THE NATIONALITY PROBLEM AND THE SOVIET FUTURE

by

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Ethnonationalism and Political Stability: Changing Soviet Perspectives

The long-term stability of the Soviet system is critically dependent on how successfully the Soviet leadership deals with its "nationality problem." The USSR is not only the largest multinational state in the world today but also one of the most complex, comprising as it does over 100 distinct nationalities of which 22 number over one million people each. It is thus exceedingly vulnerable to the possible effects of rising ethnonationalism, one of the most potent forces of political instability in developing and industrial societies alike.

Until quite recently, the Soviet system appeared comparatively immune to the impact of ethnic self-assertion. Soviet writings continued to claim that the Soviet system had finally solved one of the most difficult of all political problems and that by contrast with its Tsarist predecessor, the Imperial Russian "prison of nations," Soviet socialism had brought equality, prosperity, and harmony to its ethnically diverse population. This optimistic assessment is no longer tenable. It has been replaced, in recent years, by a more somber recognition that, from the Baltic to Central Asia, rising ethnic self-assertion constitutes a growing political challenge. The socio-cultural transformation and rapprochement of Soviet nationalities is increasingly recognized to be a far more problematic and lengthy process than was earlier anticipated, and national identity a more enduring and less malleable social phenomenon than was initially assumed. The optimism of Khrushchev's assertion, at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961, that "the Party has solved one of the most

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complex of problems, which has plagued mankind for ages and remains acute in the world of capitalism to this day - the problem of relations between nations,"¹ was superseded by Brezhnev's more somber recognition at the 26th Congress in 1981 that although the Soviet nations are now united more than ever...this does not imply that all the problems of the relations between nationalities have been resolved. The dynamics of the development of a large multinational state like ours gives rise to many problems requiring the Party's tactful attention.

This sober reassessment was reaffirmed in even stronger terms by Iuri Andropov, who used the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the creation of the USSR in December 1982 for a major address on national relations in which he reminded his audience:

[Soviet] successes in solving the nationalities question certainly do not mean that all the problems engendered by the very fact of the life and work of numerous nations and nationalities in the framework of a single state have disappeared. This is hardly possible as long as nations exist, as long as there are national distinctions. And they will exist for a long time, much longer than class distinctions.

Growing recognition by the Soviet leadership that socio-cultural change and long-term rapprochement among Soviet nationalities demands patient and delicate social engineering has in turn been responsible for its increasing encouragement and support of empirical social research on ethnic processes. This concern was already evident during the Brezhnev years, which saw a marked expansion of the range of activities of the Institute of Ethnography in Moscow and its republic-level counterparts. The establishment, in 1969, of an All-Union Council for the Study of Nationality Problems headed by the Institute's distinguished director, Julian Bromlei, not only gave high-level visibility to these efforts but provided an institutional framework for joining scholarship to policy.⁴ Andropov went the final step in explicitly linking social research to policy needs in his December 1982 speech when he called, for the first time, for the formulation of a "well-thought-out,
scientifically substantiated nationalities policy." If Soviet "nationality policy" had until now been the by-product of other functional concerns - one dimension of policies primarily focused on education, or resource allocation, or political recruitment, or demographic behavior - Andropov now appeared to be calling for the formulation of an explicit, coherent, and comprehensive strategy in which the "nationality question" stood at the very center.

Ethnonationalism and Political Stability: Changing Western Views

If the nationality problem has come to occupy an increasingly important place on the Soviet policy agenda of the 1980's, it has become a central preoccupation, if not a virtual obsession, in Western analyses of the Soviet system. The potential impact of politicized ethnicity went largely unrecognized in the scholarship of the 1950's and 1960's, in part for reasons common to the broader social science literature on nation-building, and in part resulting from specific features of the development of Soviet studies. The sway of the totalitarian model, with its focus on the capacity of a monolithic state to bring about a well-nigh total atomization of society, left no room for explorations of the potential bases of social solidarity, including ethnicity. To be sure, the "nationality problem" did not disappear from view, although its absence from the classic textbooks of the period is striking. But the predominant emphasis on Soviet domination and exploitation tended to reinforce rather than challenge the reigning paradigm.

The shift in Western approaches to the Soviet nationality problem was partly the result of internal changes in the Soviet system precipitated by de-Stalinization, and partly the result of shifts in the focus of Soviet studies more broadly which these changes invited. As the emphasis on "revolution from above" was modified by the rediscovery of society, and as the image of a monolithic
regime gave way to a concern with interest groups and the policy process, the attention of specialists was directed to the potential bases of solidarity and cleavage and their implications for Soviet politics.\textsuperscript{7} Investigation of the extent to which ethnic affiliation might itself constitute an independent basis - however limited - of collective action, thus represented a logical evolution of new lines of inquiry.

At the same time, internal developments within the USSR - beginning with the ethnic self-assertion facilitated by Khrushchev's "thaw" - offered ample evidence that the quest for collective identity had been temporarily silenced, but hardly obliterated, by the repressive policies of the Stalin era. The development of the dissident movement, which included an important national component, focused new attention on the sources of alienation in the Soviet system, while the rising tide of protests in the Baltic republics, the Ukraine, among the Crimean Tatars, and in Georgia, coupled with the emigration of some 400,000 Soviet citizens, mainly Germans, Armenians and Jews, gave further impetus to a reassessment of the position of minorities in the Soviet multinational system. Most recently, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East, with its heightened salience for Soviet domestic and foreign policy in the wake of events in Iran and Afghanistan, coupled with the astonishing demographic vitality of Soviet Central Asia revealed in the 1959 and 1970 censuses, brought this region to the forefront of scholarly as well as policy concern.

As a consequence of these developments, Western scholarship on the USSR has taken on two new features in recent years. The first is a preoccupation with the destabilizing potential of politicized ethnicity, epitomized in the titles of two recent best-selling books: Hélène Carrère de'Encausse's
L'Empire Eclaté, translated into English as Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt, and The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State, by Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup. The second feature is a shift in the focus of interest and perception of vulnerability from the more developed and Westernized regions of the USSR - the Baltic and the Ukraine - to Soviet Central Asia.

