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THE END OF ETHNIC INTEGRATION
IN SOUTHERN CENTRAL ASIA

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Intellectual leaders in southern Central Asia seldom found the subject
of group identity of compelling interest at the beginning of the twentieth
century. When the Czarist government collapsed in March 1917, they suddenly
faced the problem of group identity, not merely for contemporary political
reasons, but for basic cultural and intellectual ones. Their attempts to
find themselves were reflected at once in several forums, including the
periodical press. When genuinely local newspapers and journals had first
appeared in Turkistan in 1905-1906, the issue was easily ignored. Now, the
Reformists (Jāidichilār), active indigenous users of the new media, seriously
grappled with the crucial matter of group naming in their press. Names
defined cultural constituencies and homeland. Under the altering political
circumstances after 1917, they grew rapidly in significance.

At that moment, nothing appeared to restrict the choices available
except logic, but tension would soon grow between two possible categories
of names. Were Central Asians to be linked to their area as a whole, or,
subdivided according to some narrower principle? To the extent that the
selection of a name was to be in Central Asian hands, it looked as if the

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D.C., to whose officers grateful acknowledgement is made. Transliterations
follow the systems in Nationalities of the Soviet East... by Edward Allworth
chosen designation would be broad enough to embrace the heterogeneity of population that had characterized the area for centuries.

Around 1900, the people of southern Central Asia still defined themselves loosely. The tighter such definition, the greater the difficulties. In particular, as an eponym the name "Ozbek" was the least specific of all. One author, linked with Russian Orthodox missionaries, advanced the opinion that the name "Ozbek" was collective, not individual. "In Turkistan territory, it is accepted that those Turks are called 'Ozbek' who hold the middle ground between the Kazakhs / whom he wrongly called 'Kirgiz' / and the Sarts." In modern Central Asia, a "Sart" was a settled, not nomadic person, usually a southern village or town dweller, whose language he himself called "Turki." The designation "Sart" included as well people of urban Iranian stock who had earlier adopted the Turki tongue. To complicate matters further, Slavic invaders after the mid-nineteenth century indiscriminately referred to all southern Central Asians as "Sarts" if they were not readily identifiable as Kirgiz or Turkmens.

Central Asian humanists under these circumstances were obliged to ponder the question of group naming. A Marxist-trained local historian wrote in retrospect about "an Ozbek era" (ozbek waqti) that ostensibly began in Central Asia in the first years of the sixteenth century and continued to the present. His interpretation evidently meant to rationalize the government decision made public after 1922 to attach "Ozbek" to part of Turkistan territory. Another historiographer and author from the region writing in the 1920s declared, after substantial research, that "The name (ism) 'Ozbek' lost its old grandeur and scope in the last centuries and had been thoroughly preserved only in the deserts of Khwarazm and of some other districts." He found that the name "Sart," on the contrary, was both historical, clearly
known, and so generally used that everyone in southern Central Asia recognized it. He argued further that there were pertinent consequences resulting from the "Ozbek" group name's "having fallen to very unimportant status in the last centuries." One effect was that the lack of such an ethnic identity had served particularly to retard the emergence of specifically "Ozbek" culture and education in modern times. His contemporary testimony showed that as late as the start of the 1920s there was no unified, self-named "Ozbek" aggregate.

If there were as yet no stable group names inside southern Central Asia, a negative process was working to change the situation. Outsider's labels and ethnic slurs usually reinforce a victimized group's identity by provoking collective resentment and discriminatory acts. When imposed in modern Central Asia, such unfriendly designations have seldom, if ever, succeeded in gaining long-term favor or acceptance as group self-names. Nevertheless, usage gives labels and slurs a certain current life. Both "Ozbek" and "Sart" carried some disqualifications of this sort when viewed as candidates for large group self-names in the region.

In the "Ozbek" case, the name had substantially given way to the more flexible appellation, "Sart" centuries before 1900, though the two were not identical. "Sart" retained its primacy in much of settled life, and therefore in reported popular speech and records until the Czarist invasion in the nineteenth century. Russian adoption of the term "Sart" fixed it even more strongly in both publication and the vernacular. At the same time, the application of this name to all Central Asians in the South by the foreign infidel conqueror seemed to distort and taint it irredeemably. Not only the occupying Russians, but the Ozbeks' strongest Central Asian rivals, the Kazakhs, uttered "Sart" in ways that displeased
its bearers immensely. One folk etymology explained "Sart" as a merging of the two Turkic words sari(gh) (yellow) and it (dog), the compound equalling sart. Canines ordinarily were regarded with revulsion around Central Asian settlements, and a "yellow dog" seemed even more reprehensible. A second Kazakh derivation for "Sart" was pointedly offensive, as the noted Kazakh poet, Ibray (Abay) Qunanbay-ulî (1845-1904), had written in his "Reasonings" (Ghaqliyya):

...our Kazakhs, encountering Ozbeks, would call them 'Sarts' and make fun of them, saying: 'oh, you so and so's, skirted, gibberish-speaking people; sweet-smiling but abusive behind the smile; oh, you Sarts!' In our language, you see, sart-surt means 'loud sound, jabber, gabble', and sart means 'jabbered, gabbled, roared'. That is how we joked over our neighbors....If we ran into Russians, we poked fun at them behind their backs, considering them unbridled, credulous people...

