noted. "Sometimes tattoos appear on buttocks (for example a cat on one side and a mouse on the other which move when their wearer walks) or on the back (a naked man on one shoulder blade and a naked woman on the other; when the shoulder blades are squeezed together, the man and woman move close together)." The Mosstruddom staff could not end the rape of weaker boys by stronger ones. What a contrast between the emphasis on defects at Mostruddom and the emphasis on the collectivist environment by Mirandov, Makarenko and Pogrebinskiy in their much more lightly staffed and open communes!
and among reform-oriented criminologists, like Vasily Kufaev. Kufaev, a major critic of Mostruddom, worked in the Department for the Social and Legal Protection of Minors of the RSFSR Narkompros. He taught at the Second Moscow State University and worked in the Institute for the Study of Crime and the Criminal of the NKVD. Kufaev fought in the rearguard action of pedagogues in Narkompros and of reform-oriented lawyers like himself, Lyublinski and Gernet, against the growing reliance, already described, on physical coercion and criminal punishment for minors.53

At odds with Kufaev was Boris Utevsky, partisan of Mostruddom. Utevsky worked also at the Institute for the Study of Crime, specializing in the criminal personality (to which he returned after Stalin and until his recent death) and correctional policy. Utevsky sided with the NKVD against the approaches of educators and their jurist allies, approaches he considered to be sentimental and unrealistic.

Kufaev believed that treat a child like a criminal and you will make him one. For him, Mostruddom with its bars and guards did just that. The trend in pre-revolutionary Russian penology had been away from punishment toward treatment approaches, as still true in the capitalist countries of the West. All the harder, then, for Kufaev to take was the Soviet retreat to more "sentences to deprivation of freedom, a solution tried and already justly condemned in prerevolutionary times." Seconding Kufaev, Gernet added a vote for prevention: "Instead of sending a child to a little prison, one should send a pedagogue to seek out these waifs before they become lawbreakers . . . in orphaned families, tenements, in SRO 'corners', in workers' families, on the squares, among the street hawkers."54
Utevsky countered with the assertion that only by using guards and locks to foil inmates' escapes could Mostruddom hold them long enough to reform them. Kufaev was wrong to assume that the inmates got there by chance. Questionnaires cited by Kufaev gave false statistics, for inmates understated their ages to avoid more severe punishment, concealed past criminal records whenever possible, and were much more hardened habitual lawbreakers than Kufaev's data showed. Later, under Stalin, when labor homes like Mostruddom were being replaced by special trade schools (or simply, adult labor camps), Utevsky depicted Mostruddom as a failure. Indeed, it appeared to have been that, and surprisingly, given the heavy staffing -- nearly one staff member for every two of the 200 inmates.

Whatever their results, Labor Homes for Juvenile Lawbreakers made little difference in the fate of most juvenile lawbreakers because of limited capacity. It made little difference, also that NKVD distribution commissions might send 16 and 17-year-olds to Labor Homes, considered "educational-punitive" agencies instead of to regular correctional facilities after trials. The overwhelming majority of all teenagers, whether in the age group 14-15 or in that of 16-17, had to go to regular adult places of confinement, prisons and labor camps, there to be housed with or near adults, and schooled to crime by the real authority figures in such places, the professional thieves, as happened before the revolution. Not only lack of space caused this. Administrators at places of confinement considered 16 and 17-year olds to be adults.

Hence, alongside horrors of conflict, which vitiated the "lofty slogans" in child rehabilitation, shortages and retreats in implementing them also moved rehabilitation back toward that of Czarist times; that is, no rehabilitation at all for most juvenile criminals.
The Contradictions of Revolution

The early years of Soviet power brought diverse experimentation in the rehabilitation and upbringing of the decimated and devastated younger generation. Experts in education, crime, health and psychology, many of them already pioneers in rehabilitation before the revolution, received wide scope for their work. Among their achievements, were the Labor Communes for juvenile lawbreakers and vagrants.

Yet building a new socialist culture, a new set of values, meant not simply overcoming moral "survivals of the past." It meant also overcoming contradictions inherent in the very process of building a new political and social order.

Contradictory trends in policy reflected conflicting assumptions. Proponents of decriminalizing juvenile offenses lost ground to officials who prevailed in lowering the minimum age of criminal liability from 17 to 14. Experts favoring non-punitive approaches divided, as shown between those like Utevsky for some punishment and for isolation, in reformatories; the environmentalists; and the defectologists. These contradictory trends in policy and assumptions reflected also inter-agency and intra-agency competition.

