Syrian Refugees: Lessons from Other Conflicts and Possible Policies

Rochelle Davis,
Former Fellow, Woodrow Wilson Center and Associate Professor of Cultural Anthropology, Georgetown University

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As the violence and conflict intensifies in Syria, it is important to remember the growing movement of displaced persons and refugees. The recent experiences of Iraqis, Libyans, and Palestinians offer lessons on how to address the needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees and how the host countries and the humanitarian aid community can respond in ways that help them without creating further problems.

Immediately aiding those fleeing the violence is one clear way that the international community can provide limited measures of safety and assistance to civilians without wading into the treacherous trap of military intervention. The regime of Bashar al-Assad has proven itself unwilling to halt the vicious attacks on the population and, despite widespread condemnation, continues bombarding neighborhoods, towns, and cities as it tries to quell the uprising. The recent revelations that Saudi Arabia and Qatar are helping to fund the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is advising the FSA from southern Turkey indicate that the fighting will continue.1 Any direct military intervention in the country would mimic what took place in Libya: while not necessarily preventing more deaths, it would ensure victory for a side we know little about and do not understand at all. Given the lack of a clear perspective on what is happening on the ground and reports of widespread and serious mistrust of the FSA’s tactics and ideology, ensuring civilian safe areas both inside and outside the country is a well-grounded and necessary project for the international community.

Refugees and the Displaced

The surrounding countries, local organizations, and international community have already stepped in to aid civilians. As of August 1, 2012, over 123,000 Syrian refugees have been registered outside Syria by either the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the Turkish government, with untold numbers more unregistered and/or displaced inside Syria.2 Figures from the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) as of June 22 estimate that the internally displaced include “350,000 people in northern Idlib province and some 250,000 in the city of Homs, where more than 100 public buildings have been turned into temporary shelters for the homeless.”3 By August, SARC was estimating 1.5 million people in need of assistance. Until mid-summer, Aleppo and Damascus had hosted thousands of the displaced from Homs, Qudsya, Douma, Deraa, among other places, and local activists and charities had been gathering supplies and donations and encouraging people to rent out spaces for low rents to those fleeing the violence.4 As the fighting and bombing intensifies in Aleppo and Damascus, those who took safety there, along with those cities’ residents, are now fleeing in much larger numbers and across borders. The fourth week of July alone saw more than 1000 people per day registering with UNHCR or the government of Turkey.
The number of Syrian refugees has more than tripled since April 1, 2012.5 In Jordan, 37,615 refugees are currently registered with UNHCR, and aid groups report providing assistance to an additional 13,000.6 The Turkish government has taken responsibility for all of the Syrian refugees within its borders (44,038 as of August 1, 2012). According to the UNHCR, “The Turkish Government has declared a temporary protection regime for Syrians, the core elements include: i) open border policy with admission to the territory for those seeking protection, ii) protection against forcible returns (non-refoulement) iii) access to basic registration arrangement, where immediate needs are addressed.”7 Most of the Syrians in Iraq are located in the Kurdistan region (Duhuk, Erbil, and Sulaymania governorates), with 8,445 registered with UNHCR.8 An additional 2,349 have crossed into Iraq and are just across the border in al-Qaim in Anbar province as of late July.9 And in Lebanon, 33,382 are registered with UNHCR, with another 1,700 awaiting registration. They are distributed throughout the country (see Figure 1 below)10

Figure 1: Distribution of Syrians in Lebanon – 25 July 2012

The governments of Jordan and Lebanon are cooperating with UNHCR, UNICEF, and other non-governmental and local institutions to provide assistance to the refugees, including access to governmental educational facilities. In Jordan, Syrian refugees are being addressed within the same emergency response system as Iraqi refugees, who since 2006 have been able to access both non-governmental and governmental services (health and education) through coordinated cooperation among funders, UN bodies, government ministries, non-governmental organizations, and local community-based organizations. The Jordanian government has made provisions for temporary refugee camps near its northern border—which it did not do for the Iraqi refugees that came in the tens of thousands in 2006-2009, many of whom remain. In Lebanon and Jordan, the respective Ministries of Education have allowed Syrian children to attend school, but they must bring their Syrian school certifications, something that refugees rarely remember to bring with them when they flee. Various UN bodies are working to have this requirement waived, which will become all the more important when school resumes in September.

