

Non-proliferation and the Dilemmas of Regime Change

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The Iraq war set an important historical precedent by being the first case in which forcible regime change was the means employed to achieve non-proliferation ends. In advocating this unique use of force, the Bush administration asserted that Iraq's disarmament, mandated by the United Nations Security Council after the 1991 Gulf War, necessitated regime change because of Saddam Hussein's unrelenting drive to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD).¹ Although the US and British governments endeavoured to make the case for war based on international law – the Iraqi dictator's flouting of multiple Security Council resolutions – war was ultimately waged without a legitimising UN imprimatur because of the political deadlock over the inherently contentious issue of regime change. Instead the military action was widely characterised in the American media as a decisive, even paradigmatic, application of the Bush administration's September 2002 *National Security Strategy* document, which had formally elevated preemption as a policy option against 'rogue states' and terrorist groups in the post-11 September era.² Viewed through that political optic, the war's successful ousting of Saddam Hussein from power in April 2003 immediately raised the question as to how this precedent-setting case would affect US non-proliferation policy in addressing other hard cases.

President George W. Bush laid down an ambitious marker when he boldly declared that the United States would not 'tolerate' the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran and North Korea – the other two charter members of his 'axis of evil' (now dubbed by one observer as the 'axle of evil'). But how that declaration would be translated into action within an administration openly divided between hardliners and pragmatists remained unclear.³ Some early indicators pointed toward the possible continuation of a muscular approach, as in the bravado of one senior official

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who stated that the message of the Iraq war for Iran's theocratic regime was: 'Take a number'.⁴ But the implementation of such a non-proliferation strategy – one perhaps reflecting the president's own visceral attitudes toward undeniably odious ruling regimes in Pyongyang and Tehran – was frustrated by major constraints on both the use of force and the US' ability to bring about regime change in North Korea or Iran. Prominent among these was the serious credibility crisis for US intelligence created by the failure of coalition forces to find WMD stocks in Iraq. In a political context in which forcible regime change is not feasible and regime collapse is not imminent, the Bush administration has opted to address these proliferation threats through multilateral diplomacy: with North Korea, directly, via the six-party talks (involving South Korea, China, Japan and Russia) and with Iran, indirectly, through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).⁵

The turn toward a diplomatic approach with respect to these two 'rogue states' has required a pragmatic pivot in the administration's post-Iraq policy – a shift in non-proliferation strategy from the initial goal of *regime change and military preemption* to the alternative of *deterrence and reassurance*.⁶ The important component of reassurance as to US intentions toward them was signalled in declarations by senior officials (notably Secretary of State Colin Powell) that the United States seeks compliance with international non-proliferation norms and has no intention of invading or attacking North Korea or Iran. The apparent aim is to signal the two nations that the US objective is behaviour rather than regime change. Yet because of the administration's conflicted attitude toward the two goals of regime change on the one hand and reassurance on the other, Washington continues to send a mixed message. The source of this confusion is the policy tension between the long-term US aspiration for regime change (or profound regime evolution) and the near-term imperative of diplomatic engagement with both countries on the nuclear issue. In managing this tension, a major challenge is ensuring that the deterrence and reassurance components are in sync, so that military moves for purposes of deterrence do not undercut the message of political reassurance and thereby provide a further incentive to two countries to cross the nuclear threshold. As this uncertain alternative approach toward Iran and North Korea unfolds, the proposition that forcible regime change will prove an effective strategy to achieve durable non-proliferation is being tested in post-war Iraq.

Motivations and restraints

Whether or not regime type is a key determinant of proliferation is a subset of the broader and more fundamental question as to why states seek to acquire or, conversely, to forgo the acquisition of, weapons of

mass destruction. Because those decisions, in Benjamin Frankel and Zachary Davis's phrase, 'belong in the same domain', an understanding of core motivations helps to explain why President John Kennedy's famous nightmare vision of a world of 30 nuclear weapon states by the 1970s did not come to pass.⁷ But it also highlights the ominous possibility at this critical juncture of a nuclear 'tipping point', in which the acquisition of nuclear weapons by either Iran or North Korea could shift the calculus of decision in other regional states and prompt them to reconsider their non-nuclear status.⁸

The extensive literature on proliferation motivations has centred, in general, on two distinct sets of factors – the domestic and the international, or what political scientists respectively call the unit and structural levels. Domestic determinants of proliferation range broadly and include national prestige, civil–military relations, economic costs and technological capacity, and leadership psychology and attitudes toward international norms. The international or structural level of analysis focuses on the determined effort by states to ensure their security in what realist political theorists regard as a Darwinian system.⁹ Those eight states that have 'gone nuclear' vary widely, both in their types of domestic political orders and in their regional security environments. Their decisions, as well as those by states forgoing the nuclear option, have been highly context-dependent. The salience of any particular motivational factor and its interaction with others has differed from case to case. Because of this variance, non-proliferation strategies to address the states' core motivations must be targeted to the particular circumstances of each, through what Alexander George has described as an 'actor-specific' approach.¹⁰

During the Cold War, the structure of international relations – bipolarity – was a key factor inhibiting proliferation. Alliances and security guarantees proved highly successful mechanisms for restraining proliferation by addressing the sources of national insecurity that might otherwise have provided a strong incentive for it. Both the United States and the Soviet Union implemented strategies of extended deterrence within their competing alliance systems to assuage the security concerns of their smaller allies. For that reason, NATO, which institutionalised the extended deterrent commitment of the United States, has been called one of the most effective non-proliferation instruments in history. The creation of this collective security community linking America and Europe successfully reassured, and thereby constrained, Germany, whose post-war division had made it the frontline state most vulnerable to Soviet expansionism. Contrary to this general pattern of restraint, Britain and France became nuclear powers largely for reasons of national prestige, while publicly rationalising their programmes as a prudent

hedge against the possible failure of US extended deterrence in some future crisis. The security benefits of bipolarity even affected neutral and non-aligned states such as Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia, which reportedly considered a nuclear option in the 1950s and 1960s, but concluded that their circumstances did not warrant the development of an independent nuclear deterrent.¹¹

US security guarantees also played a critical role in forestalling nuclear proliferation in East Asia during the 1960s and 1970s. The US nuclear umbrella and a bilateral security treaty provided reassurance to Japan in the face of China's development of a nuclear arsenal and large-scale Soviet naval deployments in the Pacific. With Taiwan, the US move to bolster its security commitment after the 1978 normalisation of Sino-American relations headed off the revival of Taiwanese interest in a nuclear option. Likewise, in the case of South Korea, an augmented security guarantee, reversing the Carter administration's proposal to withdraw US military forces, along with strong pressure from Washington, was necessary to maintain the country's non-nuclear status.

