THE ROLE OF THE TRADE UNION COMMITTEES

in the

ADMINISTRATION OF WELFARE BENEFITS

by

Bernice Madison
This paper opens with a brief overview of major administrative developments in welfare benefits during the 65 years between 1912 and the present. Welfare benefits that are now available are then analyzed. This is followed by an examination of the functions and structure of trade union committees at the factory involved in administering these benefits and, in greater detail, of the manner in which they carry out their responsibilities. The paper closes with an evaluation of this administrative performance and with my views about changes that may occur in the foreseeable future.

Major Administrative Developments in Welfare Benefits, 1912-1977

The concept that social insurance ought to be administered by workers and employees, the intended beneficiaries, did not gain official support in pre-Revolutionary Russia. The most that was conceded was that they have a right to participate in the administration of measures concerning their welfare, a concession that was incorporated into the most important relevant statute of the pre-Revolutionary era - the Health and Accident Act of June 23, 1912. The three laws concerning social insurance enacted by the Provisional Government broadened worker participation somewhat and permitted women to vote for delegates, but employers, although excluded from the management of the funds (kassy), continued to wield an important influence as members of control commissions.

The Bolsheviks found both the 1912 Act and the Provisional Government's liberalizations totally inadequate since they did not conform to the social insurance principles enunciated by Lenin in January 1912 at the Sixth All-Russian Conference of the Russian Social Democrats in Prague, namely: (1) coverage of all risks -- death, disability, sickness, old age, pregnancy and childbirth, and unemployment; (2) coverage of everyone working for hire and members of his family; (3) benefits equal to total earnings, financed entirely by employers and government; and (4) administration of all forms of social insurance by unified organs, of a territorial type, in which the insured exercise complete control (emphasis added).
During the period of war communism, 1917-1921, the pre-Revolutionary social insurance administrative structure was radically changed: the new hierarchy led from local insurance councils (the old kassy), their functions expanded, to regional and finally, to national councils. In all of them representatives of insured workers and of workers' organizations predominated. The All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (ACCTU, established in June 1917) assumed the overall directing role. There is doubt, however, that these new arrangements were implemented to any significant extent; after less than a year, the councils were disbanded and their functions were turned over to the Commissariats of Labor in the republics and in Moscow.

During the period of the New Economic Policy, 1921-28, some union leaders wanted administration of social insurance turned over to the unions, but this was out of line with the then prevailing party policy and was rejected. Instead, the Fifth Trade Union Congress (September 1922) enunciated the concept of union "control" over state-managed social insurance, such control to include policing contribution payments by employers and reporting irregularities; assisting enterprises with registration at state insurance organs; explaining insurance provisions to workers; organizing worker cooperation with state insurance organs and selecting union delegates for work with them; participating in efforts to improve medical services for the work force; helping to find jobs for the unemployed; and training staff for labor inspection. These functions were ancillary in nature, bestowing little direct authority on the unions for making decisions. The country was divided into territorial units within which each particular geographic area was served by a local social insurance office and the region as a whole, by a regional office. Both local and regional offices were staffed by personnel selected after consultation with unions; the former were supposedly accountable to local unions, while regional offices were supervised by committees elected at regional union conferences. Available evidence suggests, however, that not all unions participated actively, and that even when they did, it was the state organs that played the decisive administrative role. Sorenson found that severe unemployment during the NEP period contributed to the union's defeatist
attitude and resulted in their not making good use of their unemployment funds to provide sorely needed relief to their members, thus failing to realize their potential in carrying out this party-assigned task.

The initiation of the era of five-year plans and rapid industrialization, 1928-1955, was marked by severe attacks on the NEP pattern of social insurance and its administration by the Commissariats of Labor. The practice of egalitarianism (urav-nilovka) in treating all insured workers alike rather than emphasizing differentiation by applying less stringent eligibility requirements and a more advantageous benefit formula for shock workers, union members, those in "leading" industries and unhealthy occupations, and those with long uninterrupted work records was denounced by Stalin in 1931 as a heresy. Insurance administrators were accused of not being in close touch with the masses of workers and of failing to foster among them an understanding and acceptance of the government's social insurance policies. Several short-lived organizational changes culminated in 1933 in the abolition of all Commissariats of Labor and their replacement by the AUCCTU and its constituent unions.

The latter took over in their entirety the defunct Labor's functions, that is, the administration of state social insurance, the maintenance of labor protection and safety measures, and the management of sanatoriums and rest homes. Soon the AUCCTU became, for all practical purposes, an all-Union ministry for carrying out these and additional functions assigned to it by the party and the government. In September 1933 the AUCCTU set up within its apparatus a social insurance office with responsibility for directing and supervising all union activities related to insurance: the preparation and submission for government approval of the social insurance budget for the entire country, in which the budgets of constituent unions and inter-union bodies at the republic, oblast and rai levels and the budget of the AUCCTU itself, were combined; the construction and management of sanatoriums, rest homes, and other health-oriented facilities; the preparation and submission of insurance contribution rates to be levied on enterprises for government approval; the issuance of instructions
and regulations for insurance administration. The passage of unions from "control" of social insurance to its direct administration was expected to energize them to use benefits not merely to provide material security, but more importantly, to achieve "broader" objectives - strengthen labor discipline, encourage socialist competition, and increase productivity - and to do all this at minimum expense to the government.

Explaining the reasons for the 1933 reorganization, writes a Soviet authority in 1971:

In addition, from the time of the turning over of the administration of social insurance to the trade unions, the expenditures on its realization have decreased considerably: all practical work in this domain at the enterprises is basically carried out by numerous social insurance activists. 2

Activists are not paid. This "public principle" in union activities - to strive "constantly, insistently, and systematically" to reduce expenditures on paid staff, and to involve the union aktiv more widely in union work - is still a major tenet in the administration of welfare benefits.

The administrative role of unions in social insurance did not remain all-encompassing for very long. In 1937 old-age and disability pensions - programs relatively modest in coverage and expenditures at that time - were transferred to what are now 15 republic Ministries of Social Welfare (Ministerstva Sotsial'nogo Obespecheniia - Welfare). This transfer occurred because during rapid industrialization, unions were not interested in handling insurance benefits for those no longer in the labor force. Besides, pension legislation was so complex, chaotic, and contradictory that the unions had become bogged down in its morass; it was beyond the comprehension of the "toilers," they said.

The division of responsibility in insurance administration between Welfare and AUCCTU has remained unchanged to this day: the former is responsible for those no longer in the labor force; the latter, for those active in the labor force; both exercise certain functions in each other's domain. The passage of time has brought dramatic changes in the relative importance of currently available welfare benefits in terms of the proportion of the social insurance budget allocated to them and of the number of beneficiaries served. In turn, these changes have created jealousies
and vested interests in the administrative organs involved. In the post-World War II period, especially, the unions have tried to get the administration of pensions returned to them. So far they have not succeeded. On the other hand, the unions' management of health-oriented facilities, which serve primarily those active in the labor force, was extended in 1960 when most of the sanatoriums for adults, except those for tuberculosis patients, were transferred from the Ministry of Health to AUCCTU.

Yet another change, introduced in May 1955, has had a limiting influence on the administrative powers of unions in the welfare benefits area. Since that time, the AUCCTU (and Welfare) has been "controlled" by the USSR Council of Ministers' State Committee on Questions of Labor and Wages. Created at a time when the pension system in effect since 1917 came under serious review, this Committee from the outset became involved in what the party viewed as an important re-direction of policy that would affect the entire industrial labor force, both in human and economic terms. And, in fact, the review culminated in the National Pensions Act of July 14, 1956 which finally cleared away the encrusted debris of a vast number of statutes, decrees, and regulations whose complexities, inconsistencies, and inequities had led to endless errors and to justified complaints from severely deprived beneficiaries and rejected applicants. In addition, the Act changed the benefit formula by weighting it in favor of the low wage earners, and introduced minimums and maximums in benefit amounts. Over the years, the Committee's activities expanded and became more diversified. In August 1976 it was renamed the USSR Council of Ministers' Union-Republic State Committee on Labor and Social Questions (the Committee) "in order to further intensify state leadership and coordination of work in the area of the organization, payment and conditions of labor, wise use of labor resources and resolution of other social questions." This has enhanced the power and prestige of the Committee's Department of State Pensions, one of its important divisions from the beginning. In addition to serving in an advisory role to the Council, this Department fills a key interpretive function designed to strengthen uniformity in the implementation of welfare policy.
throughout the nation. Its rulings are cleared with the Finance Ministry, with the Planning Committee, with other ministries as needed, with Welfare and with AUCCTU, after which it issues directives that are binding on the latter two. While the AUCCTU has the right of legislative initiative "in the supreme bodies of state power," the Committee has the right to review such initiatives, whether substantive or administrative. The findings of these reviews and the Committee's recommendations undoubtedly play a major role in what happens to such initiatives. The Committee has been publishing its own periodical, Socialist Labor (Sotsialisticheskii Trud) since January 1956. It is one of the more sophisticated sources of information concerning the philosophy and policy that govern welfare benefits and determine their content, purpose and direction. I now turn to these welfare benefits.

Welfare Benefits Available in 1977

Since 1956 the state social insurance system has been liberalized in coverage, in eligibility conditions, and in benefit amounts. It now applies to state-farm workers and since 1964, to machine operators and chairpersons of collective farms. At the same time, certain basic principles that determine the system's purposes and govern its operations have remained largely unchanged. Its non-egalitarian character is still rigidly enforced, so that, with the exception of a few lump-sum payments, the governing principle is still "To each according to his work" rather than "To each according to his needs." The ideological soundness of the latter precept, while not officially denied, is considered impracticable. For the most part, benefits still do not equal prior earnings. Behind this is the fear that if they did, the economic penalty for not working at top efficiency would be reduced, initiative would be discouraged, and national output would decline. Welfare benefits continue to be used both as work-incentive tools and as means to meet minimum welfare needs. Which purpose predominates at a given time is determined by many different factors, such as labor productivity, birthrate, needs of the labor force, etc. From an administrative point of view, all this adds up to a highly complicated system. Its implementation
requires not only a detailed, continuously updated knowledge of numerous laws and regulations, but also the ability to apply them to an unending variety of individual circumstances that characterize the human condition.

