THE POLITICS OF RELIGION IN THE UKRAINE:
THE ORTHODOX CHURCH AND THE UKRAINIAN REVOLUTION,
1917-1919

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Contents

Acknowledgments vii

The Rise of the Ukrainian Church Movement 1

Political Developments in the Ukraine 1

The Impact of the Revolution on the Church in the Ukraine 4

Diocesan Congresses in the Ukraine 5

Frustrated Hopes and the Sharpening of the Ukrainian-Russian Conflict within the Church 7

The Ukrainian Church Movement and the Parties of the Central Rada 10

The Formation of the Tserkovna Rada and the Convocation of the All-Ukrainian Sobor 13

The Establishment of the All-Ukrainian Church Council 13

The All-Ukrainian Sobor 17

The Church under the Hetman Regime 19

The Ecclesiastical Policy of the Hetmanate and the Reassertion of the Russian Orientation in the Church 20

The Summer Session of the Sobor and the Adoption of the Statute for the Ukrainian Church 21

The Ukrainian Reaction to the Sobor and a Shift in the Government's Church Policy 25

Another Reversal in the Hetman's Policy: The Proclamation of Federation with Russia 29

The Directory and the Autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church 32

The Invasion of the Ukraine by the Bolshevik and White Armies 34

The Ministry of Confessions under Professor Ohienko and Its Efforts to Implement the Law on Autocephaly 36

Conclusions and Reflections 38

Transliteration of Geographical Names 43

Table 1: Orthodox Dioceses in the Ukraine, 1915 44

Map: The Ukrainian Lands in 1917-1921 46

Notes 47
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The Rise of the Ukrainian Church Movement

The revolution of March 1917,* which overthrew the tsarist regime and instituted a short-lived diarchy of the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, started a chain of events that shook the very foundations of the Russian Orthodox Church and profoundly affected its internal organization, its legal and economic position, and its relationship to the state. In the Ukraine, as in other borderlands of the Russian Empire, political and social upheavals coalesced with a national revolution, resulting in the rise of an autonomous national government, and after the Bolshevik overthrow of the Provisional Government, in the Ukraine's ultimate, if not long-lasting, secession from the Russian state.

Moscow's hegemony was challenged in the ecclesiastical realm as well. In March, after more than a century of Russian domination, the Georgian Orthodox Church unilaterally proclaimed its autocephaly and was promptly recognized by the Provisional Government despite protests from the Holy Synod.¹ In the Ukraine, resurgent Ukrainian nationalism took the form of an increasingly vocal, if predominantly lay, movement for the de-Russification of the local Orthodox Church.² This presented the newly restored Patriarchate of Moscow with a new and urgent problem of national self-determination within the Church. For reasons to be discussed below, the Russian Church was neither prepared nor willing to solve this problem to the satisfaction of the Ukrainian national movement. Thus denied a canonical solution to its demands, the Ukrainian national movement turned to extra-canonical means, including the intervention of successive Ukrainian governments, in its endeavors to realize the objective of an autocephalous national church.

Political Developments in the Ukraine

The collapse of the old political order released the hitherto repressed forces of Ukrainian nationalism, which in turn accelerated the crystallization of a new sense of Ukrainian national identity among the ever-growing number of yesterday's "Little Russians," "South Russians," or simply khokhly.³ Misunderstood by Russian public opinion and contemptuously dismissed by Ukrainophobic newspapers such as Kievilianin as a foreign-inspired aberration, the dynamics of the Ukrainian "national awakening" not only threatened the dominant position of Russians and assimilated non-Russians in the political, social, and ecclesiastical realms, but it challenged the basic tenets of the established notions of Russian nationality, its historical legacy, and territorial patrimony.

With the lifting of old restrictions on the freedom of speech, press, and association, the principle vehicles for Ukrainian nation-building were the rapidly growing Ukrainian press led by the Kiev daily Nova rada;⁴ newly-legalized or newly-formed Ukrainian political parties, predominantly socialist in orientation;⁵ mushrooming cultural, professional, and cooperative

*All dates in the text will henceforth be given according to the New Style (Gregorian calendar), which was officially introduced in Soviet Russia by the Soviet government on February 1, 1918, by redating it February 14. Dates of periodicals are listed in the footnotes in both the Old Style (Julian calendar) and the New Style until the adoption of the latter.
organizations; and the Ukrainianization movement in the military. Their joint political "spokesman" and coordinating center became the Ukrainian Central Rada (Council), which was established in Kiev on March 20 under the leadership of the foremost Ukrainian historian, Mykhailo Hrushevskyi. The Rada was given a more representative membership and invested with greater revolutionary legitimacy by the Ukrainian National Congress when it convened on April 19-21. The latter acclaimed the Rada's political program centering on the formation of an autonomous Ukrainian nation-state within a loosely federated Russian Republic that would accord an appropriate place to Ukrainians and the Ukrainian language in its public, educational, cultural, and religious institutions.6

Inevitably, the Russian Orthodox Church in the Ukraine—the staunchest defender of the religious, political, cultural, and linguistic unity of Russia and the most important institutional survivor of the centralized imperial order—could not remain unaffected by Ukrainian national aspirations. Already in its March 22 appeal "To the Ukrainian People," the Central Rada urged the masses to "demand rights for the Ukrainian language from pastors of the Church."7 On April 2, a delegation from Petrograd's Ukrainian community presented Prime Minister G. E. Lvov with a brief that called for the Ukrainianization of ecclesiastical administration in the Ukraine. It requested that the Office of the Over-Procurator "instruct the rural clergy to preach and communicate with the people in Ukrainian language."8 A month later, an official Rada delegation presented the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet with a memorandum that called, among other things, for the "filling of responsible posts, both in civil and ecclesiastical administration in the Ukraine, with individuals who enjoy the trust of the population, speak its language, and are familiar with its way of life."9

The initial response to the rise of the Central Rada within Kievan church circles appeared to be cautious. Among the small stratum of "nationally conscious" Ukrainian clerics, there was spontaneous support for the cause. On the very day of the Central Rada's formation, a meeting of the Kievan clergy presided over by a Kievan vicar, Bishop Nikodim (Krotkov) of Chyhyryn,10 delegated three local Ukrainian priests to this body.11 Soon after, on April 1, another vicar, Bishop Dymytrii (Verbytskyi) of Uman,12 and several Ukrainian priests celebrated a memorial service for the Ukrainian national poet Taras Shevchenko in St. Sophia square at the start of a massive Ukrainian demonstration in Kiev.13 Later, on April 20, Dymytrii brought his personal greetings to the Ukrainian National Congress. A local clergyman, Pavlo Pohorilko, was elected to the gathering's presidium.14 The next day, Pohorilko was made a member of the reorganized Central Rada as the representative of the clergy.15

However, given the traditional hostility of Orthodox leaders in the Ukraine to even potential manifestations of Ukrainian "separatism" and their low regard for the Ukrainian language ("Little Russian dialect"), it did not take long before demands for Ukrainianization within the Church encountered open resistance. An incident that might have been calculated to inflame nationalistic passions over this issue was triggered by an April 1 note from the Kharkiv Archbishop Antonii (Khrapovitskii)16 to the local Ukrainian organizational committee. The Archbishop contemptuously rejected the committee's request to have the Gospel also read in the Ukrainian language at his Easter liturgy.17
Perceived as a deliberate insult to the Ukrainian language coming from an old enemy of the Ukrainian cause, Antonii's response provoked numerous protests from Ukrainian organizations and newspapers. Demanding his removal from the Kharkiv see, the editors of Nova rada published a lengthy polemical article by Serhii Shelukhyn that outlined the basic ideological tenets of the Ukrainian church movement. According to Shelukhyn's somewhat idealized perception of the past:

the strength of the Ukrainian Church consisted in its decentralization and autonomy, in the recognition of Christ as the sole head of the Church, and in the conciliar nature [sobornist] of its entire organization. The Ukrainian people did not recognize any blind submission to the hierarchy in matters of faith; in these matters, the laymen took the most active part, they elected and deposed the clergy, they independently decided on the affairs of their Church and were themselves its masters .... When bishops separated themselves from the people, adopted Union or Catholicism ... they could not do anything over the heads of their believers, because the latter, whenever a pastor betrayed them, deposed him as a wolf, and elected for themselves another [pastor]. The parishioners were united in brotherhoods which looked after the purity of faith, piety, church teachings, Christian morals ... And to assure their independence from the hierarchy, brotherhoods equipped themselves with stauropegion charter from the Patriarch of Constantinople. It was precisely this ecclesiastical order that had saved the Church and the Ukrainian people from Catholicism, the Union, sects, and denationalization.

This "apostolic church order," charged Shelukhyn, was destroyed after the annexation of the Ukrainian Church by Moscow. With the tsar named head of the Church, the latter estranged itself from the Ukrainian people and became an instrument of oppression and Russification. To "resurrect the apostolic times," Shelukhyn said that:

it is necessary to implement a conciliar order [sobornist] of the Church. Priests should be elected to [their] posts by the parishioners themselves .... The laymen and the priests should be electing bishops. Only then would the clergy be elevated [in popular regard], the Church renewed, and the flock and pastors reunited .... And we will then have Ukrainian bishops and Ukrainian priests, united with their flock and their Church.

Addressing the clergy who had become alien to the concerns of the Ukrainian people, Shelukhyn warned that:

we, Ukrainian Orthodox believers, abandoned by our pastors, will have to accommodate ourselves and alone constitute our church, but afterwards you will be left without a flock and houses of worship .... Because the Church is the gathering of the mass of believers, and not of you. It is not we [who exist] for you, but you for us, and were it not for us there would be no need of you ....
Shelukhyn called on the pastors to begin their reconciliation with the flock by addressing Ukrainian church-goers in their native language. "As for ourselves," he concluded:

we are already making every effort to organize and are taking all measures to resurrect our ancient Ukrainian Church and our ecclesiastical organization, our conciliar [soborna], democratic Ukrainian Church, adding to it all that is demanded by new conditions of life. 23

Shelukhyn's article had an important, if not immediate, impact on the crystallization of the platform and program of the Ukrainian autocephalist movement in which he was eventually to play a significant part. 24

The Impact of the Revolution on the Church in the Ukraine

The fall of the monarchy threw the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine into a state of anxiety, confusion, and ferment. Although there was little sympathy in ecclesiastical circles for state domination over the Church, and although the Rasputin scandal had weakened faith in the last tsar, the revolution could not immediately destroy the long entrenched belief in the interdependence of Orthodoxy and autocracy shared by the episcopate and a considerable portion of the clergy. Not yet capable of standing on its own feet, the Church continued to depend on the power of the state, which passed into the hands of political parties that had long attacked the reactionary orientation of the Church and were favoring reforms entailing the surrender of many, if not all, of its past privileges. Uncertain of its future amidst the rapid break-down of the old order, the Church was fixing its hopes on its forthcoming Sobor. 25 Yet although all elements of the church were aware of the need to revise its relationship to the state and its internal reorganization, differences over the nature and the urgency of ecclesiastical reforms deeply divided the clergy.

While dutifully following the Petrograd Holy Synod in pledging their loyalty to the Provisional Government, the bishops of the Ukrainian dioceses displayed little enthusiasm for the revolution. Compromised by their close collaboration with extreme rightist and chauvinist groups, several leading church figures soon found themselves under attack from both revolutionary authorities and increasingly vocal progressive elements among the clergy and laymen. In April, Archbishop Vasili (Bogoiaevskii) of Chernihiv, disowned by his own clergy, was arrested by the local authorities as "dangerous to public order" and taken to Petrograd to await trial. 27 In Kharkiv, the committee representing the gubernia's public organizations forced Archbishop Antonii (Khrapovitskii) to leave his diocese "in view of his harmful activity." 28 Both the Volyn Archbishop Evlogii Georgievskii and Archbishop Ahapit (Vyshevskyi) of Katerynoslav came under the attack of revolutionary authorities who made unsuccessful attempts to have the bishops removed from their sees. 31

While the rank-and-file clergy in the Ukraine appeared more favorably disposed toward the new order than their superiors, they too came to suffer from the widespread suspicion of the Church's continued counter-revolutionary orientation. Legitimate grievances on the part of parishioners combined with
anticlerical sentiments and the settlement of personal accounts to bring about numerous removals of the village clergy. According to a contemporary account:

hundreds of priests, deacons and psalmists were expelled from their posts and had to wander from place to place .... Everywhere, laymen began to intervene in ecclesiastical affairs, seized church keys from the clergy, as well as money and property, and even took upon themselves to appoint pastors.32

In the Volyn diocese alone, some 60 parish priests were expelled within two weeks in April by verdicts of village assemblies.33 A similar situation prevailed in the Kiev gubernia, causing the Kievan authorities to issue a special appeal to the peasantry calling for moderation.34 In Kharkiv, the diocesan congress had to call on gubernia authorities for countermeasures against "self-willed outbursts" directed at the clergy, for "in many localities, priests are being removed from parishes without trial and investigation; they are being deprived of their vocation, arrested and locked in jails."35

With the hitherto dominant conservative elements in the Church temporarily silenced and disorganized, the initiative passed into the hands of the progressives, the liberal clergy, and laymen. Though numerically weak and largely restricted to diocesan centers and theological schools, they were able to draw support from the liberal Over-Procurator of the Holy Synod, V. N. Lvov,36 and sympathetic public authorities in challenging the power of the conservative episcopate and the consistories. In the first weeks of the revolution, "commissars for ecclesiastical affairs" were appointed by gubernia executive committees from among liberal clergy. They were to supervise the administration of the dioceses on behalf of the revolutionary authorities.37 At the same time, executive committees of clergy and laymen were elected in each diocesan center by local priests and church intelligentsia. Led by progressive elements, these committees were to provide the rank-and-file clergy and laymen with an autonomous voice in dealing with the civil authorities and the church hierarchy.38 Their most immediate task was the convocation of diocesan congresses of clergy and laymen to discuss the future of the Church under the new order.

Diocesan Congresses in the Ukraine

Despite continuing opposition from the episcopate even after these gatherings were sanctioned by the Holy Synod,39 diocesan congresses were held in the spring and summer of 1917 in all Ukrainian gubernias. While voicing general consensus in favor of an early convocation of an All-Russian Church Sobor to undertake ecclesiastical reforms, the congresses split on the nature of the future reforms. They divided into conservative and liberal camps on the one hand, and into Russian and Ukrainian factions on the other. Greatly strengthened by large-scale lay participation, the liberals generally prevailed at these gatherings, which adopted resolutions requesting the introduction of a conciliar principle of church administration, including the election of bishops by the diocesan clergy and laymen. They proceeded to elect diocesan councils to replace the unpopular consistories. Several congresses voted in favor of the election of parish priests by their flock,40 and at least one gathering, which took place in Volyn, called for the
separation of church and state, and the secularization of parish schools.\textsuperscript{41} Conservative influence was more marked at the Odessa and Kharkiv meetings, both of which voiced demands for the Church's freedom from governmental interference and the continuation of the privileged legal status of the Russian Church.\textsuperscript{42}

The principal issue that split the diocesan congresses along national lines was the demand for the Ukrainianization of the Church advanced by nationally conscious Ukrainian clergy and laymen. While otherwise identifying themselves with the progressive camp, they viewed the "nationalization" of the Church as a necessary consequence of its democratization and a corollary of the anticipated evolution of the Ukraine toward an autonomous status within a federated Russian state. To this extent, as long as their aspirations did not involve a complete ecclesiastical and political separation from Russia, the advocates of Ukrainianization were able to draw on the support of many liberal Russians within the Church. On the other hand, conservative elements, especially the episcopate, adamantly opposed any attempts at Ukrainianization as potentially subversive to the unity of both the Church and the Russian state. This attitude contributed much to the subsequent radicalization of the Ukrainian church movement.

The opponents of Ukrainianization proved to be strongest at the diocesan congresses in Chernihiv (in August, the local gathering especially condemned such measures\textsuperscript{43}) and Kharkiv.\textsuperscript{44} The first Odessa and Katerynoslav congresses evidently failed to take a stand on the issue, but when they reconvened in the summer, the two bodies adopted resolutions favoring a measure of Ukrainianization in both Church services and parish schools.\textsuperscript{45} The clerical and lay representatives of the Volyn diocese voted in favor of Ukrainian autonomy at their first congress in April, and subsequently extended their support to the cause of an autonomous Ukrainian metropoly and the Ukrainianization of Church schools.\textsuperscript{46} By far, the greatest measure of success was achieved by the Ukrainian group at the diocesan congresses in the Kiev, Poltava, and Podillia gubernias—the traditional strongholds of the national movement.

The April congress of the Kievan diocese was dominated by a Ukrainian-liberal coalition that overrode strong objections from the Russian conservatives, renamed the gathering the "First Ukrainian Diocesan Congress," and resolved that "in an autonomous Ukraine, the Church should be independent from the [Petrograd] Synod." Chaired by Archpriest Vasyl Lypkivskyi, the gathering voted in support of the Ukrainianization of Church services, ecclesiastical administration, and parish schools. It also called for the convocation of an All-Ukrainian congress of clergy and laymen.\textsuperscript{47} To replace the Kievian consistory, the congress elected a pro-Ukrainian diocesan council headed by Archpriest Ie. Kapralov.\textsuperscript{48}

The most elaborate program of the Ukrainianization of the Orthodox Church was adopted by the May congress of the clergy and laymen of the Poltava diocese. Based on a paper presented to the gathering by a local priest, Feofil Buldovskyi,\textsuperscript{49} the congress resolutions stated that:

1. In a free, territorially autonomous Ukraine, there must be a free, autocephalous Church, independent from the state in its internal order.
2. The Orthodox Church shall be the first among the equal
religious organizations in the Ukraine and shall, together with them, receive financial assistance from the state.

3. The Autocephalous Ukrainian Church shall have a conciliar [sobornopravnyi] constitution which should permeate the entire organization of the church.

4. Church services in the Ukrainian Church shall be celebrated in Ukrainian ...

The Poltava gathering proposed a series of concrete measures to be immediately introduced in all the Ukrainian dioceses: the reading of Gospels and sermons in the Ukrainian language; the publication of Ukrainian translations of church books; an immediate end to the established practice of filling the episcopal sees in the Ukraine with Russians; and the complete Ukrainianization of parochial and theological schools. The meeting called for the clergy to support the national-territorial autonomy of the Ukraine. It also decided to establish contacts with other dioceses in order to consider in greater detail the Ukrainianization of the Church and the convocation of a Ukrainian Church Sobor as a preliminary step toward an All-Russian Sobor.

A similar line was taken by the Podillia diocesan congress at which a strong Ukrainian group was led by Oleksandr Marychiv, an army chaplain. The meeting addressed a telegram to the Central Rada on behalf of the "Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Podillia" stating that: "we believe and hope that with the autonomy of the Ukraine will come also the autocephaly of her Church." The congress resolved that gospels and sermons should be read in Ukrainian during all services, and that the theological seminary and other Church schools should adopt Ukrainian as the language of instruction and supplement their curriculum with the history, literature, and geography of the Ukraine.

An opportunity for united action presented itself to the Ukrainian Church movement when the All-Russian Congress of Clergy and Laymen met in Moscow in June. Sixty-six Ukrainian delegates from 10 dioceses led by I. Morachevskyi addressed a joint appeal to the Congress to support the cause of Ukrainian autonomy before the Provisional Government--the latter had just turned down the autonomist demands of the Central Rada--and to endorse before the Holy Synod the Ukrainian request for the convocation of a Ukrainian Church Sobor to decide the future of the Ukrainian Church. While declining to intervene in the political controversy between Kiev and Petrograd, the Moscow congress gave its overwhelming support to the proposition that "should the Ukraine become an independent state, the Ukrainian Church, too, should be autocephalous; should there be an autonomous Ukraine, the Church should also be autonomous." The gathering approved in principle the use of national languages in the Church and offered its support to the proposed Ukrainian Sobor.