In addition to alliances and security assurances, three other major factors have promoted nuclear restraint: the international norm against proliferation embodied in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); a radical change in the international environment, leading to the reduction

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of national insecurity; and regime change, through the transition from authoritarian or military regimes to democratically elected civilian ones. In Brazil and Argentina, the transition to democracy and civilian rule was instrumental in terminating covert nuclear weapon programmes under military control and in bringing about the nations' 1994 accession to the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, which had created a nuclear weapons-free zone in Latin America. The South African and Ukrainian cases, discussed below, were ones in which a structural change, the end of the Cold War, led to a profound change at the unit level – regime changes in Pretoria and Kiev – that resulted in the nations' consensual nuclear disarmament.¹² These non-proliferation successes were offset by a major

setback in South Asia, when Indian nuclear weapon tests in May 1998 precipitated a Pakistani counter-response. India's action occurred in the wake of what was, in effect, a regime change in New Delhi – the election of a Hindu nationalist government to power – and not in response to any discernible deterioration in its regional security environment with Pakistan and China.

In South Asia, as in South Africa and the other key cases of the post-Cold War era, regime dynamics played a central role in determining proliferation outcomes. The historical record indicates that regime intention, not regime type, is the critical proliferation indicator. The crux issue is whether regime *change* – whether forcibly imposed from without, as in Iraq, or precipitated by indigenous force from within – will produce a change in regime *intention*. An exploration of that question requires a more rigorous understanding of the woolly concept of regime change.

Regime change or evolution?

The Iraq war to oust Saddam Hussein reinforced the widespread, but misleading, connotation of regime change as representing a sharp split between old and new. Instead, for policy analysis, the term should be viewed as embodying a dynamic process that occurs along a continuum of change. Total change – through war (Germany and Japan) or revolution (China and Iran) that not only removes the regime leadership but also transforms governmental institutions – is rare. More commonly, the degree of change is limited, as when a newly elected political party undertakes a significant policy shift, or when one leader supplants another in an authoritarian regime. Leadership is perhaps the key determinant of change, affecting its pace and extent, or indeed influencing whether it will be undertaken at all.

Strikingly, the most important instance of regime change in the latter half of the twentieth century was accomplished through neither revolution nor war in the Soviet Union under President Mikhail Gorbachev. At the outset of the Cold War, in his famous 1947 ‘X’ article in *Foreign Affairs*, George Kennan had enunciated his doctrine of containment, of which the core premise was a concept of political change for the Soviet Union. In this conception, containment was essentially a long-term holding process by the United States and its allies to balance Soviet power until the endemic internal contradictions of the Soviet system became unsustainable and precipitated change. Kennan’s prediction came to pass in the late 1980s through the combination of successful US containment (under President Ronald Reagan in its pivotal final phase), which raised the costs of Soviet adventurism, and the advent of a qualitatively different Soviet leader. Kennan, the architect of containment, declared the end of the Cold War in 1989, arguing that the Soviet Union under Gorbachev had evolved from a revolutionary expansionist state into an orthodox great power. Gorbachev’s grand strategy – a form of regime change by internal evolution – was to integrate a transformed Soviet Union into the liberal international order forged after the Second World War from which the USSR had been substantially isolated.

At the end of the Cold War, realist and liberal political theorists forecast alternative futures. For realists, who focused on a stable balance of power to maintain international peace, the end of the stable bipolar system augured the possibility of a significant increase in the number of states pursuing their security through a nuclear alternative to obsolete Cold War alliances. By contrast, for liberal internationalists, the end of the Cold War promised the possibility of maintaining international peace through the expansion of the community of democracies. The Clinton administration's grand strategy – engagement and enlargement – reflected this neo-Wilsonian approach. Within this schema, US officials delineated four categories of states: advanced industrial democracies; emerging democracies with market economies that aspired to enter the 'advanced' tier; 'failed states'; and 'rogue states', which rejected international norms and were seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

In the non-proliferation realm, the decisions by South Africa and Ukraine to roll back their established nuclear programmes were consistent with the neo-liberal vision of post-Cold War international order. In the South African case, the end of the Cold War, which led to the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and independence for Namibia, created a favourable international environment in which Prime Minister F.W. de Klerk could terminate the nuclear programme and dismantle the country's small arsenal. South Africa's 1989 acceptance of international non-proliferation norms, in tandem with de Klerk's broader domestic political strategy to engineer the country's transition to majority rule, was intended to end the nation's pariah status and permit its reintegration into the international system. A similar motivation explains the successful 1994 outcome in Ukraine, where the successor government to the Soviets faced a stark choice: either retain the nuclear weapons it had inherited after the dissolution of the USSR and be politically estranged from the West, or return the weapons to Russia in exchange for security assurances from the United States, Britain and Russia and the promise of increased economic integration.

The positive outcomes in South Africa and Ukraine, as well as in Brazil and Argentina, offered the promise of a new post-Cold War model: non-proliferation through democratisation, security assurances and integration into the globalised economy of the liberal international order. The realisation of this vision has been frustrated for three reasons. First, the targets of this strategy – notably North Korea and Iran – have been resistant because they view integration as a threat to regime survival. The tangible economic benefits of integration are difficult to insulate from its societal impact. In short, if integration were to succeed, the resulting economic 'soft landing' for the Iranian and North Korean

societies would very likely mean a political 'hard landing' for their ruling regimes. Second, in both states, regime insecurity, rooted in perceptions of a hostile regional environment and a fundamental fear of integration into what they regard as a US-dominated liberal international order, is a strong incentive for proliferation. In the Persian Gulf and northeast Asia, the realist logic of international relations has not been supplanted by the liberal alternative. Indeed, both regions are very possibly at a nuclear 'tipping point': the crossing of the nuclear threshold by Iran or North Korea could prompt one or more regional states to follow suit.

The third roadblock to the liberal internationalist route to WMD disarmament is that democratisation of itself does not suppress other proliferation motivations. Democratisation does increase political transparency, and permit a more open debate on the rationales for a nuclear option. Thus, nuclear restraint in Brazil and Argentina was greatly facilitated by a democratic transition to civilian rule. But, in India, where a different calculus of motivations was at work, the existence of a vibrant democracy proved no barrier to nuclear proliferation; indeed, the newly elected Hindu nationalist government that resumed nuclear testing in May 1998 was catering to public opinion. This case reinforces the conclusion that regime intention, rather than regime type, is the telling proliferation indicator. Regime change or evolution will not necessarily lead to the altering of intentions and nuclear restraint if the underlying motivations for proliferation, which are unrelated to regime character, remain unaddressed.