In Iraq, the refugees are in Iraqi Kurdistan under the mandate of the Iraqi Department of Displacement and Migration (DDM), which has granted those living in the UNHCR’s Domiz Camp to apply for six-month temporary residence. UNHCR is suggesting that “with sustained unrest in Syria and an open door policy of KRG [the Kurdistan Regional Government], UNHCR will continue to register on average 1,000 Syrian new arrivals per month.” In order to avoid the humanitarian disaster (caused by military violence but not addressed by the aid community) that took place among Iraqi Kurds in 1991, it is important to support humanitarian institutions in Iraq as they address the needs of all the displaced populations, both Syrians and Iraqis. On July 20, the FSA seized a number of Syrian-Iraqi border crossings, including the main one on the Damascus-Baghdad highway. The more than 2000 new Syrian refugees at the Albu Kamal–al-Qaim border as of late July suggest that Anbar province will now also become a host to Syrian refugees.

The UNHCR has planned for 140,000 refugees as of December 2012 but the UN appeal for $84 million for Syrian refugees had only received 36 percent funding by the end of May 2012. Given the increased number of refugees of late, they increased the appeal as of June 28 to $193 million, of which 33percent has been funded. As of August, the United States “has set aside $64 million in humanitarian assistance for the Syrian people.” As with the funding and service provision to Iraqi refugees, the unified appeal comes from a coordinated plan among seven UN agencies and 36 NGO partners to respond to the needs of Syrian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq. Key to civilian assistance in recent conflicts and refugee movements in the Arab world has been the generous contributions by the governments of the United States, Turkey and Arab countries, along with Muslim, Arab, American, and European charitable organizations.
The Situation in Syria

Agriculture, food subsidies, and poverty assistance programs inside Syria have dwindled in favor of military priorities as intensified sanctions weaken already limited state services. The United States has had trade and economic sanctions in place for years (currently, the Syria Accountability Act of 2004) but which have allowed in certain food and medicines. As the more recent EU, Turkish, and Arab League sanctions are also felt, the Syrian regime cannot export oil and has resorted to pulling from its hard currency reserves. On the ground reports also indicate the army is finding it increasingly difficult to keep the entirety of its machinery and weapons working, among other issues. This situation creates long, slow processes of infrastructural decay (and encourages corruption), issues we are familiar with from Iraq prior to 2003. Without salaries and/or incomes from commerce, many Syrians outside Damascus and Aleppo are also becoming increasingly distanced from the government’s once all-encompassing
services as they strike out on their own to find basic supplies. In areas under rebel control, even the ideological network of the regime, the Ba’ath party local offices, are abandoned and those who once ran these offices must also be among the displaced. In many areas no longer under Syrian government control, the situation is often unclear regarding the provision of services such as water, electricity, healthcare, education, not to mention salaries for state-sector employees. Trade has come to an almost total standstill. Pictures of local volunteers in the Palestinian refugee camp collecting the garbage and Facebook postings seeking donations of diapers for the homeless families sheltering in the local mosque remind us that daily life goes on, and people find ways to cope and survive despite the political turmoil and the focus on political transitions.