Available benefits may be divided into those granted by the pension system and those granted by social insurance - the unions' "own" system. Together they constitute a welfare milieu that embodies the policies of its political and social environment and shapes the administration that implements them.

I. Welfare benefits granted by the pension system.

1. Old-age pensions. Since 1956 workers and employees have been eligible for a pension at age 60 (55 for women) after a minimum of 25 years employment (20 for women). Certain categories are entitled to pensions on "privileged" conditions which usually lower pensionable age or decrease length of qualifying employment. Such conditions apply to (a) those engaged in underground or hazardous work, in hot shops, in work under difficult or arduous conditions - if they have spent at least half of the qualifying period in such settings (enumerated in two "lists"); (b) since January 1968, to women who have a 20-year work record in certain occupations in textiles; (c) to those who had worked at least 15 years in the Far North or 20 years, when a shorter period in the Far North is added to work performed in regions equated to it; (d) to women who have born five or more children and raised them to age eight, and who have a 15-year work record; (3) to blind persons; (f) to dwarfs; (g) since 1975, to women machine operators in certain industries whose 20-year work record includes 15 years in this occupation.

Except for workers "privileged" under list number 1, the size of pension varies between 50 and 100% of former average earnings. The basic pension is increased by 10% if the worker or employee was with his last employer for 15 years or had worked a total of at least 10 years beyond the minimum qualifying period. Nonworking pensioners with one unable-to-work dependent are eligible for a 10% supplement, which is increased to 15% when there are two or more such dependents. Able-to-work dependents
get no supplements. Nor can supplements bring the pension above the maximum of 120 rubles per month. A reduced old-age pension for those who have worked a minimum of five years is payable at the normal retirement age, provided this employment and retirement occur within specified time limits. Neither "privileged" conditions nor supplements are applicable, but partial pensions must amount to not less than 25% of what the full pension would have been.4

2. Pensions for working pensioners. Before 1963 a pensioner forfeited his pension, in most cases, if he continued to work after retirement and earned over 100 rubles per month. But increasing longevity, the rising proportion of aged in the population, and the growing labor shortage have generated a scheme designed to stimulate pensioners to remain in the labor force. A 1964 amendment granted a flat 50% of pension to full-time workers and employees of pension age in a large number of industries and occupations, 75% to those returning to work in the Urals, Siberia, and the Far East, and full pensions to those still capable of working in arduous and hazardous occupations. A December 1969 decree and subsequent liberalizations expanded coverage so that by now few are excluded. The only restriction is that the combined sum of pension and earnings cannot exceed 300 rubles a month; if it does, the pension is reduced accordingly. Those who are not covered and who continue to work full-time, receive a pension of 15 rubles a month if their monthly earnings (not counting the pension) do not exceed 100 rubles; to those granted pensions on "privileged" conditions, either 50% of pension or 15 rubles a month (whichever is higher) is added on.

In 1976, 22% of pensioners among workers and employees, about 4.2 million persons, were working.5 A Soviet authority considers this too low; he attributes this rate to "the relatively high level of pensions" and to "the absence of working conditions corresponding to their (pensioners') special needs."6 But another Soviet authority finds that retirement is usually accompanied by loss of work ability.7 Part-time work in which retired people might be interested, continues to be an "agonizing problem;" despite the drive to open up part-time jobs begun in 1966, such jobs are still described as "a relatively new phenomenon" in 1976.8
3. **Disability pensions.** Despite thorough revamping in 1956, the system of disability pensions remains exceedingly complex. Pension amounts and required length of service, ranging from one to 20 years, depend on three factors: the cause of disability (whether work-connected or due to "general" causes); the type of work (whether ordinary or entitling to a "privileged" status); and the degree of disability. Some slight notion of what is involved in relation to cause alone may be gained from the fact that "work-connected" covers not only injuries, accidents and diseases sustained on or resulting from the job, but also those sustained while doing something "in the interests" of the employing establishment even though this activity was not requested by its administration; while going to and from work; on the premises of the employing establishment or "near" it or "in some other work place" during working hours and permitted work breaks, "if being at this place does not conflict with the establishment's rules governing the internal disposition of the work force;" as a result of donating blood. It is essential as well to determine whether the establishment or the worker is responsible. If the worker was drunk, he is refused a work-connected status.

As to degree of disability, the disabled are divided into three groups: in Group I are those who have suffered such severe disabilities that they cannot look after themselves and need constant nursing care; Group II includes people who have lost their working capacity in ordinary conditions of production but who can look after themselves; and Group III takes in those whose working capacity is substantially lowered and limited, but who are able to continue work if transferred to suitable occupations, those usually demanding lesser qualifications. Reduced pensions, not less than 25% of the minimum amount, are payable to Groups I and II. There is no partial pension for Group III. A program which began operating in January 1968 provides a flat 16 rubles a month at age 16 to Group I and II disabled since childhood, and consequently unable to build up a work record. In practice, the three factors that must be taken into account produce no less than 18 different disability benefit categories.
Writing in 1972 Simanis noted that the disability formula yielded pensions that were considerably lower than those granted to the aged. When it is realized that in that year one half of old-age pensioners had to exist on a per capita income of less than 50 rubles a month, that is, below the official Soviet poverty line, it becomes clear that the situation of the disabled was indeed pitiful. Efforts to improve it resulted in a decree which became operative at the end of 1974. As explained by Komarova, the RSFSR minister of Welfare, this decree goes beyond a mere recalculation of benefits necessitated by raised minimums and maximums: "rather, the very principle of calculating (disability pensions) is changed, while at the same time, in some instances the old method ... is retained."

The 1974 raises in minimums and maximums apply to all three disability groups. As for the "new principle," it aims to equate Group I and II pensions to those for old age. Since Group III are required to work and their pensions are seen as mere additions to earnings, the new principle does not apply to them. In contrast, Groups I and II are urged to work, and inducements for them to do so in the form of shorter work-days, longer annual vacations, and lower output norms were decreed in 1973. The method of calculating supplements - for nursing care to Group I and for unable-to-work dependents of Groups I and II - is changed from representing a percentage of pension to flat amounts, ranging from 10 to 30 rubles a month. How meager the previous sums were can be judged by the fact that in some instances this raises supplements by 300%. Overall, however, pensions for Groups I and II still amount to only 45-61% of those for old age; as for Group III, their situation has hardly been touched.

If a disabled person is reclassified into a different Group, his pension has to be recalculated. If he fails to appear on the date set for his reexamination, a different series of instructions is set in motion. From an administrative point of view, the 1974 provisions, added to the ones retained from before, pose innumerable problems of interpretation and calculation that have to be "controlled" again and again.
4. **Survivor pensions.** Benefits are granted to family members of a deceased worker who are dependent and unable to work. The members who qualify are own, adopted and step-children under age 16 (18, if in school); brothers, sisters, and grandchildren (same ages) if they have no parents able to work; parents and spouse if they have reached retirement age or are disabled; a parent or spouse, regardless of age or ability to work, if raising any of the young enumerated above who are under age eight; grandparents if there is no one required by law to maintain them. Factors taken into account in calculating pensions are the cause of death, type of work and conditions of employment, wages, and the number of persons in the deceased's family who cannot work. Again, 18 different survivor benefit categories result. The "new principle" applies only if there are two or more eligible survivors. Benefits are discontinued if a disabled survivor regains the capacity to work or when a child attains age 16 or 18. Survivors arranging burial of an insured worker receive an allowance of 5-20 rubles.\(^\text{12}\)

5. **Special pensions.** Long-service pensions are granted to those in certain occupations - educators, agronomists, doctors, pilots, performing artists - after a specified number of years in the profession, regardless of age. Personal pensions are paid to those who have given exceptional service to the State. Academic and research personnel are also granted pensions on privileged conditions.

Table 1 shows the dramatic rise in pensioners between 1941 and 1976. When veterans and collective farmers are excluded, the rise for workers and employees is from more than 3½ million to more than 29½ million in the intervening 35 years. Especially striking is the steady climb of old-age pensioners, from 242,000 in 1941 to more than 19 million in 1976. Assuming that long service and personal pensioners are a relatively small group, the decline in disabled and survivors since the 1965 peak, although erratic and small, suggests a diminution of these contingents when related to a larger work force. As a percentage of the population, the total number of pensioners went up from 8 in 1960 to 14 in 1967 to 17.2 in 1972.\(^\text{13}\) Presumably, it will continue
Table 1. Number of Pensioners in the USSR, 1941 - 1976*
(in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Total number of Pensioners</th>
<th>Old Age</th>
<th>Disability, long service, survivors, personal and others</th>
<th>Veterans and members of their families</th>
<th>Of the total number of pensioners - collective farm pensioners</th>
<th>Of these old-age pensioners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>3,967</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>3,329</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>19,524</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>3,850</td>
<td>14,720</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>21,857</td>
<td>5,379</td>
<td>10,527</td>
<td>5,951</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>26,502</td>
<td>8,180</td>
<td>13,096</td>
<td>5,226</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>32,029</td>
<td>16,067</td>
<td>10,933</td>
<td>5,029</td>
<td>7,947</td>
<td>7,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>33,774</td>
<td>17,709</td>
<td>11,159</td>
<td>4,906</td>
<td>8,855</td>
<td>7,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>35,091</td>
<td>18,954</td>
<td>11,393</td>
<td>4,744</td>
<td>9,263</td>
<td>7,967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>38,826</td>
<td>22,414</td>
<td>11,835</td>
<td>4,577</td>
<td>11,851</td>
<td>10,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>40,115</td>
<td>23,715</td>
<td>11,981</td>
<td>4,419</td>
<td>12,062</td>
<td>10,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>41,300</td>
<td>24,888</td>
<td>12,144</td>
<td>4,268</td>
<td>12,121</td>
<td>10,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>42,067</td>
<td>25,889</td>
<td>12,119</td>
<td>4,059</td>
<td>12,156</td>
<td>10,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>42,815</td>
<td>26,803</td>
<td>12,119</td>
<td>3,893</td>
<td>12,192</td>
<td>10,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>43,557</td>
<td>27,821</td>
<td>12,010</td>
<td>3,726</td>
<td>12,182</td>
<td>10,623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>44,410</td>
<td>28,835</td>
<td>11,928</td>
<td>3,647</td>
<td>12,123</td>
<td>10,594</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* For the years 1941-1974, inclusive, Vestnik Statistiki, No. 8, 1974, p.95; for the years 1975 and 1976, ibid., No. 7, 1976, p.85.
to climb but at a much slower pace and almost entirely from the ranks of the elderly — unless a major holocaust overturns prognostications.

