URBAN SOLUTIONS:
Metropolitan Approaches, Innovation in Urban Water and Sanitation, and Inclusive Smart Cities

A NEW GENERATION OF IDEAS 2016

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More than half of the world’s population lives in urban areas today. According to United Nations estimates, four out of every five people might be living in towns and cities by the middle of the 21st century. More than sixty percent of the area expected to be urban by 2030 is yet to be built, and virtually all of this urban expansion will occur in cities of the developing world. These trends present tremendous challenges to ecosystems, infrastructure, and local government capacity, but at the same time urbanization offers a unique opportunity to shape a more equitable and sustainable global future.

Profound demographic and economic transformations are reshaping the world and how it works, demanding new policy frameworks for understanding and guiding urban growth. The United Nations will convene its bi-decennial Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development in October 2016. Habitat III creates an important opening for international cooperation and national action to integrate urban approaches into the global development agenda. Leading up to the conference, formal and informal channels create space for discussions about innovative urban solutions for global challenges. These processes will contribute to the formulation of the “New Urban Agenda,” the primary outcome document of Habitat III which will guide policy and planning for the world’s cities for the next twenty years, positioning urban areas as drivers of sustainable development.

A NEW GENERATION OF IDEAS

Evidence-based research is the foundations upon which decisions about urban policies and priorities must be made. To encourage a new generation of urban scholars, practitioners, and policymakers, and to disseminate their innovative ideas, the Wilson Center’s Urban Sustainability Laboratory, together with Cities Alliance, the International Housing Coalition, USAID,
and the World Bank, sponsors an annual paper competition for advanced graduate students working on issues related to urban poverty. The competition is designed to promote the early career development of young urban researchers as well as to strengthen the ties between urban policymaking and academia.

This publication marks the sixth year of the “Reducing Urban Poverty” paper competition and includes a range of perspectives on urban challenges and policy solutions. The 2015 competition called for papers linked to one of the following subtopics: metropolitan approaches for the urban poor, making smart cities inclusive, innovation in water and sanitation, and cities through a gender lens. A panel of urban experts representing each of the sponsoring institutions reviewed 137 abstract submissions, from which 21 student authors were invited to write a full-length paper. From these, seven papers were selected for this publication. Each chapter in this volume critically examines existing urban policies and projects, offering original, solutions-oriented research and strategies.

CHAPTER SUMMARIES

**Innovation in Urban Water and Sanitation**

Rapid urbanization has brought unprecedented challenges for ensuring reliable access to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation. Substantial inequities in urban water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services produce negative health, infrastructure, and economic outcomes for the urban poor and women in particular. Yet urbanization brings important opportunities for more efficient water management and greater provision of services. Strategies to improve access, availability, affordability, and sustainability of water and sanitation in cities must be integrated with efforts to strengthen urban governance and planning, and support innovative, entrepreneurial, and locally-driven approaches.

In the first chapter of this volume, author Stephanie Butcher, assesses the local-level Delegated Management Model (DMM) of water service delivery in Kisumu, Kenya, a public-private partnership used to incentivize water utility development in informal areas. Butcher highlights the gains DMM has made in increasing access to basic infrastructure and enhancing the capacity of residents. The chapter also explores the challenges
arising from the commoditization of water services and the devolution of responsibilities, drawing conclusions about the policy implications for scaling up the practice.

In Chapter 2, Gregory Pierce documents the engagement strategies of Basti Vikas Manch (BVM), a slum development platform operating in four notified slums in Hyderabad, India. Pierce evaluates the capacity of the BVM to satisfy short-term basic service needs and to achieve long-term goals of transforming state-society relations.

Douglas McRae provides an historical overview of the politics of water supply in Brazil’s largest cities, focusing on the role of neighborhood associations in securing access to water and services in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. McRae analyzes water-spigot politics to draw conclusions about citizenship and political participation in contemporary urban Brazil.

**Metropolitan Approaches for the Urban Poor**

Metropolitan areas and their problems span multiple municipalities. Cities around the developing world are often jurisdictionally fragmented, which results in complex spatial and institutional structures and poor service provision. The urban poor suffer disproportionally from dysfunctional inter-jurisdictional governance. Metropolitan approaches to infrastructure, services, and planning can help realize the promise of urbanization as an engine for development and ensure opportunity and access for the poor.

Ei-Lyn Chia explores how existing governance structures and urban policies in Brazil can be reformulated to allow for new forms of sharing that focus less on ownership and accumulation and more on community and collaboration. Drawing from fieldwork conducted in São Paulo, Chia examines how technological innovation can empower communities and harness the potential of collaborative forces.

Chloé Malavolti conducted research in two inner-city precincts in Johannesburg to look at housing informality not only as a factor of vulnerability, but also as a phenomenon that can enhance urban resilience. Malavolti finds that the informal housing market can adapt to meet the needs of low-income residents for flexibility and affordability.

In Chapter 6, Adèle Charbonneau, presents a case study of the railway Relocation Action Plan in Kibera, Nairobi, Kenya, to analyze the dynamics and the use of models for resettlement of the urban poor. Charbonneau concludes that adapting international models to the local informal context
requires a flexible approach shared by all stakeholders and the assistance of an experienced community-based organization.

**Making Smart Cities Inclusive**

Cities around the world are seeking technologies, institutional structures, and policies to optimize operations. The challenge in developing countries is to go beyond the efficiencies offered by “smart city” approaches to focus on systems that foster inclusion. New technologies and institutional frameworks can empower the poor to define and communicate their priorities, and hold governments accountable for the provision of services.

In the final chapter of this volume, Jason B. Scott presents ethnographic fieldwork conducted in pacified favelas of Rio de Janeiro, focusing on digital inclusion. Scott explores how digital technology can serve as a local mediator of structural violence and develop new concepts of identity.
The “Everyday Water Practices” of the Urban Poor in Kisumu, Kenya

Stephanie Butcher
University College London

ABSTRACT

Kisumu, Kenya, experiences acute difficulties with safe water supply and provision. Drawing on qualitative and participatory research in May 2014, this article examines the local-level Delegated Management Model (DMM) of water service delivery. It highlights gains the DMM has made in increasing access to basic infrastructure and enhancing the capacity of residents to tap into local political structures. However, it also reveals some of its limitations, particularly given a context experiencing the commoditization of services, devolution of responsibility, and unequal social relations. In doing so, it seeks to explore implications for equitably scaling up future practice in Kisumu and beyond.

INTRODUCTION

Spiralling out in concentric circles from the banks of Lake Victoria is the port city of Kisumu, Kenya. Hugging the lakeside waterfront is evidence of the enormous influence of the fishing trade, where small-scale fishermen’s daily livelihood activities vie with large-scale industries and major international corporations. The lake looms large in the historical and prospective narrative of the city, even as it faces significant challenges related to environmental degradation, uncontrolled growth of the water hyacinth, and depletion of fish stocks following the introduction of the Nile perch. Fanning outwards, the lakeside gives way to the city’s central business district, the
small but growing hub characterized by high levels of formal planning and infrastructure provision. It serves as the historic and present-day host of the city’s commerce, government offices, and middle- and high-income housing. Further on, the major Nairobi and Nyalenda Ring roads act as a physical and symbolic barrier to the surrounding semicircle of unplanned settlements, comprising 60% of the city’s land area. Lacking adequate access to water, sanitation, sewerage, and social services, these settlements have increasingly felt the squeeze of Kisumu’s urban development pressures, a response to rising demands for land close to the inner city.

Despite its location next to the largest freshwater lake in Africa, the city experiences acute difficulties with safe water supply and provision, the triple challenge of lakeside and soil contamination, ageing city infrastructure, and a historical legacy of stratified service provision—disproportionately affecting those citizens located in unplanned areas. The vast majority of homes in these settlements remain unconnected to the municipal supply, relying instead upon communal kiosks or standpipes, or collection from (often polluted) shallow wells and boreholes—ultimately paying higher fees for lower quality water, experiencing greater vulnerabilities and variability in service provision, and holding a limited set of tools to challenge the unequal distribution of safe water. Such realities are deeply embedded in historical and political trends conditioning Kisumu and Kenya as a whole, shaped by a policy environment favoring the privatization of basic urban services, the often unregulated and profit-oriented patterns of land development, and the introduction of the Kisumu Urban Project—a multi-million dollar upgrading scheme designed to transform Kisumu into a “flagship city” in line with Kenya’s Vision 2030.

At the same time, residents of Kisumu’s unplanned settlements also engage in a mosaic of practices, drawing on multiple relations and resources. These “everyday water practices”—from collection to usage, decision making to management—help to reveal how citizens manoeuvre within their wider environment to access their basic citizenship rights. In particular, this article focuses on the local-level neighborhood planning associations (NPAs), which have experimented with the innovative delegated management model (DMM) of water service delivery. The DMM, first proposed in Kisumu in 2004, represents a public-private partnership that seeks to create incentives for the water utility to operate in informal areas through the devolution of responsibilities for water management to the community
level. In the unplanned neighborhood of Kondele, the DMM has generated an increase in the quality and quantity in water services and sought to open up new arenas of decision making for residents. It is in this regard that the DMM has the potential to operate as more than a model of effective service delivery, allowing citizens greater control over their urban environment and deepening democratic practice.

However, a close examination reveals critical gaps around the DMM, exacerbated by the wider environment within which it operates. These gaps revolve around two key challenges: the commoditization of water services and the devolution of risk and responsibility. These realities have confronted the deeper democratic potential of the model, with particularly visible impacts for more vulnerable residents. Adopting a gendered perspective throughout, this paper highlights the (significant) gains the DMM has made in increasing access to basic infrastructure and in enhancing the capacity of networked residents to tap into local political structures. However, it also offers clear reflections of the limitations of this approach in addressing persistent sociospatial inequities, particularly when dealing with issues of social relations and diversity. In doing so, it seeks to present a grounded analysis of localized infrastructure provision through the lens of one unplanned settlement in Kisumu, exploring implications for equitably scaling up future practice.

CASE STUDY SITE

Kisumu is Kenya’s third largest city, with a growing population of approximately 500,000. Despite its rich advantages in commercial trade, fishing and industry, access to natural resources, and position as a strategic transport hub in Eastern Africa, severe inequalities in the city remain a serious challenge. Levels of poverty in Kisumu are higher than those of Kenya as a whole, with 49% living under the poverty line, as compared to the 29% national average. Sixty percent of the land area in Kisumu is unplanned, and only 40% of the total population has access to the Kisumu Water and Sanitation Company (KIWASCO) piped supply, with percentages significantly lower in unplanned areas (UN-Habitat 2008).

The specific site for this study is the Kondele neighborhood, one of 22 wards that make up Kisumu, located 2 km from the central business
district. Kondele covers an area of about 2.4 km², and contains an approximate population of 82,000 (GoK 2009). It is a low-income and unplanned settlement, with the majority of households earning less than 7000 KES (US$69) per month. The bulk of residents lack access to in-home piped water, drawing instead from a range of sources including kiosks, standpipes, vendors, boreholes, or shallow wells. Residents expressed an astute and well-established system of calculated trade-offs in juggling these different supplies: boreholes and shallow wells were often cited as good for washing, but not drinking; travelling vendors might be more convenient but expensive; KIWASCO piped kiosks and standpipes (including those linked with the DMM) were perceived as the cleanest, but many residents still expressed a preference to use purification tablets at a cost. (As quipped by one resident: “The water is 98% safe—I say 98% because if you go into KIWASCO’s office you still see a dispenser [to purify their drinking water]...so how safe can it be?”).

METHODOLOGY

The analysis of Kondele builds upon a review of work done (Walker 2013; Frediani et al. 2013) to monitor and evaluate the Peoples’ Plans into Practice (PPP) program undertaken between 2008 and 2013 by Practical Action, in collaboration with the Kenyan-based Shelter Forum and Kisumu Urban Apostolates Programme. This program focused on both the provision of “hardware” (pipes, kiosks, and taps), and on the capacity building of residents through NPAs to articulate, advocate, and manage community priorities in the Kisumu planning process.

Building on this documentation, empirical research was gathered in May 2014,¹ including semi-structured interviews, focus groups, and participant observation in Kondele with residents both as individuals and as part of organizations such as the NPA. Key institutional interviews were undertaken, including with KIWASCO, municipal authorities, and practitioners

¹ Research was undertaken by the author as a part of a Masters of Research project with the Centre of Urban Sustainability and Resilience, University College London (UCL), and in collaboration with ongoing student research as part of the MSc Social Development Practice Programme, UCL.
in locally based NGOs. A number of participatory methodologies were 
employed, including transect walks, institutional mapping, and a series of 
interactive focus groups. Findings were cross-referenced with a review of 
secondary literature and Kenyan policy. Through the adoption of a micro-
scale of analysis it seeks to highlight locally grounded voices and visions, 
gathering a series of vignettes from within the Kondele neighborhood, and 
drawing wider conclusions on the ways in which diverse residents under-
stand and use the DMM.

**POLICY CONTEXT**

Before turning to the specific case of Kondele, it is critical to acknowledge 
the wider context within which the DMM operates. Three major trends in 
Kenya have had a significant impact on the possibilities and ways in which 
the DMM has been rolled out: the partial privatization (and commoditiza-
tion) of basic services, the devolution of governance structures, and an em-
phasis on citizen participation. Significantly, constitutional reforms in 2010 
saw a restructuring of governance, moving from city- to county-level gov-
ernments, and vesting greater responsibilities and authority from the cen-
tral government to counties. An emphasis on citizen participation through 
the newly devolved governance was reinforced through the Urban Areas 
and Cities Act (2011), which more specifically outlined the participation of 
residents in the governance of urban areas. This commitment was further 
iterated through the County Government Act (2012), which identified the 
mediums through which citizen participation might take place, including 
assemblies, town hall meetings, and budgetary preparation forums. Within 
this context, NPAs—legally registered as the lowest level of citizen repre-
sentation and linked to local politicians—exist as an important vehicle for 
residents to advocate and lobby for resources and authority.

While divesting greater decision-making authority to lower levels, 
Kenyan policy has simultaneously devolved responsibility for the delivery of

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2 Prior to constitutional reforms, Kenya was lacking clear policies to guide urban 
development. Among other changes, the revised constitution stipulated for the first time 
the right to housing (Article 43[1b]) and clean and safe water (Article 43[1d]), as well 
as outlining new regulations for the participation of urban residents in urban planning 
(Articles 1[4]; 6[2]; 184[1]; 196[1], 232[1]).
urban services to private operators, marked most prominently in the Water Act of 2002. This act set out the legal framework for the privatization and devolution of water services in Kenya, making the division between (private) water service providers and state-owned managerial asset-holding bodies. Although the Water Act defines cost recovery as a core principle of “sustainable service provision,” a “pro-poor” focus was added in 2007 through the Pro-Poor Implementation Plan (PPIP) for Water Supply and Sanitation. This includes stipulations related to the provision of low-cost technologies (such as communal kiosks), lower cost tariffs in unplanned areas, and the intention to replace informal systems with formal small-scale providers.

Together, these reforms are emblematic of the triple trends of privatization, devolution, and citizen participation being unrolled throughout the country. This configuration gains expression in a clear preference for privatization and public-private partnerships, citing incentives of cost-efficiency and linking with mandates for greater public control over urban processes. This logic similarly underpins the move towards the DMM, which has the aims of extending service provision, allowing greater citizen control over service management, and generating entrepreneurial opportunities for lower-income residents.

However, and critically, this convergence of similar policy approaches has been examined in other contexts as symbolizing the withdrawal of the state, and the enablement of market mechanisms in its wake (Cheema et al. 2005; Griffin 2013; Raco 2000). In the UK, for instance, Taylor (2007) has explored how neighborhood planning initiatives established in line with the UK’s Localism Act discursively purported to increase citizen voice through the devolved management of community services, but did not subsequently attempt to meaningfully increase decision-making authority. This has been similarly well documented in cities of the Global South, where more and more the challenges of service provision in unplanned or informal areas have been used to legitimate and encourage the devolution

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3 Public-private partnerships have been strongly promoted within Kenya’s Vision 2030 and echoed in various policy and programmatic approaches in the country, including through the 2011 Policy Statement on Public Private Partnerships, which articulates the government commitment: “to be able to attract both domestic and international private sector investment, where appropriate, to help address the deficiencies in productive and social infrastructure and, in this way, improve delivery of public sector services” (GoK 2011, 4).
of service delivery responsibilities to managing community groups (Jaglin 2002; Miraftab 2004; Muller 2007; Spronk 2009). While such shifts are often discursively portrayed as a commitment to “citizen participation,” a deeper examination of the various levels of responsibility and risk conferred through such arrangements often indicates a very limited power for managing communities—what Dagnino (2007) calls the “perverse confluence” of citizen participation and neoliberal governance. These critiques hold important implications in the context of Kenya’s shift towards greater citizen participation in planning, and in exploring the potential of the DMM to link with wider democratic ideals.

THE DELEGATED MANAGEMENT MODEL

Within this context, the delegated management model is an innovative and alternative service delivery arrangement, drawing on the model of public-private partnership. It was first implemented in Kisumu in 2004 in the Nyalenda neighborhood, through a program partnership between the water utility (KIWASCO), the World Bank’s Water and Sanitation Program–Africa, and the Agence Français de Développement (AFD). In this model, KIWASCO provides piped water to a bulk water point (the “master meter”) in informal neighborhoods at a subsidized rate. The operation and management of this system is then devolved to “master operators” (MOs), represented by either entrepreneurial individuals or community-based organizations. MOs in turn distribute the bulk water through smaller community-level meters, taking responsibility for all billing, maintenance, and complaints that emanate from this bulk point. Residents in close proximity to the master meter apply for a connection (available following a deposit, application, and meter purchase fee), generating a secondary network of private household connections, communal standpipes, or commercial kiosks. As such, another key node in the DMM water chain is represented by the owners of community standpipes and/or water kiosks, where residents without household connections (the majority of Kondele) can purchase water. Thus these standpipes and kiosks operate as businesses in their own right, affording individual entrepreneurs access to income-generating activities.

Though still in a moment of transition, the DMM has emerged as an important manifestation of discursive commitments to public-private
partnerships, as well as new mandates for citizen participation. Mirroring wider commitments outlined in the PPIP, this model has been expanded to most informal settlements in Kisumu, as well as in various other counties in Kenya. Likewise, it has also been implemented in other diverse contexts with NGO support, including Ghana and Mozambique. From the perspective of KIWASCO, it has performed the important function of extending service provision—and the market—into previously unpenetrated spaces, as well as reducing revenues lost through illegal connections or burst pipes (World Bank 2009). It has also linked neatly to policy reforms in the 2002 Water Act stipulating community participation in the operation and management of services. For residents, the DMM has increased the incentives for KIWASCO to operate in areas of high risk or low profitability, thereby extending coverage into underserved areas. The business orientation of the kiosks and standpipes mirrors wider international discourses linking urban services, community management, and entrepreneurship. It has facilitated greater water access and created employment opportunities for economically marginalized residents.

While recognizing the levels of mutuality in this arrangement, there is also a need for a deeper examination of how these relations have unfolded in everyday practice. In particular, if the critiques highlighted above regarding the configuration of privatization, citizen participation, and devolution are heeded, then innovative arrangements such as the DMM could risk circumscribing participation to a service delivery role to fill the gaps of a retreating state (Allen 2013), and wider claims of empowerment may be reduced to its economic dimension (Miraftab 2004).

The remainder of this article turns to an analysis of the DMM in this light. It explores two important tensions emergent within the Kenyan context—the commoditization of services and the devolution of responsibilities—as well as the gendered dimensions of these tensions, which may curtail the DMM’s democratic potential. Critically, it highlights the ways in which residents’ “everyday water practices” offer valuable lessons through which these tensions might be addressed. Importantly, this analysis is not intended to generate a definitive assessment of the DMM, but rather to draw conclusions about the specificities of how this model takes shape within the wider structural environment of Kisumu. It concludes with a number of policy implications that build from and bolster these practices of residents, further supporting the potential of the DMM.
Commoditization of Services: It is certain that the implementation of the DMM has generated a higher level of service provision in Kondele. Evaluations undertaken in collaboration with Practical Action indicated that many residents responded favorably when queried on the implementation of the reticulated system, citing a range of contributions to wellbeing from perceived health benefits, greater community interaction, improved quality and quantity of water, and economic benefits felt from the subsidized tariffs (Castro and Morel 2008; Frediani et al. 2013; Walker 2013). Studies undertaken in other unplanned neighborhoods of Kisumu have indicated that the DMM has facilitated network expansion, improved billing collection, and generated employment and income opportunities for MOs and entrepreneurial residents (Castro and Morel 2008; Schwartz and Sanga 2010). In the context of fragmented service provision, there is considerable scope for these small-scale providers to deliver a more flexible and accessible service through the DMM, as suggested in the PPiP.

Nonetheless, many residents in Kondele still experience restrictions on the ways in which they can legitimately claim for water. Critically, there is a high level of differentiation within settlements, with trunk infrastructure tending to follow major roads, or located nearer to wealthier neighborhoods of greater profitability (UN-Habitat 2008). Even within its pro-poor orientation, decisions to install master meters are based upon feasibility studies monitoring economic viability and the potential for cost-recovery (World Bank 2009). Unsurprisingly, residents in lower-income interior areas of Kondele are thus less likely to be considered for DMM service, and many pro-poor water and sanitation facilities tend to be located in denser, wealthier, or roadside locations. Where households are located at a far distance from the main line, the lengths of pipe needed may prove prohibitively expensive. Similarly, an assessment undertaken by Schwartz and Sanga (2010) on the DMM in the Nyalenda neighborhood highlights the challenge faced by poorer residents unable to make the initial investments for a household connection. In these cases, residents continue to draw upon communal sources such as kiosks, paying on average up to three times more for water. Interviews conducted in Kondele, particularly with tenants, indicated the continued trade-off between desiring improved services in the household, and the fear of rising rents. These examples reflect the reality that investment in unplanned areas—where it occurs—will benefit some while reinforcing gaps in coverage for particularly vulnerable residents.
However, although the prioritization of cost-effectiveness and the commoditization of water has been articulated at the policy level, this logic has not always been mirrored in the everyday water practices of residents. Critically, in Kondele the tender for master operator was awarded to the local NPA, named the Manyatta Residents Association (MRA). In Kondele, this association between the MRA and the DMM—bolstered by NGO collaboration⁴—has had a critical mediating role in the ways in which the DMM operates. For instance, interviews with leadership in the MRA often demonstrated a greater commitment to equitably providing for the neighborhood, rather than an allegiance to the principles of cost recovery. This sentiment was expressed clearly by the founding chairman of the MRA. Describing the recent dispute with KIWASCO regarding the transfer of existing water lines to the DMM—which would lower the running costs of the DMM—he explained that a straightforward tactic for pressurizing the utility was to shut off the master meter, temporarily depriving KIWASCO of its revenue, and generating a level of unrest within Kondele. However, the MRA was unwilling to adopt this as an option, “at the expense of the neighborhood,” citing its wider role in working for residents.