In the view of these and other observers of the Soviet scene, a resurgence of nationalism among both the non-Russian and the Russian nationalities of the USSR poses a growing threat to the long-term stability of the Soviet system. A convergence of exogenous and internal developments, they argue, though differing in their configuration from one republic to another, are contributing to growing confidence and self-assertion on the part of local elites in the non-Russian republics, particularly those of Central Asia, as well as to growing resentment over the lack of political autonomy and of other attributes of nationhood. At the same time, pressures for Russification generate growing resentment and in some cases, anxiety, about its threat to national identities. Whether or not they are likely to culminate over the long run in ethnonational movements or demands for secession, the growth of centrifugal tendencies poses increasingly serious problems of management for the Soviet state.

The increasing self-assertion of the non-Russian nationalities has in turn contributed to the growth of a Russian nationalism which views the Russian people as the victims rather than the beneficiaries of a Soviet multi-national empire. The rise of Russian nationalism poses a strategic problem rather than one of management: its impact could be decisive for the system as a whole. Because the Russians possess a strong and cohesive
sense of nationhood, and combine domination of the central organs of power with the dispersion of settler communities throughout the entire territory of the USSR (and their concentration in the major cities of the non-Russian republics), their growing impatience and resentment, if successfully translated into pressures on the Soviet leadership to promote integrationist policies and to resist further concessions to the non-Russian nationalities, could galvanize still-dormant forces and upset the precarious balance which has characterized Soviet nationality policy in recent years.

The dangers which a rise in ethnonationalism would pose for the Soviet system are substantial. It would threaten the unifying force of Soviet patriotism, provide a social base for the organization of activities directed against official values and policies, rule out reforms that entailed a significant degree of decentralization, challenge the unitary structure of the Party and military, and strengthen ties of affinity and loyalty with regions and peoples outside Soviet borders, from Poland to the Muslim East. The ultimate danger, of course, is that of political fragmentation, and it is to this prospect that much of the recent Western discussion has been devoted. Indeed, in the view of a considerable number of Western scholars and policy-makers, the scope and intensity of rising ethnonationalism is likely to become unmanageable; Richard Pipes, among others, has explicitly predicted that "sooner or later the Soviet empire, the last multinational empire, will fall apart roughly along the lines of today's republics," and Alexandre Bennigsen has given it only 10 to 20 more years.9

This burgeoning Western literature on the implications of politicized ethnicity for the future stability of the Soviet system, however, contains a number of implicit and unexamined assumptions about national consciousness and about the character of Soviet nationality policy that deserve to be held up to critical scrutiny. The first is the tendency to treat national identity
as a primordial, objective fact rather than as a subjective condition. Although many features of Soviet policy - such as the passport system itself - treat nationality as if it were a rigid ascriptive category, Soviet reality is far more complex. In many instances, particularly although not exclusively involving the smaller nationalities, national identity has a more dynamic and fluid quality. Migration, intermarriage, and changes in group boundaries alter older definitions of identity. For a growing number of Soviet citizens, the question of which of several possible identities, or levels of identity, is perceived as a core identity, and in what contexts, is a problematic issue. Moreover, to assume that national affiliation is the single most salient identity of the Soviet citizen is to ignore the large body of research which reveals the degree to which national identities overlap with other social identities and shows how its salience varies not only among individuals but with specific situations. One of the major tasks of further research is to identify the conditions under which national identity assumes high salience, and to assess the features of Soviet policy which either contribute to or minimize such developments.

A second shortcoming of much of the current literature is the tendency to treat the preservation of distinct national identities as fundamentally incompatible with Soviet goals. As John Dunlop has expressed it, "From the very beginning, the Soviet state has been viewed by its leaders as a unitary body whose underlying principle, proletarian internationalism, allowed no room for national differences and aspirations." In a similar vein, Alexandre Bennigsen asks whether by the year 2000 the children of today's Muslims will still belong to the world of Islam or will have been transformed into Soviets - totally liberated from the perezhitki (vestiges) of the past and indistinguishable from their Russian comrades. Such formulations posit simplistic and exaggerated dichotomies
totally at variance with historical experience as well as with Soviet reality, both of which demonstrate the resilience of traditional cultures and values and make it important to distinguish acculturation from assimilation. Moreover, by assuming ethnic homogeneity to be the operative objective of a monolithic Soviet approach, and the preservation of any elements of national distinctiveness as a defeat for the Kremlin's goals, it ignores shifts in Soviet policy over time, or internal differences over policy within the Soviet elite, or even the gap between aspirations and real possibilities. It also ignores the way in which the Soviet regime exploits ethnic cleavages to reinforce central power and does not merely deplore them.  

Moreover, because the perpetuation of national consciousness is viewed as incompatible with the effort to forge a new Soviet identity a number of observers have concluded, in the words of Seweryn Bialer, that "the polarization of the Soviet peoples along ethnic lines is increasing faster than their identification with, and consciousness of, a new Soviet nationhood." Quite apart from the question of whether there is an empirical basis for either supporting or challenging this assertion, it assumes an inherent conflict between ethnic consciousness and Soviet citizenship, and treats the relationship between them as a zero-sum.

Finally, a number of recent writings fail to distinguish national sentiment, a strong attachment to or exaltation of a national group, with nationalism, a political doctrine or movement. Assuming the political salience of ethnicity to be self-evident rather than problematic, and treating politics as a dependent variable, they anticipate a virtually automatic unfolding of ethnic self-assertion and project it forward to political
destabilization. They fail to explain variations in the apparent intensity of national feelings among different groups and over time, and from one situation to another. They ignore or minimize the social and political forces—repression excepted—that either propel or limit the politicization of ethnicity or may indeed result in demobilization. They fail to consider the entire range of possible outcomes short of the disintegration of the Soviet empire along the lines of its constituent national republics. And they neglect the capacity of the Soviet system to satisfy, channel, or manage ethnonationalism in ways that reduce its potential for instability.

