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**The Warsaw Pact and Nuclear
Nonproliferation**

1963-1965

by
Douglas Selvage

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During the Cold War, political scientists engaged in a debate about the nature of the Warsaw Pact. Although they agreed that it was not an “alliance” in the traditional sense of the term—i.e., a free association of sovereign states whose members were free to leave at will—some considered it to be a mere transmission belt for communicating Moscow’s foreign policy directives to the European socialist states.¹ Other analysts, pointing to signs of increased autonomy in the 1960s, especially on the part of Romania, argued that the Warsaw Pact was on the path to becoming a true alliance and its members “junior allies” (Zbigniew Brzezinski) of the Soviet Union.²

At the time, the unavailability of sources meant that analysts were forced to use foreign-policy deviance as the only yardstick for measuring autonomous behavior on the part of the socialist states. This led to a near-exclusive focus on the “obviously deviant” case in foreign policy—i.e., Romania. Such a focus, as Edwina Moreton pointed out, ignored the possibility that some of the socialist states might have had shared interests with the Soviet Union on certain foreign-policy issues (e.g., Poland and the GDR on German policy); that they might have been able to influence Soviet policy through bargaining and negotiations within the Eastern alliance; or that events or policy concerns of the socialist states might have had a general modifying influence on Moscow’s actions.³

Newly available evidence from the archives of East Central Europe has made it possible to go beyond the “obviously deviant” case and examine the actions of more orthodox members of the Warsaw Pact during the 1960s. This paper will examine the attitudes of three Warsaw Pact states [Romania, the People’s Republic of Poland, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR)] with regard to U.S.-Soviet negotiations on a nuclear nonproliferation treaty during the mid-1960s. Influenced by their own, independently-defined interests with regard to nuclear nonproliferation, Poland and the GDR opposed West German access to nuclear weapons in any form, including access through NATO’s planned multilateral nuclear force (MLF). In contrast, Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev seemed willing in his last year in power 1963-64, that would willingly concede West German access to nuclear weapons through NATO as the price for a

¹ See, for example, Malcolm Mackintosh, “The Warsaw Treaty Organization: A History,” in *The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition?*, ed. David Holloway and Jane M.O. Sharp (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 42; Andrzej Korboski, “The Warsaw Pact After Twenty-Five Years: An Entangling Alliance or an Empty Shell?” 18-19, and Jorg K. Hoensch, “The Warsaw Pact and the Northern Member States,” 48, in *The Warsaw Pact: Political Purpose and Military Means*, ed. Robert W. Clawson and Lawrence S. Kaplan (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1982), 18-19; Robert L. Hutchings, *Soviet-East European Relations: Consolidation and Conflict, 1968-1980* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 4; Richard Löwenthal, “Vormachtkontrolle und Autonomie in der Entwicklung des Sowjetblocks,” in *Der Sowjetblock zwischen Vormachtkontrolle und Autonomie*, ed. Richard Löwenthal und Boris Meissner (Köln: Markus Verlag, 1984), 11.

² Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*, 2nd Revised and Enlarged Ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 433; J.F. Brown, “Relations Between the Soviet Union and Its Eastern European Allies: A Survey,” *Rand Report R-1742-PR* (November 1975), 11-12; Robin Alison Remington, *The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution* (Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press, 1971), 6, 8; David Holloway, “The Warsaw Pact in Transition,” in Holloway and Sharp, *The Warsaw Pact*, 19.

³ Moreton, “Foreign Policy Goals,” 146-47. On the “obviously deviant case,” see Gitelman, “Toward a Comparative Foreign Policy,” 144.

nonproliferation agreement with the United States in order to increase pressure on China to abandon its nascent nuclear program. Although, the communist leaders of both Poland and the GDR opposed Khrushchev's plans to concede the MLF they adopted different approaches to the problem based on their local interests and differing attitudes towards the Sino-Soviet rift. It was only at the end of 1964, after Khrushchev's fall from power and China's first successful nuclear test, that Poland, the GDR, and the Soviet Union reached a common stance in favor of nonproliferation and banning the MLF. It was also at this time that Romania, the Soviet bloc's renegade, adopted China's stance and opposed any nonproliferation agreement whatsoever.

The diverging positions of Poland, the GDR and Romania on nuclear nonproliferation and their willingness to defend them demonstrate that the Warsaw Pact had become more than a transmission belt for Soviet directives by the mid-1960s. Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies were increasingly adamant about defending their own foreign policy interests, even in those areas in which the Soviet Union had the highest stake: the Sino-Soviet conflict, the German question, and nuclear weapons. Although Poland and the GDR did not follow Romania's example and break with the Warsaw Pact, they did demand that the Soviets consult with them on all matters relating to their vital interests. By the mid-1960s, the East European states, no longer mere "satellites" of the Soviet Union, had become its "junior allies."

It was not the renegade Romania, but the more orthodox People's Republic of Poland and the GDR, that initially came into conflict with Khrushchev over nuclear nonproliferation. Beginning in the mid-1950's, Poland and the GDR had *supported* Khrushchev's hard line towards the FRG. Specifically, they had *promoted* his dual-track policy of pushing for Western a universal recognition of the territorial *status quo* in Europe, and forestalling West German access to nuclear weapons in any form. By 1963, however, Khrushchev had changed course and was moving towards *détente* with the West, including the FRG. As Sino-Soviet tensions grew, the Soviet leader spoke more and more about a *modus vivendi* with Bonn, a new Rapallo. In his attempt to improve relations with Bonn, Khrushchev threatened to compromise not only on the issue of West German access to nuclear weapons, but also on the need for Bonn to recognize the *status quo* in Europe. The potential shift in Soviet policy threatened the security and stability of the Polish and East German communist regimes.

The first to perceive a link between the Sino-Soviet split and potential Soviet backsliding on the German question was Poland's communist leader, Władysław Gomułka. Gomułka, who kept close watch over Moscow's German policy, reputedly suffered from a "Rapallo complex:" a fear that the Soviets might someday reach an agreement with the Germans behind Poland's back and at Poland's expense. Gomułka's greatest concern was the security of Poland's western border, the Oder-Neisse Line.⁴

⁴ Piotr Madajczyk, *Na drodze do pojednania: Wokół ordęzia biskupów polskich do biskupów niemieckich z 1965 roku* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1994), 37; Janusz Rolicki, *Edward Gierek: Przerwana dekada* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Fakt, 1990), 121; Jerzy Eisler and Stanisław Trepczyski, *Grudzie '70 wewn trz "Białego Domu"* (Warsaw: A.W. Colibri, 1991), 63-4; Piotr Kostikow and Bohdan Rolinski, *Widziane z Kremla: Moskwa-Warszawa, Gra o Polsk* (Warsaw: Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza "BGW", 1992), 56; Interview with Andrzej Werblan, 3 December 1993; Interview with Stefan Jędrychowski, 18 September 1994.

The initial signs of deviation by Khrushchev on German policy, however, did not involve the Polish border, but the question of West German access to nuclear weapons—a key issue for the Polish communists. Since the late 1950s, Warsaw had been leading the struggle “to keep the German finger off the nuclear trigger.” In 1957, it had announced with the “Rapacki Plan”: a proposal for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, including the two German states, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The initiative had provoked a great deal of debate in the West, but it had failed to prevent NATO from stationing tactical nuclear weapons in the FRG.⁵ By 1963, the U.S. was planning to allow its NATO allies, including Bonn, joint control over a few strategic nuclear weapons as part of a so-called “multilateral force,” or MLF. The goal of the project was to reassure Washington’s allies that its “nuclear umbrella” remained intact, despite Soviet advances in nuclear weaponry.⁶ The West Germans, forbidden by the Paris Treaties from developing their own nuclear capability, strongly supported the MLF. They feared becoming a second-class member of NATO at a time when Great Britain and France had their own nuclear forces.⁷ Not surprisingly, the Warsaw Pact—especially Poland and the GDR—immediately denounced NATO’s plans and Bonn’s conspicuous role in them.

It was against this backdrop that Gomułka received a memorandum from the Soviet foreign ministry at the beginning of October 1963 about Moscow’s ongoing talks with the U.S. over a nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Moscow, he was shocked to learn, intended to drop its demand that the treaty include a clause prohibiting the establishment of joint nuclear forces. The Soviets were willing to settle for a mere commitment from the United States—in the treaty or elsewhere—not to allow nuclear weapons to come under the FRG’s direct command. Such a compromise, the memorandum read, would still serve the Warsaw Pact’s larger goal of denying Bonn access to nuclear weapons.⁸ Clearly rattled, Gomułka did not agree that Moscow’s plans conformed to the common “line of the socialist community in the international arena.”⁹ The proposed concession, he feared, would lead the West to conclude that the Warsaw Pact was no longer opposed to the MLF. Gomułka also worried about the nonproliferation treaty’s impact upon Sino-Soviet relations; he opposed Khrushchev’s increasingly confrontational stance towards the Chinese. Beijing’s reaction to the limited test ban suggested that a nonproliferation

⁵ On the Rapacki Plan, see Piotr Wandycz, “Adam Rapacki and the Search for European Security,” in *The Diplomats, 1939-1979*, ed. Gordon A. Craig and Francis L. Loewenheim (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

⁶ Glenn T. Seaborg, *Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), 83-4.

⁷ Helga Haftendorn, *Kernwaffen und die Glaubwürdigkeit der Allianz: Die NATO-Krise von 1966/67*, Nuclear History Program (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1994), 117.

⁸ Once Bonn’s “hands were bound” by a nonproliferation agreement, the memo continued, the Warsaw Pact could resume its struggle against the MLF from a more advantageous position. Moscow would also insist upon a withdrawal clause, which it would not hesitate to use if a “transfer” of nuclear weapons to the “West German revanchists” ever took place. See Document #1 (below).

⁹ Gomułka put a question mark after this particular passage in the Soviet text. Ibid.

treaty would lead to a final breach between Moscow and Beijing.¹⁰ If the Soviets signed a treaty that did not prohibit the MLF, it would confirm that they were more interested in forestalling a Chinese nuclear capability than in preventing West German “access” to nuclear weapons.¹¹

As soon as he received Moscow’s memorandum, Gomułka sprang into action. He called an emergency politburo meeting and obtained unanimous support for his stance that any nonproliferation treaty should prohibit joint nuclear forces. Immediately thereafter, he phoned Khrushchev and asked the Soviet leader to convene a Warsaw Pact meeting to discuss the apparent shift in Moscow’s nonproliferation policy. In the meantime, Gomułka said, he would submit a letter to Khrushchev explaining his objections.¹² When Khrushchev demanded to know the letter’s contents, Gomułka replied that it had to do with the Chinese and German questions. Khrushchev snapped: Send it to the Chinese. Gomułka responded: It would not be pleasant for Moscow if such a letter ended up in Beijing. In the second week of October 1963, the Soviet leader reluctantly received an emissary with Gomułka’s letter.¹³

Gomułka’s letter, dated 8 October 1963, consisted of two parts. First, the Polish leader warned Khrushchev that a failure to prohibit joint nuclear forces in a nonproliferation agreement would be a “unilateral concession” to the West with grave political consequences for the entire Warsaw Pact. The U.S. and West Germany, he wrote, were the only NATO members who truly supported the MLF. While the U.S. considered it a tool for preserving its hegemony in Western Europe, the FRG saw in it a tool for carrying out its “revanchist policies.” If Moscow conceded the issue in a nonproliferation treaty, it would undermine the already significant opposition to the MLF within NATO. Second, if the MLF was established, Bonn would be able to engage in “nuclear blackmail” against the GDR and the entire Warsaw Pact. Its proposed financial contribution— 40% of the MLF’s cost, with 40% allocated to the U.S. and 20% to the other

¹⁰ See Gomułka’s letter to Khrushchev, Document #2 (below). The letter has recently been reprinted in the Polish original in Andrzej Paczkowski, ed., *Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego, 1956-1970* (London: “Aneks” 1998), 170-79.

¹¹ The Chinese had voiced their opposition to a nonproliferation agreement as early as October 1962. “Antwort der Sowjetregierung auf das Memorandum der Regierung der Volksrepublik China vom 20.10.1962 [Response of the Soviet Government to the Memorandum of the People’s Republic of China from 10 October 1962],” 20 April 1963. Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO BA), J IV 2/202-184. In a similar letter from July 1963, the Soviets had declared in reference to the FRG and the MLF: “The standpoint of the Soviet Union with regard to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons does not leave open any backdoor for the imperialist states to distribute these weapons within their own camp—for example, with the help of the aggressive NATO military bloc.” See the Soviet memorandum addressed to the “Government of the People’s Republic of China,” 17 July 1963, in SAPMO BA, J IV 2/202-284. In their memorandum from October 1963 that Gomułka received, the Soviets tried to gloss over the issue of China’s probable reaction to a nonproliferation treaty. Although France and China, the memo read, would “probably not agree to become parties to a declaration on nonproliferation, @ this would still not detract from the advantages that will flow to the socialist commonwealth from the conclusion of such a declaration.” See Document #1 below.

¹² Document #2 (below).

¹³ According to Gomułka’s discussion with Jan Ptasiński, his former ambassador to Moscow, on February 6, 1972. Jan Ptasiński, “Moje rozmowy z Władysławem Gomułka, 1960-70,” Instytut Dokumentacji Historycznej Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej (IDH-PRL), PII/71, pp. 74-5.

NATO allies— would allow Bonn to assume second place within the Western alliance and increase its overall political influence. Moscow’s plans, Gomułka implied, were not in keeping with the Warsaw Pact’s stance on the MLF.¹⁴

In the second part of his letter, Gomułka expressed his “personal views” on China. Even if the U.S. did agree to ban joint nuclear forces, he wrote, Moscow still should not sign a nonproliferation treaty. The West sought such an agreement only in order to sow discord between Moscow and Beijing. Gomułka implicitly criticized Khrushchev’s policy towards China. “I assume that if the Soviet Union will consult and coordinate its more important political initiatives in the international arena with the People’s Republic of China,” he wrote, “then the Communist Party of China will desist from its propaganda and attacks against the CPSU and that a closer point of view can be achieved with regard to a number of controversial questions.” Because the European socialist states could not afford a permanent split within the socialist camp “an understanding with the Communist Party of China on the basis of a sensible compromise,” he wrote, “... [is] necessary from every point of view.” Gomułka did not even oppose a Chinese nuclear capability. In fact, if the West proceeded with the MLF, he wrote Khrushchev, then Moscow should form its own joint nuclear force with Beijing.¹⁵ Disagreeing with Gomułka’s assessment, Khrushchev dispatched Moscow’s top negotiator for disarmament, Deputy Foreign Minister Vasilii Kuznetsov, to Warsaw. But Kuznetsov failed to change Gomułka’s mind.¹⁶

Gomułka’s intervention did affect Moscow’s diplomacy—at least on paper. A few weeks later, Moscow informed its allies about the latest round of talks in Washington. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, a Soviet memorandum claimed, had returned to Moscow’s original stance on nonproliferation. He had informed the Americans about the “dire consequences” of “allowing the West German revanchists de facto access to nuclear weapons.” President John F. Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk had responded that one of Washington’s goals in proposing the MLF had been to prevent Bonn from someday producing its own nuclear weapons or gaining access to them through France. At this juncture, Gromyko asked whether the Americans could agree that the MLF would not actually be realized. If the U.S. merely promised to drop the MLF at some future date, he implied, Moscow would sign a nonproliferation treaty that did not ban joint nuclear forces.¹⁷

¹⁴ See Document #2 (below).