This sense of responsibility to serve the wider public good, rather than the goals of efficient service delivery, is perhaps related to the historical emergence of the MRA; originally formed in 2003, the group initially coalesced to “fight for the right to water access” (Founding Chairman of MRA). Only in 2005 did the organization expand to address other concerns within the neighborhood, supported by the programmatic work of Practical Action. In the words of one member of the MRA: “What is the point of KIWASCO? Water and sewerage—and they are not doing this! When there is no sewage line, we must put politics in it—this is a problem which individuals cannot address. Citizens cannot plan the town.” This acknowledgement suggests a deeper connection for residents between citizenship rights and service provision.

**Devolution of Community Responsibilities:** The second important tension is related to the absorption of responsibility and risk. A key incentive

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⁴ In particular, the Kondele NPA was selected to be supported through capacity-building measures and trainings in the 2008–2013 Peoples’ Plans into Practice program instituted by Practical Action, Shelter Forum, and the Kisumu Urban Apostolates Programme.
for the implementation of the DMM is that it allows the utility to reduce the costs of water lost from burst pipes or vandalism, both of which represent a significant risk for KIWASCO. However, what is made less evident is that this risk does not simply disappear, but is rather absorbed by the managing MOs, who are responsible for paying back the bulk water fees, regardless of how this is distributed (or not) throughout the neighborhood. To address the incidence of illegal connections, rewards are offered by KIWASCO to residents who report these activities—unrolling a model of self-surveillance into the settlement. As stated by the PPIP officer of KIWASCO: “the responsibility [of KIWASCO] stops at the master meter.” This model thus equates “partnership” with the reduction of corruption, and the generation of enabling conditions for private-sector providers to operate. This becomes discursively couched as cost-effective service delivery, effectively hiding where these costs have been reallocated—from KIWASCO to the MOs.

Meanwhile, continued disputes between the MRA and KIWASCO over the transfer of existing water lines to the DMM system have also foregrounded communication and accountability challenges. Members of the MRA expressed a general apprehension that the costs of transferring the existing lines to the DMM would not be absorbed by KIWASCO, concerns that were similarly documented in the Nyalenda neighborhood, despite contractual agreements (Schwartz and Sanga 2008). KIWASCO remains responsible for dictating the scope of MO authority, including whether MOs will have decision-making power over the expansion of the network, if capacity building and training for MOs will be provided, or whether the costs of pipes and labor to transfer existing customers to the DMM will be budgeted (Castro and Morel 2008). This perception of members of the MRA of an inability to effectively lodge grievances, or better dictate the terms of engagement, suggests that this relationship may not necessarily operate as a space for the exercise of deeper political authority, even where it operates as an effective form of service delivery.

However, as before, a reading of the everyday practices of residents within Kondele also suggests that residents are working within these (sometimes

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5 This approach was adopted in 2004 during the first iteration of the DMM in the Nyalenda neighborhood, when heavy opposition from informal water vendors was expressed over the span of a year, manifesting in an extensive campaign to sabotage the meters and piping. Crow et al. (2013) document the slow assimilation of these “rogue” traders into the DMM network through community policing tactics, encouraged by KIWASCO.
unfavorable) terms to generate alternative meanings and outcomes. There is evidence that this notion of community responsibility—particularly where espoused by members of the MRA—may be founded upon different symbolic understandings of roles and obligations. For instance, though the MRA keenly identifies with the notion of community responsibility as evoked through “community policing,” this has also been re-interpreted. As expressed by “Robert,” a member of the MRA, the mandate for community surveillance has been used as an excuse to undertake mapping and documentation activities within the settlement. Thus moving through the settlement has on the one hand served the instrumental function of policing the lines, as well as assessing the economic viability of an additional master meter through querying residents on their willingness to participate. On the other hand, it has also reinforced a level of ownership and solidarity. For Robert, this represents a moment for residents to report grievances, or to share daily experiences in relation to their water service, or other concerns that fall within the wider remit of the MRA. As expressed by Robert: “This is now our area.”

**Gendered Dimensions:** Critically, the DMM and these wider trends—commoditization and the devolution of responsibilities—have had particular ramifications for women and girls. In Kondele, responsibility for daily decision making related to water collection and usage remains primarily the responsibility of women. Cases in Kenya and elsewhere have documented the multiple repercussions this association has held on the health, time, safety, and physical and emotional wellbeing of women (O’Reilly 2011; Ahlers and Zwarteveen 2009; Harris 2008). And indeed, a key outcome of the increased quantity and quality of water provision through the DMM is related to benefits experienced particularly by women in their daily lives. Such is the case for “Mary,” a lower income resident of Kondele who migrated to the area four years prior. She lives adjacent to one of the DMM community kiosks, and remembers the time before its implementation, recalling the long queues and the distance she was required to walk to fetch water. However, the kiosk has been valuable to her not simply because of the ease with which she can access her daily water, but also because of the familiarity that proximity has given her with the kiosk managers. Mary explained this allowed her the possibility to take water on credit when she was struggling with bills, as she was known and trusted at the
site. This demonstrates one of the key innovations of the DMM—allowing a greater level of flexibility for residents to negotiate with each other, rather than with KIWASCO directly. Furthermore, the association of the DMM with discourses of community participation has also linked it to wider claims related to the “empowerment” of residents. Thus the structure of the MRA, as well as new entrepreneurial activities represented by managing community kiosks, are specifically designed to engage a range of defined identities—including women, youth, and people with disabilities—with the assumption that this will support gender parity (Walker and Butcher forthcoming).

Although the DMM has made important strides in this regard, it is also critical to examine the continued influence of gendered norms that may limit decision-making authority, detracting from the deeper democratic potential of the model. Within Kondele, many of the women interviewed confirmed the connection between women, water, and power, referring to themselves as the “household managers.” In a focus group with mixed single and married women, decision making on finances, water collection, and usage were overwhelmingly cited as remaining in their charge. In the words of “Jackie”: “Women know better, and so there we have power. Even if there is a water shortage, the man…doesn’t know where the water comes from. He could use 20 litres without even realizing.” It was felt that this traditional expectation that women maintain charge of household issues (including water use and collection) granted a measure of authority. For some women, including Jackie, this was used to bargain for opportunities to participate in extra income-generating activities, such as managing a water kiosk, especially where it was seen to contribute funds for the use of household expenditures.

Nonetheless, this discussion also demonstrated an acute awareness of the limitations of this authority. In response to Jackie’s story, a young social worker, “Dora,” was quick to counter: “Yes, we can do some things…but we do not have all the power.” She referenced the distinction between private practices and those that were acknowledged outside the home. For

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6 In Kisumu more generally, this linkage between gender, participation, and empowerment has been reflected in the commitment to, particularly, women’s participation in the management of ‘pro-poor projects’ implemented through the local government, as well as within programmatic approaches by major NGOs operating in the city.
some husbands, having an employed wife was problematic: “They know it happens, but they may not publically admit it.” While Jackie described the sense of satisfaction gained from maintaining her own small business, women’s opportunities to move from the fulfilment of “practical” needs related to responsibilities as wives and mothers, towards wider “strategic” needs (Moser 1989) related to roles in society, were not always recognized. As interpreted by Dora, women’s work was legitimated and accepted where tied with reproductive concerns related to the household or community care, while publically obscured or devalued where related to productive or political roles. She cited, for instance, the fact that even while they are considered “household managers,” decisions still primarily had to be channelled through the male head of house rather than approaching landlords or other authorities directly (though this process might be made simpler in cases where the landowner was a woman). Reflecting on this, another woman shared her experience on queues at her nearby kiosk, where she perceived men—when they collected water—received preferential treatment on busy mornings. She attributed this to the widespread recognition—espoused by both female and male kiosk operators—that men might be pressed for time before the working day. Querying this logic, she turned to the rest of the group: “But don’t I have jobs to do too?”

Such experiences are not confined to Kondele, and the reduction of women’s labor to a reproductive recognition alone has been systematically documented in other contexts (Ahlers 2002; Kabeer 2002; Cleaver and Hamada 2010). This example conforms to Kabeer’s rich analysis, which found in diverse contexts that even where women had a measure of autonomy in the household, “what remains non-negotiable is men’s overall control of household land, capital, and other valued resources” (Kabeer 1994, 225). This recognition becomes particularly important in a context where responsibilities for community services are being devolved to the individual, and the distribution of basic necessities is dictated (to a certain extent) by principles of cost recovery. Though the presence of women in the MRA, or in community employment opportunities, has certainly created more spaces for women’s public participation, challenges to the equitable access and control of water, strongly linked with identity, remain very present within Kondele.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Emerging from the experiences explored above—the commoditization of water services, the devolution of risk and responsibility, and the influence of embedded gender roles—it is possible to identify a range of practical implications. **First, the DMM was made possible in Kenya because of a supportive regulatory environment** that explicitly acknowledged the role of small service providers and offered subsidized tariffs for low-income areas. The willingness of the utility to allow a more flexible network, and a political commitment to citizen participation, supported the development of community management capacity.

**Second, while recognizing the significant network expansion of the DMM, even “pro-poor” service delivery may not be the same as universalized or equitable models.** The siting of trunk infrastructure, household income levels, and tenure status have generated a differentiated access to the DMM for residents of Kondele. This experience suggests that in particular circumstances, subsidies or the loosening of cost-recovery principles may play a crucial role if the necessary infrastructure is to be implemented in hard-to-reach or lower-income areas. Similarly, agreements with landlords to maintain rents at comparable rates for a set period following improvements, as was implemented by a Federation of the Urban Poor managed-project in Dar es Salaam (Banana et al. 2015), could offset the process of rapid land price increases, already happening throughout the city.

**Third, the decision to link the MOs with the Kondele NPA enhanced the possibilities for the DMM to relate to a broader citizenship project.** This is a critical point in light of the shifting tendering process of the DMM. In the neighborhood of Nyalenda, where the DMM originated, the MO tendering process has now been opened to private entrepreneurs, potentially moving away from management by a community-based organization (Castro and Morel 2008). Although this is intended to stimulate a climate of competitiveness to encourage better service delivery, there is a critical difference between the empowerment of savvy entrepreneurs and that of an elected community representation structure.

**Fourth, capacity-building measures for both utility staff and MOs remain key.** The experience in Kondele demonstrated the wider benefits resulting from the training provided through Practical Action’s PPP process, which has supported the MRA more generally to embark upon different
forms of advocacy across the settlement. Yet there is also still room for a deeper engagement—particularly in moving beyond managerial and financial training for the MOs. For instance, renegotiating channels of communication and accountability between MOs and KIWASCO could help to better embed water services management into existing governance channels.

**Last, the influence of embedded social and cultural norms continues to play a significant role in mediating access to and control of water services.** This calls for further research on the everyday ways in which water management occurs at both the neighborhood and household level, exploring interventions that can address those perceptions reinforcing identity-based inequities.

**CONCLUSION**

Both Kenya and Kisumu are poised on the edge of major change, with particular implications for the service experiences of the urban poor. In Kondele, while the DMM has demonstrated key successes in extending networked service in unplanned areas, it has also been unrolled in a particular configuration as a result of the wider trends of devolution, privatization, and citizen participation. In some cases this has generated gaps for particularly vulnerable residents. However, and critically, there is also evidence of opportunities to leverage this model to build towards a deeper democratic project. In particular, an examination of the *everyday water practices* of Kondele’s residents demonstrates how the challenges presented by the DMM are already being addressed at the settlement level, offering valuable reflections on how these activities might be bolstered more systematically.

Furthermore, an examination of embedded gender norms also demonstrated the *range* of processes, networks, and spaces through which interests are articulated—not only operating in the formal or public sphere. That is, as residents move through a range of networks, interact in different ways with physical technologies, or engage in various sets of public and personal politics, these form important terrains for broader struggles around the constitution of citizenship. What this indicates is that supporting the negotiation capacity of marginalized groups requires not only strong institutional responses, but also attention to the underlying norms present in everyday practice, which might equally reproduce wider structural inequalities.
Exploring this position offers the potential to develop and bolster innovative strategies represented by the DMM, going further in linking urban services and citizenship.

REFERENCES


Engaging the Local Public Sector to Meet Slum Residents’ Practical and Strategic Service Needs: Evidence from Hyderabad, India

Gregory Pierce
University of California, Los Angeles

ABSTRACT

Service provision remains woefully insufficient to meet the basic needs of slum residents across many low- and middle-income countries, but particularly in India. Consequently, resident movements, NGOs, and state and central government agencies have formed initiatives to improve Indian local government service performance. Based on multiple years of fieldwork data, this study uses the method of process tracing to evaluate the capacity of the Basti Vikas Manch (BVM)—a slum development platform operating in Hyderabad, India—to meet slum residents’ practical and strategic basic service needs. Findings inform broader policy efforts to support low-income community engagement with public agencies.

INTRODUCTION

Urban public sector service provision remains woefully insufficient to meet the basic needs of slum residents across low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), but particularly in India. Consequently, bottom-up resident movements, intermediary NGOs, and top-down initiatives by state and central government agencies have formed to improve Indian local government service
performance. The success of these efforts, however, has been mixed at best. Using data collected over multiple years of fieldwork, this study documents the origins and engagement strategies of the Basti Vikas Manch (BVM), a unique slum development platform operating in four notified slums (formally recognized by the Indian government) in the greater urban area of Hyderabad, India. The BVM originated due to an acute crisis of public water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) provision in slum settlements. BVM groups accomplish short-term service outcomes by employing several unique strategies. They attempt to not only intensively learn from and exploit the formal structures of local public agencies, but also to engage local power brokers in a manner that escalates from constructive cooperation to increasingly adversarial techniques as needed. This study evaluates the success of the BVM in terms of both its ability to satisfy short-term livelihood necessities and to effect long-term transformation in state-society relations.

THE BVM AT THE INTERSECTION OF URBAN ACCOUNTABILITY AND SLUM UPGRADE INITIATIVES

The Basti Vikas Manch can only be understood as a product of relatively recent top-down government accountability reforms, and decades of bottom-up and intermediary slum upgrading programs in Hyderabad specifically, and India more broadly.

**Top-down Urban Accountability Mechanisms**

The Indian central government did not pass legislation granting urban areas status as official governing entities—urban local bodies (ULBs)—until 1992, much later than most comparable LMICs and in stark contrast to the country’s long-established rural administrative structure. Since the onset of national reforms to enable local urban administration, state governments and ULBs across India have nominally adopted the language of decentralization, accountability, and participation in decision making regarding urban service delivery (De Wit, Nainan and Palnitkar 2008). The national government’s emphasis on decentralized service delivery has taken place concurrently with rapid urban population growth.

In practice, however, non-state stakeholders place little faith in the performance of ward committees, the lowest level of official government
decentralization. De Wit, Nainan, and Palnitkar (2008), in a review of ward committees across major cities in India, and Ghosh and Mitra (2008), in an assessment of committee performance in West Bengal, found them to be completely noninclusive and thus unaccountable to residents. Among large ULBs, Hyderabad is reputed by some scholars to operate at the frontier of governance reforms to enhance the representation of resident concerns (Caseley 2006). Ward committees in Hyderabad, however, do not function in a more egalitarian fashion than in other cities. Only municipal corporators and government officers are allowed to attend committee meetings, effectively ruling out public participation, and it often requires the involvement of a member of the national legislature to access committees’ funds for service upgrades (Kennedy 2008; M. Chand, personal interview, August 13, 2014).

Consequently, a host of other local initiatives have emerged to improve the representation of resident service concerns to ULBs. Scholars have documented the robustness and diversity of middle class collective action to improve neighborhood conditions performed through resident welfare associations (Kamath and Vijayabaskar 2009; De Wit and Berner 2009). No equivalent institutional form has emerged, however, to effectively air grievances regarding service provision on behalf of residents of low-income housing settlements. Negotiated, informal relationships rather than formal, transparent mechanisms remain low-income households’ primary means for grievance redress with public agencies.

**Bottom-up or Intermediary Slum Upgrading Programs**

Many studies argue pessimistically that intermediary institutions or platforms between low-income residents and government agencies are invariably co-opted by local power brokers and NGOs (De Wit and Berner 2009; Landy and Ruby 2005; Zerah 2009). Despite the preponderance of negative experiences, counter-examples suggest that constructive communication between local government and disadvantaged urban communities can bring about the gradual satisfaction of residents’ practical and strategic needs (Carmin, Anguelovski, and Roberts 2012; Berquist, Danciere, and Drummond 2014).

**Hyderabad and Slum Upgrading Efforts**

The Hyderabad local government’s Urban Community Development (UCD) Project was one of the great success stories featured in the early literature on
slum upgrading programs (Moser 1989a; Rao 2000). Initiated by UNICEF in 1967, the self-help housing program established slum welfare committees, which were led by existing slum leaders and local community-based organizations (CBOs). This program fit into the “sites and services” approach to slum upgrading popular across LMICs (for instance, see Mayo and Gross 1987). Since that time, however, local experts have observed that the UCD has become increasingly ineffective as a result of institutional turmoil (Kar 2014; personal interview with A. Maringanti, August 9, 2014). The UCD still nominally supports slum resident groups, but these are non-operational due to election uncertainty.

Current efforts to improve service conditions in Hyderabadi slums and low-income communities draw on international and national support. The national Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, via funding obtained under the Rajiv Awas Yojana program, purports to carry out infrastructure improvements within all 1,476 slums in the city proper (GHMC 2012). Robust community consultation and participation in planning meetings is also reported to have been mediated by the city government. The country’s Urban Poverty Reduction Strategy, required by the UNDP, also involves the Urban Community Development department in a “National Strategy for the Urban Poor” (Center for Good Governance n.d.). Despite the promising rhetoric of these initiatives, none of the residents interviewed in this study had observed the operation of these programs in their communities. From the perspective of slum residents, there was no coherent, effective representation to local government agencies of low-income community concerns regarding services. This is the gap which the BVM aimed to fill.

DATA AND METHODS

Data for this study were collected via fieldwork conducted in Hyderabad in 2013–2014. All fieldwork was carried out with assistance from the staff of two NGOs supporting the BVM, the South Asian Consortium of Integrated Water Resources (SaciWATERs) and the Society for Participatory Development (SPD). The four slums involved in the BVM—Addagutta, Ambedkar Nagar, Bholakpur and Rasoolpura—comprise the study areas.

1 Repeated requests by the author to interview current officials within the UCD were ignored.
Field visits to the study areas varied from formal transect walks and BVM meeting attendance to informal conversations with individual residents. To describe the history of basic service conditions and engagement efforts carried out in the study areas over the period 2008–2014, this study draws on previously unanalyzed program files maintained at the BVM offices in the study areas. The most relevant program data to this study were paper records of representations and media reports on basic service conditions in the study areas.

To corroborate personal observation and analysis of primary program documents for this study, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 26 stakeholders. These individuals included all SaciWATERs and SPD staff involved in the BVM (5), BVM conveners in each informal settlement (4), BVM locality leaders at the neighborhood level (9), female non-leader slum residents (5), and representatives from other NGOs and government officials (3). Finally, supplementary data are derived from an anonymous survey of 31 BVM leaders. The survey was administered by the author and SaciWATERs staff on August 3, 2014, at an all-slum BVM summit. The survey queried leaders’ reasons for joining the BVM, current satisfaction with the initiative, and the major successes and challenges of the BVM in specific neighborhoods.

This study employs the research method of process tracing. This method is a subset of case study analysis that typically utilizes multiple observations over time within a single case rather than across disparate cases (Tansey 2007; Méndez-Lemus and Vieyra 2013). Process tracing draws on data sources such as elite interviews, archival documents, and other historical sources to establish the course of an intervening causal process.

MOTIVATION OF THE BVM: HOW THE PLATFORM STARTED

The long-term institutional fracturing of the Urban Community Development and the more recent, ineffective attempts of slum residents to participate in ward committees help to explain the broad need for an independent effort to improve service delivery in Hyderabad’s slums. The more proximate inspiration for the BVM, however, was an acute failure of publicly provided water and sanitation services. In May 2009, water and sewerage lines provided and maintained by the city utility mixed with each other.
Consequently, the public water supply within Bholakpur was polluted with E. coli; residents were not immediately informed. Consumption of the contaminated water led to the death of at least 14 people, as well as hundreds of cases of serious illness (Iftekhar 2011; Times of India 2010). This public provision failure caught the attention of local and national media, and years later is still referred to in public debates (Deccan Chronicle 2014).

The Bholakpur water tragedy motivated residents to demand better public services and effectively forced local government agencies to pay more attention to these complaints. The incident also prompted a prominent activist for water equity in the Hyderabad area to work with community leaders in several slums for better public service provision. The prompting of tragedy to bring about collective action among low-income urban residents has numerous precedents (Walton 1998). An initial period of activism led to a more formal capacity-building program to improve WASH conditions. This program, the “Citizen First Campaign for Water Supply and Sanitation Accountability,” was funded by the UK charity WaterAid.

The Study Areas
The housing settlements involved in the Citizen First program—Addagutta, Ambedkar Nagar, Bholakpur and Rasoolpura—are situated north of Hyderabad’s historic core, but are centrally located in the twin-city area of Hyderabad-Secunderabad. Addagutta, Ambedkar Nagar, and Bholakpur are located within the service area of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (GHMC), while Rasoolpura is situated on the border between the GHMC and the Secunderabad Cantonment Board (SCB). Together these settlements house more than 150,000 people.

Each settlement is recognized as a notified slum by the Indian government. Notification confers a degree of legitimacy on residence in these communities (Nakamura 2014). Moreover, each slum has been settled for forty to fifty years, has a fairly permanent built environment, and has received some level of basic services from the nominally responsible public agencies before the existence of the program. Figure 1 shows a government sign recognizing Ambedkar Nagar’s notification status, with publicly provided water tanks beneath it. In short, the classic concerns regarding clearance, illegality, or lack of formal recognition from the government that have dominated the literature on slums and service provision are not especially pressing in the study areas. Rather than the complete absence or antagonism of
the public sector, it is the slow and uneven pace of public improvements relative to needs and infrastructure obsolescence that demonstrate the need for an intervention such as the Citizen First program.

**First Phase: Water Quality Improves but Broader Engagement Stalls**

The Hyderabad-based NGO Joint Action for Water (JAW) oversaw the initial phase of the Citizen First program (2010–2013). Since inception, the program has emphasized enhancing the capacity of slum residents to improve their water and sanitation access; no hardware or funds are provided. The first phase of the initiative also aimed to increase resident awareness and compel the government to conduct more consistent testing of water quality. JAW focused on distributing water quality testing and purifying kits and conducting intensive water-testing trainings for residents in Addagutta, Bholakpur, and Rasoolpura, but kits were distributed more broadly in 76 Hyderabad area slums.
In 2013, however, WaterAid transferred responsibility for the support of the Citizen First program from JAW to SaciWATERs and SPD. JAW’s failure to activate ward committees coincided with a generally shallow level of resident understanding of the service issues and involvement in collective action (Citizen First, 2013). JAW also contracted out much of the initiative’s work to local CBOs, which received payment for conducting the activities requested by WaterAid (JAW 2012). This outsourcing discouraged a significant proportion of slum residents from getting involved and taking ownership of the initiative. Consequently, implementers of the second phase decided to focus program efforts on a few promising slums (Kar 2014).