II. Welfare benefits granted by the social insurance system

6. Cash sickness (temporary disability) benefits. In existence since December 1917, these benefits have undergone many changes. Currently, they are granted when a worker becomes ill or injured, regardless of the cause; must look after a sick family member; is temporarily exempted from work as a bacteria carrier or must be quarantined; requires treatment at a sanatorium; has a tubercular condition necessitating a rest period; is changing jobs for medical reasons or must be fitted with a prothetic device, provided this is done in a hospital.

If an individual continues to be sick for several weeks, an assessment is made of his potential for recovery. If it appears that his condition will result in work limitations, transfer to the pension system is initiated, a process that usually takes two to four months except for those ill with tuberculosis who can remain on sickness benefit much longer.

Until December 1975 benefit amounts depended on three conditions: duration of uninterrupted employment; on whether the sickness is work-connected (according to lists furnished by Public Health after clearance with the AUCCTU); and union membership. Since this date, a fourth condition must be taken into account: the number of dependent children under age 16 (18, if in school) in the sick individual's family.

Now benefits amounting to 100% of earnings are paid to workers and employees whose illnesses and injuries are work-connected, regardless of the other three conditions; to working pensioners, regardless of all four conditions; to those whose illnesses and injuries are due to nonoccupational causes but who have an 8-year or longer uninterrupted work record, provided they are union members; and to sick or injured by nonoccupational causes who are supporting three or more dependent children, if they are union members, regardless of the length of their uninterrupted work record. Lack of union membership for the last two categories lowers their benefits to 50% of
earnings. Benefits of less than full earnings are paid to all others whose illnesses and injuries are nonoccupational: when employment is less than three years, 50% of earnings; three to five years, 60%; five to eight years, 80%.

Some of the administrative complications may be surmised when it is explained that a worker ill from nonoccupational causes, with three dependent children, loses his entitlement to a 100% benefit if during the eight years preceding application his work was interrupted by discharge because of "systematic violation of labor discipline, commitment of a crime, lack of trust, union demands, etc." When he returns to work after such a discharge, to regain entitlement to a 100% benefit, he must work another eight years without interruptions for such reasons. Interruptions for "respectable" reasons (time spent in the Army or on a job of his own choosing) do not break the 8-year cycle. The "three or more dependent children" applies to those born in unregistered unions, if the parents have a common household and are raising the children together; to those who do not live in the household but are being supported by their parents either fully or "partially"; own, adopted and step-children; and children of prior unions. All this must be certified by documents from apartment managers, housing offices, local soviets, and courts.

As to care of sick family members, liberalizations effective in all parts of the country by December 1974 allow a maximum of seven calendar days for married mothers with children under 14; a maximum of ten to unmarried, widowed and divorced mothers, if the child is under seven. It must be shown that lack of care would threaten the life and/or health of the child, that it is not possible to hospitalize him, and that there is no one else in the family who can provide care (the latter does not apply to married mothers if the child is under two; and not at all to other mothers.) If the child is hospitalized and it is essential for the mother to accompany him, sickness benefit is granted for the duration of the stay. If the sick family member is an adult, the caretaker can get benefits for three days and in exceptional circumstances, for a week.
7. **Pregnancy and maternity leave.** Paid leave, introduced on a limited scale in 1912, has been greatly expanded during the Soviet period. Women are now entitled to 56 days before and 56 days after confinement. For twins or an abnormal birth, the leave is 70 days after confinement. A 56-day leave is granted to women who adopt newborn infants directly from lying-in facilities. Prior to 1973 the amount of benefit depended on length of employment and on union membership and varied between two-thirds and full pay; since the benefits amount to full pay, irrespective of these two conditions. Since 1970 working mothers can take additional unpaid leave, up to one year, without prejudice to their job ratings. It is counted into their total uninterrupted work record.

8. **Allowances at the birth of a child.** Needy parents (those with a 3-month work record and earnings of less than 60 rubles a month; if working pensioners, earnings and pension cannot exceed 60 rubles a month) receive a lump sum for the support of a new infant, its amount depending on the number of children they have. Payments start at 12 rubles for a layette and 18 rubles for the newborn's food for the first and second child, then rise progressively up to a maximum of 250 rubles for food for the eleventh child.

9. **Passes and vouchers to health-oriented facilities.** These include sanatoriums, rest homes, prophylactoriums, vacation hotels, tourist hostels and dining rooms that serve special diets. Prophylactoriums are located either near the enterprises to which they are attached or in the suburbs, presumably near to workers' homes; special diets are obtainable in some enterprise dining rooms and in some on the outside.

Reporting to the 14th Congress in 1968, Shelepin stated that during the four-year period 1964-67, 23 million persons had been accommodated, an average of 5.7 million per year; by 1971, this number rose to 7.660 million; by 1975, to 8.350 million. Of these, 250,000 persons were sent to prophylactoriums and over 1 million were served special diets (1973). In 1971 the unions managed 1,000 sanatoriums, boarding and rest homes, 650 tourist hostels, camp sites and steamboats, and 1,760 prophylactoriums.
In 1975, prophylactoriums had places for 150,000 persons and all other facilities, for 406,000 persons, including 55,000 places for families. By 1977 resorts serving families were able to accept 90,000 persons. These are impressive statistics, but they indicate that unions are now serving less than 10% of their members.

While unions are "basically" responsible for the construction of sanatoriums and resorts, construction by ministries and departments, financed out of their non-centralized funds, has always been encouraged as well. Apparently, this brought about a chaotic state of affairs; an August 1970 decree directed that order be instituted without delay. The resulting measures gave ministries and departments three options: either to contract with the AUCCTU to build sanatoriums and rest homes for them, or contribute into the AUCCTU's fund for capital expenditures, or continue building on their own but coordinate their plans with AUCCTU's. In 1973 these options applied to 68 ministries and departments; those who chose to contract and to contribute became entitled to 900,000 passes over and above the number granted to their personnel by social insurance.

10. **Vacations in Pioneer camps.** Unions have managed these camps throughout the Soviet period. During the four years 1964-67, 23 million children spent summer vacations in them, or about 5.7 million per year; by 1974 the number rose to 9.8 million or 22% of all school children and half of all youngsters who had vacations that year. In 1975 the unions managed more than 11,000 camps.

11. **Allowances for children in low-income families.** In 1965 the government set as the poverty line for a family of four 206 rubles a month, or 51.5 rubles per person. Although the number of families who had long been living below the poverty line has not been made public, various factors indicate that it ran into millions. A family income supplement program was announced in 1971, but did not become operative until November 1974. How badly it was needed can be gauged from the fact that it was budgeted at 1.8 billion rubles per year for 12.5 million children, compared with the 438 million spent in 1969 on family allowances for almost 17 million children (1970).
A mother is paid a supplement of 12 rubles a month at her place of work or study (or a father if the mother is doing neither) for each child under age eight in families in which the average "total income" per family member does not exceed 50 rubles a month. Total income includes all earnings at regular places of work, whether in cash or in kind (except one-time bonuses); all stipends, pensions, and grants from social insurance (except one-time allowances such as those for newborn infants or for funerals); income from private plots (20% of state farm workers' income and 1.3% of industrial workers' income comes from such plots);23 rent from dachas. In no instance must the supplement be treated as an addition to earned and publicly supplied income already being received. If both parents are able-bodied but not working, the children are not eligible. Computations of "total income" are often complicated, but not more so than determinations in regard to family composition. In addition to husband, wife, and children under 18 - defined in the same manner as for sickness benefits and augmented by those for whom the parents act as guardians - a count must be made of children over 18 who are Group I and II disabled from childhood, and of the husband's and wife's unable-to-work parents living in the family who have no other persons legally responsible for their support. Documents from a variety of sources to verify all this must be produced and eligibility must be reverified annually.24

It should be added that these allowances do not replace family allowances (in existence since 1944) although the income from the latter is counted into "total income" in calculating the former. Family allowances are paid to families with four or more children and to unmarried mothers starting with the first child. For the fourth child and all subsequent children the married mother receives monthly payments starting at the child's first birthday and continuing until he reaches age five. For unmarried mothers payments start from the child's birth and continue until he reaches age 12. Because these allowances have failed to keep pace with rising wage levels and most couples have only one or two children, they now contribute an insignificant amount to the family budget and are benefiting a decreasing number of families.
Financing. All benefits, those granted by the pension and the social insurance systems, are financed from three sources: contributions levied on enterprises, State allocations from general revenues, and payments for passes and vouchers to health-oriented facilities. Contributions are made as a percentage of payroll - enterprises being graded according to the degree of hazard which employment in them entails - ranging from 4 to 9 percent. All enterprises in a particular industry pay the same percentage but each branch of the economy has a different tariff. In 1975 the average in relation to payroll was 6-3/4%. "Payroll" includes all sums paid to workers in connection with employer-employee relationships; rates are fixed by the Committee after clearance with the interested ministry or department, the AUCCTU, and the Finance Ministry.

Unions enter the budget process by transmitting receipts from enterprises and from passes and vouchers through the union hierarchy to the AUCCTU and by making estimates of future needs and transmitting them in the same manner. The AUCCTU submits both to the Committee and eventually they become a component part of the State budget. After funds are authorized, they are turned over to the AUCCTU which distributes them to its constituent unions for paying benefits granted by the social insurance system. The remainder is transmitted, through channels, and becomes one of the sources of financing pensions and other benefits.