Faced with severely limited medical services and sporadic access to drinking water, cooking fuel and food, Syrians are fleeing their homes not only because of violence and fear but also out of the need to get medical care and basic foodstuffs. In April 2012, the UN food agency World Food Program (WFP) increased basic food assistance to reach 250,000 Syrians, which it distributes in coordination with the SARC, but by June it had increased the number to 461,000 Syrians, with a July target of 850,000. In July, SARC and the ICRC continued the distribution of food and hygiene materials to families lodged in schools, mosques, churches, and other spaces. In addition, local charitable groups, concerned individuals, the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), and the Palestine Red Crescent also provided food, medicine, and other supplies to the internally displaced. However, because the regime has not allowed more than a handful of international institutions to work in the country and has never allowed for local NGOs to be established, providing basic assistance to people in Syria is difficult. The SARC, part of the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), has built a large network of 10,000 trained volunteers and SARC centers that function well. Whether they can maintain neutrality and access to supplies in this conflict remains unknown, but evidence to date reveals they are working to aid and protect civilians. Their knowledge of the country is crucial to the work of the IFRC, the WFP, and others, and at least four SARC volunteers have been killed while on duty.

Lessons and Possible Policies

What has become increasingly clear is that the Syrian regime no longer has the apparatus in place to coerce behavior; it only has the repressive power to punish the population using brute force and denial of basic services. The International Crisis Group notes that this repressive apparatus is gradually morphing into “an entity more akin to a militia than an army in both make-up and ethos.” Detailed below are some of the lessons from previous conflicts in the region and possible policies vis-à-vis those displaced within Syria and other refugees.
First, some Syrian refugees have found temporary places of safety among family and communities, both within Syria and with whom they have cross-border connections and shared histories. This same thing happened in 2010-2011 with Libyans displaced westward who crossed into Tunisia and found temporary homes among Tunisians in Tataoine and elsewhere just inside the Tunisian border.28 Syrians fleeing the southwestern city of Deraa and the surrounding areas are not going en masse to the cities but instead finding refuge in the areas of northern Jordan through connections and offers of hospitality. While the host communities feel that providing for those in need is both an honor and an obligation, they cannot bear such financial burdens for long. The international community, Jordanian national non-governmental organizations, Muslim and Christian charitable organizations, and other humanitarian aid bodies are directing aid to the communities and households that host refugees.29 Similar patterns can be seen in Lebanon and Turkey. However, as the host families’ ability to host those fleeing Syria becomes strained and refugees can no longer afford even the most basic rents, they will become more visible as a refugee population, and they will have depleted all of their financial and food resources and will need immediate aid.

Second, the surrounding countries and the international humanitarian aid regime have recent experience, knowledgeable personnel, and infrastructure to deal with refugees. However, the host countries need financial assistance to absorb refugees in ways that treat them with dignity and do not make them dependent on aid. The experiences of Iraqi refugees can provide lessons here. Both Jordan and Syria allowed Iraqis to enter and find safety; these Iraqis were then collectively deemed prima facie refugees by the UNHCR30 but were considered “guests” by the two governments. Both host countries eventually allowed Iraqis to attend schools and access health services. However, unable to work legally, afraid to return, and told to wait for news about their asylum and resettlement status, Iraqis today are in a terrible system of dependence on aid and waiting in anticipation of a future. To date, there are thousands of Iraqi refugees who applied for resettlement years ago who have not been told if they have been rejected or accepted. Most Iraqis in Jordan and Syria live in a situation of protracted displacement31 without a sense of a future.

Turkey, on the other hand, has assumed all responsibility for the Syrian refugees within its borders, funding some $15 million in aid, with cooperation and funding from the Turkish Red Crescent Society, as well as other countries and NGOs.32 Like the Syrian and Jordanian governments’ relationships with the Iraqi refugees, the Turkish government calls the Syrians “guests” rather than refugees and has provided seven government-sponsored camps. Turkey’s role as refugee host outside of established UN systems suggests that it sees itself playing a significant role in the region, one mirrored by its early efforts to intervene diplomatically when the regime crackdown began in 2011.