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Regime change and non-proliferation in Iraq

Were Iraq's WMD programmes purely the manifestation of the megalomania of one man who exercised total control over Iraqi society for a generation? Or were their sources rooted deeper in the country's 'strategic personality' – the long-term geographical, historical and cultural forces that uniquely shape each state's worldview and calculus of decision-making – such that a successor regime to that of Saddam Hussein might be similarly motivated in the future?¹³ The answers bear centrally on the vital post-war challenge of ensuring Iraq's long-term WMD disarmament.

The issue of regime change arose in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War, when the prevailing assumption in the US government (and beyond) was that Saddam Hussein could not survive the ignominious Iraqi military defeat in Kuwait. The Iraqi dictator's surprising political durability over the ensuing dozen years produced a tension between the competing

goals of regime change and policy change in US strategy. The source of this tension was UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687, which established a ceasefire and mandated Iraq's WMD disarmament, but said nothing of regime change. Thus, the bind both for the Clinton and the Bush administrations was that they believed regime change to be both generally desirable and specifically necessary to achieve the disarmament provision of UNSCR 687, but knew that this ambitious objective went far beyond the international consensus. In an effort to reconcile the contradiction between the twin goals of UN-mandated behaviour change and US-preferred regime change in Iraq, President Bush reiterated the tortured formulation enunciated by the Clinton administration: 'the policy of our government ... is regime change – because we don't believe [Saddam Hussein] is going to change. However, if he were to meet all the conditions of the United Nations ... that in itself will signal the regime has changed'.¹⁴

The diametrically opposite outcome of the 2003 UN debate on Iraq from the 1990 debate turned on the core issues of state sovereignty and the legitimacy – and wisdom – of external intervention. In the 1991 Gulf War, Security Council authorisation and the forging of a broad multinational coalition to liberate Kuwait were diplomatically possible because Saddam Hussein had violated the one universally supported international norm: the protection of state sovereignty from external aggression (as one observer colourfully put it, one state should not be permitted to murder another). By contrast, in the rancorous 2003 UN debate in the lead up to war, the attainment of Security Council approval for military action was inherently problematic for the very same reason: compelling Iraqi WMD disarmament through an externally imposed regime change, even if undertaken to enforce a Security Council resolution, would be a precedent-setting negation of state sovereignty.

The primary danger of the Bush administration's strategy of preventive war in Iraq was that the one scenario in which Saddam Hussein was likely to employ WMD – a threat to the survival of his regime – was the very one that was about to play out in March 2003. During the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq forward-deployed chemical munitions, and evidence strongly suggests that Saddam Hussein delegated authority to commanders to use unconventional weapons under certain circumstances. He reportedly believed that his WMD stockpile had deterred the United States from expanding its war aims beyond the liberation of Kuwait and marching on Baghdad to change the Iraqi regime.¹⁵ This accepted understanding from 1991 of the Iraqi dictator's attitudes toward WMD use, as well as his subsequent unwillingness to account fully for the destruction of the unconventional weapons stocks

identified by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in their final 1998 report, supported a pre-war assumption that Saddam Hussein both possessed and would employ WMD in the event of hostilities to oust him.

The strategic surprises of the war were that Iraq did not use WMD during the conflict, despite the regime's survival being on the line, and that, in its aftermath, coalition forces have not found stocks of the unconventional weapons that even UN Security Council opponents of intervention, France and Russia, had believed existed. The explanation remains a matter of intense speculation and political controversy, even as the search for weapons caches and the interviewing of Saddam's cronies and scientists involved in Iraq's WMD programmes by coalition forces continue. Early post-war hypotheses included the possibility that Iraq had transferred its unconventional weapons to Syria, or that WMD caches, hidden in remote sites to prevent detection, did indeed exist but that the rapidity of the US and British military operation prevented their frontline deployment and use. Former UNSCOM chief Rolf Ekeus and others involved in the 1990s inspections have offered the highly plausible explanation that Saddam Hussein retained a 'breakout capacity' – the chemical and biological agents to permit rapid WMD production rather than the actual weapons, which are difficult to store for long periods.¹⁶ This explanation is consistent with the interim report of the 1,200-member Iraq Survey Team, under the directorship of David Kay, which maintains that Saddam Hussein never reversed his intention to acquire WMD and was actively flouting UNSCR 1441, the Security Council's final disarmament resolution, with its threat of 'serious consequences' in the event of Iraqi non-compliance. An extension of this hypothesis, drawing on the 1991 experience, is that Saddam Hussein decided to engender uncertainty about the state of his WMD capabilities, rather than fully comply with UNSCR 1441, because he believed that such ambiguity could possibly deter a US invasion.

In the aftermath of the first war waged to achieve non-proliferation ends, a major goal is to ensure Iraq's successful long-term WMD disarmament. The achievement of that goal will require a targeted strategy that distinguishes between proliferation motivations unique to Saddam Hussein and factors non-specific to his regime – deriving from 'Iraq's 'strategic personality' – that might influence a successor. Saddam Hussein's megalomania, manifested in a pervasive cult of personality and his depiction as a latter-day Saladin, no doubt helped to drive his effort to acquire WMD. His removal is therefore a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a durable non-proliferation outcome. A range of policy instruments, which have contributed effectively to nuclear restraint in

other cases, are available to ensure that an Iraqi interest in unconventional weapons, abandoned with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, is not reactivated. Foremost among these instruments would be a direct US security assurance, some form of which is a certainty once a post-Saddam government is constituted, as well as an appropriate reconstitution of Iraqi conventional military forces. But beyond such moves, the long-term non-proliferation challenge in Iraq must be addressed in its broader regional context. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by another major regional actor, Iran being the obvious candidate, would create a regional security dilemma to which an Iraqi successor regime of whatever political character would be compelled to respond.¹⁷ Forestalling this possibility over the long-term will require a new regional security framework. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein, who was a proximate threat to Iran, created an opening for such a security dialogue, but it has not been exploited because of the intractable state of relations between Washington and Tehran. Instead, as discussed below, Washington sees in Iran's actions confirmation of its status as an 'axis of evil' country, while for the Tehran regime, the combination of US military encirclement and strident rhetoric provides an incentive to accelerate its covert nuclear weapons programme.