Thus, whether on the tongue of a Russian colonist or Kazakh competitor, "Sart" could carry the sting of prejudice. The ethnic slur, "yellow dog," survived malevolently into the 1920s as a pejorative flung by certain non-"Ozbeks." An eminent Russian linguist reported in the mid-1920s that "In reality, three terms aimed at Ozbeks, imbued with the spirit of /Russian/ colonialism, still live one, unfortunately, in the uncultured part of the Russian population of the territory. They are 'Sart', 'Sartishka' and 'beast' (zver').

All this explained why as late as the third decade of the twentieth century some sub-groups of Turkistan later to be categorized by Soviet politicians as nationalities still lacked unity and a single, persuasive secondary (ethnic) self-identity. People destined officially to be called "Ozbek" were spread across extensive territory in various parts of which the inhabitants, including themselves, had experienced changes differently in life style and language. Several dialects grew up within "Turki,"
distinguishing Chimkent, Farghana, Khiva, Samarkand or Tashkent speech. Only at Khiva did cultural and language boundaries closely coincide. According to a Russia-wide Academy of Sciences Commission for studying the Tribal Makeup of the Population of Russia and Adjoining Countries, "Ozbeks could not conceive of the same unified and detached ethnic group for themselves as the Kazakhs, Kirgiz or Turkmens." Their cultural-linguistic boundaries were "extremely diffused," and one great portion of the "Ozbek" group, the Turkified Iranian inhabitants referred to as "Ozbeks" by some of them, and as "Sarts" by the Kazakhs "had nowhere created a particular ethnic identification for itself." Data collectors for the farming census of 1917 in Central Asia, instructed to ignore the term "Sart," lumped numbers of Turkified Tajiks together with "Ozbeks" in their figures. This magnified the problem of counting either classification, and further confused the vaguely defined groups.

Political realization of the cultural and intellectual drive for a unitary Turkistan occurred first in late November, 1917, when a representative conclave of southern Central Asian leaders met at the city of Qoqan (Khokand) to form and organize the Autonomous Provisional Government of Turkistan (APGT). Early the next month, this body declared the independence of the new Turkistan state, but called for its federation with a democratic republic expected to rise from the ruins of the old Russian Empire.

The APGT had a complexion matching the compound prescribed by the newspaper Sāda-i Turkistan (April 1914-May 8, 1917). The new domain combined people from many sub-groups of southern Central Asia into the government and thereby united the heterogeneous region under a self-name, "Turkistan," for the first time in history (the old Turkistan had quite a different location and dimension, and of course, was not self-incorporated).
Contributors to *Sada-i Turkistan*, a Tashkent Reformist periodical, regularly included some of the most illustrious thinkers and leaders of the region from both older and younger generations. Munawwar Qari, Abdullah Awlaniy, Abdulhamid Sulayman Cholpan, Mullah Sayyid Ahmad Wasli, Hajji Mu in Shukrullah-oghili, Shakirjan Rahimi, Ubaydullah Khoja (one of its chief editors), Sa'id Ahmad Khoja Siddiqiy, Hamza Hakimzada Niyaziy, and others, by their participation signalled support for the group identity spelled out in the newspaper's flag, *Voice of Turkistan*.

The paper made real headway in developing and enlarging the numbers of public-spirited individuals and intellectuals from what was called "the nationality" (*millät*), meaning, Turkistan as it was then understood. In the same vein, a succeeding newspaper, also published in Tashkent, took a similar name, *Ulugh Turkistan* (Great Turkistan), starting in April 1917. Although the two bore outward resemblances in name, their outlook differed significantly. *Great Turkistan*, dominated and edited by Tatars in Central Asia and from Kazan, expressed a remarkable extension in the idea and compass of the proper framework in which to find unity. The nature of its sponsorship, audience and linguistic media -- Kazakh, southern Central Asian and Tatar -- showed this. All the areas and Turkic people of Tatarstan and of Central Asia, including Kazakhstan and Eastern Turkistan, except those of the Transcaspian region, explicitly became partners in this "Great Turkistan," according to the newspaper's program.

Obviously, this "Turkistan" possessed a Tatar bias and lacked a local focus. In this application, the name no longer stood simply for part or even all of Central Asia. That journalistic usage reflected a political thrust that worked at cross-purposes with any drive for refining a notion of homeland and group name peculiar to the people of southern
Central Asia. And, while it created a tension between Tatar and Turkistanian interests, it moved not an inch in the direction of specifying particular ethnic sub-groups in Central Asia -- it simply had no conventional limit. In delineating "Turkistan" from that vantage point, ideas remained more important than territorial limits. The extent and human identity of this "Turkistan" remained vague well into the period of upheaval beginning in March, 1917.