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ This is based on Gomułka's discussion of 6 February 1972, with Ptasiński, as cited in the latter's private memoirs. Ptasiński, *AMoje rozmowy z Władysławem Gomułka, 1960-70*, “IDH-PRL, PII/7a, pp. 74-75. Gomułka was convinced that Kuznetsov privately agreed with him. He was probably right. When Khrushchev backed down during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kuznetsov allegedly declared that the Soviet leader had “shit his pants.” Vladislav Zubok, “Unwrapping the Enigma: What Was Behind the Soviet Challenge in the 1960s?” in *Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Relations during the 1960's*, ed. Diane B. Kunz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 160.

¹⁷ See the Russian memorandum, “Strogo doveritelno: Voprosii germanskogo mirnogo uregulirovaniia i normalizatsii polozheniia v Zapadnom Berline [Strictly Confidential: The Question of a German Peace Settlement and a Normalization of the Situation in West Berlin],” marked “Podano do wiadomości, 31/X.63r. [For Your Information, 31 October 1963],” Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN), KC PZPR [Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party], sygn. 2639, pp. 345-60. On the U.S. desire to prevent Bonn from developing its own nuclear capability or

Gomułka was appalled by what he read. In the margins of the memo he wrote: “Who is Kennedy trying to fool -- Bonn or us?” Despite Poland’s opposition, he concluded Gromyko had been willing to sign a nonproliferation treaty with the U.S. that did not explicitly ban joint nuclear forces.¹⁸ Although the Americans had rejected the offer, for now¹⁹ what would happen to Warsaw’s concerns if they revisited Gromyko’s proposal at a later date?

At the beginning of January 1964, Gomułka and Khrushchev met in secret in eastern Poland to air their differences.²⁰ The meeting ended in acrimony. First, Khrushchev seemed to accept the Americans’ argument that the MLF would prevent other Western countries, including the FRG, from developing their own nuclear weapons.²¹ Second, on the subject of China, Khrushchev told Gomułka that there was no turning back. The Chinese were already massing forces along the disputed Sino-Soviet border. If they crossed it, Khrushchev threatened to order a nuclear strike.²² Third, Khrushchev informed Gomułka that he wanted to reach a *modus vivendi* with Bonn. When Gomułka opposed the idea, an argument broke out, and Khrushchev reminded Gomułka that his hold on power was not eternal.²³ Relations between the two leaders had reached a new low. Gomułka’s suspicions seemed to be confirmed. Khrushchev was more interested in improving relations with Bonn than with Beijing.

The GDR also expressed reservations about Khrushchev’s nonproliferation policy. On 11 October 1963—immediately after his visit to Gomułka—Kuznetsov met with Walter Ulbricht

attaining a bomb from France, see Seaborg, *Stemming the Tide*, 83-4. Seaborg indirectly confirms Gromyko's proposal. He reports that in 1965 McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor to both Kennedy and Johnson, “suggested that perhaps the Soviets would go back to a position they had seemed to adopt in 1963: they would consent to a nonproliferation treaty more or less on our terms and then withdraw from it if an MLF actually came into existence.” *Ibid.*, 159.

¹⁸ In the margins of the Soviet memorandum, Gomułka wrote: “[D]espite our opposition, the Sov. U. proposed to conclude the Treaty without . . . a prohibition . . . against the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force.” “Podano do wiadomości, 31.X.63r. [For Your Information, 31 October 1963],” AAN, KC PZPR, sygn. 2639, pp. 345-60.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ On the meeting in Łańsk, see Nicholas Bethell, *Gomułka: His Poland, His Communism* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), 242; Sergei Khrushchev, *Khrushchev on Khrushchev*, transl. William Taubmann (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1990), 49; “Stenogram II Plenarnego Posiedzenia Komitetu Centralnego Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej [Transcript of the II Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party],” 20-21 November 1964, in AAN, KC PZPR, sygn. 1265, pp. 337-39.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 337-39.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 340. On Khrushchev’s threat regarding China, see “Notatka z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego i Sekretariatu KC w dn. 26 października 1964r. [Noted from the Session of the Politburo and Secretariat of the CC on 26 October 1964],” 26 October 1964, in AAN, KC PZPR, p. 131, t. 120.

²³ Bethell, *Gomułka*, 242; Andrzej Albert [Wojciech Roszkowski], *Najnowsza historia Polski*, 5th ed., tom II (London: Puls Publications, 1994), 461. Also see “Stenogram II Plenarnego Posiedzenia,” p. 341 (see note #20 above).

and the SED Politburo in East Berlin. Ulbricht, in contrast to Gomulka, expressed a willingness to accept a nonproliferation treaty that did not explicitly forbid joint nuclear forces. What worried Ulbricht was that Moscow had let up on its propaganda against the MLF. “Already, reports are appearing in the capitalist news agencies,” he explained to Kuznetsov, “that the Soviet Union is no longer offering resistance to the creation of united nuclear weapons units in NATO.” Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Kuznetsov countered, had taken a very firm stance against the MLF in Moscow’s talks with the Americans. The SED, Ulbricht replied, knew this, “but the world does not know it.” If NATO established the MLF, he warned Kuznetsov, it would undermine the SED’s efforts to win support for its German policy with the FRG.²⁴

Ulbricht’s remarks were quite revealing. While Gomulka’s Poland worried about the MLF’s impact upon the strategic and political balance within NATO and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the East Germans were more worried about how it might affect their efforts to win support in West Germany for recognition of the GDR. For the East German communists, recognition of the GDR took priority over the purely strategic considerations of nonproliferation. Ulbricht, in contrast to Gomulka, supported Moscow’s hard line towards China. Indeed, he was not above exploiting the differences between Gomulka and Khrushchev over China to obtain more favorable treatment from the Soviets.²⁵

Suspicious of Moscow’s intentions and frustrated by its failure to counter the MLF effectively, Gomulka proposed in December 1963 that Poland, Czechoslovakia and the two German states agree to freeze nuclear weapons on their soil at existing levels.²⁶ The goal of Gomulka’s proposal was to scuttle NATO’s plans for a multilateral nuclear force by preventing the entry of mixed-manned nuclear vessels—the core component of the proposed MLF—into the FRG’s Baltic ports.²⁷ [The GDR’s cold reception of the “Gomulka Plan,” announced by the Polish leader in December 1963, reflected its policy of putting its own recognition ahead of arms control in Central Europe.] Even before Poland could make its proposal official, the GDR came forward with its own arms-control initiative on 2 January 1964: a note calling for an agreement between the two German states that renounced “nuclear armament, nuclear-weapons production, or participation in multilateral nuclear armament.” Irritated, Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki wrote Gomulka on 3 January that although the East German proposal did not have any “potential for causing an international discussion,” it could undermine Poland’s initiative. In effect, the GDR was making its own recognition a precondition for a nuclear freeze in Central Europe—a precondition that the West would undoubtedly reject.²⁸ In a bitter exchange of letters between

²⁴ See Document #3 (below).

²⁵ Letter, Ulbricht to Khrushchev, 22 October 1963. SAPMO BA, J IV 2/202-338.

²⁶ See Gomulka’s speech from 28 December 1963, in *Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik* (henceforth, *DzDP*): 1064-67.

²⁷ Memorandum of Conversation, Jacob Beam, Assistant Director, ACDA, with Dr. Marian Dobrosielski, Counselor, Embassy of the Polish People’s Republic, 27 January 1964. National Archives and Records Administration II (NARA), Record Group (RG) 59, Department of State Central Files, 1964-66, Box 1596, “DEF 18-6, 1/1/64.”

²⁸ Letter, Rapacki to Gomulka, 3 January 1964, in AAN, KC PZPR, p. 110, t. 17. For the East German proposal, see Ulbricht’s speech on January 3, 1964, in *DzDP*, IV. Reihe, Bd. 10: 24-40.

Ulbricht and Gomulka, the East German leader insinuated that inter-German contacts—and thus recognition of the GDR—were to take priority over regional disarmament.²⁹ The Soviet Union also opposed the Gomulka Plan. In an interview with *Izvestiia*, Gromyko rejected the idea of a nuclear freeze in Europe because it would revive “the thick icy frost of cold war.”³⁰

Unlike Gomulka, East Germans did not become truly concerned about Khrushchev’s “Rapallo policy” until the end of March 1964, when the Western press reported that the Soviet leader had invited West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard to Moscow.³¹ Worried about the potential consequences of a Soviet-West German summit, Ulbricht petitioned Moscow to conclude a friendship treaty with the GDR. Such a treaty, Ulbricht wrote the Soviets, would raise the GDR’s international standing and refute Bonn’s claim that only the FRG could negotiate with Moscow on the German question.³² The Soviets approved the idea, and Ulbricht arrived in Moscow at the end of May to sign the treaty.³³

During Ulbricht’s visit, it became clear that he and Khrushchev had different interpretations of the treaty’s significance. In public statements throughout his visit, Ulbricht sought to make official talks between the two German states a precondition for any improvement in Soviet-West German relations.³⁴ On the eve of the treaty’s signing, Khrushchev disabused Ulbricht of such a notion. The friendship treaty, he explained, was “not least of all a point of departure for his normalization campaign towards West Germany [Kosthorst].” The Soviet leader listed a series of upcoming contacts between Moscow and Bonn, including a visit by his son-in-law, Alexei Adzhubei, the editor-in-chief of *Izvestiia*, to Bonn. Khrushchev was even hoping to visit Bonn himself. When Ulbricht objected to the proposed contacts, Khrushchev

²⁹ Letter, Ulbricht to Gomulka, 25 January 1964, in AAN, KC PZPR, p. 128, t. 102, pp. 9-10; letter, Gomulka to Ulbricht [final German version], 13 February 1964, in AAN, KC PZPR, sygn. 2662, pp. 23-6.

³⁰ Hansjakob Stehle, *Nachbar Polen*, Revised Ed. (Frankfurt a.M.: S. Fischer Verlag, 1968), 315. At the time, Moscow, which opposed the inclusion of verification measures in the Gomulka Plan proposal, was also demanding an official clarification from Warsaw. “Protokół Nr. 98 posiedzenia Biura Politycznego w dniu 12 marca 1964r.,” n.d. AAN, KC PZPR, sygn. 1731, pp. 2-4. For the final text of the Gomulka Plan, see *DzDP IV/10*: 292-94.

³¹ Michael J. Sodaro, *Moscow, Germany and the West: From Khrushchev to Gorbachev* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 52. On 11 March the Soviet ambassador to the FRG, Andrei Smirnov, presented Erhard with a letter from Khrushchev. The letter called not only for an improvement in economic relations, but also for talks at “various levels” to discuss “important international questions.” The letter did not contain an explicit invitation to Erhard to visit Moscow. See “Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten Reinkemeyer [Note from Ministerial Director Reinkemeyer],” 1 April 1964, in *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (henceforth, *AzAP*) 1964/I: 383-86; “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Erhard mit dem sowjetischen Botschafter Smirnow [Chancellor Erhard’s Discussion with the Soviet Ambassador, Smirnov],” 11 March 1964, in *ibid.*, 332-41; and “Gespräch des Bundesministers Schröder mit dem französischen Außenminister Couve de Murville [Federal Minister Schröder’s Discussion with the French Foreign Minister, Couve de Murville],” 8 June 1964, in *ibid.*, 608.

³² Daniel Kosthorst, “Sowjetische Geheimpolitik in Deutschland? Chruschtschow und die Adschubej-Mission 1964,” *Vierteljahrshefte zur Zeitgeschichte* 44 (1996): 268.

³³ Sodaro, *Moscow, Germany and the West*, 59.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

stood his ground. One should not avoid contacts, he lectured Ulbricht, because “avoidance means fear.”³⁵

* * *

Alexei Adzhubei, known for his drinking and talking, was an unlikely emissary.³⁶ When he traveled to Bonn in the summer of 1964, Polish and East German intelligence kept close track of his movements.³⁷ He turned out to be a fount of information. His private comments suggested that Khrushchev was willing to forego the longstanding security interests of both Poland and the GDR—including the prevention of West German access to nuclear weapons—for the sake of a *rapprochement* with Bonn.

The highlight of Adzhubei’s tour was his meeting with Chancellor Erhard on 28 July 1964. The two politicians spent most of their time discussing a potential visit by Khrushchev to Bonn and reiterating longstanding positions on the German question. Adzhubei strayed from the official Soviet line only once, when he conceded that Bonn and Moscow might discuss “humanitarian improvements” in the GDR.³⁸ Although his statement would not have pleased the East Germans, it was far from a sellout of the GDR.³⁹

More troublesome for the GDR and Poland were Adzhubei’s “private” conversations with West German elites: journalists, politicians, and businessmen. Polish and East German intelligence did not have to look far to find disturbing information. The West German news magazine, *Der Spiegel*, reported some of Adzhubei’s more heterodox statements. Throughout his

³⁵ Kosthorst, “Sowjetische Geheimpolitik,” 271.