Frustrated Hopes and the Sharpening of the Ukrainian-Russian Conflict within the Church

Evidently encouraged by the response from the Moscow congress, the Kievan diocesan council proceeded on June 30 to elect a commission for the convocation of a Ukrainian Sobor. The commission, however, encountered stiff opposition from the local episcopate, and in July the Petrograd Synod flatly rejected all Ukrainian demands:
The Synod refuses to consider the question of establishing a separate Ukrainian Church; it is not intended to raise this question at the All-Russian Local Sobor since there was never an autocephalous church in the Ukraine and the Kievan Metropolitan has been subordinated to the Patriarch of Constantinople and, since the end of the Seventeenth century, to the Moscow Patriarch and, by succession, the Synod.56

One immediate consequence of the Synod's refusal was the resignation of Bishop Dymytrii of Uman from the Kiev commission.57 Having failed to secure the blessing of the Russian episcopate, the commission decided to present the Synod with a fait accompli. On July 22, it published an appeal to "the clergy and the laymen" announcing the convocation of a Ukrainian Church Congress to be held in Kiev between August 12 and 18.58 At the last moment, however, the new Over-Procurator of the Holy Synod, A. V. Kartashev, prohibited the Congress on the grounds that it would interfere with the elections of delegates to the All-Russian Sobor scheduled to meet in Moscow on August 28.59 Any remaining hopes of securing a strong Ukrainian representation at the Moscow Sobor were dispelled when the two-stage elections in the Ukrainian dioceses produced a solid pro-Russian majority.60 Though faring somewhat better, the liberals also failed to dominate the elections. In both cases, it seems that the mode of representation and the indirect method of elections worked against liberal and Ukrainian elements that drew their strength primarily from among the urban clergy and lay intelligentsia. But a far more important cause of their failure was a marked shift to the right in the attitudes of the rank-and-file clergy.

Several factors combined to bring about a gradual reassertion of traditional conservative attitudes among the clergy. Probably the most important of these was the disenchantment of rural parish priests with the effects of the revolution on their relationship to their parishioners and on their social and economic status. The numerous expulsions of pastors by their flock, laymen's attempts to control administrative and economic affairs of the parish, and the peasantry's designs on ecclesiastical and monastic lands led to a decline in the rural clergy's sense of security and prestige. Accustomed to relying on the civil authorities for security and support, the clergy found the local representatives of the new order largely indifferent, if not unsympathetic to their predicament. Occasionally, the authorities themselves were instrumental in worsening the position of village priests who found it very difficult to disassociate themselves from the reactionary reputation of their ecclesiastical superiors. The clergy's anxiety increased as the Provisional Government proceeded to remove disabilities imposed by the tsarist law on other religious denominations and to transfer the parish school under the Ministry of Education—a tendency that the priests feared would eventually end in a complete separation of the Church from schools and the state. The growing distrust of the government's motives and its capacity to cope with increasing anarchy in the countryside and at the front made the clergy more and more inclined to close their ranks around the conservative episcopate and to submerge their differences in a common front against the "wreckers of the church."61

These developments greatly strengthened the hand of the episcopate in dealing with their liberal and Ukrainian opponents and at the same time galvanized dispersed reactionary elements into action, whose influence rapidly
increased in urban parish councils. The latter were the products of the early progressive upsurge in the Church. Together with the local "unions of pastors," they soon became a weapon in the hands of the episcopate and reactionaries against the "anti-canonic" activities of the "commissariats for ecclesiastical affairs" and diocesan councils. These organs of "revolutionary democracy" within the Church lost the powerful support of the Over-Procurator of the Holy Synod when the liberal V. N. Lvov was replaced in July by A. V. Kartashev, who was more inclined to concede to the wishes of the episcopate. Symbolic of the changed mood in the Church was the August reelection of the self-banished Antonii Khrapovitskii, an arch-enemy of progressive and Ukrainian tendencies, as Archbishop of Kharkiv.

While given hostile reception by nearly all bishops in the Ukraine, the emergence of a movement for the Ukrainianization and autonomy, if not independence, of the Church was at first ascribed little significance by the Russian ecclesiastical leadership. However, it became a matter of concern when the Ukrainian Central Rada challenged the Provisional Government on the issue of Ukrainian autonomy in June. The subsequent compromise between Petrograd and Kiev and the official recognition of the Rada's General Secretariat as an autonomous government sharpened Russian political circles, with the Kadets joining rightist groups in opposing Petrograd's Ukrainian policy. The reality of Ukrainian autonomy suddenly gave substance to Ukrainian demands for ecclesiastical self-government and a de-Russification of the Church. The dual threat to the unity of the Russian state and the Russian Church not only strengthened the determination of Russian Church authorities to oppose even minor concessions to Ukrainian demands, but it also served to split the liberal ranks within the Church on the Ukrainian issue. The belief in the Church's special mission to preserve "one indivisible Russia," long nurtured under the tsarist regime, reasserted itself among the Russian and Russian-oriented majority of the clergy in the Ukraine. This helps to explain the Synod's reaction to the Ukrainian requests for autocephaly in July and the subsequent banning of the proposed Ukrainian Church Congress. It also accounts for the marked sharpening of Russian-Ukrainian conflicts within the Church.

The main battle was waged in the Ukraine's capital where the Ukrainian-progressive coalition controlled the local executive committee and the diocesan council of the clergy and laymen, with the active support of the Kievian commissar for ecclesiastical affairs, priest E. Pospilovskyi. From the very beginning, it encountered the determined resistance of Metropolitan Vladimir (Bogoiaevskii) of Kiev, who refused to recognize the "arbitrary" and "anti-canonical" resolutions of the diocesan congress or to replace the consistory with the elected Diocesan Council. Appeals to the Synod and the intervention of Over-Procurator Lvov in May failed to impress the Metropolitan, who was supported by the upper stratum of the clergy and local Russian nationalist circles. The stalemate continued until Lvov's departure as Over-Procurator. In August, the Metropolitan counterattacked with a pastoral letter. Condemning liberal tendencies in the Church, he challenged the bona fides of the Ukrainian church movement:

Combined with the general unhappiness that has visited the Russian land is our local spiritual grief which considerably deepens our distress. I speak of the mood that reveals itself in Southern Russia and which endangers the peace and unity of our Church. It is
dreadful for us to hear them speak of the separation of the South-Russian Church from the One Orthodox Russian Church. Have they, after such a long life in common, any reasonable grounds for those attempts? ... None whatsoever! I testify, on the basis of my personal experience, that in all dioceses and metropolises in which the Lord honored me to serve, everywhere the teaching of Orthodoxy and morals has been preserved pure and unchanged, everywhere there is unity in Church teaching, liturgy and ceremonies. Why is there the striving for separation? Whither will it lead? Of course, it delights only internal and external enemies. The love of one's motherland must not overshadow and overcome our love for all Russia and the One Orthodox Russian Church.67

The Metropolitan's message failed to answer the arguments of the Ukrainian movement, which were addressed not to the doctrinal, but to the national and political orientation of the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine. Vladimir's phraseology and reasoning, well reflected the attitudes of the dominant Russian strata in the Church. Divorced from the national and cultural aspirations of the Ukrainian people, and indeed often ignorant of its separate existence,68 they failed to appreciate the potential strength and viability of the Ukrainian church movement. Novel and impatient with the canonic and hierarchical obstacles raised by its opponents, the movement appeared to the Russian episcopates as an artificial, politically-inspired faction that was alien to "South-Russian" believers and destined to pass with the return of peace and order to "Holy Rus."

The failure of the Ukrainian church movement to secure any of its major objectives and the increasing hostility of the ecclesiastical authorities to its adherents contributed to the radicalization of its mood, while causing some defection from the movement. Representative of the deepening frustration of the movement was an article published in a September 1917 issue of Nova rada. The author, evidently one of the adherents of the movement, noted that the Moscow Sobor revealed the victory of anti-democratic and imperialist tendencies within the Church, and concluded that the only course left to the Ukrainian clergy was to break away from the Russian Church by revolutionary means.69 Not surprisingly, having exhausted ecclesiastical channels for bringing about the realization of its objectives, the Ukrainian church movement turned now to Ukrainian organizations and authorities for support.

The Ukrainian Church Movement and the Parties of the Central Rada

The relationship between the Ukrainian church movement and the dominant political and social forces shaping the course of the Ukrainian revolution in 1917-18 was one of considerable complexity and ambivalence. Not only were the few nationally conscious clergymen and lay churchmen who launched the movement for the Ukrainianization of the Orthodox Church guided by religious motives—a shared desire to end the church's alienation from the life of the people, to make the Orthodox liturgy and teachings accessible to the masses, and to bring life into the atrophied body of the Church. They also shared the national, social, and political aspirations of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and the predominately peasant following of the Ukrainian revolution. Unlike the passive and indifferent mass of their fellow priests, these Ukrainian clerics and laymen welcomed the formation of the Central Rada in March 1917 and later
used their influence to assist in the work of the embryonic Ukrainian government, as for example when the diocesan council of the Poltava eparchy publicly endorsed the Rada's First Universal in June and had it read in the churches of the Poltava gubernia.7° Undoubtedly, the leaders of the Ukrainian church movement, brought up as they were in the Orthodox tradition of a close correspondence between the religious and political life of the people, viewed a national church as an important force in the process of nation-building and expected that the emergent Ukrainian government would throw its full weight behind the movement's attempts to de-Russify the Church.

These expectations were not wholly fulfilled. The alienation of the established Church from Ukrainian cultural, social, and political aspirations, and its use as an instrument of Russification and a weapon against the Ukrainian movement, left the Ukrainian intelligentsia with a legacy of bitterness and hostility to the official Church. This combined with strong socialist influences on the thinking of the last two generations of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to produce widespread anticlerical, if not atheistic, sentiments. In line with the prevailing attitudes of socialist parties, the two parties dominating Ukrainian political life in 1917-18--the Social Revolutionaries and the Social Democrats--considered religion "a private matter" for both party and state, and favored an early separation of the Church from the state and the school. They also favored the nationalization of lands owned by the Church and by monasteries.71 While the Social Revolutionaries and the Social Democrats with few exceptions tended to minimize the importance of the "ecclesiastical front" and to leave the Ukrainian church movement to its own fate, the smaller political groups--the liberals72 and the nationalists73--ascribed somewhat greater importance to the Ukrainianization of the Church. The most constructive attitude toward this question was adopted by the nationalists. In April 1917, while addressing a mass meeting in Kiev, Mykola Mikhnovskyi, the leading nationalist ideologist, came out in support of the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under its own Patriarch.74 At its December 1917 Congress, the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Independists resolved that:

1. The Church in the Ukraine must be independent and Ukrainian, according to its historical traditions.
2. Divine services should be celebrated in the Ukrainian language.
3. Every nation must be free [nesaimano] in its religious affairs, as the freedom of confession and convictions is the foundation of a true popular liberty.75

The importance of the nationalists' sympathetic attitudes toward the aspirations of the Ukrainian church movement derived not from their weight in the Central Rada where they constituted a small minority, but from the considerable influence they developed in Ukrainian military circles. Among the latter, the Ukrainian church movement found some of its earliest proselytizers and leaders in the person of military chaplains and some junior officers, especially former seminarians who had participated in clandestine Ukrainian circles active in these institutions before the war. The Ukrainian church movement found another source of support in Ukrainian peasant organizations, thanks to the movement's popularity with cooperative workers.
who played an important role in these organizations, and to the influence of Ukrainianized soldiers who returned to their villages.

It was to these soldiers, the "peasants in uniform," that the frustrated Ukrainian church movement turned for assistance in the fall of 1917. The occasion was the massive Third Ukrainian Military Congress held in Kiev during the first half of November. No doubt influenced by the news of the Bolshevik seizure of power in Petrograd and sharing the Congress's impatience with legal niceties as far as the Ukraine's right to self-determination was concerned, the Ukrainian military clergy prevailed on the Congress to pass a special resolution endorsing the objectives of the national church movement on November 9:

In a free democratic Ukrainian Republic there must be a free autocephalous Orthodox Church, independent from the state in its internal order, with a conciliar constitution ... in the Ukraine liturgy should be celebrated in the Ukrainian language.76

From words, the Congress proceeded to action by appointing an Organizational Committee for the Convocation of the All-Ukrainian Church Sobor, consisting of some 30 military chaplains and army representatives.77

If there was still any hesitation on the part of the movement about the prudence of revolutionary tactics, two subsequent events may have relieved them of such doubts. On November 12, the Moscow Sobor voted--against the opposition of its liberal minority--to reestablish the Patriarchate of Moscow, and the Central Rada issued its Third Universal on November 20, proclaiming a de facto independent Ukrainian People's Republic. The Ukraine's new status and the Sobor's decision to restore a monarchical system of ecclesiastical government, which was interpreted in Ukrainian circles as a victory of reactionary and imperialistic elements within the Church, led the Ukrainian church movement to assume an organized form and to press for formal recognition and support by the Ukrainian authorities. Late in November, the leaders of the movement formed a Brotherhood of Resurrection (Bratstvo Voskresenia) in Kiev. The chairmanship of the Brotherhood was assumed by the deposed Archbishop of Vladimir, Oleksii Dorodnytsyn, whose conversion to the Ukrainian cause at last provided the national church movement with a leader of episcopal rank.78 The founding meeting adopted resolutions calling for the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church, the cessation of links with the Patriarch and speedy convocation of an All-Ukrainian Church Sobor.79 At the same time, Ukrainian Church circles turned to the General Secretariat with a request for government intervention to end the opposition of the ecclesiastical authorities to the Ukrainianization of the Church.

An old supporter of the Ukrainian church movement, State Secretary Oleksandr Lototskyi, presented this matter at the meeting of the government, pointing out:

the necessity of bringing the matters of ecclesiastical administration into the general sphere of the Ukrainian government's activities, and of establishing certain external controls over the administrative activities of the leading organs of the clergy, to prevent them from misusing [their authority] in church matters.

This, Lototskyi argued:
had to be done as long as the separation of the church from the state had not been formally implemented and as long as our alien episcopate made use of the state apparatus and various governmental means.80

Accordingly, Lototskyi introduced a bill in the cabinet to create a separate secretariat (ministry) for religious cults—a proposal to which his colleagues reacted rather cautiously. The bill, however, was shelved after the Mala Rada took up the matter on November 29. Lototskyi's plea for a constructive church policy aroused a stormy debate. The socialist majority defeated the bill on the grounds that "our ideal is a system where religion has to become a private matter; therefore, the establishment of any administrative institution for this sphere would be a departure from this idea."81 Noting the government's "utterly apathetic position" on the ecclesiastical question, Nova rada sadly observed that:

Members of the Mala Rada adhering to higher, inaccessible socialist ideals and party purism have not dealt, unfortunately, with the clearly vital affairs of the Ukrainian Church which should be of concern to them, as cultured people.82

The first attempt to secure the aid of the Ukrainian government for the "nationalization" of the Church was therefore frustrated by the ideological inhibitions of the dominant political parties in the Central Rada. Before long, however, the escalating conflict with the new Bolshevik regime in Russia forced the Rada to shed some of its inhibitions and belatedly intervene in support of Ukrainian forces in the Church.

The Formation of the Tserkovna Rada and the Convocation of the All-Ukrainian Sobor

The Establishment of the All-Ukrainian Church Council

Despite initial setbacks, the Ukrainian church movement proceeded with its plans for ecclesiastical independence from Moscow. On December 6, the Organizational Committee for the Convocation of the Ukrainian Church Sobor held a meeting attended by the leaders of the Brotherhood of Resurrection and some members of the old Church Congress Committee that had been elected by the Kievan diocesan council. It is hard to determine which factor was of greater importance in prompting this important meeting: the news of Metropolitan Tikhon's election as the "All-Russian Patriarch," or a telegram from Moscow recalling Archbishop Oleksii from Kiev, which organizers of the meeting inevitably interpreted as a Russian attempt to deprive the movement of its only patron in the episcopate. The gathering decided to merge the three organizations with their largely overlapping membership into a Provisional All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church Council (Tserkovna Rada)—a body of some 60 members headed by Archbishop Oleksii Dorodyntsyn. The latter being a rather honorary post, the actual leadership of the Council devolved on the curate Oleksander Marychiv, with Colonel Tsivchynskyi and deacon V. Durdukivskyi as vice-chairman and secretary, respectively.83 Pointing to the "separation of the Ukrainian State from the Russian State" and to the election of the Patriarch "who might extend his power also upon the Ukrainian Church," the
Tserkovna Rada took the revolutionary step of proclaiming itself a provisional government of the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine until the convocation of an All-Ukrainian Sobor to which it would surrender its powers. Resolutions adopted at this constituent meeting provided for the inclusion of representatives of the dioceses, the episcopate, monastics, theological institutions, and certain lay organizations into the Rada, but stipulated that "all representatives should be Ukrainian by origin and conviction"—a restriction that along with other provisions was obviously designed to prevent Russian church elements from taking over the new institution. The meeting appointed Rada commissars for individual dioceses and explicitly prohibited its chairman, Dorodnytsyn, from complying with Moscow's order transferring him to a monastic post in Russia.84

At the same time, the Tserkovna Rada issued a call for an All-Ukrainian Church Sobor to meet in Kiev on January 10. In an intensely nationalistic proclamation "To the Ukrainian People," echoing the language of the Central Rada's Universals, the All-Ukrainian Church Council stated the motives and objectives of the forthcoming Sobor:

Once, at the time of the Hetmanate, you were free, but having united with Tsarist Moscow, you have lost your freedom, not only political, but also ecclesiastical. Now, having rebuilt your People’s Republic, you should have restored your, once independent, autocephalous holy church ....

But the Russians, having got rid of a temporal tsar, have created for themselves a new spiritual autocrat—the Patriarch of Moscow—in order to usher also our Ukrainian people into a new spiritual slavery ....

In order not to fall into this spiritual captivity, you should immediately elect your All-Ukrainian Orthodox Sobor of clergy and laymen; at [this Sobor] you should restore the ancient independence of the Ukrainian Church, confirmed by the Treaty of Pereiaslav [1654], and illegally destroyed by Moscow ....

Only the All-Ukrainian Church Sobor ... has the right to decide the fate of your Church and recognize or not recognize the newly-elected Patriarch of Moscow; therefore, the latter should not be now mentioned [in liturgical prayers] in the churches of the Ukraine ....

The Tserkovna Rada's message also set forth the mode of representation at the projected Sobor—a move calculated to prevent its domination by Russians entrenched in the higher layers of the Church. Not only were the laymen favored in distribution of the Sobor seats, but the document restricted membership in the Sobor to "Ukrainians by birth and invariably sympathetic to the Ukrainian cause, which must be confirmed in the credentials issued to them by their electors."85

At the same time, the revolutionary nature of the Tserkovna Rada's action did not prevent it from resolving to send a delegation to Patriarch Tikhon to deal with questions pertaining to the Ukrainian Church and the convocation of the Sobor in Kiev. This suggests the Rada's reluctance to sever its canonic links with Moscow, and its expectation that the radical measures adopted on December 6 would frighten the Russian Church leadership into making concessions to Ukrainian demands. Most likely, there were internal divisions
within the Rada over the strategy and tactics of the Ukrainian church movement.

The pace of events then quickened. Local Russian church circles reacted vehemently to the Tserkovna Rada's coup by staging a series of protest meetings. On December 6, the meeting of the Kievan "Union of Parish Councils" condemned the "arbitrary and anti-canonic attempt to create an autocephalous Ukrainian Church" as eventually leading to "submission to the Vatican and the Pope." It requested the Moscow Patriarchate to "prevent" the convocation of the Ukrainian Sobor and to unfrock the Rada's clergy unless they "renounce their designs." At the same time, the Kievan meeting dispatched a pledge of loyalty to Patriarch Tikhon, "the spokesman of the Russian Orthodox idea," under whose banner "the unity of the Russian people will be preserved."86

Meanwhile, forewarned on December 3 of the impending "threat to ecclesiastical peace and unity" in the Ukraine, the Moscow Sobor took up consideration of the crisis. Shortly afterward, the Sobor delegates from the Ukraine held a caucus meeting. While it appears that Metropolitan Vladimir remained adamantly opposed to any compromise with the Ukrainians, less extreme counsels prevailed, and the conclusions of the caucus were reported to the Sobor plenum on December 6 by Archbishop Evlogii of Volyn. They recommended that "in view of the extreme importance of political events in the Ukraine," a Ukrainian regional (oblastnyi) Church Sobor should be held in Kiev as soon as possible under the chairmanship of Metropolitan Vladimir "to consider the new situation and the ordering of the local ecclesiastical affairs in the new political circumstances."87 After some deliberation, it was decided to send a delegation to Kiev "to announce the Sobor's decision to convene a regional Ukrainian Sobor and to establish relations with the Ukrainian Central Rada and church organizations for the sake of mutual reconciliation."88

However, when the Sobor learned of the Tserkovna Rada's resolutions, an angry debate erupted at the session, with a number of speakers condemning any concessions to the Rada and others pleading for caution and some compromise with the Ukrainians in view of the changing political situation in the Ukraine.89 A new resolution was finally adopted to send a strong "pacifying-enlightening" delegation to Kiev, headed by Metropolitan Platon (Rozhdestvenskii) of Tiflis,90 as the Patriarch's plenipotentiary. It was instructed to "establish relations with the Kievan clergy and to take measures assuring that a regional Ukrainian Sobor, against which the local Sobor does not protest in principle, be convened on a canonical basis, and not arbitrarily."91

The subsequent course of events is somewhat blurred by contradictory accounts. On the one hand, the Tserkovna Rada's delegation, led by priest Marychiv, arrived in Moscow on December 12. As subsequently reported by Marychiv, the delegation received a sympathetic hearing from Patriarch Tikhon, who authorized the Rada to convocate the All-Ukrainian Sobor and promised to send his official blessings later with the Russian Sobor's delegation.92 On the other hand, when the Russian Sobor's delegation arrived in Kiev in December and entered into negotiations with the All-Ukrainian Church Council, after four days the irreconcilability of their respective positions led to a complete deadlock as Metropolitan Platon broke off the talks. The Ukrainian side accused Platon of demanding the Rada's dissolution and of refusing to concede even autonomy to the Ukrainian Church.93 It is likely that the extreme anti-Ukrainian position maintained by Metropolitan Vladimir and the
local Russian clergy might have affected the attitude of Platon and his delegation.