Two and a half months after the declaration at Qoqan in late 1917, the APGT disintegrated and disappeared under Russian gunfire, ending that first modern attempt at indigenizing (yırılissent) Turkistan identity in political terms. When the Provisional Government in Petrograd in 1917, and the new regime in Moscow in 1918 moved to reorganize administration in southern Central Asia, the general popularity and currency of the Turkistan name induced the country's political leadership to employ it for the territorial unit. A Turkistan Committee appointed April 7 (20), 1917, by the Provisional Government was matched to some degree by a Turkistan Territorial Council of Workers and Soldiers Deputies that held its first congress April 7-15, 1917.

The editors of the local Great Turkistan paper revealed sufficient sensitivity to regional issues to perceive the threat implicit in these two outside manipulations of Central Asian affairs. One of its writers commented: "...when it comes to the country (olḵā) of Turkistan, the situation is totally different, of course, because the nationality (khalq) found in it is 98% Muslim....The /Russian/ soldiers and laborers found in Turkistan...persistently mean to administer the entire country themselves. Clearly, Turkistan's Muslims will not agree to this situation, in which 2 or 3% govern the remainder." Russian political actions had
the effect of unifying or at least solidifying Turkistanian consciousness by pitting all Central Asian Muslims against all Slavic non-Muslims as the infighting began.

More durable than the bloodily suppressed APGT was the Autonomous Turkistan Republic (ATR) of the Soviet regime, also temporarily called the Federative Soviet Republic of Turkistan, proclaimed April 30, 1918, and later to be named the Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. But in October 1924, the designation "Turkistan" vanished from newspapers and as an official group name or general territorial-administrative title in Central Asia. Today there is a small town in Kazakhstan that has been known under the name since the fifteenth century, and a village in Uzbekistan SSR's Khwarazm oblast. Curiously, the name Turkistan has been preserved as a territorial designation mainly as part of the label for the Turkistan Military District (Turkistan Härbiy Akrugi), a sector of Central Asia commanded by a succession of Slavic generals. The steps that led to the disappearance of that group name are instructive and laden with irony.

From the outset, the ATR struggled with an intangible, invisible opponent, in addition to the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR) government, which was determined to dismember and destroy it. That insubstantial enemy, some of whose moves became publicly visible or audible with time, was "the ethnic principle." All efforts in its interest appeared to be directed toward a reduction or neutralization of the influence in Central Asia of any tribe or ethnic group whose members were numerous and scattered throughout the area. Efforts to concentrate certain people on relatively compact bases were part of the technique employed. As early as 1920, perhaps even 1918, some politicians urged the immediate establishment of monoethnic administrative units in Central Asia in place of the
multiethnic blend of ages past and of the contemporary Turkistan republic. Inexpedient as open policy at the time, the idea was forwarded by indirection, through a Turkistan Commission (Turkkomissila) dispatched from Moscow, and other devices. In Tashkent and its subordinate centers, a Turkistan Commissariat for Nationalities' Affairs, responsible to Joseph V. Stalin's Russia-wide agency in Moscow, opened a series of ethnic departments in 1918-1919. The ten in Turkistan included Armenian, Dungan, Jewish, Kazakh, Russian, Tajik, and Uzbek. Jizzakh, Samarkand, and other sizable Turkistan cities undertook to open corresponding sub-departments. From that early date, the administration of the ATR worked to focus and raise ethnic groups' awareness of self, rather than to integrate them. This divisive activity evidently helped to speed the segregation of the population, but it also provoked the Turkistan Commissariat's dissolution in October 1919. That action was decided by delegates to the Eighth Congress of the Councils of the ATR, October 1-2, 1919. Citing "the internationalist slogans of the Soviet government," the Congress resolved that "there cannot be any talk about separate institutions that set the goal for themselves of defending separate sub-nationalities (narodnosti)." In the same period, the fact that the chief Communist Party (CP) press outlet of the ATR, Ishtirakiyun, was being issued, as it claimed, "in the Sart language," meaning the Turki tongue of the southern oases, suggested that the main force within domestic affairs of the ATR was not quite ethnically impartial, for it served the interests of the "Sarts," however defined, whom demographic evidence proved to comprise most of the relatively small reading public for the paper and much of the population at large.