US policy: regime change vs reassurance

The Iraq war may turn out to be the high watermark of the Bush administration's strategy of military preemption, which was elevated to official US doctrine with the publication of a new National Security Strategy document in September 2002. This overarching strategy document was the first since the 11 September terrorist attacks. Those attacks did not alter the structure of international relations, but they did usher in a new age of American vulnerability. To prevent another mass casualty attack on American soil, unilateral preemption was called 'a matter of common sense' in the National Security Strategy document. Characterised in the press as a central element of the emerging 'Bush Doctrine', preemption was said to be supplanting the outdated Cold War concepts of deterrence and containment. Secretary of State Colin Powell, seeking to allay concerns, said that preemption had long been part of the panoply of American policy instruments, which also included non-military instruments.

Confusion and controversy surrounded the National Security Strategy's elevation of preemption as a policy option. The administration unveiled an ostensibly general doctrine of preemption, to be undertaken unilaterally when necessary, just as it presented the specific case for multilateral military action against a single state – Iraq – that had been in non-compliance with UN Security Council resolutions for a dozen years. The

presentation of the preemption policy also contentiously linked the terrorism and non-proliferation agendas, on the assumption that a 'rogue state' might transfer WMD to a terrorist group such as al-Qaeda. While military action to avert an imminent terrorist threat enjoys broad international support, no such consensus exists on the use of force against a state violating international norms. Moreover, the US debate misleadingly conflated two terms – preemption and prevention – whose analytical distinction has important policy implications. Preemption pertains narrowly to military action when WMD use by an adversary is imminent, whereas prevention refers to a repertoire of strategies to forestall WMD acquisition through the full spectrum of means, including, in extreme circumstances, the use of force.

These controversial lines of argumentation came together in the administration's justification for coercive regime change in Iraq to achieve WMD disarmament. The administration asserted the existence of a direct link between the Saddam Hussein regime and al-Qaeda. In the words of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, 'Disarming Iraq and the war on terror are not merely related. Disarming Iraq of its chemical and biological weapons and dismantling its nuclear weapons program is a crucial part of winning the war on terror'.¹⁸ Rhetorical excesses, such as occasional references to 'mushroom clouds', conveyed to the public a sense of urgency and imminent threat that required immediate action rather than the continuation of deterrence and containment. In July 2003, the administration acknowledged that what had changed was not the state of Saddam Hussein's WMD capabilities but the willingness of the United States to tolerate the potential threat posed by them in a post-11 September world. Thus, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told a congressional committee, 'The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. We acted because we saw the evidence in a dramatic new light – through the prism of our experience on 9/11'.¹⁹ Because of the conflation of preemption and prevention in the public debate preceding war, the failure to find WMD stocks in post-war Iraq left the administration vulnerable to criticism that it had initiated a preventive war of choice under its new strategic doctrine of preemption.

In addition to not meeting the key criterion of imminent threat, the Iraq war was not an instance of preemption in one other important respect that bears critically on the possible use of force in the ongoing nuclear crises with North Korea and Iran. The origins of the current US preemption policy date to the Clinton administration's 1993 enunciation of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, which was widely interpreted overseas as auguring possible unilateral and preemptive

military strikes against suspected Third World targets producing or housing WMD. To dampen this controversy, the Clinton administration, like the Bush administration later, affirmed that counter-proliferation was embedded within a comprehensive non-proliferation policy that included non-military instruments. Still, the widespread connotation of the term 'counter-proliferation' is of preemptive military attacks on an adversary's WMD assets (Israel's June 1981 strike on Iraq's Osiraq nuclear reactor is often held up as the paradigm). One of the most remarkable aspects of the 2003 Iraq War – a conflict waged to achieve nonproliferation objectives under the administration's new preemption doctrine – is that US military planners reportedly eschewed air strikes on suspected Iraqi WMD sites for fear of releasing chemical or biological toxins into the environment.²⁰ This cautionary wartime experience points to significant constraints on the use of force in counter-proliferation missions such as those currently discussed as options to deal with North Korea and Iran.²¹

Many in the Bush administration regarded the war to oust Saddam Hussein as a demonstration conflict exemplifying the new National Security Strategy. That sentiment was captured in one official's assertion that 'Iraq is not just about Iraq ... It is of a type'.²² But of a type in what respect? Was the administration signalling that the Iraq precedent – coerced non-proliferation through regime change – is relevant to the

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resolution of the nuclear crises with North Korea and Iran? The administration's answer was mixed because of its persisting internal policy divide over the issue of regime versus behaviour change. Hard-liners, such as Under Secretary of State John Bolton, reportedly viewed the war as a stark example that could compel the other axis members to relinquish proscribed WMD lest they face the same fate. Administration pragmatists expressed concern that the preventive war precedent, if characterised as the new paradigm and not as an extraordinary remedy for a unique case, would create an incentive in Pyongyang and Tehran to accelerate, rather than roll back, their nuclear weapon programmes in order to deter an American attack.²³

To assuage concerns about the Iraq precedent vis-à-vis North Korea and Iran, officials reiterated that the administration did not have a 'cookie-cutter' strategy. But critics questioned whether it had a cookie-cutter mindset that would preclude meaningful negotiation.

Maintaining the focus on regime change just after the fall of Baghdad, President Bush declared, against the appropriate backdrop of an F-18 production plant in St. Louis,

By a combination of creative strategies and advanced technology, we are *redefining war* on our terms ... In this new era of warfare, we can target a regime, not a nation ... Terrorists and tyrants have now been put on notice, they can no longer feel safe hiding behind innocent lives.²⁴

By 'redefining war', the Bush administration was boasting of a revolutionary capability that can decapitate a state's ruling regime without inflicting unacceptable collateral damage on the civilian population. This stance ratcheted pressure on North Korea and Iran, as well as, notably, on Syria – an 'axis of evil aspirant' according to a senior State Department official, which was publicly accused by Rumsfeld of 'hostile acts' for providing aid to the Saddam Hussein regime during the war.²⁵

Despite the undoubted preference of hardliners within the administration, as well as neo-imperial proponents outside it, for the vigorous pursuit of regime-change strategies toward North Korea and Iran, serious practical constraints – military, geopolitical, economic and domestic political – intruded. When its visceral preferences for regime change in both countries came up against hard realities by mid-2003, the administration shifted, however reluctantly, to the alternative strategy of deterrence and reassurance. For US policymakers, the implementation of this strategy, emphasising diplomacy and traditional non-proliferation instruments, poses a major challenge. It requires effective policy coordination to ensure that the deterrence and reassurance components are in sync, so that, for example, a military deployment undertaken to bolster deterrence is not perceived by the target state as the prelude to regime-changing preemption. Overplaying the military component can undercut the message of political reassurance, and thereby provide the target state an incentive to maintain and even accelerate its nuclear programme. But in implementing the strategy of deterrence and reassurance, the administration is hampered by, in one observer's words, the unresolved 'competing impulses' at the heart of the policy debate over North Korea and Iran.

Alternative futures, alternative strategies

For US policymakers, the issue of North Korea's and Iran's nuclear programmes is embedded in the broader question of the future evolution of those countries. Just as Kennan's containment strategy took for its premise a concept of political change in the Soviet Union, so too must US strategies in the current crises be informed by realistic assessments of both the alternative political trajectories that North Korea and Iran might take and the probabilities of those trajectories. Is regime collapse imminent?

Can it be externally induced (as some Bush administration officials reportedly believe)? Is a 'soft landing' to reintegrate either nation into the international system possible? These various concepts of societal change create a critical threshold assumption for strategy development and implementation. With North Korea and Iran, the near-term imperative of addressing the states' proliferation threats and the long-term American interest in the transformation of their regimes create a policy tension between objectives on different timelines. This tension can be managed, but not totally resolved, through effective policy coordination to ensure that the non-proliferation component is consistent with the broader strategy to promote regime change – or radical regime evolution.

Iran

The Bush administration has reportedly been unable to complete a presidential directive on Iran, commissioned shortly after Bush took office, because of a persisting interagency policy cleavage.²⁶ Meanwhile, the IAEA's June 2003 report suggesting that Iran's civilian nuclear energy infrastructure masks a covert weapons programme has created an international crisis that commands Washington's attention. For US administrations from Carter to Bush, the challenge of forging a coherent strategy toward Iran has been complicated by the dual nature of political power there since the 1979 revolution – a duality reflected in its very name, the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran exists as a 'republic' in an international system of like states, while its 'Islamic' character asserts a source of legitimacy from outside the state system. This dual identity has produced a schism: Is Iran an 'ordinary' state that accepts the legitimacy of the international system, or a revolutionary state that rejects the norms of a system regarded by hardliners as US-dominated? For the hardliners, led by Supreme Leader Khamenei, revolutionary activism abroad, such as support for Hezbollah, remains an integral part of Iran's identity and a source of legitimacy at home.

Since the revolution, American administrations have periodically sought to engage 'moderates' inside the Iranian regime who purportedly desire to normalise relations with the external world. In the May 1997 election of a popular reformist president, Mohammed Khatami, the Clinton administration perceived an opportunity, which led to its proposal for 'a road map leading to normal relations'.²⁷ The failure of Khatami, after six years in power, to deliver on the reformist agenda in the face of staunch hardliner opposition has generated an internal political backlash from disappointed former supporters. Debate centres on whether he has been unable to implement meaningful reform because he lacks the power, since the Supreme Leader controls the regime's key

institutions, or because, as an integral member of the regime, he lacks the will to do so. The Bush administration does not consider Khatami an agent of political change; no longer is he called Iran's Gorbachev.

Current views of political change in Iran divide into two competing schools – one positing a hard landing leading to regime change, the other projecting a soft landing through regime evolution. The key determinant in these contending concepts of change is the new reality of Iranian politics – a politically energised civil society. Proponents of the hard-landing school regard Iran as being in a pre-revolutionary situation, such as Eastern Europe was in 1989, or Iran itself was in 1979. Soft-landing adherents believe that regime evolution is possible either through the reformists' finally gaining political ascendancy or through pragmatic hardliners' willingness to cut internal and external deals to ensure political survival. The Bush administration has sent mixed signals on which concept of political change is at the heart of its policy. It has not moved toward a Reagan Doctrine-type policy of supporting external insurgents (though some outside the administration do favour support of the Iranian exile group, Mujaheddin-e Khalq, to pressure the Tehran regime). But in its support of Iranian civil society as the agent of change, the administration is divided on whether a politically energised population could bring down the theocratic regime or, alternatively, put pressure on the regime to implement the reformist agenda.

The nuclear crisis is playing out against the backdrop of this broader political struggle in Iran. The challenge for the administration is that the non-proliferation timeline, which is immediate because of the IAEA's recent revelations about Iran's undeclared uranium enrichment facilities, is at odds with the timeline for internal political change. Even among fervent proponents of the hard-landing school, few would argue that the theocratic regime is on the verge of being toppled through a civil society uprising. With regime change not an imminent prospect, and certainly not a threshold assumption upon which prudent policy can be based, the US administration is left with two options for addressing Iran's nuclear programme: military preemption or negotiation. Successful preemptive action would face formidable military and intelligence hurdles in light of Iran's multiple and redundant nuclear facilities. Moreover, a military strike would likely have serious negative political ramifications, triggering an anti-American backlash that could set back the prospects for domestic political reform in Iran by seemingly confirming the hardliners' image of a predatory United States.²⁸

The Bush administration has maintained its unwillingness to engage in bilateral or multilateral negotiations with the Tehran regime. Instead, it prefers to allow the IAEA and the threat of referring the matter to the

UN Security Council to pressure Iran into complying with its Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations. This strategy led the Tehran regime in October 2003 to agree to sign the IAEA's additional protocol for inspections and temporarily freeze its enrichment activities in the face of a hard IAEA deadline. However, the implementation and durability of this arrangement remain open questions because it does not address the underlying motivations of Iran's covert nuclear weapons programme.

After the end of 'major combat operations' in Iraq, the United States, having eliminated the major threat to Iran's security, had an opening for strategic dialogue with the Tehran regime. Instead, Washington's 'take a number' rhetoric gave Iran an incentive to accelerate its nuclear programme as a deterrent. And yet, it is only Iran's quest for nuclear weapons that gives rise to the possibility of an American preemptive military strike on the country. The imperative of addressing Iran's long-term proliferation motivations was underscored by CIA Director George Tenet, who strikingly acknowledged in a February 2003 congressional testimony that those motivations are not regime-specific: 'No Iranian government, regardless of its ideological leanings, is likely to willingly abandon WMD programs that are seen as guaranteeing Iran's security'.²⁹ Thus, even if regime change, which no one believes is imminent, were to occur, this development in itself would not necessarily produce long-term nuclear restraint.

Some have proposed that the United States should engage the current Iranian regime in a 'grand bargain': US security reassurances, a pledge of nonaggression and noninterference, would be exchanged for major, verifiable shifts in Iranian behaviour related to WMD and terrorism.³⁰ Such an arrangement, which faces formidable political obstacles in

Should the US engage Tehran in a 'grand bargain'?

Washington and Tehran, would require a complementary regional security forum to address legitimate Iranian concerns that go beyond the United States. These proposals are necessary, but not sufficient: ultimately, an additional prerequisite to induce long-term nuclear restraint is a change in the terms of debate within Iran itself. The nuclear issue has hitherto been monopolised by the hardliners and characterised as a discriminatory effort by the United States to deny Iran advanced technology permissible under the NPT. Increased political transparency, advocated by the pro-democracy movement, would subject the putative energy and security rationales of the Iranian programme to scrutiny and promote nuclear restraint in the most durable and legitimate way – indigenously.³¹

North Korea

As with Iran, the nuclear challenge with North Korea is embedded in the broader question of political change in that society. But the United States has conducted direct negotiations with the Pyongyang regime – as it has not done with Iran – through the six-party talks to address the current crisis and in an earlier bilateral forum that yielded the October 1994 Agreed Framework. That framework required North Korea, under IAEA supervision, first to freeze activity both at its 5 MW graphite-moderated research reactor and at a related reprocessing facility for separating weapons-grade plutonium from spent reactor fuel, and then to dismantle two larger 50 MW and 200 MW reactors, which, along with the existing reactor, could have produced an estimated 175 kilograms of plutonium per year. In return for this freezing and dismantling of North Korea's nuclear infrastructure at Yongbyon, the United States committed to create an international consortium, KEDO, to construct over the next decade two 'proliferation-resistant' 1,000 MW light-water reactors. In a December 1994 briefing on the agreement, Ambassador Robert Gallucci stated that the US negotiators had focused on 'the real threats to our national security and to regional stability', meaning, in short, 'North Korean access to plutonium'.³² The Clinton administration undertook this limited engagement with North Korea, reluctantly, in the face of no better alternative: military preemption carried the serious risk of triggering a general war on the Korean Peninsula; while economic sanctions would not have stopped North Korea's access to plutonium. An accounting of North Korea's nuclear history – specifically, the 1989–1991 shutdowns of the research reactor that could have yielded 1–2 bombs worth of weapons-grade fissile material – was deferred for years.

The Clinton administration considered the Agreed Framework an instrument to facilitate political change in North Korea. But its inducements for maintaining the Pyongyang regime within the NPT were castigated by US domestic critics as an act of appeasement. After the Cold War, the imploding North Korean economy created an imperative for economic engagement with the outside world. Its nuclear programme was an impediment to improved relations, while also providing its only bargaining chip. Relations with the outside world, particularly the United States, offered the possibility of alleviating that economic crisis, but at a potentially steep political price if such an opening eroded the regime's totalitarian hold over North Korean society. Because the Agreed Framework would help open up the DPRK to the outside world, some Western analysts referred to the KEDO-provided nuclear reactors as 'poison carrots'.

After the conclusion of the Agreed Framework, Clinton administration officials refrained from publicly predicting the demise of the Pyongyang regime. The Clinton administration's decision in 1996 to provide food aid to North Korea signified a change in its 'operational assumptions' about the DPRK.³³ Foremost among these was the assessment that the sudden collapse of North Korea – a hard landing – carried the significant possibility of war on the Korean Peninsula by triggering a final desperate act on the part of the Kim Jong Il regime. The South Korean government shared this view and was additionally concerned, in light of the German experience, about the staggering economic costs of rapid reunification, as well as the uncontrolled movement of refugees to the South. For similar reasons, the Chinese government provided the Pyongyang regime with food and other aid to forestall a collapse. President Clinton and South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, architect of Seoul's 'sunshine policy', sought to reassure the North Koreans of their commitment to peaceful reunification through a soft landing.

In practice, the fear of political contagion has overridden economic necessity. The Kim Jong Il regime has been unwilling to implement economic reforms based on the Chinese model for fear of their political impact. A high-ranking defector, Hwang Jang Yop, who had been the leading theoretician of North Korea's ideology of self-reliance (*juche*), affirmed that for the Pyongyang regime 'politics dominates economics'. Nonetheless, the economic crisis and famine have narrowed the regime's

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options, since it needs international aid.³⁴ This combination of dire need and an unwillingness to implement meaningful economic reform has led the North Koreans to utilise their sole source of negotiating leverage – their WMD and ballistic-missile programmes.

In 1999–2000, the Clinton administration received reports of a covert North Korean uranium enrichment facility, in contravention of the Agreed Framework, even as the administration sought a missile-testing moratorium. During Secretary Madeleine Albright's visit to Pyongyang in October 2000, Kim Jong Il agreed to that moratorium. The North Koreans reportedly offered to permanently end missile testing and exports in return for substantial economic inducements and Albright believed that a deal was within reach as the Clinton administration ended.³⁵ The Bush administration came to office with a grudging commitment to continue the Agreed Framework, but it was highly sceptical of any engagement with North Korea, including that by the Seoul government through the

'sunshine policy'. In the post-11 September period, the administration's designation of North Korea as part of the 'axis of evil' and its enunciation of a preemption doctrine were viewed by the Pyongyang government as a virtual declaration of war.³⁶ North Korea's acknowledgment of the covert uranium enrichment facility in an October 2002 meeting triggered a US suspension of oil supplies that had been stipulated by the Agreed Framework, and a North Korean counter-response of expelling IAEA inspectors, restarting its sole dormant reactor and withdrawing from the NPT.³⁷ While the United States was at war in Iraq in April 2003, the nuclear crisis with North Korea took another major escalatory turn: the Pyongyang regime announced at the six-party talks in Beijing that it had completed reprocessing the previously stored spent fuel rods that could produce fissile material for several nuclear weapons.

During spring 2003, two episodes in particular highlighted the challenge of integrating force and diplomacy. The first surrounded the resumption of North Korean fissile-material reprocessing, which US officials were unable to independently verify. What is striking about the North Korean admission and the Bush administration's non-response is that reprocessing, according to former Secretary of Defense William Perry, had constituted a 'red line' for the Clinton administration in the spring 1994 crisis, the crossing of which could have triggered the use of force, notwithstanding the fear of catalytic war on the Korean Peninsula.³⁸ The Bush administration has set its own less stringent red line: the export of fissile material or a weapon outside North Korea. The second episode occurred when the United States deployed additional bombers to the Korean theatre during the Iraq War to bolster deterrence through an increased military presence.³⁹ To Kim Jong Il, who disappeared from public sight for 50 days, that deployment could have appeared as the prelude to regime-decapitating air strikes, such as were launched against Iraq. One side's deterrence is the other side's preemption.

After the Pyongyang regime's reprocessing claim, Rumsfeld reportedly sent President Bush a memo recommending that the United States should enlist Chinese assistance to oust the Kim Jong Il regime.⁴⁰ The memorandum reflected one of the two contending concepts of political change driving policy options. In this hard-landing approach, the threshold assumption is that the North Korean regime is on the verge of collapse and that an economic strangulation policy, if supported by China, can push the regime over the edge. A variant of this regime-change scenario is that the Chinese could be persuaded to engineer an internal coup that leads to the removal of Kim Jong Il and his immediate entourage, leaving a hard-line but more acceptable alternative in power. But the same factors that precluded a regime change and preemption strategy in the 1990s still

pertain: preemptive military strikes on North Korea's nuclear facilities for 'counter-proliferation' purposes are likely to be indistinguishable to the Pyongyang regime from the initiation of general war; China and South Korea are opposed to a hard landing because they fear its political and economic consequences; and the Kim Jong Il regime has proved resilient and able to insulate itself from the consequences of economic collapse and famine. In any case, regime change is a vain hope in a timeframe relevant to the proliferation issues at hand.

The alternative to the hard-landing regime change strategy is the pursuit of negotiations within the context of the alternative strategy of deterrence and reassurance (to convince Kim Jong Il, in the words of a State Department official, 'that we're not trying to take him out'.)⁴¹ For a president who admitted, 'I loathe Kim Jong Il', reassurance will not come easily, but is necessitated by the circumstances.⁴² Hence, the Bush administration, while rejecting the North Korean call for a nonaggression treaty, agreed in October 2003 to explore mechanisms to provide North Korea with security assurances. To break the impasse, an interim solution might be possible that restores the freeze on North Korea's nuclear facilities pending negotiation of a final resolution.⁴³

The future of Bush administration policy toward North Korea remains uncertain because of the interagency disagreement on whether to change regimes or change behaviour. The administration, which balked for months at the prospect of negotiations, is diplomatically engaged, but whether it would be prepared to go beyond the question of security assurances to implement a more comprehensive version of the Agreed Framework – a so-called 'more for more' engagement approach in which the verifiable rollback of North Korea's nuclear programme would be exchanged for tangible incentives – is unclear.⁴⁴ The underlying assumption is that, while providing a near-term resolution of the nuclear issue, the approach will promote a process of political change in North Korea through expanded contact. The challenge, of course, as witnessed in the food aid programme would be to ensure that the benefits of engagement are not hoarded by the regime and actually penetrate the broader society. A revived soft-landing strategy is likely to face strong resistance from hard-landing proponents, who would view this alternative strategy as propping up an odious regime that is vulnerable to collapse.

Resolving the dilemmas

The perennial mantra of American policymakers is that diplomacy and force should be effectively integrated. In the aftermath of 'major combat operations' in Iraq, debate focuses on what implications the world will draw from the Iraq case and, as important, what lessons Washington will

take from the experience. The question most often asked – whether the Iraq experience of forcible regime change to accomplish non-proliferation objectives is replicable elsewhere – begs a prior one: will regime change per se lead to durable proliferation restraint? In addressing that key threshold question in the context of the unfolding nuclear crises with North Korea and Iran, the historical record, across a wide range of cases, offers relevant insights for policymakers into the calculus of decisions by states to acquire or forgo nuclear weapons (and WMD, more broadly), and into the development of targeted strategies to forestall their acquisition.

Regime intention, not regime type, is the critical proliferation indicator. Proliferation is not unique to a particular type of regime – democratic, authoritarian or military. The current roster of nuclear weapon states, as well as those seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, represents the full range of regime type. Democratisation can increase political transparency and accountability, as well as facilitating open debate and scrutiny of motivations, but will not, of itself, restrain proliferation. Indeed, a majority of the states in the nuclear club are established democracies.

Regime change per se will not lead to durable non-proliferation if the underlying motivations are not addressed. Proliferation arises not from regime character but from a range of domestic and international or systemic factors. Some factors may be regime-specific, as in the personal megalomania of Saddam Hussein, which was a driving force behind the Iraqi WMD programmes. But other factors would motivate a regime of whatever political character. Even if regime change occurs, durable non-proliferation will not be achieved unless those general motivations are addressed through a range of available instruments, such as security assurances and alliances.

The near-term, often imminent non-proliferation issue is embedded in the larger question of the long-term political trajectory of the target state; the non-proliferation component must be consistent with that broader strategy for political change in the target state. The non-proliferation and regime change (or regime evolution) issues are operating on different timelines. In dealing with an imminent proliferation threat, policymakers cannot wait for a long-term political process to play out. In a context where preemption is not an option, such waiting is the functional equivalent of acquiescing to proliferation.

Non-proliferation policy should not be premised on the assumption of imminent regime collapse. The Iraq case is a cautionary experience as, even after more than a decade of economic sanctions, Saddam Hussein could not be

ousted from within. The North Korean regime, despite economic implosion and famine, has similarly proved far more durable than was expected. Such regimes, however inept in executing the functions of government, are adept at ensuring their sole priority – survival – by insulating key constituencies (such as political cronies and the military) from the tangible consequences of their pariah status. Strategies to sever the link between the regime and its core constituencies are difficult to fashion and implement.

In the current crises, North Korea and Iran should be presented with a structured choice – and not be pushed into a choice. In these cases where regime change and preemption are not practical options, the alternative is a strategy of deterrence and reassurance. The regimes should be presented with a stark choice between the tangible benefits of behaviour change and the penalties for non-compliance. The military components of American power should be used to induce the target state to choose the option of behaviour change. Leaving these regimes a political exit by being prepared to provide a security guarantee of nonaggression and noninterference is a central aspect of reassurance. The challenge for the Bush administration is whether its rhetoric and policies – the ‘axis of evil’ speech, the preemption doctrine and the St Louis speech ‘redefining war’ to permit targeting regimes rather than civilian populations – have priced the administration out of the reassurance market.

Implementing a strategy of deterrence and reassurance requires effective policy coordination to ensure that the two components are in sync. Thus, for example a military deployment undertaken to bolster deterrence should not be mistaken by the target state as the prelude to regime-changing preemption. An overplaying of the military component can undercut the message of political reassurance, and thereby provide the target state an incentive to maintain and even accelerate its nuclear programme. In the current era, policymakers who seek to integrate force and diplomacy face no greater challenge than managing the tension between deterrence and reassurance.