If revolution was not immune to these familiar schisms in the correctional establishment, it brought special contradictions. First of all, the numbers of besprizorniki overwhelmed child care facilities. Millions suffered or perished during the civil war period and in the aftermath. Again, despite the bright hopes for the new order, the overwhelming majority of juvenile criminals went not to the Labor Communes of Narkompros or the reformatories of the NKVD but to adult prisons and camps, as before the revolution.

Toward the end of NEP a Soviet criminologist stated that the breakdown of law and order in his country was "not the result of the
Bolshevik autocracy' as out enemies believe or wish to believe, but of the survivals of the old way of life . . . of the capitalist past and capitalist encirclement." Indeed, the Bolsheviks faced an inauspicious legacy of un-managed urbanization and mis-managed wars. Social authority had been breaking down and crime increasing long before the Bolshevik Revolution. The question remains, what did the Bolshevik Revolution itself contribute, alongside the greater possibility of implementing progressive ideals of upbring and rehabilitation?

Did the Bolsheviks bring on the chaos described here because they eliminated private welfare agencies, eliminated churches' hold over the family and introduced freedom of marriage and divorce and other anti-patriarchal legislation? Critiques to that effect are hardly convincing. Private agencies failed before 1917 to cope with the smaller number of besprizorniki and lawbreakers. There is no reason to believe that they could have coped with them after the revolution. As for family breakdown - that had been growing along with urbanization in the 19th and 20th centuries. Legal and policy changes after the Bolshevik Revolution paled alongside the real subversive forces at work among the masses of Soviet people unleashed by the catastrophe of civil war and famine.

The basic contradiction of the Bolshevik Revolution, other than the paradox of an authoritarian liberation, was the contradiction between ideals and after-effects of conflict. It smashed existing cultures and authority faster than revolutionary social engineering could replace them.

"Systematic efforts to prevent crime," a leading Russian and Soviet criminal statistician wrote in 1918, "require expenditures of considerable resources and domestic tranquility in a society not distracted by political crises and intensified class struggle."
Conditions as he wrote could hardly be becoming more distracting
or the class struggle more intensified. A physician active in
CJA's attributed the torrent of besprizorniki and their crimes
to the demoralizing hardships and rapid change "that come with
every revolution."\textsuperscript{58} Certainly they occurred after the Bolshevik
Revolution. The Bolsheviks took power upon a miscalculation that
revolution would erupt also in the West, easing the task in backward
Russia. Adding also to the conflict was not so much class struggle
of itself as the Bolshevik insistence on a monopoly of power
(save for a brief coalition with a minority made up of Left Socialist
Revolutionaries from December 1917 to March 1918), and on forced
requisitions and terror to extract grain from the peasantry.
Repression, along with drought and transport breakdowns, contributed
to the famine of 1920-21.\textsuperscript{59}

Feliks Dzerzhinsky more than once stated frankly what the
conflict had meant. Victory won in the "bitter and bloody struggle"
had been a "costly" one, damaging to children's wellbeing, he told
Soviet readers.\textsuperscript{60} Earlier he told Lunacharsky, "we are faced with
a terrible calamity" among children, many of whom "have been
crippled by the struggle and poverty."\textsuperscript{61} This crippling after-effect
reached farther in the 1920's than did the ideals of the new man.
True, some youth workers extolled besprizorniki's romanticism,
street code of honor and collectivism, their rejection of the
"philistine" dreams of the private, well lined little nest.\textsuperscript{62}
Dzerzhinski remained less sanguine. He feared that child vagrancy,
"which after all takes such very monstrous and frightening forms
as child crime and prostitution, threatens the younger generation
with the gravest consequences."\textsuperscript{63} I would agree with Lilge's
conclusion that probably, among the besprizorniki, the greater
number died of famine and epidemics, that others grew up into adult criminals, and only a small minority were rehabilitated." Military experiences of children in uniform instilled in some of them "a passion for bloodletting."\(^{65}\)

The promoted achievers (the \textit{vydvizhentsy}) of Stalin's control and purge apparatus would come out of those caught as youths in the devastation of 1917-1921. The political police recruited from among social outcasts, and saints yes, but also sadists and perverts.\(^{66}\) They became operatives who put away and liquidated many makers of the revolution, the "old Bolsheviks." They became criminals who, when caught and sent to labor camp, preyed on those same "politicals." Meanwhile Stalin, his way paved by the revolutionary single party regime, liquidated also any rehabilitation based on the old socialist and liberal ideals inspiring the efforts at rehabilitation. Such were the contradictions of revolution, contradictions not concocted at a rarified distance from the scene by some academicians musings, but hammered out and amply recorded in the heat of the struggle for power - and for a new culture.
Notes

Quotation is from M.N. Gernet’s introduction to first edition of V.I. Kufaev’s Iunye pravonarushiteli, reprinted in Ibid., (2nd ed.; Moscow, 1925).