Soviet analysts point out that as social welfare develops, there is a tendency for the specific sources of funds to merge into a single fund, and for the share of budgetary allocations from general revenues to increase. At present the latter make up at least 50% of welfare expenditures. In 1974, for example, the amount spent on pensions from all sources was 22,100 million rubles, that is, 6,285 million more than the remainder transmitted from the social insurance budget. Long service, personal and veterans' pensions, family allowances and those for newborn infants and for funerals are financed entirely from general revenues (in State and local budgets) - as is largely the case with allowances for low-income families. But sickness benefits,
pregnancy and maternity allowances, and cost of health-oriented facilities are percentages of the unions' "own money" (contributions from enterprises and payments for passes and vouchers) that are not supplemented from general revenues.

The percentage to be spent on sickness benefits is determined after clearance with the Finance Ministry. What is taken into account are the number of days lost to production per 100 workers because of illness, and the extent to which this morbidity rate is to be lowered during the next fiscal year by improving medical services and working conditions. The percentage for health-oriented services is fixed at 7.6% of "own money." To provide incentive for lowering morbidity and "liquidating" traumas, in 1969 unions were directed to create special funds out of unused sickness benefits and above-plan receipts for passes and vouchers, which would remain at their disposal - to be used for improving and increasing health-oriented services and camp vacations. During 1971-75, inclusive, these funds yielded 191.2 million rubles and provided such services for 1.9 million persons above the planned number. Incentives were accentuated in 1975 by a scale of differentiated norms for reckoning off resources into these funds which relates the planned decrease in morbidity to the actual decrease achieved.

Table 2 shows that in the 24 years since 1950 social insurance expenditures multiplied more than 12-fold. The most dramatic rise occurred in pensions: they multiplied almost 19.5-fold. In 1950 pensions absorbed 43.6% of the budget; in 1974, almost 70%. Expenditures on sickness benefits, the next largest item, in 1974 took up less than 20% of the budget. Given that some of the programs in whose administration unions participate are financed partly or entirely by general revenues, union "control" over budgetary operations at the factory level is not easy to carry out.

Now that the reader has been introduced to the welfare benefits sub-culture, I can turn to the union committees at the factory involved in benefits administration.
Table 2. Soviet Social Insurance Expenditures, 1950-1974
(in millions of rubles)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Expenditures</td>
<td>1,867</td>
<td>7,165</td>
<td>10,541</td>
<td>13,850</td>
<td>15,345</td>
<td>17,107</td>
<td>18,353</td>
<td>19,650</td>
<td>21,057</td>
<td>22,619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Other Welfare Benefits, including:</td>
<td>1,044</td>
<td>2,210</td>
<td>3,126</td>
<td>4,265</td>
<td>4,907</td>
<td>5,445</td>
<td>5,549</td>
<td>5,802</td>
<td>6,316</td>
<td>6,757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Cash sickness (temporary disability) benefits</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>1,329</td>
<td>1,963</td>
<td>2,807</td>
<td>3,338</td>
<td>3,734</td>
<td>3,693</td>
<td>3,855</td>
<td>4,265</td>
<td>4,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Pregnancy, maternity, nursing, baby care, funerals</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>942</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>1,043</td>
<td>1,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Sanatoriums, rest homes, special diets; capital expenditures</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Children's Services**</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Other</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Narodnoe Khoziastvo SSSR v 1969 g.; ibid., v 1974 g. (National Economy of the USSR, in 1969 and in 1974), Moscow, 1970 and 1975, respectively.

** Includes children's sanatoriums, Pioneer camps, out-of-school education.
The Functions and Structure of Factory-Plant and Local Trade Union Committees
(Fabrichno-Zavodskie i Mestnye Komitety Professional'nykh Soiuzov - FZMK)

The rights and responsibilities of FZMK in relation to welfare benefits were defined in regulations issued on January 5, 1962, and expanded and updated on September 27, 1971 and on May 21, 1975.26

The FZMK is supposed to (1) watch over the timely and correct payment of contributions by enterprises and when necessary, impose penalties for non-compliance. Penalties must also be imposed if a work-connected injury or disease is the fault of management but management fails to reimburse the insurance fund for sickness benefits paid to the affected worker; (2) jointly with management, to assemble and "present" to Welfare the documents necessary for pensions; resolve problems around job placement of the disabled; through its representatives to Welfare, participate in pension determinations, check to see that pensions to working pensioners, paid at enterprises, are correct in amount; (3) grant benefits payable under the social insurance system, supervise the distribution of passes to sanatoriums and rest homes and of vouchers for special diets, and arrange camp vacations - as well as publicize information about health-oriented facilities and workers' proposals for improvements; (4) decide on need for emergency aid; and (5) make sure that insurance funds are spent correctly, that is, in line with decisions of higher union organs to whom FZMK must send quarterly expenditure reports.

To do all this, the FZMK appoints a social insurance commission of at least five members, if the work force numbers 100 or more. They are selected from among "leading" workers and employees, medical personnel serving a given enterprise, and others who presumably enjoy the respect and confidence of their co-workers. The commission, chaired by the chairman of the FZMK, operates through several functional groups: "comradely assistance in the home," "children," "control of medical care," "financial control," "pensions," etc., each headed by a commission member assigned responsibility for the particular function. If the work force is very large, shop committees
may be elected which appoint shop-level social insurance commissions. In enterprises
with over 500 workers, FZMK may create a separate pension commission; in enterprises
with fewer than 100 workers, the FZMK will carry out all social insurance functions.
In 1974, 94% of the insurance aktiv was unpaid. This is pointed to with pride as
personifying "broad democratic principles" which make possible the administration of
a multi-billion-ruble insurance budget by spending "only slightly over 0.1% of bud­
getary income for organizational purposes." 27

In this aktiv the most directly involved in administering welfare benefits are
the social insurance delegates, elected at general meetings of their union groups by
open vote and responsible to and sometimes supervised by, insurance commissions. They
first appeared on the scene in 1930; since then their functions have remained essen­
tially the same. 28 According to a 1975 description, they are supposed to participate
in measures to improve workers' health, lower morbidity, create and maintain condi­
tions that increase productivity, and make sure that insurance funds are spent cor­
rectly. Their unique duty is to visit the homes of those who cannot or fail to re­
port for work, and those who are hospitalized. The purpose is to help the sick per­
son procure medicines and carry out the regimen prescribed by the physician. Dele­
gates also make sure that patients' children are properly cared for, at home or
through placement in day-care centers and institutions; sometimes they do the shop­
ping and the housecleaning. Another important purpose is to check up on malingeringers.
The delegate may find among the sick some who were injured while drunk, or who re­
fuse to follow the prescribed treatment. These situations as well as malingering the
delegate reports to the social insurance commission which may then deny sickness ben­
efits. Delegates are also expected to intercede on behalf of those who need emergency
aid, diet vouchers, sanatorium or rest home passes, or whose children need vacations
or special medical treatment. In addition, they must be able to explain what workers
are entitled to under welfare and insurance laws.

All this adds up to a rather big order. In relation to lowering morbidity, for
example, it is considered essential for delegates to know (a) how to use statistical data and analyze morbidity indicators; (b) how to detect the connection between the frequency and dynamics of illnesses and the causes producing them and influencing their rise or fall; and (c) what measures are likely to be most effective in removing these causes. For especially good work, delegates may on occasion receive a prize or be written up in the press.

For 1964 I gave the number of delegates as 1.2 million out of a 2-million insurance aktiv; in 1977, there are probably 2.3 million delegates out of a 4-million aktiv. In 1964, the 1.2 million delegates served about 68 million union members, a ratio of one delegate per 57 workers; in 1977, 2.3 million delegates served about 107.9 million union members, a ratio of one delegate per 47 members. This reduction in the average load in the intervening 14 years must be viewed against heavier demands arising out of a greater variety of benefits and of situations to which they apply. Some idea of the magnitude and complexity of the visiting task alone can be glimpsed from a 1976 estimate that "a reduction of just one day per worker per year in the illness rate among industrial workers and in job absenteeism because of sickness would make possible an additional 32.5 million working days per year;" and from the findings of a nine-year study, 1965-73, concerned with violators of labor discipline at four large automotive plants which showed that absenteeism accounted for 45.5% of the total number of violations and that abuse of alcohol was involved in some way in 85-90% of the total number. Furthermore, more than half of the delegates continue to be women who are not freed from their regular jobs so that they must perform their union-assigned tasks outside of working hours - hardly possible to accomplish in a systematic and thorough manner given the "double-shift" lives of Russian working women. Besides, delegates are elected annually "and in the majority of cases change almost every year." This, point out Soviet writers, is not efficient since their work demands "deep" knowledge of many intricate laws and regulations, of harmful conditions of work, preventive measures, etc. - to say nothing of the knowhow
to apply this knowledge in practice, to find their way "to the hearts and minds" of the members of their groups. During their first post-elective year, at best, delegates can become only "generally acquainted with all this." They recommend that a delegate's work be transformed into her "social profession," to continue for many years.

The turn-over problem is aggravated by continuing difficulties in providing training, despite oft-repeated protestations that "educating and reeducating" the insurance aktiv is of primordial importance. While guidance and assistance from higher union organs are supposed to be available, it is the FZMK's responsibility to provide training. Some do this in what is considered a laudable manner, but complaints and criticisms are more abundant than praise. Quite often instruction for newly-elected activists is delayed so long or spread thin over such long periods that during the major part of their tenure they are ineffectual; sometimes instruction is of low quality, or irrelevant to insurance concerns, or unrelated to practice; or so sporadic that some are trained but others are not. Paid union officials and party members within the factory are not always able to make up for these lacks because, complain Soviet unionists, not enough "special" attention is paid to their selection, assignment and training and party comrades often do not participate actively, while rank-and-file activists are sometimes kept back from participating. Some higher union organs devote little attention to the aktiv's training needs and know little about what is going on among the masses in the factories. It is urged that in addition to continuously functioning seminars, unions organize entire continuously functioning schools. But as yet these are rare. Emphasizing that not only the paid staff but the activists as well must be equipped with the necessary knowledge and with skill in using it, Okhrana Truda i Sotsial'noe Strakhovanie in 1975 initiated a series of articles which, it hoped, would "assist the aktiv in some measure to understand (social insurance) problems (and) to find optimum ways of dealing with them." I now turn to the administrative process itself, that is, the manner in which FZMKs transform or help to transform welfare policy into benefits.
FZMK ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE IN WELFARE BENEFITS FINANCING

The FZMK is responsible for submitting an annual estimate of its needs to higher union organs, and for collecting and transmitting to them enterprise contributions and receipts from passes and vouchers for the social insurance budget. It is safe to assume that the needs estimate undergoes modifications while going up and down the hierarchical ladder; that the FZMK must adjust to its final allocation once it has been made is quite likely.

In monitoring enterprise contributions, the FZMK frequently runs into problems. In 1973 measures taken by some unions to raise the financial accountability of enterprises were instrumental in reducing overdue payments, but not all unions took such measures. In 1975 an AUCCTU audit added 50 million rubles to the insurance fund, collected from additions to contributions that were incorrectly low and from fines that the FZMKs had failed to impose. On the expenditure side, as well, many FZMKs fail to adhere to the percentages and norms established for various items in the insurance budget. A check by the USSR Finance Ministry in 1975 uncovered many overpayments and underpayments both to working pensioners and to recipients of other benefits.

To some extent these inefficiencies may reflect basic inadequacies in financing. In many branches of the economy existing contribution rates, fixed years ago, do not yield sufficient "own" funds to meet obligations; that rates need to be raised is recognized but nothing is done. Constantly increasing subsidies from general revenues for benefits that are paid at individual enterprises but are not part of the unions' "own" budget - pensions to working pensioners and allowances to low-income families - make financial operations which the FZMKs must "control" more and more complex.

FZMK PARTICIPATION IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF PENSIONS AND FAMILY ALLOWANCES

FZMK involvement in administering welfare programs that are not financed or only partly financed by its "own" budget is obviously not as great or decisive as in programs that are. Nevertheless, as noted, FZMK is expected to participate.
Pensions for those no longer in the labor force. In 1962 the FZMK was made responsible for preparing and submitting to Welfare the claims of those planning to retire, but it did so little that most applicants had to continue to rely on their own efforts. In April 1969 this responsibility was made a joint one: since then the FZMK and management do this work through a 3-member commission composed of the enterprise's bookkeeper, and a union and a management representative, the latter a personnel inspector who chairs the commission. The commission either "presents" the applicant to Welfare or notifies him that he is not eligible, giving reasons, in which case he can apply to Welfare directly.

The role of the union representative is clearly secondary. This is not surprising in view of the fact that Welfare does not maintain records of earnings of covered individuals nor are such records maintained in any centralized facility; rather, they must be developed at the time claims are made at personnel departments of individual enterprises. Theoretically, the work book, filled in by bookkeepers throughout a person's working life, is supposed to provide almost all of the needed information to do this. But, it seems, work books are often lost, destroyed or, the most troublesome problem, inaccurately and/or incompletely filled out. This often creates considerable difficulties, particularly in ascertaining the total length of service, general, "privileged" and uninterrupted, in obtaining the detailed monthly wage record for the past ten years when this computation method is used (instead of the alternate one which bases average monthly earnings on the final year of employment), and in proving age. This means that inquiries must be sent to previous employers, witnesses located, and to prove age, the judgment of medical examiners obtained. "Privileged" conditions cause endless problems. Revisions in the two lists describing them, accumulated in the last 20 years, have been incorporated in a new manual, but an insufficient number of copies has been printed so that many bookkeepers are still filling work books with occupations that do not correspond to new listings. And because not enough new format work books have been printed, required for those entering their first jobs after
January 1, 1975, many workers are without them and will face difficulties when it comes time to apply for pensions. In practice, "uninterrupted" also becomes an extremely complicated concept and commissions must likewise be alert to a "vicious practice" whereby wages are inflated or bonuses given "even for substandard work" during the year preceding retirement in order to qualify the future pensioner for maximum pension.

Managements and FZMKs have received a considerable amount of help with all this from Welfare. In 1975, 90% of applications that reached Welfare in the RSFSR came via "presentations;" 80% in the Ukraine in 1976. But this does not mean that this many are properly compiled; complaints about errors, delays and "superficial" attitudes continue. "Presenters" complain about Welfare, and Welfare about the enterprise commissions. Despite urgings to do so, not all commissions draw up lists of those who plan to retire within the next 2-3 years in order to have enough time to complete everything that is required by the legal deadline. Nor do they avail themselves of the right to "present" with partial documents, to be followed by the additional needed documents within three months, so that pensions can be paid retroactively. Writing in Trud in 1975, Komarova was emphatic in stating that delays are frequent, that unions do nothing to guarantee timely and full realization of pension rights for workers and employees, are timid and inconsistent in the control they exercise over management in regard to work books, and that this leads to overpayments and underpayments. If necessary, unions ought not to hesitate to take managements to courts, she says.

In turn, these inefficiencies complicate the evaluation of "presented" claims and the fixing of pension amounts which is the job of another 3-member commission, composed of representatives from Welfare, Finance and FZMK. In practice the work falls almost entirely on the Welfare member; FZMK member's participation is useful only in cases of disagreement between the enterprise commission and the Welfare member. Decisions either grant the pension and fix its amount, or notify the "presenter" that additional documents are needed. Given the work book and other problems, the final adjudications are often approximate rather than correct.
Pensions to working pensioners. The law requires that within five days after hiring the pensioner, management must notify Welfare of this fact and of his post-retirement occupation. Welfare then calculates the proportion of pension to which he is entitled and authorizes its payment at the enterprise. But this requirement is very often (сплошь и рядом) ignored. Notifications are delayed and there are also cases when the pensioner is listed in an occupation which gives the right to full pension when in reality he is doing work for which only partial pension or no pension at all must be paid. This leads to overpayments. During nine months of 1974, RSFSR Welfare alone reported four million rubles of overpayments. Again the FZMKs are found "guilty" for failing to exercise the proper control over management. 49

Disability and survivors' pensions. "Presentations" of the disabled and survivors to Welfare are also made by the enterprise commissions. For the disabled this process is more complex because they have to go through the system of Medico-Labor Expert Commissions (Врачебно-Трудовые Экспертные Комиссии, VTEK), moved to Welfare from Labor in 1937.

VTEKs are charged with evaluating their remaining working capacity, recommending suitable jobs, and informing them about privileges and services to which they are entitled. VTEKs consist of medical personnel, Welfare inspectors and FZMK representatives. The major reason for including the latter is to utilize their knowledge of working conditions in specific enterprises and occupations when recommending suitable jobs, since the other members may have only approximate or erroneous ideas of production processes and of what is actually feasible in different work settings. The FZMK member is also expected to demonstrate "daily concern" for the disabled person, especially in making sure that he is in fact placed in the recommended job at a given enterprise, that proper working conditions are provided, and that he is not overlooked in the granting of passes and vouchers.

Examples of this blueprint being successfully applied are rare. In contrast, examples of its remaining a paper model abound. In 1974 Komarova attributed serious
defects in VTEK work - vague job recommendations that ignore the disabled person's professional qualifications, failure to intervene actively in job placements - to the fact that FZMK (and Welfare) representatives attend VTEK sessions only sporadically, a "vicious" practice that has deteriorated into an accepted pattern in many places. In 1975 she declared flatly that "in fact" unions do not take part in VTEK work. Nor are they doing much to involve management in addressing seriously the problem of job placements for the disabled (and the aged). As for passes to sanatoriums, requests for them from the disabled are not always examined with due attention, she said.

Union criticisms of VTEK under Welfare tutelage are not lacking, either. VTEKs, anxious to lower disability indicators, often send applicants back to Medico-Consultative Commissions (Vrachebno-Konsul'tatsionnye Komissii, VKK) for further treatment (dolechivanie), while VKK doctors, anxious to lower morbidity indicators, send merely sick patients to VTEK. Depending on who is more adroit, the "savings" achieved will show up as expenditures either in the Welfare or the FZMK budget. Research by VTEKs, whose doctors are often inexperienced, is superficial and fails to provide unions with "factual material" on which to base "concrete" preventive measures (but neither is VKK always helpful); Welfare inspectors are often assigned to VTEKs on a part-time basis and turn-over among them is high.

All this is not to say that the disabled do not work. As already noted, Group III (the largest one) are required to work and 80% of them do, usually by simply going back to their old jobs. Sheltered workshops in industry are being extended to provide employment for those affected with various diseases. Writing in November 1975, the chairman of the All-Russian Society for the Blind (VOS), claimed that in the RSFSR job placement of all blind was achieved by 1963 and that its "scientific basis" has been improving since then - largely the result of "joint creative work" by VOS and VTEK specialists. He did not mention unions.

FZMK disinterest may perhaps be better understood if placed in a broader context. The statutes on VTEK do not guarantee execution of its decisions, or the safeguarding
of employment rights of the disabled, nor do they fix responsibility for violations. When VTEK recommendations are not carried out, nobody is punished. In fact, in many enterprises, the disabled are hired without anyone paying attention to VTEK recommendations. Theoretically, plans for placing the disabled in jobs, approved by local soviets, are obligatory for affected enterprises; control over their implementation is lodged in Welfare. But in practice plans continue to turn into a "passive registration of unfilled jobs which are often contraindicated for the disabled." In order to transform them into reality, Welfare, with FZMK assistance, is urged to keep a continuing, updated count of working disabled and of jobs that should be reserved for them at every enterprise, as well as insist that medical recommendations be followed. This would require close working relationships with manpower utilization agencies and "factual" information services that would reach the disabled promptly. In such extensive and demanding undertakings the unions apparently are not prepared to actively cooperate.

As for survivors, they also go through the procedures of commissions at the enterprise and at Welfare. Given the 18 survivor categories and frequent VTEK involvement, long delays in pension determinations are not uncommon.

Family allowances. Administration of these benefits must implement a battery of complicated regulations, especially those that define the children who "belong" to the mother and qualify her for this allowance. Provisions have not been modified since 1944 except that in 1947, payments were cut in half and have not been raised since. They now range from four rubles a month for the fourth child to 15 rubles a month when the eleventh one is born. The administrative process starts when the mother's application reaches the Welfare department at her place of residence, accompanied by several documents verifying the ages and whereabouts of "her" children.

The commission that handles her application consists of the Welfare department's director who chairs it, a representative from the local finance department, and one either from FZMK or a higher union organ. Allowances are authorized by Welfare and
paid at savings banks. Union participation is pretty much on paper only; there is no mention of it anywhere except in the law.

FZMK ADMINISTRATION OF WELFARE BENEFITS GRANTED BY THE SOCIAL INSURANCE SYSTEM

Paid out of the unions' "own" budget, these are the benefits in which FZMK administration is most direct and decisive.

Cash sickness (temporary disability) benefits. The most important among them, in terms of costs and numbers served, are the sickness benefits. The first step is the issuance of a sickness certificate by the treating physician; theoretically, this leads to a home visit by the social insurance delegate; when the sick person or the worker who took care of a sick family member returns to work, he must present the certificate to personnel which fills in the appropriate information and sends it on to the FZMK insurance commission; the latter determines eligibility, the amount payable and the number of compensable days, and returns the certificate to personnel for payment.

The commission must know how to "read" the sickness certificate, to see whether the bookkeeper and the physician have drawn it up correctly. Complaints against physicians are quite frequent, blaming them for issuing certificates too often, for lacking sufficient skill to determine whether a condition is temporary or permanent, for extending sick leave without studying the history of the patient's disease, or reexamining him, or indicating what the treatment should be. Commissions must also be alert to the efforts of some employers to have certain occupational diseases designated as insurance cases, thereby removing the responsibility for their occurrence from themselves. In cases of injuries and accidents, commissions must determine whether they are work-connected. Higher union organs often criticize them for failing to do this. In 1973 in Kiev, one-third of work-connected accidents went unreported. FZMKs are accused of not using their powers vis-a-vis managements on this issue, of failing to establish contacts between their safety inspectors and prosecuting organs.
Commissions find especially troublesome the requirements regarding the "uninterrupted" work record, the location and cause of work-connected accidents, the circumstances around non-work-connected accidents (to be ascertained through witnesses, militia, medical personnel, etc.), and the home situations of those who take care of sick family members. The needed information is supposed to be supplied by the insurance delegate, the personnel office and the physician. In view of the problems already discussed, it is not likely to be forthcoming consistently and promptly or to be complete in every case. Perhaps other commission members supplement the delegate's investigative efforts, but there is no mention of this anywhere.

Given the financing arrangements, the pressures on FZMK to hold down expenditures must be considerable. Exhortations to "get tough" with absentees and drunkards saturate the press. That holding down is not universally successful is indicated by the permission to use the "special funds" in existence since 1969 not only for improving and extending health-oriented services, but also for covering above-plan expenditures on sickness benefits.57

A different kind of problem has surfaced recently and awaits resolution. In 1976 Literaturnaia Gazeta published a letter from one Zaitsev (similar letters received in the past had not been publicized) in which he asks: "Must an employee divulge the nature of his medical problems?" Current procedure, he writes, requires the signature of several co-workers on the sickness certificate before the benefit can be paid so that "medical secrets inevitably become public knowledge." He thinks this is unethical and illegal: co-workers do not need to know, for example, that a person had been treated for venereal disease or in a neuropsychiatric clinic (the latter could label him as "psycho" and might bring about dismissal, on some pretext). Most readers agreed heartily with Zaitsev. Just how "public" the knowledge becomes is shown by a personnel official who writes that at her enterprise certificates routinely move from the personnel department (four employees) to the FZMK (12 employees) to the accounting office (10 employees) - a total of 26 persons. Two doctors in their letters stress
the psychological trauma the patient now suffers, especially if he works with a small group and there is something "juicy" about his ailment. A man explains that lack of confidentiality forced him to change jobs after recovery from a nervous depression: his fellow employees continued to consider him a "mental case." Patients in gynecological departments express dismay at the prospect of having their certificates read at work; alcoholics claim that they are deterred from seeking treatment by the fear of being exposed to co-workers; others eschew doctors to escape being labelled "psychos." Zaitsev suggests that certificates should either state the existence and duration of an ailment but not its nature, or that benefits be authorized directly by hospitals or clinics, "without paperwork at the place of employment." Others urge confidentiality except that management only should be informed when an employee's illness poses a threat to fellow-workers; or that International Classification of Illnesses numbers be used instead of names of ailments; or that doctors write the names in Latin. Among the few who disagreed with Zaitsev one stresses that clearly stated diagnoses in certificates are essential for preventive work by unions; another comments that the only embarrassed workers are 18- to 20-year-old women having their first abortions.

The Gazeta agreed with Zaitsev, but invited reactions from the USSR Ministry of Health and the AUCCTU. These arrived in January 1977, after a meeting of the two agencies. They reiterated that sickness certificates are required for benefit payments, for recording absences, and for alerting unions to unsanitary or contagious conditions. It was conceded, however, that the number of persons with access to certificates should be restricted and that confidentiality should be strictly observed. A joint committee has been set up to consider the possibility of replacing the written diagnosis with a code number; it promises a revised certificate form within three months.58

This development points up the festering nature of some administrative problems and indicates that beneficiaries do not always perceive the activities of activists as benign - and raises questions about the FZMK's future role in relation to morbidity, an important element in the administration of its "own" benefit programs.
Pregnancy and maternity benefits. The administration of these benefits has been measurably simplified by the 1973 regulations entitling women to full pay, irrespective of length of employment or union membership. The FZMK is still required to fix the benefit amounts. This can become complicated, especially in cases of women whose earnings are not regular monthly wages, but rather come from commissions, piece-work, payments in kind combined with those in cash, etc.59

Allowances at the birth of a child. There is no discussion of this program in the union press. The law requires the social insurance commission to establish "need" by reference to certain documents. Supposedly, information supplied by insurance delegates is also taken into account. In other countries, administration of benefits based on need rather than on earned right often involves subjective judgments and deterrent methods and attitudes on the part of administrators. There are reasons to think that this holds for the Soviet Union as well: how strict and patronizing the delegates and commissions are in responding to need probably varies from one enterprise to another.

Passes and vouchers to health-oriented facilities. Passes are perhaps the most popular among benefits available to insured workers and employees, unions spend much time on administering them, at times being accused of getting so involved in sending people on vacations that they neglect the more important duty to increase production.

As always, AUCCTU regulations reach the FZMKs via republic, krai and oblast union councils. The FZMK's participation in putting together the annual country-wide plan for the distribution of free, privileged and paid passes consists of informing its higher union council how many passes it needs, which of those allocated to it in the preceding year it wishes to retain, and which it wishes to reject. How this FZMK input is treated once it gets into the hierarchical stream is not clear, but it is obvious that not all needs and desires are met. After the overall plan is approved by the AUCCTU, passes are allocated to the various union branch committees which, in turn, divide them up among the FZMKs within their jurisdictions. Passes that are
turned down are sent around once more and finally, the ones that are left over are sold at full cost, their number not to exceed 10% of the total number allocated. Insurance pays full cost of 20% of sanatorium passes and of 10% of those to rest homes. Overall, for the remaining passes receivers pay 30% of the cost, individual amounts being based on a graduated scale adjusted to their financial circumstances. Travel to and from health facilities must be paid by pass receivers, except in unusual situations. Passes to children's sanatoriums are free. As noted, special funds created in 1969 can be used to augment the number of passes at the FZMK's disposal. On occasion plans have to be modified as in 1974, for example, when the party ordered that insurance funds be used to provide 50,000 tourist passes inside and outside the Soviet Union, for winners of socialist competitions.60

Within these limitations, the FZMK decides who among union members who have applied is to receive a pass. Free passes are supposed to be issued only to those for whom sanatorium treatment or sojourn in a rest home is requested by physicians. Among this contingent priority is assigned to employed veterans and disabled, engineering and technical personnel, leading and shock workers, innovators, blood donors, and employed adolescents. Privileged passes go to those who fall within this priority classification and whose financial situation is weak. Nursing and unmarried mothers may also be considered. But those who disturb labor discipline are categorically refused, no matter what their medical needs: passes are rewards for honest, hard work. As to "family" vacations, for couples or for parents, the latter are permitted to take with them children between ages 4-15 who usually sleep on cots in the parents' room for which there is an extra charge. Complications seem to arise when couples or parents work in different enterprises, as one FZMK has to "sell" the pass to the other, something it is reluctant to do. After returning, receivers must present a "return pass" from the facility at which they stayed, to the FZMK. This is to check on whether the pass was used and if so, by whom.61
That administration is not always smooth is obvious; that it is affected by larger issues is also clear. In 1968 Shelepin stated that the rate of growth of health-oriented facilities lagged behind the rate of growth of the labor force; in 1977, Shibaev stated that construction plans for such facilities are systematically unfulfilled. Consequently, sanatorium overbooking continues to be widespread. Even people with reservations are housed for days in makeshift rooms and do not receive proper and courteous attention from medical and service personnel - while others, without reservations, get the best rooms and good service. Reprimands meted out by AUCCTU do not necessarily improve matters.

At the same time, some persons for whom sanatorium treatment is contra-indicated and who would do better in rest homes do get passes to sanatoriums. Annually, about 20,000 persons are sent to sanatoriums which are "categorically" unsuitable for them, thereby doing harm to their health, causing them to "suffer" from difficulties in travel and to lose money. Thousands have to be returned home, having received no treatment; others have to be hospitalized. Despite many appeals to improve selection, little change occurs. While doctors are obviously responsible, so are the FZMKs who issue passes thoughtlessly, often just to use up their quotas. Another chronic criticism is that FZMKs ignore the AUCCTU regulation that mainly those directly involved in production, rather than white-collar employees, be issued passes.

Given that there is a shortage of passes, it nevertheless happens that some are not used up. Why, asks a 1974 Trud editorial. "We must improve the service;" selecting must be done more carefully and without delays. In some facilities people are not comfortable and may get sicker than they were upon arrival; a resort pass recipient wants to know where he can have dinner; a pass may be issued too late to be of use. FZMKs are also taken to task for running over their quotas, overburdening the budget; a few FZMK higher-ups consider passes as their private property and hand them out to friends, ignoring the selection process required by regulations. Control must not be relaxed even for a moment, says Trud.
Passes to prophylactoriums and vouchers for special diets are administered by FZMK in close cooperation with management. Among receivers 20% get them free and 80% at a discount which goes up to 70% of cost. The process involved is the same as for other types of passes, but does not seem to create as many problems.