³⁶ Although Adzhubei's views corresponded to those of his father-in-law, he had the habit of saying things publicly that Khrushchev would say only in private. In May 1962, for example, at a fiftieth anniversary party for *Pravda*, he had openly criticized Ulbricht for not having a “single fresh thought.” L. Cieřlik, Moscow, “Notatka z rozmowy z A. Adóubem,” 7 May 1962. AAN, KC PZPR, p. 116, t. 40. Before leaving for Bonn on 20 July 1964, Adzhubei insulted the East Germans anew. An editor from his newspaper, *Izvestiia*, apologized at the West German embassy for reprinting an article from the East German press that had accused the FRG's president, Heinrich Lübke, of complicity in war crimes. The SED, embarrassed by the publicity that the apology received in the West, lodged an official protest with Moscow's ambassador to East Berlin. Dorothy Miller, “Soviets Disavow East German Insult,” 15 July 1964, in *Radio Free Europe Research, Foreign Relations Series: Eastern Europe*, fiche 61; Albert Norden to Ulbricht, 20 July 1964, in SAPMO BA, J IV 2/202-77. On Adzhubei’s propensity for drinking and talking, see “Kampf den Mongolen,” *Der Spiegel* (5 August 1964), 17-20; Arkady N. Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1985), 135-36.

³⁷ S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev on Khrushchev*, 132.

³⁸ Bundeskanzleramt, “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Erhard mit Chefredakteur Adzhubei [Chancellor Erhard’s Conversation with Editor-In-Chief Adzhubei],” 28 July 1964, in *AzAP* 1964/2: 896-904; Kosthorst, “Sowjetische Geheimpolitik,” 281-82. Erhard wanted to meet with Khrushchev, but he insisted that the Soviet leader come to Bonn. It was an election year, and the last meeting between a Soviet premier and a West German chancellor had taken place in Moscow (i.e., Adenauer's visit in 1955). “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Erhard mit dem sowjetischen Botschafter Smirnow [Chancellor Erhard's Conversation with Soviet Ambassador Smirnov],” 27 July 1964. *AzAP* 1964/2: 879-83.

³⁹ Kosthorst, “Sowjetische Geheimpolitik,” 282.

trip, he was constantly warning the West Germans about the ‘yellow peril.’⁴⁰ China, he declared at one point, would be Moscow's “first front” from now on. In order to have a free hand for dealing with the Chinese, Moscow was seeking a *modus vivendi* with Bonn in the “spirit of Rapallo.”⁴¹ In a discussion over Bavarian beer with the *bête noire* of Soviet-bloc propaganda, Franz Josef Strauss, Adzhubei put it more bluntly. “We'd just as soon give you Germans a hundred hydrogen bombs, form a corridor through the Soviet Union, and let you mop up the Chinese.”⁴² Adzhubei's comments could have only confirmed Gomulka's worst fears about Khrushchev's nonproliferation policy.

Adzhubei also hinted about other potential concessions at Polish and East German expense. When discussions turned to Ulbricht, Adzhubei stated point-blank that he would not live much longer because he suffered from cancer.⁴³ On the issue of the Berlin Wall, Adzhubei declared that when his “papa” came to West Germany and saw how friendly everybody was, he would tear it down.⁴⁴ Of greater interest to the Poles was his comment that under appropriate conditions—for example, if Warsaw tried to leave the socialist bloc—land could be sliced off and returned to Germany, beginning with the border port of Szczecin.⁴⁵ Polish intelligence succeeded in recording some of Adzhubei's conversations, and as soon as the famous son-in-law returned home in August, Gomulka fired off a protest to Moscow. Yuri Andropov, Secretary of

⁴⁰ “Kampf den Mongolen,” *Der Spiegel* (5 August 1964): 17-20. According to *Der Spiegel*, Adzhubei had made similar comments to Erhard. The documents released to date by the Federal Republic of Germany do not confirm this. State Secretary Carstens repeated a number of statements attributed to Adzhubei regarding China in a telegram to the West German ambassador in France, but he might have gleaned this from Adzhubei's discussions with other West German dignitaries. Telegram, State Secretary Carstens to Ambassador Knoke, Paris, 7 August 1964. *AzAP* 1964/2: 224-25.

⁴¹ Kosthorst, “Sowjetische Geheimpolitik,” 279.

⁴² In another discussion Adzhubei proclaimed: “For hundreds of years, we Russians have held the Mongolian storm against Europe in check so that Europe could move forward. China will soon have the atomic bomb. We must be alert and thus have our back free. Naturally, we will have to pay something for this. But speak with them in East Berlin first. We cannot afford to lose face.” Kosthorst, “Sowjetische Geheimpolitik,” 279.

⁴³ “Kampf den Mongolen,” *Der Spiegel* (5 August 1964): 17-20. Adzhubei or his colleagues apparently made similar comments to Heinz Lathe, the West German journalist who arranged his trip, in June 1964. Kosthorst, “Sowjetische Geheimpolitik,” 274.

⁴⁴ Aleksej Adzhubej, *Gestürzte Hoffnung: Meine Erinnerungen an Chruschtschow*, transl. Susanne Roedel (Berlin: Henschel Verlag, 1990), 341-42; Sergei Khrushchev, *Khrushchev on Khrushchev*, 132-33; Kostikow and Roliński, *Widziane z Kremla*, 17; interview, Andrzej Werblan, 3 December 1993. In 1964, Kostikow was a *referent* in the Polish section of the CPSU Central Committee's Division for Contact with Fraternal Countries. Werblan was director of the Division for Science and Education in the Polish Central Committee.

⁴⁵ Kostikow and Roliński, *Widziane z Kremla*, 17. That Adzhubei tried to deny in discussions with a Polish journalist in October 1964 that he had ever discussed the Polish border while in Germany provides circumstantial confirmation of Kostikow's account. See Szymon Jakubowicz, “Notatka z rozmów z towarzyszem Adóubem [Memorandum from a Conversation with Comrade Adzhubei],” 12 October 1964, in AAN, KC PZPR, Kancelaria Sekretariatu, 237/V-532, pp. 46-9.

the CPSU Central Committee responsible for relations with the socialist states, listened to the Polish tapes in Warsaw and returned to Moscow with a transcript.⁴⁶

The fallout from Adzhubei's visit could not have come at a worse time for Khrushchev. In September 1964, his opponents in Moscow were already plotting to overthrow him.⁴⁷ Against the backdrop of Khrushchev's statements about China, nuclear nonproliferation, and a "new Rapallo," Adzhubei's comments suggested that Khrushchev was planning a major reversal in Moscow's German policy, a reversal that would have permitted West Germany "access" to nuclear weapons through NATO and undermined the security interests of both Poland and the GDR. Given the gravity of such a potential shift in Soviet policy—one that Khrushchev had failed to discuss with his "comrades" in the Soviet presidium—Adzhubei's mission to Bonn probably played a greater role in Khrushchev's fall from power than previously thought. Mikhail Suslov, who led the attack against the Soviet leader, used the visit to call into question Khrushchev's leadership methods and his foreign policy. [Immediately before Khrushchev's removal,] Suslov lectured the Central Committee "that Alexei Adzhubei had made totally unrealistic predictions and unacceptable judgments about the future evolution of the Soviet Union's policy towards the German Democratic Republic, as well as the Bonn government, and also about possible negotiations over a settlement of the Berlin question."⁴⁸

Irrespective of the role that Khrushchev's "Rapallo policy" played in his downfall, it had an enduring impact on the Soviet bloc. Poland and the GDR became more assertive in promoting their own German policies. In November 1964, Gomułka explained the circumstances surrounding Khrushchev's fall to a plenum of the Polish central committee. While the Soviets had domestic grounds for removing Khrushchev that approved, Poland, Gomułka declared, had its own reasons for supporting the decision. Citing Khrushchev's "Rapallo policy," his attitudes towards the MLF and nonproliferation, and the Sino-Soviet split, Gomułka proclaimed: "It is clear that both Poland as a country and our party are not the main creative force for the foreign policy of the socialist camp, and it is unthinkable that when we do have reservations to the policy of the Soviet Union, we would express them openly ... because the enemy would immediately detect it and exploit it.... At the same time ... [when it comes to] matters, in which our party, our government, our country, is deeply and directly interested, we demand, have the right to demand, and always will demand that these matters be discussed with us and approved..."⁴⁹

Although the East Germans were more circumspect than Gomułka, they had reached similar conclusions. They would continue to insist—armed with their friendship treaty—on being consulted by Moscow on all matters related to the German question.⁵⁰ They also became

⁴⁶ Adzhubei, *Gestürzte Hoffnung*, 341-42.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*; S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev on Khrushchev*, 132-33.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 393-97. See the excerpts from Suslov's speech in *DzDP*, IV/10, 1045-46.

⁴⁹ "Stenogram II Plenarnego Posiedzenia," p. 324 (see footnote #20 above).

⁵⁰ In October 1964, Hermann Axen, head of the International Division of the SED Central Committee, had criticized Khrushchev in talks with Soviet diplomats for his failure to consult with the SED before planning a visit to Bonn. Leiter, Abteilung Internationale Verbindungen KC SED, to Ulbricht, 27 October 1964. SAPMO BA, J IV 2/202-322. Also see Ulbricht's statements to Zhou on 10 November 1964, in "Besprechung der Partei- und

less enthusiastic about Moscow's plans to expel China from the world communist movement. Ulbricht tried—unsuccessfully—to mediate between Moscow and Beijing, lest the Soviets be tempted again to reach an understanding with Bonn at East German expense.⁵¹

Gomułka doubted that the new leaders in the Kremlin, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Premier Alexei Kosygin, would alter Moscow's policy on nonproliferation and the MLF. In a meeting with Hungarian First Secretary János Kádár in October 1964, Gomułka complained that the Soviets in general—not just Khrushchev—were underestimating the danger posed by the establishment of joint nuclear forces in NATO. A Soviet concession to the U.S. on the MLF, especially after Khrushchev's retreat during the Cuban Missile Crisis, would underscore the weakness of the socialist camp. Summing up, Gomułka warned: "If we do not liquidate the [Sino-Soviet] conflict, if we do not restore unity, then we might as well tell ourselves openly that we will be unable to oppose the West, that we will tread the path of one defeat after the other."⁵²

Gomułka's pessimism about the Sino-Soviet split proved to be justified. On the question of nonproliferation, however, a convergence of factors in the fall of 1964 brought Poland, the GDR and the Soviet Union to a unified stance. Both Bonn and Beijing unwittingly contributed to that process. In October 1964, Chancellor Erhard made the mistake of suggesting in an interview that Bonn and Washington would establish their own nuclear force if the other NATO allies proved unwilling to participate. Although he later retracted his remarks, the damage had been done. Criticism of the MLF grew within the Western alliance.⁵³ At the same time, China's

Regierungsdelegation der DDR mit der Partei- und Regierungsdelegation der VR China," n.d., in SAPMO BA, J IV 2/201-712, p. 27.

⁵¹ Khrushchev, the SED publicly insinuated, had forced the GDR to take part in polemics against China. Then, in an address to workers on November 10, Ulbricht declared: "When I hear all the things that Bonn says about the alleged natural differences between the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic ... I have the feeling that Herr Adenauer and Herr Erhard, having nothing else to do, hope that the differences will develop further. We have exactly the opposite interests." Dorothy Miller, "East German Radio Comment on Khrushchev and China, 11 November 1964, and idem., AUlbricht after Khrushchev's Ouster, @ 10 November 1964, in *Radio Free Europe Research, Background Reports, Country Series: German Democratic Republic*, fiche # 12. On Ulbricht's attempted mediation see his letter (with attachments) to Brezhnev from November 2, 1964, in SAPMO BA, J IV 2/202-273, and the transcript, "Besprechung der Partei- und Regierungsdelegation der DDR mit der Partei- und Regierungsdelegation der VR China (10.11.1964 in der Botschaft der DDR in Moskau) [Discussion by the Party and Government Delegation of the GDR with the Party and Government Delegation of the PR China (10 Nov. 1964 in the Embassy of the GDR in Moscow]," in SAPMO BA, J IV 2/201-712.

⁵² Kádár, apparently citing Soviet policy, defended Moscow's stance. The USSR, he said, had sufficient nuclear forces to counter not only the U.S. arsenal but also any joint nuclear forces in NATO. If necessary, the Warsaw Pact, he added, could establish its own fleet of nuclear-armed vessels in response to the MLF. Gomułka questioned the value of such a fleet, since the only socialist states with sufficient ports (besides the USSR) to host such a force were Poland and the GDR. "Notatka z rozmowy odbytej między Tow. Gomułką i Tow. Kádárem w czasie pobytu węgierskiej delegacji partyjno-rz dowej w Polsce [Memorandum of a Conversation between Com. Gomułka and Com. Kádár during the Visit of the Hungarian Party and State Delegation to Poland]," 21 October 1964. AAN, KC PZPR, sygn. 2598, pp. 620-22.

⁵³ Christopher Hoppe, *Zwischen Teilhabe und Mitsprache: Die Nuklearfrage und Allianzpolitik Deutschlands, 1959-1966* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993), 204-6.

successful explosion of a nuclear device on 16 October 1964—two days after Khrushchev’s fall from power—obviated the need for Soviet concessions to the West on nonproliferation. The Chinese communists could no longer claim—as far as Gomułka was concerned—that a nonproliferation treaty was directed against them.⁵⁴ On 15 November, the Soviets released a declaration condemning the MLF and the conspicuous role that Bonn was playing in its development. The MLF, they admonished the West, was incompatible with a nonproliferation agreement.⁵⁵ On 7 December, Gromyko attacked the MLF from the rostrum of the UN General Assembly. Its establishment, he warned the West Germans, would further delay any possibility for German reunification.⁵⁶

For Gomułka, however, words were not enough. When the East Germans proposed a meeting of the Warsaw Pact to approve a declaration against the MLF, Gomułka opposed the idea.⁵⁷ “An empty protest won’t change anything,” he had told Kádár, “it will only underline our weakness.” The Polish leader insisted that something concrete should come out of the meeting.⁵⁸ In apparent response to his concerns, the Soviets had the East Germans put together—under Moscow’s close supervision—a draft of their own nonproliferation treaty. In a final reversal of Khrushchev’s policy, Moscow insisted that the draft treaty explicitly link alliance nuclear forces with nuclear proliferation. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin told the East Germans: “In contrast to the ... USA, which wants to disassociate the [nonproliferation] issue ... from the MLF issue, we should emphasize the inseparable link between the two problems.”⁵⁹ The GDR submitted the draft treaty along with a draft declaration against the MLF and a proposal for regular meetings of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers, to its allies on 13 January,

⁵⁴ “Notatka z rozmów w sprawie posiedzenia Komisji Redakcyjnej, zapowiedzianego na 1 marca 1965 r. [Memorandum from the Discussions regarding the Session of the Editorial Commission, Scheduled for 1 March 1965],” n.d. AAN, KC PZPR, sygn. 2662, pp. 193-94.