The second phase aimed to conduct “regular training for members to build the capacity which ensures the well-built knowledge base of upcoming policies and schemes to leverage support from public bodies and guide the communities for sustainable livelihoods” (Ramoji 2014). The envisioned means to ensure greater participation was the BVM, whose long-term aim, according to a letter to a government district collector, was “to empower the slum dwellers for accessing their entitlements” (Rasoolpura BVM 2013).

THE SCALE AND CORE ACTIVITIES OF THE BVM

BVM groups are organized at the slum scale, but the core activities of the BVM take place at the scale of the neighborhood. These neighborhoods contain between one to three thousand people. Weekly meetings are held in each neighborhood in the slums where the BVM has been activated (see Figure 2).

The meetings serve to solicit resident concerns and identify shortcomings regarding public services in neighborhoods. These concerns are communicated to the slum-level BVM group, and are then used to file “representations” with relevant public agencies. Representations are service concerns or grievances of local slum residents presented to local, state, and national government agencies. The process of representation in the BVM involves soliciting the basic service concerns of local residents at the neighborhood level, putting these concerns in writing, and filing formal requests for service upgrades with local government agencies on a routine basis. Representations utilize formal grievance mechanisms that are built into many public agencies (Caseley 2006; Davis 2004), but are more accessible to slum dwellers.
To monitor progress on addressing service needs, staff from the supporting NGOs visit each slum area weekly. Other capacity training or engagement strategies are also carried out by the supporting NGOs on an ad hoc basis. For instance, in Bholakpur and Addagutta, NGO staff have helped stage slum-wide events and public demonstrations annually on World Toilet and World Water Day, which have been publicized by the local press.

PROCESS: MEETING PRACTICAL NEEDS

How can we evaluate the work of the BVM? In this type of engagement initiative, the definition of success or failure is not obvious (Joshi 2013). Donor, local implementer, and resident objectives and definitions of success are likely to differ. Accordingly, this study assesses the BVM based on its ability to meet residents’ practical and strategic needs while satisfying donor goals. The long-term success of initiatives such as the BVM requires a unique
combination of patience and subversion to meet both practical and strategic needs (Moser 1989b; Mitlin 2008). Practical needs are met in three time frames: short-term improvements in service outcomes via the existing BVM structure, medium-term sustainability of engagement efforts without NGO support, and long-term transfer of responsibility to government agencies.

**Short Term**

In the short term, the BVM operates to communicate pressing basic service needs to local government agencies and incentivizes them to address these needs. During the period of February 2010 to August 2014, BVM groups filed 500 formal representations with local government agencies.² Filing representations epitomizes the unique way in which the Citizen First program learns the local government system and exploits new opportunities. The main government forum to which BVM groups make representations is the Prajavani (People’s Voice) program of the GHMC (New Indian Express 2013). The most successful representations were for one-off, short-term requests. For instance, representations made to the GHMC to do a special sweeping of streets in advance of Ramadan, to state power agencies to replace light bulbs and power lines, and to the city’s water utility to address contaminated drinking water, all quickly achieved their aims. Other issues raised via representations, such as the covering of nalas (open drains) and the provision of ration cards to eligible households, have only partially succeeded. By contrast, repeated representations regarding issues such as school sanitation and the construction of community halls and health centers have received scant response. The lack of progress in resolving these service deficiencies appears to be due to their dependence on coordination between local and national agencies. Representations also appear less successful if made to national agencies, which easily ignore local concerns.

Moreover, representations sometimes bring about the minimum response to address a basic service deficit rather than satisfactory resolution.

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² As an alternative measure of success, in the six months between the origin of the BVM phase and the end of 2013, the BVM leveraged approximately $18,500 of investment from public agencies that would not have otherwise been spent in the study areas. This compares to $15,600 dollars in BVM program costs for the same period (email correspondence with C. Kar, January 9, 2015). In other words, whether judged as a direct resource transfer from WaterAid to slum communities or via a full cost-benefit analysis, the BVM appears to be effective.
Still, the potential for lasting change in basic service security due to representations should not be understated. In the Gun Huts Bazaar area of Rasoolpura, representations filed by residents successfully pressured the SCB to devote 7–8 lakhs ($11,700–$13,300) to regularly pick up solid and liquid waste in this area. This site’s status as an unauthorized trash dump had lasted for forty years, but it took only nine months of collective pressure to fully resolve the issue.3

**Medium Term**

Beyond the scope of the second program phase (through 2016), WaterAid’s goal is for the platform to carry out its work without external support. Since complete devolution of the platform to slum residents has always been envisioned, supporting NGOs have consistently provided training to increase the capacity of BVM conveners, neighborhood BVM leaders, and non-BVM leaders (BVM 2013; Ramoji 2014). In a 2014 survey, however, leaders of the BVM identified insufficient funds as one of the initiative’s biggest ongoing challenges. Neighborhood-level BVM groups must consider creative means to raise funds for continued operations, or a system of dues, to prepare for the complete autonomy of the platform. Accordingly, Bholakpur’s BVM leaders are building a large base of participants with the goal of eventually collecting fees for program activities when external support is withdrawn. Moreover, BVM leaders in Ambedkar Nagar, who do not receive any funds from the Citizen First program, have actually requested more autonomy from program implementers in order to work on their own agenda.

**Long Term**

The long-term goal for the BVM is not only to be entirely self-run, but also for the majority of its current activities to become superfluous due to the existence of reliable local public sector service provision. The BVM attempts to accomplish this long-term handoff to local government by treating local public officials as potential allies rather than inevitable enemies (personal

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3 From the perspective of residents, assessing short-term effectiveness involves a comparison to the status quo in the slums before the initiation of the BVM. Among BVM leaders, self-reported satisfaction with the platform’s progress on achieving service outcomes was fairly high (4 out of 5 on a Likert scale).
If cooperative efforts are unsuccessful in eliciting public sector response, however, BVM groups do not hesitate to engage in confrontation and shaming of public agencies and officials. The ultimate goal of all engagement, whether cooperative or adversarial, is to increasingly incentivize government officials and politicians to provide better services to slum residents (Allaby and Preston 2005). As detailed above, this mainstreaming of service tasks by the public sector has been successfully achieved with respect to water quality testing and solid waste collection. Government mainstreaming of other services will serve as a key indicator of success in the future.

**PROCESS: MEETING STRATEGIC NEEDS**

In addition to meeting practical needs and bringing about government mainstreaming to meet these needs in existing program areas, the BVM maintains more strategic aims. Given its ambitious remit, the platform can be evaluated in terms of its capacity to increase the scale of its operations intensively (taking on a larger remit within existing program areas) and extensively (reaching more slums outside of original program areas).

**Intensive Scaling**

Slum dwellers need more than consistent access to WASH. Supporting NGOs have long referenced the idea of the “right to the city” in envisaging that the Citizen First program would also bring slum residents better livelihoods and bargaining power (J. Jairath, personal interview, August 15, 2013). Dissatisfaction with progress on this broader remit in the program’s first phase led to the creation of the BVM platform. Without directly invoking the right to the city, slum residents also clearly embrace a more ambitious agenda than WASH. Representations filed by the BVM have expanded to bring about improvements to basic health care, electricity, solid waste management, and education. Participation in the BVM has also raised a broader range of concerns among residents. In the Anna Nagar neighbourhood of Rasoolpura, for instance, residents have taken up emergency transportation services as a concern. In Ambedkar Nagar the BVM spends much of its effort demanding a new public school, and in Bholakpur women’s concerns regarding domestic abuse are central. Coordination of BVM units across the slums,
if not coalitions at larger scales, is required in order to elicit a government response regarding these issues.

**Extensive Scaling**

A focus on extensive scaling, before program design has demonstrated effectiveness or elicited interest from the supposed beneficiaries, is a common mistake made by NGOs (Uvin, Jain and Brown 2000). The first phase of the Citizen First program exhibited this type of over-extension. Program implementers envisioned the spread of the program across slums as a citizens’ collective movement. Consequently, they immediately aimed to scale up collective action across seventy-five slums without sufficient momentum. The second phase, on the other hand, has made intensive efforts to activate the BVM in four slums and has consequently gained the trust and enthusiasm of residents. This divergence in outcomes suggests that program scaling may be better pursued via demand from local communities rather than supply from program implementers. The spread of the BVM to Ambedkar Nagar in 2013 demonstrates horizontal scaling of the initiative. The success of the BVM has prompted other slums to request BVM activation, and residents from other slums have attended city-level meetings and leaders trainings of the platform (BVM 2013; personal interviews, C. Kar, July 9 and September 11, 2014).

**CONCLUSION**

This study explains the origins of and evaluates the engagement strategies employed by the Basti Vikas Manch in four slums situated in Hyderabad, India. The BVM effectively balances cooperative and combative engagement with local power brokers to improve conditions for slum residents. Moreover, the BVM navigates the tension between meeting practical and strategic needs in the urban public sector. At the same time, since the BVM platform relies on the agency and efforts of slum residents to engage local government, it should not be expected to realize complete transformation of the service access status quo. Normatively, the onus should not be laid entirely, or even primarily, on disadvantaged residents to address their basic service deficits, much less their access to a broader set of rights and opportunities. In practice, the effect of participatory initiatives in bringing
about better service provision and large-scale social change is mediated by local government administrative structure (McCourt 2012). In this respect, there is some room for optimism in Hyderabad. Although political parties continue to interact with slum dwellers in a non-democratic fashion, urban bureaucrats now follow official, public agency protocols more often than they did in the past (Kar, 2014).

On the other hand, participants in the contemporary BVM must still often register representations with multiple agencies to address one issue. Policy efforts to revitalize the Urban Community Development of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation are likely to have the biggest positive effect on slum dwellers in the study areas. The department historically functioned as a comprehensive forum for slum dwellers to register complaints regarding public sector service delivery and other civic rights. Moreover, endemic shortcomings suggest that local government agencies need to be reorganized to prioritize infrastructure maintenance in addition to new construction (Ramoji 2014).

This study also contributes to a broader understanding of how low-income resident platforms can effectively engage and secure basic service improvements from under-performing urban governance structures across LMICs. Other urban initiatives to improve basic service access for low-income communities can adopt elements of the BVM’s constructive engagement strategy and the flexible employment of a range of tactics based on detailed knowledge of the nuances of local public sector (dys)functioning.

The development of the BVM in Hyderabad has taken place in the larger context of profound administrative and political change. Attempting to foster similar initiatives in more closed political and bureaucratic contexts, however, will require different strategies. In addition to learning from initiatives employed in open contexts such as the BVM, future policy can draw on insights from the literature on nonviolent protest formation to initiate effective engagement strategies with local government agencies in autocracies.
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Citizenship and Water-Spigot Politics in Rio de Janeiro

Douglas McRae

Georgetown University

ABSTRACT

This paper asks what have been the obstacles to extending water supply equitably in Brazil’s largest cities? Specifically, how have the politics of water supply evolved over time and in relation to Brazil’s recent political history? The analysis considers the defining role of neighborhood associations in Rio de Janeiro in shaping citizenship and political participation in the latter half of the past century. It reviews recent literature on citizenship in Brazil and relevant case studies related to access to water and sanitation to assess obstacles and advances in strengthening universal citizenship in urban Brazil.

In 1968, Brazil entered the most repressive phase of its 21-year military dictatorship. Following the issuance of Institutional Act 5 (AI-5), which outlawed political participation and expression outside the strict parameters set by the military government, the promise of democratic participation and social inclusion at the decade’s start seemed ever more distant. Brazil’s military dictatorship, which had overthrown president João Goulart in 1964, was the first of a wider regional pattern of authoritarian rule in Latin America, a wave sustained by conservative elites, military officials, and the frequent support of the U.S. government. Economic growth and political order dominated a

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system that in theory sought a renewal of Brazilian democracy while simultaneously crushing dissent, seen as radical and destabilizing. As the military government propped up a façade of electoral democracy at the national level, older forms of politics persisted at the local level.

One illustrative example comes from Rio de Janeiro, a city that until 1960 had been the capital of the Brazilian republic. Facing declining political centrality and economic dynamism, the newly established city-state encompassing Rio (known as Guanabara) found itself in the unique position of being the only state with “opposition” governors during the years of military rule. In 1971, Antônio Padua de Chagas Freitas came to power as a member of the Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB), the nominal opposition party to the military’s Aliança para a Reconstrução Nacional (Arena). The name Chagas Freitas became associated with a form of clientelistic urban politics known as a política do bica d’água, or “water-spigot politics.” In this configuration, a politician like Chagas Freitas would visit a favela community and offer some sort of basic infrastructure (usually a communal water spigot) in exchange for a promise for electoral support. If the community followed through and the candidate won, the improvement was delivered to the community, often in a ceremonious fashion (McCann 2014, 43). Although this clientelism had long existed in Rio, in this phase it became synonymous with Chagas Freitas (Trindade 2000).

Clientelism, while not strictly confined to Latin America, has historically shaped much of the urban political landscape in the region. Local variants in different countries evolved in response to the gradual incorporation of popular sectors into national political coalitions. Understanding the resulting patterns of political organization in Latin American cities is key to understanding how notions of citizenship transformed under authoritarian regimes and later during the transition to civilian rule. Such understanding is also needed to develop a more nuanced sense of the obstacles to installing basic and sustainable improvements to sanitation infrastructure. The purpose of this paper is to rethink a notion like water-spigot politics and incorporate its implications into the study of citizenship in Brazil’s contemporary democracy. The military years choked the development of citizenship rights in Brazil, already unevenly distributed in earlier periods of its history. Additionally, the forms of citizenship and rights found in Brazil differ from those found in other societies, a fact with which policy makers and social scientists must grapple when studying urbanization in contemporary Brazil.
This paper looks at attempts by communities and associações de moradores (neighborhood associations) to acquire and maintain water and sanitation systems, especially in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, thus making their own version of water-spigot politics, I argue that neighborhood associations played a significant role in securing access to water and other services, though maintenance of these services was tenuous. Water supply will be the analytical lens for investigating citizenship and political participation in urban areas. As anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes observed in her ethnography of an urban periphery in Pernambuco: “Water is a key word, a Paulo Freirian ‘generative theme.’ It animates social life…and both divides and unites the social classes” (1992, 68). Thirst, drought, and general lack of clean water are stereotypical images of Brazil’s Northeast, yet these issues increasingly manifest in Brazil’s largest urban areas. Likewise, water can and continues to be “generative” for political action, beyond the clientelistic practices of local political machines. By taking a close look at the intertwined development of citizenship rights and basic water infrastructure in one of Brazil’s largest cities, we may understand better the modern challenges facing urban communities with precarious access to basic sanitation.

DEFINING CITIZENSHIP IN MODERN BRAZIL

Citizenship, the rights and duties of a member of a community (a citizen), historically emerged alongside the rise of the modern city. With growing urban populations, political leaders sought to consolidate state power over a new base of legitimacy (Carvalho 1987, 11–12). The idea of the rights of citizenship dates back to the emergence of the nation-state as a viable political unit in the nineteenth century. Membership in a modern political community (in this case, the Brazilian nation-state) assumes a two-way street of rights and duties associated with members of that community, its citizens. In Brazil, nineteenth-century proponents of liberalism theoretically embraced civil, political, and social rights for all Brazilians, though historically social groups enjoyed highly differentiated access to these rights. In fact, as anthropologist Roberto Da Matta observes for Brazil, one of the contradictions of citizenship is that denoting all members of a society as citizens obscures inequalities based on factors such as social status, race, or gender (1997, 63–65). Subsequently, groups excluded from the full spectrum of
rights and duties encompassing citizenship, such as urban favelados (favela residents), have often worked outside the established but exclusionary legal frameworks, exercising in effect alternative forms of citizenship.

To understand the social processes by which favela communities petitioned for and frequently acquired access to water services, it is helpful to begin with T.H. Marshall’s classic delineation of the progression of citizenship rights in nineteenth-century industrial Britain. Marshall saw a gradual progression over the course of two centuries from civil rights to political rights and finally social rights (Marshall 1964). For Charles Tilly (1996), current trends towards the dismantling and restriction of previously “in-eradicable perquisites of citizenship in Western countries” have led to critiques of Marshall’s teleological take on the rights of citizenship. In a recent reflection on the comparative experience of citizenship rights in Latin American countries, Philip Oxhorn presents an alternate view of these rights in the context of recent democratic transitions: “the provision of universal political rights in the absence of civil rights and with social rights in decline” (Oxhorn 2003, 47). In the post-authoritarian period of democratic transition in Latin America, Oxhorn predicts: “The juxtaposition of universal political rights with such sharp limits to other aspects of citizenship will have important consequences for the quality of democracy” in the region (ibid., 53). Political shifts, privatization measures, and the subsequent restructuring of state power have contributed to the relative decline of the neighborhood associations and the proliferation of illegal drug trafficking networks, often with the complicity of agents of the state, from the police to politicians (Arias 2006).

James Holston has described citizenship in Brazil as an entanglement of differentiated “entrenched” and “insurgent” types: the former is exclusionary by nature, “a mechanism to distribute inequality,” (2008, 7) while the latter has emerged among urbanized working classes from the 1970s onwards as a way to assert rights in the face of informality and legal exclusion. Holston traces this distinction in São Paulo (Brazil’s largest metropolitan area), though the pattern could easily be expanded to Rio’s urban landscape and communities, offering another site for studying demands for the rights of citizenship. Looking at the Vargas era and the brief democratic period prior to 1964, historian Brodwyn Fischer argues that a significant expansion of certain political and civil rights occurred, interwoven with “poverties of rights” built into the Brazilian legal system. The military government
subsequently undermined this expansion of rights (Fischer 2008, 309–310), or at least altered its course. These ruptures follow a pattern of historical disjuncture (versus homogeneous expansion) in the development of Brazilian citizenship. The relationship of such disjuncture to the most basic of urban infrastructures, water supply, is explored in the next section.

WATER AND THE BRAZILIAN CITY: OLD AND NEW STRUGGLES

The emergence of megacities (urban areas with ten million inhabitants or more) over the past century raises questions about the equality afforded by the idea of citizenship. A majority of the world’s urban growth and population is now found in developing countries, Latin America being the most urbanized region after North America (Perlman 2010, 44–49). This long process of urbanization accelerated for Latin America in the early mid-twentieth century, characterized in Brazil by the growth of two competing metropolises, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The arrival of a combined 108 million inhabitants from impoverished rural areas to the largest urban centers of Brazil over the course of the twentieth century constituted one of the most dramatic shifts of rural-to-urban populations, a trend now reflected globally as over half the world’s population resides in urban environments (Davis 2006). Indeed, according to the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística Censo 2010, Brazil has nine metropolitan areas with over three million inhabitants, with Rio de Janeiro alone reporting over twelve million, the largest after São Paulo. Social relations and access to resources and public services have historically been unequal in Brazil, cleaving sharply on race and class lines. Statistical analysis has additionally demonstrated in Brazilian cities an inverse correlation between city population size and differences in quality of life, specifically as it relates to equal provision of urban services such as piped water (Da Matta et al. 2005). The issue of water as a basic social right and a necessity for human life subsequently motivated much of the initial mobilization and activism within the urban context.

In a megacity like Rio de Janeiro and elsewhere in Brazil, access to water continues to generate a hierarchy. All levels of society have a stake in this hierarchy of access for survival, though it proves consistently unfavorable to the poor. Efforts of public administrators and engineers to supply water to Rio’s residents received a strong push with the construction of the Guandu water
treatment station in the 1960s. However, urbanization trends in Brazil have continued to exacerbate this issue, folding water into a host of issues that face the impoverished and often informal settlements that make up greater Rio’s urban metropolitan landscape, even as international events like the World Cup and the Olympics draw more attention to the city (Stefanini 2013). Globally, the risks of water shortages and lack of access for the urban poor is just as acute as the health risk of unchecked or low-quality expansion of water and sewer services in urban reservoirs (Davis 2006, 136–137). Water manifests as an important aspect of urban organizing and demand making, especially in suburban and favela communities, where neighborhood associations began to operate after the 1960s. Brazil’s oscillation between citizen and military authoritarian rule influenced the goals of nascent favela neighborhood associations from resisting forced removal policies to accessing urban infrastructure and services. Access to water was a fundamental requirement to sustain settlements; additionally, its symbolic value made it a potential rallying point for community demands for legal recognition.

Occasional crises due to inadequate urban services along with periodic droughts have occurred since the founding of the Brazilian Republic in 1889, consistently confirming a seeming inability by the government to deliver adequate solutions. One recent chronicler of Rio’s water supply spoke for his fellow cariocas (residents of Rio de Janeiro), describing them as suffering from a “psychosis” stemming from this historical hyperawareness of water shortages (Santa Ritta 2009, 319). At the turn of twentieth century, Rio had established itself as Brazil’s most eminent city, having surpassed the important economic centers of the northeast (Salvador and Recife) while still competing for political and economic dominance with São Paulo to the south. As Rio simultaneously became both the nation’s capital and a conduit of global trade, urban elites imagined the city as a testament to civilization, a way to look beyond the stigma of slavery and monarchical rule that had defined Brazil from the beginning (Meade 1997, 18). To this end, reformers often expelled poor urban dwellers to peripheries (such as the surrounding hills), simply removing what did not fit their concept of a modern city (Sedrez 2009, 92).

Construction of public works related to water reflected this bias in urban planning; indeed, the material outcomes of the reforms benefited the wealthy while the moral outcome of such reforms sought to remove the unsightly and poor (Meade 1997, 94). As the city struggled with yellow
fever outbreaks in the early twentieth century (in addition to popular resistance against obligatory vaccination campaigns), water works increasingly expanded for wealthier residents in the South Zone (Santa Ritta 2009, 179–183). The period defined by the political regimes of Getúlio Vargas (1930–1945, 1951–1954) initiated the incorporation of a wider swath of Rio’s expanding population, though on highly asymmetric terms. It also laid the groundwork for popular organizations, though the Vargas regime initially severely limited political and civil rights. As residents of central favelas gradually began to refer to urban services as rights in demands that they made, women and children carrying heavy water jugs up steep steps became an important image in popular politics as the “ultimate hardship” (Fischer 2008, 68). Politicians answered these requests more often than not with favors or highly symbolic responses—recalling the latter-day methods of water-spigot politicians.

NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Although administrators and elites based their urban planning on philosophies of civilization and modernity, pressure from the growing favela population certainly shaped the final results. The wave of urban renewal at the turn of the twentieth century, in the form of public health campaigns and sanitation infrastructure, elicited resistance among the plebeian sections of Rio that, ultimately, the political sphere could not ignore. Vargas and his supporters relied on the military and secret police to maintain political stability, while technocrats took care of administration. When elections took place in 1945 following Vargas’s forced resignation by the military, political organization reasserted itself on all levels. Amnesty for political dissidents and an initial period of political liberalization led to the formation of Comitês Democráticos e Populares (CDPs) throughout Brazil, often connected to the (briefly) unrestricted Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB) (Duarte 2009; Fischer 2014). The new regime and its public security forces were deeply suspicious of organizations connected to the PCB, eventually attempting to co-opt the CDPs once the government outlawed the PCB again in 1947. Although the CDPs allowed for opportunities to address grievances and provide political expression and ideology for a liberalizing urban society, another contemporary form of organization took on greater
significance. This process was echoed in many respects in other urban areas, with Rio undergoing an increase in local neighborhood associations.