The failure to reach agreement brought about renewed hostilities between the Tserkovna Rada and Russian ecclesiastical circles. On December 21, the Rada's representatives visited Metropolitan Vladimir, requesting that he and his vicar Nikodim should leave Kiev within three days. As the same time an unsuccessful effort was made to have one of Vladimir's Ukrainian vicars, either Bishop Dymytrii or Vasylii (Bohdashevskyi), take over administration of the metropoly. Steps were taken by the Rada to bring the Kievan consistory under its control, and it succeeded in a temporary Ukrainianization of the diocesan press organ. On December 21, the Rada published an order requesting all clergy in the Ukraine to offer liturgical prayers for "the God-loved and divinely-protected Ukrainian State, its supreme ecclesiastical authority--the All-Ukrainian Church Council, and the Ukrainian Army." Two days later, the Rada issued an appeal to the Ukrainian population calling for its wholehearted support of the Ukrainian government in resisting the Soviet Russian invasion.

In the meantime, the Ukrainian church movement's continued efforts to win the active support of the Ukrainian government began to bear fruit. In the second half of December, in what amounted to an official recognition of the All-Ukrainian Church Council, its representative was seated in the Central Rada and the latter's was given a place in the Council. Within its General Secretariat for Internal Affairs, the government established the office of commissar for religious affairs, and on December 27 it decreed that henceforth all communications with the Patriarch and Russian church authorities must be carried out exclusively through the commissar.

The shift in the government's attitude toward the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in the Church might have been the decisive factor in persuading the Russians to seek a compromise with the Tserkovna Rada. Reflecting the change in Russian tactics was the sudden arrival of a group of Moscow Sobor members on December 23, evidently led by Archbishop Evlogii who, bypassing Platon and Vladimir, entered into negotiations with the Rada. On December 24, Metropolitan Vladimir presided over a joint meeting of the Kievan union of the clergy and representatives of the parish councils that resolved "to ask the Central Rada why it had recognized the self-appointed All-Ukrainian Church Council." At the same time, however, the meeting clearly indicated a readiness to reach compromise on the issue of the Ukrainianization of the Church:

Higher church authority--the Kievan Metropolitan together with the clergy and representatives of the parish church organizations of Kiev--take this opportunity to declare openly to the Ukrainian Central Rada and all the leaders of the Ukraine's national revival, that they not only do not oppose the renovation of ecclesiastical life in accordance with the national peculiarities of the Ukraine, but also welcome such renovation and shall cooperate in every way in realizing this sacred cause.

Two days later, the conference of the Kievan "Union of the Parish Councils" requested that higher church authorities allow the convocation of the Ukrainian Sobor "for the sake of pacification."
Meanwhile, renewed negotiations with the Tserkowna Rada initiated by Evlogii soon produced a compromise formula declaring that "The All-Ukrainian Church Council, headed by the bishops of the Ukrainian dioceses, is the only legal organ for the convocation of the All-Ukrainian Church Sobor." A new mode of representation and decisionmaking at the forthcoming Sobor, partly based on the practice of the Moscow Sobor, was agreed upon. Thus the entire episcopate was to be included in the presidium of the Sobor and contribute its chairman. The bishops were to form a separate "chamber" of the Sobor with veto power. Each district (povit) and each gubernia center was to be represented by a clergyman, deacon, psalmist and three laymen. Every monastic and theological institution was entitled to one representative. At the same time, the entire Tserkowna Rada—some 60 members—was to be included in the Sobor, but the Rada was to dissolve itself upon the convocation of the Sobor. In addition, one delegate was to be admitted from every Ukrainian military unit. The Patriarch and the All-Russian Sobor duly bestowed their blessings on this compromise.

The agreement clearly bore the marks of a truce rather than a reconciliation between the two ecclesiastical camps. Neither side evidently believed in the sincerity of the other. The Ukrainians counted on both governmental backing and the weight of their lay and military representatives to assure a favorable outcome. Russian ecclesiastical circles were at least assured of the bishop's veto over unfavorable Sobor decisions. Meanwhile, the Soviet Russian invasion of the Ukraine and the shrinking of the Central Rada's control over Ukrainian territory emboldened Metropolitan Vladimir and the more irreconcilable Russian elements. They attempted to revise the original terms of the compromise with the Tserkowna Rada and to force the postponement of the Sobor, probably in anticipation of the imminent fall of the Ukrainian regime. At the same time, measures were taken to deprive the Ukrainians of their only supporter among the bishops. On December 31, the Patriarch again ordered Archbishop Oleksii Dorodnytsyn to Moscow. When Oleksii did not comply, he was suspended by the decision of Metropolitan Platon and other bishops on the very opening day of the Sobor.

The All-Ukrainian Sobor

The First All-Ukrainian Church Sobor, which opened in Kiev's ancient St. Sophia Cathedral on January 20, brought together 279 delegates, including bishops of nearly all Ukrainian dioceses. The Soviet-Ukrainian war prevented the attendance of some delegates from the eastern gubernias of the Ukraine, and in at least two dioceses (Poltava and Kherson), local bishops failed to make arrangements for elections to the Sobor, thus depriving the Sobor of a quorum. By its national makeup, the Sobor had a predominantly Ukrainian character, although as far as the future status of the Ukrainian Church was concerned, its membership was divided into centralist, autonomist, and autocephalist orientations.

The election of the Sobor's presidium and commissions took up much of its time. While the honorary chairmanship was assumed by Metropolitan Vladimir, the youngest of the participating bishops, Pimen (Pegov) of Balta, was made chairman in a bitterly contested election, with two other bishops and the Rada's members making up the rest of the presidium. Six commissions were formed, each headed by a bishop, to consider such questions as the supreme church administration in the Ukraine, diocesan and parish administration, the
Ukrainianization of the Church, education, economics, and personnel questions.110

Obviously, the central task that awaited the Sobor was the determination of the future relationship of the Ukrainian Church to the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ukrainian state. The gathering was left in no doubt as to where the Central Rada stood on this question. In his passionate welcoming address, the government's representative, A. M. Karpinskyi, reminded the Sobor delegates that the Ukraine had been invaded by the Russians and warned that "the General Secretariat will not tolerate Muscovite guardians in our Church." Karpinskyi said that:

if you really intend to establish a national church, if you are filled with love of the people, if you desire to serve it and to support the Ukrainian State, there is only one road before you: to give the Ukrainian Church autocephaly; thus you will complete the task which is being pursued by the Government of the Ukrainian People's Republic.111

The Sobor agreed to issue a call to defend the Ukrainian state against the Bolsheviks,112 but procrastinated regarding any changes in the ecclesiastical status quo. While some work had begun in the commissions,113 no decisions were reached on any of the substantive questions on the Sobor's agenda by February 1. By then, the Bolshevik uprising in Kiev and the approach of Soviet Russian troops persuaded the majority of the rapidly melting body of Sobor delegates to adjourn until May 23. At the last stormy session of the Sobor, the Ukrainian delegates demanded in vain an immediate vote on the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church against the determined opposition of the pro-Russian camp, which appeared to be intent on gaining time in expectation of the demise of the Ukrainian People's Republic. In frustration, 53 Ukrainian delegates issued a joint declaration stating that "the Sobor did not reveal its Ukrainian character before the people and failed to answer questions demanding immediate decision." Before dispersing, the authors of the declaration decided to form a Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood to continue the work of the Tserkovna Rada.114

On January 22, 1918, the Central Rada proclaimed the full sovereignty of the Ukrainian People's Republic and concluded a separate peace treaty with the Central Powers on February 9. On the same day, however, Kiev was captured by Soviet troops, and the Ukrainian government was forced to evacuate westward and seek military assistance from Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Bolshevik tide was soon reversed. By early March, German and Ukrainian forces recaptured Kiev, ending a reign of terror that claimed, among many other victims, Metropolitan Vladimir of Kiev.115

Following the Central Rada's return to Kiev, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict within the Church resumed. The autocephalists, now organized in the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, appealed to the Central Rada to reconvene the All-Ukrainian Sobor and to proclaim by state law the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church. The government, however, did not proceed beyond the establishment of a Department of Confessions within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The advantages of this belated change in the official attitude toward ecclesiastical affairs were largely nullified by the choice of an odious figure to head the new department--the self-unfrocked former Krasnoiarsk Bishop Nikon (Nikolai) Bezsonov.116 His orders to the Church,
including a provision on April 1 for the departmental clearance of all ecclesiastical communications with the Moscow Patriarchate, were ignored by the episcopate. Sensing the political instability of the Rada, the Russian Church leadership was intent on delaying any changes in the ecclesiastical status quo, as shown by the April 2 meeting of six bishops from the Ukraine who attended the Moscow Sobor, at which it was decided to postpone the second session of the All-Ukrainian Sobor indefinitely.

The continuing stalemate on the ecclesiastical front generated much bitterness among the supporters of Ukrainian autocephaly. Symptomatic of the growing desperation of the Ukrainian church movement was an article in Nova rada that called for a radical break with the Russian Orthodox Church through the repudiation of the authority of the Russian bishops, the organization of a separate Ukrainian autocephalous church with its own episcopate, and the struggle for the control of churches throughout the Ukraine:

Nationally conscious and idealistic [ideine] clergy should be obliged to pledge in writing to recognize only the ecclesiastical authority approved by the state and not to subordinate themselves to any agents of the Moscow Patriarchate. In the beginning, even a protopresbyter could be placed at the head of these priests and, later, a bishop, but one elected from among the white clergy.

This, the author felt, was the only way to liberate the Ukrainian Church "from the chains of the All-Russian religious oppression, which throughout centuries has been exploiting for its insatiable interests the material and intellectual resources of our Fatherland."

However, the Central Rada's days were numbered. Its overwhelmingly stronger allies, intent on squeezing the maximum amount of supplies out of the Ukraine, soon grew impatient with the Rada's socialist orientation and its continued insistence on Ukrainian sovereignty. Progressively usurping a number of administrative and economic prerogatives of the Ukrainian government, the Germans finally intervened in April 1918 to overthrow the republican regime.

The Church under the Hetman Regime

The coup d'état of April 29 replaced the Central Rada with a satellite, quasi-monarchical regime headed by Lieutenant General Pavlo Skoropadskyi who assumed the historical title of Hetman. Dependent on German arms and supported by conservative landed and industrial interests, among which Russian influence was dominant, the new regime aimed largely at the restoration of the socioeconomic status quo before 1917. All of these features of the new regime, as well as the growing ruthlessness of the country's economic exploitation by its "allies," placed the overwhelming majority of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and peasantry in opposition to the Hetmanate.

Ukrainian by sentiment, yet conservative and gradualist in his political views, Hetman Skoropadskyi had to rely on the upper social strata. Among this group, there were many who looked to the restoration of a united Russian Empire and the old social system, treating the Hetmanate as a mere stepping stone to the achievement of these ends. The necessities of political survival made the new regime much more cautious than its predecessor with regard to the realization of Ukrainian national objectives and more inclined to seek
compromise with Russian interests in the Ukraine. At the time, the Ukraine was flooded by a mass of politically vocal refugees from Soviet Russia.

The characteristics of the Hetman regime had a profound effect on the course of the Russo-Ukrainian struggle for the control of the Church during the next eight months. Encouraged by the political orientation of the new government and taking full advantage of its vacillating ecclesiastical policy, conservative Russian elements within the Church were able to consolidate their strength and turn the balance of power in their favor, once again frustrating Ukrainian attempts to emancipate the Church from the Russian control.

The Ecclesiastical Policy of the Hetmanate and the Reassertion of the Russian Orientation in the Church

The Hetman coup opened a new stage in church-state relations in the Ukraine, symbolized by the ceremonious anointment of Skoropadskyi by the Kiev vicar, Bishop Nikodim, at St. Sophia Cathedral on April 29. The new regime's "Provisional State Constitution", adopted on the same date, provided for a confessional state. While all non-Orthodox residents of the Ukraine were granted "freedom in the performance of their faith and rite," the fundamental law provided that "Orthodoxy shall be the principal confession of the Ukrainian State." The Hetman's first cabinet included a Ministry of Confessions, which was entrusted to a popular Kiev university professor, Vasyl Zinkivskyi (Zenkovsky), a moderate supporter of the Ukrainian church movement.

Despite its favorable disposition toward ecclesiastical interests in the Ukraine and its policy of avoiding direct government intervention in Church affairs as much as possible, Zinkivskyi's ministry soon found itself in conflict with the Russian episcopate, which evidently was determined to settle its accounts with the Ukrainian autocephalists.

The first clash between the government and the Church arose from the disputed election of the Ukrainophobe Antonii Khrapovitskii to the vacant metropolitan see of Kiev by the local diocesan sobor on May 19. The pro-Russian majority at this gathering resolved not only against the autocephaly of the Church, but also against the use of the Ukrainian language in Church services. It challenged the representative nature of the January session of the All-Ukrainian Sobor and demanded the removal of members of the former Tserkovna Rada from its ranks. It also demanded the "reelection" of delegates before the summoning of the second session of the All-Ukrainian Sobor. Welcoming the Kievan gathering's stand against "centrifugal political winds," the Kadet Golos Kieva saw in the retention of the "unity of faith" a harbinger of "the coming unity of the Russian state."

The Hetman government, which unsuccessfully attempted to prevent the election, refused to recognize its outcome on the grounds that the Metropolitan of Kiev, as the canonic head of the Ukrainian Church, should have been chosen by representatives of all Ukrainian dioceses. It furthermore claimed that Khrapovitskii was elected in violation of the rules set by the All-Russian Sobor because he lacked the required two-thirds majority of votes. Patriarch Tikhon, however, hastened to ratify the election "of such a worthy and highly authoritative hierarch" despite an appeal from the Minister of Confessions to postpone a decision in this matter until the second session of the All-Ukrainian Sobor.
The reaction of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to the election of Khrapovitskii was best summed up by Serhii Iefremov in Nova rada:

They elected a man who time and again has displayed hostility towards the Ukrainians, who achieved notoriety by his reactionary activities in one and, then, a second Ukrainian diocese, who smashed even such a modest haven of independent theological thought as the Kiev academy, who cast his insatiable eyes on the neighboring Galicia and offered asylum to traitors of their own people; who made for himself the reputation of the staunchest Russifier and reactionary .... What confidence can the Ukrainian Church have towards such a head, and how will the 'flock' look upon their 'pastor'? Both the 'flock' and all the nationally conscious Ukrainian public will look upon Metropolitan Antonii as an enemy of the Ukrainian idea.128

The German and Austro-Hungarian governments also took direct interest in this matter, viewing Khrapovitskii's election as a show of force on the part of reactionary Russian elements in the Ukraine. Vienna indeed instructed its minister in Kiev, Forgacz, to prevent the Hetman's approval of Antonii's election, primarily because of his past attempts to subvert the Uniate Church in Galicia.129

Anxious to avoid a showdown with any of the parties concerned, the Hetman government refused to recognize Khrapovitskii's new title, but did nothing to stop him from assuming actual control of the Kiev metropoly. The official line was to leave the selection of the Kiev Metropolitan to the coming session of the All-Ukrainian Sobor, at which the government hoped to use its influence with the lay delegates to defeat Khrapovitskii's candidacy.130

The immediate problem was to overcome the episcopate's opposition to an early reconvening of the All-Ukrainian Sobor. On May 28--the date originally set for the resumption of the Sobor sittings--over 100 autocephalist and liberal members of the Sobor met in Kiev at the Ministry of Confessions. Charging the episcopate with violating the Sobor's resolution concerning the reconvening of the second session, the meeting demanded that the latter be called not later than June 10 and appealed to those attending not to leave Kiev until their demand had been satisfied.131 The Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood (former members of the All-Ukrainian Church Council) threatened to convene the Sobor on its own initiative.132 Ukrainian conservative groups also interceded with the Hetman, calling for governmental intervention in support of the Ukrainian autocephalist movement.133 Finally, after two governmental conferences with church leaders and the personal intervention of Hetman Skoropadskyi, the episcopate yielded.134

The Summer Session of the Sobor and the Adoption of the Statute for the Ukrainian Church

By the time the All-Ukrainian Sobor reconvened on June 20 for its second session, its composition had changed in favor of the conservative Russian camp as a result of numerous forced resignations, the defection of several Ukrainian delegates, and the alleged interference of some bishops with the orderly election of new delegates. The supporters of Ukrainian autocephaly and their few liberal allies found themselves about 20 delegates short of a
majority, without a single spokesman among the bishops, and with little effective support from the government. This relationship of forces predetermined the outcome of the Sobor.

One of the first acts of the Sobor was to elect Antonii Khrapovitskii as honorary chairman and to request, by majority vote, that the government recognize Khrapovitskii as Metropolitan of Kiev and Halych. Frustrated in its hopes that a hierarch more acceptable to Ukrainian opinion and the allies would be elevated to the Kievan see, the government accepted the Sobor's decision, trusting that Antonii would adhere to his pledge of loyalty to the Ukrainian national cause offered in a recent letter to the Hetman.

The principal task of the second session was to devise a constitution for the Ukrainian Church. In his address to the Sobor, Zinkivskyi stated the cabinet's position on this question. He said that the government did not envisage a separation of church and state but would refrain from interfering in the Church's internal affairs, trusting the latter to reciprocate by supporting the state. While the government felt entitled to decree autocephaly for the Ukrainian Church, it would not act unilaterally and would await the popular verdict. In the meantime, the Sobor had an urgent duty to organize the Ukrainian Church on an autonomous basis. As for the latter's ultimate relationship to the Moscow Patriarchate, this matter would be placed before the fall session of the Sobor, at which the government would state its position. Despite its moderate tone, Zinkivskyi's declaration met with an unfavorable reaction on the part of the pro-Russian majority at the Sobor, which resolved that the minister's thoughts and acts "contradict the idea of the freedom of the Church."

The majority of the delegates had a similarly negative reaction to the government-supported draft of the Church's constitution, introduced on behalf of the Ukrainian delegates and their few supporters among Russian church liberals by Archpriest Vasyl Lypkivskyi. Worked out during the preceding month by a commission headed by the minister of confessions, this draft was the product of a compromise between progressive Russian church circles and Ukrainian autocephalists. It envisaged broad autonomy for the Ukrainian Church, while preserving its canonical subordination to the All-Russian Church Sobor. In mid-June, the commission submitted the draft to Patriarch Tikhon. Tikhon declined, however, to endorse the project so as not to "limit the Sobor's freedom to express its will." As could be expected, the Sobor majority defeated the draft constitution. Thus, as Professor Pokrovskii, one of the progressive coauthors of this project, observed:

one lost the last opportunity to devise the kind of autonomy which could yet have been accepted by nationally-conscious Ukrainians. From that moment on, ecclesiastical aspirations of the Ukrainians could not anymore be fitted into the framework of even the broadest autonomy, but deviated sharply towards autocephaly.

Before turning to an alternative draft prepared by a commission headed by Archbishop Evlogii, the Russian majority made sure that the Ukrainian faction at the Sobor was further numerically weakened, if not silenced altogether. Having succeeded in eliminating the former Tserkovna Rada members from the Sobor Presidium, which was now restricted to bishops, the Russian faction relied on the credentials commission headed by Khrapovitskii's former vicar, Bishop Mitrofan (Abramov), to exclude a number of Ukrainian delegates on a
variety of pretexts. A resolution was passed condemning the 102 delegates who signed a public declaration stating that irregularities had taken place at the diocesan electoral conferences, that bishops had violated the will of the Sobor by obstructing the convocation of its second session, and that the latter did not reflect the actual voice and mood of the Ukrainian people. On July 7, in violation of the rules set in December 1917 for the All-Ukrainian Sobor, all 45 members of the Tserkovna Rada were deprived of mandates by a vote of 198 to 108. Having rejected the offer of sending only three representatives to the Sobor, the former Rada members walked out of its meetings declaring that they would not recognize the canonic validity of the Sobor. In protest against the majority decision, the entire liberal opposition also left the Sobor. Only some 10-15 declared supporters of the Ukrainian cause survived the Sobor purge. Zinkivskyi protested against the exclusion of the Ukrainian delegates, but when the Sobor refused to reconsider the matter, the government reconciled itself with what it continued to regard as the canonical voice of the Church.