⁵⁵ See the excerpt from the TASS declaration in *DzDP* IV/10: 1106-11.

⁵⁶ For the relevant excerpts from Gromyko’s speech, see *DzDP* IV/10: 1210-13.

⁵⁷ Letter, Ulbricht to Gomułka, 6 November 1964, and attachment. AAN, KC PZPR, p. 128, t. 102, pp. 30-9.

⁵⁸ “Protokół Nr. 8 posiedzenia Biura Politycznego w dn. 13 listopada 1964 r. [Transcript Nr. 8 from the Politburo Session on 13 October 1964],” n.d. AAN, KC PZPR, sygn. 1732, pp. 445-6; “Notatka z rozmowy odbytej między Tow. Gomułką i Tow. Kádárem...” (see note #52 above).

⁵⁹ The East Germans had some problems in writing the draft treaty; they were too focused on the West German threat. In December 1964, Zorin told the East German Deputy Foreign Minister, Otto Winzer, that the GDR’s declaration should be less “propagandistic”; it should neither exaggerate Bonn’s role in advancing the MLF nor claim that its establishment would thwart any future progress towards disarmament. Büro des Staatssekretärs, MfAA, “Vermerk über ein Gespräch zwischen Staatssekretär Genossen Winzer und dem Stellvertreter des Ministers für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der UdSSR, Genossen Sorin, am 11. Dezember 1964 in Warschau [Record of a Conversation between Comrade State Secretary Winzer and the Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Comrade Zorin, on 11 December 1964 in Warsaw],” 12 December 1964. SAPMO BA, J IV 2/202/254. The discussion between Winzer and Zorin took place at a meeting of Warsaw Pact deputy foreign ministers in Warsaw, making preparations for the January meeting of the Political Consultative Committee. See the document marked “Warschau, Dez. 1964,” in SAPMO BA, J IV 2/202-253.

1965.⁶⁰ Due to this, Bonn's renewed push on the MLF, which led to greater opposition within NATO, and Beijing's successful nuclear test, explain why after over a year of wrangling over nonproliferation, Moscow, Warsaw, and East Berlin came into the Warsaw Pact meeting in January 1965 with a unified stance.

The other socialist states were not as enthusiastic about the January 1965 meeting because they knew that NATO's meeting in December had basically ended in defeat for the MLF.⁶¹ Nevertheless, only one Eastern-bloc state opposed the draft nonproliferation agreement: the Socialist Republic of Romania. In early 1964, the Romanians had broken free of bloc discipline by playing the role of self-proclaimed mediator between Moscow and Beijing. In April 1964, after the attempted mediation failed, the Romanian Central Committee issued a declaration on "questions of the international communist and workers' movement." A virtual declaration of independence, it called for a restoration of unity between Moscow and Beijing on the basis of "national independence and sovereignty, equality and mutual advantage" principles that Bucharest sought Moscow to apply in its relations with its allies. Although Romania was willing to cooperate with "all socialist lands" (i.e., including China), it would also defend its sovereignty against any encroachment by international organs including the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact.⁶²

At the meeting in Warsaw, the Romanians reaffirmed their sovereignty by supporting China's stance on nonproliferation. First Secretary Gheorghe Gheorgiu-Dej and the Romanian Premier Ion Georghe Maurer refused to support a nonproliferation treaty until Beijing was consulted on the matter. When Brezhnev and Gomulka pressed the Romanians to reveal their own stance on nonproliferation, they voiced support for the idea, but only in the context of Beijing's call in December 1964 for a worldwide ban on nuclear weapons. Exploiting the Warsaw Treaty's unanimity clause, Bucharest effectively vetoed the draft nonproliferation treaty and then refused to support the GDR's declaration for the conference unless the clause linking the MLF to nonproliferation was removed.⁶³

Gomulka tried to reason with the Romanians. He could understand their opposition to the draft nonproliferation treaty, since Poland had suggested its own revisions, but he could not understand their refusal to link the MLF with nonproliferation. The MLF, he said, was a

⁶⁰ Ibid.; Memo, M. Naszkowski, Podsekretarz Stanu, MSZ, to Gomulka, 16 January 1965, with attachments, including the Polish translation of the GDR's draft nonproliferation treaty. AAN, KC PZPR, sygn. 2662, pp. 118, 135-41.

⁶¹ Dr. Hv., "Betr.: Warschauer Gipfelgespräche [RE: The Warsaw Summit Talks]," 3 February 1965. AdSD, NL Eugen Selbmann, Bd. 158; Hoppe, *Zwischen Teilhabe und Mitsprache*, 204-5, 222-24.

⁶² Dionisie Ghermani, *Die nationale Souveränitätspolitik der SR Rumänien, 1. Teil: Im Rahmen des sowjetischen Bündnissystems*, Untersuchungen zur Gegenwartskunde Südosteuropas, Vol. 17 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1981), 41-6, 82-3. In the years 1962-64, Bucharest had already vetoed various attempts by Gomulka and Khrushchev to promote economic integration within Comecon. See *ibid.*, 36-41, and Henryk Rózański, *Spojrzenie na RWPG: Wspomnienia, dokumenty, refleksje 1949-1988* (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1990), 161, 165-66, 171-3, 179-82.

⁶³ See Document #4 (below).

synonym for nuclear proliferation. It was not enough, he said, to condemn Bon's gaining access to nuclear weapons, as the Romanians had suggested. Rather, it was also in the Warsaw Pact's interest to prevent any other NATO members from gaining access. The Chinese, he added, could not claim that a nonproliferation treaty was directed against them because they had already demonstrated their own nuclear capacity.⁶⁴ Since China's proposed ban on nuclear weapons would be difficult to realize, intermediate steps needed to be taken first.⁶⁵ There was no reason, Gomulka concluded, why the Chinese would oppose linking the MLF to the issue of nonproliferation. The Romanians however, were unimpressed with the Polish view. Comrade Maurer retorted: "You, Comrade Gomulka, have expended a great deal of energy and employed good logic to demonstrate that the Chinese comrades—and not only—they will support your point of view. It seems to me that it would be simpler just to discuss the matter with them."⁶⁶

Ulbricht was less diplomatic than Gomulka and focused on issues that were closer to home. He argued—quite predictably—that the "fundamental danger" to the Warsaw Pact was the U.S.-West German "atomic bloc;" lesser considerations, such as China, should be ignored. The Warsaw Pact could not wait, he asserted, until Bonn had access to nuclear weapons to voice its support for a nonproliferation agreement. If the passage linking the MLF to a nonproliferation agreement were stricken from the draft communiqué, Ulbricht reasoned, "this would mean that we are not against the West Germans obtaining atomic weapons." Like Gomulka, he could not see why the Chinese would oppose such a formulation. At any rate, the Warsaw Pact could not consult outside countries about every decision that it made.⁶⁷ The other First Secretaries at the meeting—Antonín Novotný of Czechoslovakia, János Kádár of Hungary, and Todor Zhivkov of Bulgaria—supported the clause linking the MLF to a nonproliferation treaty, although Novotný criticized the East Germans for viewing the nonproliferation issue too narrowly (i.e., only in terms of Bonn).⁶⁸

Brezhnev, for his part, told the Romanians that the Eastern alliance could not wait to discuss the matter with China because it would lose the initiative on a nonproliferation treaty to the imperialist powers. A number of nonproliferation proposals, he noted, were already pending at the United Nations. For the Soviet Union, he said, it was a question of prestige [He accused Bucharest of merely echoing China's nonproliferation rather than taking a principled stance of its own]. Since Romania's obstruction would prevent the Warsaw Pact from preparing a common draft, Moscow could and would present its own draft nonproliferation treaty to the UN. The

⁶⁴ Ibid. Gomulka was apparently referring to the declarations from the meetings of the international communist movement in Moscow in 1957 and 1960. Brezhnev also referred to these declarations.

⁶⁵ Gomulka's statement was in keeping with Moscow's stance. On 28 December, 1963, Kosygin had responded positively to China's call for a world summit to ban the use of nuclear weapons, but he had also used the occasion to reiterate Moscow's support for measures short of a universal ban C i.e., including a nonproliferation treaty. *Europa Archiv* 20 (1965), D146.

⁶⁶ See Document #4 (below).

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

other socialist states, Brezhnev said, could decide on an individual basis whether to support it. Thus calling for a nonproliferation treaty that banned joint nuclear forces was dropped from the draft declaration, and the final communiqué from the meeting, published on 20 January, made only passing reference to the nonproliferation issue: “A multilateral nuclear force—no matter in what form—would be a proliferation of nuclear weapons and would mean in particular putting these weapons into the hands of the West German militarists.” The declaration diplomatically proclaimed the Warsaw Pact’s support for China’s proposal for a worldwide summit on banning the use of nuclear weapons, but it also called for intermediate steps, including a nonproliferation treaty.⁶⁹

Another issue discussed at the conference, but not referred to in the final communiqué, was an East German proposal, backed by the USSR, to institute regular meetings of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers. Dej did not understand the need for such a resolution. Such meetings, he argued, could be held whenever the need arose, without a new statute. Ulbricht countered that in the year-and-a-half that the Warsaw Pact had not met, its members had come forward with numerous foreign-policy initiatives (a likely reference to the Gomulka Plan). On a less orthodox note, Gomulka brought up Khrushchev’s abortive planned to visit Bonn. If there had been regular consultations, he suggested, then Khrushchev would have had to discuss his plans with the entire alliance. Brezhnev, for his part, sought regular consultations as a way of demonstrating the Warsaw Pact’s unity—a particularly important consideration for the Soviets, given their ongoing dispute with China. Once again, Romania used the Warsaw Pact’s unanimity clause to “veto” the East German proposal, and it was dropped.⁷⁰ Ironically, Poland sought regular Warsaw Pact meetings in order to defend its sovereignty (e.g., against Soviet initiatives), while Romania opposed regular meetings on the very same grounds. After the Romanians left for home on 20 January, the five remaining parties met in a rump session to confer about China. It was the first, but not the last, time that the other Warsaw Pact states would meet to discuss important matters without Romania’s participation.⁷¹

The January 1965 Warsaw Pact meeting marked a turning point in the history of the Eastern alliance. Henceforth, Romania would represent a serious obstacle to any coordination of policy within the Warsaw Pact. For Poland’s Gomulka, the issue of China and nonproliferation had been turned on its head. Although in 1963-64, it had been Khrushchev’s willingness to overlook the MLF for the sake of a nonproliferation treaty that had posed the threat of Bonn’s gaining access to nuclear weapons, (1965), Moscow had accepted Gomulka’s proposed linkage of the MLF and nonproliferation. Now it was China—a nuclear power itself—and Romania which were threatening to allow Bonn access to nuclear weapons by opposing a nonproliferation treaty. At the final session in Warsaw, Gomulka accused the Romanians of deliberately linking

⁶⁹ See the “Kommuniqué über die Tagung des Politischen Beratenden Ausschusses der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages [Communiqué from the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact Member States],” 20 January 1965, as reprinted in *DzDP IV/11*: 82, 84.

⁷⁰ See Document #4 (below).

⁷¹ “Notatka z rozmów w sprawie posiedzenia Komisji Redakcyjnej, zapowidzianego na 1 marca 1965r. [Note from the Discussions regarding the Session of the Drafting Committee, Scheduled for 1 March 1965].” AAN, KC PZPR, sygn. 2662, pp. 191-210.

nuclear nonproliferation with proposals that they knew would be unacceptable—viz., universal nuclear disarmament. “They (and the Chinese comrades as well),” he asserted, “are in favor of the largest number of capitalist states possessing nuclear weapons. This [they believe] will undermine the unity of the capitalist camp and weaken the hegemony of the United States.”⁷² Although Gomulka would not give up hope that Moscow and Beijing might someday resolve their differences, he would never again be as critical of Soviet policy towards China as he had been in the final year of Khrushchev’s rule.⁷³

The disputes within the Warsaw Pact over nuclear nonproliferation in the years 1963-65 demonstrate that the Sino-Soviet rift contributed to divisions within the Warsaw Pact not only through the ideological differences that it spurred, but also through its impact upon Soviet security policy. Khrushchev’s ham-fisted attempts to reach a *modus vivendi* with West Germany, in order to strengthen the Soviet position for a potential confrontation with China brought Moscow into conflict with two of its most loyal allies, Poland and the GDR. Khrushchev’s confrontational course with China also created an opening for Romania to assert its own national sovereignty.

Although Khrushchev’s successors mended Moscow’s differences with Poland and the GDR, the geopolitical temptation to reach some sort of understanding with Bonn remained. Relations only grew worse with China, and by 1969, armed clashes had broken out along the Sino-Soviet border. Poland and the GDR would continue to keep a close eye on Moscow lest it betray their vital interests for the sake of a *modus vivendi* with Germany.

⁷² Ibid. Gomulka and the other Soviet-bloc leaders overlooked another potential reason for Romania’s opposition to a nonproliferation treaty: that it was seeking to develop its own nuclear capability. After Maurer’s visit to Paris in October 1964, French officials informed the West German foreign office that the Romanians seemed eager to purchase nuclear-power facilities in the West. See Kirchner, Ostausschuß, “Besprechung mit den Präsidenten Flechet und Georges-Pichot von Patronat Français in Paris am 14.10.1964 [Conversation with President Flechet and Georges-Pichot von Patronat Français in Paris on 14 October 1964],” 15 October 1964. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PA/AA), Referat IIIA6, Bd. 164.

⁷³ For example, in September 1965, Brezhnev told Ulbricht that Gomulka was “angry” about China and “more or less” supported Moscow’s stance on international questions. “Niederschrift der zweiten Beratung zwischen den Partei- und Regierungsdelegationen der DDR und der UdSSR am 24.9.1965 von 10.00 Uhr bis 13.15 Uhr [Transcript of the Second Consultation Between the Party and State Delegations of the GDR and the USSR on 24 September 1965 from 10:00 a.m. to 1:15 p.m.],@ 24 September 1965. SAPMO BA, J IV 2/201-726.

DOCUMENTS

Document 1

Memorandum (Translation from the Russian by Douglas Selvage; Gomułka's marginalia, from the Polish. AAN, KC PZPR, sygn. 2639, pp. 335-37.)

Striving to the utmost to promote the consolidation of peace, to prevent the threat of thermonuclear war and to relax international tensions, the Soviet Government, as we already informed our friends, has been exchanging views with the U.S. government over the past year regarding the conclusion of an agreement on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. In the course of this exchange of views, consent was obtained from the USA that such an agreement would provide that nuclear weapons would not be transferred—directly or indirectly, or through military alliances—to the national control of states that do not yet possess such weapons and that these countries would not be assisted in the production of such weapons.