In this period, favelados faced clear restrictions on water availability, often waiting in line for hours to collect water from communal spigots, often far downhill from their *barraco* (shanty) homes. A lack of piped water also created vectors for mosquito-borne diseases such as yellow fever and malaria, due to the fact that water drawn from the communal spigot had to be stored in open cans or buckets in the household. The combination of ever-present grievances over water, compounded by rising neighborhood political organizations, supplied the impulse that allowed 15,589 shanty homes to be connected to the city water supply (Pino 1997, 53). Piped water furthermore had the potential to make informal squatter homes more permanent and linked to the wider city.

Throughout the 1960s, though, poor water infrastructure still defined the favela landscape. Though Rio could claim that 76.7% of the city had access to city water in 1960, this coverage broke down in peripheral and favela neighborhoods, with coverage measured at 56% in far suburban communities and only 22% in favelas. Water spigots and other basic infrastructure given as populist favors often were poorly installed or never worked, and in any case such “populist payoffs…did not translate into participation or permanence” (Fischer 2008, 60–67). In the former favela of Catacumba the vast majority of favelados still relied on low-pressure water spigots concentrated at the street level, far from the growing population center of the favela (Perlman 1976: 28). Symbolic gestures were just that: removal could be instituted even in communities with water pipes or sewer lines. Catacumba, inconveniently located near affluent South Zone neighborhoods, was eventually demolished and its residents removed in 1970.

Not all suburban communities pined for water, at least initially. In testimony collected from Nilza Rosa dos Santos, the lifelong resident of Morro de Formiga and former neighborhood association president, she described her childhood bathing, drinking, and fishing in the freshwater of a river (Pandolfi and Grynszpan 2003, 176). In the late 1970s the Companhia Estadual de Aguas e Esgotos (CEDAE), a reconfiguration of earlier state water companies created after the 1975 merging of Rio de Janeiro and Guanabara states, engaged with communities like Morro da Formiga and became the main administrator of water supply. Groups of approximately fifty neighbors organized different *sociedades* (associations) to maintain
water, though some sócios (water association members) in Morro da Formiga continued to rely on água de nascente (natural spring water) (ibid., 177–178). Residents of Vigário Geral, a North Zone favela, at first installed their own electric and water systems, though these later also came under the control of the neighborhood association (Arias 2006, 131–132). Informal neighborhoods on the cusp between rural and urban could enjoy access to open springs, rivers, and streams, though mounting population pressures threatened to create supply constraints and contamination.

The military coup, combined with accelerating urbanization (spurred in part by the ephemeral Brazilian economic “miracle” of the 1970s, though also building on waves of domestic migration from earlier decades), contributed to the context in which favela neighborhood associations and residents contested citizenship. Brazil’s booming urban growth continued within a period of authoritarian military rule that severely restricted civil society and political autonomy. The military leadership grew to realize, however, that it needed legitimacy in order to achieve its goals of national development; domestic dissidence in particular threatened to undermine support for the perceived stability of military rule and suppression alone could not sustain the military regime. As a significant portion of the urban population, favela residents naturally stood to make up an important part of the political order, at least nominally. Assumptions that residents in informal or impoverished communities exist on the margins outside of the “core” urban society have long fallen out of favor, in part due to strong arguments that residents of favela communities are actually deeply integrated with wider urban society (Perlman 1976; 2010). The military government had attempted to graft their official political system through the Arena and MDB parties onto pre-existing urban society. Ultimately, though, community organizations that negotiated for public water services emerged strengthened from eviction struggles with the experience to petition on behalf of their communities.

The specific context of Rio provides myriad examples of communities and associations to study. During the most repressive period of the military dictatorship, some residents of Rio’s favelas still believed they could influence the government, particularly in regards to acquiring essential needs for urban life, for example: “influencing local government to put in a water standpipe, lay in a paved stairway up the hill, or provide materials for a drainage ditch” (Perlman 2010, 211). Beyond petitioning for these public
works, neighborhood associations gained newfound strength in struggles to resist the favela removal attempted by the military government. Maria José de Rezende (2001) has highlighted the military government’s “psychosocial strategies” to co-opt the population’s political consciousness, particularly through patriotic symbols and the promotion of social values favorable to the dictatorship. Rather than molding them into useful citizens desired by the military state, such exercises reinforced the desire of the residents of poorer neighborhoods for the rights of urban citizenship.

Systematic favela condemnation and removal has dominated urban public policy in Brazil from the end of the nineteenth century to the present. Removal and resettlement programs promoted through various government organizations never fully achieved their goals, wasting political and monetary capital through the construction of poorly maintained and managed conjuntos (public housing apartment buildings). Particularly after 1975, urban politicians in Rio interacted with favelas through neighborhood associations, reinstating clientelistic approaches to garner votes in exchange for favors for those associations that mobilized on their behalf. The monopoly of the Chagas Freitas political machine on state resources aided the consolidation of political clienteles in Rio’s poorest neighborhoods (Gay 1990). A national water and sanitation initiative known as PLANASA provided the public institution in this period for water works, offering public subsidies to a substantial number of urban households nationwide (Merrick 1983). Though removal and eviction attempts have continued well into the present, the installation of water infrastructure lent a stronger sense of permanency as well as a base of political organization to contest threats of government removal. As the military government edged towards political liberalization after 1975, those neighborhood associations that successfully resisted removal saw opportunities to stake a claim in the aforementioned urban fabric, secured figuratively by thousands of kilometers of water pipeline.

DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, SHIFTING RELATIONSHIPS

Electoral institutions and clientelistic politics allowed a degree of bargaining and even contention in favelas through neighborhood associations. Experiences struggling against favela removal had strengthened neighborhood association cohesiveness in Rio. The political coalitions formed in
working-class neighborhoods, in fact, became key sources of votes for the opposition Partido Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB) in 1985, due in part to organizing efforts on the level of the neighborhood organizations. This marked a return to overt political activity in neighborhood associations, though the clientelistic system still shaped many interactions.

Neighborhood associations’ resistance to removal programs carried out in the South Zone of Rio had persisted throughout the mid-1970s, with umbrella groups of favela associations resembling a vital parallel congress for favelados (McCann 2014). Certain neighborhood associations found success in influencing the quality of attention that government organizations paid to urbanization projects, for example in the Brás de Pina favela in the Northern Zone (Cardoso 1984, 225–226). Brás de Pina “did not possess even those minimal sanitary conditions indispensable to human life” in the 1960s, including water connections and sewer systems. This lack of services became a rallying point especially as unsanitary conditions posed a threat for the younger generation (Pino 1997, 55). Other competing public organizations focused on urbanization and public housing succeeded in moving some families to conjunto projects, which provided standard urban services and often an address, an important facet in achieving legal formality (Perlman 2010, 56). Attachment to land and communities associated with urban spaces complicated this relocation project, essentially creating a new space of social exclusion.

Collaborative efforts undertaken by government agencies, such as the Companhia de Desenvolvimento de Comunidades (Codesco), were successful, initiating new ways of dealing with the government where previously there had been no avenue for neighborhood input (Perlman 1976, 235–240). The favela Vidigal in the South Zone represented a unique example of the way in which neighborhood associations operated during the era of abertura (liberalization). The neighborhood association refused to allow patronage politics to affect voting patterns to the degree typical in most other favelas. Instead, it became adept at petitioning local government offices or halting traffic on the road near the entrance of the favela to draw attention to their demands. In this way, the two sides financed piped water and other public works. Public services that required more community contribution besides labor, like public education, had to be addressed by politicians, while immediate urban services necessary for survival could be provided directly through the association’s maneuvering (Gay 1990, 77–79). In a favela
with more clientelistic relations, residents saw the installation of water and other urban infrastructure as the duties of the association president, who in exchange for completion of the obra (public work) actively promoted electoral support for political candidates who sponsored the project (ibid., 112). New interactions with vote-seeking politicians and the fulfillment of critical urban services also marked a shift in community mobilization.

Community activists remembered how high levels of popular participation had secured them access to water and other services. Francisca Honorata da Nóbrega Oliveira, resident of sprawling Rocinha, recalled the difficulties of carrying water from distant spigots, emphasizing as well that few people could afford to boil or purify water. Though the different governments over the years carried out urban infrastructure projects in small pieces, the residents of Rocinha had to struggle to achieve services like piped water. In her view, recent participation by her sons demanding water for a sector of Rocinha located further up the hill reflected this spirit of popular struggle from earlier years (Pandolfi and Grynszpan 2003, 105–107). José Martins de Oliveira, the first president of the associação de moradores in the Rocinha neighborhood Bairro Barcelos, recalled competing with the president of the local electricity committee for influence in installing piped water. Rather than having the wealthier president of electricity buy materials, Martins convinced the vizinhos (residents of the neighborhood) to contribute a small fee to buy materials, as well as provide “sweat equity” to the state water company in order to install piped water (Pandolfi and Grynszpan 2003, 37–39). This created a situation in which the fees for maintaining the water system were collected by the neighborhood and not by a sole influential individual. These varying experiences demonstrate a few of the ways in which neighborhood associations connected their communities to wider networks of water and power, networks that were far from stable in terms of guaranteed water supply and political influence.

The harnessing of sweat equity in favela communities coalesced with public policies initiated in the administration of Leonel Brizola. Two projects remembered favorably by organizers are the municipal work scheme Projeto Mutirão and the sanitation expansion initiative called the Programa de Favelas de Companhia Estadual de Águas e Esgotos (Proface), both founded in the early 1980s and forbears of the Favela-Bairro urbanization program in the 1990s. Projeto Mutirão (based on the word for a collective work group) institutionalized and paid residents who contributed labor
to sanitation projects (and later roads and community centers) in their respective favelas (Perlman 2010, 274). Proface emphasized the expansion of water and sanitation specifically in favelas. Though the style of populism embodied in water-spigot politics had prevailed in urban politics, Proface broke from this paradigm. Proface partnered with neighborhood associations, not just in the coordination of construction but importantly in consolidating water payments under the CEDAE (Freire et al. 2009, 57). This unification, in addition to allowing residents to participate in debates over monthly water payments, also allowed neighborhood associations to establish their authority over water administration on the community level.

The significance of Brizola’s political maneuvering was a turning point for community leaders (McCann 2014). Jó Rezende, a former president of the Federação de Associação de Moradores do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (Fametj), declared that the city as well as the state of Rio de Janeiro were already *brizolando* (becoming Brizola supporters), moving more towards party politics and less towards the relations that associations had established at the municipal level (Rezende 2001, 19–20). Although not weakened to the point of irrelevance, the role of the neighborhood associations certainly was changed during Brizola’s administration. Brizola’s popularity and subsequent ability to consolidate infrastructure projects rose from wide urban support: favela removal had no place in the governor’s public policy, while *loteamentos irregulares* (irregular subdivisions) offered another source of political support (Freire 2008, 130–131). A pamphlet from 1985 touted Proface’s achievements, using on its cover an evocative favela image: a dark-skinned girl balancing a water bucket, facing out into a view of the urban skyline, a view clearly from the favela hillside. The poster is notable for its declaration in the accompanying text: “We are working to make the water can a thing of the past, so it remains only a pretty samba” (Governo do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, 1985). The political rhetoric still present in the 1980s continued to draw on fundamental images of water as it altered the forms of political engagement that worked towards ameliorating conditions of water access in the favelas.

As political participation spread, the channels through which the neighborhood associations worked lost importance. Itamar Silva, a community leader in Santa Marta, noted the relative decline in the organizing potential of the neighborhood association as basic needs came to be satisfied. After the propagation of Proface and Mutirão, the residents saw
that “the channel was open, it was only a question of negotiation” with political actors, working through representatives instead of through collective mobilization (Pandolfi and Grynszpan 2003, 320). Although the association in Santa Marta and other favela neighborhoods continued monitoring activities, the associations had exhausted their immediate political purpose through early successes. Political participation proliferated through party politics, though a new reality emerged in favela communities: the drug trade. Infrastructure deteriorated over time and new settlements continued to crop up around Rio de Janeiro: by the time new or updated infrastructure was needed for favelas, the system had completely changed. In one favela in the mid-1990s, the neighborhood association president acted as a source of advice and know-how for residents in a neighboring community on how to improve water services. In this new type of urban politics, however, neighborhood associations mediate between politicians, residents, and traffickers if indeed they are not totally co-opted by the last, which frequently maintain the local monopoly of violence (Arias 2006, 69–70).

CONCLUSION: WATER AND CONTINUING SOCIAL DIVISIONS

Favela and neighborhood associations began, by the end of the 1970s, to recover a degree of political rights, petitioning for water, sanitation, and related infrastructure. This action allowed them access to social rights through public services, even as they encountered severe restrictions on civil rights, including threats of repression and removal. The onset of drug trafficking violence in the 1990s led to a further erosion of neighborhood associations, even a glorification of earlier solidarity and achievements. The clientelistic systems facilitated by local political machines and neighborhood associations had provided a type of political right to residents. When they mobilized successfully, their actions created responses for providing water services in a booming urban center, often where water seemed like a scarce resource.

What relevance does discussion of relatively abstract concepts, like citizenship and participation, have for urban policy makers concerned with water and sanitation? Although any urban area presents specific challenges in terms of its environment and geography, these elements can be overstated
and displace concerns of citizenship rights. Political participation, though perhaps broader today than at any point in Brazilian history, is seen less positively and as less effective than it was for earlier generations of favelados, in part due to an internalized tendency among the youngest voters to express “less faith in the ability of citizens to make wise selections in their candidates for public office” (Perlman 2010, 218). This lack of faith in the political system plays out in democratic Brazil’s post-abertura climate. While residents’ remembered with nostalgia elections that took place prior Brazil’s authoritarian regime, the now older activists (like Francisca Honorata cited above) remember fondly the victories won by the neighborhood association in more unequal struggles. On the other hand, the specter of drug trafficking has substituted itself in the clientelistic model established in earlier generations, often sparking violent conflict with neighborhood associations. Attempts to dislodge traffickers through Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPPs) (pacification police units) have the potential to restore order, but too often have brought a new brand of mistrust and repression that has not contributed to the organizing needed to secure basic infrastructure on that neighborhood’s terms.

What better example than Rocinha, one of Rio’s largest and most iconic favelas? Despite undergoing the pacification process and gaining a degree of notoriety, Rocinha has one of the longest histories of community organizing. Today, however, it still faces basic infrastructure challenges, as well as infrastructure projects that more reflect Rio’s tourist image and less the needs of its long-term inhabitants. Longtime residents remember earlier struggles, as well as difficult years during both the dictatorship and the rise of drug trafficking (Hosek 2013). New forms of popular petition and neighborhood organization, building on the vestiges of older efforts, emphasize broader participation and awareness of citizenship rights. In many ways, emphasizing strong civil society, community organization, and the fundamental importance of social rights will be just as important as any technological innovation. Furthermore, understanding these processes allows insight into simultaneous occurrences worldwide, as megacities and their peripheries become the reality of the world’s urban future. Water-spagot politics may yet become something more than mere clientelism.
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ABSTRACT

Public policy and urban governance have seen a profound transition in developing countries as a result of technological advances and new pro-inclusive institutional provisions. This paper explores sharing as a force that could enhance equity, solidarity, and urban quality in truly smart cities, and seeks to expand the realm of sharing beyond a narrow set of presumptions into an understanding of richer, more complex forms of cooperation. Through the evaluation of a hypothetical hybrid tenure model for the district of República in São Paulo, it uncovers the spatial, institutional, and organizational potentials of a shared smart city.

INTRODUCTION

Cities in developing countries are confronted with complex processes of modern economic growth that both create and reinforce existing sociospatial inequalities. In response, Brazil took a fundamental step by establishing the social function of urban property, a progressive principle enshrined in the 1988 Constitution and consolidated in the 2001 City Statute (Fortes
and Cobbett 2010). This marked a shift from the inherent right to private property to a change that included a collective responsibility (Maricato 2010). More than ever, governance and public policy in São Paulo appear to advocate principles of participation and egalitarianism (UN-Habitat 2010). The city’s progressive outlook presents an opportunity to test the limits of a truly smart city, one that expands on systems that go beyond efficiencies to the creation of a new urban commons based on a culture of sharing.

In Brazil, the introduction of pro-inclusive policies and social provisions, such as the national social housing program Minha Casa Minha Vida (My House, My Life—MCMV), represent important steps towards its vision of equality. Despite commendable effort and financial support, urban inequality in São Paulo remains among the highest in the world. This paper argues that institutional provisions are essential, yet insufficient in themselves, in resolving the structural problems of an historically unequal society; rather, their implementation can suspend social mobility and in some cases, invent clearer, more definitive sociospatial divisions.

This paper posits that along with key roles played by public bodies, there must be reciprocal engagement from communities as self-organizers—broad coalitions of people in which sharing and cooperation become indispensable. Over the past decades new technologies have accelerated the flow and coordination of information, enabling an unprecedented level of exchange between entities. Yet today, although most modern organizations are in favor of cooperation, it is hindered in practice by, their structure (Sennett 2012).

The questions raised here are:

1. To what extent can we learn about and build upon existing forms of sharing that focus less on ownership and accumulation and more on community and collaboration?

2. To what degree can the convergence of smart technological advances with highly networked and densely populated physical spaces lead to novel forms of sharing in cities?

3. How can public policies be redefined to provide the broader legal, social, and political context in which sharing platforms can evolve?
4. How can existing mechanisms in Brazil be reformulated to provide an alternative or complementary framework that would allow for more complex forms of cooperation?

METHODOLOGY

Based on a comparative place-based case study method, fieldwork was conducted in the city of São Paulo between September 2014 and April 2015. The seven-month fieldwork was carried out at the Housing and Human Settlements Laboratory (LabHab) at the University of São Paulo. Data sources included first-hand observations, semi-structured interviews with experts, informal conversations, analyses of municipal plans and reports, and site surveys.

This period included the author’s participation in Habitacidade, a cross-disciplinary working group at Escola da Cidade. Formed in 2014 by members of the “Habitation and City” post-graduate course, it has been working closely with social movements in a bid to explore strategies for providing social rental housing in República. Participation in the group consisted of attending weekly meetings with a diverse range of active members including academics, economists, planners, architects, members and residents of social movements, environmental specialists, and NGO representatives.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THEIR IMPACT ON URBAN POLICIES

Since the 1970s, social movements in Brazil have been at the forefront of urban reform, playing a vital role in ensuring that public policies and housing agendas have been inclusive and progressive (Caldeira 2003). As a result of years of pressure by social activists and powerful trade unions, institutionalized sociopolitical transformations such as the Constitution and the City Statute have been set in place to initiate long-term reform (Fortes and Cobbett 2010). This marked the beginning of formal recognition of the traditionally marginalized population in the city’s decision-making processes.

Located within the historic heart of São Paulo’s downtown area, República suffered dramatically from an exodus by the urban elite in the 1970s (EMURB 2004). Once the site of the most elegant buildings in the
city, the district has become the least populated administrative region, covering an area of 2.3 km² and home to only 56,981 inhabitants (IGBE 2014). As the demographic profile shifted, República became equated with neglect and desolation (UN-Habitat 2010). Today the district consists of a number of privately owned abandoned buildings simply waiting to be sold, entangled in disputes, or in some cases hanging on to reap the profits from an anticipated gentrification (ibid.).

In recent years, faced with a lack of legal housing alternatives, highly organized social movements began occupying vacant buildings in the center of São Paulo, demanding the democratization of access to housing and to the city (Rodrigues and Barbosa 2010). Abandoned for more than twenty years, the Hotel Columbia Palace is currently occupied by more than sixty families, all of which are members of the Frente de Luta por Moradia (FLM). Mildo Nascimento, a resident of the occupation, explained that a disagreement between three owners on the future of the property resulted in its idle state (personal communication March 12, 2015). Inheritance disagreements, along with entanglements in ownership, legal, technical, financial, and structural disputes, are a few of the many reasons that buildings have been abandoned in the city center (UN-Habitat 2010).

CURRENT URBAN POLICIES TOWARDS AN INCLUSIVE SMART CITY

In 2001, thirteen years after the declaration of the Constitution, the City Statute (Federal Law No. 10.257) was established. This unique set of legal instruments reinforced the Constitution by providing specific tools for its realization at the municipal level (Fortes and Cobbett 2010). In a single text it brought together a series of key themes on democratic governance, urban justice, public processes of participation, and environmental equilibrium in cities (Maricato 2010). Among the instruments introduced by the new Constitution and City Statute are:

1. The Municipal Master Plan: Compulsory for cities with over 20,000 inhabitants, master plans must be implemented through participatory planning processes, such as public hearings and workshops. The result is that decision-making is no longer in the hands of a few experts.
2. **Special Zones of Social Interest (ZEIS):** A zoning mechanism used for regularizing informally occupied areas, this instrument is also used to earmark vacant or underutilized properties for use as social housing, allowing public authorities to set aside areas that benefit from good infrastructure.

3. **Compulsory Land Parcelling, Building, and Use (PEUC):** PEUC was set in place to avoid the retention of vacant land, restrain property speculation, and increase access to urbanized land by obliging owners to use underutilized or vacant properties.

4. **Progressive Property and Land Tax (IPTU):** A progressive tax paid by owners that increases over five consecutive years. Noncompliance with PEUC after five years allows the municipality to charge IPTU at the maximum rate until the PEUC obligation is met.

5. **Expropriation with Payments in Public Debt Bonds:** Noncompliance with PEUC after IPTU has been charged for five consecutive years can lead to the expropriation of property by the municipality with payments made in public debt bonds.

These instruments present opportunities to explore collaborative techniques that would address urban challenges by creating smarter ways to use resources while helping cities make better decisions. In São Paulo, participatory processes have started to take root, as seen in the development of its current master plan. In addition to physical participatory activities, user-friendly online platforms were set up to provide information on planning issues and engage with a wider group of people in the city’s decision-making processes. In many cases however, the operational capacity of public bodies is limited. At present, up-to-date mapping of key information, such as the location and size of underused or occupied buildings, is unavailable even for large cities such as São Paulo. Crowdsourced maps provide a way to facilitate the mapping of important aspects of the city and help change the way both local authorities and the public perceive their environment (Saunders and Baeck 2015).

Nonetheless the success of these legal instruments has depended heavily on state and local governments, which are responsible for specifying in their
master plans the areas in which these tools are employed (Rodrigues and Barbosa 2010). Today there is a lack of fortitude in its application across municipalities, including São Paulo (Reali and Alli 2010). The main instrument being employed is primarily ZEIS, which merely demarcates zones designated for social housing within central city areas (Rodrigues and Barbosa 2010). The employment of just a single instrument has proven ineffective, as simply earmarking the areas has resulted in many private owners choosing to simply leave their property undeveloped because there are no consequences for their inaction. These essential instruments can, and should be, enforced intensively and collectively. Using PEUC and IPTU along with the establishment of ZEIS, for instance, would strengthen effectiveness by forcing owners of idle private land to ensure that their property fulfils a public function. Although still in embryonic stages, these instruments do provide the framework that allows for further policy changes towards a more equitable city, institutionalized changes that are unlikely to be reversed.