Emboldened by the government's vacillation, the Sobor brushed aside Zinkivskyi's reservations concerning some provisions of the draft constitution presented by Evlogii's commission and adopted it by a majority vote on July 9. Based largely on the constitution adopted by the Moscow Sobor for the whole of the Church, "The Statute of the Provisional Supreme Administration of the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine" provided for limited Ukrainian autonomy from the Moscow Patriarchate. The Patriarch, whose name was to be mentioned in liturgical prayers in every church in the Ukraine, was to "bless" (i.e., approve) the convocation of Church sobors in the Ukraine, sanction the election of the Kievian Metropolitan, and confirm all the Ukrainian bishops. He was to receive complaints against the Kievian Metropolitan and to exercise appellate court powers over all diocesan bishops. The statute itself was subject to the Patriarch's ratification.

As for the internal organization of the Church in the Ukraine, the statute proclaimed the Ukrainian Church Sobor the "supreme organ of the ecclesiastical, legislative, administrative, and judicial power." The Sobor, which was to meet every three years, was to consist of all Ukrainian bishops, clergymen, and laymen elected at diocesan meetings. Between the Sobors, supreme executive power was to be exercised by the Holy Sobor of Bishops, embracing all governing bishops of the Ukrainian dioceses, and the Supreme Church Council, both to be chaired by the Kievian Metropolitan who was also designated as an ex officio chairman of the Ukrainian Sobor. The Holy Sobor of Bishops, which was to meet at least once a year, delegated its powers between its sessions to the episcopal members of the Supreme Church Council. The latter was to consist of three bishops appointed annually by the Holy Sobor of Bishops, four clergymen, including one psalmist, and six laymen to be elected for three-year terms by the Ukrainian Sobor. Joint meetings of these two bodies were to examine reports of their activities, approve financial reports of ecclesiastical institutions, and consider questions relating to the convocation of the Ukrainian Sobor. Prerogatives of a hierarchical and pastoral nature were reserved for the Holy Sobor of Bishops, including questions of faith, liturgy, ecclesiastical administration, church court, and discipline. The Supreme Church Council, on the other hand, was vested with jurisdiction over external and public aspects of ecclesiastical administration, including the economic affairs of the Church, education, inspections and examinations, and legal matters.
With regard to church-state relations in the Ukraine, the statute provided that:

The Ukrainian State shall have the right of control over the spending of State subsidies and the supervision of legality of operations by organs of the Church administration in terms of their conformity with the State laws.

The representative of the Orthodox Church in the Ukrainian State and the liaison between the Church and the State shall be the Kievan Metropolitan as chairman of all organs of the supreme Church administration.

From the side of the Ukrainian State, the liaison between the State and the Church shall be the Minister of Confessions, who should be of Orthodox creed.

The Metropolitan of Kiev and Halych shall be a member of the State's supreme legislative organ.

The Statute, moreover, provided that "before it will be ratified by the Most Holy Patriarch, it will be submitted for approval of the supreme State authority from the viewpoint of its conformity with the State laws."145

Before it adjourned on July 11, the Sobor elected clerical and lay members of the Supreme Church Council. They joined Metropolitan Antonii Khrapovitskii, the ex officio chairman, and members elected by the Sobor of Bishops: Metropolitan Platon of Odessa, Archbishop Evlogii of Volyn, and Bishop Pakhomii (Kedrov) of Chernihiv.146 Not a single representative of Ukrainian orientation was included in this body, thus making the limited autonomous powers conferred upon the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine even less meaningful.147 Several resolutions were adopted by the Sobor at its last sittings, including an appeal for the popular support of the Hetman regime and a declaration threatening the invaders of the landed property of the Church with anathema.148

On August 5, the Hetman government asked Patriarch Tikhon to ratify the Provisional Church Statute with the exception of article two, which defined the Patriarch's powers over the Ukrainian Church. The latter question, stated the government, "should be carefully considered and finally decided upon in the future sittings of the All-Ukrainian Church Sobor."149

In his reply of September 26, Tikhon rejected the Ukrainian government's request on the grounds that "the postponement of the Statute's approval, even in part, could be interpreted as our disagreement with the decisions of the Sobor, which could hardly contribute to the peace in the Church ..."150 Nevertheless, in a letter of the same date addressed to Metropolitan Antonii Khrapovitskii, the Patriarch voiced his reservations over some of the powers reserved in the statute for the Ukrainian supreme church administration. While otherwise approving the statute, Tikhon and the All-Russian Sobor introduced a number of important revisions that further narrowed Kiev's modest autonomy:

1. The Orthodox dioceses in the Ukraine, while remaining an inseparable part of the one Russian Orthodox Church, shall form an...
ecclesiastical province of the former, enjoying special autonomous privileges.

2. Autonomy of the Ukrainian Church shall extend over local church matters—administrative, educational, missionary, charitable, monastic, economic, judicial in subordinate instances, and shall not include matters of general church significance.

3. Decisions of the All-Russian Church Sobors, as well as decisions and directions of the Holy Patriarch, shall have obligatory force for the whole Ukrainian Church.

4. The bishops and the representatives of clergy and laymen of the Ukrainian dioceses shall participate in the All-Russian Church Sobors in accordance with the existing Sobor rules. The Metropolitan of Kiev [ex officio] and one of the bishops of Ukrainian dioceses ... shall participate in the Holy Synod.

5. The Holy Patriarch shall have the right to send his representatives to the Ukrainian Church Sobor.

6. The Holy Patriarch approves both the Metropolitan and governing bishops of the Ukrainian dioceses.

7. The Holy Patriarch retains with regard to the Ukrainian Church all rights provided for in the All-Russian Sobor's resolution on the rights and duties of the Holy Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia. 151

These revisions had to await the decision of the Ukrainian Sobor scheduled to meet for its fall session on October 28. At that session, the Hetman government, according to Foreign Minister Dmytro Doroshenko, intended to bring up the question of the Church's relationship to Moscow. In the event of the Sobor's refusal to adopt autocephaly for the Ukrainian Church, it was planned to dissolve the Sobor and order new elections. 152 In the meantime, the Ministry of Confessions made efforts to introduce some degree of Ukrainianization into the Church. A "learned committee" of university and theological academy professors was entrusted by Zinkivskyi with the task of translating the Gospels and other religious literature, including a Ukrainian catechism, into Ukrainian and publishing them. A new statute was decreed by the government for the Kievan theological academy that restricted the Kievan Metropolitan's authority over the academy to canonic matters. Courses in Ukrainian language, literature, history, and the history of the Ukrainian Church and law were included in the academy's curriculum. 153 In the fall, the Ministry of Confessions launched a newspaper, Slovo, designed to popularize the government's church policy among the clergy and believers.

The Ukrainian Reaction to the Sobor and a Shift in the Government's Church Policy

The limited scope of the Hetman government's efforts at the Ukrainianization of the Church, its vacillation on the question of autocephaly, and its failure to protect Ukrainian delegates against the vendetta of the Sobor majority, had shaken the autocephalists' trust in the regime's good will. The summer Sobor session left the Ukrainian church movement with a mood of profound frustration as can be seen in P. Mazukievych's article, "Finita La Comedia," published in Nova rada. According to Mazukievych:
The great tragedy has ended for us truly tragically .... The Sobor gave us, except for disappointment, except for loss of faith [and] boundless, dark despair, absolutely nothing.154

The expulsion from the Sobor of the former members of the Tserkovna Rada—the institution that had initiated the All-Ukrainian Sobor—evoked a wave of protest in the press and from various quarters of the Ukrainian community, outraged at what they considered an alliance of the ruling church strata with the forces of Russian chauvinism and reaction.155 The developments at the Sobor's summer session destroyed the hopes of the moderates for a viable Ukrainian-Russian compromise and contributed to the further radicalization of the program and tactics of the autocephalist movement. At the same time, these developments helped to popularize the movement, and the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, headed by a prominent Ukrainian jurist, Serhii Shelukhyn, grew rapidly in membership and activity.156

In September, the Brotherhood joined the Ukrainian National Union (Soiuz)—a coalition of Ukrainian left and center opposition parties. The latter formed a special committee on ecclesiastical affairs under priest O. Zhevchenko that drafted a Soiuz resolution on the situation of the Church in the Ukraine. Published on October 10, this resolution stated that "the subordination of the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Church to the authority of a foreign Patriarch of another state ... endangers the development of political independence in the Ukraine." The Ukrainian National Union, therefore, demanded a series of measures on the part of the Hetman government, including the "establishment of the full independence of the Ukrainian Church," "the liquidation of the oppression of the clergy and laymen by the hierarchy," "the introduction of the elective principle" at all levels of the Church, and "new elections to the All-Ukrainian Sobor."157

The resolution of the Soiuz reflected a significant change in the attitude of Ukrainian socialist parties toward church-state relations in the Ukraine. The Church's successful defiance of both the autocephalist movement and the Ukrainian government, and its open collaboration with the increasingly vocal enemies of Ukrainian statehood, brought the parties of the former Central Rada to a belated realization of the political importance of governmental intervention into the ecclesiastical domain in order to implement the autocephaly and Ukrainianization of the Church.

A similar view was voiced in progressive Russian church circles. Writing in the Kievan Novosti dnia, Professor Boris Titlinov, one of the most prominent representatives of the liberal church intelligentsia, cited a series of historical precedents in support of the state's right to enact autocephaly for the Ukrainian Church:

In vain do the Ukrainian churchmen claim that the question of the relations between the Kievan and Muscovite Churches is an exclusively internal ecclesiastic matter. It would have been so if the Church in the Ukraine were separated from the State. However, being presently connected with the State power, the Ukrainian Church in no way can independently decide this serious problem. On the contrary, it would be more proper to say that the Ukrainian State has the right to make this decision according to its wishes.158
A truly national Ukrainian Church, argued Titlinov, would grow out of effective conciliar organization of the Church on the basis of progressive ecclesiastical reforms. As for the hierarchy's opposition to state intervention, he pointed out the inconsistency of the bishops' position:

They want the State to let the Church to itself while preserving all [the Church's] privileges and maintaining it from the State treasury. God's is not enough, they want also what belongs to the Caesar. If you want freedom, separate yourself from the State.

Shortly after the publication of the Ukrainian National Union's resolution on ecclesiastical matters, a shift in the Hetmanate's orientation in favor of reconciliation with national opposition parties created prospects for the implementation of some of the resolution's objectives. A new coalition cabinet was formed, in which several portfolios were entrusted to nominees of the Soiuz, including Oleksandr Lototskyi, who on October 24 replaced Zinkivskyi as the minister of confessions.

A few days later, on October 30, the Ukrainian Sobor reconvened for its third session in the Kievo-Pecherska Lavra after having waited in vain for two days to assemble its quorum of 300 delegates. First on the agenda of the session was the problem of reconciling the original draft of the Church's Provisional Statute with Moscow's amendments and the government's reservations. The latter were outlined in Lototskyi's welcoming address to the Sobor in which he requested a basic revision of the statute in the direction of Ukrainian autocephaly. With only a few remaining Ukrainian delegates supporting the minister's stand, the Sobor majority responded with vehement protests and threats. The Ministry of Confession, declared Metropolitan Antonii Khrapovitskii, "simply spat on the Sobor's decisions ... the Church has been made subject to unprecedented oppression which it never experienced during the times of Over-Procurators." The Sobor warned the government that it would dissolve itself and address a special appeal to the people unless the government restored "the authority of the Church and the ecclesiastical leadership."

While a stalemate thus developed on the issue of Ukrainian autocephaly, the Sobor proceeded to deal with the legal and material conditions of the clergy. It passed resolutions requesting the safeguarding of church lands, tax exemptions for the Church, and similar state concessions. However, some of the Sobor's actions provoked the intervention of Lototskyi, in particular a Khrapovitskii-instigated attempt to unfrock members of the former Tserkovna Rada for "insubordination." A motion to that effect was withdrawn only after the minister's forceful representation.

To break the Sobor's opposition to autocephaly, Lototskyi brought this issue before the cabinet and persuaded it to decide in favor of the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church on November 13. The cabinet's decision was communicated by Lototskyi to the Sobor on November 14 in an elaborate statement of the government's church policy, which deserves to be quoted at length:

The Government, during my predecessor's term of office, adopted a provisional and compromise solution and sought to reach an understanding with the Moscow Patriarch in view of the previous connection of our Church with the former Russian Church. But these
attempts not only did not help to solve the problem, but made it even more complex. The autocratic demands of the Moscow Patriarch who even wishes to approve Ukrainian bishops, revert the question to its original state. The Ukrainian Government and the Church Sobor are again facing the same task: to establish order in the Church and to this end, first of all, to create the fundamental law for the Ukrainian national Church. The situation requires that the Government state clearly and firmly those basic assumptions from which it approaches the formulation of the legal relations between the Church and the State. In our country the Church is connected with the State and, therefore, the Government has not only the right but also the duty to formulate their mutual relationship ....

The basic principle of the Ukrainian state power consists in the following: in an independent state there must be also an independent Church. This is required by the interests of both the State and the Church. No government that understands its duties to the State would agree to having the center of ecclesiastical authority located in another state. The less is it admissible in the present case, in view of the cardinal differences between the two states with regard to both their political regimes and the legal status of the Church in Muscovy and in the Ukraine. Therefore, in its relations to other churches, the Ukrainian Church must be autocephalous, headed by the Kievan Metropolitan and maintaining canonical ties with other independent churches. As to the other aspects of our Church-State relations, their relations should rest on the immutable basis: Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's ....

Accordingly, the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church represents not only an ecclesiastical but also our national and state necessity .... On behalf of the Government of the Ukrainian State, I have the honour to announce its firm and unshakeable view that the Ukrainian Church should become autocephalous. 168

The Sobor majority reacted to the minister's declaration with a storm of protests challenging not merely the government's right to intervene on the issue of autocephaly, but even the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state. In the words of D. Skrynchenko, a close collaborator of Khrapovitskii:

The Sobor expresses the will of the people. This will is clear. Only the Government fails to understand it. The ground is already prepared, now is the time to realize it, and, having extended [the Government's] hand to the Sobor, to admit: we had erred; we shall now join the people who do not desire the separation from Russia and her Church. But if the Government even now fails to comprehend the events, if it still intends to violate the Sobor's decision, who knows whether the Sobor would not have to resort to the means which had sometimes been used by the Church in defence of its positions, that is, the excommunication of the violators. 169
Replying to the objections of the bishops—in particular those of Metropolitan Platon and Archbishop Evlogii—that "they see greater freedom for the Church in Bolshevik Russia and would prefer to separate the Church from the state in the interest of ecclesiastical freedom," Lototskyi pointed out that the government would have no objections if those dissatisfied with the policy of the Ukrainian state should decide to move to Soviet Russia; nor would it oppose the separation of the church and state, especially in view of the financial advantages the latter would bring to the state. But he warned that the latter "will not untie the hands of the agents of the Church for a destructive work" against the state, and that such activities will be punishable under state laws.\textsuperscript{170}

Another Reversal in the Hetman's Policy: The Proclamation of Federation with Russia

A sudden turn of events prevented the implementation of the cabinet's decision on autocephaly. Later on November 14, the very day of Lototskyi's clash with the Sobor, Hetman Skoropadskyi proclaimed a federation with Russia. In a desperate effort to save his regime in view of Germany's capitulation, Skoropadskyi sought an alliance with the Entente-supported Russian Whites. The recently "Ukrainianized" cabinet was dismissed and Lototskyi was replaced by Mykhailo Voronovych as the new minister of confessions. On November 16, the Directory—an insurrectionist coalition government formed by the Ukrainian National Union—launched an armed uprising against the Hetmanate that soon engulfed the entire Ukraine.

The news of "the restoration of a united Russia and the fall of the cabinet of the independists," was received with "tremendous enthusiasm" at the Sobor's sitting on November 15.\textsuperscript{171} The gathering now hastened to vote, without discussion, on the issue of autocephaly which was rejected by a nearly unanimous vote (there were three opposing votes) in favor of an autonomous status for the Church in the Ukraine. This was followed by a resolution accepting the Provisional Statute as amended by Moscow:

1. The letter from the All-Russian Patriarch containing the decisions of the All-Russian Sobor concerning autonomous administration of the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine, should be annexed to the Statute [\textit{polozhenie}] elaborated by the All-Ukrainian Church Sobor as a constituent act announcing the canonical character of the autonomy of the Ukrainian Church.

2. With regard to those paragraphs of the Statute which concern only the organization of the Supreme Church Administration on the basis of autonomy and which were recognized by the Government in an official manner, their implementation must be started immediately after a prior agreement with the Government.

3. To elaborate and submit for the governmental approval the establishment [\textit{shtaty}] of the chancellery of the Supreme Church Administration.

4. To enter into an agreement with the Government concerning those paragraphs of the Statute on which it had not yet expressed its opinion.\textsuperscript{172}
Celebrating its victory over autocephalist aspirations, the Sobor sang "Te Deum" and "Many Years" for Patriarch Tikhon, Metropolitan KhраМopitskii, and the Hetman. The meeting resolved to announce the Sobor's decision to the clergy and believers in a special message and condemned "any attempts at illegal [samochimnoe] proclamation of autocephaly." According to Golos Kieva, "leaving the Sobor, its members congratulated, kissed one another and crossed themselves. The 15th of November shall become a great historical day. The ecclesiastical unity with Russia shall become a guarantee, no doubt, of the state unity as well."\(^{173}\)

The Sobor's message, published on November 22, attested to the intensity of passions guiding this body. After declaring that the "preservation of our filial unity with the supreme Russian archpastor and the entire Russian Church" was in accordance with the historical traditions and spiritual interests of the Ukrainian people, the 17 bishops who signed the document threatened, "those unwise men [who] attempt to sow chaos and separate the Ukrainian Church from unity with the Holy Patriarch, who nurture hope to reinforce by such evil deed the unity of the Ukrainian people and strengthen its independent 'sovereign' statehood," with "divine punishment." They argued that:

one should strengthen the life of the people, not by ecclesiastical separation from and hatred of the fraternal Russian people, but through love and faithfulness to God's Church ....

Therefore, do not listen, brothers, when they will speak to you unwise words: we are Ukrainians and we do not need an alien Moscow Patriarch but will recognize only our Ukrainian pastors. Do not listen to them: no benefits came to those peoples which have separated themselves from the great patriarchal sees and enclosed their life with the borders of their state; virtue and religious teaching became impoverished among those peoples and everything is absorbed by the struggle among political parties. It thus happened in the kingdoms of Romania and Serbia, of Greece and Montenegro; and the Bulgarian people, having illegally separated themselves from the [Ecumenical] Patriarch were subjected justly to exclusion from the Orthodox Church and ceased to be an Orthodox people, becoming a schismatic people. This fate now awaits also the Georgian people who had separated themselves from the All-Russian Church.

May the Lord preserve from such disaster for the sake of her present and future life our Orthodox Ukraine .... May He preserve her from evil splitters; they speak of their love to the Ukraine, but in fact many of them want to drag our people into the nets of the Uniate heresy, that is, completely to split it away from the Church of Christ and, consequently, from eternal salvation.\(^{174}\)

Its membership rapidly decreasing as the regime's situation progressively worsened,\(^{175}\) the Sobor's subsequent meetings dealt with the question of church-state relations. Aiming at a minimum of state intervention in ecclesiastical affairs, on November 21 the Sobor council proposed to ask the Hetman "to restrict the functions of the Ministry of Confessions with regard to the Orthodox Church or even [order] a complete liquidation of the
At a meeting on December 12 attended by Skoropadskyi, the Sobor passed a resolution stating that:

the State power in the Ukraine should have no right to veto candidates for Metropolitan and governing bishops. They should be elected by Sobors and approved by the Patriarch, with the State Government merely to be informed about it ....