The Americans also consented that an agreement on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons will contain an obligation on the part of non-nuclear powers not to produce nuclear weapons; to refrain from acquiring—directly or indirectly, or through military alliances—national control over any nuclear weapons; and not to receive or seek to receive assistance from other states in the production of any nuclear weapon.

Still, the USA objected to our position regarding the inclusion in an agreement on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons a clause that would impede the creation of multilateral or any other such unified nuclear forces in NATO with the participation of West Germany.

In considering the next steps in the struggle for solving the problem of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Government is proceeding from the idea that it would be particularly important for the socialist states with regard to this question at the present stage to secure a statement that the West German revanchists will not be able to get their hands on nuclear weapons. It should thus move things towards preventing the West German government, or the *Bundeswehr*,⁷⁴ or even its individual subdivisions, from gaining the possibility of having nuclear weapons under its control within NATO or outside NATO. [Gomułka note in margin: “For now, no one is putting {nuclear weapons} into their own hands.”]

⁷⁴ The West German army.

Based on these considerations, the Soviet Government has reached the conclusion that it is expedient to announce to the Americans our readiness to conclude an agreement on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons even in the case that the agreement will not contain a statement prohibiting outright the creation of multilateral nuclear forces in NATO, but either in the same declaration or in some other form, the Americans [will have to] take upon themselves the obligation not to permit a situation in which West Germany might obtain the possibility of being in charge of nuclear weapons.

We believe that an agreement on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons would still be advantageous to the socialist states even in this case because the main goal would be achieved: placing a serious obstacle in the path of the West German revanchists' accomplishing their dangerous plans to take possession of nuclear weapons. It goes without saying that the socialist states, as before, will remain opponents to the plans for establishing multilateral or in general any other sort of unified NATO nuclear forces and will continue its struggle against the establishment of these forces. As long as the West German revanchists' hands would be bound with regard to nuclear weapons by an agreement on nonproliferation, our struggles against the creation of NATO nuclear forces will be waged from a more advantageous position.

It can be expected that China and likely France will not agree to become parties to an agreement on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, but this will not detract from the advantages for the socialist community that will ensue from the conclusion of such an agreement.

We also have in mind that an agreement on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons—similar to the treaty regarding the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests—should contain an article expressing the right of any state—in keeping with the realization of its national sovereignty—to leave the agreement if by maintaining the concluded agreement, circumstances would place the higher interests of the given state under threat. That statement will guarantee us the possibility to take counter-measures—in case of need—if the Americans, in violation of the understanding, nevertheless move towards actually transferring nuclear weapons to the West German revanchists in accordance with the NATO line. [Gomułka in margin: “Prohibit the creation of multilateral nuclear forces now, and you will not [need to] reserve yourself the right to tear up the treaty.”]

The Soviet Government is proceeding from [the idea] that this tactical line on the question of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is in keeping with the interests of preserving peace [and] the security interests of all the socialist states and that it derives from the commonly agreed-upon line of the states of the socialist commonwealth in the international arena. [Gomułka: “?”]

The Soviet Government would like to know the opinion of our Polish friends regarding the aforementioned considerations. The problem of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons will clearly be broached in the current, ongoing discussions of USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko with Dean Rusk on measures leading to a further relaxation of international tensions and the consolidation of peace.

Marked “Strictly confidential.” Notation at top: “Original handed over by Com[rade] Averkii Aristov on 2.X. at 10 a.m.”

Document 2

Letter, Gomulka to Khrushchev, 8 October 1963.

Dear Comrade Khrushchev!

This letter is closely related to the phone conversation we had on 2 October. At that time, I expressed a desire to meet with you personally to discuss directly the matters that were the theme of our phone conversation. In the conversation, I also asked you to consider the usefulness of convening a conference of the First Secretaries of the Central Committees of the [East European] Parties, with the possible participation of representatives of the governments of the Warsaw Pact states, in order to jointly discuss and fix the conditions under which the socialist countries might conclude a treaty with the countries of the capitalist world on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. You promised to give me an answer to my proposals in several days, after your return to Moscow.

Regardless of whether the conference proposed by the leadership of our party will be convened or not, I believe that I should meet with you at a time and place that is most convenient for you. I want to discuss with you the matters that I am raising in this letter. I am raising them in this manner, before meeting with you, so that you might consider them in advance.

In the first part of the letter, I present you with the motives and reasons why the leadership of our party does not consider it possible to express our agreement with the proposal presented to us by the Soviet government regarding the conclusion of a treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. In the second part of the letter, I will share with you my own, deeply troubling thoughts about the conflict that has flared up with the People's Republic of China.

The memorandum explaining the Soviet government's views on the conditions under which the Soviet Union would be prepared to conclude a treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons was handed to me on the second of this month by Com[rade Averkii] Aristov.⁷⁵ After I acquainted myself with its contents, I explained to Com. Aristov that I disagreed with the proposals contained in it and that I was immediately convening a session of the Politburo of the CC of our party. The session took place the same day, and the Politburo reached the unanimous conclusion that Poland could not support the Soviet government's proposals regarding the conclusion of a treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons for the following reasons:

⁷⁵ Aristov was the Soviet ambassador to Poland.

1) The proposal to not mention in the treaty a prohibition against the creation of joint nuclear forces by the NATO states would mean in effect that the socialist states signing the agreement were expressing their silent consent to the granting of access to nuclear weapons to the Federal Republic of Germany and the other NATO states that do not yet have such weapons.

The creation of a unified, nuclear missile force by the NATO state—even under the condition that only the United States, based on its veto power, could decide upon [their] use ... would [still] mean in effect the proliferation of nuclear weapons to states that do not yet possess them. This would be the first step for these states towards obtaining nuclear weapons under their national control. Regardless of whether the USA has ... a veto, multilateral nuclear forces under the NATO states would significantly increase the danger of war.

2) The creation of multilateral nuclear forces would greatly increase the role of the FRG in NATO, enable it to apply more forceful pressure ... upon the policy of the USA and the entire NATO bloc towards the adoption of uncompromising and more aggressive positions with regard to the socialist states. The Federal Republic of Germany has declared its readiness to bear an enormous part of the costs associated with the creation of multilateral atomic forces (according to the bourgeois press, 40% — FRG; 40% — USA; and 20% — the other participants). In this way, the FRG seeks to assure itself the maximum possible influence upon the policy and stance of the USA, also with regard to a veto over the use of these forces.

One of the main goals that the FRG seeks to achieve with the help of the multilateral nuclear forces and its assumption of second place after the United States in these forces is to demonstrate to the German people that Bonn's policy on the German question has, at the very least, not bankrupted itself, and still has the support of the NATO allies—most importantly, the United States. There can be no doubt that the creation of multilateral nuclear forces would strengthen Bonn's pressure against the German Democratic Republic and its population, along with its atomic blackmail against the Warsaw Pact states.

3) The creation of multilateral nuclear forces or any other form of proliferation of nuclear weapons to states that do not yet have them would contradict the spirit of the Moscow Treaty [i.e., the 1963 limited test ban treaty]... The treaty, signed by the leaders of over one hundred states, proclaims as its main goal the quickest possible achievement of an understanding on universal and complete disarmament. In our addresses and publications we have been presenting the treaty as a first step in this direction. In contrast, multilateral nuclear forces mean an increase and proliferation of weapons among the NATO states. Their signature has not yet dried on the Moscow Agreement,⁷⁶ and already they are violating the spirit of the treaty. We cannot agree with this, let alone make it easier for them.

⁷⁶ The limited test ban treaty.

4) Omitting the question of NATO multilateral nuclear forces in the proposed [nonproliferation] treaty ... would be a unilateral concession on the part of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist camp to the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the other imperialist countries—a fundamental concession that would inevitably bring serious harm to the entire socialist camp.

For a number of years we have struggled against the FRG's gaining access to nuclear weapons in any form. This issue continues to be a fundamental link in our general political line towards the imperialist states. For a number of years the Bonn government has persistently strived for and publicly demanded that the *Bundeswehr* be armed with nuclear weapons. Given the situation, what would it say to the peoples of the socialist states if their governments were to sign a [nonproliferation] treaty ... that did not forbid the creation of multilateral nuclear forces in NATO, along with other forms of proliferation ...? How could we explain our signatures upon such a treaty in a situation in which the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the other NATO states are making a concrete decision on how to organize multilateral nuclear forces? How can we fight against [such forces] if we voice our silent consent to their establishment in the treaty? It is not difficult to foresee what harm such a treaty would cause for our countries and our parties, especially in the case of Poland, and to an even greater degree for the German Democratic Republic.

The idea of renouncing the treaty in the event that NATO should create multilateral nuclear forces is the worst possible way out. A treaty should not be concluded if one can see in advance that it might be quickly renounced.

Also unacceptable is the proposal of the United States—known to me from previous information—that both the NATO and the Warsaw Pact states have the right to organize multilateral nuclear forces. We cannot conclude a treaty that would stimulate and legalize the arms race; moreover, in contrast to the NATO states, multilateral nuclear forces would not bring any advantages to the Warsaw Pact countries.

5) Only the USA and the FRG are interested in [the creation of] multilateral nuclear forces in NATO. The USA sees in them a method to stave off the ... decay and collapse of NATO and to maintain and preserve its hegemony in Western Europe. The FRG, for its part, sees in multilateral nuclear forces an important instrument serving the goals of its revanchist policy—first of all, liquidation of the GDR.

Bonn understands that the unification of Germany lies in the interest of neither France nor Great Britain, and thus it cannot count on their real support in its efforts to liquidate the GDR. It can receive such support only from the USA, because the unification of Germany does not directly threaten the interests of the USA and is even in keeping with its anti-communist line.

NATO's multilateral nuclear forces are, in effect, a military-political transaction between the USA and the FRG based on the FRG's committing itself to the maintenance of US hegemony in Western Europe in return for the USA's committing itself to supporting the FRG's efforts to annex the GDR. The maintenance of cohesion in the NATO bloc is in keeping with the realization of the goals of both partners. It is thus necessary to include other states—especially Great Britain and Italy—in the multilateral nuclear forces. That's where the pressure from the USA and FRG on Great Britain to join the [nuclear] forces comes from.

Multilateral nuclear forces do not reflect the interests of either France or Great Britain. Regardless of its negative stance with regard to the unification of Germany, France is firmly

opposed to U.S. hegemony in Europe because it has pretensions to that role itself... Great Britain opposes multilateral nuclear forces in NATO because their creation would undermine its special position with regard to the USA [*“special relationship”*]; would strengthen the FRG’s position in NATO, without bringing [Great Britain] any advantages as a power that already possesses nuclear weapons; [and] would burden it with needless expenditures... [Great Britain also] seriously believes that their creation could increase international tensions, including the Soviet Union’s granting the People’s Republic of China access to nuclear weapons. We should not dismiss the possibility, though, that Great Britain, under pressure from the USA, and also as a price for certain commitments by the FRG with regard to its entry into the Common Market, will participate in the joint nuclear forces.

The Bonn government and its Chancellor [Konrad] Adenauer have deftly used the contradictions between the USA and France—their struggle for hegemony in Western Europe—for its policy and its drive to attain nuclear weapons. It concluded an alliance with France to show the United States that the FRG could find an alternative for its policy in case the USA did not want or hesitated to give [Bonn] its support. Life has shown that the alliance between Bonn and Paris has born fruit for the West German militarists. The USA, struggling with France to maintain and ensure its hegemony in Europe, decided to bind itself strongly and permanently with the multilateral nuclear forces. France, seeking to counter this, proposed the idea of creating European nuclear forces based on its nuclear potential and is offering the FRG its own nuclear umbrella. The FRG cannot break away from its main ally, the USA, today, but at the same time it does not want to quarrel with France. While [the FRG is] pressing for the creation of a multilateral nuclear force in NATO, it has also expressed through Adenauer’s mouth that it is ready to participate in a European nuclear force as well, whose creation was announced by General de Gaulle’s France.

We probably will not be able to prevent the USA and the FRG from creating a multilateral nuclear force in NATO. We should nevertheless direct our policy and diplomacy towards deepening the contradictions and inflaming the struggle between the USA and France. Everything that contributes to the weakening and decay of NATO is in the interest of the socialist states. Our main enemy is and will remain ... American imperialism, not French imperialism. West German imperialism, allied with U.S. imperialism, represents a greater threat for peace in Europe than the alliance between Bonn and Paris. Unfortunately, one cannot say that the policy of the socialist states is sufficiently directed towards playing upon the contradictions within the NATO bloc, especially not the contradictions between France and the USA.

All the factors touched upon above made the leadership of our party decide to respond negatively to the proposal to conclude a [nonproliferation] treaty ... under the conditions discussed in the Soviet government’s memorandum.

The Politburo of the CC [Central Committee] of our party believes that if the NATO countries establish a multilateral nuclear force, the creation of a Sino-Soviet nuclear force should be considered.

In the next part of the letter I would like to share with you, dear Comrade Khrushchev, my own thoughts, which I did not present at the session of the Politburo of the CC of our party, prompted by the desire to coordinate my views with your position.

In my opinion, we should not conclude a treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons even if the USA and other states in the NATO bloc renounce the construction of multilateral nuclear forces in the text of the treaty.

As we know, three imperialist states have nuclear weapons at their disposal today: the United States, Great Britain, and France. In the socialist camp, only the Soviet Union possesses nuclear weapons. For understandable reasons, every imperialist state that possesses nuclear weapons does not want to permit other states in the capitalist world from also becoming an owner of these weapons. This would lead to a further growth in contradictions in the capitalist world and weaken the leading role of the imperialist Great Powers, especially the USA, which is striving to dominate the entire capitalist world. For these reasons, the imperialist “nuclear” powers are interested in the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Such a treaty, even if it provided for a ban on NATO’s multilateral nuclear forces, would still be in keeping with the interests of the imperialist “nuclear” powers. After all, there are three of them, and in the socialist camp, there is only one—the Soviet Union. It is highly unlikely that the United States will resign in the near future from the concept of creating a NATO multilateral nuclear force. Still, we cannot exclude the possibility. It could turn out, however, given the stance ... of the People’s Republic of China, that it would pay them to resign from NATO multilateral nuclear forces and conclude a [nonproliferation] treaty with the Soviet Union as the price for further inflaming Sino-Soviet relations to the point of their rupture, for ... dividing the socialist camp and the international communist movement. That would of course bring great advantages for imperialism and great losses for socialism.