MINHA CASA, MINHA VIDA—BRAZIL’S MEGA LOW-INCOME HOUSING PROGRAM

In 2009, soon after the global financial crisis, Brazil’s federal government launched an ambitious national social housing program, Minha Casa, Minha Vida (MCMV), a model based on the construction of low-cost units for homeownership (UN-Habitat 2013). The goal was to tackle the country’s housing deficit through to the year 2023 and at the same time quickly stimulate national economic growth through the mobilization of the private sector (Labhab 2012). By 2011, one million units were built across the country. This target was increased in the second phase to a total of three million units by the end of 2014, bringing total investment to R$328.1 billion, roughly USD$93 billion (UN-Habitat 2013).

MCMV is structured mainly under two operational models. The first is market oriented, undertaken by the private sector. This currently accounts for more than 90% of MCMV funds (Labhab 2012). The second model is Minha Casa Minha Vida - Entidades (MCMV-E), a lesser known social-oriented sub-program. MCMV-E finances the acquisition of land and construction of housing units by self-organized families affiliated with nonprofit entities, trade unions, and cooperatives (UN-Habitat
Throughout the program MCMV-E was responsible for only 6% of the total housing units produced in the second phase (Pasternak and D’Ottaviano 2014). Despite its availability, the production of collaborative projects using this model has fallen short of expectations. Anaclaudia Rossbach, former advisor of the Ministry of Cities, explained that technical and institutional complexities, along with the lack of capacity of local communities have hindered the reach of this subprogram (personal communication March 3, 2015).

HABITACIDADE AS A COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION

With the retreat of the public sector—notably in long-term asset management—and the inability of the private sector to cater to low-income groups, third-sector organizations have emerged as crucial actors (Ganapati 2014). Within this structure, national and local governments lay out wider institutional frameworks (e.g., mechanisms to access land, infrastructure, and financing opportunities) and communities act as self-organizers, with support from third-sector bodies.

In Uruguay, for example, the Federación Uruguaya de Cooperativas Vivienda por Ayuda Mutua (FUCVAM) is an umbrella organization that supports the establishment of cooperatives. Its structure enabled the extensive growth of cooperatives in the early 1970s, which represented more than 40% of the housing stock (Khor and Lin 2001). The success of FUCVAM lies in its basic model that does not advocate replication. Instead it transfers a set principles that is then adapted to each context (ibid.).

The MCMV-E offers an opportunity to explore alternative processes of housing production that could empower local communities in São Paulo. However, to expand on MCMV-E, emphasis must be placed on capacity building, mobilization, and knowledge sharing between entities. To this end, this paper proposes the creation of a third-sector supportive structure, the Community Development Association (CDA).

At first, Habitacidade might initiate the formation of a CDA. The intellectual capital and wealth of experience in this multidisciplinary group would provide a strong foundation for the formation of a research platform that could explore the use of digital technologies that connect and collaborate with dispersed groups of people. Open source collaborative technologies
could be used as ways to integrate and mobilize collective knowledge by contributing to the creation of common tools that new cooperatives could appropriate (Saunders and Baeck 2015). Later the CDA could look beyond initial procurement stages to provide support for maintenance, which could be in the form of technical, administrative, legal, and procedural support. Such support could help cooperatives to overcome conflicts that arise between members, educate members about management practices, and establish routine procedures for everyday functioning (Ganapati 2014). The CDA could unlock access to land and finance through MCMV-E by acting as an intermediary between government officials, private enterprises, and communities. Ultimately the key role of the CDA would lie in its potential to drive cooperation and collaborative technologies by supporting knowledge sharing between individual cooperatives.

Habitacidade could demonstrate feasibility through the completion of a pilot project, in this instance, the rehabilitation of Hotel Columbia Palace. This pilot project could be used as a means of navigating the complexities of financing and planning through to procurement, setting an example for future projects. Typical routes of acquisition for further MCMV-E funded projects in República could include: property bought directly from private owners; donation by public administrations (federal, state or municipal); negotiation with land owners who want to build social housing using MCMV’s resources; and property acquired through the implementation of urban planning tools (ZEIS, IPTU, etc).

RIGHT TO HOUSING VS THE RIGHT TO (MAKE AND REPAIR) THE CITY

Despite notable positive impacts, and as with any megascale national effort, MCMV faces many challenges. Among them is the scarcity of well-located urban land (Labhab 2012). Constrained by time and cost, privately-led projects often result in impersonal, repetitive housing clusters that are geographically isolated from the urban centers (ibid.), which increases fragmentation and further segregates poorer communities.

The introduction of ZEIS was intended to increase access to urban land. In São Paulo however, the proportion of land earmarked as ZEIS is small in comparison to the scale of the city and the magnitude of its housing deficit. Additionally, as a result of the ineffective enforcement of existing planning
tools, less than 50% of ZEIS areas have been successfully used for social housing projects since their demarcation in the 2003 master plan (Prefeitura de São Paulo 2013). Vacant buildings are underused assets within a city. If efficiency is at the heart of smart city visions, then the largest waste of a city’s resources lies in its idle buildings. A recent study highlighted that the number of vacant properties in the center of São Paulo is almost equal to the city’s housing deficit (Fundação João Pinheiro 2011). City governments should invest in technologies that track down the wasted resources and support collaborative means to make better use of their existing assets. By promoting digitally-enabled collaborative economies, underused spaces can be identified and intelligently matched to demand. In Seoul, for instance, in a bid to promote collaborative schemes, 800 public buildings were opened up to the public for meetings and events when they are not in use (Saunders and Baeck 2015).

Nonetheless, top-down provisions such as MCMV raise questions about the right of the poor to participate equally in urban life (Baviskar 2010; Gherner 2010). They stand against Sen’s argument for positive development through the expansion of freedoms; this includes political freedom, economic facilities, and social opportunities among other elemental freedoms such as the right to housing (Sen 1999). More than just rights, which implies that there is a custodian of that right, the emphasis on freedoms builds capacity. Although the numerical side of the housing deficit is tackled, these provisions fail to address the root of inequality as progress is not assessed on whether the freedoms of people have been enhanced.

Housing is far more complex than just a place to live. Besides accounting for the largest single use of urban land, housing resonates with meaning on many other levels (Adams 1988). It represents status and economic growth, the expression of private aspirations, social networks, and, above all, it provides the security and stability to build individual capacity. Today there is a striking contradiction in Brazil’s public initiatives. Although the City Statute strives to reinforce the social function of the city, housing programs continue to promote private homeownership as a way to provide access to affordable housing. The Brazilian government is often reluctant to become directly involved in social rental housing as it lacks the capacity for long-term, large-scale asset management (UN-Habitat 2013; A. Rossbach, personal communication March 3, 2015). Rather than encouraging the expansion of private property or relying on state-owned rental housing,
alternative means that would address collective interests should first be explored with an understanding of the city as a shared space. In doing so, these programs could address issues beyond just the right to housing towards the wider right to participate in the production of the city.

COOPERATION AS A MODE OF PRODUCTION

With modern technological advances, sharing assets, knowledge, services, and skills has become easier than ever and therefore possible on a much larger scale. In the past decade, there has been energetic debate over the feasibility of voluntary shared effort. Urban renewal projects, community gardens, and labor-sharing practices are current examples of voluntary cooperation. More recently the concept of the “sharing economy” has taken root and is marginally associated with for-profit businesses, such as TaskRabbit, Airbnb, and Uber. The question here is: are there spatial, organizational, and institutional reforms that could be reinvented to allow a society to capture more of the benefits of cooperative exchange than we currently realize; and, if so, to what extent can this lead to novel ideas of how cities can be better made?

Over the years, there has been considerable enthusiasm for increasing labor-managed cooperative enterprises as opposed to conventional investor-owned corporations (Hansmann 1996). Today, internet-based technologies and services provide innovative opportunities for stimulating co-production while at the same time securing citizen engagement in the process of developing smart services. The foremost complication however is that these cooperatives are essentially operating within a capitalist economy; thus they must compete in order to survive. Set against aggressive competition, most cooperatives tend eventually to mimic and take on the role of the capitalist entrepreneur, a contradiction that accounts for the usual failure of productive cooperatives (Luxemburg, 1900; Harvey, 2012).

From this it is clear that cooperative production units cannot survive in isolation. There must be a shift beyond the limits of the workplace that engages with the larger economic, social, and political systems they are embedded in. If urbanization is a product of co-production, then the prime site of production should be the city as a whole (Harvey 2012), and emphasis must be placed on geographical rather than sectoral forms of
organization (Fletcher and Gapasin 2008). As the distinction between work and community-based struggles start to disappear, the workplace is no longer defined as a place of production isolated from the site of social reproduction in the household (Pahl 1984; Harvey 2012). In São Paulo’s 2014 master plan, ZEIS classifications were amended to include a category that allows up to 40% of certain ZEIS areas to be used for non-residential purposes (Prefeitura de São Paulo 2014). The loosening of this restriction reduces sectoral forms of organization and presents opportunities to creatively mix uses within ZEIS areas, which enables the establishment of productive housing cooperatives.

**THE PRODUCTIVE HOUSING COOPERATIVE: HOUSING BEYOND PROFIT**

Sharing encompasses more than just the physicality of space or transactions of goods and services. By advancing cooperation in everyday shared experiences, such as laundry and child care, the test of collaborative action has concrete implications for daily life. For the urban poor, it is not only the spatial dimension of inequality that restricts opportunities for social mobility, but also the temporal dimension. In São Paulo it is not uncommon among the low-income population to spend four hours a day commuting. Workers living in this situation have little or no time to think about things outside of work. Their days are occupied with trying to make ends meet and providing food and shelter for their children. The individual burden could be eased by providing support through the mutual sharing of human and physical resources for the common good. Today digital technologies can enable people to connect with one another to make more efficient use of resources. In Singapore, for example, BlockPooling, a social network for communities, was set up with a grant from the government in 2013 to enable neighbors to share belongings and skills.

The productive housing cooperative resembles a traditional cooperative, which has neither buyers nor renters but is membership based. It builds on a fundamental principle that access to skills and assets triumphs over ownership. Rather than directly holding the title to their individual unit, residents purchase a share within the non-profit cooperative. The resale of a share is sold at a price determined by inflation and the cooperatives bylaws.
not at market value (Ganapati 2013). Each share grants the right to occupy one housing unit and constitutes one vote (Northcountry Cooperative Foundation 2003). In productive housing cooperatives, residents have a direct role in decision-making processes behind both living and production.

A productive housing cooperative could lead to a system based on sharing and capacity-building. Each share could be obtained with both financial and sweat or knowledge equity. The time recaptured by living close to work could thus be redirected to sustaining the cooperative (Fig. 1). A cook living in the building, for instance, could invest time by participating in the preparation of meals for the cooperative or conducting evening classes in a communal kitchen, an arrangement that already exists in housing occupations in República.

The intersection between physical and cyber-space provides a unique opportunity for more inclusive and environmentally efficient economies rooted in a sharing culture. A retired English teacher living in San Francisco could easily be connected to physical classrooms where she can conduct live English classes to underprivileged students. The retiree’s desire to stay involved and active is matched with the student’s desire to learn a new language.
A NEW URBAN COMMONS: DE-COMMODIFYING HOUSING AND THE CITY

Over the past decades, housing and the quality of urban life have increasingly become commodities; in turn, so has the city itself (Harvey 2003). The result is that predominant housing policies around the world, including in Brazil, advocate the promotion of credit for homeownership (Rolnik 2014). Such a policy may suit certain demographic profiles but it does not correspond to conditions faced by very low-income households that, in many cases, lack the capacity for asset management.

Undoubtedly, no country is able to provide well-located low-income housing solely through homeownership. Community Land Trusts (CLT) offer an alternative tenure structure by removing land from the private, speculative market without disconnecting residents’ interest in owning and improving their property. A CLT holds the collective ownership of land in perpetuity and any building on it is leased to homeowners, non-profit entities, or in this case, productive housing cooperatives, at a rate that is permanently linked to local incomes (Lewis and Conaty 2012). Put simply, CLTs separate the ownership of property from the ownership of the land. They ensure that homeowners have a sense of security and get a fair return on their investment while avoiding fluctuations in the land market (Peterson 1996).

CLTs are managed by a board consisting of residents and members of the wider community such as neighbors, representatives of non-profit organizations, academics, or local business owners. In urban contexts they often operate on a local scale, addressing wider issues beyond housing affordability, such as neighborhood stabilization and environmental sustainability (Marcuse 2014; UN-Habitat, 2012). In some cases the flexibility of the model has enabled the inclusion of workforce training and childcare, among other social services.

Through FUCVAM, Montevideo’s municipal government allocates centrally located property to cooperatives that in turn rehabilitate or build new affordable housing. In the 1990s, a “land bank” was established to acquire and hold properties within the core city for the development of low-income cooperatives (Ganapati 2014). In República the establishment of a district-wide CLT could also assume the role of a land bank with urban land acquired through the implementation of planning tools, such as PEUC and IPTU described above. This model could prove to be a robust framework
that would allow labor-managed productive housing cooperatives to endure and engage with the unrelenting cycles of the economic market.

As people work together and the fruits of their collective labor materialize, such a network of cooperatives would become deeply embedded in the social identity of a community, thus becoming more resilient to external forces. By de-commodifying land through the CLT model and introducing labor-managed productive housing cooperatives, an “urban commons” sustained through collective activities can be created.

A RECAP OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SÃO PAULO

1. Empower communities by increasing their role in the design and development of new collaborative techniques.

2. Tap into the collective knowledge of people by opening up decision making and planning processes to a wider group of people.

3. Establish third-sector organizations that drive innovation in collaborative technologies, connect dispersed groups of people, and mobilize collective knowledge.

4. Set up open source platforms to collect, map, and share data on the environment, particularly non-static conditions (e.g., location and sizes of buildings that are unused or occupied by squatters).

5. Support socially oriented policies that redefine smart cities from the ground up and are based on the development of communities (e.g., MCMV-E).

6. Improve sustainability by identifying underused assets or services through open source collaborative technologies and intelligently matching them to demand.

Nowhere in modern society is the heart of cooperation and sharing more evident than in cities. Not only is the city the prime site for sharing spaces,
objects, and services—it is in itself an historically shared entity, a product of co-creation and production (Agyeman 2014). Today technological innovations are transforming how cities are run. As smart cities across the world invest in the potential of new efficient technologies, they often are more concerned with hardware than with people (Saunders and Baeck 2015). Truly successful smart cities could bring together the best aspects of technological innovation while harnessing the potential of collaborative forces, most importantly the people who empower them.

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Towards Resilience: Informality and Affordable Housing in the Inner City of Johannesburg

Chloé Malavolti
Sciences Po, Paris & Centre For Urbanism and Built Environment Studies (CUBES), University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg

ABSTRACT

This article looks at housing informality not only as a factor of vulnerability, but also as a phenomenon demonstrating resilience. It does so by synthesizing findings from desktop and fieldwork research conducted in two inner-city precincts in Johannesburg. The findings show that the informal housing market provides low-income residents with opportunities through various forms of re-composition of space and management arrangements that allow for better flexibility and adaptability. This paper formulates several recommendations for policy makers to design policies supporting the positive effects of the informal housing market on urban resilience.

INTRODUCTION. INFORMAL HOUSING IN INNER CITIES: A PUBLIC POLICY CHALLENGE

The literature tends to situate informal housing within the context of rapid urban growth in the cities of developing countries (AlSayyad 1993), and the growth of informal settlements in peripheral areas of the city and relevant public policy interventions in these settlements has been extensively analyzed. The definition of housing informality primarily in terms of insecurity
of tenure (De Soto 2000; Huchzermeyer 2008) has directed a large body of literature to focus on the illegal nature of informal settlements (AlSayyad 1993). However, this definition does not account for the diversity of informal housing typologies. In fast-growing cities, a high number of migrants and poor households attempt to locate in central areas in order to access income-generating opportunities (Few et al. 2004). This phenomenon increases the demand for affordable housing, creating conditions for the development of informal housing in inner cities (Custers 2001). More often than not, such centrally located informal housing typologies take the form of rental housing arrangements, and thus require different grids of analysis (Rakodi 1995).

Housing informality is a particularly acute challenge in the inner city of Johannesburg, marked by an immense housing backlog in the low-income part of the market. It is estimated that the cheapest accommodation available on the formal market is a room at a rent of R1700 a month (Tissington 2013, 55). This price is above the rental affordability level of the 49% of the inner-city households living on less than R3500 a month (ibid., 51). In this context, a high number of households live in informal types of accommodation, such as backyard dwellings, rooms and spaces in subdivided flats, hijacked buildings, buildings run by slumlords, and informal settlements. Some residents accommodate themselves in “bad buildings,” overcrowded buildings where the basic requirements for water, electricity, and waste removal services are unmet (Zack et al. 2010).

Despite the extent of the phenomenon, policy interventions conducted by the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (CoJ) have inadequately addressed the challenge. Since 1998, interventions have focused on the “bad buildings” issue through inner-city regeneration policies that have resulted in a high number of evictions. In this context, the courts have blamed the CoJ for its lack of planning for affordable housing delivery in the inner city (Tissington 2013). In recent years, the attempt to support affordable rental housing has failed to result in an adequate strategy and implementation plan at the scale of the challenge. The incomplete and inadequate policy response can be explained in two ways. First, there is a lack of understanding of the ways in which the informal housing market functions. Second, the predominant

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1 A building is considered hijacked when one or several parties, pretending to own the building, collects rent and/or performs several management functions.
conceptualization of housing informality as vulnerability overlooks the role it plays for low-income residents in the inner city. As a result, there is a need to adopt a more comprehensive approach in order to better inform policies.

This article aims at overcoming the restrictive understanding of informality as vulnerability by exploring the ways in which the inner-city informal housing market enhances or impedes residents’ ability to adapt to ever-changing circumstances. It presents the results of desktop and fieldwork study on housing and living conditions of low-income residents in two inner-city precincts, Yeoville and Jeppestown. Findings show that while many aspects of the informal market do produce vulnerabilities, its ability to adapt provides flexibility and affordability to low-income residents, filling in the formal market gap. This article presents the conceptual framework used, before detailing the desktop and fieldwork methodology. The findings are then presented and discussed.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: UNDERSTANDING URBAN RESILIENCE AND INFORMALITY

Government’s failures to address the challenges of informal housing are partly due to a lack of understanding of the dynamics in play. In this context, there is a need for a new conceptualization of housing informality that can account for its complexities and the role it plays for the low-income population. This article uses the concept of evolutionary resilience, which describes the ability of an organism to constantly adapt to ever-changing circumstances (Simmie and Martin 2010).

The concept of resilience emerged from the field of ecology in the 1960s and 1970s. It then expanded to various fields of study, turning resilience into a multidisciplinary and sometimes blurry concept (Simmie and Martin 2010). In urban studies, theories of resilience consider cities as “human-dominated social-ecological systems” (Walker and Salt 2006) composed of various interconnected subsystems (Holling, Gunderson, and Peterson 2001). The literature distinguishes two main approaches to resilience. The “equilibrist” approach considers the ability of an organism to resist a shock and return to its original state. The “evolutionary” or “transformative” approach considers the ability of an organism to constantly adapt to ongoing changes in its environment (Simmie and Martin 2010).
In South Africa, the concept of resilience gained influence in both a research and a policy perspective. In 2011, the South African Cities Network released a report called “Towards Resilient Cities” (SACN 2011). Following this report, the City of Johannesburg’s “Joburg 2040: Growth and Development Strategy” (GDS) vision advocates a “resilient and adaptive society” for the future of the city (CoJ 2012). A few studies explored the link between informal settlements and resilience. A research conducted in Plastic View informal settlement in Tshwane stressed its positive role in enhancing resilience and adaptability of the community (Peres and Du Plessis 2013). A study of the Kya Sands informal settlement in Johannesburg argues that although informal settlement displays some forms of vulnerability, it also provides considerable benefits to its residents (Weakley 2013). However, no research has applied the concept of resilience to the inner-city informal housing environment. This article aims to fill that gap.

The concept of urban resilience is useful in three ways. First, it acknowledges vulnerabilities while making room for the ability of systems and subsystems to overcome vulnerabilities and produce positive effects. In this regard, it provides a framework on which to overcome the restrictive conceptualization of housing informality. Second, it also provides a framework for describing the interactions between residents’ livelihood strategies and the informal housing market. Third, this concept is coherent with long-term policy goals and is used in a number of policy documents, including the Johannesburg GDS.

METHOD: DESKTOP RESEARCH AND FIELDWORK

This research was conducted in the context of a six-month internship in the CoJ Department of Housing, from January to July 2015. The proximity to local government directed the research process towards a practical aim, which was to answer the need for a better understanding of housing informality in order to inform policies. This embeddedness of the research process in local government action presented certain drawbacks. The first was the general and somewhat vague research question that constituted the point of departure. This work started from the need, expressed by the Housing Department, but also researchers and professionals, to better understand the inner-city informal housing market. The first research question was defined
collectively as: “what are the living and housing conditions of inner-city residents”? From this question, a number of themes of interest were defined, such as the use of space, housing management, access to services, tenants’ socio-economic profiles, etc. An individual analysis by the researcher was conducted to define a more precise and analytical research question. The second was the strong focus on government intervention which introduced a bias in the priorities in terms of actors and themes.

The desktop research was conducted with a view to identify, review, and synthesize available data on housing and living conditions of inner-city low-income residents. It includes a large amount of policy documents and court cases that are useful to identify the CoJ’s responsibilities and objectives and to investigate how housing informality is conceptualized. In addition, a large, but mostly overlooked, amount of literature on housing and living conditions of inner-city residents was identified, mostly in the form of dissertations and theses produced by local academics. The data extracted from the literature was organized by themes into a matrix; these themes were analyzed in light of the concept of resilience.

Building on the desktop research, the fieldwork focus was defined. Previous studies either focused on only one informal housing typology or on case studies. To fill this gap, the fieldwork was conducted across typologies and within two precincts. The goals were to gain an overall understanding of low-income residents’ living and housing conditions, and to understand informal arrangements, with a view to identifying which of them enhance residents’ resilience. The choice to focus on the Yeoville and Jeppestown precincts is twofold. First, the informal housing market in both precincts hosts a large part of the population and offers a wide diversity of housing typologies. Second, the precincts are different in terms of built environment. In Yeoville, there is a majority of low-rise semi-detached houses, while Jeppestown is marked old industrial buildings in reconversion.

The fieldwork consisted of several phases. The first explored how accommodations are advertised as a point of entry into both the demand and supply sides of the market. In Yeoville, the “Shoprite Wall,” situated at the corner of Rocky Street and Bedford Road, is a key meeting place for actors in the informal housing market. This phase consisted of reading the notices, observing interactions, and conducting interviews. However, this provided access to only a section of the informal market. In order to fill this gap, the second phase consisted of interviewing people in public spaces, in
an attempt to grasp the links between housing location, income-generating strategies, and housing. The third phase consisted in entering buildings to conduct interviews and generate building profiles. Several methods were used, such as calling the numbers posted on the notices, using networks of relationships, and approaching security guards and caretakers at the entrance of buildings. In total, 33 semi-structured interviews were conducted.\textsuperscript{2} The length of interviews varied depending on respondents’ availability.