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Notes

- ¹ In the non-proliferation field, after the Cold War and the 1991 Gulf War, the traditional primary focus on nuclear weapons was broadened into the rubric 'weapons of mass destruction', which also encompassed biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery (both ballistic and cruise missiles).
- ² White House, 'The National Security Strategy of the United States of America', September 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>.
- ³ David Sanger, 'To-Do List: 1) What Not to Tolerate. 2) What That Means', *New York Times*, 31 August 2003, section 4, p. 4.
- ⁴ Sonni Efron, 'War with Iraq – Diplomacy: Looking Past Baghdad to the Next Challenge', *Los Angeles Times*, 6 April 2003, p. 10.
- ⁵ International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 'Proliferation Challenges: Dealing with Iran and North Korea', *Strategic Comments*, vol. 9, no. 7, September 2003.
- ⁶ The effectiveness of combining deterrence and reassurance is discussed in Stephen Walt, 'Containing Rogues and Renegades: Coalition Strategies and Counterproliferation', in Victor A. Utgoff (ed.), *The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, US Interests, and World Order* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), p. 224; and Alexander L. George, 'The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of Adversaries', in Barry R. Schneider and Jerrold M. Post (eds), *Know Thy Enemy: Profiles of Adversary Leaders and Their Strategic Cultures* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center, November 2002), pp. 275–276 ff.
- ⁷ Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel (eds), *The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread (and What Results)*, special issue of *Security Studies*, vol. 2, nos. 3–4, Spring–Summer 1993, p. 2.
- ⁸ Author's conversation with Mitchell B. Reiss.
- ⁹ For analyses of the motivations to acquire or give up nuclear weapons see Scott D. Sagan, 'Rethinking the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation: Three Bomb Models in Search of a Bomb', in Utgoff (ed.), *The Coming Crisis*, pp. 17–50; Davis and Frankel (eds), *The Proliferation Puzzle*; Tanya Ogilvie-White, 'Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate', *Nonproliferation Review*, Fall 1996, pp. 43–60.
- ¹⁰ Alexander George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), part I.
- ¹¹ Benjamin Frankel, 'The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation', in Davis and Frankel (eds), *The Proliferation Puzzle*, pp. 45–51.
- ¹² For detailed post-Cold War case studies of nuclear restraint or reversal see Mitchell Reiss, *Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities* (Washington: Wilson Center Press/Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).
- ¹³ According to Caroline F. Ziemke, Philippe Loustaunau, and Amy Alrich, strategic personality 'focuses on

broad historical and cultural patterns that evolve over the whole course of a state's history (its historical plot) and identifies the fundamental consistencies in its long-term strategic conduct in order to shed light on how they might shape its current and future strategic decisions. The methodology is not deterministic and, hence, not precisely predictive'. See *Strategic Personality and the Effectiveness of Nuclear Deterrence* (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, November 2000), p. ES-1.

- ¹⁴ White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 'President Discusses Foreign Policy Matters with NATO Secretary', 21 October 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021021-8.html>.
- ¹⁵ Amatzia Baram, 'An Analysis of Iraqi WMD Strategy,' *Nonproliferation Review* 8, no. 2, Summer 2001, pp. 34–35. Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, 'Saddam's Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars', in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James J. Wirtz, *Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 73.
- ¹⁶ Rolf Ekeus, 'Iraq's Real Weapons Threat', *Washington Post*, 29 June 2003, p. B7; Jonathan Tucker, 'Iraq', in *Proliferation Challenges after Iraq*, a conference report on a US Army Eisenhower National Security Series workshop co-organised by the Division of International Studies, Woodrow Wilson Center and the Reves Center for International Studies, The College of William and Mary, 24 June, 2003; online at <https://www.eisenhowerseries.com>.
- ¹⁷ Tim Trevan, 'Iraq', in *Proliferation Challenges after Iraq*.
- ¹⁸ Quoted in Barton Gellman and Walter Pincus, 'Iraq's Nuclear File: Depiction of Threat Outgrew Supporting Evidence', *Washington Post*, 10 August 2003, p. A9.
- ¹⁹ Steve Schifferes, 'Rumsfeld brushes aside WMD fears', *BBC News online*, 9 July 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3054423.stm>.
- ²⁰ David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, 'Allies Say They Took Iraqi Posts Early to Prevent Use of Chemical and Biological Arms', *New York Times*, 23 March 2003, p. B5. According to this report, US and Australian special forces seized or blew up Iraqi command posts to prevent the transmission of orders to use chemical and biological weapons.
- ²¹ For a discussion of the constraints on force as an instrument of non-proliferation policy see Robert S. Litwak, 'The New Calculus of Pre-emption', *Survival* 44, no. 4, Winter 2002–03), pp. 53–80. The Osiraq case, far from being a paradigm, was a rare instance in which all the conditions for success were present – specific and highly reliable intelligence, and the negligible risk of collateral damage and retaliation.
- ²² David E. Sanger, 'Viewing the War as a Lesson to the World', *New York Times*, 6 April 2003, p. B1.
- ²³ *Ibid.* The negative consequences of preventive war are also discussed in Joseph Cirincione, 'Can Preventive War Cure Proliferation', *Foreign Policy*, July/August 2003, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com>
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- ²⁵ Guy Dinmore, 'Rogue States: One down, six to go in US terror Battle,'

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- ²⁶ Michael Dobbs, 'Pressure Builds for President to Declare Strategy on Iran', *Washington Post*, 15 June 2003, p. A20.
- ²⁷ Barbara Crossette, 'Albright in Overture to Iran, Seeks a "Road Map" to Amity,' *New York Times*, 18 June 1998, p. A1.
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- ³⁰ See Geoffrey Kemp, 'How to Stop the Iranian Bomb', *National Interest*, no. 72, Spring 2003. Kemp characterises this approach as 'constructive containment'.
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- ³² Federal News Reuter Transcript Service, Ambassador-at-Large Robert Gallucci at the Secretary's Open Forum, 'North Korea and National Security', 12 December 1994.
- ³³ Cited in Koh, 'American Perspectives on Regime Dynamics in North Korea', in Moon (ed.), *Understanding Regime Dynamics in North Korea* (Seoul, Korea: Yonsei University Press, 1998), p. 101.
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- ³⁵ Jonathan D. Pollack, 'The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework', *Naval War College Review* LVI, no. 3, Summer 2003, p. 23.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 28.
- ³⁷ IISS, 'Proliferation Challenges: Dealing with Iran and North Korea'.
- ³⁸ William J. Perry, 'It's Either Nukes or Negotiation', *Washington Post*, 23 July 2003, p. A23.
- ³⁹ Thom Shanker, 'Lessons from Iraq Include How to Scare North Korean Leader', *New York Times*, 12 May 2003, p. A17.
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- ⁴¹ Quoted in *Ibid.*
- ⁴² Quoted in Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), p. 340.
- ⁴³ IISS, 'Proliferation Challenges: Dealing with Iran and North Korea'.
- ⁴⁴ See, for example, Alan D. Romberg and Michael D. Swaine, 'The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: A Strategy for Negotiations', *Arms Control Today*, May 2003, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_05/rombergswaine_may03.asp.