I am of the opinion that neither a nonproliferation treaty nor any other understandings of serious international importance can be concluded without consulting the Communist Party of China or in spite of the People’s Republic of China. If we continue further down such a path, it will inevitably lead to the division of the socialist camp and to fierce factional struggles within the international communist movement and within the communist and workers’ parties in individual countries.

We already see today what great damage arose in this regard from the fact that the Moscow Treaty ... was concluded without consulting the Communist Party of China. Undoubtedly, such a consultation would not have led the People’s Republic of China to alter its stance on achieving the production of its own atomic bomb. However, it might have been that as a result of such a consultation, the Moscow Treaty would have applied only to the states participating in the negotiations. Because the treaty was concluded for all states, this led to an angry reaction on the part of the Communist Party of China, which interpreted the treaty as an effort to isolate the People’s Republic of China both among the socialist states and in the international arena.

In the running debate with the Communist Party of China, we should not permit the debate to lead to a split of the socialist camp into two factions. There cannot be two socialist camps. It must remain one despite all the internal differences. A split of the socialist camp would alter in a fundamental way the world balance of forces between socialism and imperialism to the benefit of the latter. Despite its smaller productive potential, the socialist camp has predominated and may still have the advantage over imperialism thanks only to its unity. All the basic principles of our policy, our tactics and strategy in the struggle with imperialism over peace and peaceful coexistence of states, for disarmament, for the victory of socialism on a world scale, rest

upon the unity of the socialist camp. We must be fully aware of this fact. We must be aware of the consequences that would arise from a split in the socialist camp.

It does not change anything, nor does it excuse us—that is, the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union], the PZPR [Polish United Workers' Party] and other parties—when we say that the Communist Party of China is splitting the unity of the socialist camp. In the name of maintaining the unity of the socialist camp, we must reach an understanding with the Communist Party of China. The socialist camp numbers over one billion people. Let's not forget that for even a moment, and let's appreciate the importance of the fact that the Chinese are almost two-thirds of this population. Without the People's Republic of China, nothing can be achieved in terms of the socialist camp's international policy. We should seek a compromise and move towards the conclusion of a compromise in the debate with the Communist Party of China and the People's Republic of China.

At the root of the divisions with the Communist Party of China lies “in my opinion” the fact that the People's Republic of China was denied the possibility of participating in the making of decisions with regard to important international matters. It will never consent to this. It is too great of a state, with great future possibilities, to permit itself to be cut off from the settlement of various world problems. The United States, seeking to isolate it from international life and in keeping with its goals of struggle with the entire socialist camp, has cut it off from this up to now; it has not established diplomatic relations with it; it has closed off its entry to the United Nations Organization, has established Taiwan as its own Chinese “state,” etc.

In this situation, the People's Republic of China can insure its influence over decision making with regard to various international questions only through the socialist camp, or speaking more precisely, through the Soviet Union, from whom it demands that it consult with [China] on its political initiatives in the international arena and in its relations with the imperialist states. When it turned out that the Soviet Union did not always consider it proper to take into account the reservations of the People's Republic of China in its policy, there began to grow in the Communist Party of China a rebellion against the CPSU, which after the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty ... spilled out in the forms known to us now. Yes, as I see the matter, the Communist Party of China has already decided upon even a split in the socialist camp and the international communist movement, unless the Soviet Union agrees to coordinate its policy in the international arena with the People's Republic of China.

Our citing the conformity of the Soviet Union's policy with the Declaration from 1957 and the Declaration from 1960 of the communist and workers' parties won't do any good. Those documents only sketch a general line of how to proceed. The CCP [Chinese Communist Party], interpreting them in its own fashion, has not renounced these documents either. It seems to me that we can maintain and apply our interpretation of the general line in practice without raising opposition from the Chinese Communist Party if the Soviet Union will consult and approve its concrete international steps and political initiatives with the People's Republic of China. The CCP has placed particular emphasis on this—without stating this demand by name—at the conference in 1960, and this also found expression in the conference's “Declaration.”

We cannot strive towards a relaxation of the international situation at the cost of our weakness, at the cost of dividing the socialist camp, and a split in the international worker's movement. Such a relaxation would be illusory, in reality it would quickly evolve into an even greater tension, because imperialism, seeing our weakness resulting from the division, would not hesitate to turn its aggressive teeth against the socialist states. Without the unity of the socialist

camp, there is not and cannot be a true relaxation [of tensions], there is not and cannot be a possibility of curbing imperialism [and] of safeguarding humanity against the catastrophe of nuclear war.

In various regions of the world there are hot spots where at any moment wars could quickly flare up. The most threatening spot is Cuba. The United States has not given up and will not give up its efforts to liquidate revolutionary Cuba. We should clearly realize this. [U.S. President John F.] Kennedy himself does not conceal this. Even if the USA does not commit armed aggression against Cuba directly, it has not desisted from organizing such aggression with the aid of its puppets in the countries of Latin America. It does not desist from this even in a state of complete unity within the socialist camp. Nothing could encourage the USA more and speed up its efforts to organize armed aggression against Cuba than a state of division in the socialist camp.

You, Comrade Khrushchev, as well as I, along with every other sensible person, must reject the idea that the socialist camp will use Soviet nuclear missiles in defense of Cuba. That would mean unleashing a devastating nuclear war. In case of an attack against Cuba, the socialist camp is not in a position to lend it military assistance. At the same time, we also well understand that if imperialism crushes revolutionary Cuba through military aggression and the socialist camp reacts only with protest rallies, its authority in the world—especially the authority of the Soviet Union—would be seriously undermined. Although we should not use nuclear missiles in defense of Cuba, we should also not limit ourselves in the event of an invasion to mere protests. Today, we should have already worked out a plan for counter-blows in other regions of the world. Whenever and whoever might carry it out, two states should agree upon it on behalf of the entire socialist camp: the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

The USA should be aware that it will have to pay something for Cuba. Only this will prevent it from renewing its aggression against Cuba, and not any fear that the Soviet Union will use its missiles in [Cuba's] defense. The USA might still decide on good grounds that even on the basis of today's relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China—not to speak of the situation that will arise in the event of a further inflammation of those relations—it will not have to give up anything for the liquidation of revolutionary Cuba.

I am not worried that the Chinese Communist Party will want to go too far in agreeing to a plan for counter-blows in the event of an invasion of Cuba. We should count instead on great caution on its part. Throwing out slogans that call for the granting of assistance to countries struggling with imperialism—something that China has not been lavish with—is a different matter than entering into concrete obligations and granting assistance in practice.

An understanding with the Chinese Communist Party on the basis of a sensible compromise is thus necessary from every point of view. I assume that if the Soviet Union will consult with and gain the approval of the People's Republic of China for its more important political initiatives in the international arena, the Chinese Communist Party will desist from its propaganda and attacks against the CPSU and that a closer point of view can be achieved with regard to a number of controversial questions. It will not be possible to achieve a full unity of views. Ideological differences will remain for a long time, but they should be kept within limits that will not tear apart the unity of the socialist camp.

I am not outlining a platform here for an understanding with the Communist Party of China. It can be worked out later. The most important thing is to move towards a halt in public and direct ideological polemics even if everyone maintains for a certain time their own views on

controversial issues. We must voice our views in a positive form, without polemics with other parties, and even more without attacking other parties, whether by direct or indirect means. The likelihood exists that over time the differences will diminish or become outdated, and this will permit a return to ideological unity.

I do not believe that any attempt or form of mediation on the part of a party that does not share the CCP's ideological views will be positive for improving relations between the CPSU and CCP. It would be best if the CPSU itself would present a concrete initiative on this matter.

Dear Comrade Khrushchev,

In this letter, I have presented you with my thoughts, which have grown out of my deep concern regarding our common goal of socialism. Please weigh them seriously, especially since they come from your sincere friend. Between us and between the parties of our two countries there are no ideological differences. But none of us can say of ourselves that we are free of errors. Please take this fact also into account as you weigh my thoughts presented to you in this letter.

I send you my sincerest greetings and wish you good health and strength in your difficult work, which bears responsibilities that are beyond words.

With communist greetings

W. Gomułka

Marked "Final Version," in AAN, KC PZPR, sygn. 2637, pp. 267-82. [Translation from the Polish.]⁷⁷

⁷⁷ Translation note: only minor excisions (as noted by ellipses) were made to improve the readability of the document.

Document 3

Excerpts from discussion between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasilii Kuznetsov and the SED Politburo, 14 October 1963.

... [Comrade Kuznetsov] then turned to the question of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The USA and the Soviet Union have already exchanged views on this matter for some time. In response to the pressure of the socialist countries, world public opinion, and especially a relevant resolution from the UN General Assembly, negotiations have moved forward. The USA is proceeding from its own motives on this topic. A certain role is played by the fear of the USA that West Germany will obtain nuclear weapons, remove them from the USA's control, and that they might then be misused even against the plans of the USA. This fear has grown since [the establishment of] closer relations between West Germany and France. The Paris Treaties did indeed forbid the production of nuclear weapons in West Germany, but West Germany can receive nuclear weapons from outside. Moreover, on the basis of relevant data, West Germany could quickly produce nuclear weapons if the Paris Treaties were annulled....

[In the years] 1959-60, the USA developed the idea of creating united nuclear weapons forces in NATO. At this time, General de Gaulle's ideas regarding independent French nuclear weapons were already known. West Germany was also demanding access to nuclear weapons. Under these conditions, the USA launched its new idea in order to maintain the unity of NATO and its monopoly in the military alliance. It wanted to urge France to give up on nuclear weapons, or, at the very least, to freeze the development of nuclear weapons. It wanted to demonstrate a certain willingness to compromise with regard to West Germany, and to prevent it from obtaining nuclear weapons itself. These thoughts were presented over and over again to the Soviet comrades by American Foreign Minister [Dean] Rusk. It is clear that the creation of united nuclear forces in NATO will bring West Germany closer to control over such weapons. That is why the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic and other socialist states have come out against the creation of such nuclear forces in NATO. It has to do here with exploiting realities, and the negotiations that the Soviet comrades are conducting with the USA are also directed towards hindering the proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially to West Germany.

In the negotiations conducted with the USA at the end of 1962 and the beginning of 1963, the USA had initially declared that it was in favor of an agreement against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but it did not want to give up its plans for proliferating nuclear weapons within the NATO alliance. On 8 August 1962, the USA had declared in an oral statement by Rusk to Gromyko that a future agreement should proceed from two main theses:

1. The states possessing nuclear weapons will undertake the obligation not to transfer them to third countries.
2. The countries that do not yet possess nuclear weapons will take on the obligation to not produce or seek to obtain any weapons of this sort.

The theses did not foresee, then, any limitation against the transfer of nuclear weapons under the aegis of a military alliance. They thus even wanted to obtain in this way silent consent for the creation of united nuclear weapons forces within NATO.

On 23 August 1962, the Soviet Union responded after a consultation with the socialist countries. The main theses were:

1. No transfer of nuclear weapons to other states, and also no information about their production.
2. Countries that do not yet dispose of nuclear weapons will not obtain them and will also not receive any technical data.
3. The transfer of nuclear weapons through military alliances to states that do not yet dispose of nuclear weapons is also forbidden.

In response to further exertions, the USA moved a step forwards. On 12 April 1963, they distributed a draft declaration and an aide memoire, which was given to the Warsaw Pact member-states for their information. With regard to points 1 and 2 from August 1962, the question of military alliances was added. States possessing nuclear weapons would undertake the obligation not to transfer any sort of nuclear weapons—directly or indirectly through military alliances—into the national control of states that do not dispose of such weapons, and not to give these states any assistance in the production of such nuclear weapons; states that do not possess any nuclear weapons should undertake the obligation not to produce nuclear weapons or to seek national control over any nuclear weapons—directly or indirectly through military alliances—and also not to receive or seek any assistance from other states in the production of such weapons.

This new proposal of the USA does not hinder West Germany's access to nuclear weapons. The debate in NATO itself over the creation of united nuclear weapons forces continues. Many proposals have been made that are still far away from the reality. The main goal of the Soviet Union is, to begin with, to bind West Germany's hands, to prevent it from obtaining nuclear weapons. Other capitalist countries that dispose of the economic potential to produce nuclear weapons should also have their hands bound. Smaller states must also be prevented from increasing the danger of nuclear wars.

The question for now is how should the negotiations move forward. Should one strive for an all-embracing treaty? This is probably impossible for now, because the USA has committed itself as far as possible with its proposal for united nuclear weapons forces. Should one exclude these questions from an agreement, while maintaining our position? Even if the second American variant were accepted, this would not mean that one would have to give up the struggle against the creation of united nuclear weapons forces in NATO. The possibilities for such a struggle would be even better. In this regard, Com. Kuznetsov referred to the fact that such speeches as those held by Comrade Walter Ulbricht and Comrade Gomułka during the last visit of a party and government delegation of the GDR to the PRL [People's Republic of Poland], in which they came forward in opposition to the aggressive plans of West Germany and NATO, were very good. This is particularly necessary now, given the fact that Adenauer is popularizing a program of revanchism in a more brutal fashion.

When one weighs all the pluses and minuses of the USA's second proposal, the positive outweighs the negative. An agreement on this basis is at any rate better than the current situation, in which no such treaty exists. The Soviet comrades have closely evaluated the GDR's proposals, and they meet with their complete understanding. They will now try to achieve a treaty that goes further than the USA's second proposal. Whether the agreement will take the form of a protocol, a treaty, a declaration, or something else is unimportant for the time being. The Soviet comrades plan to give a proposal to the USA in which the preamble will refer to the goal—i.e., general and complete disarmament—and will designate:

1. No transfer of nuclear weapons directly or indirectly through military alliances into the national control, including into the possession (disposal) of states that do not yet have of nuclear weapons at their disposal, and also not into the control of a military unit or individual member of the military, who belongs to the unified armed forces of the military alliance.

2. No transfer of information and no help in the production of nuclear weapons for states that do not yet possess them.

3. The states that do not possess nuclear weapons will undertake the obligation not to produce nuclear weapons; to not seek national control or possession (disposal) of nuclear weapons—either directly or indirectly through military alliances, or through the control of one of its unite or a member of its armed forces within NATO. They will undertake an obligation not to obtain or seek help, information, etc. regarding such weapons.