The direct method adopted to disintegrate the southern Central Asian complex entailed a stripping away of layers of its outer groups until the
heart of this old human complex was exposed, and, in the process, delineated. Each action, planned by Moscow's agents, was caused to appear as if it had occurred on local initiative. Or, such moves have since been interpreted that way in official histories. First, on August 26, 1920, the Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR issued a decree in which it raised the possibility of combining the territory where Kazakhs lived, both inside and outside the ATR. This undertaking ostensibly responded to appeals from Kazakhs groups like the one dated back in September 1918, said to be from Mangishlaq tribesmen, or a June, 1920, one allegedly from Adaev, Tabin and other Kazakh nomads demanding Mangishlaq uyezd and two volosts in Krasnovodsk uyezd as part of a new Qirghizistan (i.e., Kazakhstan) ASSR. In January 1921, a congress of poor Kazakhs and Kirgiz living in the ATR was called together and guided by CP leaders to adopt a resolution favoring the shift of the Kazakhs of the ATR, and their lands, into the Qirghizistan ASSR.13

When that QASSR came into existence, the decree of the Russia-wide Central Executive Committee, September 1, 1920, allotted Mangishlaq uyezd to the new unit. This still left many Kazakhs and their pastures within the ATR. Qirghizistan officials were allowed to pursue the matter of gaining control over those additional people and territories with vigor.14 By April, 1922, a conference had been organized in Moscow among representatives of the QASSR, ATR, and presumably the RSFSR in regard to the matter of transferring Sir Darya and Yetti Suw oblasts of the ATR to the QASSR. Meanwhile, following the Ninth Congress of Councils of the ATR, September 19-25, 1920, separate ethnic sections were opened for business under the Central Executive Committee of ATR. The sections were opened for business under the Central Executive Committee
of ATR. The sections were staffed with people from the Kazakhs, Turkmens and Ozbeks. And in August, 1921, a Turkmen Autonomous Oblast was marked out within ATR, a move toward merging lands inhabited by Turkmens into a single Central Asian Turkmen unit. 15

By May and August, 1923, near symmetry had been achieved among the three governments of southern Central Asia in ethnic arrangements. The Khwarazm People's Conciliar Republic and Bukhara People's Conciliar Republic, respectively, then decided, through their Central Executive Committees, to establish special Turkmen and Kazakh departments of "autonomous" oblasts within themselves. By October, 1923, Bukhara had also carved an "autonomous" Turkmen oblast out of itself, made up of Charjoy and Karki wilayats (provinces). 16 Thus, the units in southern Central Asia had come to create the organization and structure needed for segregating from Turkistan the many Kazakhs and all Turkmens of ATR, two of the most dynamic nomadic groups and among the more sizable populations of the region.

While the politicians maneuvered, intellectuals and figures in the creative arts within the ATR started efforts that hinted at the end of an older era and outlined a modern framework for their own activities. They reconciled the broad concept of "Turkistan," upon which their generation had grown up, with the use of cultural subdivisions such as "Kazakh" and "Ozbek," by allocating different functions between the two classifications. A precursor of that usage had already unobtrusively found a place in the Reformist press before World War I. In the influential journal, Ayinä, from Samarkand, edited by Mahmud Khoja Behbudiy (1874-1919), a distinction was carefully drawn between local and outside Reformists and languages. Reporting about activity within the then new theater of Turkistan that involved Turkic visitors, for example, articles used phrases such as
"Ozbek and Tatar youths and progressives" (ozbek va tatar yash va taragiparwarlari), or "uniting Ozbeks and Tatars" (ozbek va tatarlar birlashib). When the parties to an endeavor in Samarkand or Tashkent came entirely from among Turkistanians, this kind of journalistic subgroup designation was usually omitted. "Turkistan," for several years, spelled place, territory, history, statehood, people. "Kazakh," "Turkmen," "Ozbek," and the like, seemed to touch literature, language, and subordinate ethnicity. These were subjects that to Turkistanians remained disconnected still from state, nation, and politics.

There were still those who linked Turkistan tightly with their language and literature, however. At the First Countrywide Ozbek Language and Orthographic Congress, January 1921, Sayyid Ali Osmani, an invited Tashkent specialist, could quote such an appropriate verse by the Turkistan Reformist Abdullah Awlaniy (1878-1934). In part, it read: "Awake, oh nationality (Uyghan millat), that senses the dawn's approach when the sky is turning white for our Turkistan.../ Our glorious Turkistan, which lost the sun of its freedom, its fame and nobility, and remained oppressed, disgraced." Here is a Turkistan patriot's literary call to country and homeland. And Osmani, during the same Congress, declared: "Our Turkistanians (Turkistanlar) used to love verse very much in earlier times..." as he attached the popular comprehensive territorial name, Turkistan, to its inhabitants, as well. But complete agreement was elusive in the Congress, though it had been called to standardize terminology, orthography and grammar in the language. It remained for Shāhid Āhmād, Commissar of Education, likewise from Tashkent, capital of the ATR, to express the new terms in his discussion. Āhmād was responding to reports and remarks from Osmani and Abdalrauf Fitrat (1886-1937), Bukharan poet and politician and head...
of the influential Tashkent literary society, Chaghatay Gurungi. The Commissar's comments included terms such as "Ozbek ethnic group" (ozbek khālqi), "Ozbek literature" (ozbek aābiyati), "Ozbek populace" (ozbek eli). He acknowledged the lack of a distinct Ozbek art and culture as late as 1920-1921 and the difficulties this entailed for the definition of group identity. Simultaneously, he rejected as ineffectual the old call from Ismail Bey Gaspirali (1851-1914), Crimean Tatar Reformist, and others, to treat all Turkic people as one cultural body. 19