Third, many refugees will be in situations of multiple-displacements. With the passage of time, people who have fled internally to nearby villages or cities will be forced to move again,
oftentimes across borders. This was the situation of many of the Palestinian refugees who fled in 1948 (and again in 1967) as well as of some Iraqis. From previous experience, we know this means that by the time people turn to the aid community, they have often spent what savings they had, have tried their other options, and are at their most vulnerable. Everyone fears that if the situation continues for long, the Syrian refugees will become increasingly dependent on aid, housed in temporary turned permanent shelters, unable to work legally and, thus, without an income. In addition, because it is now summer, people can be housed in tents and temporary shelters. However, in at least some of the places where they have been resettled, they will be hard pressed to withstand the cold climate and winter storms and may move to warmer places if possible. The aid community needs to prepare both for winter provisioning as well as seasonal movement.

Internal displacements of Syrians began prior to the current violence. The years of drought in northeastern Syria that started in 2006 had resulted in between two to three million people considered “food insecure” by 2010 when it was estimated that some “600,000 people have migrated out of the affected regions to urban centres, on both a seasonal and semi-permanent basis.” Such populations, many of whom are now drastically poor, add to those made vulnerable by the political violence. They also form a population that feels at odds with the regime, and their existence provides suggestions as to why the countryside and the hinterlands have led this uprising against the regime due to their disaffection with and disenfranchisement from state policies and state services.

Fourth, there is a need to prepare for the security of individuals and information as well as post-conflict cleansings. Because of the ongoing violence, Syrian refugees are reluctant to give over information about themselves out of fear of repercussions for the safety of their persons and their families. Thus, recording them for aid provision can be challenging. For Iraqi refugees, the UNHCR set up the Refugee Assistance Information System (RAIS) that, with proper security measures, could also work well for Syrian refugees to keep track of them, their access to services, and status. Refugees put a great deal of trust in the UNHCR—trust that it rightly deserves—and it should continue to protect that trust with security protocols on this Internet-based system.

As was clear from Iraq, people will feel the need to hide their information in order to protect themselves and their families. This is not necessarily because they have done bad things or been part of repressive regimes. Life in Syria under the Ba’ath party is complicated (as it was in Iraq), and people and their families make compromises in order to survive and build normal lives for themselves. There will be those—both pro-regime and anti-regime—who will have to flee and find permanent refuge and who will be unable to return to Syria, whether the regime falls or survives. The International Crisis Group report of August 1, 2012, “Syria’s Mutating Conflict” lays out many of the possible paths and the needed actions to prevent widespread factional and sectarian violence.
There also will be retributive killings, as we have already seen. Syrians, the Arab world, and the international community cannot allow what happened in Iraq also to happen in Syria. Avoiding an all-out civil war and retributive killing must be a priority as the conflict plays out; this can be addressed by preparing for local transitional justice initiatives, viable truth and reconciliation commissions, and other forms of public trials and amnesties. Such projects can productively involve refugee communities starting now. Providing both livelihood assistance as well as developing mechanisms to confront conflict and challenges will help avoid a much larger – and more costly – problem later if the refugees refuse to return because of fear or ongoing chaos, as is the case of the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees today.

The majority of Iraqis living in Jordan and Syria today are there because they are afraid to return to Iraq due to the risk of personalized violence at the hands of other Iraqis as a result of brute thuggery, retributive violence, and ideological fanaticism. This situation must be avoided.

Fifth, we must be aware that there are refugees among the refugees, primarily the Iraqis and the Palestinians. The fear is that these groups will be treated broadly as “Iraqis” or “Palestinians” based on whatever the regime or the FSA decides their allegiance to be and, thus, will be forced as a group to take sides. As the fighting and violence in Syria has now spread to the two main cities – Damascus and Aleppo – it will impact the majority of the refugees within Syria, who include almost half a million Palestinians and an estimated 750,000 Iraqis living in and around those two cities. Should these refugees become displaced, there will be additional complications. Some Iraqis have already chosen to return to Iraq: 13,450 Iraqi returnees were reported for July. Resettlement and aid officials in Iraq will need to be prepared for continued numbers. Surrounding countries – Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon – may or may not let Iraqis enter. If they do allow them to enter, these countries will face an increased strain on the aid community and services because most Iraqis are refugees who are either awaiting resettlement or looking for a permanent residence outside of Iraq, not just seeking a temporary safe haven away from the violence.

Until now, only small numbers of Palestinians have crossed into Jordan, which has promised to treat the Palestinians from Syria with the same procedures they are using with Syrian nationals. UNRWA reports indicate 480 Palestinians from Syria have entered Jordan, at least a portion of whom are being held in Cyber City Camp near Ramtha. Given that Jordan has set up camps for all refugees coming from Syria, the larger question will revolve around what kind of freedom of movement these refugees will have. There are more than 20,000 Palestinians living in Iraq who were forced to flee due to the violence directed at them. From 2006 until 2010, thousands of Palestinians were held in four camps on the Iraqi-Jordanian and Iraqi-Syrian borders. They were captives, unable to leave, and lived in tents at the complete mercy of the elements and officials while being taken care of by the UNHCR and UNRWA. Activists and officials arranged a series of third-country resettlements for them, although over 2,000 still live in Syria’s al-Houl Camp and Iraq’s al-Walid Camp, and the UNHCR estimates another 10,000
have been relocated in Baghdad. Neither Jordan nor Lebanon will want to allow thousands of Palestinians who have no passports, only some of whom even have Syrian travel documents, into their countries because of the possibility that they will not be allowed to return to Syria when the fighting is over. While the vast majority are from what is today Israel, Israel does not allow them to return to their original homes.

Until the present, neither the Iraqi refugees nor the Palestinian refugees have been implicated in the fighting, either by the regime or the resistance. Nor have they been the target of either the government or the rebels, but the government siege on Deraa Refugee camp (Palestinian) and a rebel bombing of a government building near the shrine of Sayyida Zaynab outside Damascus—and the home of many Iraqis—suggest that they are among the victims and the displaced. While claims of foreign intervention have been put forward—and certainly there are small groups of foreign fighters—neither Iraqis nor Palestinians have been mentioned. That is not to say they are not involved: the Palestinian political factions in Syria have taken positions either pro-revolution or pro-regime, and, thus, those activists will feel more pressure as the situation changes. To date, a number of Palestinians in prominent positions have been gunned down by unknown persons, including the head of security for Yarmouk Camp, a Hamas official, and a high-ranking member of the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) branch of the Syrian Army. In July 2012, more than a dozen PLA soldiers were kidnapped and executed, allegedly by the SFA.

In Iraq, the Palestinians were attacked after 2003 because they had lost their patron in Saddam Hussein, and criminal and fanatical elements sought to steal their homes, businesses, and property by driving them out. The same could happen to the Palestinians in Syria, although they are not protected by the Syrian regime but fall under the administration of UNRWA and the General Authority for Palestine Arab Refugees (GAPAR), a government body within the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. A large percentage of the refugees live in nine official and three unofficial UNRWA refugee camps in Syria, and many living outside the camps also own homes and property. In the last few months, the camps have become places of refuge for many of the poor fleeing the countryside around Damascus, although in mid-July regular bombing of Yarmouk camp and fighting in the neighborhoods nearby had resulted in the deaths of tens of Palestinians. In addition, they are drafted into the Syrian Army (as are Syrians) but can join a special unit of the PLA. They also have most of the rights of Syrian citizens (with the exception of investment property holdings, citizenship, and voting). Thus, their status in the country is fundamentally different than the status of Palestinians in Iraq, and they will likely not be seen as partisans of the regime. However, without passports and outside Syria, they are seen as stateless Palestinians who most countries will not want to accept.

Sixth, we must consider migrant workers and other foreigners among the refugees. Unlike Libya, Syria has few migrant laborers. However, it does have thousands of domestic workers, mostly women from the Philippines, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia who work for
upper-middle class and wealthy Syrian families. These workers will likely flee with the families that employ them and will need assistance in returning to their home countries. Given that many employers hold their workers’ passports and plane tickets, many may be without papers or the means to return home. Syria also hosts thousands of foreign students at universities from African and Asian countries. These students too will need assistance in returning to their home countries should the unrest increase in Damascus and Aleppo.

Finally, Syrians are accustomed to high levels of state intervention in their lives. The decades of the Ba’ath regime created a system of rewards and punishments that ensured a loyal citizenry and one that was dependent on the state for basic services. While this was truer in Iraq than in Syria, the international community will need to keep this in mind as it becomes hosts to and caretakers of refugees from Syria. The refugees will be afraid of retributions and punishments, they will be protective of their personal information, they will be fiercely proud of being Syrians, and they will carry with them a keen sense of humor and irony – all of which has been shown in media coverage of the refugees. However, as policies are developed, it is important to remember that, like Iraqis, Syrians have been part of a state that monitors all aspects of their lives, as well as one that provides subsidized food and access to free healthcare and education. This is not to say that they should be treated differently than other refugees. Rather, it is to push policymakers and planners to recognize that an awareness of refugees’ past experiences when establishing refugee-programming will ensure greater compatibility, management, and success in dealing with the displaced both within Syria and outside its borders as the conflict continues.

The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect those of the Woodrow Wilson Center.
113,000 individual refugees. The camp is located some 12km east of Mafraq border point.”


11 For example in Jordan, services are implemented by the Jordan Health Aid Society (for healthcare) and Tikyet Um Ali for food assistance; while in Lebanon, the High Relief Commission (HRC) has played a major role and UNICEF is partnering with Iqraa to provide summer camps. Update No. 10 Syria Regional Refugee Response: Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey. 21 June 2012 (located http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php) Accessed June 28, 2012.


15 “DDM continues the provision of three hot meals a day to the single males, while providing dry food rations to the families who have kitchen facilities. DDM has agreed to cover additional dry food shares for families for the second half of June. WFP is looking at providing food rations to the population in Domiz as of July, while assessing the situation of the Syrians and planning to distribute food vouchers at a later stage.” Update No. 11 Syria Regional Refugee Response: Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey. 21 June 2012 (located http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php) Accessed June 28, 2012.


24 http://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/wfp-scales-food-assistance-reach-250000-syrians-affected-unrest WFP’s emergency operation for Syria was launched in August 2011 with a budget currently estimated at US$37.4 million – and it is still seeking funding, as so far less than half that amount has been secured. Accessed June 28, 2012. Additional information on the SARC/ICRC is here: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/update/2012/update-syria-0712.htm


26 This understanding of the Syrian regime is derived from the work of Bassam Haddad, including his interviews with Haytham Manna. These articles are located here: http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/contributors/545.

WFP continued its distribution of food rations (rice, pulses, vegetable oil and sugar) via its partners the Jordanian Hashemite Charity Organization (JHCO) and the Jordanian Red Crescent to 25,000 Syrians who are living in host communities. Over 38 mt of food have been distributed so far (6 to 20 of May 2012) reaching 4,235 beneficiaries. WFP has also distributed more than 19,000 hotmeals in the transit centres since the start of this programme on 19 April, 2012.” Accessed June 28, 2012.


For example, Qatar Charity is working with the Turkish IHH. http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=508373&version=1&template_id=36&parent_id=16, Accessed June 28, 2012.


“Two to three million Syrians face food insecurity”, September 2010.


UNHCR has registered 110,000 Iraqi refugees and asylum seekers but for planning figures for 2012-13 maintains there are some 1 million Iraqis in Syria along with 150,000 stateless persons, and more than six thousand Somalis and others. UNHCR Country Operations Profile – Syrian Arab Republic. http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486a76.html, accessed August 1, 2012.


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