The fieldwork faced a number of challenges. In April 2015, two waves of violence struck Jeppestown. The first, closely related to the topic of this article, consisted of riots protesting against evictions. The second was a wave of xenophobic attacks that have to be understood within the national context at the time. As a result, the fieldwork in Jeppestown was paused for a few weeks. Due to time constraints and to the violent events occurring during the fieldwork research, the data gathered in Jeppestown is not thick enough to establish a strong comparison with Yeoville.

FINDINGS

This section presents the findings of the desktop and fieldwork research. It explores the ways in which the informal housing market enhances or impedes residents’ resilience. The findings are synthesized into three themes: access, asset management, and housing arrangements.

**Negotiating access to affordable accommodation in the inner city**

The issue of access is explored through three questions: Why do low-income residents choose to locate in the inner city? To what extent is accommodation available to them there? And, which strategies do residents develop to access accommodation opportunities? These questions are explored at both the inner-city scale and the precinct scale.

The literature stresses two sets of motivations for residents to move to the inner city. The first relates to the minimal decision-making power of residents faced with lack of opportunities where they come from (Mayson and Charlton 2015). The second relates to the search for better income-generating opportunities (CASE 2006; COHRE 2005; Poulsen 2010).

\textsuperscript{2} All interviews were confidential; the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement.
Improved access to transport and proximity to place of work are also important motivations (Few et al. 2004; Gordon and Nell 2006), as well as improved access to amenities (Matjomane 2012). Other authors stress social motivations. This is particularly true for migrants, who tend to locate close to relatives, friends, or other networks of solidarity. A number of non-South Africans locate in the inner city in order to escape xenophobic attacks in the townships (Greenburg and Polzer 2008; Poulsen 2010).

The findings also identify precinct effects in Yeoville, whereby residents choose to locate there because of certain characteristics that they value. However, this precinct effect is under-documented in the literature. It seems to be strong for accessing social networks. A number of migrants indicated that they came to Yeoville in the first place because of existing ethnic networks from which they could get support. Moreover, some precincts provide amenities valued by residents; for example, a migrant from Zimbabwe came in order to be close to his church (personal interview, March 30, 2015).

Barriers to accessing accommodation are high, particularly in the formal housing market, where prices and the “system check” (Tissington 2013) are debilitating for the large part of the population earning less than R3500 a month. Non-South African migrants face even higher barriers to formal housing access (Greenburg and Polzer 2008). In this regard, informal accommodation appears to be more accessible, as there is no need for lease agreement, deposit, or paperwork; this is called the mastande system. The mastande is the main leaseholder; he or she rents the flat directly from the owner and sublets the unit through verbal agreements. The mastande advertises rooms and spaces within the flat, finds sublessees, collects rents from them, negotiates and deals with payment for services, ensures that the spaces are well maintained, and deals with conflicts (Mayson 2014). In some cases, the mastande lives in the unit and shares it with sublessees in order to be able to afford the rent. In others, he or she manages several units and lives in one of them, while subletting the others.

As indicated by Mastande R in Yeoville: “I don’t ask anyone for a deposit. I tell the price, it’s R1500. If you can afford to pay the R1500 I give you the room. I don’t want a deposit, I don’t want anything” (personal interview, March 30, 2015).

However, there are still other kinds of barriers to access even in the informal sector. The first is the lack of information about, for example, places
of advertisement, availability, etc. The second is the selection of prospective tenants by the owner or the mastande. Interviewee R, for example, refuses to let his room to someone who drinks or smokes. Sometimes, notices on the wall indicate specific criteria, such as gender; some are written in French, which is a way to select French-speaking tenants. Mastande D describes how he selects the tenants: “I put up a notice, [then] I’ll meet you by the corner; I’ll assess you. . . . If I suspect something I’ll say no . . ., I don’t want two people I only want one person. There’s always a way to get out of it” (personal interview, April 27, 2015).

This fieldwork research was conducted at the Shoprite Community Board, or “Shoprite Wall,” a central place for advertising rooms and spaces in the inner city. A few studies have used the Shoprite Wall as an indicator of the type and cost of rental accommodation available on the informal market (Tissington 2013; Mayson 2014). However, the postings there are not fully representative of the informal housing market, as only the rooms and spaces typology is advertised. The types of accommodation advertised fall into the following categories: spaces in beds, spaces in bedrooms, rooms, sitting rooms, balconies, rooms in cottages, and flats. The Shoprite Wall is not only a place where accommodation is advertised; most importantly, it is a place of interaction between the various actors in the housing market: prospective tenants, mastandes, landlords, and drivers. A high number of landlords or mastandes come to the wall in order to look for tenants. Not only do they post a notice there, they also stand in front of it and observe prospective tenants, or wait for tenants to approach them. If they see someone they like, they might approach him or her with an offer. In this way, mastandes or landlords can enter into direct contact with prospective tenants and assess them. If an agreement is reached, a few trucks parked on the side of the road are ready to drive the tenants to their new accommodation.

**Asset management: the need for flexibility and adaptability**

Asset management refers to the various assets used by residents to support their livelihood. Two questions are explored here: How do low-income residents manage their assets? And how does the informal housing market contribute to enhancing these asset management strategies? The literature highlights four main types of assets in the urban context: financial capital, human capital, social capital, and physical capital (DFID 1999). More than the amount of assets that one possesses, the literature highlights the
crucial importance of how assets are mobilized and managed (Mayson and Charlton 2015).

**Financial Capital**
A large number of inner-city inhabitants living in informal housing rely on low and unstable incomes (Mayson and Charlton 2015; Poulsen 2010; COHRE 2005). To the question: “What job do you have?” the most common answers were security guards, piece jobs (domestic work), informal self-employment (dressmaking, street trading), small business (fruits and vegetables trading, small construction company), or employed in shops (barista, butler). Other answers included musician, technician, unemployed, and/or relying on husband or relatives. A number of respondents relied on “hustling” as a strategy—relying on relatives or friends to pay rent or other expenses. For example, Respondent S. was unemployed, but he managed to pay a monthly rent of R2300 thanks to his “hustling” strategy (personal interview, March 30, 2015). A high number of residents choose to live in the cheapest possible accommodation, in order to send money back “home.” One interviewee was living in an extremely degraded building in Jeppestown. He was working as a security guard, but he could not move to a better accommodation because he was the only one providing for his mother, sister, and brother in the Eastern Cape (personal interview, April 12, 2015).

**Human Capital**
Human capital is defined as the skills, ability to work, and health (DFID 1999). The inner-city environment is not always supportive of human capital. When asked about blockages to employment, 67% of inner-city residents indicated that there were not enough jobs available (CASE 2006, 40). At the same time, the inner city seems to provide fewer barriers to informal work and more self-employment opportunities. Interestingly, the CASE survey showed that 17% of Joubert Park respondents indicated they were not interested in looking for a job, compared to 5% in Diepsloot and 13% in Zandspruit (2006, 40). This finding suggests that Joubert Park residents find it easier than township residents to make a living without having a formal job (through informal work, “hustling,” etc.). This seems to suggest that human capital is valued in different ways in the inner city. If qualifications and skills are not always fully rewarded on the formal market, they still provide potential access to more opportunities than where the migrants come from.
Social Capital

Social capital refers to social resources used to support livelihoods, such as connectedness and networks (DFID 1999). Findings indicate that inner-city residents rely strongly on social capital, the main sources of which are networks of relatives, friends, and other social networks, in particular national or ethnic networks, churches, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Inner-city residents use their social capital for various purposes, such as accessing accommodation, work, or income; ensuring safety and security; and navigating bureaucracy and securing legal status (Mayson and Charlton 2015; Greenburg and Polzer 2008; Matjomane 2012). Living in informal conditions in the inner city has contrasting effects on one’s social capital. Mayson describes how life in some inner-city buildings can produce “destructive social ties” and a culture of “antisocial behaviour” (Mayson 2014, 82). At the same time, living in rooms and spaces can also be supportive of social ties. In a comparison of three inner-city buildings, Mayson showed that residents living in the most informally managed building developed stronger bonds with their neighbors (ibid.). In some cases, the flexibility of the rooms and spaces typology creates conditions for cross-subsidization (Mayson and Charlton 2015); for example, when Mastande D in Yeoville could not pay the full electricity bill, a subtenant offered to pay the rest (personal interview, March 28, 2015).

Physical Capital

Physical capital refers to “the basic infrastructure and producer goods needed to support livelihoods” (DFID 1999, 13). In terms of tenure, rental in the informal housing market is more insecure and often leads to a “high degree of instability” (Greenburg and Polzer 2008, 3). At the same time, these “stories of continuous displacement from one accommodation to the next” (ibid.) should not be seen only in a negative light. Because income-generating strategies are highly unstable, low-income residents need to be able to change accommodation quickly in order to adapt to changes. The informal market can respond to these needs because tenure arrangements are flexible. Indeed, a number of inner-city residents choose to rent because they can move out quickly if they need to (Hlangweni 2013). In terms of access to water, sanitation, and electricity, some buildings still fail to provide the most basic services. Many low-income buildings in the inner city are in a state of disrepair (Few et al. 2004). The case of the recyclers’
building on Fox Street, in Jeppestown, shows how people deal with the lack of access to basic services such as electricity and water. The inhabitants collected water from a broken pipe on the street opposite the building. Interviewee E said they had to go to the public park, where they paid R1 to use the toilets (personal interview, April 12, 2015). Although access to basic services is highly valued by residents, affordability and cost reliability are also crucial elements of satisfaction (Mayson 2014). A number of interviewees complained about the fluctuating prices of water and electricity, which contributed to their feeling of insecurity (some claimed that the management company or the landowner was overcharging them).

**Housing arrangements**

The aim of this section is to better understand how the informal housing market provides low-cost accommodation. The Yeoville Studio research suggested scales of analysis at the building and at the unit levels (Bénit-Gbaffou 2011). This method of analysis is used here for two themes: space and management.

Due to the high pressure on housing markets in the inner city, space in the informal market is continuously re-arranged in order to keep providing affordable housing opportunities. At the building scale, space arrangements translate into three main patterns. The first is the development of backyard dwellings, which are “informal shacks, typically erected by their occupiers in the yards of other properties” (Lemanski 2009, 472). Backyard dwellings are to be found in low-rise inner-city precincts such as Yeoville. A room in a backyard dwelling is typically rented by a single person or a couple, for R1000 to R1500 per month, including water and electricity. The second is the illegal reconversion of old industrial buildings for residential use in industrial precincts such as Jeppestown. Often, shacks are erected within the buildings to create living spaces. A shack in such buildings is rented for R500 to R1000 a month depending on the building, often without access to water and electricity. The third pattern is the illegal erection of walls on the top of or within high-rise buildings to create additional spaces. A three-story building on Auret Street in Jeppestown is a good example of such. Walls have been illegally erected in order to create 54 housing units within the building. In each unit, occupants pay a rent of R350 to R550 to the hijacker. Occupants are illegally connected to water and electricity networks.
At the unit scale, spaces are subdivided and used in flexible ways. Flats are divided into accommodation spaces, balconies, door spaces, window spaces, or bed spaces. In some cases, living rooms, corridors, staircases, kitchens, or bathrooms become sleeping spaces at night. Numerous examples of such subdivision are to be found in the literature (Mayson 2014; COHRE 2005; Few et al. 2004; Bénit-Gbaffou 2011; Ngombe 2011). The fieldwork provides many examples of units being subdivided for subletting purposes. For instance, a women interviewed was staying in Jeppestown in a two-bedroom unit with her husband, her three children, and one sub-tenant. She was paying R2000 per month for the unit. Her space was separated from her kids’ space by a curtain, and the sub-tenant was sleeping in the other room, which was also the kitchen (personal interview, May 15, 2015). On the Shopright Wall in Yeoville, the most expensive accommodation advertised was R3000 for a “big room with balcony”; while the cheapest was R500 for “a bed to share.” The most common types of arrangement were a “space to share” (R1000 to R1500) or a “bedroom to share” (±R2000).

The literature describes a diversity of management arrangements within inner-city buildings. Management functions are often spread across several complementary or competing entities or individuals. At the building scale, the most formal setting includes a building caretaker employed by a management company. This formal management arrangement seems to work in terms of rent collection and maintenance of the building, but involves more barriers to access than informal types of management. In many cases, subdivisions occur at the unit scale within such formal building management settings. Informal management at the building scale often occurs when buildings are abandoned by their owners, which leaves room for alternative arrangements (Charlton Forthcoming 2016) or when the owners failed to maintain the buildings, leading to situations of slumlording (Poulsen, 2010 and Matjomane, 2012).

A number of buildings have been hijacked, meaning that one or several actors collect rent on behalf of the owner and perform various management functions. The literature also explores several examples of sectional title buildings. Bénit-Gbaffou (2011) describes a “strong sense of vulnerability” in sectional title buildings, because of risks of default by both owners and tenants. Findings from the fieldwork show that confusion regarding roles and responsibilities is common in a number of buildings, regardless of the type of management. For example, Da, a tenant subletting
a space in a formally managed building on Yeo Street, in Yeoville, was confused as to who was in charge (personal interview April 24, 2015). In the same building, several tenants complained about abusive practices from management such as increasing the rent above the levels allowed by the lease, charging for additional costs, and asking people to leave without giving them three month notice (Respondent Da, As and Dan, April 27, 2015). The tenants’ response to these abuses was to move out. When asked why tenants did not mobilize to go to court, Dan answered that tenants did not communicate with each other: “There is no body corporate\(^3\). Because when there is a body corporate that’s where you discuss deep issues” (personal interview, April 27, 2015).

In many buildings, a building management structure operates simultaneously with management arrangements at the unit scale, which is called the mastande system (Mayson, 2014; see above). The fieldwork shows that mastandes operate at small scales. They sometimes manage a few units, but hardly less than two or three. Most of the time, they manage units within a small geographic area in the same precinct. The fluctuating prices of electricity are an issue for mastandes, because they are the ones paying for it. The example of Ego Court shows how management structures can be broken down at several scales. The building caretaker is mainly in charge of controlling who stays in the building and ensuring maintenance. At the same time, the body corporate defines the rules to be followed in all units. Each mastande is then in charge of implementing them within his/her own unit. At the unit scale, the mastande manages the use of collective spaces within the unit along with the subtenants. This results in signs being put up in collective spaces (kitchen, bathroom, and corridor) reminding all about the common rules.

\(^3\) The body corporate is the entity gathering all the property owners of a scheme. In this case, Dan uses the term “body corporate”, even if he is not the formal owner of the flat, because he considers himself the owner. He is saying that the absence of a collective decision-making arena facilitates abuses.
DISCUSSION: SUPPORTING DIRECT RELATIONSHIPS AND SMALL-SCALE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

The findings suggest that residents chose to move to the inner city or to specific precincts because these locations were more supportive of their resilience than where they come from. However, their ability to find accommodation is greatly limited by high barriers to access in the formal market. The informal market partly fills this gap by reducing these barriers and valuing assets that low-income residents have, such as social capital. Low-income residents access informal accommodation through various types of interactions that do not occur on the formal market. Low-income residents have highly unstable income-generating strategies, and rely greatly on social assets. They need to be able to quickly recompose their asset management strategy when faced with changing circumstances. In this regard, tenure arrangements used in informal markets provide low-income residents with flexibility and adaptability.

At the same time, informal housing is also a source of vulnerability in terms of insecurity of tenure, lack of access to basic services, and unreliability of prices. In a context of high demand, the informal housing market recomposes space and management arrangements in order to keep accommodation prices affordable. The erection of backyard dwellings, the illegal reconversion of old industrial building to residential use, and the illegal erection of walls within or on top of buildings are strategies used to create additional spaces at low cost.

On the one hand, these arrangements are often breaking by-laws and create risks of overcrowding and lack of access to basic services (water, electricity, waste removal). On the other hand, certain aspects of these arrangements seem to be working for the residents. At the unit scale, the mastande system functions relatively well because it creates conditions for direct relationships between the managing agent and tenants, facilitating the respect of common rules, solidarity, negotiation, and flexibility of arrangements.

FINDINGS

From this discussion, a number of aspects of the informal housing market can be identified as enhancing or impeding residents’ resilience. A few of them are discussed below and translated into policy-based recommendations.
Findings from the literature and the fieldwork indicate that small-scale management practices are more likely to provide flexibility of tenure and prices while avoiding building degradation and management failures. Management failures, which are more likely to occur when there is no clear definition of roles and responsibilities, can be addressed in two ways: by facilitating direct relationships between tenants and management agents, and by supporting management arrangements at the unit scale.

The existence of direct relationships between tenants and management agents reduces the risk of management failure at the building scale. The existence of a body corporate within the building provides a venue for communication and exchange of information about management. In case of abusive practices, the body corporate facilitates residents’ mobilization. It also facilitates residents’ self-organization as a temporary solution to take over management and collectively pay for maintenance and services when management is failing. In some buildings, the body corporate is dysfunctional or has disappeared as a result of a history of conflict and management failure. In such cases, the body corporate needs to be supported. The “Bad Buildings Strategy” recommends the appointment of administrators selected by the CoJ to install leadership structures and communication before turning buildings over to residents (Zack et al. 2010). Small-scale management practices can also be supported proactively through financial support (Gordon and Nell 2006). The Trust for Urban Housing Finance (TUHF) finances building renovations for small-scale landlords throughout the city. Their approach seems to be original and better suited to the needs of low-income residents (Ngombe 2011).

Going down to the unit scale, the mastande system of management functions relatively well and could inspire policy design. Moreover, bad management of communal spaces is often a factor of vulnerability, in particular when these spaces are dirty and residents choose to cook and/or bathe in their rooms. In this regard, Mayson and Charlton (2015) show that communal spaces are more likely to remain clean when they are smaller and have more proximity, as people can control who is abusing or not cleaning the space. Such a finding could inform designs for affordable and subsidized rental housing projects, since it suggests that communal spaces should be central enough to be watched by “people with eyes,” and shared with a fairly small number of people. In this regard, two- to three-bedroom units that allow sharing or subletting between two to three families with just one bathroom
and a kitchen as the shared areas seems to be a better working setting than a succession of single rooms with bathrooms for each and a communal kitchen.

CONCLUSION

This article argues for a re-conceptualization of inner-city housing informality in order to better account for its complexity and the role it plays for residents. The concept of evolutionary urban resilience is used to identify which dynamics of the informal housing market enhance or impede residents’ needs as regard their livelihood strategies. By providing an understanding of the interactions between residents’ asset management strategies and the informal housing market, this research aims at informing policy in order to move towards more comprehensive interventions. Findings show that while many aspects of the informal market produce vulnerabilities (insecurity of tenure, overcrowding, lack of access to basic services, illegality, etc.) they also demonstrate the ability of the informal market to adapt in order to better fit residents’ needs in terms of affordability and flexibility. In this regard, they fill a gap by providing services that are not provided by the formal market (low-cost accommodation, flexible tenure arrangements, social proximity, and networks of solidarity). To be comprehensive, a policy towards informal housing has to address factors of vulnerability while supporting factors of resilience. In this perspective, small-scale management practices should be supported by encouraging direct relationships between tenants and management agents, planning for informal subdivision and management of units in housing designs, and supporting small-scale landlords. Supporting small-scale management arrangements can be seen as both a preventive (against management failure and abuses) and proactive (supporting the positive effects of management) measure.

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How Do Decision Makers Adapt and Reconcile International Models to Local Urban Poor Contexts? Case Study of the Relocation Project in Kibera, Nairobi, Kenya

Adèle Charbonneau
Sciences Po Paris

ABSTRACT

International organizations such as the World Bank provide governments with models for safeguard policies to avoid forced evictions of informal encroachers when developing urban infrastructure. Yet, these models tend to be somewhat rigid and ill-suited to the urban poor, a particularly vulnerable population. Based on the case study of the railway Relocation Action Plan in Kibera, Nairobi, Kenya, this article argues that adapting international models to the local informal context requires a flexible and open-minded approach shared by all stakeholders and the assistance of an experienced community-based organization, such as Shack/Slum Dwellers International.

In the cities of many developing countries, the lack of government resources dedicated to the poorest urban dwellers as well as a saturated urban land market have allowed the land reserved for future development to be progressively encroached by slums. Historically, a flawed system of land allocation, combined with an ill-regulated land market, has discriminated against the urban poor, often forcing them to acquire land informally through illegal occupancy (Otiso 2002). Yet, almost any attempt to improve basic services
and urban infrastructure requires the very land on which slum dwellers have made their homes (Patel, D’Cruz, and Burra 2002). Indeed, in the increasingly competitive global economy, cities have to constantly attract new enterprises and investors, which generates the redevelopment of urban land and modifications of its use (ibid.); when designing projects aimed at expanding their infrastructure network, many city councils and public agencies encounter slum populations settled in these areas. Resettlement is often a challenge, because finding well-located sites for those who are displaced is difficult within already densely populated cities.

In Nairobi, the Kenya Railway Corporation (KRC) faced such challenges when implementing a project financed by a World Bank loan to improve the railway lines passing through Kibera, one of Africa’s biggest slums. Kibera covers around 2.38 km² and hosts an estimated population of 200,000 inhabitants. The average density of the settlement is 87,500 inhabitants per km². The income per person ranges around 3977 KSH per month (40€), while the poverty line in Kenya has been established at 2645 KSH per month (27€) (Desgroppes and Staupin 2011). Kibera is known for its volatile political situation as well as its high level of crime and violence, the last main event being the post-election violence in 2007–2008 (Osborn 2008). Such density, violence, and concentration of poverty unfortunately characterize many informal settlements in the world, which makes the settlement an interesting sample for the study of slums. Analyzing the railway Relocation Action Plan (RAP) in Kibera is an opportunity to understand the dynamics and the use of models for resettlement of the urban poor. The case study will focus on the challenges and difficulties faced by decision makers when adapting international models on resettlement to the local context, particularly to informal settlements. The article will contribute to the academic reflection on the sustainability of pro-poor urban policies developed within a set of international models and constraints.

**CHALLENGES IN APPLYING WORLD BANK SAFEGUARD POLICIES IN KIBERA**

**Implementation of the World Bank international model for resettlement**

Facing the challenge of developing railway lines where slum populations
had encroached on the reserved land, the first reaction of Kenya Railways Corporation (KRC) was to send out eviction notices in 2004. However, given their influence and financial participation, the World Bank pressured KRC to adopt a plan for relocating the populations concerned. Convincing KRC to develop such a plan was not an easy task and the idea was received with mixed feelings. But the combination of the World Bank’s policy and pressure from human rights and civil society organizations, as well as from organized slum dwellers, made it necessary to adopt a resettlement project.

The World Bank, following its internal policy, would not have condoned the eviction of the slum dwellers. Indeed, acknowledging the risks imposed by development projects on displaced populations, the World Bank had adopted its first involuntary resettlement policy in 1980, which has been updated three times. The current version is the Operational Policy 4.12 (OP 4.12), which was approved in December 2001 (World Bank 2001). This policy on resettlement and rehabilitation compelled KRC to abide by the World Bank rules as a condition for obtaining the funds they needed to modernize and upgrade the railway network. The obligation of the Kenyan
state to limit forced evictions also stems from international legal instruments, which include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Art. 11, para. 1) (United Nations 1976, 2008). Decision makers within the Kenyan government were thus made to adopt a RAP to relocate slum dwellers as a precondition to expand their railway lines.