The Orthodox Church in the Ukraine should be connected with the State and possess the first place [among religious denominations]; the state should, in questions relating to the legal and public rights of the Church, seek the agreement of the Higher Church Administration which shall be given the rights and privileges enjoyed by legislative houses. 177

Having received the government's promise to restore control over parish schools to the Church, 178 the Sobor proceeded to adopt a new statute for theological academies linking them closely with higher church authorities. 179

Turning to the question of the Ukrainianization of Church services, the Sobor voted to retain the Church-Slavonic language on historical, aesthetic, and linguistic grounds, due to:

the spiritual need of every people to pray in a different tongue than the every-day, ordinarily spoken language; the general and unanimous wish of the entire Ukrainian population expressed through their representatives at diocesan congresses in 1918; as well as the fact, that the Church-Slavonic language ... unites all Slavic churches and peoples .... 180

At its last session on December 13, the Sobor reopened the case of the clerical members of the Tserkovna Rada, accusing them of "persecuting" the late Metropolitan Vladimir and insinuating their complicity in his murder. 181

Before Hetman Skoropadskyi capitulated on December 14 to the Ukrainian insurgent forces surrounding Kiev, the Church attempted to rally popular support for the tottering regime. Thus on November 19, the episcopate telegraphed an appeal to all Ukrainian dioceses calling on the people "to unite around Lord Hetman and his new Government, in order to achieve by the united efforts of all true sons of the Ukrainian State the salvation of entire Russia for the glory of the Holy Orthodox faith and church, under the leadership of the Holy Patriarch Tikhon." 182 On November 30, the Sobor issued another appeal urging the population to fight against the "Petliurite bands." 183 Four days later, it issued a request for the urgent dispatch of Entente troops to save the Hetman regime. 184 Finally, after the capture of Kiev by the Directory, a meeting of the Sobor of all Ukrainian Bishops held on December 18 resolved that:

should any members of the Government dare to repudiate the significance of this [Ukrainian Church] Sobor and consider its resolutions as null and void, they should be excluded from the Church.
... any official, secular or clerical, who would dare to convoke an [illegitimate Ukrainian] Sobor or participate therein, shall by this decision of ours be excluded from the Church if they are laymen or unfrocked if they are bishops or clergymen.

And we, Orthodox bishops, remaining faithful to the Holy Orthodox Church, do reaffirm the canonical and obligatory nature of the recent All-Ukrainian Church Sobor and by [our] oath accept the obligation both to conform with its decisions and submit in everything to the Holy Patriarch Tikhon, and, after his death, to his legitimate successor, and also to the representative of the Ukrainian Church ... Metropolitan of Kiev, Antonii, and, in the event of his death or voluntary departure from the see, to his successor legally elected by the Sobor and approved by the Patriarch, and until the election of such, to ... Metropolitan Platon of Kherson.185

This important resolution, signed by 18 bishops shortly after the arrest of Archbishop Evlogii by the new regime, clearly was intended to frustrate any attempts by the victorious Directory to implement its plans for the autocephaly and Ukrainianization of the Church, and to threaten the entire Ukrainian autocephalous movement with wholesale excommunication from the Orthodox Church. This document was destined to play a part in the subsequent Russian-Ukrainian struggle for the control of the Ukrainian Church.

The Directory and the Autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church

Following Skoropadskyi's abdication, an interim Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee headed by Volodymyr Chekhivsky assumed power in Kiev until the arrival of the Directory.186 In a general roundup of the principal anti-Ukrainian leaders, the new military authorities arrested Archbishop Evlogii on December 18 and Metropolitan Antonii on the next day, sending them to a Uniate monastery in the western Ukraine for confinement. The arrests took place without the knowledge of Lototskyi, the Ukrrevkom's commissar for the Ministry of Confessions, but he accepted the official justification of these measures as reprisals for the bishops' political message urging the population to fight against the Directory.187

The reversal of political fortunes and the anxiety created by the arrests of the two hierarchs evidently broke the united political front of the episcopate. On December 19, Archbishop Agapit of Katerynoslav took part in the ceremonial welcome of the Directory, celebrating a solemn service in the St. Sophia Square and greeting the Directory's commander-in-chief, Symon Petliura, as a liberator.188 To fill in the hiatus in ecclesiastical authority, Metropolitan Platon--apparently reluctant to act as Khrapovitskii's deputy189--convened the Sobor of Bishops in the last days of December. It was decided that the ecclesiastical administration would be temporarily transferred to the Kievan Office (Kontora) of the Holy Sobor of Bishops headed by Bishop Dionizii (Valedinskii) of Kremianets.190

Meanwhile, the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood met on December 20 to plan the autocephalist strategy. The meeting resolved in favor of the proclamation of autocephaly by a state law and the creation of a Ukrainian Synod. It
approved a list of candidates to this body headed by Archpriest Vasyl Lypkivskyi.¹⁹¹

Under the new regime, the Ukrainian autocephalist movement emerged in stronger position than ever before. Its members assumed important positions in the government and enjoyed the support of at least two members of the Directory, Symon Petliura and Opanas Andriievskyi.¹⁹² In the new cabinet formed on December 23, Volodymyr Chekhivskyi and Serhii Shelukhyn of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood assumed the posts of Premier and Minister of Justice, respectively. After some initial hesitation,¹⁹³ the Ministry of Confessions was retained in the new governmental structure and entrusted to Dr. Ivan Lypa, an Odessa "independist," while Lototskyi was soon to be sent as the Directory's minister to Turkey with a special mission to secure the blessings of the Patriarch of Constantinople for the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church.¹⁹⁴

Pressed both from within and by Ukrainian public opinion,¹⁹⁵ the government made the realization of autocephaly one of its first priorities. On January 1, 1919, the Council of Ministers decreed "The Law on the Supreme Authority of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Conciliar Church." Drafted by Shelukhyn and paradoxically resembling prerevolutionary ecclesiastical legislation in some respects, the law severed the Church's ties with the Moscow Patriarchate. While retaining close links between the Church and the Ukrainian state, it invested the latter with extensive powers over ecclesiastical affairs, doubtlessly in order to compensate for the weakness of Ukrainian elements in the upper strata of the Church. Accordingly, the law provided that:

1. The supreme ecclesiastical authority in the Ukraine--legislative, judicial, and administrative--shall belong to the All-Ukrainian Church Sobor; its decisions, whenever they relate to Church-State relations or require expenditure of funds from the State treasury, shall be submitted for consideration and approval of the State's legislative organs.

2. A Ukrainian Church Synod shall be created to direct the affairs of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church; it shall consist of two bishops, one arch-priest, one priest, one deacon, and three laymen, as well as one priest from the Military Department. Until the convocation of a Sobor which shall elect members of the Synod and present them for the Government's approval, members of the Church Synod shall be appointed by the Supreme Ukrainian Republican Government.

3. The jurisdiction of the Synod shall extend upon the matters: (a) religious; (b) administrative; (c) economic; (d) educational; (e) control and revision.

4. The Ukrainian Synod shall meet in the presence of a representative of the Republican Government appointed by the Minister and designated as the State Representative. His duties shall include: the supplying of information, the explanation of laws, the supervision over the implementation of laws and decisions of the Synod which do not violate the interests of the Republic. The State Representative shall have the right to submit protests to the Council of Ministers.
5. The ecclesiastical authorities of the Autocephalous Ukrainian Church together with their administrative apparatus shall be maintained from the funds of the State Treasury, in accordance with the establishment [shtaty] which shall be separately provided for.

6. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Church with its Synod and clergy shall not be subordinated in any way to the All-Russian Patriarch.

7. The Ukrainian Church Synod shall elaborate rules directing its activities, as well as those relating to the convocation of the Church Sobor, which shall enter into force upon their approval by the Ukrainian Republican Government. 196

Shortly after the publication of this law, the government attempted to transfer control of the Kievan diocese to Ukrainian hands by simultaneously requesting that Bishop Dionizii remove Khrapovitskii's deputy, Bishop Nikodim of Chyhyryn, and ordain the government's nominee, Archpriest Iuriì Zhevchenko, 197 as bishop and administrator of the Kievian see. However, the bishops' Kontora turned down both requests, pleading the canonical inadmissibility of Nikodim's dismissal without a trial by bishops and insisting that only the episcopate could elect another member of the hierarchy. 198 The authorities reacted by deporting Nikodim to the Basilian monastery in Buchach, where he joined Antonii and Evlogii, 199 but they were unable to prevent the next ranking vicar of Khrapovitskii, Bishop Nazarii (Blinov) of Cherkasy, 200 from assuming charge of the Kievian diocese.

Attempting to implement the law on autocephaly, the new Minister of Confessions, Dr. Ivan Lypa, entered into protracted negotiations with the episcopate to secure its cooperation in setting up a Ukrainian Church Synod. Despite the bishops' reluctance to commit themselves without approval from Patriarch Tikhon or Metropolitans Antonii and Platon, a tentative agreement was reached to establish such a body on a provisional basis; but to conciliate the episcopate, the term "Synod" was dropped in favor of the designation, "The All-Ukrainian Supreme Consecrated [Osviachena] Council." Archbishop Ahapit, chairman of the council, and Bishop Dionizii were selected to serve on this temporary council, together with several priests, including Vasyl Lypkivskyi and Petro Tarnavskyi, 201 and laymen. All were leading members of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood. 202 The council, which managed to meet only once, ceased to exist when the Directory was forced to evacuate Kiev by early February. 203 The ministry's plans for the consecration of nationally conscious bishops had to remain unfulfilled. 204 Once again, the changing fortunes of war frustrated Ukrainian attempts to secure the control of the Church "from above."

The Invasion of the Ukraine by the Bolshevik and White Armies

In November 1918, Lenin renounced the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and in late December, without a formal declaration of war, the Red Army again invaded the Ukraine. Meeting only weak military resistance and helped by political chaos and administrative disorganization following the anti-Hetman uprising, the Bolsheviks entered Kiev on February 4, 1919. The Directory was forced to evacuate westward until it had to retreat into the territory of the West Ukrainian People's Republic in the spring. 205
Several leaders of the Ukrainian autocephalous movement—in particular the priests V. Lypkivskyi, N. Sharaivskyi, and P. Tarnavskyi—remained in Kiev where they successfully continued their activities under the Bolshevik regime, using a new tactic of "grass-roots Ukrainianization." On April 17, 1919, the autocephalists reconstituted the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church Council under the chairmanship of Mykhailo Moroz. Taking advantage of the recent Soviet Ukrainian Decree on the separation of church and state, which proclaimed the "nationalization" of all church buildings and made their use dependent on governmental registration of local congregations, the council bypassed the episcopate and "registered" three Ukrainian parishes with the new authorities between May and July. Eager to exploit divisions within Orthodox ranks, the Bolsheviks promptly assigned three major Kievian churches to these parishes, including the historic St. Sophia Cathedral. Earlier, on May 22, the first liturgy in the Ukrainian language was celebrated in the "Ukrainianized" St. Nicholas Church. These developments brought relations between the autocephalists and the bishops close to the breaking point. Other autocephalists, including S. Shelukhyn, V. Chekhivskyi, and professors I. Ohiienko and V. Bidnov, followed the Directory. The Ministry of Confessions was reduced rapidly to a skeleton apparatus and largely discontinued its activities. The instability of the Ukrainian regime unfavorably affected the outcome of Lototskyi's subsequent efforts in Constantinople on behalf of Ukrainian autocephaly. The Patriarchal Locum Tenens, Dorofei, while giving sympathetic hearing to Lototskyi's case, declined to act until the political and ecclesiastical situation in the Ukraine was stabilized and a new Ecumenical Patriarch was elected.

By June, however, the Directory's troops were able to recover a small amount of territory in Podillia, with the Directory moving to Kamianets Podilskyi. This led to the reactivation of the Ministry of Confessions under the direction of Deputy Minister K. Myrovych. He attempted in vain to reassert the ministry's authority over the bishops who continued to ignore the Directory's law on autocephaly. The Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood also resumed its activities. On July 22, it held a general meeting in Kamianets Podilskyi presided over by V. Chekhivskyi. The meeting produced a plan of action that envisaged such principal steps toward the Ukrainianization of the Church as the removal of anti-Ukrainian elements from the episcopate, the introduction of the Ukrainian pronunciation of Church-Slavonic in church services, and the reading of the Gospels and sermons in the Ukrainian language.

By the end of August, a successful Ukrainian offensive liberated Kiev from the Bolsheviks, only to lose the capital again to the stronger forces of Denikin's Volunteer Army, which occupied most of the Ukraine for several months. The Russian Whites reinstated Antonii Khrapovitskii as the Metropolitan of Kiev. He had rejoined the Whites after having secured his release, as well as Evlogii's and Nikodim's, from the Poles after they occupied the western Ukraine.

One of his first acts was to issue an appeal to the population calling for support of the Volunteer Army—"the only army in Russia struggling for the faith and fatherland." Khrapovitskii's message warned believers "not to communicate with the secret enemies of Orthodoxy, sechevki [elite troops of the Directory] and all Petliurites, not to succumb to their snaky [smelnym] charms."
Antonii's and Nikodim's return brought repression against the Ukrainian clergy and the three Kievan parishes that had been Ukrainianized during the Bolshevik occupation. The Kievian consistory ordered that:

at absolutely all church services, prayers should be held for the God-protected Russian State, its Supreme leader, Kolchak, the city authorities and the Christ-beloved army .... All services which had earlier been celebrated in the 'Ukrainian' language, should be held in the Church-Slavonic language; books in the 'Ukrainian' language, if they are in churches, should immediately be collected and surrendered to the church archive under special responsibility of the church warden; all business of the church should be conducted only in the state Russian language ....²¹⁵

Simultaneously, the Metropolitan suspended 13 Ukrainian clergymen accused of having "illegally seized" several Kiev an churches and of conducting their services in Ukrainian, and a commission was set up to try them.²¹⁶ When attempts at the "de-Ukrainianization" of the St. Andrew Church met massive resistance on the part of parishioners, the ecclesiastical authorities had to call for governmental help. Eventually, Khrapovitskii found it expedient to make a concession to the Ukrainians by assigning to them the "Little Sophia" Church and another church in the suburbs.²¹⁷ In November, the Russian bishops tried Archbishop Ahapit for his collaboration with the Ukrainian authorities and for supporting Ukrainian autocephaly. Accused of "treason" against the Church and the Russian state, he was deposed and confined to a monastery by the "Supreme Church Administration in South-Eastern Russia."²¹⁸

The Ministry of Confessions under Professor Ohienko and Its Efforts to Implement the Law on Autocephaly

With the temporary stabilization of the Russian-Ukrainian front, Kamianets Podilskyi--the seat of the Ukrainian government--became the center of the Ukrainian autocephalist movement for some time. The movement was reinforced by Lypkivskyi and Mykhailo Moroz, chairman of the reconstituted All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church Rada. A close relationship developed between the reactivated Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, the theological faculty of the local Ukrainian University, and Professor Ivan Ohienko, who assumed the post of the minister of confessions in mid-September. In numerous instructions addressed to the episcopate, Ohienko called for the bishops' cooperation in the gradual Ukrainianization of the Church. In his first order on September 16, the new minister requested that Ukrainian pronunciation of Church-Slavonic be used in Gospel readings, and that sermons be read in the Ukrainian language. He appealed for "the preservation in purity of our ancient Ukrainian church customs and rites."²¹⁹ Two days later, Ohienko requested the bishops to adopt Ukrainian as the official language of the diocesan administration and its publications within a month.²²⁰ On September 24, he set a deadline of a month for the adoption of Ukrainian pronunciation and asked the bishops to restrict ecclesiastical appointments to Ukrainian-speaking candidates.²²¹ Shortly afterward, he instructed the episcopate to seek his consent for any appointments or transfers of persons born outside the Ukraine.²²²

36
On October 7, 1919, the Directory adopted a decree reestablishing a central authority for the Ukrainian Church. Reaffirming the position of the January 1, which held that "the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church is independent from the Muscovite or any other ecclesiastical authority," the decree provided that:

The supreme Orthodox Church authority in the Ukrainian Republic shall be the Church Sobor of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which should be convoked as soon as possible.

Until the convocation of the All-Ukrainian Church Sobor, immediately to reactivate, on the basis of the law of January 1, 1919, the Ukrainian Holy Synod, composed of persons approved by us [the Directory] in January.

We instruct the Minister of Confessions to submit for our approval other persons of proper status, to replace temporarily members of the Synod who cannot presently arrive to perform their duties.

The Ukrainian Synod should commence its work no later than October 14, 1919.

Complete regulations for the Synod should be elaborated by the Holy Synod itself, together with the Minister of Confessions and [the Synod] should be guided by them until [the convocation of] the All-Ukrainian Church Sobor.

The Synod was inaugurated on October 14 in a ceremony attended by the Ukrainian chief of state, Symon Petliura. However, it could not be fully constituted, as no hierarch could be persuaded to occupy the post reserved for a bishop on this body. Both bishops who then resided in the territory under the Directory's control--Pimen of Kamianets and Amvrosii (Polianskii) of Vinnytsia--refused to recognize the canonicity of the Synod. Accordingly, the latter was composed of only two priests (Archpriests V. Lypkivskyi and Iukhym Sitsinskyi), a deacon (Makar Kramarenko), and two laymen (V. Chekhivskyi and Professor V. Bidnov). The temporary chairmanship of the Synod was assigned to Lypkivskyi, but its actual leadership was reportedly assumed by Professor Ohienko, an ex officio member, who acted as the government's representative. This situation evidently created some tensions within the Synod. In the absence of the episcopate's representative, the Synod had to restrict its activities mostly to the preparation of plans for future ecclesiastical reforms. By mid-November, the Polish occupation of Kamianets Podilskyi brought the work of the Synod to a sudden end. The orders and pleas of the minister and the Synod, while encountering a determined resistance on the part of Archbishop Pimen of Podilia and his Vinnytsia vicar Amvrosii, found a positive response only among a small group of nationally-conscious clergy. With the Polish occupation, these priests were summarily suspended by Pimen as he resumed an open anti-Ukrainian campaign. The return of the Ukrainian authorities to Podilia after the conclusion of the Directory's alliance with Poland in April brought renewed official efforts to de-Russify the Church. These culminated in October 1920 in the arrest of Archbishop Pimen and some of his collaborators for "agitation
aiming at the destruction of the national achievements of the Ukrainian people, its language, and the Autocephalous Church." \(^{228}\)

While the Ministry of Confessions under Ohiienko was unable to realize its plans for the consecration of sympathetic Ukrainian bishops, \(^{229}\) somewhat more positive results were obtained during 1919 and 1920 when basic liturgical and other religious texts were translated into Ukrainian and published. These activities centered around the Kamianets state university, whose theological faculty attracted a number of Ukrainian scholars. \(^{230}\) The university also organized Ukrainian courses for the clergy, and its chapel was the main proselytizer of Ukrainianized services and rites during this period. \(^{231}\)

The collapse of Ukrainian statehood ended the government's efforts to implement its law on autocephaly. The Bolshevik attack in late November 1920 forced the Petliura government to abandon the Kamianets Podilskyi area--its last territorial base. The remnants of the Ukrainian army crossed the river Zbruch into Polish-occupied Galicia only to be disarmed and interned by its erstwhile allies. In March 1921, the Poles signed a separate peace treaty with the Soviets at Riga that sealed the fate of the Ukrainian People's Republic.

Most members of the Kamianets autocephalist group, including Professor Ohiienko, followed Petliura's government into exile in Poland. In subsequent years, they developed considerable contacts with Ukrainian émigrés, primarily through the publication of Ukrainian translations of religious literature, research studies, and popular brochures. \(^{232}\) Part of the group settled in the Polish-occupied provinces of Volyn and Polissia, and some joined the ranks of the Orthodox clergy. Later, they spearheaded the movement for the Ukrainianization of the Church in those parts of the Ukraine. \(^{233}\) A few Kamianets autocephalists remained under the Soviet regime and joined the Kievan group in building the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church "from below." \(^{234}\)

Conclusions and Reflections

The legacy of the long Russian domination over the Ukrainian Orthodox Church not only placed the latter outside the mainstream of Ukrainian cultural and political revival; it also made the Church into an ideological and institutional weapon determined to block the progress of the Ukrainian people toward nationhood and political independence. In the words of Oleksandr Lototskyi:

In the course of more than two centuries a system prevailed in the Ukraine whereby influential ecclesiastical posts were filled by Russifying elements--either native Muscovites or Russified Ukrainians, who thanks to their natural ties with the Ukrainian environment excelled the Muscovites in carrying out the policy of Russification within the church in the Ukraine. Metropolitanans and the episcopate, without exception, belonged to this category of ecclesiastical leaders strained through the bureaucratic-Russificatory sieve. This leading stratum filled all positions in ecclesiastical administration with their adherents--people of the same ideology of ecclesiastic Russification--largely their relatives from Muscovy. During two centuries, especially over the past seventy-five years, there emerged in the cities of the Ukraine a
ruling class of Russian ecclesiastical bureaucracy that assumed exclusive influence on all aspects of the local church life.\textsuperscript{235}

Russified theological schools and monasteries in the Ukraine zealously guarded against the infiltration of "Ukrainophile" influences. They produced a clergy that with few exceptions was alien to Ukrainian national and social aspirations. This also reflected the degree of submergence of the national identity of the Ukrainian masses and the weakness of the Ukrainian national movement. Arrested by legal and administrative restrictions, the movement was largely restricted to a small stratum of Ukrainian intelligentsia. As Mykola Kovalevskyi pointed out:

One could find in Volyn or Podillia priestly families which while not using the Russian language at home and retaining certain overt characteristics of their Ukrainian nationality, politically, however, stood completely and without reservations on the platform of Russian unity and Muscovite autocracy. [Nationally] conscious individuals among our Orthodox clergy were simply lost in the sea of Moscovite reaction [chornosotestvo] that predominated among our Orthodox parish priests [batiushky]. Church organization, too, was in our country Russified to an absurd degree, as it did not make any concessions to Ukrainian rites and popular customs even where these could be made without undermining ecclesiastical unity with Moscow.\textsuperscript{236}

Catalyzed by the revolution of 1917, the Ukrainian church movement emerged as a reaction against this state of affairs in the Church. It was nourished by a combination of indignant nationalism, ecclesiastical radicalism, and fundamentalist religious zeal. On the one hand, the movement represented a projection of renascent Ukrainian nationalism upon the ecclesiastical-religious scene. With the political forces of the day, it shared the ultimate aim of the Ukrainian revolution—the recovery of the Ukraine's national identity, heritage, and freedom through emancipation from Russian control. On the other hand, paralleling the evolution of the aspirations of the Ukrainian revolution from federalism to independence, the Ukrainian church movement progressed from its initial aspirations for ecclesiastical autonomy and Ukrainianization of the liturgy toward demands for the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church. In the Ukrainian context, it expressed the aspirations of the progressive movement within the Russian Orthodox Church for the democratization of the Church on a conciliar basis; an equalization in the status of the white and black clergy and the curtailment of episcopal domination; the renovation of the Church, especially at the parish level; and the establishment of harmony between the Church and the aspirations of the people.

The hard core of the Ukrainian church movement consisted of people of diverse backgrounds, such as urban parish priests (V. Lypkivskyi and P. Tarnavskyi), military chaplains (O. Marychiv, P. Pohorilko, Iu. Zhevchenko), and theological seminary teachers (V. Bidnov, P. Tabinskyi, and for some time, V. Chekhivskyi). I. Ohienko was a university professor and M. Moroz was a landowner. Lototskyi's prerevolutionary career combined government service with literary work, and S. Shelukhyn was a jurist. They had almost no experience in ecclesiastical administration with the exception of P.
Sikorskyi, and surprisingly there were few village priests among them. Some, such as V. Lypkivskyi, V. Chekhivskyi, and V. Bidnov, had long espoused the Ukrainian cause in ecclesiastical circles, and their careers had been thwarted by official antagonism. Others revealed their Ukrainian convictions only after the fall of the autocracy. A handful, like Nestor Sharaiovskyi, were converts from the Russian nationalist camp. Most of the principal members of the movement came from priestly families or attended theological schools. Nationalist and religious motives were closely intertwined in bringing them into the movement. Personal ambition and career expectations might have propelled some of them as well.

Probably the main sources of the movement's strength were its intense faith in the righteousness of its cause, optimism, and energy. Its weaknesses were many: a lack of access to the levers of ecclesiastical power; a precarious and limited base among the rank-and-file clergy; and the autocephalists' emotionalism, impatience, and inexperience in the art of ecclesiastical politics.

Arrayed against the national church movement was the entire episcopate of the Ukraine. The episcopate was supported by the ecclesiastical administrative apparatus and nearly all the monastic clergy, and commanded the considerable material resources of the local church. After 1918, this formidable force, containing some of the most outstanding representatives of political reaction and militant clericalism in Russia, was headed by Metropolitan Antonii Khrapovitskii. A powerful figure with considerable gifts of leadership and persuasion, of vast ambition and authority, he maintained a remarkable hold on the loyalties of the ecclesiastical elite in the Ukraine. This stratum's perception of the Ukrainian problem was shaped by a combination of nationalism, conservatism, and a vast misunderstanding of the dynamics of the Ukrainian revolution. Hence, their disdain and ridicule of the Ukrainian language as either a crude dialect of "Little Russian" peasants or a "Galician invention;" their notion of the Ukrainian people as an integral part of the Russian nation, without a distinct past or future; their view of Ukrainian nationalism as an artificial and unpopular creation of misguided intellectuals and enemy-inspired troublemakers; and their opinion of the Ukrainian church movement as an exclusively politically-inspired venture of a handful of malcontent priests and radicals devoid of true faith and alien to the pious masses. Hence their insistence on the greatest possible freedom from state intervention into the ecclesiastical domain under their control.

The near complete monopoly of power in the Ukrainian dioceses enjoyed by the Russian or Russian-oriented episcopate—who were equally opposed to the Ukrainianization and the democratization of the Church—made the tasks of the Ukrainian church movement both simpler and more difficult. It tended to submerge the contradictions between the two major facets of the autocephalist movement, and enabled it to draw support from both nationalist and eventually socialist elements of Ukrainian society as well as a small stratum of progressive Russian clergy and church intelligentsia in the Ukraine. The movement’s cause thus reflected the blending of national and social aspirations that typified the early stage of the Ukrainian revolution.

At the same time, the canonical framework and the hierarchical structure of the Orthodox Church supplied the Russian episcopate as the exclusive repository of apostolic succession and canonical authority—with formidable weapons against the opponents of the status quo. Not only could the bishops resort to ecclesiastical sanctions against the "anti-canonical" acts of the
clergy and believers at will; they also had the forces of mass inertia and habit on their side, the conservative spirit of the Church, and in particular the vigorous support of powerful nationalist and reactionary Russian elements strategically entrenched in Ukrainian cities, both within the Church and outside it in bureaucratic and military strata as well as among the middle class. Believers or not, these elements of the hitherto dominant Russian minority in the Ukraine shared the episcopate's view that the retention of the Church's subordination to Moscow and its Russian orientation and leadership were of prime political importance in preparing for the restoration of "one and indivisible Russia." With the breakup of the imperial power structure and the dispersal or suppression of political organizations of the Russian right in the Ukraine, the Church remained the only institutional link with the past around which these forces could rally and combat, from a privileged sanctuary, the forces of Ukrainian "separatism" and radicalism.

While the great majority of some 9,000 "white" parish priests in the Ukraine were Ukrainian by origin, the nationally-conscious clergy among them were a distinct minority, and as a rule they were devoid of ecclesiastical authority. On the whole, the rank-and-file clergy tended to resent the heavy hand of monastic bishops, and the appeals of both liberals and autocephalists for the improvement in the status of the parish clergy could not but strike many sympathetic chords. As long as they could be protected effectively either by the state or an alternative de facto ecclesiastical authority from episcopal sanctions or rejection by their parishioners, many "white" clergymen were willing to challenge their bishops by openly supporting ecclesiastical reformers. This has been amply demonstrated by the early successes of spokesmen for progressive Church reforms, including Ukrainianization, when they enjoyed the direct support of a progressive Over-Procurator and local civil authorities. The subsequent loss of this relative immunity to their superiors' reprisals combined with the realization of dangers to their individual welfare inherent in the laymen's control of church affairs, produced a large-scale defection of the parish clergy from the ranks of the liberal and national church movements.

The Ukrainian revolution provided the autocephalist movement with the historically tested, if not canonical, alternative of relying on state legislation and administrative measures to establish harmony between the Church and Ukrainian national interests. Unfortunately for the movement, the Central Rada government, which probably stood the best chance of enforcing the Ukrainianization of the Church, intervened belatedly and only half-hearted in support of this cause. The Hetmanate, though taking a positive attitude toward ecclesiastical affairs and professing sympathy for the nationalization of the Church, was too dependent on the acquiescence of conservative Russian strata to break the open defiance of the Ukrainian cause by the Russian episcopate with state power. Eventually, in a futile attempt to salvage his regime, Skoropadskyi sacrificed the cause of the emancipation of Ukrainian Church along with Ukrainian independence. The Directory acted promptly and forcefully to implement the objectives of the Ukrainian autocephalist movement by law, but the Directory's life-span was simply too short to effectively implement its decree on autocephaly. Of the several causes that prevented the autocephalists from breaking the opposition of the ecclesiastical authorities, the instability of the Ukrainian national government was the most obvious.

As the Russo-Ukrainian struggle for the control of the Church increased in bitterness, the chances for a compromise solution espoused by Russian
Church liberals--broad autonomy of the Ukrainian Church under the limited authority of Moscow, coupled with a gradual Ukrainianization of the Church--rapidly decreased with the polarization and growing rigidity of the attitudes of the contending camps. The two major documents of this period--the "autonomous" statute as finally adopted in November 1918 by the All-Ukrainian Church Sobor, and the January 1919 government decree on autocephaly--illustrated the irreconcilability of the positions taken on the one hand by the Moscow Patriarchate and its spokesmen in the Ukraine, and on the other by the Ukrainian autocephalists and their governmental supporters. Neither of these two documents could be said to have finally settled the controversy. They were rather declarations of the mutually exclusive attitudes of the respective contending parties. With some support from Russian church liberals, the Ukrainian side persistently denied the validity of the 1918 statute on such grounds as the arbitrary composition and procedures of the All-Ukrainian Sobor and the failure of the statute to secure the required approval of the state. The supporters of the Moscow Patriarchate rejected the Directory's law on autocephaly as a unilateral act of the Ukrainian government that had never been approved by the canonical leadership of the Church. While the Bolshevik victory prevented the implementation of the 1919 decree on autocephaly, the former document--the 1918 Poloshenko as amended by the Patriarch--was of minor practical significance in guiding the internal affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Ukraine until its near complete destruction by the end of the 1930s. 23 7 The nominal autonomy provided in this document was later claimed and expanded in practice by the pro-Russian wing of the Church in the German-occupied Ukraine during 1941-43.

As the hopes for the survival of Ukrainian statehood faded away, the Ukrainian autocephalist movement came to face a momentous decision. Frustrated in its attempts to de-Russify the Church from above, it could either admit defeat and disband, and perhaps work slowly toward these aims within the Church, or resort to a Church revolution, sever its canonical links with the Russian Church and form a separate Church organization that would undertake the Ukrainianization of the Church from the grass roots by winning over Ukrainian believers and progressively depriving the Russian Church of its parishes in the Ukraine.

The issue of "canonical" as opposed to "revolutionary" means of emancipating the Ukrainian Church from Moscow's control eventually split the autocephalist movement. While some of the autocephalist activists returned to the ranks of the Russian Church in the hope of mobilizing support for a gradual Ukrainianization of the Church, including ordination of "canonical" Ukrainian bishops, 23 8 the majority of the movement followed the charismatic leadership of Archpriest (and future Metropolitan) Vasyl Lypkivskyi and Volodymyr Chekhivskyi in breaking away from the authority and canonical restraints of the Russian Orthodox Church in 1921. Believing passionately in the righteousness of their cause, they launched a distinctly national and popular church--the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. The Autocephalous Church was independent from and fiercely combated by the Moscow Patriarchate, and denied recognition by all other Orthodox Patriarchates. Until its forcible suppression by the end of the 1920s, the Autocephalous Church remained the most important ideological and institutional link with the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-19, and the most important autonomous vehicle of Ukrainianization among the popular masses during the early years of Soviet rule.
Transliteration of Geographical Names

The transliteration of Ukrainian and Russian terms in this paper follows the rules of the Library of Congress, except that soft signs and diacritical marks are omitted. Names of Ukrainian geographical locations are rendered in their Ukrainian version, except for such designations as Kiev and Galicia. Listed below are the differing Ukrainian and Russian geographical names that appear in this study.

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Table 1

Orthodox Dioceses in the Ukraine, 1915a

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<tr>
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<td>230</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>87</td>
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<td>Convents</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nuns</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>438</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female Novices</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>492</td>
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<tr>
<td>Orthodox Populationb</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(in thousands)</td>
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<td>1,140.3</td>
<td>1,659.2</td>
<td>1,471.9</td>
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<th>Chernihiv</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>4,843</td>
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<td>Orthodox Populationb</td>
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<tr>
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aExcluding the Berdiansk, Dniprovsk, and Melitopoluezdy of the Tavriia guberniia; b1913 totals; cincluding 202 students of the Kievan Theological Academy, the only graduate theological school in the Ukraine; dexcluding bishops' residences, one in each diocese, except for Poltava with two residences.
Notes

1. For the text of the Provisional Government's declaration, see "Vidnovlennia hruzynskoi tserkvy," Nova rada (Kiev), no. 4 (March 30/April 12, 1917). Petrograd's recognition was spelled out in ethnic and extraterritorial terms, leaving the non-Georgian Orthodox in Georgia in the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church. The latter, however, did not recognize Georgian autocephaly until September 1943, when such recognition was evidently made part of Stalin's quid pro quo with the Moscow Patriarchate.

2. The extent of the Russification of the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine on the eve of the Revolution can be illustrated by the ethnic composition of the episcopate in nine "Ukrainian" dioceses. Of the nine diocesan bishops, eight were Russian, and only one bishop, Ahapit Vyshnevskyi, was of Ukrainian origin. Of the 15 vicar bishops, 11 were Russians, two of Ukrainian origin (Kievan vicars Vasylii Bohdashevskyi and Dymytrii Verbytskyi), one of Georgian background, and one of a Latvian-German ancestry. Russia. Sviateishii Pravitelstvuiushchii Sinod, Spiski sluzhashchikh po Vedomstvu Pravoslavnago ispovedaniia za 1915 god (Petrograd, 1915).

3. A derisive Russian term for Ukrainians, which was adopted by some illiterate peasants to distinguish themselves from katsapy, an equally derisive Ukrainian term for Russians.

4. First published on March 24/April 5, 1917, Nova rada [New council] was actually the continuation of a prewar Ukrainian daily Rada (1906-1914), published by the secret Society of Ukrainian Progressives (TUP), which after the March 1917 revolution renamed itself the Union of Ukrainian Autonomists-Federalists and shortly afterward changed its name again to the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Federalists, while remaining a liberal, democratic, middle-of-the-road group.


7. Nova rada, no. 1 (March 30/April 12, 1917).

8. Nova rada, no. 4 (March 30/April 12, 1917). Simultaneously, the delegation demanded that the government "immediately recall the Orthodox (ecclesiastical) administration [established] over the Galician Greek-Uniate Church and restore to the latter the right to run independently its own affairs."


10. Second vicar of the Kiev diocese; a Russian, born November 29, 1868 in Kostroma diocese; ordained priest in 1890; accepted monastic orders, graduated from the Kiev Theological Academy in 1899; ordained Bishop of Akkerman in 1907; made first vicar of Kishinev diocese in 1909; appointed Kievan vicar in November 1911. This and all subsequent biographical notes on individual bishops are based on Russia. Sviateishii Sinod. Vedomstvo provoslovannogo ispovedaniia, Sostav Sviateishago Pravitelstvuushchago Vserossiiskago Sinoda i Rossiiskoi tserkovnoi ierarkhii na 1917 god (Petrograd, 1917).

12. Fourth vicar of the Kiev diocese, Ukrainian, born August 4, 1869, in the Poltava diocese; completed Poltava seminary, ordained priest in 1890; accepted monastic orders in 1896; graduated from the Kiev Theological Academy in 1899; ordained Bishop of Uman in October 1910.


16. Born March 17/30, 1863, in Novgorod diocese, a Russian; graduated in 1885 from St. Petersburg theological academy; ordained hieromonk, magister of theology in 1888; appointed rector of St. Petersburg theological academy in 1890; transferred the same year to the rectorship of Moscow academy; made rector of Kazan theological academy in 1895; ordained bishop of Cheboksary in September 1897; transferred to Chistopol in 1899 and Ufa in 1900; appointed bishop of Volyn in May 1902 and archbishop in 1906; doctor of theology in 1911; archbishop of Kharkiv from May 1914.

17. Antonii's reply, hand-written on the Committee's petition, read, "I have always permitted and permit all priests, who so desire, to read Easter Gospel in Little Russian; but during my service I never permit it in either Great Russian or Little Russian. All great nations pray not in the same language in which they speak at the market, and Little Russians cannot stand Little Russian Gospel and do not take it even if [it is] given to them as a present." *Nova rada*, no. 10 (April 9/22, 1917).


19. In essence, exemption from the authority of the diocesan bishop and direct subordination to the Patriarchate.


21. Shelukhyn, "Vo istynu voskrese!"

22. Shelukhyn, "Vo istynu voskrese!"

23. Shelukhyn, "Vo istynu voskrese!"

24. In 1918, Shelukhyn became chairman of the autocephalist Brotherhood of SS. Cyril and Methodius and its main spokesman in the opposition Ukrainian National Union. After the overthrow of the Hetman regime, he became Minister of Justice in the first Directory cabinet. In this capacity, Shelukhyn drafted and carried through the Council of Ministers the law on the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine promulgated on January 1, 1919.

25. On May 12, the Holy Synod announced its desire to convene a local (national) Sobor of the Russian Orthodox Church. On June 24, it convened a pre-Sobor council (sovet) to prepare for the Local Sobor, and on July 18 it set the latter's opening date for August 28 in Moscow. *Sviashchennyi Sobor Pravoslavnoi Rossiiskoi Tserkvi, Delianitsa*, vol. 1, pt. 31 (Moscow, 1918), pp. 3-5 and 11.

26. Born on February 1/14, 1867, in Tambov diocese, a Russian; completed Tambov seminary in 1888; ordained priest in 1890; graduated from Kazan theological academy in 1900; magister of theology in 1907; ordained bishop of Sumy, vicar of Kharkiv diocese, in August 1909; transferred to Chernihiv diocese as vicar bishop of Novhorod Siverskyi; appointed bishop of Chernihiv in May 1911; elevated to Archbishop in October 1916.
27. Nova rada, no. 3 (March 29/April 11, 1917), no. 8 (April 7/20, 1917), no. 15 (April 15/28, 1917), and no. 34 (May 9/22, 1917). In May, a Chernihiv diocesan congress of clergy and laymen approved Bishop Vasilii's removal and replaced him with his first vicar, Pakhomii (Kedrov).

28. Russkiia vedomosti, April 16/29, 1917. Antonii's removal was also demanded by the gubernia's Ukrainian congress, which branded him as an enemy of the Ukrainian Church. After his refusal to have Ukrainian Easter Gospel read at his service, demands for his removal came from many Ukrainian organizations and meetings from all over the Ukraine.

29. Born April 10/23, 1868, in Tula diocese, a Russian; graduated from Moscow Theological Academy in 1892; ordained hieromonk in 1895; appointed rector of Kholm seminary in 1897; ordained bishop of Lublin in January 1903; appointed bishop of Kholm in July 1905 and archbishop in 1912; member of State Duma 1907-1912; appointed archbishop of Volyn on May 14/27, 1914; headed campaign to "reunite" Uniates in the Russian-occupied Galicia in 1914-15.

30. Born July 16/29, 1867, in Volyn diocese, a Ukrainian; completed Volyn theological seminary in 1888; ordained priest in 1889; accepted monastic orders in 1895; graduated from the Kiev theological academy in 1896 and appointed inspector of Poltava seminary in the same year; made rector of the Katerynoslav theological seminary in 1898; ordained bishop of Uman (third Kievian vicar) on April 7/20, 1902; bishop of Cherkasy (second vicar) in 1906, and of Chyhyryn (first vicar) in 1908, and transferred to Vladikavkaz in the same year; appointed bishop of Katerynoslav on October 4/17, 1911.

31. Rech, April 7, 1917; and Odesskiia novosti, August 24/September 6, 1917.

32. Trybuna (Kiev), January 2, 1919.

33. Russkiia vedomosti, April 26/May 9, 1917.


35. Russkiia vedomosti, May 18/31, 1917.

36. Vladimir Nikolaevich Lvov (1872-?), a Center Party deputy from Samara gubernia, who chaired the Duma's Committee on the Orthodox Church before the revolution.

37. Priest E. Pospilovskyi, a liberal, was appointed commisssar for ecclesiastical (dukhovni) affairs for the Kiev gubernia. Nova rada, April 3/16, 1917.

38. The Kievian diocesan executive committee of the clergy was headed by another liberal priest, Ie. Kapralov. Nova rada, April 2/15, 1917; and Kievskia mysl, March 30/April 12, 1917. A Ukrainian clergyman, S. Fylypenko, was elected secretary.

39. See, for example, Rech, May 5/18, 16/29, and 18/31, 1917.

40. For example, congresses in the Kiev, Poltava, Volyn, Odessa, and Kharkiv dioceses. See Russkiia vedomosti, April 18/31, April 23/May 6, and April 25/May 8, 1917; Den, May 22/June 4, 1917; and Rech, June 8/21, 1917.