4. The agreement will not expire, but it will be possible to leave it.

The Soviet proposal was worked out on the basis of old Soviet proposals while taking into account the opinions of other socialist countries, especially the German Democratic Republic.... But the Soviet proposal goes farther:

1. It does not have to do with national control, but with the possession (disposal) [of nuclear weapons], which the Soviet proposal also forbids.

2. The Soviet proposal also forbids the transfer [of nuclear weapons] to individual military units or military personnel who are members of a unified military alliance.

3. The Soviet proposal more clearly defines “national control.” The U.S. proposal says nothing about a ban on transferring scientific-technical data, while the Soviet proposal forbids their transfer.

4. The American proposal does not provide for leaving [the agreement], while the Soviet proposals maintain the right to leave. In this way, the possibility is preserved in case the agreement is violated by the USA to proceed in accordance with one’s own conscience. In certain cases, this right could be a means for exerting pressure.

Comrade Kuznetsov then discussed what acceptance of the Soviet proposal would get us. West Germany would not receive nuclear weapons or any data regarding their production. In reply to Comrade Walter Ulbricht’s question about whether this would only apply to the USA, Comrade Kuznetsov responded, [it would apply] also to France if West Germany agrees to this treaty, because it would have to undertake the obligation not to produce or obtain nuclear weapons, along with any relevant information. Comrade Kuznetsov is of the opinion that especially the obligation that West Germany assumed with regard to the Paris Treaties—i.e., not to produce nuclear weapons—would receive greater weight as a result of the signing of an agreement on the basis of the Soviet proposals. It is unknown whether France will agree, but West Germany would also be bound if France did not sign. Comrade Kuznetsov gave a presentation regarding what West Germany would be forbidden to do under the Paris Treaties, the American proposals and the Soviet proposals...

With regard to the creation of nuclear weapons forces within NATO, Comrade Kuznetsov said: Acceptance of the Soviet proposals would make this development more difficult, if not impossible. The relaxation of international tensions bound up with it would make it difficult for the Western powers to carry out the atomic armament of NATO. He believes, for example, that France did not sign the Moscow Treaty on a limited ban of nuclear weapons tests, but it is now much more difficult for it to carry out nuclear weapons tests. If West Germany would sign on to the points proposed by the Soviet Union, it would make it more difficult for it

to gain access to nuclear weapons. The attention of the nations of the world in this regard would increase. The argumentation of the USA—that if one does not make concessions to West Germany in this or some other form, it cannot be kept away from nuclear weapons—will be invalidated by the proposed agreement. The struggle against the creation of unified nuclear weapons units under the aegis of NATO will be easier for the socialist states to carry out and will be expanded. The agreement would also create a barrier to the transfer of data from France to West Germany. One must take into account here that West Germany declared a very great interest in de Gaulle's proposal to set up united nuclear weapons units for Western Europe.... If the [nonproliferation] agreement does not exist and unified nuclear weapons units already exist in NATO, it will be difficult to reach such an agreement, and West Germany's influence over the United States will be greater. West German circles have come out against such an agreement and are prepared for every form of cooperation in nuclear weapons forces. Adenauer is crazy because he fears that the USA is prepared to reach an understanding. Comrade Kuznetsov believes that an agreement of the desired type will have even greater resonance than the Moscow Treaty [i.e., limited test ban treaty].

Comrade Kuznetsov expressed his satisfaction that the CC [Central Committee] of the SED [East German Socialist Unity Party] found time to assess these problems, and he declared that one can expect a positive result in the form of the great work of all the socialist countries. Why shouldn't we strengthen what has already been achieved by undertaking new steps? Everything cannot be achieved, but much can. Why should we not press ... forward in the interest of the socialist world-system and the preservation of peace? Currently, no obstacle exists to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and practically no barriers to the attainment of nuclear weapons by countries that do not yet possess them. Comrade Khrushchev gave him the mandate to declare that the CC of the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] has proceeded from our common interests and asks for understanding with regard to the Soviet proposals. All the other thoughts expressed by the comrades of the socialist countries will be assessed. The desire exists to work out a common strategic and tactical line for the Soviet Union's negotiations with the USA and England regarding the issue of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Comrade Ulbricht thanked Comrade Kuznetsov for his detailed presentation. He declared that we [i.e., the SED] agree with the CPSU's conception. The negotiations with the USA and England serve the strategic task of achieving universal and complete disarmament. The arguments that Comrade Gromyko used in his discussions with Rusk are correct. The Soviet comrades' proposed amendments are also correct. We ask for understanding that in conjunction with the results of these negotiations our situation in Germany is somewhat different than the situation of the other socialist states. The tactics of the Soviet Union indeed present the possibility of distancing the bourgeoisie in West Germany from each other and of pushing back the ultras to a certain extent. We recognize that nothing more can be achieved. That still has consequences, though, for the debates in Germany. The West German militarists consider the creation of united nuclear weapons forces in NATO as a success for their armament plans. They are declaring that they have not achieved what they want, but they are coming forward step by step—i.e., their political authority in Germany is growing, even if they are discrediting themselves internationally. For domestic needs, Adenauer can say that the next step has been achieved; this is also true of [Fritz] Erler (West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) leaders) and [Herbert] Wehner. The creation of so-called multinational nuclear weapons forces in NATO will also shore up the cooperation of the right-wing SPD leadership with the CDU (Christian and

Democratic Union). One will have to consider what all can be done to mobilize the SPD's membership against the creation of nuclear weapons units in NATO.

Comrade Ulbricht turned to the words of Comrade Kuznetsov—that the course of the negotiations cannot prevent us from struggling against the creation of nuclear weapons forces in NATO—and said: But the opponent [i.e., the West] will claim that the Soviet Union has ignored the proliferation of nuclear weapons in NATO; only the GDR is opposed to it. Already, reports are appearing in the capitalist news agencies that the Soviet Union is no longer offering resistance to the creation of united nuclear weapons units in NATO. We know that this is not true, and we will come out against it. But world public opinion will be misled by the Western agencies because people do not know what we know. One must consider how to react against the methods of psychological warfare [employed by the] militarists. Probably, one has to underline the changing balance of forces. One must come forward in such a way that the West German population can be mobilized.

Comrade Ulbricht pointed out that there is no obligation on the part of the USA not to increase or to reduce atomic and nuclear weapons in West Germany. Currently, the NATO troops are being stationed closer to the GDR's border in accordance with a decision by NATO. It is necessary to influence the USA to make declarations in this regard in which it obligates itself to not change anything. If these plans nevertheless become reality under pressure from West Germany, the dangers will increase even if West Germany is not supposed to control nuclear weapons. Conflicts will likely not begin with nuclear warheads, but with traditional weapons. In this regard, the plans of the West German militarists are dangerous, even if the USA controls the nuclear warheads. West German militarism has become strong, especially through its alliance with France. It does not yet possess nuclear weapons, but it does have the means for delivering nuclear weapons, such as rockets and other things. The danger of aggression has also become greater. The policy of the Soviet Union is clear. It is not yet clear, however, how the campaign against the creation of unified nuclear forces in NATO should be carried out.

Dr. Lothar Bolz⁷⁸ supported the comments of Comrade Walter Ulbricht and pointed out that two tendencies exist: on the one hand, to achieve disarmament, and on the other hand, the aggressive plans of the West German militarists in the sense of a forced tempo of armament. He said that a linkage has yet to be made between the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and the Moscow Treaty... World opinion will initially interpret the exclusion of NATO's united nuclear weapons forces [in a nonproliferation treaty] as a renunciation of broader demands. Already, the situation must be clarified for the masses in preparation [for a nonproliferation treaty]. Taking into account the fact that the enemy has not yet agreed to the proposals, [Bolz] posed the question of how far one might still retreat. He doubts whether the possibility of leaving [the treaty] will bring any advantages to the socialist side and opined that the form of the agreement is not important, but it would still be better not to retreat to something less than the Moscow Treaty [i.e., limited test ban]...

Comrade Florin: ... The current Soviet proposals demonstrate that the Soviet comrades' in conjunction with the positions of the SED CC [Central Committee]—have seen that the problem is complicated and that something more will have to be done. Greater pressure will be necessary in order to push through the current Soviet proposals.

⁷⁸ The GDR's foreign minister.

Comrade Kuznetsov thanked [the SED] for the exchange of views and declared that nuclear weapons must be prevented from falling into the hands of West Germany. The analysis presented by Comrade Walter Ulbricht is clear and conforms to the thoughts of the Soviet comrades. A common standpoint exists that nothing should be left untried in preventing the creation of unified nuclear weapons units in NATO so that West Germany will not get ahold of nuclear weapons. We must move forward and continue the negotiations in order to achieve as much as possible on the basis of the Soviet proposal. He agrees that it will not be easy to achieve and that the public must be mobilized. The reports of the capitalist press agencies were interpreted by him as attempted feelers. Nevertheless, Comrade Gromyko—he said—has a clear conception. (Comrade Ulbricht interjected that we know this, but the world does not.) Comrade Kuznetsov declared that any agreement in accordance with the Soviet proposals will not give silent consent to the creation of unified nuclear forces. Consultations will probably have to take place more often during the course of the negotiations. With regard to leaving a joint agreement, one cannot discern everything in advance. But one must have the possibility—even if it would be difficult—to free one's hands in the interest of possible defensive measures. He understands our concerns regarding the imperialist troops on the border, but he asked what concretely can be done. The Soviet Union made a broad proposal to withdraw all foreign troops from West Germany and the GDR. Perhaps this proposal will have to be resuscitated. In closing, Comrade Kuznetsov [referred] to the preparatory measures being taken in the session in Washington with regard to creating unified nuclear weapons forces in NATO. Up to now, the imperialists have had their hands free to do this; if we could create an obstacle to it, it would be better.

“Aktenvermerk [Note for the File],” 14 October 1963, “Anlage Nr. 1 zum Protokoll 35a vom 11.10.1963 [Attachment to Protocol 35a {of the SED Politburo} from 11 October 1963].” SAPMO BA, J IV 2/2-900, pp. 2-21.

DOCUMENT #4

“Memorandum from the Discussions of the Heads of Delegation who Came to Warsaw for the Session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact Member States,” n.d. [20 January 1965]. **Excerpts.**

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[Gheorghe Gheorgiu] Dej⁷⁹: Please allow me to say a few words, although I will not say anything new that I have not already said at our meeting. It has to do above all else with the idea of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and the inclusion of a relevant formulation in the Communiqué [from the meeting]. We already spoke of our position regarding the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. It is true that today many countries, including the USA, are coming forward regarding the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. And not only the USA. Other countries as well—e.g., India⁸¹—which want to exploit this idea with the goal of linking it to a definite campaign, having as its goal the condemnation of China for the tests it conducted with an atomic weapon. The Indian government, as far as we know, gave instructions to its representatives in other countries to sound out the situation, along with the stance of these countries regarding the aforementioned problem, because it seeks to bring its campaign before the United Nations assembly. It is directed against People’s China.... The government of India wants to demand a harsh condemnation of People’s China at the UN.

The question arises whether it is useful for us at this time to link the matter [of the MLF] with the question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons ... when all our exertions are directed against the creation of multilateral nuclear forces. We can think about it, or even better, establish contacts with representatives of China, Korea, Vietnam and other socialist countries and bring them over to our side, to a position opposed to the creation of the MLF. We would achieve in this way at the very least a unity of stances among the socialist countries on this very important international issue. We are not presenting the issue in a way that would oppose the campaign directed against third countries. For us it has to do with the actions of the Indian government, with which our countries maintain good relations; we should use them to influence [India] not to use the tribunal of the UN against People’s China. It cannot be ruled out that this is connected with the stance of the USA, which is also presenting the matter of China in the very same way....

⁷⁹ First Secretary of the Romanian Workers’ Party.

... Right now, the government of India is expanding its efforts. We have expressed our regret about this, and it is an unpleasant surprise that the Indian government is undertaking such efforts. Why is it not so sensitive, for example, with regard to the MLF, the question of prohibiting nuclear weapons, or the arms race? Nevertheless, it wants to create a scandal at the UN out of the Chinese matter. This will lead to a worsening of relations between China and India and—it cannot be ruled out—to other unpleasant things. For both the former and the latter country are beginning to engage each other in this way. We have to think out what we should do, [and] we have to appeal to the governments of other countries, in order to calm [the situation] and to approach sensibly the ... resolution of controversial problems....

... I would like to declare with total conviction that we will be making a mistake if we include in the communiqué such a formulation [i.e., supporting nonproliferation]. The government of India will not fail to exploit it, and we will not be able to oppose it....

Ulbricht: We have to be guided by the fundamental danger. And the fundamental danger now is the USA-FRG atomic bloc. In this regard we must take into account that the Bonn government is the only one putting forward revanchist demands. This does not concern India or any other states. That is, the danger of proliferation of atomic weapons lies in the fact that the FRG will receive such weapons, which it will use for its revanchist goals. That is where the main danger lies that we should come out against.

The Romanian comrades, however, are trying to skirt the problem and turn attention to India's initiative. [Dej tried to respond at this point.]

Let me finish, Comrade Dej, I did not interrupt you.

The attempt to skirt the fundamental problem represents a great danger for the countries of the Warsaw Pact because it would mean that they are not coming out against the proliferation of atomic weapons. The FRG will receive the right to jointly decide upon the use of nuclear arms, and we are supposed to just declare that we are in favor of a treaty on the non-use of such arms?⁸²

Currently, the fact of possession of nuclear arms creates a concrete situation in itself, and leads to certain activities. This is a very complex problem. We believe that the most realistic move is to strive for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

The USA possesses nuclear weapons and the most important question now is in what way and under what conditions it will give the Federal Republic of Germany access to them, how broad of a right the FRG will have to use these arms. In this lies the main danger.

I am certain that the Chinese comrades will support our stance. They told us that they are against multilateral nuclear forces among the NATO countries, that they are against the proliferation of nuclear weapons by the USA and their transfer to the FRG, and I believe that this is the most proper point of view. I do not doubt that we will easily be able to agree with the Chinese comrades, because this is not a matter that is open to discussion.

Dej: If the Chinese comrades respond in the affirmative, then I will carry out a self-criticism not only before you, but also before the Chinese Comrades.

⁸² At the meeting, the Romanians were supporting a Chinese proposal calling for a universal pledge not to use nuclear weapons as a first step towards a treaty on universal nuclear disarmament.

Ulbricht: But we have come together here as the countries of the Warsaw Pact to talk about a concrete enemy. We cannot consult about all our resolutions in advance with every country. After all, we have a treaty that was concluded by certain states. In signing it, we agreed to a particular order that we have to abide by.