Uncertainty over the choice of written language continued even then, for many teachers felt that "Ozbek" was only a hearthside tongue that children might use at school for no more than the first two or three grades. It was to be supplanted, in their scheme of things, by "the common Turkic language" (ummi turk tili), closely following Ottoman Turkish of the period. 20 One of four outstanding young "Ozbek" poets of the 1920s, Mir Mashriq Yunus-oghli Elbek (1898-1939), demonstrated in his verse this two-tiered arrangement for language employed in Turkistan. In his first short poem printed in what was probably the first book of contemporary verse entitled "Ozbek," Elbek writes this about "Language" (Tii):

Sing and sing on in sad unison, understand! Who are those who sell the Turkic tongue?!/Shan't I be abashed who flings from this country/ This tongue that ever sings like a nightingale?!/May I not comprehend, who forever abuse, abuse/ The soulful Turkic, sweeter than honey?!/...

In these lines the poet alludes to country and populace without reference to specific place. He expressly links them to the Turkic tongue he finds "sweeter than honey," and as he writes in his Turki idiom, he never calls it "Ozbek." Further illustrating this mixture of identities in the same volume was a second young poet's offering, "For 'an Ozbek Girl!" ("'Ozbek qizi' ichun"), dated August, 1920, Baku, and composed in his
rendition of Ottoman Turkish (CUthmanîcü, as he labels it).22 Despite the
titles, neither in language nor content can these poetic selections clarify the
traditional ambiguity regarding literary identity in southern Central Asia.
Nor do any others in the collection.

That ground-breaking book, Young Ozbek Poets, issued in 1922, ethnically
neutral under its covers, by its title and most of its literary language repre­
sented a genuine innovation in twentieth-century Turkistan. It also indicated
the path that authorities of the ATR elected to follow in the early 1920s
toward cultural delineation of its language groups.

But these cultural arrangements left the problem of place strikingly
indefinite; these publications lacked any reference to territory other than
Turkistan. The absence of "country of..." (-istan) from the general usage
given for southern Central Asian sub-groups was significant. Omission of the
words "Ozbekistan" or "Tajikistan" is particularly consistant with the nature
of ideas about group and territorial naming that prevailed among the literate
men of the region. This 104-page booklet of verse, therefore, offers no proof
that the authorities in the South then felt any sort of threat to the ATR and
its heterogeneity from the appearance of such a literary anthology compiled in
the name of one large group within the Republic. Nor does the writing of these
young "Ozbek" poets suggest that they harbored a dream of administrative
separateness and segregation of their own language group in some social or
political manner.

Elbek's poetic devotion to what he called "Turkic language" (Turk tili) in the
eyear 1920s echoed public attitudes. The Section for Public Instruction of the
ATR offered a pointed resolution in March 1919 at the Special Seventh Con­
gress of Councils of the ATR. The proposal spoke of "Turkic schools," "the
Turkic script," of men of "Turkic" origin, of "Turkic language," and the like,
in most positive terms. Moreover, the resolution specified that "a Central
Asian Turk must head the Commissariat of Education of the ATR or be its first Deputy Commissar." It went on to remark that "They /these Turkic people/ are full of understanding about the needs of their ethnic group (khälg)...."

Productivity in the work of the Commissariat demanded that "Turkic" leaders stand at the top in the capital of the ATR as well as in subordinate sections and towns, it added. The Congress delegates attested to their view that the term "Turkic" designated the fundamental human segment of population in southern Central Asia.

Turkistanians, Bukharans and Khwarazmians were, in addition, beginning to see themselves again in an ever wider context that reached beyond the Turkic family. Frequently, spokesmen in Moscow as well as in Central Asia referred to an even larger, Asian association. This conscious gesture toward Eastern affinities beyond Central Asian frontiers occurred early in the life of the heterogeneous autonomous and people's republics, as Moscow sought to employ these groups in its external propaganda and ideological indoctrination. Around the time of the Congress of the Peoples of the East, held in Baku, 1920, with enthusiastic participation by Central Asians and other Middle Easterners, community with foreign Asia was often voiced. One of the new poets from Turkistan composed verses about the East (Şerq) tracing its old complexities, common to Central Asia and beyond. Politicians from Russia and Central Asia dramatized the area's new role — that of "revolutionary beacon," "outpost of revolution," and "magnet" for the other people of Asia. That notion of exploiting ties between the RSFSR's and USSR's domestic "East" and foreign Asia became a theme expounded not continuously but repeatedly, very soon.

The puzzle for Central Asians (who normally avoided using the name "Central Asia" employed by outsiders), lay less in selecting and defining any extensive
relationships than in contemplating the fractions that comprised the whole of Turkistan.

At home, the attitudes of neighbors and kin are not invariably the most objective evidence for judging the worth, popularity or importance of their friends and families. In the practice of naming, however, their attitudes, when offered with or without malice, can inform the question. Such a gesture, made by a prominent Turkistanian politician and journal editor, tells much about the thinking among his circle of CP officials regarding group names at that juncture. In the course of analyzing Turkistan's political situation in March 1922, Nadhir Toraqol-ulū (1892-1939) quoted a contemporary non-Soviet Riga newspaper to the effect that "Muslim businessmen and Turkmen, Tajik, and Sart (?) mullahs /educated men/ are becoming dissatisfied with the policy adhered to by the conciliar government and are agitating against the government."25 The parenthetical interrogation mark inserted by the author in his list of ethnic groups reveals his discomfort with the name "Sart." A Kazakh, Toraqol-ulū knew well enough what the name signified. As a ATR CP leader, he seemingly already understood, as early as spring, 1922, that the label "Sart" retained no promise in Moscow's political plans for Central Asia. Two likely possibilities remained.

The mere presence of the Kazakh, Toraqol-ulū, in Tashkent with serious responsibility, was a powerful ethnic symbol. He edited all and wrote much of the principal "Ozbek-language" political affairs periodical, Ingilab. This was the CP Central Committee's foremost publication for the ATR. Toraqol-ulū's position as editor affirmed the continuing Asian ethnic heterogeneity in that Republic's internal arrangements. Another voice heard frequently then in connection with Turkistanian cultural change was that of Abdalrahman Sa'adi, a Tatar scholar from Kazan resident
in Central Asia. In his opinion, by late 1922 a new literary language was moving Turkistan past the era of Chighatay (Chaghatay), which had lasted until the arrival of the twentieth century. From the earliest 1900s up to 1917, he felt, Turkistanians had experienced an awakening that made their written language into what he called along with some others, "Chighatay ozbek." In this analysis, after Czarist Russia fell apart the ideology and economy changed in Turkistan. Then, "A new vital name, 'Ozbek language' ('ozbek tili') and 'Ozbek literature' ('ozbek adabiyati') gained the day over "Chighatay'." This "victory" he attributed to the rise of young Ozbek poets and authors since the end of the old regime in March 1917. The young Ozbek writers" ("yash ozbek adib wä sha'ırları") displayed a language, style, intonation, meter, mood and literary content that seemed completely different and fresh, Sacadi claimed, in keeping with the new name. He listed Abdalrauf Fitrat, Abdulhamid Sulayman Cholpan, Elbek, Shakir Sulayman, Mahmud Khadiyew Batu, and Ghulam Zafariy, most of whom had been closely involved in the Turkistan movement in literature and press, as representative "revolutionary poets and authors."

Sacadi's argument seems plausible. It means that a new Turkistani cultural and intellectual core, small but dynamic, had arisen by late 1922. That nucleus, writing what its members called "Ozbek poetry and prose" in what he termed "Ozbek language" -- though they did not insist on this -- constituted the laying of a cultural base upon which ethnic group identity could be erected, though no specific political framework need stand around it. 26 His formulation of the argument continued the convenient distinction between geographic-political-administrative necessities and those aspects of Central Asian life more particular to certain groups
of people.

Yet the preoccupation of these young "Ozbek" literary intellectuals embodies not so much a political vision as a cultural one. They were struggling with the encumbrances and conformity clamped upon all poets and authors by the rigidity of traditional literary form and other conventions in Central Asia. Their principal aspiration in declaring themselves "young Ozbek poets" lay in the desire to modernize, especially to match the experimentation of Azerbaijani and Turkish writers, who had long before sensed the changes taking place in literature and language in Europe. This opportunity to throw off the dominance of the old aruz meter and the cliches of subject matter in the omnipresent lyric form, the ghazal, had to be seized if Turkistanian writings were to catch up with the esthetic progress of other Middle Eastern countries. Though this "Ozbek" literary movement may have coincided with and proved convenient for the purposes of CP politicians, its origins must be looked for outside the political developments of Turkistan.

Sacadi's proclamation of a new age in Turkistan letters by 1922 did not guarantee, even if correct, that his announcement would influence cultural affairs positively in Central Asia. Among outsiders, the Kazan Tatars more than any related group had aroused the active resentment of southern Central Asians. Tatars displayed a patronising disdain for Turkistanian life and achievements that infuriated intellectuals in the old cities.

Ghazi Yonis (Yunus) Muhammad-oghli (ca.1887-ca.1937), an outstanding Turkistanian writer and cultural figure, charged Tatar authors with distorting Turkistan's history, as well. They erred so willfully that their misstatements, he felt, harmed Turkistan by fashioning a chain of incorrect impressions and inferences to which succeeding authors, relying upon them, would add
by innocently adopting the Tatar view. Such treatment, Yonis reported, earned the Tatars Turkistan's lasting aversion.

But animosity turned into deep hatred when coupled with the more basic matter of Tatar identity. Though Tatar kinship with Central Asian Turkic people is reasonably close, Turkistanians in the twentieth century and earlier regarded Tatars with suspicion. Their language was very early laced with Russianisms, and their activity in Central Asia often caused Tatars to be regarded as proxies or agents, with some cause, for their Russian masters. Yonis remarked that Tatars made up "the latest generation to obstruct Turkistan's progress." His identification of Tatars with Turkistan's Slavic oppressors pays homage to the function of group hostility in enhancing the sensitivity of populations yet rather imperfectly defined, to their image and perimeters. Tatar unpopularity in Turkistan suggests that such disparagement and unkind name-calling as that practiced by well-defined outsiders like the Kazakhs, Russians and Tatars consists of more than enunciation of petty differences. It seems rooted in long-range contests for group survival. In itself, that does not necessarily explain the vacillation in preference for self-names.

Feelings about "Sart," already alluded to, did not represent the only terminological ambivalence prevailing among the larger Turkistan community. "Ozbek," too, sometimes fell short of being a good name. A folk saying quoted freely among the Sarts, who acknowledged their name affirmatively, captured a blunt negative nuance: "Ozbek! Watch what you say when you call your neighbor 'thief'." That is, you are not immune from the same accusation. The Sart himself sometimes fared better than others in sayings common to his own group: "If a Sart gets rich, he builds a new roof; if a Kazakh gets rich, he marries a new wife."
Popular expression gave surprising clues to attitudes among the educated, as well. As late as 1920, or in a certain sense until after 1922, among either the lettered or unlettered, a noticeable uncertainty existed concerning the employment of the designation "Ozbek" in general communication. Otherwise, the "Ozbek" name would have shown up either in the flags of the rapidly-growing Reformist press in the new drama of Central Asia before 1918 or in the wide-circulation, Soviet-sponsored newspapers and theater soon afterward. Disinterest in "Ozbek" as a heading of that kind is evident in both the Turkic and Slavic written languages in Central Asia during the first 24 years of the twentieth century. Editors of newspapers and bulletins, communist or noncommunist, when they chose the most important symbolic names available for the press, selected flags with larger territorial extent or supraethnic meaning. Drama and theater of that era, so important to the education of largely illiterate Turkistan, introduced plays entitled "Turkistan Doctor" (Turkistan tabibi), by Mannan Majidov Uyghur, "Turkistan Khanate" (Turkistan khanlighi), by Mannan Ramiz, and "Turkistan" by Ziya Sa'id, but nothing in the record shows a play with a title using the group name "Ozbek" during the period. Besides Voice of Turkistan and Great Turkistan, already mentioned, there were newspapers called Turan "Land of the Turk), Turk eli (Turkic Populace), Shora-i Islam (Council of Islam), starting in 1917 or before. Turk sozi came out in 1918, and Turkestanskaia pravda (Turkistan Truth), in Russian, continued in that pattern. Like Qizil bayraq (Red Banner), beginning in 1920, more general still was the name of the new intellectual journal issued by the Autonomous Turkistan Republic's Commissariat for Education, Bilim ochaghi (The Source of Knowledge), starting September 1922. A slight alteration in that journal's self-description between the first two numbers cannot be meaningless in
the atmosphere of the early 1920s. On the masthead for issue No. 1, the magazine declared itself to be printed "in Ozbek" (ozbekcha). Numbers 2/3 omitted the language stipulation altogether, signalling that this periodical, appearing in a modified Arabic script that in any case tended to obscure linguistic differences among Turkic languages, was not to be considered an "Ozbek" house organ in the ATR. 30

Just how strongly the symbolism carried by press flags and other titles was felt became apparent when yet another change occurred in the flag of the newspaper, Red Banner, with its alien Marxist heading. The paper had served as the main press outlet in a local language for the CP of Turkistan. In September 1922, the editors adopted a new name for the flag, Turkistan, surely in order to exploit the word's power to evoke a strong historical and cultural sense of identity among readers and listeners (newspapers were read aloud for uneducated Central Asians). Usman Khan Ishan Khoja, the editor of this new Turkistan and two other first-rank serials, wrote in a lead article devoted to the new flag: "...the formerly enslaved ethnic groups (khülqlär) have neither sufficient awareness nor adequate customs. Thus, our overriding concern for the present is the raising of consciousness...and achieving the goal."31 To fix an identity in which both intellectuals and the uneducated could recognize themselves was evidently the immediate task. In the first issue of the same paper, a second writer directly addressed the crucial question of naming:

...denominating each thing by its name is an inescapable law...
We think that the name of this newspaper, Turkistan, will give reminders frequently about all of Turkistan's needs. We hope that our government...will also give broad scope to translating the truth into reality, despite the fact that the truth will seem bitter /this is a paraphrase of the popular Arabic saying in which the Prophet exhorts his followers to speak the truth even though it be bitter/....We trust that public-spirited young people...of Turkistan will make use of this newspaper and put forward their demands.
In these remarks, journalists in the communist party press, speaking to and for Central Asian readers in 1922, reaffirm the tendency of their noncommunist predecessors to stress the broadest common identity possible among their people, area, and communications media. This was a high point for the assertion of that choice in modern Turkistan, and a peak in accomplishing local options since the short-lived independence of the Autonomous Provisional Government of Turkistan in late 1917-early 1918. "Turkistan" continued to be the flag of the principal political bulletin and the identifying term for the namesake ATR-TASSR administrative unit. But, before another year had passed, a decisive change took place beneath that spacious umbrella of the "Turkistan" denomination. Russian CP leaders, with the collaboration of some important Central Asian party figures, notably Fayzullah Khoja of Bukhara, effected a realignment between functions and names. So long as the choice of name stayed a Central Asian prerogative, given time and a further popularization of "Turkistan" in the South, the broader terms might have survived for administrative and territorial purposes. Even so, the subordinate, ethnic labels "Ozbek," "Tajik," and the like, already identified with language and culture, were drawing territorial and political significance away from the heterogeneous units and names, and enjoyed strong Russian encouragement. The outsiders possessed dogmatic certainty that group names must coincide with single ethnic identities, and they had a tight political organization to back it up. They concentrated their efforts on causing a shift in Central Asia to a European style of ethnic compartmentalization. This was not to benefit the people of the South, as Soviet histories have always claimed, but for other reasons. The Russians wanted to validate their Marxist economic theories of nationality development, and, more cogent still, to establish
themselves, with their presumed ethnic homogeneity as the sole model for the East. Above all, they meant to counteract that adaptive, assimilative ambiguity so characteristic of the "Sart/Ozbek" mixture throughout the cities of southern Turkistan. By a strange twist, removing that protective coloring so advantageous to the leading group in the South by sharply defining and publicizing the group as "Ozbek," by organizing it formally and politically restricting its people to territory forming but a fraction of its former sphere of influence, the politicians effectively replaced an indigenous emperial power with an alien, Russian one. In this tactic, the renaming played an exceptionally important role in the disintegration, through planning, of the previously composite Turkic-Iranian population and culture so typical of Central Asia. In taking such action, the foreign label "Central Asia" came to supersede the indigenous protoethnic cognomen, "Turkistan." That profound alteration plainly revealed the precedence that outsiders' political aims had taken over domestic cultural values in determining the region's eponyms not long after 1922.


3 Miyan Buzruk, "Ozbek (tä'rikhî tekshirishlär)," Mäcirif wu qotghuchi No. 3 (Samarkand 1928), pp. 43-44.


5 Evgenii D. Polivanov, p. 18.


9 Ziya Sä'id, p. 68; S"ezdy sovetov RSFSR i avtonomykh respublik RSFSR. Sbornik dokumentov 1917-1922 g.g. (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel' stvo "Turidicheskoii Literatury," 1959), vol. I, p. 243.


12 "Iz deiatel'nosti Turkestanskogo Komissariata po Natisonal'nym Delam," Zhizn' natsional'nosteii, No. 20 (June 1, 1919), p. 4; "Snezdy sovetov...", vol. I, pp. 390-391.

13 Yânya Ghulamawich Ghulamaw, Hâshið Nàbiywich Nàbiyew, Mówlan Ghûffarawich Wânabaw, Ozbekistan SSR târikhi (one volume) (Tashkent: Ozbekistan SSR Fânlar Akademiyası Nashriyati, 1958), pp. 557-558; Ortá Asiya kommunistik tâshkilatlârîning târikhi, p. 769.


19 Birinchi olkâ..., p. 42.

20 Ibid., p. 39.

21 Pitrat (Pitrat), Cholpan, Batu, Elbek, Ozbek yash sha'îrlârî (Tashkent: Turkistan Dâwlât Nashriyati, 1922), p. 76.

22 Ibid., pp. 58-60, 62-63.


26 *C* Abdalrahman Sa*c*adi, "Chighatay wa ozbek adabyati ham sha`irleri," *Ingilab* Nos. 7/8 (Oct. – Nov. 1922), p. 54.


31 Usmankh*n*an, *Turkistan* (Sept. 11, 1922), cited in Ziya Sä`cid, pp. 94-95, 96-97.

32 Zährriddin Ak*lam*, *Turkistan* (Sept. 11, 1922), cited in Ziya Sä`cid, p. 95.