42. Russkiia vedomosti, April 25/May 8, and May 21/June 3, 1917.

Ukrainian language is not "suited" for liturgical use. *Nova rada*, August 26/September 8, 1917.

46. According to *Nova rada*, April 26/May 9, 1917, the Volyn congress in Zhytomyr unanimously "condemned the 'black-hundreds' politics, resolved for a democratization of life in all spheres, for autonomy of the Ukraine and the separation of church from the state, for reform of theological schools and an immediate church sobor convened on a democratic basis." But the congress asked the authorities not to remove Archbishop Evlogii from the Volyn see. Cf. *Russkiiia vedomosti*, April 23/May 6, 1917.

47. *Russkiiia vedomosti*, April 18/May 1, 1917; Iurii Samoilovich, *Tserkov ukrainskogo sotsial-fashizma* (Moscow, 1932), p. 28; and P. Korsunovskyi, "Tserkovnyi rukh na Ukraini v pershi roky revoliutsii," *Dnipro*, July 3, 1925. According to Korsunovskyi, a participant in the Kiev congress, "the black-hundreds delegates left the hall during the voting on this motion" [to rename the congress]. In his subsequent account, the congress chairman, V. Lypkivskyi, stated that the gathering elected a special commission to convene an all-Ukrainian sobor of clergy and laymen, allegedly headed by Bishop Dymytrii of Uman. V. Lypkivskyi, *Istorii Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkivy. Rozdil 7: Vidrodshennia Ukrainskoi Tserkivy* (Winnipeg, 1961), p. 7. It is likely that Dymytrii chaired the commission elected in June.

48. Metropolitan Vladimir refused, however, to ratify resolutions of the Kievan congress or to convene the newly-elected diocesan council. On May 12, the Kiev Consistory issued a special resolution in which it accused congress supporters of "seeking to occupy those posts from which priests and deacons are being removed with their participation and collaboration." *Kievskiiia Eparkhiialnya Vedomosti*, no. 19 (May 7/20, 1917), pp. 152-53. Later that month, the Kiev diocesan council dispatched a delegation to Over-Procurator Lvov, who responding to delegates' complaints, asked Metropolitan Vladimir to approve the diocesan congress' decisions. *Nova rada*, May 27/June 9, 1917.


51. *Pro Ukrainsiatstu tserkavy*, pp. 8-10.
52. *Visty z Ukrainskoi Tsentralnoi Rady*, no. 6 (May 1917), pp. 3-4.
60. Samoilovich, Tserkov ukrainskogo sotsial-fashisma, p. 33.
61. Cf. B. V. Titlinov, Tserkov vo vremia revoliutsii (Petrograd, 1924), pp. 60-64.
63. For the adverse Ukrainian reaction to Antonii's reelection, see L. Burchak, "Obnovlennia tserkovnogo zhyttia," Nova rada, August 25/September 7, 1917.
64. The only active bishops to show some sympathy for the movement in 1917 were Feofan (Bystrov) of Poltava, and a Kievan vicar, Dymytriy (Verbytskyi) of Uman.
65. See Russkiiia vedomosti, May 27/June 9, 1917; and Rech, July 30/August 12, 1917.
66. Born in 1848 in Tambov diocese, a Russian; graduated from the Kievan Academy with a candidate degree in 1874; ordained priest in 1882; consecrated Bishop of Staraja Rus in 1888; made Exarch of Georgia in 1892, Metropolitan of Moscow in 1898, and Metropolitan of Petrograd and senior Holy Synod member in 1912; transferred to the Kievian see on December 10, 1915.
68. One of the participants in the Ukrainian church movement in Kiev, priest P. Korsunovskyi, relates that when accused by a Ukrainian delegation of being alien to Ukrainian aspirations, Metropolitan Vladimir "simply could not understand what they were talking about. Surprised, he inquired: 'What is a Ukraine? What is a Ukrainian people? Are not Little Russians the same as the Russian people?'" Korsunovskyi, Dnipro, November 1, 1925.
70. Russkiiia vedomosti, June 23/July 6, 1917.
72. The old Society of the Ukrainian Progressives (TUP), which in the spring 1917 assumed the new name of the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Federalists. Borys, "Political Parties in the Ukraine," p. 142.
73. Primarily, the Ukrainian National Party, which joined with several small nationalist groups in forming the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Independists, in December 1917.
74. M. Kovalevskyi, Pry dzerelakh borotby. Spomyne, vrashennia, refleksii (Innsbruck, 1960), pp. 259-60. As early as 1900, Mikhnovskyi attacked the use of the "language of our oppressors in the Orthodox Church" in his program of the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party. M. Mikhnovskyi, Samostiina Ukraina (Munich, 1948), p. 19.
76. Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materialy do istorii ukrainskoi revoliutsii, 1917-1920 rr., p. 46.
78. Oleksii Dorodnytsyn (Aleksii Dorodnitsyn), born November 2/15, 1859, in the Katerynoslav diocese; graduated from the Moscow Theological Academy with a candidate degree in 1885; awarded magisterial degree in 1891; appointed Katerynoslav diocesan missionary in 1892 and teacher of Chernihiv theological seminary; ordained monastic priest in 1902; made inspector of Stavropol theological seminary, rector of the Lithuania theological seminary, and archimandrite in 1903; consecrated Bishop of Sumy (vicar of Kharkiv diocese) on May 30/June 12, 1904; transferred in July 1905 to become Bishop of Elysavethrad (second vicar of the Kharkiv diocese); six weeks later, moved again from the Ukraine to become Bishop of Chistopol (first vicar of the Kazan diocese) and rector of the Kazan Theological Academy; awarded doctor of theology degree in 1910; appointed bishop of Saratov in January 1912, and Archbishop of Vladimir on July 30/August 12, 1914. A Ukrainian by origin, Dorodnytsyn was dismissed by the Synod in 1917 for his alleged links with Rasputin. For Dorodnytsyn's denial of this charge, see Novoe vremia, March 25/April 7, 1917. Archbishop Oleksii explained his motive for joining the Ukrainian movement in a letter to Kievtianin, December 6/19, 1917, in response to this paper's vicious attacks on his "Ukrainophilism." On the circumstances of his election to the honorary chairmanship of the Brotherhood, and subsequently the All-Ukrainian Tserkovna Rada, see Korsunovskyi, Dnipro, August 15 and 29, 1925.
79. Russkiia vedomosti, November 23/December 5, 1917; and Tserkovno-obshchestvennyi vestnik, November 24/December 6, 1917.
83. Samoilovich, Tserkov ukrainskogo sotsial-fashizma, pp. 36-38; Friedrich Heier, Die Orthodoxe Kirche in der Ukraine von 1917 bis 1945 (Cologne-Braunsfeld, 1953), pp. 15-16; and Ivan Vlasovskyi, Narys istorii Ukraïnskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy, vol. 4, pt. 1 (New York-Bound Brook, 1961), pp. 15-16. According to Korsunovskyi, chairmanship of the Tserkovna Rada was first offered to Bishop Dymytrii (Verbytskyi) and only after he declined, was Archbishop Oleksii (Dorodnytsyn) invited to assume this post. Korsunovskyi, Dnipro, August 15, 1925. Among other members of this body were priests V. Lypkivskyi, N. Sharaivskyi, P. Tarnavskyi, A. Hrynevych (former Duma deputy), E. Kapralov, B. Fylypenko, P. Pashchevskyi, P. Korsunovskyi, N. Marynych, V. Khomenko, and S. Potikhyn; deacons Botvynenko and Rafalskyi; P. Maziukevych; and military representatives Andriienko, Holyk, and Halamiiv.
88. *Tserkovno-obshchestvennyi vestnik* and *Russkiia vedomosti*, both dated November 24/December 7. During the debate, a Kiev delegate, K. K. Myrovych, urged the Sobor to authorize the convocation of a Ukrainian Regional Sobor without delay in view of the recent developments in the Ukraine: "the question of national self-determination for the Little Russians has been resolved affirmatively. The very least that the Little Russians will get is national autonomy, but taking into account the actually existing circumstances one may expect the establishment of an independent Ukrainian republic, federally connected with the Russian Republic .... And the previous relations between the Ukrainian Church and the Great Russian Church cannot remain [the same] ... one has to create new forms of ecclesiastical relations that correspond to new political conditions. The church situation that emerged in the Ukraine may be defined as a broad autonomy or autocephaly with the preservation of union with the Russian Church and all Eastern Churches in matters of church doctrine, canons and rites, but all matters of local church life should be decided locally." Cited in Sheshko, "The Russian Orthodox Church Sobor of Moscow and the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine (1917-1918)," pp. 243-44. Archbishop Evlogii of Volyn, the spokesman for the caucus of delegates from the Ukraine, summed up his perception of Ukrainian developments as follows: "There emerged in Kiev a movement for disunity and, possibly, schism. It derives its power from its connection with the Ukrainian Government and the troops. This self-appointed organization went as far as to decide to convene the Ukrainian Sobor for December 28 (January 10). Can we let this Sobor happen? Would it not ignite a fire? And chestnuts will be carried [into the fire] by Count Sheptytskyi [the Uniate metropolitan of Galicia] and his collaborators. Our duty is to prevent an arbitrary Sobor, and provide conditions for the convocation of a canonical Sobor. One should not be afraid of such a Sobor. Several representatives of the Ukraine here declared that the people do not want separation, that they do not strive toward autocephaly. The people's mind is firmly for unity and we will secure the confirmation of this unity by the Sobor. The Sobor should be held as soon as possible, so no one would say--it's too late. And to make it cannonical, a delegation must be dispatched to Kiev. No special powers should be given to the delegation: it should bring about calm [in the Church] and say that all issues will be turned over to the Ukrainian Sobor which will say its decisive word." Sheshko, "The Russian Orthodox Church Sobor of Moscow and the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine (1917-1918)," pp. 279-80.

89. See Sheshko, "The Russian Orthodox Church Sobor of Moscow and the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine (1917-1918)," pp. 251-324.

90. Born in Kursk diocese in 1866, a Russian; graduated from the local theological seminary in 1886; ordained priest in 1887; monastic orders in 1894; graduated in 1895 from Kievan theological academy with a candidate degree; appointed Docent in 1896 and Inspector of the Kievan Academy; awarded magisterial degree; made rector of the Academy in 1902; ordained Bishop of Chyhyryn (second vicar of the Kievan diocese) on July 3, 1902; promoted to first vicar in May 1906; member of the second Duma in 1907; elevated in June 1908 to Archbishop of Aleutians and North America; transferred in March 1914 to the see of Kishinev; later appointed Exarch of Georgia; exiled from Tiflis in 1917 after the proclamation of Georgian autocephaly.

91. *Russkia vedomosti*, November 25/December 7, and November 28/December 10/1917. Other members of delegation were S. A. Kotliarevskii (the former deputy minister of confessions), Prince G. N. Trubetskoi, Priest Ia.
Botvynovskyi, and K. K. Myrovych. Archbishop Evlogii, who had been nominated by Archbishop Antonii Khropovitskii, declined membership in the delegation, pleading that "in certain circles his name is odious" as a "centralizer," which "may hurt the cause." On Professor S. N. Bulgakov's motion, the delegation was given the following mandate: "The All-Russian Church Sobor, which highly esteems filial faithfulness not only to universal, but also to local traditions, invites the Ukrainian metropoly to explain its local needs regarding the ordering of the church life. At the same time, it expresses its hope that its adherence to local traditions will not induce the sons of the Ukrainian land to abandon the heritage of entire Russian Church and thereby violate the unity of ecclesiastical love." Sheshko, "The Russian Orthodox Church Sobor of Moscow and the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine (1917-1918)," pp. 310 and 317.

92. Rech, November 30/December 13, 1917. According to Metropolitan Antonii Khropovitskii, Tikhon declared to Ukrainian delegates, "I shall never give my consent to any autocephaly for the Ukrainian Church, but autonomy, even the broadest, is in your hands." Bishop Nikon [Rklitskii], Zhizneopisanie Blashhemishehogo Antoniia, Mitropolita Kievskago i Galitskago, vol. 4 (New York, 1958), p. 234.

93. Korsunovskyi, Dnipro, August 29, 1925.
94. Korsunovskyi, Dnipro, October 31, 1925.
95. Korsunovskyi, Dnipro, November 21, 1925; and Kievlianin, December 12/25, 1917. A month later, on January 11/24, 1918, Kievlianin carried a story of a subsequent midnight visit to Metropolitan Vladimir by two Rada members who allegedly offered him the post of Ukrainian Patriarch, and demanded a contribution of 100,000 rubles for the needs of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church when he refused. The story, which could not be confirmed from any other source, was probably invented.

96. Kievlianin, December 12/25, 1917; and Korsunovskyi, Dnipro, November 21, 1925. According to Kievskaia Eparkhirialnyia Vedomosti, nos. 48-49-50, December 3, 10, and 17/16, 23, and 30, 1917, the Consistory was taken over by new members elected by the Kievan diocesan council in Spring 1917: Archpriests Vasyl Lypkivskiy and Nestor Sharaiiskiy, and priests Petro Tarnavskyi, Serhii Fylypenko, and Petro Starovoitenko, with priest Pavlo Pashechevskiy appointed by the Tserkovna Rada as Kievian diocesan commissar for ecclesiastical affairs.

98. Samoilovich, Tserkov ukraiskogo sotsial-fashizma, p. 38.
100. Kievlianin, December 15/28, and 17/30 1917; accompanying Archbishop Evlogii was Bishop Pakhomii of Chernihiv.
104. See "Sozyv Vseukrainskago tserkovnago sobora," Kievlianin, December
22, 1917/January 4, 1918, signed by V. Lypkivskyi and N. I. Luzgin. The initial Sobor opening date was set for January 12.


106. Korsunovskyi, Dnipro, December 12 and 19, 1925. Recall of Archbishop Oleksii and sanctions against him were considered at length at the Moscow Sobor. Sheshko, "The Russian Orthodox Church Sobor of Moscow and the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine (1917-1918)," pp. 319-320. But according to Korsunovskyi, Metropolitan Platon "guaranteed" that Oleksii would not be prevented from participating in the Sobor. His suspension by the Patriarch was requested in a joint letter from all bishops of Ukrainian dioceses, except for Pimen (Pegov) of Podillia, who was not available at the time.

107. Rech, January 30/February 12, 1918; Samoilovich, Tserkov ukrainskogo sotsial-fashisma, p. 424; and Heier, Die Orthodoxe Kirche in der Ukraine von 1917 bis 1945, p. 44.

108. Born in 1875 in Ufa diocese, a Russian; graduated in 1895 from Ufa theological seminary; completed Kazan Academy in 1901; monastic priest in 1901; appointed teacher of Ufa theological uchilishe, subsequently transferred to Solikamsk uchilishe; appointed in 1907 rector of Tiflis theological seminary; ordained bishop of Baku in February 1911; transferred to the Erevan see in 1912; made bishop of Balta, second vicar of the Podillia diocese, during the war.

109. According to Korsunovskyi, Pimen's candidacy received support from Ukrainian delegates who mistook him for a sympathizer with the Ukrainian church movement. Dnipro, December 19, 1926.

110. Heier, Die Orthodoxe Kirche in der Ukraine von 1917 bis 1945, p. 44n. Each Sobor commission was presided over by a bishop. Ironically, Archbishop Evlogii, a well known opponent of the Ukrainian cause, was made chairman of a commission on Ukrainianization.


112. Samoilovich, Tserkov ukrainskogo sotsial-fashisma, p. 44. Before the appeal could be published, the Sobor adjourned.

113. In Sobor commissions, a number of reports were read by delegates and invited guests. These included Professor F. I. Titov on the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church, Professor T. I. Mishchenko on a similar subject, Professor I. I. Ohienko on the Ukrainianization of liturgy, and Professor V. Ekzemplarskyi on the questions of church constitution. Skrynchenko, "Vseukrainskii Tserkovnyi Sobor," p. 93.

114. Nova rada, March 14, 1918. The vote for adjournment was 94 to 42. According to Metropolitan Antonii, "the Ukrainian Sobor did not reach a single decision. After the Sobor convened, elections of the presidium began, which lasted a whole 10 days. Then began canonade and the Sobor had to disperse." Detalnia Sviashchenago Sobora Pravoslavnoi Rossiskoi Tserkvi, vol. 7 (Moscow, 1918), p. 115. The first constituent meeting of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood took place only after the Central Rada's return to Kiev, on March 24, 1918. Bezvirnyk, no. 1 (1931), p. 45.

115. Versions charging Ukrainian nationalists with responsibility for the murder of Metropolitan Vladimir of Kiev were circulated by both the Bolsheviks
and the Russian Whites and were subsequently repeated by some Russian émigré writers. Yet even Metropolitan Antonii Khrapovitskii who supervised the investigation of this murder, afterward rejected this accusation. Bishop Nikon, Zhisneopisanye Blashennshago Antonii, pp. 221-222.


117. Samoilovich, Tserkov ukrainskogo sotsial-fashisma, p. 48.

118. Kievski Eparkhialniy Vestnik, no. 1 (2/15 May 1918), pp. 2-4; Archbishop Iosif (Krechetovich), Proiskhozhdenie i sushchnost samosviatstva Lipkoutsev (Kharkiv, 1925), p. 6.


122. According to Zinkivskyi, the initial candidates for the post of minister of confessions were, D. Doroshenko, the nominee of Ukrainian circles and a historian ("though a gentle and moderate man, he definitely stood for the Ukrainianization of the Church"), and the candidate of the Russian circles, a former gymnasium director, N. V. Storozhenko, a Ukrainian who favored a complete subordination of the Church to the Moscow Patriarchate. V. V. Zenkovskii, "Vospominanii [1900-1920]: P"iat mesiatsev u vlasti [Moe uchastie v ukrajinskoi zhizni]" (Unpublished manuscript, Archive of Russian and East European History and Culture, Columbia University, New York, 1952), pp. 19-20. As for himself, Zinkivskyi wrote in 1952, "being Ukrainian by birth, I was, from my childhood on, Russian by language, mentality, and sympathies, and, to be truthful, until then had no idea about the Ukrainian 'problem'" (p. 73). Before joining the Hetman Government, Zinkivskyi formally became a member of the Kadet Party because, he felt, "I needed to orient myself how, precisely, from the Russian point of view, to consider the entire problem of the Ukraine, since I have always been and am now a Russian first of all" (p. 26). Oleksandr Lototskyi, who declined, for political reasons, to serve in this post, characterized Zinkivskyi as an individual "without clear national conviction or strong will." O. Lototskyi, "Tserkovna sprava na Ukraini," Literaturno-naukovyiisnyk, vol. 22 (1923), no. 5, p. 66.

123. Archbishop Evlogii, who organized this election, wrote that "there were 200 electors ... Metropolitan Antonii was elected Kievan Metropolitan by an overwhelming majority. He was supported by the entire Russian population and the Ukrainian centralist, Bishop Dymytrii [Verbytskyi, a Ukrainian]--by the 'independists.'" Doroshenko, Istoriia Ukrainy, 1917-1923 rr., p. 312. According to Doroshenko, "of the 290 members of the Congress [Kievan Sobor], only 160 casts their ballots for Metropolitan Antonii; the remaining 130 votes went to Bishop Dymytrii of Uman. However, the election of Metropolitan Antonii was uncanonical since he lacked the required two-thirds of the votes [as demanded] by a resolution of the All-Russian Church Sobor in 1917, which was binding in this case." Doroshenko, Istoriia Ukrainy, 1917-1923 rr., p. 323.

124. Samoilovich, Tserkov ukrainskogo sotsial-fashisma, pp. 54-55.

125. Goloe Kieva, May 29, 1918.


129. See a telegram from the German legation counsellor Graf von Berchem to the German Foreign Office, dated June 20, 1918, and a letter of June 30, 1918, from the German minister in Kiev, Mumm, to Chancellor von Hertling, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amtes, Bonn: "Die Ukraine," band 1, Akten betreffend Kirche, document nos. 421 and 1039.

130. Telegram of June 18, 1918, from Graf von Berchem to the Foreign Office. Politisches Archiv, Bonn, document no. 1028.

131. Archbishop Iosif, Proiskhozhdenie i sushchnost samosviatstva lipkoutsev, p. 6n.


133. A memorandum presented to the Hetman by the Ukrainian Democratic Peasants' Party and other right-wing parties and vocational organizations stated: "However, during the period of the Hetmanate the militancy of the Muscovite Church has assumed particular force: a campaign is being conducted against the Ukrainian sobor, new Metropolies are being introduced, the persecution of the Ukrainian clergy is being carried to an extreme, our statehood is ignored within the Church or is being openly attacked, and in general everything is being made in order to prevent, at any price, the establishment of our Autocephalous Church." Cited in P. Mirchuk, Ukrainsko-moskovska viina, 1917-1919 (Toronto, 1957), pp. 60-61. See also Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materialy do istorii ukrainskoi revoliutsii, 1917-1920 rr., pp. 81. In mid-June, the All-Ukrainian Union of Zemstvos presented the Hetman with a memorandum criticizing reactionary clergy's opposition to Ukrainian autocephaly. John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920: A Study in Nationalism (Princeton, 1952), p. 153.

134. Zenkovskii, "Vospominaniia (1900-1920)," p. 36-38.


136. On June 18, 1918, Graf von Berchem reported to Berlin that "yesterday, the Hetman received a lengthy letter from Metropolitan Antonii in which the latter completely accepts the national Ukrainian position (Boden) and declares his readiness to faithfully cooperate with the Hetman and his Government." Politisches Archiv, Bonn, document no. 1028.

137. Doroshenko, Istoriia Ukrainy, 1917-1923 rr., pp. 326-327. Writing in 1952, Zinkivskiy thus characterized the policy of his Ministry: "Just as in the political realm, where without predetermining one way or another the question of the interrelationship between the Ukraine and Great Russia we contribute all our energy to the recovery of our land—similarly, in the ecclesiastical realm one should approve and practically implement the principle of ecclesiastical autonomy, the organ of which is the Sobor. Without predetermining in any way the interrelationship between the Ukrainian Church and the Patriarch of All Russia, we should in practice, with all determination and seriousness, proceed towards the realization of ecclesiastical autonomy." Zenkovskii, "Vospominaniia (1900-1920)," p. 39.


139. A. I. Pokrovskii, "Avtokefaliia Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi na Ukraine," Ukrainskiy Pravoslavnyi Blahovisnyk, no. 18 (September 15, 1925), p. 4. The commission consisted of several liberal professors of the Kievian Academy, including Pokrovskii, Kudriavtsev (chairman of the committee), Mischchenko,
Ekzempliarskii, Zavitnevych, Rybinskii, Popov, one Kievan University professor, Lukianenko, as well as several leading advocates of autocephaly (V. Chekhivskyi, priests N. Sharaivskyi and O. Marychiv). B. A. Evreinov served as secretary of the "Learned Committee" at the Ministry. Zenkovskii, "Vospominanii (1900-1920)," p. 32.

140. Pokrovskii, Ukrainskyi Pravoslavnyi Blahovisnyk, no. 18 (September 15, 1925).

141. A Russian, born ca. 1876, graduated from Kazan Theological Academy in 1902; appointed diocesan missionary in Volyn in 1904; ordained monastic priest in 1907; appointed Kharkiv diocesan missionary in 1915; consecrated in June 1916 Bishop of Sumy (second vicar of Kharkiv diocese).


143. P. V. L. (Lypkivsky), Trybuna, January 2, 1919; and Vlasovskyi, Marys istoriui Ukrainoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy, pp. 43-44.

144. Lototskyi, Ukrainski dzerela tserkovnoho prava, p. 130.


146. A Russian, born in Viatka diocese ca. 1875; graduated in 1898 from Kazan Theological Academy; ordained monastic priest in 1899; appointed assistant smotritel of Lipetsk theological uchilishche in 1900, and smotritel of Kremianets theological uchilishche in Volyn in 1903; made abbot of the Trinity Monastery of Derman in 1906; ordained Bishop of Novhorod-Siverskyi on September 12, 1911; became bishop of Chernihiv in 1917.

147. Elected to the Council from the clergy were Archpriests F. Titov, N. S. Grossu (both professors of the Kievan Theological Academy), and Lobov (Chernihiv), and psalmist Tsiuimanov (Podillia). Bych-Lubenskii (Kharkiv), Professors Iasinskii (Kiev) and Morachevskiy (Odessa), Marchenko (Volyn), Tiulpanov (Kherson), and Cherniavskiy (Chernihiv) were elected from the laity. Kievelianin, August 25, 1919.

148. Samoilovich, Tserkov ukrainskogo sotsial-fashizma, pp. 63-64.


155. Samoilovich, Tserkov ukrainskogo sotsial-fashizma, p. 60. Developments at the Sobor stimulated a wave of sympathy for the Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church in Ukrainian circles because of its national Ukrainian orientation.

156. Samoilovich, Tserkov ukrainskogo sotsial-fashizma, pp. 61-62.


158. Novosti dnia, October 6, 1918.

159. Novosti dnia, October 26, 1918.

160. Novosti dnia, November 9, 1918.
161. According to Zinkivskyi, the deteriorating position of the Germans led them to exert pressure on the Hetman to seek compromise with the Ukrainian opposition. Zinkivskyi refused to stay in the new "Ukrainianized" cabinet both because he opposed a complete independence of the Ukraine from Russia and due to the fact that "extremist Ukrainian circles were dissatisfied with [his] peaceful tactics in church matters." Zenkovskii, "Vospominaniia (1900-1920)," pp. 71-73.

162. By October 29, only some 100 delegates--one quarter of the total--had assembled in Kiev. Nevertheless, a pre-Sobor conference decided to open the fall session of the Sobor despite the absence of the quorum. Novosti dnia, October 30, 1918. Only three or four autocephalists remained among the Sobor delegates. Samoilovich, Tserkov ukrainskogo sotsial-fashizma, p. 66.

163. Samoilovich, Tserkov ukrainskogo sotsial-fashizma, p. 66.

164. Golos Kiev, November 8, 1918.

165. Novosti dnia, November 9, 1918.

166. 0. Lototskyi, "Na svitanku tserkovnogo vidrodzhennia", Kalendar-almanakh "Dnipro" na perestupnyi rik 1928 (Lviv, 1927), pp. 102-104.

167. Kievskaia mysl, November 14, 1918; and Odesskiii listok, November 15, 1918. According to Samoilovich, Skoropadskyi refused, however, to endorse the Cabinet's decision on autocephaly. Samoilovich, Tserkov ukrainskogo sotsial-fashizma, p. 68.


169. Golos Kiev, November 16, 1918. Similar sentiments were expressed by sobor delegates Metropolitan Platon, Morachevskyi, Archimandrite Veniamin, Bych-Lubenskii, and others. Some speakers called for Lototskyi's excommunication. Samoilovich, Tserkov ukrainskogo sotsial-fashizma, p. 60. Judging by the boldness of their attacks on the Minister, it is likely that the Sobor leaders had some advance knowledge of the Hetman's impending proclamation of federation with Russia.


171. Golos Kiev, November 16, 1918.

172. Russkii golos, November 16, 1919.

173. Golos Kiev, November 16, 1918.

174. Golos Kiev, November 22, 1918.

175. By December 10, only 55 delegates were still participating in the Sobor sittings. Kievskaia mysl, December 10, 1918.

176. Nash put, November 22, 1918.

177. Kievskaia mysl, December 13, 1918.

178. Kievskaia mysl, December 10, 1918.

179. Mir, December 12, 1918.

180. Cited in Lototskyi, Ukrainski dzherela tserkovnogo prava, p. 49n.

181. Mir, December 14, 1918.


184. Samoilovich, Tserkov ukrainskogo sotsial-fashizma, p. 70.

185. "Pravoslavie i ukrainofilstvo," Tserkovnye vedomosti (Ekaterinodar),
186. V. Chekhivskyi was born in July 1876 in the village of Horokhuvatka, Kiev gubernia, of the local priest's family; graduated from the Kiev Theological Academy in 1900; worked as assistant inspector in the Kamianets-Podilskyi Theological Seminary, 1901-1905; elected in 1906 to the first Duma and subsequently exiled for one year to Vologda gubernia. From 1907 to 1917, Chekhivskyi lived in Odessa and was active in Ukrainian life there. He was a member of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party, a member of the Central Rada, and headed the Ukrainian Military Revolutionary Committee during the anti-Hetman uprising. From December 26, 1918, to February 11, 1919, he served as premier and minister of foreign affairs in the first Directory government. A. Zhukovsky, "Chekhivsky, Volodymyr," in V. Kubijovyc (ed.), Encyclopedia of Ukraine, vol. 1 (Toronto, 1984), p. 407.

187. Trybuna, December 19, 1918. The military command of Kiev was at that time in the hands of Col. Mykola Chekhivskyi, Volodymyr's brother. The conditions of confinement, as attested by both hierarch, were not harsh. Subsequently, Evlogii considered his arrest as a providential event that saved him from the Bolsheviks. Put moei zhizni, p. 344.

188. Trybuna, December 21, 1918. Archpriest Vasyli Lypkivskyi delivered a welcoming address on this occasion.

189. On Platon's fears of arrest, see Bishop Nikon, Zhizneopisanie Blashenmeishago Antoniia, p. 245. Shortly afterward, Platon departed for Odessa where he pleaded with the French vice-consul Henno to assume "the protection of interests of the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine." Trybuna, January 1, 1919. Later in March 1919, Entente representatives demanded from the Directory the release of Metropolitan Antonii and Archbishop Evlogii. Vlasovskyi, Narys istorii Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy, p. 61n.

190. Nash put, December 29, 1918. Bishop Dionizii (Valedinskii), a Russian, was born in 1876 in Vladimir gubernia; completed Ufa theological seminary in 1896, and Kazan Theological Academy in 1900; ordained hieromonk in 1899; appointed inspector of Khola theological seminary in 1901, and rector in 1902; served as pastor of the Russian embassy church in Rome, 1911-13; ordained on April 21, 1913, Bishop of Kremianets, third vicar of Volyn diocese.


192. Symon Petliura (1879-1926), who replaced V. Vynnychenko as head of the Directory in February 1919, wrote to Professor Ivan Ohienko in December 1921 that, in his opinion, "planned organization (budivnytstvo) of the Ukrainian Church is an integral part of our state-building." He admitted, however, that "we did not have [during the Ukrainian Revolution] such a specific, detailed, thought-through program; and this, from my point of view and experience, was one of the main reason for our failures." Petliura, in contrast to most autocephalist leaders, favored a strictly hierarchical Ukrainian Church, headed by its own patriarch. See Oleksandr Lototskyi, Symon Petliura (Warsaw, 1936), pp. 53-55, cited in Vlasovskyi, Narys istorii Ukrainskoi Praisoslashnoi Tserkvy, pp. 105-106. Petliura studied at the Poltava
Theological Seminary from 1895 to 1901, but was expelled before graduation, along with a number of other Ukrainian seminarians for his participation in a secret Ukrainian society. Opanas Andriievskyi was a leading member of the Ukrainian Party of Independists-Socialists, which openly supported the cause of Ukrainian autocephaly in its program and activities.

193. The Directory's meeting of December 23, 1918, decided, probably under pressure from Vynnychenko, the most anticlerical member of this body, to abolish the Ministry of Confessions, which was to be replaced by the Main Administration of Cults within the Ministry of Popular Education. A member of the Directory, Opanas Andriievskyi, was to be responsible for this area of government activity. Trybuna, December 24, 1918. Protests from the Ukrainian autocephalists evidently caused the government to reverse its stand. Trybuna, December 27, 1918.

194. See Lototskyi, V Tsarhorodi, pp. 94-99; and Vlasovskyi, Narys istorii Ukrainskoï Prawoslavnoi Tserkvy, pp. 66-69.

195. See, for example, P. Maziukevych's article in Nova rada, December 18, 1918; and A. Hrynevych's in Vidrodshennia, December 22, 1918, cited in Samoilovich, Tserkov ukrainskogo sotsial-fashizma, p. 75.


197. One of the founding members of the Ukrainian church movement, Iurii Zhevchenko was born in 1883 in Ielysavethrad region of the Kherson-Odessa diocese; completed the diocesan theological seminary; served as military chaplain during World War I.


199. Soon afterward, two Pochaiv Lavra monks--Archimandrite Vitalii (Maksymenko), one of the leaders of the "Union of Russian People" in Volyn, and Tikhon (Sharapov)--were also confined by the Ukrainian authorities to the same monastery. Evlogii, Put moei zhyzni, p. 323.

200. Born ca. 1855, a Russian nobleman with military education; after 12 years of military service entered (with the rank of Lt. Colonel) the Kievan Pecherska Lavra in 1887; ordained monastic priest in 1893; in 1896 made director of Lavra publishing house, ordained in February 1910 Bishop of Cherkasy, fourth vicar of the Kiev diocese, third vicar since October 1910.

201. I. Lypa, "Iak ia pishov v revoliutsiiu (Uryvok iz shchodennya)," Kalendar-almanakh "Dnipro" na perestupnyi rik 1928 (Lviv, 1927), p. 98; and Samoilovich, Tserkov ukrainskogo sotsial-fashizma, p. 76.

202. According to Ohienko, Archbishop Ahapit presided over the single meeting of the Council (misnamed by Ohienko the "Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church") just as the government began preparations for evacuating Kiev. Ivan Ohienko, "Svitlii pamiati Ivana Lypy," Nasha Kultura (Warsaw), vol. 3, nos. 8-9 (August-September 1937), p. 322.

203. The leftist majority in the Cabinet defeated Lypa's proposal to evacuate the Council members from Kiev. Lypa, "Iak ia pishov v revoliutsiiu (Uryvok iz shchodennya)," Kalendar-almanakh "Dnipro" na perestupnyi rik 1928 p. 98.

204. Lypa relates: "Though there were conscious Ukrainians among bishops, but not many, I have undertaken to have conscious Ukrainians from among clerics consecrated as bishops in Kiev or in Bukovyna and two such [candidates] have already agreed. Evacuation prevented this, too." Lypa, "Iak ia pishov v revoliutsiiu (Uryvok iz shchodennya)," Kalendar-almanakh "Dnipro" na perestupnyi rik 1928, p. 98.
205. Formed on November 1, 1918, the West Ukrainian Republic formally united with the Ukrainian People's Republic on January 22, 1919, though in fact it retained a separate government and army. Until forced to retreat across the Zbruch River in June 1919, the government and the army of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic had to wage a losing struggle against the Entente-supported Poles.

206. Samoilovich, Tserkov ukrainskogo sotsial-fashizma, pp. 82-83; and Vlasovskiy, Narys istorii Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy, pp. 69-74.

207. For the text of the Decree of the Provisional Workers'-Peasants' Government of the Ukraine, "On the Separation of the Church from the State and School from the Church," January 22, 1919, see the Soviet Ukrainian Vestińk Narodnogo Komissariata Vnutrennykh Del (Kharkiv), no. 1 (February 23, 1919), p. 4. With one exception, it followed closely the wording of the 1918 Soviet Russian Separation Decree.

208. Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivskiy, "Pravoslavna Khrystova Tserkva Ukrainskoho narodu," Tserkva i zhyttia (Kharkiv), no. 1 (1927), pp. 23-24. Outstanding Ukrainian composer, M. Leontovych (one of several thousand Ukrainians who joined the first Ukrainian parish), wrote music for this service and himself conducted the church choir. Vlasovskiy, Narys istorii Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy, pp. 74-75.

209. Lypkivskiy, "Pravoslavna Khrystova Tserkva Ukrainskoho narodu," p. 24. Responding in the summer to a Kievian bishops' complaint about the "arbitrary" activities of the Ukrainian clergy, Patriarch Tikhon did not impose any sanctions upon the latter but merely called them to obey the bishops and to await the decisions of the next Russian Sobor.

210. Out of some 160 employees of the Ministry, only 30 were evacuated from Kiev. Lypa, "Iak ia pishov v revoliutsii (Uryvok iz shchodenyka)," Kalendar-almanakh "Dnipro" na perestupnyi rik 1928, p. 99.


213. Ukraina, August 26, 1919, cited in Samoilovich, Tserkov ukrainskogo sotsial-fashizma, p. 86.


216. Vlasovskiy, Narys istorii Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy, p. 82.

217. Dotsenko, Litopys Ukrainskoi Revoliutsii. Materialy i dokumenty do istorii Ukrainskoi Revoliutsii, 1917-1922, vol. 4, p. 82. In both churches, prayers for the Patriarch and Metropolitan Antonii had to be included in service.


221. Litopys Ukrainskoi Revoliutsii, pp. 124-125.

222. Litopys Ukrainskoi Revoliutsii, p. 125.

223. Cited in Dotsenko, Litopys Ukrainskoi Revoliutsii, pp. 117-118.

225. In one month, the Synod approved liturgical prayers for the Ukrainian government, drafted a statute for church brotherhoods, began drafting a statute for parishes, and devised a plan for the transformation of theological schools into brotherhood colleges. Dotsenko, *Litopys Ukrainskoi Revoliutsii*, p. 120.

226. Minister of Confessions Ohienko remained in Kamianets as the Government's plenipotentiary. The city was under the Ukrainian government's control from April to July, and from late September to November, 1920.

227. Dotsenko, *Litopys Ukrainskoi Revoliutsii*, p. 120.


229. According to Metropolitan Ilarion (Ohienko), after V. Lypkivskyi and V. Chekhivskyi declined to stand as candidates for bishops, the Ministry’s choice finally fell on priests Pohorilko, Kovalenko, and Makarenko. Interview with Metropolitan Ilarion, Winnipeg, August 1958.

230. Within the Theological Faculty, a special commission was formed for the translation of Church Slavonic texts into Ukrainian. It included the Dean of the Faculty, V. Bidnov, Professors (Archpriests) Iu. Sitsinskyi and P. Tabinskyi, and Archpriest V. Lypkivskyi. Professor Ohienko made the most prominent contribution to this program. Thanks to a governmental grant of two million karbovantsi, a series of texts were published, among them the Divine Liturgy, Acts of the Apostles, the Book of Hours, a prayer book, and a biblical history. *Tserkva i zhyttia*, no. 7 (1928), p. 138; see also V. Bidnov, "Z nedavnoho mynuloho tserkovnoho rukhu," *Siitch*, vol. 2, no. 3 (1927), pp. 11-12, and no. 4, pp. 10-11.


232. These activities centered in the early 1920's around a publishing house, Ukrainska Avtokefalna Tserkva, in Tarnow. Under the direction of Professor I. Ohienko, it published several liturgical texts and a series of popular brochures. Another autocephalist center was the Sviato-Pokrovske Bratstvo (Brotherhood) in the Ukrainian prisoner-of-war camp in Szczepiorno, under the leadership of priest P. Bilon. For several years, the Brotherhood published the journal *Relihiino--Naukovyi Vistnyk* and sponsored a publishing house, Do svitla, which published five titles. See M. Kur, "Pro vydavnychu diialnist Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Avtokefalnoi Tserky," *Tryzub*, vol. 2, no. 2 (October 25, 1925), pp. 14-16; and Vlasovskyi, *Narys istorii Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy*, pp. 102-106. Later, in the 1930s, important studies in comparative and Ukrainian church law and history by O. Lototskyi appeared under the imprint of the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Warsaw. The principal figures among the émigré autocephalists were Professor Ivan Ohienko (after World War II, Metropolitan Ilarion of Winnipeg and Canada), Professor V. Bidnov, and Professor O. Lototskyi.

233. In Volyn, the autocephalist publishing activities centered around the journal *Na varii* in Volodymyr Volynskyi, which also published several titles, among them A. Richynskyi's important study *Problemy ukrainskoi relihiinoi svidomosty* (1933). Among the leaders of the movement for the Ukrainianization of the Orthodox Church in Volyn and Polissia were P. Sikorskyi (later Bishop and, eventually, Metropolitan Polikarp), S. Skrypnyk (presently Metropolitan Mstyslav), A. Richynskyi, I. Vlasovskyi, N. Abramovych (later Metropolitan Nikanor), and others.

234. In particular, Archpriest V. Lypkivskyi, M. Moroz, V. Chekhivskyi, and I. Oksiiuk. For the discussion of the subsequent stages of the Ukrainian


236. Kovalevskiy, Pry dzherelakh borotby, pp. 557-558.

237. Neither in the Ukraine nor in Russia did the Soviet regime allow the orderly operation of the Russian Orthodox Church according to the norms and procedures set by the Sobor in 1918. Evacuation of Metropolitan Antonii (Khrapovitskii) and several other bishops with the White Army emptied most diocesan sees. Rather than appoint another Metropolitan of Kiev (Khrapovitskii clung to this title until his death in Serbian exile in 1936), Patriarch Tikhon appointed Metropolitan Mikhail (Ermakov), formerly of Grodno, as Patriarchal Exarch of the Ukraine in August 1921; after his death in 1929, Archbishop Konstantin Diakov continued as Exarch until his arrest in the late 1930s. By then, the total strength of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Ukraine was reduced to probably no more than a dozen operating churches.

238. On the "canonical" Ukrainianization movements within the Russian Orthodox Church, see Bohdan Bociurkiw, "Ukrainianization Movements within the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church," Harvard Ukrainian Studies, vols. 3/4, pt. 1 (1979-80), pp. 92-111