This paper will propose a somewhat different framework for assessing the implications of rising ethnonationalism for Soviet political stability. It will argue that the preservation of important features of national identity is not of itself incompatible with Soviet goals; that the political salience of ethnicity in the USSR is not self-evident and automatic but varies over time and among contexts and is constrained and shaped by complex factors; that the goals and strategies of ethnonational elites are similarly diverse; and that the capacity of the Soviet system to manage ethnonational assertion in ways that reduce or eliminate its potential for instability is a critical element in any assessment of Soviet prospects in the years ahead.
National Identity and Soviet Patriotism

The widespread tendency to assume that Soviet policy is devoted to the total eradication of national distinctiveness ignores what is perhaps the most striking development in the evolution over time of Soviet views about the relationship of nationalism and socialism: the growing recognition of the ubiquitousness and durability of national identity. From the initial opposition of socialism to nationalism in the 19th century writings of Marx and Engels, to the "Austro-Marxism" of Renner and Bauer, through the Leninist "federal compromise" which granted political-administrative recognition and limited cultural autonomy to a variety of national groups, to the ambiguous Stalinist formulation of the dialectical relationship of the "flowering" (rastsvet) and "rapprochement" (sblizhenie) of nations, to current reformulations of the very definition of a "nation," the fundamental trend of Soviet theory and practice has been its accommodation to the reality of national attachments. National identity is increasingly recognized to be a far more stable and less malleable social phenomenon than was initially assumed by socialist theory, and national differences are treated in recent Soviet writings as enduring, if not actually indestructible.16

The precise balance to be struck between integrationist and pluralist approaches in Soviet nationality policy remains the subject of continuing ideological and political controversy. Two opposing "tendencies," with conflicting diagnoses, goals and policy recommendations echoing the early debates between Rosa Luxemburg and the Austro-Marxists, still contend for influence over doctrine and policy, the first advocating more rapid integration and assimilation of the non-Russian nationalities and the latter the more flexible adaptation of the Soviet system to the social and cultural
characteristics and needs of its varied groups. But the expectation of complete merging of national groups into a single Soviet entity, as distinct from the increasing economic, political and ideological integration of distinct national entities, has been postponed to a very distant future, and in some cases explicitly repudiated, in authoritative Soviet pronouncements.

As a leading Soviet specialist on national relations recently commented,

"It is no secret that in the early 1960s there was exaggeration in the literature about the results achieved in the rapprochement of nations; certain scholars manifested nihilism in interpreting the national factor in the life of peoples and even began to search for the road to merger in the "visible" future."

A 1969 editorial in the Party's theoretical journal, Kommunist, clearly distinguished the concepts of rapprochement (sblizhenie) and merger (sliianie):

"Each Soviet nation and nationality brings its own weighty contribution to the successful construction of the new community. In the process of creating communism they attain an all-round flourishing and ever closer rapprochement with one another. For all nations the common characteristics increase in all spheres of the material and spiritual life of the Soviet people. However, the rapprochement of nations and their international unity should not be viewed as merger. The elimination of all national differences is a long process, and it is possible only after the complete victory and consolidation of communism in the entire world."

The renewed and explicit use of the term sliianie in December 1982 by Andropov, in a passage quoting directly from Lenin himself, is now linked to the assertion that these changes will occur only in the very distant future, if at all. In a series of writings on national relations which preceded Andropov's speech, R. I. Kosolapov, a leading Party theorist and editor-in-chief of the Party journal Kommunist, pointedly noted:

"It seems to me that the idea of the fusion of nations has suffered in large part from a vulgar-utopian interpretation which assumed that fusion meant the total eradication of all linguistic and ethnic differences among national groups.... But why impute a meaning to Lenin's concept that it doesn't have?"
In a striking passage, Kosolapov argues:

As the 26th CPSU Congress pointed out, social classes will largely disappear while we are still in the historical period of developed socialism. The same cannot be said of socialist nations, which are more stable social and ethnic entities. As for the racial, national, and ethnic differences among major population groups and individuals, these will undergo substantial changes, of course, as a result of migration and the constant intermixing of the population, but in principle they are indestructible. Only given this condition can we realistically conceive of the future fusion of nations.

As a corollary of this view, and contrary to the often-repeated assertion that Soviet policy seeks to make "state" and "nation" coterminous, Soviet writings insist on the distinction between existing nations and the supra-national Soviet community. The term sovetskii narod is properly translated as "the Soviet people" rather than "the Soviet nation;" in the Soviet conception, it "does not abolish or supplant socialist nations and national distinctions." The Soviet multinational system thus might more usefully be viewed as one which recognizes the simultaneous existence of two cultures, corresponding to two different levels of identification: an inclusive "civic culture" based on universal membership in the Soviet political community and emphasizing a unified economic system, political integration and shared ideological orientations, and a variety of "group cultures" based on distinct national identities and drawing sustenance from the political recognition and limited cultural autonomy granted to them. National sentiment, or loyalty to an ethnonational group, is clearly distinguished from patriotism, or loyalty to the Soviet state. While there may well be particular circumstances in which the two come into conflict, there is no reason why the two are in principle incompatible.
Indeed, far from being treated as a necessarily threatening or destabilizing trend, the growth of national consciousness in the Soviet Union in recent years is now endowed with historical legitimacy in authoritative Soviet writings. As an article in a recent issue of *Istoriia SSSR* insisted, "the growth of national consciousness and national feelings is a lawful regularity under socialism and cannot be considered as 'a form of nationalism'."\(^{22}\) This position was reaffirmed by Andropov himself when he stated, in his December 1982 speech, "Life shows that the economic and cultural progress of all nations and nationalities is accompanied by an inevitable growth in their national self-awareness."\(^{23}\)