Under OP 4.12, the World Bank and the borrowing states are compelled to ensure that the affected populations are identified, consulted, and provided with enough support to restore them to living conditions that are equal to or better than before (World Bank 2012). If evictions are inevitable, they should be fully justified, given the negative impact they have on a wide range of human rights (ibid.). “Any eviction must be (a) authorized by law; (b) carried out in accordance with international human rights law; (c) undertaken solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare; (d) reasonable and proportional; (e) regulated so as to ensure full and fair compensation and rehabilitation; and (f) carried out in accordance with the present guidelines” (United Nations 2008). The safeguard policies are applicable to all affected populations irrespective of whether they hold legal land or property titles, and World Bank staffs regularly participate in meetings and visits to assess their respect. For example, REMU, the Railway implementation unit of the RAP project, had to produce regular reports for the World Bank to show the progress of the project as well as its compliance with the safeguard policies. A mission focused on safeguard and environmental policies also visited the Kenyan team in April 2015 as a way of assessing the due application of the rules and amending some elements of the RAP when they did not correspond with OP 4.12.

Yet, some World Bank policies have proved contradictory or difficult to apply. Despite a monthly monitoring by the World Bank senior officer in charge of the project, the multiplicity of hired consultants throughout the implementation of the RAP project produced some confusion. For instance, some decisions made at the beginning were later considered inadequate by a different set of World Bank consultants. This created obstacles for the efficiency, coherence, and success of the project and generated administrative and financial challenges for decision makers (De Wet 2001). Indeed, they are expected “to hold together, and to keep apart, four key elements in a resettlement project: (a) The political realities and power differentials; (b) The logic and the bureaucracy of planning and implementation; (c) Funding;
[and] (d) The complexities of the processes that arise when [at the same time] we try to combine providing people with increased options through development projects, with . . . depriving them of options by moving them, usually against their will” (ibid., 4645). In addition, the changing rules on safeguard policies have made it difficult to maintain coherence in the decisions taken.

Unfortunately, this state of things does not seem to be unique to the RAP project in Nairobi. The World Bank admitted in 2015 that it had failed to respect its own regulations to protect deprived populations displaced by large infrastructure projects such as dams or roads (Chavkin, Hudson and Hallman 2015). An investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), the Huffington Post, and more than twenty other media revealed that World Bank projects had “physically or economically displaced an estimated 3.4 million people, forcing them from their homes, taking their land or damaging their livelihoods” (Chavkin, Hallman, Hudson, Schilis-Gallego and Shifflett 2015). In March 2015, the World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim acknowledged major problems with its resettlement policies and promised to seek reforms (World Bank 2015a). These events highlight the inherent tensions within development-induced relocation projects and the existing gaps between the international and national guidelines and their actual implementation.

**World Bank safeguards policies ill-adapted to informal environments**

Slums such as Kibera are places characterized by dire living conditions, insecure land tenure, and often violence (Desgroppes and Staupin 2011). The situation is aggravated by the saturated urban land market, defined by high land and real estate market prices and shortages of housing for the low-income population. Although most of the land is owned by the state, individuals have managed to negotiate informally with local authorities and have been progressively allowed to construct structures and collect rents (Weru 2004). The consequence is that most slum dwellers are tenants, and owners have little incentive to maintain their structures or provide basic services. The rental business is quite lucrative and the influence of absentee owners who do not live in the slums but who own and rent many units illegally is strong (ibid.) Yet, the ambiguous tenure status of slum dwellers—structure owners and tenants alike—prevents them altogether from enjoying their rights as urban citizens (Goux 2003). They are not acknowledged officially
by the authorities and usually do not participate in the decision-making processes that affect them. Within a resettlement and slum-upgrading project, structure owners and tenants have very different priorities: owners usually seek full compensation for their built structures; tenants aspire to the recognition of their right to live in the area and for the possibility of constructing their own houses (Weru 2004).

Unfortunately, the World Bank international model for compensation, resettlement, and safeguard policies lacks the flexibility to succeed in such a complex situation. It tends to favor a single relocation solution for every Project Affected Person (PAP) despite the plurality of situations and often to the advantage of the minority of structure owners. What’s more, the World Bank policies tend to transmit an essentialist vision of communities, overlooking the multiplicity of positions within them. Indeed, “participatory projects have unwittingly built upon pre-existing power structures, reinforcing them . . . to the advantage of the ‘learning elites’ [see Wilson 2006]” (Rigon 2014, 259). Yet, this “often idealized view of harmonious ‘natural’ communities . . . suffers from a lack of understanding of power structures . . . and of how community representatives may also be motivated by individual interests rather than the good of the collective” (ibid., 260).

This limited understanding renders it difficult for decision makers to really improve the lives of slum inhabitants. International organizations and government institutions are used to dealing with the formal and state spheres but are ill prepared for informal settlements and the urban poor. Yet, improving the living conditions of or resettling slum dwellers can be complicated by the potential conflicts between structure owners and tenants and by the existing tensions between ethnic groups that have often been manipulated by powerful political interests (Goux 2003, Weru 2004). Resettlement projects are thus characterized by high levels of failure “because of the inherent complexity of what is involved when we try to combine moving people with improving their conditions” (De Wet 2001, 4642). For example, community representatives, who are mainly structure owners, can manipulate the project and decision makers to their advantage and to the detriment of tenants (Weru 2004). Therefore, success requires extensive flexibility in the design of resettlement projects in terms of planning, implementation, and budget, especially in an informal context. Such flexibility and an “adapt-as-you-go approach” (De Wett 2001, 4644) are important to increase the chances of success of resettlement and to ensure
that the highest number of PAPs is benefiting. The difficulty arises from the necessity of local authorities and funders to give up part of their control over the project. Indeed, they are meant to “sacrifice the idea of a kind of ‘one size fits all’ model of resettlement” (ibid.). In the RAP project, the 5.3km of railway lines were divided into six districts, and different compensation methods were created for residential, business, and institutional PAPs (KRC 2011).

In Nairobi, the RAP is being implemented in very politicized neighborhoods with histories of patronage politics and political violence, a capital consideration for decision makers (Osborn 2008). Kibera is the arena of political struggles for acquiring the largest number of votes and the politics of patronage occupies a central place (ibid.). Tribal rivalries abound within Kibera, as the settlement is regularly the scene of community violence. For instance, Luo, Kikuyu, and Nubian communities have strong claims over the land and important political and economic antagonisms (Goux 2003). In Nairobi, within the different communities, many individuals have resisted the RAP and some have even filed petitions in the High Court of Nairobi, delaying substantially the implementation of the RAP. This environment can be found in many, if not all, informal settlements in the world. Therefore, the risk is high that slum dwellers will mobilize and obstruct a project that is not properly designed and communicated.

In Kibera, the principle of 1 PAP, 1 structure was particularly opposed by residents who were also structure owners, as it meant a reduction of their assets and sources of income. So, in addition to one unit, they were also given cash compensation related to the number of houses they possessed before. But since those structure owners were also overwhelmingly the community representatives it was important for REMU to try to understand the real interests of others and make informed decisions, especially considering the limited budget. Absentee structure owners who were not living in the railway reserve and who were not entitled to a residential unit, were given financial compensation for their demolished units.
COMBINING THE WORLD BANK MODEL WITH SHACK/SLUM DWELLERS INTERNATIONAL’S EXPERIENCE

Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI), a crucial partner to help reconcile the RAP with the informal context

One of the solutions found by the KRC and the World Bank to help fill the gap of the safeguard model has been to involve another international actor capable of applying the policy to the informal context. As such, the inclusion of Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI) in the RAP has been highly beneficial for decision makers. SDI is an international non-profit organization, regrouping national slum dwellers federations and their supportive NGOs. Federations are composed of community groups from informal settlements, and organized around savings schemes. Savings schemes are established to foster trust and solidarity between members and to enhance their financial resources. They are also the structures in which members discuss, identify their needs, and develop strategies to cater for them (Mitlin 2013). SDI supports “people-centred development, with organized communities leading and implementing activities to secure a pro-poor urban transformation recognized and resourced by the state” (Mitlin 2013, 484)

Alongside the slum dwellers federations, NGOs are in charge of fundraising, financial management as well as advocacy, documentation, and linkages with professional agencies (ibid., 487). The structure of dual organizations (federation and support NGO) “emerged from SDI’s history and has remained as the preferred form to support a substantive grassroots process able to negotiate with local and national politicians, while also managing donor finance and building relations with officials” (bid., 488).

Pamoja Trust has been for more than ten years the supportive NGO of the Kenyan slum dwellers federation, Muungano Wa Wanavijiji, and representative of SDI in the country. Although since 2010 it no longer belongs to the SDI network, it still applies most of its models.

SDI was not primarily funded to manage relocation action plans, however it has gained experience in resettlement projects since its foundation. SDI first developed its international model around community organizations and slum dwellers federations in India. It is also there that SDI first had experience with a large-scale relocation plan, which would later help Kenyan stakeholders. SDI participated in the Mumbai Urban Transport Project in 2002 (Patel, D’Cruz and Burra 2002). The project has many similarities with the
one in Kibera, as the Indian Railways and the government of Maharashtra also needed to clear the railway lines to make way for its expansion with the assistance of a World Bank loan (Giovannetti 2009). Muungano Wa Wanavijiji as well as REMU were directly exposed to and influenced by the Mumbai Transport Project through two international transmitters: the World Bank and SDI.

The combination of the Indian experience with the existing federation of slum dwellers made SDI and Pamoja Trust important stakeholders to facilitate the implementation of the RAP. Muungano Wa Wanavijiji, supported by Pamoja Trust, created a related organization called Ngazi Ya Chini, dedicated to slum dwellers living along railway lines throughout the country. Those preexisting structures were later used as entry points for REMU when discussing and negotiating with the PAPs. They also encouraged trust and dialogue between the different actors as well as provided a common platform linking the two worlds: formal/informal, state/community. In that sense, the project was viewed as an opportunity to strengthen and organize the concerned communities (D’Cruz and Mitlin 2007). Indeed, it caters for improved housing conditions for the slum dwellers who will benefit from permanent and stable housing in a place close to where they used to live. They will also enjoy access to water and sanitation through a legal and formal connection to Nairobi water and sewerage systems. In terms of empowerment, communities have been organized into cooperatives in order for them to manage the units and to sign lease agreements with KRC.

SDI’s international model is based on different strategies applied in the RAP to gather and unite slum dwellers and to facilitate contacts with formal actors. Daily savings schemes are at the center of SDI’s: “The process of savings embeds practices of accountability and transparency within these local organizations” (D’Cruz and Mitlin 2013, 7). Therefore, in Kibera, PAPs were encouraged to conduct savings at the segment level so that they could discuss how to use the amounts they collected. Indeed, most slum dwellers “have lost the ability to trust their own community. Rebuilding this trust is essential for collective action” (ibid.). The second most important strategy of SDI for community learning and knowledge creation is the constant flow of information and exchange of experience between slum dweller communities through exchange visits (Mitlin 2013), which create links between the different savings groups and between national federations (Patel, D’Cruz, and Burra 2002). For example,
members of Muungano Wa Wanavijiji visited Mumbai in order to learn from the completed railway project.

Enumeration of all inhabitants living in the railway reserve was the third step of the Kenyan RAP. Self-enumeration aims at sharing with community members the methods used to gather reliable and complete data about households in their own communities (Mitlin 2013). Federations with the support of their related NGO have structured these techniques into a series of steps to follow in order to create knowledge and capacity in their settlements. Indeed, settlement profiles and enumerations are all-powerful tools in mobilizing communities and advocating for their rights (Patel, D'Cruz, and Burra 2002). In Nairobi, after the community collected the household details of each PAP, the information was entered in a database that was then posted in a public place in each segment for public verification. This process was important because it helped weed out some community members who had tried to be counted several times or had concealed their true information. After its amendment, the verified database was handed over to the PAPs to support them in advocacy and voter registration. The database is
still the one being used by REMU for allocation of permanent houses or water and electricity connections. The data was also utilized to produce maps of the areas, the basis of the engineering and planning design. Finally throughout the project, REMU, together with Pamoja Trust, conducted public meetings with and visits to the communities to explain and inform the PAPs of the progress of or difficulties encountered in the project. SDI has thus provided tools for decision makers to reconcile the safeguard policies with the local context and the communities concerned, even reinforcing their application.

**A complex combination of models to ensure smoother resettlement**

The application of the SDI model in the Kenyan resettlement project has been highly beneficial, however, it has required a complex repartitioning of roles and a continuous adjustment of the models. One of the first difficulties is the sometimes conflictive or competitive relationships between Pamoja Trust, Muungano Wa Wanavijiji, Ngazi Ya Chini, the PAPs, and the community. Indeed, they all intend to speak in the name of the “community,” yet they might have diverse discourses or positions. On the one hand, Pamoja Trust must “respect the autonomy of the community organizations and their ability to make decisions for themselves” (Mitlin 2013, 488). Indeed, Pamoja Trust links the community to REMU, KRC, and the World Bank; it participates in the major meetings representing and protecting the interests of the PAPs. On the other hand, Muungano Wa Wanavijiji and Ngazi Ya Chini have to determine their own positions and strategies to guarantee the PAPs’ space for participation and learning.

Even between Muungano Wa Wanavijiji, Ngazi Ya Chini, and the community, be it PAPs or non-PAPs, conflicts can arise. For instance, in Kibera, rumors were circulating that accused community representatives of plotting with REMU and reserving permanent houses for their own benefit. Another major tension existed between residential and business PAPs; it took a lot of mediation from Pamoja Trust and REMU to bring them together in order for them to speak as one. Some disagreements even came to an extreme point with a court petition being filled in 2011 by Langata Youth Network against KRC and the World Bank regrouping PAPs and non-PAPs, claiming that they could not evict the population and that the process was illegal. Politics within the community also turned around groups of PAPs taking
advantage of the confusion to get some financial gains by asking people for money when they were being enumerated. “Rather than one party being dominant, the challenge [for decision makers] is to recognize ways in which the benefits of collaboration can be maximized while recognizing that differences in social status (and in some cases class position) means that more than good will is required” (Mitlin 2013, 492).

Grievance mechanisms are an interesting combination of models from SDI and the World Bank and an example of the effective repartition of roles within the actors. It is a requirement of the World Bank safeguard policies to have a complaint system to channel and resolve inquiries (World Bank 2015b). Yet, within the RAP, this was combined with an important community dimension: for each segment along the railway lines, a segment executive committee (SEC) was elected by the community to take care of the mobilization and sensitization of the PAPs. Together with REMU and Pamoja Trust, the SEC is also in charge of organizing public meetings and the processes of vetting and balloting. Distinct from the SEC, each segment hosts a grievance committee composed of elected members of the community. Each PAP has the right to enter a claim with REMU, claims that are later transferred to the grievance committee of the respective segment. The committee makes a decision on the case, with the support of a legal professional from REMU, by listening to witnesses and using the original collected data. The decision is then communicated to the persons concerned. This system allows tracing claims by the community itself while the presence of different members and the legal advisor avoids favoring any personal interest. If the case is too complex to be decided by the committee, a second multisegment level has been established grouping members from the six segments in Kibera (Soweto East, Laini Saba, Gatwekera, Kianda, Kisumu Ndogo and Mashimoni). Finally, a third level of grievance gathers three representatives from REMU and two professionals appointed by them. They are to decide on the most complicated cases that need professional input. Grievance mechanisms are a long process but they enable the community to make decision on most of the cases and get both training and power. They institutionalize complaints and reduce potential violent confrontations.

SDI, together with the World Bank, KRC, Pamoja Trust, and the different community structures, has thus managed to ensure the near completion of the project. In October 2015, some of the PAPs had already
relocated to the permanent buildings benefiting from water and electricity connections. Yet, in not all projects is it “in the perceived interest of either of these parties (that is, funders and borrowers) to undertake resettlement properly, as this requires an essentially open-ended approach to the resettlement component of a project” (De Wet 2001, 4644). The obstacle lies in the power shift required from authorities and funders, who will lose part of their control over the decisions made. In addition, PAPs are usually from less powerful and more marginalized backgrounds, so their economic and social networks can take time to reconstruct. Such slow reconstruction has to be considered; protecting it implies an unusual commitment of effort and resources—a commitment that slum dwellers are rarely able to exact from their governments (De Wet 2001).

In that sense, as the Kibera case illustrates, adding another actor, such as SDI, with experience and knowledge of the community concerned, has been critical to facilitate a smoother implementation of the resettlement project. This is also very useful in helping decision makers to apprehend the complex situation of the urban poor they must confront. Indeed, practices in the international development sphere tend to favor professionals who are moving between and within countries, taking with them their particular expertise, but who often lack a proper knowledge of the historical, social, and cultural context in which they are working (Wilson 2006). For decision makers, SDI was a very useful partner in the cases of Mumbai and Nairobi, although its model might not be applicable everywhere. Ideally, to reconcile international models with local urban poor contexts, the idea is to find a suitable collaborator for each large-scale resettlement project. This collaboration can be viewed as expensive, yet the costs can be much higher as a result of political resistance, considering the probable delays and difficulties that might be encountered.

CONCLUSION

As illustrated in the Nairobi Railway RAP project, one of the solutions for decision makers to adapt the World Bank safeguard policies to Kibera and to maximize the positive impact on the urban poor was combining them with SDI’s model of community organization and slum upgrading. This interaction was not without negotiation and conflict. It did require a
flexible but clear repartition of roles between the various actors as well as a defined hierarchy and decision-making procedures. The RAP did not manage to avoid major oppositions, such as the court case that greatly delayed its implementation, but imagining the situation without the participation of Pamoja Trust shows the very high risks of obstruction or manipulation of the project.

Even so, it provides important ideas for states and international organizations, in particular for managing the resettlement of poor populations in a context of rapid urban change. Perhaps one of the key outputs of the Kenyan RAP relates to the importance to low-income communities of being organized and being able to participate directly in the development and management of their resettlement projects. Such participation cannot be achieved easily or rapidly and requires more than good will. A knowledgeable institution with previous experience in the community concerned is thus a critical requirement when developing resettlement policies if safeguard policies are to be respected.

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Pacified Inclusion: Digital Inclusion in Brazil’s Most Violent Favelas

Jason B. Scott
University of Colorado-Boulder

ABSTRACT

Starting in 2008, the city of Rio de Janeiro began to “pacify” its gang-ridden favelas and invest billions of dollars in economic development. Pacified favelas became more integrated within the broader Brazilian political system while innocent bystanders fell victim to daily police-trafficker shootouts. During this time, digital technology became a ubiquitous tool for favela activists who sought to critique pacification policy as a reproduction of structural inequalities. The discussion of violence helped to form a network between online favela activists and powerful institutions in the Brazilian state. This network embraced participatory politics in the form of Paulo Freire’s ideas of “critical pedagogy” as well as state-aligned ideas of entrepreneurship and economic formalization. The friction between state- and community-oriented goals in Rio’s favelas demonstrates that structural violence is an essential aspect of how communities experience digital inclusion.

INTRODUCTION

In 2010, the Brazilian military and state police removed a decades-old parallel state controlled by imperialistic drug gangs and “pacified” the Complexo do Alemão, one of Rio de Janeiro’s most violent favelas. Through the use of online social networks, favela activists critiqued, networked with, and worked alongside newly established state institutions. Notably, these
activists embraced locally produced digital imagery that depicted police abuse, gang violence, and state neglect. These same networks encouraged digital inclusion projects that trained locals in a critical form of digital literacy. Community policing policies and citizen journalism interacted to help construct a new type of Brazilian state and citizen within the favela. I suggest that favela residents constructed a unique form of pacified citizenship through the simultaneous embrace and critique of authoritative institutions. This conflict demonstrates how everyday violence becomes a vital element of digital inclusion in marginalized urban communities.

**Pacified Citizenship: “If You Catch a Bullet, I Won’t Rescue You”**

By July 2015, Complexo residents understood that it would be the deadliest year since pacification in 2010. The police had already killed fifteen locals while losing two within their own ranks. On a Saturday night in late July, 7,000 residents filled a venue for an annual winter festival. A flatbed full of speakers blasted the locally popular funk music. Police feared that the local gang had assembled nearby in order to sell drugs or, worse, target police in a revenge attack. Police silenced the music, which had often been accused by more traditional parts of society as offering an apology or excuse for drug trafficking. Officers pointed automatic rifles at a crowd that included the elderly and young children. Beto—a 20-something self-fashioned activist from the Complexo—jumped off a stage and walked nervously towards the police. His childhood friend and colleague, Bruninho, followed a half step behind. Beto held his hands in front of him and begged for restraint. An officer warned the two: “If you catch a bullet, I won’t rescue you.” A few moments later, police cleared the venue.

Over the next five days, the police killed three people in the Complexo. The Monday following the festival, Bruninho returned to his job at Rio’s city hall and Beto carried out interviews for his Complexo-based newspaper. Photographs and videos of the festival had circulated online for over 24 hours and the Complexo’s dense alleyways echoed with alarm for those involved. Beto began a 900-word Facebook post with, “I think that all of you should be startled by the wait for this post.” As a community journalist, Beto was known among activists for his online critique of pacification, mainstream media, and government corruption. He had been featured in a *New York Times* article and his newspaper had received funding from media conglomerates, multinational corporations, and the municipal government.
He represented a novel yet essential form of institutional engagement within the favela that was made possible through his use of digital mediums. Like many of their colleagues in the favela, Beto and Bruninho began their careers as educados (students, or, more literary, the educated) in government-funded projects that focused on digital photography. They later became educadores (educators) for projects that encouraged people of all ages, but mostly youth, in the Complexo to translate the structural violence that they witnessed and experienced through the use of digital mediums. Digital technology encouraged a transformative form of citizenship that challenged socio-economic and political marginalization while seeking inclusion within Brazil’s plural democracy.

QUESTIONS AND OUTLINE

This article asks three central questions. First, how is digital technology utilized under conditions of structural violence? The Complexo is a unique ethnographic space principally defined by post-colonial urban exclusion. Inspired by the liberation theologian Paulo Freire’s critical pedagogy (1970/1993), favela residents are taught to “read”—to learn the technical aspects of digital or traditional literacy but also to “read the world” by critically examining forms of authority. Second, how can critics of violence form networks with dominant state institutions? Institutional incursion by the state influences the practices and priorities of favela residents through technological collaborations that follow the form of information-driven network societies discussed by Manual Castells (1996) and modify a form of “insurgent citizenship” described by James Holston (2008). Finally, what are the limitations of digital inclusion projects? I focus on ethnographic concerns relating to plurality and cultural authority. Problematically, although these networks promote non-hierarchical ideals, local activists depend on outside institutions that have only brief economic or political ambitions in the community.