We believe that the formulation on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons must be added to the communiqué. If we do not include this formulation, it will mean that we are not against the West Germans receiving atomic weapons.

If we come forward only later—after the FRG receives these weapons—with a proposal forbidding the use of these weapons, it will not be any policy. The Chinese comrades will not do that, they will not sign.

I ask you, Comrade Dej, are you in favor of our going on record in the communiqué that we are against the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the form of the MLF—which would mean that the West Germans will receive the right to participate in the use and concentration of these weapons or, to put it bluntly, will mean the joint atomic armament of the USA and the FRG?

Should we go on record in the communiqué in this fashion? What do you think?

Dej: We completely agree that it be recorded in the communiqué that we all believe that the Germans should not achieve access to nuclear weapons. But we cannot link this idea with the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. For that is a much broader idea. We can link it to the regime established in Germany on the basis of the treaties concluded after the Second World War.

Ulbricht: You speak of the Germans—which Germans do you mean?

Dej: The Federal Republic of Germany.

Novotný: We should specify certain things. The Americans, for example, also assert that the FRG cannot receive nuclear weapons. We do not want that—they say—and for that very reason we are organizing joint nuclear forces.

For us, it has to do with the West Germans not receiving nuclear weapons in any form.

Dej: We should write in the communiqué that the FRG cannot receive nuclear weapons in any form.

Novotný: Such a situation has now developed that we must take a stance. Either accept it as it is, or work to change the situation. And the question here does not apply just to Germany.

Gomułka: Clarifies the Polish stance regarding the MLF.⁸³ We assess the multilateral nuclear forces as a proliferation of nuclear weapons to states that do not yet possess them. That is why we are coming out against these forces, without limiting the question to the FRG and the NATO states.

⁸³ In the original.

The Romanian comrades—and as Comrade Dej assert—also the Chinese Comrades speak only of the FRG and NATO.

Dej: It has to do only with the FRG and preventing it from gaining access to nuclear weapons.

Gomułka: For us the term “MLF” is a synonym for the term “proliferation.” Tell us yourselves: If German units join the multilateral nuclear forces under an American command that receives nuclear weapons—is that not a proliferation of nuclear weapons? And 25 battleships?

After all, these are only the first steps. Schooling German units in the USA and preparing them to handle nuclear weapons—is that proliferation?

Maurer: Of course.

Gomułka: For me it is a matter of not dividing these matters, that the MLF be treated as a proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are against that. The Romanian comrades agree with us in our assessment of the MLF, and if they agree—they should also come out against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

But you, Comrades, apply this only to the FRG and not to all the NATO countries. I think that you would also not want other NATO countries—e.g., Turkey, Belgium, Holland, etc.— to possess nuclear weapons. You should also specify this.

If we proceed only with that proposal—that will be our weakness, because when they ask us about other countries, we will have nothing to say.

Second, for some reason, Comrade Dej has not taken into account the fact that the current situation is somewhat different than several months ago. Before the experimental detonation of an atomic weapon in China, the idea of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons was also leveled directly against the Chinese Republic. Now, this problem no longer exists. China counts itself among the nuclear powers, and we are not coming out against China. This means that there is a different situation.

Let us see now what the intentions of the Chinese comrades are in this regard, to which countries the People’s Republic of China would like to proliferate nuclear weapons. I do not know which [countries], and I think that the PRC absolutely does not want to proliferate these weapons. But the danger lies in the fact that such countries as Japan and India—i.e., the very two countries that are coming out against the PRC—can produce atomic weapons with relative ease. If every state accepted a treaty banning nuclear weapons, that would also lie in the interest of People’s China and the entire socialist camp. That is the second matter that Comrade Dej should take into consideration.

Third matter: we can find many documents—our declarations and statements, adopted together with the Chinese—in which we expressed our coordinated stance regarding the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Those are declarations from the Warsaw Pact and from the international conferences of the communist and workers’ parties.

We all stand in favor of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and under new conditions we are reaffirming our old declarations.

The fourth matter that I would like to touch upon is linked to the communiqué. In our discussions, Com. Dej came out in opposition to the draft treaty that Com. Ulbricht proposed to bring before the UN in the name of the socialist countries. That matter is closed. [The question] no longer has to do with whether the members of the commission can argue about the text of the

treaty. There will not even be time for precise study of all of its provisions. We also have comments regarding the contents of the treaty.

But at this moment, the discussion is not about the draft [nonproliferation] treaty, but about the communiqué, about whether we should add to it a formulation stating that we are declaring ourselves to be opposed in general to the proliferation of nuclear weapons to new countries. We have already declared ourselves against the MLF.

I cannot understand why you are opposed to such a general formulation. If you were against the treaty, that would be understandable, but your opposition to the communiqué is not understandable.

Now—regarding the UN. You are saying that India will be coming forward with its proposal. But there are more countries that might come forward with proposals directed against the PRC—e.g., Ireland, which preceded even India and presented a proposal signed by Sweden, Norway, Brazil, Burma, the USA, England, Canada, and other countries coming forwards with proposals on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. It is a matter of course that such a proposal will be presented at the UN.

Novotný: The entire world knows that we are consulting about this now.

Gomułka: And now we are supposed to come out at the UN in opposition to the idea of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons!?

After all, this is a matter of our entire policy. We should orient ourselves to what sort of treaty it is that they are proposing....

... It is clear to us that achieving a ban on the use of nuclear weapons will be a very difficult matter and at the current stage of development of the international situation, the West will not agree to it. We are presenting more far-reaching demands—the destruction of stockpiles of these weapons and even—this is already a new stage—universal disarmament.

Thus the question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons lies, so to say, as the first and easiest step. The second step might be a ban on their use.

I do not have anything against your talking with the Chinese comrades, but don't we have our own minds, can't we evaluate the situation? We are not coming out here in opposition to the interest of the People's Republic of China.

If our initiative is rejected and the NATO states create an Atlantic, or some other kind of multilateral nuclear forces, then the problem will be different. Then we will assemble again and confer about how to proceed in the changed situation. Could it be that we will decide whether or not to give nuclear weapons to the Warsaw Pact states? In other words, then the situation will be different.

You think the same as we do, but you are afraid that this will create further differences between us and the Chinese comrades, that it might inflame the situation? But after all, parties can mutually influence each other. We may also be able to influence the views of the Chinese comrades.

Maurer: ... The problem of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is a broad matter of universal character and affects all the states of the world. There are both advocates and opponents to the idea. Currently, we have found ourselves in a situation in which we are supposed to take a stance on this problem, to declare ourselves either for or against it.

The Romanian delegation is guided by the following fact: the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact states decided to gather in order to declare itself against the

danger of nuclear war on the part of West Germany. Com. Ulbricht's entire speech, as well as all of your speeches, mainly had in view this same goal, and that is normal....

Why are we against a formulation on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and its placement in the communiqué? Because several socialist countries do not support the idea. It would be good to add that idea to our fighting arsenal only after we are certain that all socialist countries will support us.

You, Comrade Gomułka, have expended much energy and employed good logic in order to prove that the Chinese comrades—and not only they—will support your point of view. It seems to me that it would be easier to simply discuss the matter with them. Moreover, we will not only need the consent of the socialist countries, but also non-socialist and even developing capitalist countries. Do you believe, for example, that France will be in favor of the formulation on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons? Gomułka: Yes, that's what I think. We should be certain of that. France is one of the leading states in the struggle against the atomic armament of the FRG....

Gomułka: I have one question. Do you consider our earlier declarations regarding the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons to be invalid?

Maurer: I did not say that. The Romanian position can be reduced to the idea that we always link the question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons with the much broader question of concluding a treaty on nuclear disarmament....

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Brezhnev: First of all, I want to clarify and ask Com. Dej and Maurer whether what you are saying—to refrain from such a formulation at this time—is the personal opinion of the Romanian Workers' party, or whether you are subordinating [your opinion] to an understanding with the Chinese comrades? I would like to clarify why I am posing this question. Our party has always had and does have its own opinion regarding the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and we do not intend to retreat from that opinion....

So much depends on the clarification because it is important for my further presentation that I know—I repeat—whether the stance voiced by you is the principled position of your own party, or whether you want to consult with the Chinese comrades as well.

If you are in favor of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons as a matter of principle, we are glad, and we do not have anything against your seeking the opinion of the Chinese comrades.

In my address I said that it would probably be useful to bring up the question of the non-armament of West Germany with nuclear weapons in the UN assembly, to the extent that People's China will associate itself with such an initiative.

If I understand you well, you have your own stance, and your party declares itself to be in principle in favor of ... nonproliferation...

Maurer: Our stance is as follows: We are in favor of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons as a first step, closely linked with nuclear disarmament. We support the idea of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons because it is a good idea, but we oppose adding it to the communiqué from a tactical point of view; in the interests of better organizing our struggle, we oppose adding it to the communiqué.

Brezhnev:... I am speaking in the name of the CC of the CPSU. Nobody is against universal disarmament, but it seems to me that there was mention in the Declaration and

Statement from the Moscow conferences of the international communist movement of 1957 and 1960 that we should strive for disarmament by various means, including the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. We all signed those documents then, including the Chinese comrades.

On this question, there are no differences between us. Another matter, and this is already a separate issue, should we add such a formulation to the communiqué?

In our opinion, repeating and accumulating all our old positions in a document does not strengthen the document. The document should be short, sharp....

... We are sitting in the headquarters of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party at an extremely important historical juncture.... Simply remember how it was before and compare it with what is being done today. The Potsdam Agreement? It has been dissolved. Step by step, the imperialists are preparing for war. The revanchists dream of revenge. The Americans want to exploit this force ... of over 30 million revanchists.

There has also been a process of secret armament. The Americans are openly selling atomic fuel for West German reactors. Officially, they say that it is for peaceful uses. But it is clear to specialists that the uranium that is being burned in them can yield plutonium, which is indispensable for atomic missiles. The Germans assert that they are preparing rockets for space research and similar goals. But I seriously doubt that the West Germans are truly interested in outer space. It is revenge that interests them.

We should demonstrate flexibility and courage and take steps that will demonstrate our readiness to give it to the imperialists in the teeth. We cannot permit ourselves to lag behind public opinion, [we] cannot permit ourselves to lose its trust.

If we do not affirm our stance in favor of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons now, the imperialists will say: "They lacked courage and will swallow the proliferation of nuclear weapons."...

Should we add to the communiqué a formulation regarding the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons? Personally, I am for it, although there may be other forms. What is important is that you say that the Romanian Workers' Party supports nonproliferation in principle. Hence, we can discuss the issue of whether to add the formulation [on nonproliferation] ... to the communiqué or not, and we can also think up a number of other forms.

The USSR, for example, might come forward with a relevant proposal at the UN assembly, and the other socialist countries—not as members of the Warsaw Pact, but as [individual] states—can voice their support for it.... Otherwise, the initiative might slip from our hands, and we might find ourselves left behind. Yes, it is a question of prestige....

Maurer: I would like to ask, why must we decide today whether to present to the UN a joint proposal on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and why can't we speak about it after consultations with other fraternal parties?

Brezhnev: Because we gathered together for exactly that, to decide the matter now. Do we have to assemble again in two weeks? We all agreed, after all, to inform them. But even if they do not agree, that will not cause us to change our opinion. Similarly, if the Romanian comrades have their own principled opinion, it will remain unchanged, regardless of any consultations. We cannot after all postpone our decisions until we consult with other countries—e.g., with Indonesia, which is also affected by the issue....

* * *

Novotný ... We might of course reproach the German comrades for viewing the matter too narrowly, linking it to German interests. You might demand a change in their formulations. But one party ... is putting the issue forward, and we all came here to discuss it. We believe that reducing the issue of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons to only the FRG is politically unacceptable. It's not just the FRG that is being discussed. It has to do with a general ban against the proliferation of these weapons....

... Let the Romanian comrades forgive me, but if we proceed in accordance with their suggestion, then the entire world will know that we did not achieve an understanding, that we did not come to a unified stance through the fault of the Romanian comrades. We are here in a close circle, among communists. So we can state things bluntly. The whole world is waiting for a reaction. The entire Western press is expecting the Romanian delegation to arrive with a different stance. I am putting this bluntly and ask the Romanian comrades not to be insulted.

Dej: Public opinion around the world expects us to declare ourselves against multilateral nuclear forces—that is, we will declare ourselves regarding matter for which we have now gathered....

* * *

Gomułka: It is already 1:00 p.m. We have little time left. We talked about whether to add to the communiqué the issue of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons which will be brought before the UN assembly. You [the Romanians] were against it, and we will not include the addition regarding the UN in the communiqué. But we are participating in our session as members of the Warsaw Pact. Comrade Brezhnev presented the stance of the CPSU, which we all support—you as well—including [the idea] that we should contact the other socialist states that are not members of the Warsaw Pact and coordinate with them. It cannot be ruled out that they will oppose bringing the matter to the UN, but this does not mean that one of the socialist countries or several countries will not present it at the UN. That is their sovereign right. We are thus finished with the first issue.

Let us turn now to the second issue arising from our discussion. The Romanian comrades have proposed consultations here on a broad range of subjects. Consultations between the member countries of the Warsaw Pact are thus all the more necessary. Comrade Ulbricht came forward with a proposal, supported by the Soviet comrades, calling for our acceptance of an internal statute that would obligate the ministers of foreign affairs of the Warsaw Pact states to come together periodically for consultations.

This arises from the resolutions of the Warsaw Pact, in which there is mention of consultations. We are also a Consultative Committee. But it would be difficult for us to gather three times a year. Our ministers of foreign affairs should systematically gather and consult on current questions. We should charge them with such a responsibility by means of an internal statute, which will not be subject to publication.

Maurer: We already responded to that some time ago when Khrushchev wrote to us on the matter. We are fundamentally opposed to the creation of such an organ because the Political Consultative Committee is already an organ of a permanent character.

Gomułka: We are not interested in the creation of such an organ. We will order the ministers of foreign affairs to gather for consultations to the extent that it is necessary.

Maurer: There is a great lack of clarity here and a confusion of ideas. The Political [Consultative] Committee was created on the basis of the Treaty, which was signed by

representatives of all the member countries, which received the necessary mandate from their countries' governments. In this way, the Political Committee was created as the forum that signed the treaty.

In the Political Committee, government delegations participate. That can be ministers of foreign affairs, other ministers, or special representatives. