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THE TURKIC PEOPLES AND CAUCASIA
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For more than a millennium and a half, the fortunes of the peoples of Transcaucasia have been closely, at times inextricably, bound up with those of the Turkic world. Standing at the "crossroads of empires," Transcaucasia was often a major thoroughfare through which the predominantly Turkic nomads of the Eurasian steppelands entered the zone of sedentary cultures of the Eastern Mediterranean basin. Indeed, recognition of its strategic importance to the limes system that separated steppe from sown was one of the factors which has traditionally drawn the attention of neighboring, imperial powers to this region.

Transcaucasia's relationship with the steppe peoples was, at first, largely transient. In time, however, profound, nomadic interventions into the political life of Armenia, Georgia and Sirván-Arrán-Azarbayjan did occur. With the advent of the Öğuz Turks and subsequent Mongol and Turkic invaders, these interventions were regularized, affecting the underlying fabric of society and altering the texture of life. These sweeping changes included the restructuring of the ethno-linguistic character of the region (always distinguished by heterogeneity, although never matching that of the "mountain of tongues" to the North) with the Turkicization of Azarbajyan. The assessment of the impact of nomadic society on the Transcaucasian polities remains a subject of lively debate. Thus, some scholars today seek in the disruptions of political, social and economic life that characterized this period the roots of the backwardness that typified these societies at the time of their absorption into the Russian Empire.¹
Early Armenian and Georgian historical accounts contain a variety of anachronistic notices on the activities of Turkic peoples living in close propinquity to Transcaucasia. It is only with the appearance of the "European" Huns (whose antecedents and relationship to the Hsiung-nu of Chinese sources still require elucidation) in the mid-fourth century, however, that we may begin to speak of a genuine interaction between the Turkic peoples and the populations of Transcaucasia. A Hunnic raiding party, undoubtedly in connection with their activities against Sasanid Iran, made its way into Armenia ca. 363. Mvvsès Dasiuranc'i's tale of the victory of Babik of Siwnik', the champion of Sapor II (309-379), over the "Hun called Honagur" in single combat in the late 370's illustrates the Hunnic presence here. These raids and the devastating campaign of the Huns (apparently brought about by famine in the steppe) of 395 in which they menaced Armenia, Iran and Roman Mesopotamia, induced the Empires to work out a system of joint responsibility for the forts guarding the Caucasian passes. The Huns, thus, became an important consideration in the policy of synarchy by the "superpowers" in Transcaucasia, a policy which ultimately led to the abolition of the local monarchies.

Iran, faced with a constant threat from the nomads, regularly summoned vassal Armenian and Georgian forces to fight them. The "Northern Invaders," however, although a potentially double-edged sword, could also be exploited by the Transcaucasian polities in attempts to gain greater autonomy or independence from their neighboring overlords. Moreover, Sasanid persecutions of Christians fluctuated in proportion to their success or lack of it in the wars against the Xion. Thus, when nomadic pressure slackened, Sasanid attempts to implant Zoroastrianism in Christian Transcaucasia tended to increase. In response, the Armenians could and
did enter into direct alliance with the "Huns" against their Iranian overlords. This occurred during the revolt against Yazdigard II (438-457) which ended in the Armenian defeat at Avarayr in 451. Similarly, the Albanians (Ajuan) did not hesitate to bring in the Huns in the course of their revolt against Peroz (458-484) during the early years of his reign. Indeed, the death of Peroz in 484 in warfare against the "Huns" gained for the Georgians, Armenians and peoples of Albania an easing of direct Sasanid rule.

While several patterns in the involvement of the Turkic nomads in Transcaucasian affairs up to the early sixth century may be discerned, we cannot distinguish any broader conceptualization on their part of their role in the larger clash of empires to their south. As we are poorly informed regarding the internal workings of the nomadic formations at this time, it cannot be determined whether this was due to the absence of a centralized political command amongst them or the lack of a sustained interest on the part of the Empires to make use of their services in the struggle for dominion in the Near East. Nonetheless, the course of events in the sixth century witnessed some dramatic changes.

A series of nomadic migrations had introduced new Turkic confederations to the Ponto-Caspian steppes. Driven by the movements of tribes in Western Siberia and Central Asia touched off by the expansion of the Juan-Juan in Mongolia, the Oğur Turkic tribes crossed the Volga into the western Eurasian steppes ca.463 A.D. These Oğurs, speaking a variant form of Turkic, were part of a larger tribal union, the T'ie-18 of Chinese sources. Long involved with commerce (especially the fur trade) and relatively
well-advanced in agriculture, metallurgy and military technology, they were intermittently drawn into Byzantine anti-Iran coalitions. This policy became more regularized in the course of the sixth century and the names of the tribal groupings involved, the Oğur, Onoğur, Saragur, Uturğur, appear frequently in Byzantine and Syriac sources.

In the early decades of the sixth century, the Oğurs were joined in this region by the Sabirs (who were probably directly responsible for their westward migration). The bulk of the Sabir union nomadized in the North Caucasian steppelands. Elements of them, however, appear to be located on the Volga as well (subsequently figuring in the Volga Bulgar tribal union: the Suwar of the Islamic authors?). The Sabirs were soon engaged in the lucrative (for them) Byzantine-Iranian wars of Justinian I (527-565) fought in Transcaucasia. Although not adverse to switching sides, their fickle "loyalties" were more often than not in the Constantinopolitan camp. From the Byzantine standpoint, an alliance with a large and powerful steppe confederation located in the pivotal North Caucasian steppe zone conferred several benefits. Such allies not only provided a constant source of pressure on the Sasanids, but could also be used to check the movements of other nomads seeking to cross the Volga. With the emergence of the nomads as a consideration in imperial policy, it soon became apparent that the Volga, a gateway to the North Caucasus and Black Sea, constituted the first line in Constantinople's defense. The fate of the peoples of Transcaucasia, as we shall see, came to be closely tied to the success of Byzantium in this vital region.

Evidence for an "activist" approach to the nomad question on
the part of the Transcaucasian Christian peoples as well may be seen in the mission of the bishop of Albania, Kardost, who, ca. 530, went to the "land of the Huns" (perhaps the Sabirs). His alleged mission was to minister to the needs of Christians languishing in captivity there, but, in fact, he attempted to convert the nomads. In this, he was following a tradition that had begun with Gregory the Illuminator (d. 331). This mission and subsequent attempts to bring about the conversion of the nomads undertaken by Armenian/Albanian and Byzantine clerics, had little lasting effect. Nonetheless, growing hostility toward Iran tended to place the nomads in the Byzantine camp and as a consequence their interventions into affairs in Transcaucasia frequently weakened Sasanid rule.

The appearance of the Avars in Western Eurasia ca. 557-558 brought an end to Sabir domination of the North Caucasus. The Avars, however, were quickly (ca. 567) driven into Pannonia by the Turks who had overthrown the Juan-Juan (Avar) Qaghanate in Mongolia in 552. In their pursuit of their erstwhile overlords, the Turks extended their hegemony to the western steppes. Interested in both trade (the silk route) and establishing their dominion over fugitive elements of the Avars, the Turks made their initial diplomatic overtures to Iran. When the inherent conflict of interest between the Sasanids and the Ašina became apparent, the Turks turned to Constantinople. The history of Byzantino-Türk relations, despite the shared hostility towards Iran, is chequered with misunderstandings, fears of deception (not always unjustified) and occasionally devastating raids on Byzantine holdings in the Crimea and Transcaucasia. On balance, however, it was the Iranian hold in the Caucasus that was more profoundly shaken. Once again,
Iran was faced with a nomadic menace on both its northwestern and northeastern frontiers. Unlike the earlier threats, the nomads were now united under the aegis of the Türk Qağans. In keeping with an already established pattern, Sasanid difficulties with the Turks, combined now with Byzantine pressure, permitted the Transcaucasian states some greater measure of independence. Thus, ca.588, the Eastern Georgians (Iberia/K'art'li) reestablished their autonomy. A material reflection of the extent of the Türk threat may be seen in the extensive building activity of Anšširvan (531-578) who carried out a large-scale reinforcement of the limes system in the Caucasus.

The Turks also organized the various Sabir, Qğur and other Turkic elements in the Western Eurasian steppes into a powerful tribal confederation under the direct authority of the Yabğu Qağan. The latter was a member of the royal Ašina clan and the ruler of the western part of the Türk realm. In the course of the seventh century, two major tribal unions emerged in this region under the Türk banner: the Khazars (Q'azar) and Bulgars. Although the latter were not unknown to our Transcaucasian sources, it was the former who figure most prominently in the contemporary accounts. Given the understandable confusion in our sources of Khazar and Türk (the two are virtually interchangeable at this time) and the anachronistic attribution of the ethnonym Khazar to a number of nomadic groupings in the early sixth century, it is not until the mid-seventh century that we can trace the outlines of Khazar involvement in Transcaucasian affairs with any degree of clarity. Prior to this, they operated in close concert with their Türkic overlords. Thus, the Khazars formed the bulk of the Türk forces used by the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius (610-641) in his counter-
offensive against the Sasanids in Transcaucasia. Armenian and Georgian sources provide important details on the campaigns of the Jebu Xak'an/Jibgu (Yabgu Qaghan), in particular his participation in the conquest of T'bilisi in 628.13

The Türkio-Khazar involvement played a decisive role in the Byzantine victory. At the war's conclusion, however, Transcaucasia once again found itself partitioned into "spheres of influence." Armenia was placed within the Byzantine orbit while Iberia/K'art'li enjoyed an uneasy "independence." In Albania-Azarbayjan, the situation was somewhat more complicated. The south was firmly in the Sasanid orbit. The northern zone, controlled by the Mihranid dynasty (which was related to the Iranian royal house) was a vassal state. The degree of its dependence, however, was in large measure determined by the Khazars who frequently raided its northern regions and periodically occupied various territories. The Mihranids, of course, attempted to exploit this situation with results that were occasionally devastating to their lands.14

Iran and Byzantium had been exhausted by the long contest, a factor which greatly facilitated the Arab conquest of Transcaucasia in the mid-seventh century. The only effective opposition to the new invaders was provided by the Türkic nomads under Khazar leadership. Needless to say, their involvement here was hardly altruistic. In the steppe, too, major changes had taken place. The Türk Qaghanate, long caught up in domestic strife, had submitted by 659 to T'ang China. The Türk hold in the westernmost part of the steppes, the Ponto-Caspian zone, had actually begun to fade in the decades preceding the final collapse. The period 630-640, then, marks the full emergence of the Khazar and
Onogur/Onogundur-Bulgar confederations, successor states of the Türk, ruled by rival clans of the Western Türk (On Oq). Although faced with Arab attacks on their North Caucasian territories as early as 642, the Khazars, in a protracted struggle with the Bulgar union, one which largely escaped the notice of our sources, completely defeated their rivals by the 670's. Those Bulgars that did not migrate westward to Danubian Europe and the Balkans were absorbed into the Khazar union.

As early as 661-662, the Khazars, taking advantage of the slackening of the Arab hold in Transcaucasia brought about by the struggle between 'Ali and Mu'āwiyah (657-661), unleashed a series of devastating raids into Albania. Juanšer (d. 680), the Albanian ruler and his successor Varaz-Trdat (680-699) tried to maneuver between the Khazars, Arabs and Byzantines through an elaborate system of marital ties and timely submissions to one or another authority. It did little to restrain the incursions of the Khazars and their subjects, the "North Caucasian Huns" and resulted in placing the Mihranid realm further into the Arab camp. An interesting episode of a more pacific nature was the dispatch, in 681, of a religious mission headed by the Albanian bishop Israyāl to Alp' Illit'uer (= Alp il-tever/il-teber, a Turkic title designating a vassal ruler in the Old Türk system) of the "North Caucasian Huns." The account of this cleric's sojourn amongst the nomads is preserved in Mōvsēs Dāsxuranc'i and provides us with many valuable details regarding their shamanistic practices.

Following the geo-political policy lines already established by Heraclius, Byzantium encouraged Khazar attacks on the Arab-dominated regions of Transcaucasia. Thus, the 680's witnessed
destructive assaults on Armenia, Iberia/K'art'li and Albania. The early decades of the eighth century were marked by a sharp increase in the scale of Arabo-Khazar warfare for control of Transcaucasia. The use of Transcaucasian forces by the Arabs in these campaigns only compounded local difficulties. A dramatic denouement to this phase of the Arabo-Khazar confrontation took place in 737 when the Umayyad commander, Marwan, in a surprise drive on the Khazar capital on the Volga, Atil, captured the Qagan. The latter was forced to embrace Islam, signaling thereby his submission to the Caliphate. This, however, was a transient victory. The Umayyads, who were soon overthrown and replaced by the 'Abbāsids (750), did not have the resources to station a permanent army of occupation in Khazaria. The Qagan, discarding Islam, resumed his independence. The old Sasanid limes at Bāb al-Abwāb (Darband-i Xazarān) became the border between the two empires and the northernmost extension of Arab power in this region.

The Khazars were now full partners in a kind of tri-dominium that was established in Transcaucasia. Their full integration into the state system here was reflected in a series of marital ties with the Byzantine and Western Georgian royal houses as well as with the local Arab governors. Striking evidence that Khazar policy did not necessarily coincide with that of Constantinople may be seen in several incidents involving the Georgian lands. In 780, the Khazars refused to aid the Iberian/K'art'lian prince Nerses against his Arab overlords. Some six years later, however, the Qagan supported his kinsman (grandson) Leon, the erist'avi of Ap'xazet'i (Western Georgia) in the latter's successful bid to end Byzantine hegemony there. The Khazars, thus, were instru-
mental in reestablishing Georgian independence. Not long thereafter, ca. 799, the last major Khazar raid against the Arabs in Transcaucasia took place.20

The ninth century witnessed a weakening of both the Caliphate and Khazaria brought about by centrifugal forces and a concomitant resurgence of Byzantium. The Khazar decline had serious repercussions in Transcaucasia. The destabilization of the western steppe zone which resulted from the end of the (Pax Chazarica, permitted the entrance of new nomadic forces into the region. The Byzantine response was a shift away from the Khazars and an attempt (ultimately unsuccessful) to transform the Pečenegs into the guardians of Ponto-Caspian steppes.21 At the same time, the political fragmentation of the Caliphate, in which the large-scale introduction of Central Asian Turkic (Julams22 in the latter half of the ninth century played a significant role, permitted a Byzantine reconquista in the East. These same forces helped to bring about the revival of the Armenian and Georgian monarchies, in the course of the 880's, under the ubiquitous Bagratids. In 1008, Bagrat III (975-1014) united Eastern and Western Georgia (K'art'li and Ap'xazet'i) thereby paving the way for subsequent Georgian expansion throughout Transcaucasia. Concurrently with this, Azerbaijan was experiencing what Minorsky has felicitously phrased the "Iranian Intermezzo," the brief emergence of local Iranian dynasties in the wake of the Arab retreat and Turkic advance.23 The greatest immediate danger to the restored monarchies, however, was posed by Byzantium whose territorial acquisitions in the course of the tenth and early eleventh centuries came to include Armenian and Georgian lands. These Byzantine gains, culminating in the annexation of the Armenian kingdoms of Vaspurakan (1021) and Ani
(11) (1045), proved illusory. Byzantine rule not only removed the Armenian "buffer" against steppe forces which had already made themselves felt in the region as early as 1016, but did much to dismantle the Armenian armed forces.\textsuperscript{24}

Meanwhile, a complex concatenation of events in the Central Asian steppes galvanized a number of Turkic tribes into motion. The Oğuz confederation which had formed on the Syr Darya in the last quarter of the eighth century in the aftermath of the collapse of the Second Türk Qağanate in 741 was highly unstable. In the course of the latter half of the tenth century, some of its elements were drawn into the web of Byzantine anti-Khazar coalitions (there is evidence that some of these Oğuz had been Khazar vassals). They appear to have joined with the Pešenegs, the Trans-Caspian As and the Byzantines in an attack on Khazaria at this time. Subsequently, they played a role in the destruction of the Qağanate (965) in alliance with the Rus'.\textsuperscript{25} The fall of Khazaria once again opened the northern approaches to Transcaucasia (as well as Byzantium). While the Volga-oriented Oğuz were later pushed westward by the Cuman migration and collapse of the Kimek union (these buffetings also brought the Pešenegs to the Balkans), their eastern elements were increasingly caught up in the troubled politics of Muslim Central Asia. Here, Oğuz groupings, including the followers of the house of Seljuq, were converted to Islam and drawn into the Gaznavid-Qaraxanid rivalry. Subjected to a number of reversals at the hands of their more powerful neighbors, some Seljuqid (and other Oğuz) bands migrated to Gaznavid-controlled Khurâsân. In 1034, the main mass of the Seljuqid-led Oğuz fled thither as well. Faced with starvation, they took to brigandage. Their raids and deprivations resulted
in a Gaznavid offensive against them. Knowing that they must either prevail or face extinction, the Seljuqs scored a resounding victory over the Gaznavids at Dandanaqân in 1040. All of Iran now lay open before them. The 'Abbasid Caliphs, seeking a means to rid themselves of the Shi'i Buyyids, were induced to legitimize this new force. Thus, the resultant Seljuqid Sultanate was provided with a program that would make them masters of a good portion of the Islamic world.

The precise identity and political/tribal affiliations of the Turkic raiders who troubled Vaspurakan in 1016 and the Nig region in 1021 are still in dispute. In any event, their activities induced Senek'arim, ruler of Vaspurakan, to transfer his kingdom to Byzantium in exchange for estates in the region of Sebasteia (Sivas). Bands clearly associated with the Seljuq dynasty may be placed in Azarbayjan as early as 1029. Elements of these Oghuz subsequently raided Armenia (ca.1038) and were soon giving little peace to the Saddâdid rulers of Ganja/Gandzak.

The size and pace of the Turkic attacks increased as the events of 1047-1048 show. These raids may be termed "Seljuq" only in so far as they were carried out by bands nominally under the leadership of the Seljuq dynasty. In reality, the Seljuqs (whose actual interests were focused on establishing their supremacy within the Islamic world) were often compelled by their "subjects" to undertake these ventures against the surrounding Christian states. Ibn al-Afir gives us some insight into the internal dynamics of the "Seljuq movement." In connection with the events of 1048 he notes that the Seljuqid Ibrahim Yinal (Yinal/Inal is a high-ranking Oghuz title), finding himself inundated with newcomers
from Transoxiana and not having enough land to provide for them, suggested that they raid "Rûm." The wretched state of the Ogûz entering the Near East accounts for their particular rapaciousness, frequently remarked upon by our sources. Thus, Aristakes Lastivertc'i notes that they "fell on the Christians like hungry wolves."30

The Turks launched several attacks into the Basean valley and defeated a Byzantine-Armenian-Georgian army. The Georgian magnate, Liparit, who had been exploiting the Byzantine presence in Vaspurakan and Ani to resist the centralizing policies of Bagrat IV (1027-1072), was captured and carried off to Iran. After a Byzantine-Georgian counter-offensive had driven the Turks from the Ganja region, Liparit was released (Byzantium continuing its interference in Georgian affairs paid his ransom) and resumed his divisive activities.31 Aristocratic opposition to the centralizing monarchy, a perennial problem, was, as we shall see, ultimately strengthened by the nomadic presence.

In 1054, the Sultan Toğrul-Beg brought about the submission of the Rawwâdîd rulers of Southern Azabayjan and the Šaddâdids of Dvin and Ganja. This was preparatory to an invasion of Christian Transcaucasia. Marauding expeditions were directed thither in 1054-1055, resulting in widespread destruction, especially in the Armenian territories. The pressure continued in 1055-1056 when the Šaddâdîd Abu'l-Asvâr, now a vassal of the Sultan, attacked Armenia, thereby contributing to the growing number of refugees.32 Famine and plague in the lands recently acquired by the Ogûz added to the ferocity of their assaults on their neighbors. Internecine strife in Byzantium and Georgia lessened the resistance encountered by the raiders. Indeed, in Georgia, they were even called in by
rebellious magnates.

Bagrat IV sought to relieve some of the pressure by calling in the Ossetins (with whose ruling house he had extensive ties) to attack Ṣaddādīd Arrān in 1062 and 1065. These measures, however, were of little avail for a massive Seljuq force was now directed at Transcaucasia. In 1064, Togrul-Beg's successor Alp Arslan (1063-1072) entered the region. Although all of Transcaucasia felt the impact of the Türkmen, the principal target was Ani, the onetime capital of Bagratid Armenia. It fell and Gagik of Kars abandoned his lands shortly thereafter. Bagrat IV, despite his attempts to ward off the approaching danger with marital alliances and diplomacy, could not save Georgia from attack in 1067-1068. His neighbor, the Kaxet'ian king Ağsart'an, who was fearful of Bagrat's efforts to "unite" his lands with those of K'art'li, chose a different course. He accepted Islam and submitted to Alp Arslan. The resourceful Bagrat, however, parried these blows, successfully defending himself against the Ṣaddādīd Faḍlūn who often functioned as Alp Arslan's agent in Georgia. Bagrat, thus, managed to evade formal tokens of submission (payment of the xarāj).

At the same time, the Seljuq hold in Şirvān was established when Fariburz of the Yazidi/Mazyadid dynasty ruling there submitted to the Sultan in 460/1067-1068 following the appearance of Oğuz raiding parties in his realm. Fariburz then joined Alp Arslan's campaign against Georgia which had often been a troublesome and aggressive neighbor.

One of the main thrusts of the Seljuq Transcaucasian campaign thus far had been the securing of Azarbayjan as a staging area for future activities to be directed largely against opponents in
the Muslim world. The campaign also provided a necessary safety-valve for the restless energies of the Türkmen. This latter factor was probably the main consideration behind the raids into Anatolia. The Seljuqs were really little interested in this area at this time, hoping only to maintain a secure flank for their operations in Syria. The Türkmen raids, however, forced a confrontation with the Byzantines culminating in the dramatic clash at Manazkert (Mantzikert/Kalazgirt) in 1071. Continual probing of Christian defences, both Byzantine and Transcaucasian had shown how weak these actually were. As a consequence, raiding would now give way to invasion and settlement. After the Manazkert debacle, Byzantium withdrew from the region. Armenia, undermined by Byzantine aggression and shattered by the Turkish raids, was already experiencing the more permanent presence of the Turks within its borders. Georgia, isolated and surrounded, was now open to what its contemporary historians termed the didî t'urk'oba (lit. "the Great Turkdom", i.e. massive Turkish incursions and settlement). Meanwhile, waves of refugees had left Armenia to join their kinsmen in Byzantine held areas of Anatolia. These soon coalesced into the Cilician Armenian kingdom.

Giorgi II (1072-1089) succeeded his father Bagrat IV to the Georgian throne at approximately the same time that Alp Arslan was assassinated. The latter's son and successor, Malikşah (1072-1092) proved to be one of the dynasty's strongest figures. Giorgi, whose compassion and justice is extolled by the Georgian chroniclers (in contrast to his father), was plagued by domestic strife and despite valiant efforts could not effectively deal with the Turkish threat. Malikşah unleashed a series of assaults against both Georgia and the semi-independent Muslim rulers in Sirvan and
The latter were brought under Seljuq control in 1074-1075 and Arrān, in particular, was now thickly settled by Türkmen. Giorgi was initially successful in fending off the Seljuq forces led by Sautegin that were sent against him in the late 1070's. In 1081, however, Maliksāh began the didi t'urk'oba and Giorgi was compelled to submit. The renewal of resistance on the part of the Saddādids and Širvānšahs brought another large-scale Seljuq invasion in 1086 and a consequent strengthening of Turkish control throughout the region. Transcaucasia had been incorporated into the Seljuq system.

Seljuq rule in Transcaucasia was not uniform in its duration or impact. On the whole, in keeping with old Turkic practices, they were relatively tolerant in religious matters. The negative aspects of their rule surfaced, rather, in the area of economic development. The invasions alone were enough to seriously disrupt the local economy. This was compounded by the Turkish settlements and resultant transformation of agricultural lands into nomadic pasturages. Paradoxically, this regression provided a temporary hiatus in the enserfment of the local peasantry. The great estates tended to be broken up as the Türkmen economy was little interested in large-scale agriculture and lands were needed to be allotted as ḵarāṣ to the local begs and servitors of the dynasty. Thus, a less dependent peasantry supported by a system of small holdings was encouraged. This, of course, only benefitted those peasants who had not fled and had survived the raids. The ḵarāṣ system, unwittingly tended to fuel centrifugal forces which greatly contributed to the Seljuq decline. These same forces of regionalism-separatism undoubtedly diluted the impact of Seljuq rule. Moreover, the Old Turkic practice of viewing the conquered
lands as the common property of the ruling dynasty and the consequent division of this territory to provide for "mini-states" within the larger whole, permitted considerable local autonomy in those regions (such as Georgia) where the native rulers, now vassals of the Sultan, survived. Indeed, this theory of government, despite the brilliant statesmanship of Nizâm al-Mulk (the principal minister of Alp Arslan and Malikšâh) who attempted to create a centralized system, probably contributed to the survival of the Christian Caucasian polities. In practice, it also coincided with older Near Eastern traditions of superstratification in which the "king of kings" was now the Sultan-i Āzam.

The rapidity of the Seljuq decline after the death of Malikšâh prevented the Turks from achieving a stronger foothold in regions like Georgia. This decline, in part the result of internal dynastic struggles, was greatly exacerbated by the hostility of the Türkmen towards the dynasty. An echo of this hostility could still be felt centuries later. Those regions, however, like Azarbayjan (where large-scale politico-territorial units had not existed) became tribal reservoirs and were drawn into the very heart of the post-Malikšâh system. In the process, they were permanently Turkicized.

As Seljuq authority became fragmented and diffused, particularly after the death of Berkyaruq (d.1104), the opposite tendency is observable in Georgia. Giorgi II was forced to relinquish the actual governance of the country to his energetic son Davit' Ağmašenebeli ("the Builder"). The latter became co-king in 1089 and promptly embarked on an ambitious program of domestic reform and foreign expansion. This policy laid the groundwork for a pan-Transcaucasian state. Thus, by 1097, Georgia ceased paying the
xaraj and had made significant progress in expelling the Turks beyond its borders. Following his victory over the Saddādid Fadlān of Ganja at Frouxi in 1104, Davit' established control over Heret'i and Hakat'i. From 1110 until his death in 1125, he was continuously at war with his Turko-Muslim neighbors. By the end of his reign, Georgia had been cleared of the Turks and its borders greatly expanded. The lands of the former Armenian kingdoms were incorporated into the Georgian state. The predominantly Muslim realm of the Sirvanshahs was brought under Georgian jurisdiction and a sphere of influence was extended to the Osetins. On 12 August, 1121, Davit' defeated a coalition of Seljuq-Muslim forces at Didgori, thereby confirming Georgian supremacy in Transcaucasia. T'bilisi which had been in and out of Georgian hands, was taken in 1122 and became the capital of the greatly enlarged Georgian state.

These successes in foreign affairs were preceded and accompanied by domestic reforms aimed at strengthening central authority. Here too, a Turkic component is much in evidence. Davit' seeking to free the government from the stranglehold of the great aristocratic clans, brought in lesser nobles and non-Georgian elements (the displaced Armenian nobility figured prominently here) who would be beholden to the crown. Taking advantage of his marital ties to the Qipčaq-Cumans of the Ponto-Caspian steppes (his wife, Guranduxt, was the daughter of At' rak'a (Otrak of the Rus' sources), the son of Sarāgan/Sarukan). Davit' invited some 40,000 Cumans to settle in Georgia (many regions of which had been depopulated) and serve in a special military force tied directly to the crown. This measure, when viewed in the context of the role Turkic groups had played in the Islamic world, was not a radical innovation for
the region. Even in Rus' (with which Davit' apparently had some contact), Turkic elements were brought into the border-guard system in the mid-twelfth century (cf. the Černye Klobuki). Those Qipçaqs that ultimately chose to stay on permanently in Georgian service (others returned with Otrok to the steppes) were Christianized and Georgianized. They were joined by other Qipçaqs in the course of the twelfth century and some of them came to occupy leading positions in the state. Georgian sources distinguished between the "new Qipçaqs" (givi'aqnì axalni) and "former Qipçaqs" (the nagivi'aqaras).

Georgia had been transformed into the leading power in Transcaucasia. Davit's successors would now be hard pressed to retain their Armenian and Sirvâni possessions. Indeed, the nature of the relationship of the Georgian crown to these subject territories was not only poorly defined (to some extent the Georgian kings functioned as "kings of kings") but was continually in the process of being re-defined by the changing fortunes of war. The surrounding Turko-Muslim amirates (the Saltuqids, Artuqids, Mengüjikids, the Sâh-i Armens/Sökmenids of Axlat/Klat, Il-Degizid/Il-Dengizids) and their nominal Seljuq overlords (particularly the Iraqi Sultanate) were not reconciled to the loss of these lands and bitterly contested them. Thus, Demetre I (1125-1156) and Giorgi III (1156-1184) were occupied almost totally with the question of control over Ani and adjoining Armenian lands and Sirvân. On the whole, Demetre and Giorgi were relatively successful in maintaining a Georgian presence in the areas acquired by Davit' AĞmaşenebeli. Nonetheless, a qualitative change in Georgia's relationship with some of these regions may be noted. The policy of outright annexation was largely abandoned in favor of what became an often
unstable vassal relationship. The weakening of the Georgian hold was attributable, in part, to the resurgence of aristocratic opposition to the crown which exploited strife within the Bagratid house. Thus, Giorgi III had to put down a serious rebellion in 1177 (he was greatly aided by the Qipšaq general Qubasar). He never resolved the problem of aristocratic opposition which was bequeathed to his daughter and successor T'amar (1184-1213). The other factor militating against a more dynamic realization of Agmašenebeli's program was the rise of the atabeg dynasty of the Il-Dengizids in Azarbeyjan. Il-Dengiz (or Il-Dengüz, 1133-1172) was a Qipšaq Gülün who had begun his career in the service of the Iraqi Seljuq Sultans. In 1133, he was appointed atabeg of Arrān and married into the Seljuq royal house. Within several years, he had control over most of Azarbeyjan and had become the leading figure in the Sultanate. Despite the extraordinary turbulence of Seljuq domestic politics, Il-Dengiz was able to mount an effective opposition, in both Western Azarbeyjan and Armenia to Georgian encroachments. This policy was continued by his son Jahan Pahlavan (1172-1186). After his death, various centrifugal elements (local amirs) reasserted themselves. His brother Qızıl Arslan (1186-1191) tried to combat these disruptive forces as well as the resurgent Iraqi Seljuqid, Togrul III, his nominal overlord. Allied to the 'Abbasid Caliphate which was also making a bid to regain its secular authority, he was proclaimed Sultan, but was murdered in 1191. The Iraqi Sultanate did not long survive him. In 1194, Togrul III, the last of his line perished fighting the Xwarazmshah Tekiš who had increasingly injected himself into the ever-widening strife. Thereafter, the Il-Dengizids went into a sharp and irreversible decline.

Thus, one of the principal roadblocks to a continuation of
Georgian expansion had been removed. T'amars early years, however, were also filled with domestic strife. The ailing amir-spasalari and mandaturt'uxuc'esi, Qubasar, her father's loyal servitor, was purged by anti-crown forces. Another Qipchaq official, Qutlu Arslan, the meşurület't'uxuc'esi, with the support of the aristocratic opposition, put forward a proposal to create a kind of parliament which would have greatly limited the power of the crown. The plan was dropped but concessions to the magnates were made. The latter also made their influence felt in the question of her marriage. Against her will, T'amars was married to the Rus' prince Giorgi (=Jurij, son of Andrej Bogoljubskij). The marriage soon collapsed and T'amars took another husband, the Osetin prince Davit' Soslan (of Bagratid origin) in 1189. Giorgi "the Russian" now became the rallying point for a revolt (1191) and subsequently attempted to use the Il-Dengizids to regain the throne. Although the insurrections failed, they were further warning signals of what proved to be fatal, centrifugal forces.

Foreign expansion provided a positive outlet for the energies of the restless Georgian nobles and much of T'amars activity (as well as that of the darbazi, "council of state" that governed with her) focused on the acquisition of neighboring lands. The series of impressive victories won by Georgian arms underscored Georgia's paramountcy in the region. Thus, the defeat of the Il-Dengizid Abu Bakr at Samxor in 1195 and subsequent taking of Ganja gave convincing evidence of Georgia's supremacy in Şirvən and brought some amirs of Arran and Türkmen begs into the Georgian orbit. Attention now shifted to the Armenian lands. The Armeno-Kurdish generals in Georgian service, the Nxargrdzeli brothers, took Ani (1199) which was then given to them as a fief (1201). Dvin was taken in
1203. These victories led to a confrontation with the Seljuqid Sultan of Rûm, Rûkn ad-Dîn, at Basean (in either 1203 or 1204) which ended in a Georgian victory. Georgia now began a protracted struggle (1204-1209) to gain control of the southern Armenian lands under the domination of the Sîkmenid Axlât-Sâhs. Although ultimately unsuccessful in achieving all its goals, some new territories (such as Kars, taken in 1206) came into Georgian hands. This was followed by a massacre of the inhabitants of Ardebil (in retaliation for their attack on Ani) which led, in turn, to a spectacular raid into Azarbayjan and Iran proper (1210). Thus, by the end of T'amâr's reign, the Georgian state extended from Osetia and Dağistan to Armenia. Sirvân and a series of lesser Turkish statelets ringing her borders were vassals, while the Byzantino-Georgian Empire of Trebizond was a client-state.

This "golden age" quickly came to an end. Giorgi IV Laša (1213-1222) managed to suppress the attempts by T'amâr's newly acquired vassals to regain their independence. He was unable to deal, however, with a new steppe force, the Mongols, who appeared here in the winter of 1220-1221. Il-Dengizid Azarbayjan, greatly weakened by internal strife and Xwârazmian conquests, initially bought off the newcomers while attempting to join forces with the Georgians. The Mongol force led by Jebe and Sübe'etay, which had come westward in pursuit of the Xwârazmîsh Muhammad and to gather intelligence, quickly moved against Laša. Various regions of Transcaucasia were devastated in a series of lightning attacks, a preview of future events. The invaders then crossed the Caucasus into the Qipşaq steppes.57

Recovery was prevented by the visitations of still other steppe forces set in motion by the Mongol whirlwind. In 1222-1223, Qipşaq
refugees caused disturbances in Azarbajjan. The was soon followed by the appearance of Jalâl ad-Dîn, heir to the now destroyed Khvârazmshâh state, in 1225. A brilliant general but myopic statesman, Jalâl ad-Dîn, rather than create an anti-Mongol coalition, set out to conquer and plunder the region. Georgia, now ruled by Rusudan (1223-1245), Laša's sister, seemed to welcome the confrontation. The Khvârazmians destroyed the Il-Dengizids and repeatedly ravaged Georgia. Halted by a coalition led by the Seljuqs of Rûm, Jalâl ad-Dîn died (1231) in Kurdistan whither he had fled the advancing Mongols. The Khvârazmian "Interlude" was entirely negative in its consequences, precluding the possibility of effective resistance to the Mongols in lands already thoroughly scourged by war.

In the following decade (1231-1240), the Mongols, spreading everywhere "like clouds of locusts," took control of Transcaucasia. "The entire country," Kirakos Gandzakec'i notes, "was filled with the corpses of the dead and there were no people to bury them." With their defeat of the Seljuqs of Rûm at Köse Dağ in 1243, the Mongols became masters of much of Anatolia as well. Within the Georgian realm, the Armeno-Georgian military aristocracy fled to their castles or the impenetrable mountains and forests and soon submitted. Queen Rusudan found sanctuary in the difficult terrain of Western Georgia. From here she sought to take advantage of internal Mongol divisions, preferring to offer her submission to the more distant Batu. The Mongols, however, were better able to exploit Georgian domestic disputes by playing off against one another Ulu Davit' (Laša's illegitimate son) and Rusudan's son Davit' Marin.

Current scholarly opinion discerns two tendencies that were operative during the period of Mongol domination. One, termed the "Old Mongol" or "Nomadic" tradition, viewed the conquered lands as
occupied territory to be mercilessly and quickly exploited. This
was a policy of "instant gratification" which often led to sizable
pockets of anarchy. The other tendency, represented in the Near
East by the Iranian bureaucracy (and in China by the Uyghur and Qitan
traditions of statecraft) sought to create a centralized monarchy
which would regulate the "shearing of the flock". This not only
curbed centrifugal elements within the nomadic tribal confederation,
but prevented the rapid exhaustion of the resources of a region and
made possible a long and leisurely harvesting of the local riches.

The Mongol ideology, about which our local sources were well-
informed, was premised on the belief that it was God's will that
the Činggisids rule the earth. On a more concrete level, Činggisid
domination was best realized by encouraging regional and separatist
forces in the conquered kingdoms. This policy was pursued with con-
siderable success in Rus' and Transcaucasia. Basic political and
social structures were left intact and the local church, often the
only surviving truly national institution, was subtly co-opted. The
insecurity of the subject rulers and their often semi-independent
vassals was heightened by the requirement to journey to the distant
supreme Qagan to personally receive the yarliq confirming their sta-
tus and by sudden and inexplicable shifts of favor. Meanwhile, re-
gardless of the mode, the conquered lands were systematically de-
spoiled by Mongol tax-collectors and their henchmen who were often
recruited from the traditional enemies of the land in which reve-
nenue was being collected.

The Mongols and the sizable Turkic elements they brought in
with them from Inner and Central Asia were numerically inferior to
the local Georgian and Armenian forces. Hence, the Mongols sought
to incorporate into their armies the large number of Turkic nomads
and semi-nomads concentrated in Azarbayan and Anatolia, whose numbers had been swelled by the arrival of Öğuz and other Turkic groups from Central Asia. This was in keeping with traditional techniques of nomadic state-building. It was somewhat less successful here than in the Qipçaq or Transoxanian steppes as Türkmen resistance, flight to the frontiers and general lawlessness attest. In part, this was undoubtedly the result of the breakdown of the tribes themselves, reflected in a diffused pattern of settlement stretching from Xurâsan to the Byzantine borders, to which Seljuq rule had contributed.

The Il-xanid ("Xan of a subject polity") realm established by Hülegü (after 1256) in the Near East and Transcaucasia did little to change this pattern. Indeed, local centrifugation was further encouraged. While rapacious tax-collectors bore off the material wealth of the region, Armenian and Georgian forces were forced to participate in the relentless drive to acquire new territories and later in the struggle of the Ilxanids against the Golden Horde. In keeping with steppe tradition, vassals newly joined to the tribal confederation, were placed in the front ranks to absorb the heaviest losses in combat. Thus, Mongol rule, while allowing for considerable autonomy (which furthered its policy of "divide and conquer") took a great toll in lives and treasury.

Mongol interventions in Georgian dynastic politics further splintered the already weakened monarchy: Some of the princely domains, such as Samc'xe under the Jaqeli family, were evincing ominous signs of virtual secession by the late thirteenth century. Continuing struggles at the Il-xanid court also had negative reverberations in Georgia and Armenia. With the mass conversion of the Mongols to Islam (their Turkic subjects were Muslims of long-standing) during the reign of Gazan (1295–1304), the last barriers to
religious persecution fell. Disturbances in Georgia followed (1297). Serious persecutions took place during the reign of Öljeytü (d. 1317) but appear to have slackened under his successor Abu Sa'id (1317-1335), the last Il-xanid ruler of any note. It is unclear whether the Georgian king, Giorgi V Broqinval, "the Resplendent" (1314-1346), who worked closely with the amir Čoban, a leading figure under Abu Sa'id, actually succeeded in unifying the Georgian realm. In any event, his and the neighboring lands could not escape the anarchy that accompanied the Il-Xanid collapse after the death of Abu Sa'id. In the morass of the Čobanid-Jalayirid struggle for control of the Il-xanid legacy, a contest which was further exacerbated by the brief invasion of Azerbaijan by Janibeg of the Golden Horde (in 1357-58), the ruination of the region and further disintegration of authority continued. The Armenian magnate families (e.g. the Zak'arids/ξaξargrdzeli), who had kept alive the idea of Armenian statehood within the Georgian pan-Transcaucasian monarchy, now fade from the scene. They were replaced by Turkish begs.

The brief period of Jalayirid ascendancy under Sultan Uways (1356-1374), undistinguished by any growth in stability, soon gave way to the wholesale slaughters which attended Timur's invasions (1386-87, 1394-96, 1399-1403). These incursions were immediately followed by those of the Türkmen tribal confederations, the Qara Qoyunlu and Aq Qoyunlu. The Georgian kingdom experienced still further fragmentation, leading to the development of the T'avadni or independent princes as the most important element in the land.

By the middle of the fifteenth century, the Ottomans had begun to encroach on the Abxaz coast. Transcaucasia was soon transformed into the battleground of two new Turkic states: the Sunni Ottomans and the Ši'î Safavids. The region was alternately or simultaneously
dominated by one or the other, with the Ottomans predominant in the western zone and the Șafavids in the east. The Caucasus as a whole became an important source for Ottoman and especially Șafavid military slaves. Indeed, the Șafavid Qullarağas was usually a Georgian. All of Christian Transcaucasia was now subjected to profound Turkic cultural and linguistic influences.

In keeping with Turkic and Islamic traditions, the Christian states retained considerable autonomy. This was, perhaps, more true of Șafavid rule which was less stable and not as centralized.

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The history of Turko-Transcaucasian relations may be divided into three broad periods. The first (Hunno-Khazar phase), characterized by destructive raids and brief occupations of certain regions, most seriously affected the weakest of the three Transcaucasian polities: Albania. It undoubtedly contributed to the more complete integration of this region into the Caliphate. The second (Seljuq phase) saw the complete absorption of Azarbayjan, i.e. its Turkicization. The Seljuq presence also crushed any hope for a revival of Armenian statehood, the loss of which, however, should be ascribed to Byzantine policies. The surviving state, Georgia, in responding to the shock underwent a remarkable recovery. For a brief period it created a pan-Transcaucasian monarchy, dominating the entire region. The third (Mongol phase) proved fatal to it as well. Mongol rule, by encouraging centrifugation on the part of the great aristocratic houses, a factor which had always been barely controlled by central authority in Armenia and Georgia, fatally undermined national unity in Georgia and ultimately destroyed those same magnate clans in Armenia.

The Ottoman-Șafavid period, thus, although extremely significant in terms of cultural influences, constitutes, in effect, a protracted post-script to the history of the decline and fall of the Transcaucasian Christian polities.
NOTES


9. On the Juan-Juan-Avar connection, see Czeglédy, Nomád népek, chaps.IV-VI where all the available data is gathered and A. Kollautz, F. Miyakawa, Geschichte und Kultur eines völkerwanderungszeitlichen Nomadenvolkes (Klagenfurt, 1970), I, pp.134ff.


18. Dunlop, Khazars, pp.81-4; Artamonov, Ist. Xazar, pp.218-222; Bunijatov, Azerbajdzhan, pp.106-112.

19. K'art'lis C'xov., I, p.251; I. Jawaxišvili, K'art'veli eris istoria (T'biliisi, 1965-1966), II, pp.82,92-3. The conversion of the Khazar ruling house to Judaism in the late eighth cen-
tury (see al-Mas'ūdī, Muraqqa, ed. Pellat, I, p.212) may also be viewed as a sign of Khazar independence of both Baghdad and Constantinople.

20. At-Tabari, ed. Ibrāhīm, VIII, pp.269-70


26. The literature on the origins of the Seljuqs is too extensive to be cited here. A good introduction to the problem may be found in S.G. Agadžanov, Očerki istorii Öguzov i Turkmen Srednej Azii IX-XIII vv. (Ašxabad, 1969), esp. chap. IV; C.E. Bosworth, The Ghaznavids (Edinburgh, 1963), chap. IX; Cl. Cahen, "Le Malik-namah et l'histoire des origines Seljukides" Oriens, 2 (1949) and in his Pre-Ottoman Turkey, trans. J. Jones-Williams (New York, 1968),pp.19ff.


31. K'art'. C'xov., I, pp.302-4; Aristakes Lastiverto'ı, trans. Juzbašjan, pp.86-88, 94-5; Minorsky, Studies, pp.57, 60-2; Mattios Uşhayec'ı, Fatmut'ıwı: Urfalı Hattıos Vekayinesi (952-1136) ve Papaz Grigor'un zeyli (1136-1162), Turk. trans. H. Andreasyan (Ankara, 1962), pp.8-9. Liparit, upon his return, took part in a rebellion against Bagrat, was captured, tonsured and subsequently sent off to Byzantium (K'art'. C'xov., I, pp.304-5). The Seljuq house was also troubled by discontented magnates. İbrahim Yimal revolted in 1050. Agağanov (Ocerki, pp.216-7) has argued that the result of these revolts was the expansion of the İstat system as a means of keeping the Türkmen aristocracy well-disposed towards the dynasty.


35. Minorsky, Sharvān and Darband, Arab text, pp.12-14, trans. 35-8 al-Husaini, Axbār, p.44.

36. K'art'. C'xov., I, p.320, see also Şengelia, Selç'ukebi, pp.301ff.

38. K'art'. C'xov., I, p.315 which also (p.316) terms Malikşah "the enemy of all Christians." Armenian sources, however, have a positive view of Malikşah (cf. Matt'os Urvayec'i, trans. Andreasyan, p.146; Kirakos, Gandzakec'i, Fatmut'ınn Eayoc': Kirakos Gandzakeci, Istorija Armenii, trans. L.A. Xaniljan, Moskva, 1976, p.89).


42. Cf. Abu'l-Xazif, Sajara-yi Tar'akima/Rodoslovnya Turkmenc, ed. trans. A.H. Kononov (Moskva-Leningrad, 1958), Turkic text, p.64: "The Seljuqs said 'we are Turkmen, we are brothers,' but no benefit came to the polity (il) or people. Before becoming Pəd-i Sāhs, they said 'we are of the Qınıq Türkmen,' but after becoming Pəd-i Sāhs they said 'a son of Afrasiyab fled from Kaykusraw to the Turkmen clan of the Qınıq and he grew up and remained (with them). We are his sons, from the lineage of Afrasiyab..."


44. Sengelia, Selc'u kebi, pp.340ff.; Mesxia, Didgorskaja bitva, pp.26-7,56; K'art'. C'xov., I, p.326: "He neither paid the xaraj to the Sultan nor could the Turks winter in K'art'lı." A good account of Davit's activities may be found in M.D. Lordkipanidze, Istorija Gruzii XI-načala XIII vecka (Tbilisi, 1974), pp.88-126. His political program is analyzed in V. Abašmadze, Markvevebi Sak'art'velo's velos politikur modžyvrebat'a i storiiidan (Tbilisi, 1969), chap. III.

45. K'art'. C'xov., I, pp.344-5. On the thorny question of the nature of Sirvanian-Georgian relations, see M. Asat'iani, "Sak'art'velo-Sirvanis politikuri urt'ier't oba XII saxunyus" XII saxunus sak'art'velo istoriis sakit'ixebei, ed. S.A. Mesxia (Tbilisi, 1968), pp.7-54 and Z.M. Bunijatov, Gosudarstvo atabekov Azerbajdzana (Baku, 1978), chap. IV.


47. K'art'. C'xov., I, pp.335-7. The horde of At'rak'a/Otrok was part of the confederation known in Rus' as the Polovci diki, see P.B. Golden, "The 'Polovci Diki' Eucharisterion (Omeljan Fritsak Festschrift), ed. I. Sevčenko (in press).

48. On the eastern Anatolian beyliks, see O. Turan, Doğu Anadolu
49. The complexities of the struggle for Ani have been meticulously analyzed by Minorsky, Studies, esp. pp. 80-106. Although the struggle was occasionally marked by savagery (e.g. the bey of Arzan, Qurt; b. Toğan Arslan, is reputed to have built a minaret of Georgian skulls, see Turan, Doğu Anadolu, p.8), Muslim rule, such as that of the Saffādīds in Ani, was often characterized by significant cultural and material advances, see I.A. Orbeli, Gorodišče Ani e ego raskopki in his Izbrannye-frudy (Revan, 1963) p.7. On Sirvan, see the studies of Asat’iani and Bunijatov, n.45.

50. Bunijatov, Gos. atabekov, pp. 77-95.


52. K’art'. C'xov., II, pp.35-6. He was at that time hiding from his uncle Savaлат'(Vsevolod "Boľ'soe Gnezdo") in the city of the Cuman xan Sevinc. Jurij's paternal grandmother was a Cuman princess; another example of the complex qipčaq-Georgian ties.


54. Minorsky, Studies, pp.102-03. On the conquests of the Xxargrdzeli see Kirakos Gandzakec’i, trans. Xanlarjan, pp.118-9. Babajian (SEP Ist. Arm., pp.14-23) has argued that this was actually an Armenian kingdom which the Georgians helped to revive and with which they had a suzerain-vassal relationship. This thesis has been questioned by Bunijatov (Gos. atabekov, p.14) and Lordkipanidze, (Istoriija, p.174).


57. Our most important source is Jalāl ad-Dīn’s biography, Sīrat as-Sultān Jalāl ad-Dīn Mankūbirī by Sihāb ad-Dīn an-Nasawī. A critical edition of the text prepared by Z.M. Bunijatov which will supersede the edition of O. Houdas (Paris, 1891) has not yet appeared. Bunijatov’s Russian translation, however, is available: Türk devletleri tarihi (Istanbul, 1973). The Il-Dengizids are exhaustively treated in Bunijatov’s Gos. atabekov.
59. According to Ibn al-Atīr (XII, p.435), the Georgians wrote to Jalāl ad-Dīn, commenting that the Mongols had destroyed his father's realm but "we, however, did not attribute great significance to them and which they thought about most was to get away from us entirely.''


62. Grigor Aknerc'i : History of the Nation of the Archers (the Mongols) by Grigor of Akanc', Arm. text, Eng. trans. R.P. Blake, H.N. Frye in the Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 12 (1949), Arm. text, p.300, trans. 301: "It is the will of God that we take the earth and maintain order and impose the (y)asax (= yassaq/yasa) ..." Cf. the comments of Kirakos Gandzakec'i, trans. Xanlarjan, p.173: "They usually say the following: their sovereign is a kinsman of God who has taken heaven as his appanage and given the earth to the Xak'an (=Qagan) ..." See also the discussion in K. Sager, "Herrschaftsideologie und Friedensgedanke bei den Mongolen" Central Asiatic Journal, XVII (1973), pp.223-242. Kirakos Gandzakec'i apparently learned some Mongolian (see L. Ligeti, "Le Lexique mongol de Kirakos de Gandza" Acta Orientalia Hungarica, XVIII, 1965, pp.241-97) as did the anonymous author of the Georgian Chronograph (Zamt'aagmcrceli : K'art'. C'xov., II, p.159).


64. Németh, HEK, pp.19-20, 234-5.


68. See K. Tabatadze, K'art'veli xalxis brdzola uc'xoel dampqrobt'a cineagmdeg XIV-XV saukuneebis ml'jnaze (Tbilisi, 1974). Tabatadze indicates (pp. 27-37) that Georgia, at this time, was reunited under Bagrat V (1360-1393) and relatively prosperous.

69. On the Qara Qoyunlu, see F. Sümer, Kafa Koyunlular, I (Ankara, 1967). On their rivals, the Aq Qoyunlu, see J. E. Woods, The Aq Qoyunlu. Clan, Confederation, Empire (Minneapolis, 1976).

70. K. Kuc'ia, "Kavkasiuri elementi Sep'iant'a Iranis politikur sarbielze" Maxlobeli Aq'mosavlet'ís is toriis sakit'xebi. ed. V. Gabašvili et al. (Tbilisi, 1963), pp. 66-75.


72. C. Toumanoff, "The Fifteenth-Century Bagratids and the Institution of Collegial Sovereignty in Georgia" Traditio, VII (1949), pp. 169-221, emphasizes, rather, the effects of the Byzantine system of collegial sovereignty as the "decisive factor" in Georgia's decline and fall.