**The Political Salience of National Identity**

The historical experience of a wide range of multinational societies suggests that the politicization of ethnicity is not a unilinear and automatically-unfolding process but the function of specific catalysts in the socio-political environment absent which ethnonationalism would remain a latent or relatively minor force. Moreover, the politicization of ethnicity is a two-way process, in which the relevant actors include not only ethnic groups or elites but also central political elites, and in which the forms, scope and intensity of ethnonationalism vary with specific institutions, policies and socio-economic conditions. An assessment of the potential scope and limits of ethnonationalism in the USSR therefore requires a close examination of those issues which have served as catalysts of national tensions in the Soviet context and the nature of the cleavages they crystallize. To the extent that those cleavages are cumulative and mutually reinforcing, their potential for political instability is commensurately enhanced.
A series of issues bearing directly on the resources, power and status of different nationalities stand at the heart of current tensions and debates; we can only touch on them briefly in turn here. The first of these is the nature of the federal system itself, and the balance to be struck between a unitary and centralized as opposed to a federal or pluralist conception of the Soviet system. This classic center-periphery conflict, which pits the interests of republic elites against those of the center, has its origins in the fundamental tension built into Soviet nationality policy from the earliest days of the Soviet state. Forced to grapple with the Tsarist legacy, and to combine political centralization with some form of administrative and cultural autonomy, Lenin opted for a federal system which gave limited political-administrative recognition to major national groups and which committed the Soviet system to their economic and cultural development. This arrangement provided an organizational context, a political legitimacy and a cultural impetus for the assertion of group interests, values and demands. At the same time, the centralization of economic power and political control in a unitary Party organization dominated by a largely Slavic elite, and pursuing a cultural policy which had a strong component of Russification, undercut the commitment to diversity and provoked intensified national consciousness and self-assertion on the part of the non-Russian nationalities.

Despite the fact that the republics are endowed with many attributes of sovereignty, the center defines the scope and limits of republic jurisdiction and excludes large areas of economic life from direct republic control. Nonetheless both the nature of the functions performed by the republics and indeed the very sanctity of the original
federal arrangement have been the subject of continuing controversy. Under Stalin several republics and autonomous areas were arbitrarily abolished and in some cases their populations forcibly removed, as in the cases of the Crimean Tatar, Kalmyk, and Chechen-Ingush republics. While these abuses were exposed and denounced by Khrushchev, it was also during his rule that the Karelo-Finnish Republic lost its union republic status. A prolonged controversy over the powers and status of the union republics again erupted during the Brezhnev era and delayed the adoption of the 1977 Constitution. While the debate revolved around the question whether Lenin viewed the creation of the federal structure as a temporary and tactical expedient or as the expression of a durable political principle, other, more practical policy questions lurked just beneath the surface.

Advocates of reducing the role of the republics further, or of eliminating the federal principle altogether, urged their case both on grounds of economic rationality - namely, that existing boundaries were an obstacle to optimal economic planning - and as a matter of political control - that retention of the federal structure impeded political integration. Defenders of the federal arrangement cited Lenin on its behalf and argued that on the contrary, the retention of the existing system was a precondition for further rapprochement among nationalities. In the end, the existing structure was preserved, although with some diminution of republic autonomy. In Brezhnev's subsequent comments about these discussions, interestingly, he did not challenge the principle of a unitary system, but indicated only that it was inexpedient to consider any major change at that time. Behind the scenes the debate continues, however, with discussions of the durability of
the republics and the conditions under which they might become superfluous in the future a crypto-dialogue with considerable economic and political stakes.

The pace and pattern of economic development have constituted a second subject of real controversy, this one pitting the interests of different regions of the USSR against each other. Within the framework of a unified national economy based on regional specialization and a "fraternal division of labor," local elites have called for a more diversified and balanced pattern of economic growth within their republics and greater reliance on indigenous labor rather than Slavic immigrants. Moreover, declining rates of economic growth are exacerbating competition over investment among different regions. The emphasis on Siberian development is challenged by the advocates of a "European strategy" who call for increased investments in the Western regions of the country because their skilled labor forces, excellent transportation networks and nearby markets generate higher productivity. It is also challenged by those who seek increased investment in Central Asia, both to utilize a growing labor surplus and to promote greater equalization of the level of development among republics. But this competition over resource allocation not only does not directly threaten the cohesion and stability of the system; it may indeed enhance it by pitting the interests of republics and regions against each other in ways that prevent unified resistance to the center. 26

Cadres policy is yet another subject of controversy, involving the sensitive issue of access to positions of political power. The nomenklatura has preserved the dominance of Slavic elites in the key positions of the
political, military, and security apparatus not only in the central organs but in the non-Russian republics as well. For example, while the first secretary of a republic's Communist Party is now customarily a member of the titular nationality, the second secretary, who controls cadre assignments, is usually a Russian or other Slav. While the resentment that this situation has generated seldom reaches public expression, there is abundant evidence that local elites are quietly promoting increased — or even proportional — representation of local cadres in the political apparatus, and reap frequent criticism for substituting "local origins" for merit in appointments and promotions.