Young Pioneer camps. In most large enterprises the FZMK appoints a children's commission, a functional group that, among other child-related activities, helps select the children to be sent to camps. These commissions work closely with insurance delegates and with insurance commissions; in smaller enterprises, the selection is made by the latter.

In selecting, the factors that must be taken into account are the Pioneer's age and physical condition and the family's economic situation. Some parents are not asked to pay anything, but the majority do pay on the basis of a sliding scale. It is safe to assume that quotas are fixed for individual enterprises since many children do not get to go and unions urge a wider development of city and town "camps" for them. Among criticisms of union performance in this sector, those heard repeatedly are that not enough attention is being devoted to the selection and training of personnel for work in the camps; that many are not properly equipped with furniture, transport and food. In some, during the hottest summer days, there is no fresh milk, vegetables and fruits - said to be due to irresponsibility and lack of organizational know-how.

Allowances for children in low-income families. Administration is lodged in an enterprise commission whose three members include a representative from FZMK, one from management who becomes the chairman, and the enterprise's chief bookkeeper: this is "because the makeup of a family and its income is known best" at the place of employment. If eligibility is established, the parent is paid the benefit at the enterprise.

Before the law went into effect, the Finance Ministry (responsible for interpretation and control) and Welfare (responsible for administering the program to a large contingent not covered by social insurance) arranged a series of seminars for these
commissions. But given the intricacies of the law and of subsequent regulations, administrative complications were inevitable. A few of the "certain questions" stymieing the commissions (much more intricate ones have to be resolved by Welfare) were revealed in a 1976 survey by the RSFSR ministry of Welfare: "is it permitted to grant allowances to the guardian of children whose parents fail to make the legally required support payments? Only after investigating the parents' income or initiating such an investigation;" "is it possible to grant allowances to a woman whose marriage has been registered, without taking into account the income of her husband who is not living with the family? No, the income of the husband must be ascertained;" "does total income include rent for space in a city dwelling? No, in dachas it does;" "where are allowances paid to mothers who are attending schools as requested by employers? At their permanent places of employment;" "should the husband's income be counted in under the following circumstances: parents' divorce and application for allowances occurred in the same year; during part of the preceding year the husband was making support payments by order of the court? Yes," in line with a detailed formula that requires, among other things, knowledge of exact amounts paid and the number of "full" months during which payments were made.  

In many enterprises the required register of applicants is not kept, or kept inaccurately or sloppily. Delays cause eligible families to lose allowances. In June 1976 we are told that many errors continue to occur; the basic reason is lack of knowledge about this program among all involved in its administration - commissions, personnel departments, instructors, inspectors - in individual enterprises and in higher union organs. This ignorance lowers the quality of control: review and verification are carried out superficially, devoid of a "deep" analysis of deficiencies and of what is needed to eliminate them. In an important measure, errors are also explained by the fact that both managements and FZMKs, having appointed their representatives to the commissions, lose interest in their work and give them no assistance. Even such a simple matter as providing all enterprises with enough application blanks gets bogged down, producing delays and complaints.
The impression is that the unions are not interested in administering this program. Nor would an objective analyst find it easy to figure out why they should be. Its contribution to raising productivity is at best indirect. The eligible families may be seen as the least productive and consequently, as the least likely to take active part in socialist competition and in union work. From the applicants' point of view, there may be resentment toward an administration that invades family privacy and makes "public" family "secrets" among co-workers as does the administration of sickness benefits in relation to medical "secrets."

FAIR HEARINGS

As is generally recognized, the appeals process yields insight into how well a program of welfare benefits serves the people for whom it was intended by revealing the impact that its provisions and procedures make on the daily lives of applicants and recipients. This source of information is non-existent in the Soviet context - even though the right to appeal is spelled out in the law.

In the pension system, the dissatisfied individual may appeal either because he has been refused, or because he thinks the amount of the benefit is incorrect, or when his pension is discontinued because it is found that he was not entitled to it to begin with, or when certain part of the benefit is withheld in order to cover over-payments. The appeals route is to the executive committee of the local soviet; however, "in practice, not rarely (recipients) with such complaints appeal to higher Welfare organs," culminating in the republic ministry. Appeals from VTEK are either to the local welfare department or to VTEK in which the disabled had his initial examination. The directors of these two organs forward the appeal to the republic, krai, oblast, Moscow or Leningrad central VTEK which requests the disabled person to present himself for a re-examination. The decisions handed down in this manner are final: there is no exit into the court system. It should be added that there apparently exists an interlocking relationship between the local soviet and the local pension commission: the chairman of the latter, the Welfare member, is also a member of the insurance commission of the local soviet or of its executive committee.
In the social insurance system, the appeals procedure for those dissatisfied with sickness benefits and pregnancy and maternity allowances is through the union hierarchy: first within the factory to the FZMK, and then outside the factory, up to the republic union council. If the worker's complaint is about management - for incorrect or delayed payment of the benefit - he appeals to the FZMK, no further. Again, no court review is possible. For those dissatisfied with family allowances and allowances for children in low-income families appeals are to the executive committee of the local soviet and its decisions are final. No appeals can be made by those complaining about passes, vouchers and camp vacations.

The constricted nature of this administrative appeals system raises doubts about its objectivity and accessibility. In many instances, the review of grievances is made by persons who handed down the original decision; and it is not likely that the dissatisfied person will be encouraged and assisted to present his grievance to a higher organ (in the case of VTEK, in writing) by individuals against whom the complaint is lodged.

And yet there is no question that many do have grievances. Indeed, it can hardly be otherwise, given the scope and the variety of welfare programs and the frequent reliance in the administrative process on subjective judgments - notoriously prone to favoritism, punitive attitudes, and the desire to please higher-ups while "nipping" (ushchemliat') the rights of applicants. If not all who are dissatisfied voice their grievances, either because the administrators have a chilling effect on them or because they are "grateful" to the government "for providing all these benefits for us free of charge," many do voice them. But union literature is utterly devoid of discussion about the appeals process, either in terms of factual data (number, reasons for and outcomes of appeals) or in relation to its potential for liberalizing statutory rights and improving their administration. This silence suggests that the unions' power structure is more interested in keeping activists busy with minutiae required by a rigid application of the law than with helping them think about how to change the
law to make it more compassionate and generous - an interest that illumines the unions' function in carrying out party and government policies.

CONCLUSIONS

Soviet spokesmen claim that in their country's "political system of developed socialism," the unions (a "public organization") "administer" welfare benefits. This, I think, is too sweeping a generalization. To be sure, unions have been given responsibility for many administrative functions, but much of it is peripheral and almost all of it is shared with government organs. It will be recalled, for example, that FZMK collects contributions from enterprises, but contribution rates are fixed by the Committee in consultation not only with the AUCCTU, but also with planners, Finance, and other ministries; in the pension system, which disburses 70% of the social insurance budget, FZMK performs a facilitating function that is less important than the function of management inside the factory and is very small, indeed, when compared to the decisive role of Welfare outside the factory; even in its "own" benefits system, which disburses 30% of the budget, the FZMK's decision-making authority is circumscribed by fixed budgetary limits and by assumptions about morbidity rates that come down both from the AUCCTU and government organs that "control" the AUCCTU.

I think that among factors that influence the quality of FZMK administrative performance, three are especially important: the substantive welfare benefits provisions, the technology available for administrative operations, and the "public principle" used in securing staff.

As mentioned, welfare benefits are used as work-incentive tools (when unions "face production"), and as means to meet minimum welfare needs (when government faces people). In "life" these two goals are by no means mutually supportive. Consequently, administration is often confronted by conflicting purposes which create ambivalences and perhaps outright disaccord about what the unions' priorities ought to be. This is sharpened by the absence of a coherent theory of what social insurance is supposed to accomplish: is it to maintain income or is it to provide income security?
The former replaces earnings and therefore reflects their inequalities and inadequacies; the latter guarantees a common level of living considered essential for well-being and therefore rises above inadequate and unequal earnings. When the goal of work incentive predominates, as is now the case, what might be called negative and excessive individualization comes to the fore; that is, the entire galaxy of legal stipulations is applied to each case as strictly and narrowly as possible. This approach tends to stress the income maintenance objective, as well as support the non-existence in the Soviet Union of a decent public assistance program that would provide anything but pitifully small sums to the aged and disabled who are utterly destitute. When the goal of minimum welfare needs is recognized, as happened in 1956, the income security objective makes a timid appearance; hence, minimums, weighting the benefit formula in favor of the low wage earners, grants to unmarried mothers and to mothers of many children, and since 1974, allowances to low-income families. The latter, anxious not to weaken the work incentive goal (as are the others), limits the number of eligible children and pays supplements low enough to entrap families at a niggardly poverty level.

It will be recalled that Welfare does not maintain earnings records of covered individuals and that enterprises do not transmit their records to a centralized agency. Computers which would be required for maintaining reliable, complete and centralized records, given the scope of Soviet programs, are not yet in use; this lack is aggravated by the absence of modern office machines in individual enterprises where entries are sometimes still made by hand and calculations, by using abacuses. I think that the excessive administrative decentralization in welfare benefits is dictated not so much by the officially proclaimed desire to be "democratic," as by the low level and the outright absence of technology needed for managing efficiently the huge and difficult work load involved in welfare benefits administration. The "errors" about which there are so many complaints are one of the outcomes - to say nothing of unequal protection under the law which must be rife.
One of the reasons for turning over the administration of social insurance to unions in 1933 was the desire to save costs. This desire has been fulfilled; but a price that is still being exacted is that unpaid activists cannot be held to a standard of acceptable performance nor made to avail themselves of training, especially when it is patchy, inadequate, and offered at inconvenient times. Stories about "good" insurance delegates, for example, usually stress the self-sacrificial nature of their endeavors, their big hearts, and their devotion to the kollektiv. That these traits may strike some recipients as patronizing and condescending is, of course, true; that applied to a huge and almost inordinately intricate welfare program, they are not enough is certain. I do not think that regulations detailing the welfare duties of FZMK and those spelling out the many applicable laws are all implemented. Surely not all sick people are visited, many factors that should be taken into account are passed over, the "errors" continue. It seems obvious, too, that FZMKs are not interested in several programs in which they are made to participate. Humanitarian motives are not strong enough to galvanize them into consistent "daily comradely concern" for the aged, disabled, unmarried mothers, mothers of many children, and low-income families. As a matter of fact, there is resentment about having to do "Welfare's work," and there are instances when activists act in ways that are neither unbiased nor protective of workers' rights. It is also disturbing to find that most administrative problems continue over decades, simply spreading to new programs from the old ones. \(^79\) One is tempted to join Brezhnev in asking, as he did at the 16th Trade Union Congress in March 1977: "Do we not beget too many different papers - decrees, decisions, enactments (rasporiazhenii, reshenii, postanovlenii) - forgetting at times to check out what these papers change in actual life?"

In short, I find that the administration of welfare benefits by trade union committees is not a resounding success, although by no means a dismal failure. The extent of failure or success is seen differently by people involved in the welfare subculture: beneficiaries find much to complain about; the union hierarchy, despite self-criticism, finds much to praise. I believe that a better job would be done by what
might be called a regular government agency (instead of a "public organization" one) without losing the advantages that accrue from broadly based participation by beneficiaries, provided what they have to say is heard.

As to future directions, I do not think that the FZMK role in administration will be expanded by returning the pension system to unions. On the contrary, when introduction of modern technology into social insurance operations makes possible a centralized record-keeping agency, both unions and managements will be relieved of their cumbersome "presenting" function and will exit from the pension realm. I see this happening in relation to allowances for low-income families as well: clearly a needs-oriented program that is even now financed almost entirely from general revenues, it will probably join its not-active-in-the-labor-force contingent in Welfare. Who will direct a centralized agency is an open question. AUCCTU will be faced with strong competition from Welfare which is pushing for all-Union status and whose performance is certainly as good as the AUCCTU's and its constituent unions. Both will have to face the Finance Ministry, the Committee, and the planners. In the "own" social insurance domain, the now recognized right of beneficiaries to confidentiality may lead to a diminished FZMK involvement in medical aspects of benefits administration, confining it primarily to educational activities and benefits computation. As for the collection and transmission of enterprise contributions, it seems to me that this function is likely to be moved to Finance which now verifies and controls. Such changes in direction will undoubtedly bring about changes in substantive provisions. To be sure, none of this will happen soon. Welfare measures scheduled for the current plan add up to more of the same as no "new principles" are contemplated. But there are indications that something more fundamental may occur in some more distant future. There is a growing recognition of the "necessity of raising the role of the general work record" (and, by implication, diminishing and perhaps eventually eliminating "privileged" conditions); and there is growing concern about the low level of benefits in the pension system which underscores the discrepancy
between the pensioners' level of living and that of persons in the labor force and
which cannot be removed by raising minimums: for its solution, this problem requires
"a more flexible mechanism which will permit a scientifically based relationship be-
tween the incomes of those in and out of the labor force. What seems least amenable
to change, even in a distant future, is the lack of significant implementation of human
rights in welfare - the freedom for beneficiaries to challenge their government when
they consider decisions affecting them to be unjust, whether handed down by a govern-
ment agency or by a "public organization" that is carrying out government policy.
REFERENCES AND NOTES


3. How deprived may be judged by the following: the average monthly pension under the first old-age pension law, introduced in 1928 and restricted to textile workers, equalled about 36% of the 1927 wage; the law was later extended to other manual workers and in 1937, to employees, but pension amounts kept dropping, to 23% of average wage in 1955. The 1956 Act set the minimum old-age pension at a level almost 50% above the maximum sum generally allowed previously. On the average, pensions rose 100%. Low wage earners gained the most: for them, pensions increased almost three times.


14. Unemployment compensation was abolished in October 1930 and has not been reintroduced.

15. Since infractions of labor discipline are judged by comrades' courts, it is likely that their decisions influence benefit determinations.


22. Vestnik Statistiki, no. 1, 1977, p.19, Table 20. Many children will remain in poverty, however, specifically those whose families' per capita income is below 38-40 rubles per month and those whose age excludes their families from help.


30. This estimate is derived from (a) G. Simonenko, "K 50-Letiiu, etc.," op. cit., p.27; (b) "Na Temy Dnia. Strakhovoi Delegat," OTiSS, no. 6, June 1973, pp.10-11; (c) "V Bloknot Strakhovomu Delegatu. Chetyre Milliona Pomoshchnikov," OTiSS, no. 1, January 1974, p.30; (d) L. Novak, op. cit.; (e) G. Simonenko, "Demokratism etc.," op. cit. In 1977 there were 113.5 million union members: 107.9 among workers and employees, 5.6 million among collective farmers.


37. P. Danilov, op. cit.
41. A. Baraniskin "Za Vse v Otvet," Sots. Obes., no. 4, April 1974, p.27; V. Sokolova, "Preditaviteli 'Obretaet Litso,'" Sots. Obes., no. 11, November 1974, p.14. In this connection it should be noted that "employees in plant personnel services have relatively low qualifications;" there is not "a single educational institution in the country to train personnel workers; they come from diverse educational backgrounds, some totally unrelated to management science, law or social psychology," others, "with no higher or specialized education whatever" (see V. Matirko, "The People in Whom We Place Our Trust. - The Problem of the Business Career from the Viewpoint of the Personnel Service," Literaturnaia Gazeta, January 26, 1977, p.10, translated in CDSP, vol. xxix, 1977, no. 6, p.15).
uninterrupted work record is kept at a given enterprise if they work there a full season and return within the prescribed period the following season. Time between seasons is not counted in.


51. Agapov, op. cit. The disabled themselves often beg to be sent back to VKK: sickness benefits are higher than disability pensions.

52. B. Zimin, "VOS - 50 Let. Sogretye Zabotoi Partii," Sots. Obes., no. 11, November 1975, p.8; see also the interview with Zimin in Pravda of November 12, 1975, p.3.

54. E. Azarova, "Gosudarstvennye Posobiia Mnogodetnym Materiam," Sots. Obes., nos. 5 and 6, May and June 1976, pp.49-52 and 48-50, respectively. One-time allowances start with the third child, when the mother gets 20 rubles, and go up with each additional child, reaching 250 rubles at the birth of the tenth and subsequent children.


63. V. Poltoranov, "Uluchshit' Kurortnoe Lechenie," _Trud_, July 13, 1974, p.2; Kudriavtsev, _op. cit._


66. Zemlianikova, _op. cit._


68. "In the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers," _Izvestiia_, September 28, 1974, p.1; M. Kaziev, "V Interesakh Materi i Rebenka," _OTiSS_, no. 12, December 1974, pp.33-4; Acharkan, _op. cit._, p. 38. Welfare responsibility applies to children whose parents are members of creative unions (writers, composers, painters, etc.), are in the military, in rank-and-file and lower echelon administrative jobs in the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the USSR and Republic Ministries of Communications, workers on guard duty in ministries and departments, non-working wives of drafted servicemen, non-working unmarried mothers, widows and divorced women, persons working for individual citizens or groups of citizens, non-working women whose husbands live in a different location.
- as well as children of retired workers, employees and collective farm members
(see Acharkan, op. cit.; Simonenko, "Posobiia etc.," op. cit.; V. Mikhalkovich,

69. (Editorial) "Nekotorye Voprosy Naznacheniia Posobii na Detei Maloobespechennym
Sem'iam (Po Materialam Obzorov Glavnogo Upravleniia Pensii i Posobii Minister-
stva Sotsial'nogo Obespecheniia RSFSR)," Sots. Obes., no. 4, April 1976, pp.47-8;
G. Simonenko, "O Nekotorykh Oshibkakh pri Naznacheniia Posobii na Detei," OTiSS,
no. 6, June 1976, pp. 31-2.

70. V.S. Andreev, Pravo Sotsial'noho Obespecheniie v SSSR (Moscow, 1974), pp.252-3.
Courts can only be resorted to when the status of a dependent or the existence
of marital relationships must be established.

71. V.A. Babkin and G.B. Smirnova, Kommentarii k Polozheniiu o Poriadke Naznacheniia
i Vyplaty Gosudarstvennykh Pensii (Moscow, 1974), p.95.

72. OTiSS, "Sprashivaiut - Otvechaem," no. 4, April 1974, p.4; and Andreev, op. cit.,
pp. 263 and 268. Disagreements may arise between management and FZMK. If in
granting the benefit or in establishing the work record the social insurance
commission does not observe the law, management has the right to point to such
law breaking. If the commission does not agree with management's opinion, the
latter can ask for a review, through the FZMK to a higher union organ whose
decision is final.

73. E. Azarova, op. cit., no. 6, June 1976, pp.48-50,50; M. Kaziev, "V Interesakh
Materi i Rebenka," op. cit. If overpayments occur in the case of low-income
families because of abuse by the recipient or as a result of an arithmetical
error, the commission can make deductions from the allowance, but not to exceed
20%; such deductions can be made also from earnings, stipends, pensions, or
other grants, again not to exceed 20% of their sums.

74. I. Poida, op. cit., p.6; I. Razumkov, "Delu - Chastichku Dushi," Sots. Obes.,

76. Lantsev, "Sovershenstvovanie etc.," *op. cit.*, p.136; Kolesnikov, *op. cit.*; Simonenko, "Demokratism, etc.," *op. cit.*


80. Lantsev, "Sovershenstvovanie etc.," *op. cit.*. Pensions are likely to gain further importance both because of demographic factors and because they constitute the main source of income for a growing proportion of pensioners: for 82% in 1970 compared to 62% in 1959 (see V. Acharkan, "Sotsialisticheskii Printsip Raspredelenia po Trudu i Sotsial'noe Obespechenie," *Sotsialisticheskii Trud*, no. 11, 1974, pp.119-129, 121).