7. E. Tarnovskii, "Dvizhenie chisla nesovershennoletnikh,


11. Vasilevskii, Detskaia prestupnost', pp. 27-28; A.A. Gertsenzon, Bor'ba s prestupnost'iu v RSFSR: Po materialam obsledovaniia NK RKI SSSR (Moscow: 1928), pp. 13-16; Liublinskii, "Okhrana detstva." p. 28; Iu. Bocharov, "Pervye detskie sudy po delam o maloletnikh v Rossii." in Gernet, Deti-prestupniki, pp. 525-32, 536-40. As a young radical criminologist, M.N. Gernet envisaged that gallows, prison, corporal punishment would "wither away along with the old unjust social relations," to be replaced by "compulsory rehabilitation with the utmost humanity and respect for the inmates." Obshchesvennyya prichiny prestupnosti sotsialisticheskoe napravlenie v nauke ugolovnogo prava (Moscow, 1906), pp. 204-208.

12. Sobranie uzakonenii rabochego i krest'ianskogo pravitel'stva, hereinafter SU RSFSR, No. 16 (1917-1918), item 227.


16. Ibid., p. 42; M.K. Zamengor, "Mery presecheniiia i nakazaniia,
premeniaemyia k iunym prestupnikam," in Gernet, Deti-prestupniki, pp. 397, 409-10; P. Vsesviatskii, "Nesovershennol'tennie v tiur'me," Ibid., pp. 416, 421, 425-26; N.A Okunov (the first justice of the peace to be assigned to children's court), Osoby sud po delam o maloletnikh: Otchet na 1910g., quoted in Emel'ianov, "Prestupnost' nesovershennol'tennikh," Ibid., p. 221, and see also pp. 227-32.

17. Here are just two dimensions of the multifarious damage of conflict. In 1917-1920, the urban population fell from 18 to 15 percent. Not until 1926 did industrial production and percent urbanization regain 1913-1914 levels. Robert A. Lewis and Richard A. Rowland, "Urbanization in Russia and the USSR: 1897-1966," mimeographed monograph, Columbia University; B. Ts. Urlanis, Rost naseleniia v SSSR (Moscow, 1966), p. 28; Iiu. Pisarev, Naselenie i trud v SSSR (Moscow, 1966), p. 76. Petrograd's population fell from 1,217,000 to 722,000 in 1918-1921, but per capita crime rates of juveniles rose from 2.0 to 7.6 per 1000 inhabitants. Arrests of adults rose nearly 2.5 times in the Russian Republic between the first quarter (under 18) of 1920 and the first quarter of 1922. Arrests of juveniles/rose nearly four times. P.I. Liublinskii in intro. to Vasilevskii, Detskaia prestupnost', pp. lv-v.

18. Kufaev, Iunye pravonarushiteli, pp. 135-49, 61, 115-17, 122, 186-87, 218-25


24. Kufaev, *Iunye pravonarushiteli*, pp. 185, 188.


26. S. Tizanov, "Ob uchrezhdeniiakh dlia trudnykh detei i podrostok v sviazi s planom bor'by s detskoi besprizornost'iu," in V.L. Shveitser and S.M. Shabalova, eds., *Besprizornye v truodivkh kommunakh: praktika raboty s trudnymi det'mi; sbornik statei i materialov* (Moscow, 1926), p. 13. Tizanov was head of the Department of Social and Legal Protection of Children in the Chief Administration of Social Upbringing, RSFSR Narkompros. See also Epshtein, "Besprizornost' v SSSR," p. 786. Epshtein was head of that chief administration. Nearly a half century
after his encounter with the besprizorniki, "begging or stealing and living as wild animals unconnected with normal community life," an American visitor recalled that "At the time the tragic problem of these children seemed unsolvable." W. Averell Harriman, America and Russia in a Changing World: A Half Century of Personal Observation (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971), pp. 5-6.


28. Gernet, forward to Kufaev, Iunye pravonarushiteli, p. 10.

29. Widespread hunger, beyond the outcome of World War I, began already in 1919 before the main famine struck. See accounts by inmates of the Moscow Labor Home in B.S. Utevskii, V bor'be s detskoi prestupnost'iu: ocherk zhizni i byta Moskovskogo trudovogo doma dla nesovershennolennikh pravonarushitelei (Moscow, 1927), pp. 104-105.


Jennie Stevens, Arlington, Va. has prepared a pre-publication draft of "Children of the Revolution: Soviet Russia's Besprizorniki (Homeless Children) in the 1920s," in which agency organization and roles are treated in some detail.


34. Ibid., pp. 124-25.


40. Ibid., pp. 32, 138.


42. G. Daian, "Vtoroi psikhonevrologicheskii s'ezd (nekotorye itogi), Krasnaia nov', No. 2 (1924), pp. 155-66; No. 3 (1924), pp. 223-38. Quote is from No. 3, p. 231. Prof. Sheila Fitzpatrick brought this to my attention.

43. "Ot redaktsii," in Shveitser and Shabalova, Besprizornye v trudovikh kommunakh, p. 6; "Instruktivnoe pis'mo glavsovtsova ot 19/X-25g. No. 98206 o reorganizatsii uchrezhdenii dla trudnikh detei i o postanovke v nikh rabote," Ibid., pp. 174-77

44. Mirandov, "Rabota Ul'ianovskoi trudovoi shkoly-kommuny pri s. Maksimovke," Ibid., pp. 41-47. Quote is from p. 48.

45. Ages are only approximate for many reasons, and are mentioned in the later Statute on Labor Communes for Adolescents, January 7, 1926 in Ibid., pp. 171-74. On Pogrebinsky see M. Pogrebinsky Fabrika liudei (Moscow, 1929); E. Vatova, "Bolshevskaia kommuna i ee organizator," Iunost' No. 3 (1966), pp. 91-93, a source suggested by Prof. Sheila Fitzpatrick, saying on p. 93: "In 1937 Pogrebinskii perished at the age of 42 at the peak of his powers and talent. Bolshevo Commune also soon ceased to exist."


47. Ibid., pp. 13-14.

48. Education instead of punishment was to be used on juveniles
14 through 17 years old "acting without reason" (the old Czarist mitigation). Decree of December 12, 1919, SU RSFSR, No. 6 (1919), item 590, Art. 13.

49. A decree of March 4, 1920 changed the criteria of conditional responsibility for ages 14 through 17 from "acting with reason" to incorrigibility by educational or medical means. SU RSFSR, No. 13 (1920), item 83. Changes in policy are summarized in Kufaev, Iunye pravonarushiteli, pp. 27-76, Boldyrev, Mery, pp. 12-21.

50. Bulldog is a pseudonym supplied by this writer for an anonymous besprizornik and criminal quoted in Utevsky, V bor'be, p. 106.


52. Utevsky, V bor'be p.7 (Statute of labor home, on goals, quoted by E. Shirvindt, in intro.), and pp. 36-44, 75-95.


55. Utevsky, V bor'be, pp. 12, 13, 28, 31, etc.


57. B. Utevsky, "Itogi bor'by s prestupnost'iu nesovershennoletnikh," Administrativnyi vestnik, Nos. 10-11 (1927, pp. 56-61, cites room for only 1883 inmates in RSFSR Labor Homes in 1926. There were about 1 mln. convictions in the RSFSR (Juvel'rik, Revolutionary Law and Order, p. 31) and juvenile convictions were 4.7% of the USSR total (A.A. Gertsenzon, Sovetskaa ugolovnaia statistika


59. Zenzinov, Besprizornye, pp. 10-14; Bertrand Russell, The Practice and Theory of Communism (2nd ed.; London: George Allen and Unwin, 1949), p. 114 reasoned that forced requisitions "led to disaster, as they were bound to."


61. Quoted in Ibid., p. 123.


63. Quoted in Min'kovskii, "Osnovnye etapi," p. 39. See also Zenzinov, Besprizornye, p. 221.


65. Gernet in Kufaev, Iunye pravonarushiteli, p. 8. See also Zenzinov, Besprizornye, pp. 189-90; Vasilevsky, p. 70.


Addendum p. superfix 64 after rehabilitated." on line 2.