This issue is all the more delicate because of earlier Soviet encouragement of "affirmative action" in access to higher education and desirable jobs outside the political apparatus. Throughout the history of Soviet rule, considerable efforts have been made to foster the emergence of indigenous elites in the non-Russian republics whose loyalty and cooperation would add legitimacy to Soviet rule. Preferential access to higher education and professional positions, particularly in the cultural arena, helped to create a new native intelligentsia which had a stake in the achievements of Soviet power. At the same time, the process of modernization brought with it a major influx of Russian and other Slavic settlers into urban centers in the non-Russian republics. There they provided needed technical and administrative skills and enjoyed in return career opportunities and living conditions far above what they might have attained in the provincial capitals of the Russian republic.
During a long period of economic and educational expansion, when opportunities for rapid upward mobility were widespread, these trends generated little friction between the local populations and the Slavic settler communities who led relatively separate lives. In recent years, however, shrinking opportunities have intensified the competition for scarce positions and have provoked controversy over whether the preferential treatment of local nationalities is justifiable in present conditions. In a veiled protest against the squeezing out of Russians from republic-level organs, one of several recent articles in Nauchnyi kommunizm (in good Leninist form, using members of national minorities to attack local chauvinism) declared:

Under conditions of mature socialism, when actual equality of nations and nationalities has been achieved in all spheres of life, when the population of the republics has become multinational, and the Russian language as a medium of international intercourse has become widespread, there is no longer any need in the selection of cadres to give preference to representatives of the indigenous nation to the detriment of other nationalities living in a given republic. Today an unconditional carrying out of the policy of "indigenization" of the party and state apparatus would mean a limitation of the interests of the non-indigenous nationalities, the forgetting of the fact that all inhabitants of this or that republic, regardless of nationality, are the bearers of the statehood of a given national republic and make a contribution to the development of its economy, science, and culture...Consequently neither absolutization or exaggeration of national identification, nor ignoring it or national nihilism is permissible in cadre policy.

The central leadership has sought to steer a delicate balance between these two positions. Brezhnev was undoubtedly alluding to the problem in his speech to the 26th Party Congress when he tactfully stated, "The population of the Soviet republics is multinational. All nations, of course, have the right to be adequately represented in their party and
state organs. Needless to say, the competence and moral and ideological makeup of every candidate must be carefully scrutinized."²⁸ Andropov expressed a similar concern in his 60th anniversary speech:

We are not talking about any formal norms of representation of course. An arithmetic approach to the solution of such problems is inappropriate. But we must consistently seek to ensure that all nationalities present in a given republic be properly represented at various levels of party and soviet agencies. Consideration of business, moral and political qualities, courtesy, thoughtfulness and great tact in selecting and placing cadres are especially necessary in conditions of the multinational composition of the union and autonomous republics.²⁹

This set of issues creates a complex mosaic from republic to republic, pitting the demands of the titular nationality of a given republic against the interests not only of the Russian settler communities but often of other minority nationalities as well. It is therefore no accident that criticisms of the preferential treatment of local elites link the interests of local Russians and non-Russian minorities together as victims of these exclusionary practices.³⁰

Demographic policy has become yet another catalyst of inter-ethnic tensions in recent years. As demographic trends have ceased to be treated as a natural process and have increasingly become the subject of official regulation in the USSR, the direction of state policy has become the object of intense public interest and controversy. The vitality and potential political "weight" of different national groups are deeply engaged by this issue. Nationalities experiencing declining birth rates—the Russians, the Balts, and the Ukrainians—express growing fear and anxiety over the perceived threat to national identity and focus their criticism
on central policies which have constituted, in their view, a contributing element in this decline. On the other hand, those nationalities with high birthrates—particularly those of Central Asia—find in this demographic vitality a source of pride and self-confident assertiveness, as well as a rationale for the allocation of increased resources and greater political representation to their region.

Moreover, in a situation where sharply contrasting regional demographic trends are linked to differences in the cultures, values, and socio-economic opportunities of distinct national groups, and where the policies involve not only the allocation of material resources but intervention, however indirect, in the most sensitive domains of group and personal behavior, the effort to develop a nation-wide population policy is an inherently delicate undertaking. Unavoidably the discussions came to focus on the most sensitive and potentially divisive issue of all namely the question of whether this policy should be regionally—and by implication—ethnically differentiated. A number of leading economists and demographers largely centered in Moscow advocate the pursuit of a differentiated policy which would seek to increase birthrates in regions suffering from decline, while attempting to control and limit them in regions of high population growth. Speaking for opponents of such a policy, a distinguished Kazakh demographer argued that "a differentiated population policy is by its nature and intent a discriminatory policy." His critical reaction was shared by others, who expressed the view that such an approach ran counter to key features of Soviet nationality policy and constituted a direct violation of Leninist norms.
While the decisions taken at the 26th Congress of the CPSU represented something of a compromise between the two positions, the inherent sensitivity of the issue, and its tendency to structure interests and issues along dichotomous lines which correspond to fundamental ethnic cleavages, make it highly likely that demographic policy will continue to serve as a precipitant of ethnic tensions in the years ahead.

The status and recognition accorded various nationalities - whether in the treatment of their languages, history, cultural monuments, or customs and traditions - has been a further source of tension and conflict. Language policy has become especially sensitive in recent years; while basic instruction in the non-Russian republics is guaranteed in the local languages, Russian remains the official language and its study as a second language is compulsory in native schools. Moreover, upward mobility - especially in scientific and political arenas - depends on mastery by local elites of Russian language and cultural norms, while Russians experience little pressure to master the languages of the republics in which they live and work, a source of widespread resentment by local elites. Under these conditions, recent shifts in language policy intended to give further impetus to the study of Russian, but which threaten the status of the local language, can generate severe resistance or even mass demonstrations, such as those which occurred in Georgia over this issue.

While the language issue has proven to be the single most sensitive catalyst of national protest, cultural assertion takes far broader forms. Russian and non-Russian elites alike are engaged in exploration as well as glorification of "roots." The resurrection of folk heroes, both
ancient and modern, including those previously under opprobrium, the purification of national languages and exclusion of foreign borrowings, the evocation of group achievements, the concern with preserving the group's environment, both cultural and natural, and the defense of local traditions - from religious practices to family behavior - all involve an assertion of developing cultural identities and an effort to convert cultural traditions into a political resource.

While many aspects of this development have a conflictual aspect, it would be a mistake to exaggerate the degree of polarization involved, or to assume a uniform situation from republic to republic. With respect to language policy, for example, Belorussia and the Ukraine which have obvious cultural and linguistic affinities, offered less resistance to Khrushchev's efforts to expand the use of Russian than Armenia, Georgia, and the Baltic republics, with their more distinct cultural roots and stronger sense of national identity. In Central Asia, by contrast, where the cultural divide between the indigenous and Russian communities was especially great and the prospects for large-scale assimilation so minimal, the new legislation did not present the same threat and did not evoke as strong or visible a reaction. Moreover, while local cultural elites - particularly from intellectual, professional and student milieus - have been in the forefront of efforts at national self-assertion in the USSR as elsewhere, there are many for whom career interests are bound less to the fate of national languages and cultures than to upward mobility in a largely Russian scientific, technical and administrative milieu. Finally, it should be borne in mind that cultural self-assertion by national elites
is part of a process of political bargaining as well as conflict, in which cultural traditions are converted into a political resource in a within-system competition over power, wealth and status.

All these problems could well be exacerbated by several emerging trends and issues in Soviet political life. The succession process, which promises heightened competition and instability at the apex of the political system, could increase the temptation of rival claimants to exploit nationality policy to build political support. Declining rates of economic growth are also likely to make the management of ethnic relations more difficult; competition over the allocation of limited resources among the different republics as well as within them is likely to grow. An expanding economic pie mitigated both the costs of empire, on the one hand, and the resentment of exploitation on the other. In strained economic circumstances, rival groups will confront each other's claims more directly. This trend is captured in a striking article in the prominent journal _Soviet State and Law_. It conveys the widespread sense of grievance among Russians incataloguing a whole succession of central policies - from family allowances to agricultural procurement prices - which transfer resources from the Russian heartland to unspecified "outlying regions." "As for budget policy," it complains, "not once in the entire existence of the Soviet state has the Russian republic benefited by a subsidy from the all-Union budget, as several other republics have."

Major shifts in the relative "weight" of different regions resulting from demographic trends or new technologies compound the problems of low-growth. A more flexible deployment of resources between the older
industrial regions and the emerging "sun belt" is vitally needed, but as American experience suggests, such shifts are politically difficult to achieve. Moreover, the prospect of reduced social mobility in the decades ahead is especially conducive to increased ethnic tensions as the competition for educational and professional advancement sharpens. Differential birthrates are producing a rapidly-growing cohort of young people in the Muslim regions of the USSR who will confront a stable but well-entrenched cohort of their Slavic counterparts. Short of massive investments in industrialization to generate new job opportunities, increased competition is likely to intensify ethnic prejudice.34

The increasing salience of foreign policy in Soviet domestic affairs may also interact with ethnic assertiveness. The greater involvement of the Soviet Union in the outside world during the past two decades has exposed the Soviet population to a wider variety of influences, values, and experiences than was the case when official media held an unchallenged monopoly. In the case of Central Asia, for example, the orientation of Soviet policy toward the Middle East has been accompanied by the emergence of Tashkent as a showcase of Soviet achievement. The proliferation of officially-sponsored technical, cultural, and even religious delegations, increasing reliance on Central Asian cadres in technical and diplomatic roles, and most recently, the dispatch of Soviet armed forces and administrative personnel into Afghanistan, have created both opportunities and problems for Soviet policy. The gains from using members of minorities to expand Soviet influence abroad are undeniable, but recent developments have also rekindled traditional anxieties about divided loyalties.
The effects of increased interaction on popular attitudes are difficult to assess but they introduce a new frame of reference for evaluating Soviet accomplishments and failures. Whether or not comparisons of Tashkent with Kabul or Teheran are as unfavorable to the Soviet Union as comparisons of Moscow to New York, renewed campaigns against religious organizations, now embracing "foreign Moslem reactionaries," testify to official sensitivities. Soviet publications issue repeated warnings against efforts to bring the "flame of the Islamic revival" to the USSR in order to destabilize Central Asia, inflame nationalist prejudices in these regions, and "arouse discontent among believers with the policies of the Communist Party and the Soviet state." 35

The greater visibility and impact of linkages between foreign policy and regional domestic needs also help explain the growing attention to foreign policy issues on the part of Soviet regional elites. Finally, Sino-Soviet tensions also intersect with the Soviet nationality problem, both in providing impetus for better treatment of the indigenous nationalities of Soviet Central Asia and in the Soviet appeal to fellow-nationals across the Chinese frontier.

Nonetheless, this brief discussion of some of the major issues around which ethnonational grievances have focussed demonstrates the considerable difficulties which stand in the way of forming ethnonational movements able to bridge the diverse backgrounds, interests and objectives of their constituencies. The conflicts we have outlined here create diverse and crosscutting cleavages rather than cumulative and mutually reinforcing ones. They span a broad spectrum, including competing claims and interests.
of center and periphery, of different regions against each other, of local elites of the titular nationality against those of the Russian settler community, often itself allied with other minority nationalities, as well as conflicting views within local as well as national elites. With the possible exception of the Baltic republics and the Ukraine, where under some circumstances it is at least conceivable that protest movements could join working-class unrest to national grievances, considerable difficulties clearly stand in the way of defining issues "which strike responsive chords simultaneously among the elites and masses and serve to link the concerns of different strata in a coherent ethnic movement." 36

Strategies and Goals of National Self-Assertion

The widespread tendency of Western observers to assume that political instability, if not outright secession, is the natural and logical outcome of rising national consciousness neglects the broad repertoire of potential strategies and goals available to ethnonational elites. Especially in light of the severe constraints on the political mobilization of ethnicity imposed by the Soviet system, it is important to be mindful of the full gamut of possibilities in the choice of strategies and goals available to those who wish to identify themselves with some form of national self-assertion in the USSR.

At the individual level, national elites are presented with a wide range of options, from assimilation, whether in the form of identifying with the dominant group and its culture, or by actually altering ethnic identity; to maximizing individual power by acting as a broker between
the two cultures; to linking one’s personal fate to that of one’s nation and defending or asserting its distinctive traits. The ethnonational group faces a parallel spectrum of possibilities, including not only outright secessionism at one end of the political spectrum, to mobilizing for increased autonomy, communalism, or resources, and for the promotion of cultural or political nationalism in its many possible manifestations.

Of this entire gamut of possible strategies, by far the most widespread in the Soviet context is one devoted to working within the system. This encompasses center-periphery bargaining designed, on the part of the participant group, to enhance its resources, power, and status. The degree of pressure which any group can exert on the center is in turn the product of several factors, of which the most important have been the responsiveness of a given leadership to group pressures; the overall "weight" of the particular group in the system as a whole; its role in key positions of economic, political, and military power; its control over strategic resources; and the availability of exogenous political forces willing and able to offer effective support to its goals or to provide leverage on its behalf. In short, the scope, the strategies, and the outcomes of national self-assertion are highly diverse, variable and problematic. They will, moreover, be shaped in important ways by the particular constraints imposed on its expression by Soviet institutions and practices.
The long-term prospects for ethnonational resurgence in the USSR are constrained both by intrinsic and by systemic factors. First, as we have already noted, there are significant intrinsic constraints on the political mobilization of ethnicity in the Soviet Union as elsewhere. The repertoire of potential ethnic identities and their salience varies among individuals and in different situations. In the case of Central Asia, for example, an individual may identify himself or herself as Soviet Central Asian, Turkic, Uzbek, or Muslim—or a combination of these, depending on the particular context. It is difficult to imagine circumstances in which a politically significant grassroots movement might crystallize around a single one of these. Furthermore, individuals have multiple and overlapping identities and roles, of which ethnicity is only one and not necessarily the most salient. As a number of Soviet sociological surveys suggest, education and professional role are usually more significant determinants of attitudes and behavior than ethnicity per se. Moreover, neither national elites nor masses share homogeneous and unified attitudes or aspirations, and these divisions complicate still further the task of mobilizing large populations around a single issue.

An additional constraint on the political mobilization of ethnicity in the USSR is the absence of a single overriding cleavage around which such mobilization might take place. The issues which pit the interests of Russians against those of the non-Russian nationalities form only a small part of a much larger spectrum. Divergent historical and political
experiences have shaped the attitudes of different non-Russian nationalities toward the Russians; for some the Russians represent allies or protectors against traditional enemies. As we have seen, regions and republics compete over the allocation of resources. And even within the same national republic ethnic communities are themselves divided over key issues, whether the desirability of further modernization with its attendant Russification or any others. Even the dissident groups are internally divided; Jewish and Ukrainian activists have more than once accused the civil rights movement of being insufficiently concerned with the national question. The existence of multiple crosscutting cleavages that are not cumulative and mutually reinforcing constitutes a major regime asset in the management of ethnic relations.

Another Soviet system asset turns on matters of comparative size, consciousness, integration, and demands on the system among national groups. The most "advanced" Soviet nationalities - the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, absorbed into the Soviet Union during World War II - which are likely to make the greatest demands and are potentially the least "digestible," are also numerically smallest. The potential demographic weight of the Central Asian republics, on the other hand, is offset in the short run by a more parochial, underdeveloped and self-sufficient way of life that makes comparatively fewer demands on the system.

Secondly, the very nature of the Soviet system imposes severe constraints on the political mobilization of ethnicity, as indeed on the mobilization of any other subculture or group identity, through a combination of coercion, repression, control, cooptation, competition, and
concessions. A potential national movement faces a political regime with an exceptionally highly developed mechanism of control. Repression and the threat of repression have remained central components of Soviet nationality policy. They are used to prevent the organization of dissident movements, outlaw their activities, ban their publications, and arrest and try participants in such movements. In addition, the management of dissidence includes efforts to ridicule and discredit potential participants in such movements by defining their concerns as non-issues, by labeling their spokesmen as fanatics or as anti-Soviet accomplices of Western imperialism or by warning of the disastrous political and economic consequences that might follow from any effort to disengage a constituent unit from the larger federal Union. Soviet statements are not above depicting many national languages and cultures as relatively primitive and limited, unlikely to receive full international recognition on their own, and implying that nationalist movements would deprive these groups of the cultural status which derives from their association with the larger Union. An official monopoly over all forms of organization and association as well as overall means of public communication is a further impediment to the expression of demands outside official channels, while the assignment of military conscripts outside their own regions ensures the loyalty of the armed forces and possible use in local disturbances. To the extent that a solid organization is a sine qua non of any potential ethnonational movement, its prospects inside the USSR are exceedingly slim.

Quite apart from the coercive restraints on the politicization of ethnicity, there is also an appeal to normative and material interests. The Soviet leadership goes to considerable lengths to emphasize the way
in which members of non-Russian nationalities derive substantial benefits from working within the system. Unlike classical colonial systems, the Soviet Union proffers full and equal citizenship, providing symbolic recognition and genuine opportunities for participation and advancement of the non-Russian nationalities in exchange for loyalty and partial assimilation. Having initially destroyed traditional local elites and eliminated the economic and political bases of alternative centers of power, the Soviet system has gone on to train, promote and coopt new indigenous subelites and to reward them for their collaboration and loyalty. These elites are more likely to direct their energies toward within-system demands than toward secession.

Displacement and depoliticization are especially useful instruments for the management of ethnic tensions. The enormous expansion of cultural and scientific elites in Central Asia is not only a way of rewarding and coopting local elites but a way of channeling ethnic aspirations away from more sensitive political and administrative domains. Similarly the toleration of societies for the preservation of historical and cultural monuments reflects a recognition that they constitute a comparatively harmless alternative to other forms of ethnic self-assertion. The expansion of Soviet contacts with the Third World in recent years, and more recently still, the construction of a new administrative and cultural infrastructure in Afghanistan are likely to offer opportunities to enlist the energies and skills as well as the "imperial" aspirations of the Central Asian elites.

The regime has also employed a strategy of avoidance in a number of areas. By concentrating its efforts at control of the "commanding heights," and avoiding direct and counter-productive assaults on local customs and
norms when they are marginal to central priorities, the regime has prevented a number of counterproductive confrontations. The treatment of Islam is a telling illustration: thanks to its control of the recruitment, training, and activities of official religious elites, and to an active campaign of antireligious propaganda, the Soviet leadership can afford to tolerate a considerable degree of private religious observances.

Another major device in the management of national relations is the exploitation of alternative lines of cleavage and solidarity. By emphasizing class rather than ethnicity as a fundamental social division by promoting contacts across ethnic boundaries among different professional groups, from writers and artists to natural and social scientists, and by exploiting conflict among ethnic groups as well as conflicting tendencies within them, the Soviet leadership has managed to create solidarities that transcend ethnic boundaries and to exploit cleavages that cut across them. It has also largely avoided creating situations which activate ethnic identities in politically destabilizing ways.

Finally, the Soviet leadership has motivated ethnic elites to participate in and benefit from the system, rather than to exacerbate ethnic conflict. By exploiting external threats, particularly threats from China directed at Soviet Central Asia, by pressing the view that any conflict would detract from the economic well-being of the whole, and by making clear that the acquisition or retention of political power depends upon collaboration with central elites, the Soviet leadership has emphasized the benefits the present system confers as well as the dangers of fragmentation. Under these circumstances, the political salience of national self-assertion will
probably increase significantly over the next decade, but it is difficult to imagine a scenario, short of major war, in which ethno-nationalism would seriously threaten the stability of the Soviet system.


6. For instance, in the work of Merle Fainsod, Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, John N. Hazard, Leonard Schapiro, and Adam Ulam, as well as, among recent writings, Jerry F. Hough. Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer's *The Soviet Citizen* (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1961) is particularly instructive as a case in point. While their study demonstrates extraordinary prescience in anticipating many of the key developments of the Khrushchev period on the basis of refugee interviews, it failed to anticipate the emergence of a significant dissident movement in general and of national protest in particular.

7. Cleavages based on functional specialization, for example, are explored by Milton Lodge, *Soviet Elite Attitudes Since Stalin* (Columbus, Ohio, 1969) and in H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton, N.J., 1971); on task differentiation, by Jerry Hough's contribution to Skilling and Griffiths, eds. in *ibid.*;


10. This approach is suggested, in particular, by Frederik Barth, ed., *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (Boston: Little Brown, 1969).


12. Bennigsen and Broxup (fn. 8), p. 140.


19. R.I. Kosolapov, "Klassovye i natsional'nye otnosheniiia na etape razvitogo sotsializma" [Class and national relations in the stage of developed socialism], *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia*, no. 4, 1982, p. 10.

20. Ibid., p. 15.

21. M.A. Morozov, *Natsiia v sotsialisticheskom obschestve* [The Nation in Socialist Society] (Moscow, 1979), p. 41. In a similar vein, a recent article in *Kommunist Moldavii* argues that
contrary to the false claims of bourgeois ideologists, the Soviet people do not consider themselves as some sort of 'Russian-Soviet nation' in which the ethnic features of the non-Russian peoples are said to have dissolved and disappeared. In reality the international community does not replace the national one, but encompasses it.... The development of the USSR proves that the nation is now the definitive form of social development. Even under socialism, it is within the framework of the nation that production and all other social relations...exist.

Kommunist Moldavii, no. 11, November 1982, as cited in JPRS 82927, 23 February 1983 (Political and Social Affairs, no. 1373).

22. A.V. Chertina, "
Istorila SSSR, no. 6 (November-December 1982), p.


25. For a discussion of the earlier controversies, see Grey Hodnett, "The Debate Over Soviet Federalism," Soviet Studies XVIII April, 1967, p. 458. A recent Soviet source reports that during the discussions of the draft constitution of 1977 a number of proposals were advanced to introduce into it a reference to the existence of a single Soviet nation, to liquidate or sharply curtail the sovereignty of union and autonomous republics, and to establish a unicameral Supreme Soviet by abolishing the Soviet of Nationalities. "However, all these proposals
were held to be baseless." P. Paskaria, "Sovetskii narod--noavaia
tsotsial'naia i internatsional'naia obshchnost' liudei," [The Soviet
people - a new social and international community of people]
Kommunist Moldavii, no. 12 December 1982, pp. 80-86.

26. It should also be noted that local elites are not themselves united
on these issues, and that policy differences cut across both indigenous
and Russian elites. See, for example, the study by Teresa Zimmer,
"The Ethnic Dimension of Policy-Making at the Regional Level:
Economic Development Debates in Uzbekistan."

27. See, for example, G.T. Tavadov, "O razvitii natsional'nykh otnoshenii
v SSSR" [On the development of national relations in the USSR],
Nauchnyi kommunizm, no. 5, 1981, pp. 11-21. Another article declared:
In the past, when actual equality among peoples had not yet been
established, when there still existed significant survivals of the
former backwardness of the indigenous nationalities in this or that
republic, it was necessary to conduct a policy of indigenization of
the apparatus....But under present conditions,...when there are no longer
any backward national districts, the need for such advantages no longer
exists." I.P. Tsamerian, "Vklad XXVI s"ezda KPSS v marksistsko-
leninskuiu teoriiu natsional'nykh otnoshenii," [The contribution of the
26th Congress of the CPSU to the Marxist-Leninist theory of national
relations], Nauchnyi kommunizm, 4, (July-August, 1981), pp. 63-64.


30.


33. The inverse relationship between job mobility and ethnic prejudice is clearly demonstrated in the research of Iu. V. Arutjunian, "Konkretnosotsiologicheskoi issledovanie natsional'nykh otnoshenii," [Concrete sociological research on national relations], Voprosy filosofii 12 (1969).

34. For two examples of a large number of articles dealing with efforts by the KGB to combat ideological subversion from abroad directed at Central Asia, see S. Tsvigun in Kommunist, no. 4, September 1981, pp. 88-89, and Major General Z. Yusif-Zade, Bakinskii rabochii, December 19, 1980, p.3.