ONLINE ETHNOGRAPHY OF AN URBAN SPACE

I lived and conducted ethnographic research for two years (2014–2015) in the Complexo do Alemão. I interviewed over 150 activists and residents
with questions focusing on individual institutional affiliations, personal histories relating to structural violence, philosophies concerning technology, and interpretation of the pacification policy in the favela. I recorded over one thousand hours of classroom observation of digital inclusion projects and volunteered for twenty hours a week over the course of a year at a multinational digital inclusion NGO based in Rio. I analyzed and archived social networking content of several dozen digital online-activists from the Complexo and attended the events (i.e., workshops, meetings, and frequent protests) that these groups organized.

Stephen Graham (2004) argues that the Internet has become a banal cultural object with an assumed set of globally recognized functions. This banality opposes a more utopic view of “cyberspace” that envisions an alternative social space remote from everyday life. Scholars have discussed how both banality (Mbembe 1992) and utopia (Jameson 1979) should be seen as suspect because they subtly reassert dominant authority. The case of the Complexo demonstrates that digital technology is physically embedded in a moral, political, and cultural context in which users evoke unique forms of learning and community (Hine 2015). My ethnographic method follows scholarship that examines how “participatory modes of circulation online have an often obscured political charge that an ethnography combining online and offline sociopolitical worlds can elucidate” (Fattal 2014, 321). Online content both supports and challenges dominant ideologies, and activist engagements with powerful Brazilian institutions demonstrate a multi-sided network of allegiance. Ultimately, this paper interrogates the cultural importance of online imagery as experienced and acted upon within marginalized urban communities.

Rio de Janeiro, a modern metropolis of eight million, is an incredibly salient urban location in which to test how the Internet is engaged as a cultural object in the Global South. My research constructed an online ethnographic space of global ideas and local practices. In this space, I analyzed the embodied forms of structural violence that represented an intersection of socioeconomic, racial, and cultural inequalities prevalent in many postcolonial societies. According to Paul Farmer (2004), erasing history through censorship and silence is the predominant method for dominant actors to enforce these structural inequalities. In modern liberal democracies, dominant social actors are invested in fostering more pluralistic political dialogue. Digital technology becomes transformative
of previous social structures and fetishized as a politically neutral tool (Mazzarella 2010).

Through online networks, residents challenged various forms of censorship by re-conceptualizing ignored or silenced subjects. The Internet provided unprecedented ability to broadcast a previously “hidden transcript” (Scott 1990) that challenged hegemonic forms of discourse and subverted the prejudicial assumptions of the dominant classes. Subjects like race, violence, and poverty were not only discussed in bars and living rooms but were presented openly online. Previously observed forms of self-censorship and outright silence concerning historical inequalities by Brazil’s marginalized citizens (Sherriff 2000) took novel shapes both on- and off-line. The police and politicians were common targets for on-line commentary but activists also often critiqued drug gangs, benefactors, and colleagues, although in private and with the promise of anonymity.

One informant who ran a corporately funded computer lab in the Complexo told me: “I don’t say anything about other projects. It’s all a novela (soap opera). They all want to show violence and travel abroad and visit universities, but then the political action never comes. I go on Facebook and ask people if they need help with food or school or if they need my shoulder to cry on. If I talk about a shootout, I show a picture of when they were alive, not of their blood on the street.” Asked if she believed that sharing images of violence had a positive effect in the community, she responded: “Of course. Outsiders come here and take pictures of smiling children at my NGO so they can go back to their multinational and say they are doing something good. The police show pictures of dead bandits but never the innocent victims. We need to show that the favela is human.”

Much of my data came from informal street-level conversations. An ethnographic intimacy “grounded” the narrative presented online. This was important not only to understand the practical mobility of content and technology but also to build trust and intimacy with my informants. Henrique, an organizer for Ocupa Alemão (Occupy Alemão), often lamented the dozens of daytime visits to the community by government investigators, university researchers, and middle-class NGO workers. Henrique passed by my home in the Complexo about once a week. I would ask him about his politically oriented Facebook posts that regularly received hundreds of “comments” and “likes”. He once joked: “I have a business and my own social projects. I can’t hold everyone’s
hand and walk with them.” He considered outsider interventions as half-hearted engagements with dubious intentions. Towards the end of my research, Henrique posted to Facebook: “I’m fed up with these alienated folks! They don’t live in the favela and they want to be a doctor…give a thousand solutions to the problem. Come here and live for one month.” Henrique’s opinion of outsiders reflects a radical inversion of expertise and knowledge in the age of social media (Eysenbach 2008). Social media allow marginalized individuals to become culturally authoritative experts who challenge traditional knowledge hierarchies. “Reading” this marginalized expertise, one could argue, requires as much training as reading more historically authoritative sources.

INEQUALITIES IN THE COMPLEXO DO ALEMÃO

By 2014, more than 11.4 million people, or six percent of the population, lived in favelas across Brazil with Rio having more than 763 favelas housing 1.4 million. The Complexo, with over 69,000 residents and in the heart of Rio de Janeiro’s metropolis, reflects one of the more severe forms of marginality associated with favelas. Dominant opinions concerning informality, race, and class helped to make the favela a marginalized space that reflected state neglect and fostered the rise of drug gangs. Pacification policy consciously engaged this history but also reproduced forms of censorship and violence that had existed before the state arrived.

Institutional authority is most visible when states impose formality on traditionally informal communities (Guyer 2004). The distinction between o asfalto (asphalt) and o morro (hill or favela), although physical, is maintained by legally sanctioned ideologies that confer formality on the former and informality on the latter. Guillermo O’Donnell (1993) makes the distinction between “blue zones,” with a strong state presence that effectively normalizes legal, economic, and social activity, and “brown zones,” defined by illicit markets, dominant violent non-state actors, substandard housing, and limited infrastructure. Brown zones are neglected or directly excluded from state institutions. Over the last hundred years, favelas have had various political categorizations: gueto (ghetto), ilegal (illegal), invadida (invaded), informal (informal), não planejada (unplanned), marginal (marginal), and algomerados submornais (subnormal agglomerates). These terms
carry varying degrees of political and social recognition, with *pacificada* (pacified) being the newest and most legitimate favela classification.

The Complexo occupies a former royal *fazenda* (ranch) that was parceled into factories after WWI. These factories later informally sold off small lots to workers who continued to divide the land until legal records became unreliable. Residents who arrived in the 1960s told me about expansive gardens and grazing livestock dotting the community’s low-lying mountains. This image contrasts with the dense cluster of mismatched concrete homes that now crowd the postindustrial cityscape. Until pacification, politically connected but legally weak neighborhood associations kept a largely informal record of real estate transactions. Local businesses and employment were rarely licensed. Electricity and water were illegally siphoned from infrastructure outside of the community. Telephone, cable, and Internet providers avoided direct investment and instead relied on local proxies. During the 1990s policy makers designated large swaths of favela land as areas of environmental risk and built walls around them in order to contain community growth. Bus routes skirted the community but never entered. These informalities and risk designations can be seen today in the form of heavy-handed economic development policies and violent policing strategies.

Class in an informal community becomes the most significant obstacle to social inclusion and mobility. The vast majority of Complexo residents make less than Brazil’s minimum wage (R$788 or ~US$225) (UPP Social 2014). One percent of them have a university degree, while 8 percent of the community is illiterate. Many non-trafficker men there consider themselves *trabalhadores* (workers or laborers). Almost half of the adult women in the Complexo declare themselves *donas de casa* (housewives). The majority of Rio’s *empregadas* (maids) and *babás* (nannies) come from Rio’s favelas, and this gendered valuation of labor sustains a sense of inferiority among Brazil’s marginalized (Goldstein 2003).

The emergence of online activists, artists, and technicians represents a visible shift in the class and gender connotations of work. Alicia, a 17-year-old *orientadora* (advisor), who had already been an educada, worked for a digital videography program. She began working with NGOs within the community and preferred to go by the term *militante* (militant) instead of activist. When asked about digital technology, Alicia immediately alluded to the activist network that she took part in: “I always thought that I would leave the community, go to the asphalt. Some older guys are going
to Europe after a multinational saw a rap they did on Facebook about a shootout. So, now I know I’m going to help the community by staying here and I don’t have to feel isolated, or a victim, or a poor person, because it’s a favela.” Alicia embraced a cosmopolitan aspiration common among activists that challenged the worker-trafficker dichotomy.

As the dominant group in Brazil, many whites utilize the concept of “racial democracy” (Twine 1998; Goldstein 1999; Htun 2004) to avoid critiques of structural racism. However, the vast majority of the Complexo self-declare as negro (black) or pardo (brown) (Barbosa et al. 2013) and understand racism as a primary form of exclusion in Brazil. Robin Sheriff notes that favela activists take a conversational but non-confrontational approach towards racism, which helps to construct individual theoretical perspectives but fails to address structural inequalities (Sheriff 2001, 127). Sheriff describes the need for a discourse “that supplies a coherent and more explicit narrative that resonates with what poor Brazilians of African descent already know” (ibid.). Activists in the Complexo discussed racial violence against blacks in other parts of the world, and they compared the media coverage of trafficking for criminals inside and outside of the favela. Through image and text, whites from the asphalt were referred to by education and class (“university students from the upper-middle class are arrested for drug trafficking”), while dark skinned favela youth were depicted simply as bandidos (bandits) or traficantes (traffickers).

**Parallel States and Censorship**

The lack of economic opportunities and political recognition was compounded by a rise in favela gangs. In the 25 years before pacification, imperialistic drug gangs waged inter-faction wars for pseudo-judicial and market sovereignty in Rio’s favelas. Scholars dubbed these “parallel states” (Zaluar 1992; Leeds 1994; Goldstein 2003), which insulate the favela from dominant state repression and develop internal political mechanisms that respond to local needs. Drug traffickers gradually gained influence outside of the favela by running political campaigns and bribing police (Arias 2006). Outsiders commonly accuse favela residents of aiding these parallel states, but even by official estimates only 1 percent of the Complexo participated in trafficking before pacification (Salles 2010).

The most overt and violent form of censorship in the favela is the lei do morro (law of the hill) (Penglase 2010). Drug factions, the dominant
political and economic authority, retaliated against locals who openly spoke to journalists and police. One notable case was the death of award-winning journalist Tim Lopes. Lopes filmed a *boca* (drug distribution point) in the Complexo and presented the footage on national television. Shortly thereafter he was kidnapped by traffickers, quartered with a katana blade, and placed in a *micro-onda* (burning stack of tires) at the top of the Complexo. This story was repeated to me several times when informants discussed being cautious about whom I should talk to and what I should say. Police operations in the community typically took place after such violently dramatic events. These operations offered the only form of contact that community residents had with dominant state institutions. Fluid allegiances divided favela territory among violent non-state actors. Outsiders were seen as suspicious. There was little incentive to speak to police about drug trafficking and, without participatory mediums such as Facebook and Twitter available to share these events anonymously, outsiders became estranged from violence in the favela.

**A PACIFIED COMPLEXO**

More than one in ten of the world’s homicides take place in Brazil (Notícias, r7 2015) and over half of those are connected to favela-based drug trafficking (Instituto Igarapé 2015). Rio de Janeiro had 4,939 homicides in 2014 of which 244 were *homicídios decorrentes de intervenção policial* (homicides due to police intervention) (Anistia.org, 2015; Globo.com 2014). The government moved to “pacify” the favelas. Pacification, more specifically, is a militarized policing strategy inspired by models in Medellín, New York, Port-au-Prince, and Baghdad to destabilize non-state armed groups (gangs and illegal police militias) while installing economic formalization programs in the community. The pacification policy implied the arrival of armed forces as well as plans for or the installation of a *Unidade de Polícia Pacificador* (UPP), or Pacification Police Unit. The government framed pacification as a *reocupar*, a “re-occupation” of favelas, but this erroneously suggested that the Brazilian state had institutional and judicial control there. These transformations are significant only because the state institutions were previously absent in almost all practical ways. Importantly, the pacification police never set out to end violence but instead to destabilize
imperialistic drug gangs, reduce violent crimes, and introduce a new governing modality in previously excluded communities.

In the Complexo, the UPP killed 14 residents and shot 13 more (Instituto de Segurança Pública 2015). Police defensively claimed that they, too, were victims with 3 killed and 46 shot in 2014 (Casas Novas 2015). This claim could be seen as dubious given the aggressive nightly police-civilian encounters, similar to stop-and-frisk tactics in New York City, and the fact that one officer was shot in the back by friendly fire. Despite a homicide rate that fell by 65.5%, deaths linked to the UPP were more commonplace. In the opinion of residents, the police had deposed gangs as the chief state actors in the favela as well as the principle agents of violence. The UPP Social—the name was later changed to Rio+Social because of a negative association with its judicial counterpart—was established to guide billions of dollars into social programs and economic development across the city. By 2015, 37 UPP units covered 711,699 residents in 208 pacified favelas over 20 square kilometers (Rio+Social 2015).

Although civil society (e.g., NGOs, multinational corporations, and foreign governments) had invested millions in local organizations that predated pacification, pacification economically formalized the favela, increased a social safety net, and promised permanent police occupation. Real estate received legal titles and businesses required licenses and tax documents. Workers enrolled for public unemployment benefits and health care. Infrastructural investment improved roads, sanitation, electricity, and telecommunications (Gazetadopovo.com.br 2015). In the Complexo alone the federal, state, and city governments invested over a half billion dollars in infrastructure including a ~US$100 million dollar cable car network meant to provide public transportation. The UPP built seven police stations along the cable car route and placed armored storage containers that housed police outposts along major thoroughfares. The cable car formed the infrastructural backbone for UPP Social-sponsored citizenship, digital literacy, and community journalism projects.

According to my informants, the Complexo had hosted only five digital inclusion projects in the twenty years before pacification. Since pacification, the number has risen to as high as six concurrent programs and thirteen in total. Most were staffed by locals but designed and funded by outsiders. Increased investment by cable and telephone companies established (relatively) reliable Internet connections for the first time and a booming Brazilian economy.
allowed many to buy inexpensive smartphones on newly available forms of credit. At least in the Complexo, digital activists supplanted neighborhood associations as intermediaries between the Complexo and Brazil’s broader political apparatus. Activists critiqued these interventions with phrases like “a UPP Social é 100% maquiagem” (the UPP Social is 100% makeup).

Heavily armed gang members could still be seen in back alleys around the Complexo but they mostly stayed hidden. Censorship, prejudice, and everyday violence carried over from the parallel state structure and the lei do morro, at least in terms of traffickers, continued. Even those activists considered politically neutral were targets of retaliation because of public comments about violence. The Complexo branch of the Grupo Cultural Afro Reggae, an NGO of former drug traffickers, had been firebombed in 2013 after the group’s founder expressed on Facebook that he valued the lives of police and traffickers equally. No group claimed responsibility for the bombing but, given historical forms of censorship, most assumed it to be local traffickers.

The state did not enforce a violent form of censorship but still crept close to political abuse. As antigovernment protests drew millions into the streets of Rio, the federal police investigated three local Facebook groups for their support of the protests. No one was arrested in the Complexo, but 23 “militant” educators were held without charges for several days. One woman, who found out she was being investigated after her Facebook page was listed in a newspaper article, stated: “I almost gave up. Most of my posts are about cultural events in the community. When everyone else posts images of a shootout, I usually post [a picture of] a sunset over the hill (“o morro,” slang for “the community”). I end most of my Facebook posts with ‘peace’.”

After pacification, the police went from being agents of brief and deadly force to the dominant violent actors in the community. As representatives of a liberal democratic government, both local and outside journalists experienced unprecedented access to the community. Reporters from Brazil’s largest outlets donned bulletproof vests to broadcast from inside the community several times a week. Citizen journalists sought, for the first time, to openly criticize the dominant local actors without risk of reprisal.

**The Network Society and the Pacified Favela**

One of my informants, Ricardo, a 40-something native of Rio’s wealthy Zona Sul, had spent twenty years constructing what he called a “digital
utopia.” Growing his NGO out of a nineteenth-century mansion in one of Rio’s most elite neighborhoods, he shepherded millions of dollars from multinationals into hundreds of computer labs in impoverished communities and claimed to have given more than one million people access to the Internet. He also partnered with state officials in education, security, and telecommunications. His organization had carried out at least five projects in the Complexo in which many local activists had participated. In part because of the 2008 global financial crisis, Ricardo temporarily lost his corporate sponsorships and restructured the NGO towards mobile applications. By 2014, mobile technology had become the principle means by which Brazilians accessed the Internet (Sandaña 2015). In interviews with Ricardo’s subordinates, most of whom were from middle- or upper-class families, some complained that the NGO was losing touch with the favela. I asked Ricardo what he thought about his subordinates’ critique. He answered defiantly: “You didn’t see the favela, Rio, Brazil twenty years ago. No one had access to the Internet. Maybe only the rich. We were able to bring computers to places that didn’t even have water. Our biggest problem was the lack of electricity in (some of the) schools. Things have changed. The school is no longer the main problem. Even technology is not the problem. We need to find the new citizens for a digital revolution.” Ricardo sought to adapt technology to favela society and hoped that marginalized society would adopt his technological revolution.

Ricardo, like most of those who espoused digital inclusion, embraced the methodologies of Paulo Freire, a Brazilian liberation theologian who was exiled during Brazil’s military dictatorship (1964–1985). Freire gained recognition through teaching sugar cane cutters how to read, write, and, above all, contextualize their values within a broader society. This “critical pedagogy” (Freire [1970/1993] encouraged marginalized groups to understand what they valued, why they valued it, and how to express that value to oppressive institutions. Traditional pedagogical institutions, when made available to the poor, conferred the mere technical skills of reading and writing but did nothing to help upset forms of oppression. For Freire, there were only educators and educated as the teacher/student relationship was hierarchically exclusionary. I had frequent discussions about Freire with teachers in public schools, informal educadores, and newly “literate” educados.

When applied to digital technology, this type of critical pedagogy seeks to give not only the technical skills required to navigate the Internet but
also a socioeconomic perspective that encourages the oppressed to “read the world,” organize around a set of local values, and disseminate those values in order to effect social change. Some scholars have called the content-based struggle of marginalized community’s “counterpublics” (Hirschkind 2002; Warner 2002; Fattal 2014) or “recursive publics” (Kelty 2008). These publics are technologically informed subcultures with collective identities that challenge dominant social and political structures. These publics also form a “network society” (Castells 1996) in which technology subverts the traditional limitations of geography and places increased economic value on the exchange of information. The commodification of knowledge and the elimination of previously insurmountable social and physical obstacles are characteristics shared with modern liberal democracies that rely on global capital. The network society is fundamentally a state-building process through its instillation of newly inclusive economic and social values.

Digital technology develops inclusive economic practices and concepts of identity while even the most collectivist Freirian contextualization prioritizes the individual attainment of knowledge. The individual—the activist, worker, trafficker, housewife—is ultimately prioritized by digital inclusion and pacification. When I asked Ricardo about any possible conflicts between the government and his clients, he responded: “The big guys have the money and the mission. The revolution doesn’t disappear because the government is involved. The militants can still have freedom, just freedom within a larger technological ecosystem.”

**FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE ACTIVIST**

Much of the activism that is witnessed in the favela is a transformative form of what James Holston calls “insurgent citizenship.” Economic formality, aggressive security tactics, and individual inclusion within powerful institutions allow the state to upset those forms of “insurgency” that marginalized populations have carved out. The most influential residents within the community become conducive to the state-building process through engagement with dominant institutions and discourse. Pacification subdues the militancy while redirecting it towards state-sponsored goals. The overt governmentalizing and statizing effects of pacification—through economics, real estate codification, and dramatic uses of embodied violence—are
coupled with a concerted effort to create a local civil society embedded within a dominant one.

I attended a protest for a child who had been killed by the police and spoke to a 23-year old named Marcela who lived with her parents and was planning, until only recently, to take the entrance examination for Rio’s free federal university. “I’m scared. I don’t want to work in a kitchen,” she told me. The political party that supported a small NGO where she was employed as an educadora had lost congressional seats in a recent election and, in turn, had to defund her project. I asked her what she thought about the ambitions and sincerity of the state. She quickly shifted the topic to political activism and took a playful tone: “We’re rats in the favela. Rats don’t scare anyone if no one knows they exist. And when they know they exist, their first instinct isn’t to feed them. We can bring the world to us with this kind of movement, make them see that we rats exist; then we could really scare them. I got the government to give me work, didn’t I? They will do it again and I will bring others with me.” Marcela was alluding to the negotiated nature of the state in a pacified favela. She and her colleagues formed a local node of a larger network and structure of ideologies. The Internet, and more specifically digital imagery, was connected with institutional recognition. She formed her marginalized identity, not around the kitchen, but through a set of technologies governed by a newly installed state.

The Educator and Educated

While in the classroom of Eco-cine, a digital inclusion project that combined ecology, digital filmmaking, and citizenship, I heard an educador ask: “Do you know the history of the favela?” He was a middle-class, university-educated Brazilian who learned about the course through political party connections. The educados, normally talkative teenagers from the favela, sat silent. The educador proceeded to ask if they had seen any movies about the favela. One named the internationally acclaimed film Cidade de Deus, while others made reference to popular Brazilian novelas. All of the examples contained violent depictions of drug culture while being geared towards an audience outside of the favela.

The educador asked if those representations were indicative of their lives. One educado chuckled: “It’s completely different. I mean, it’s worse than the films.” The educados debated race, class, and cultural representation for the next hour. By the end of the day, the group had brainstormed the basic
premise for a short film. A month later the group was in an auditorium with a thousand people in attendance presenting a satirical short film about a youth with a hairstyle typical of the morro who was attempting to seek employment on the asfalto. The message of the film related everyday experiences of prejudice to a racialized and classed physical appearance.

After the course, most of the students planned on studying more about film and carrying out projects with their smartphone cameras. A few had already agreed to be orientadores for the next term of Eco-cine, promising to continue the cycle of citizenship building in the pacified favela. All of the educados expressed a desire to build a life in the community and make the community more visible to outsiders. A few months later, a student joined Beto—the activist discussed at the beginning of this article—as a volunteer at his newspaper. Others used their audiovisual skills for church, business, and independent activism. These ambitions and actions suggested the emergence of a new generation of favela residents who viewed their world in terms of technology. Most importantly, they would use technology to ask their community and the world: “Do you know the history of the favela?”

CONCLUSION

Digital inclusion has brought pluralism and accountability to the favela but in a way that is often conducive to the Brazilian state’s goal of pacification. The Internet, as part of building the state in the favela, has created an intersection between pedagogical individuality and institutional involvement. Through this form of institutional recognition, residents are negotiating a pacified space and embodying a transformative form of informality. Pacification’s impact is not limited to pacified favelas but extends to its citizens and other marginalized communities struggling with drug violence.

Technology and everyday violence will continue to exist alongside one another. In Rio’s favelas, the UPP has become a prerequisite to any form of major government investment and many residents in non-pacified favelas express anxiety over the give-and-take of militarized economic development. Digital inclusion will remain an essential social aspect of pacification as the policy progresses and other governments adopt the policy. The UPP has spread to Rio de Janeiro state and the pacification policy is being copied throughout Brazil and Latin America. The type of pacified citizenship
discussed above can build digital bridges between marginalized communities while solidifying the formalizing goals of the state. As pacification continues as an influential means of state intervention in Latin America, researchers must continue to examine digital technology as a local mediator of structural violence.

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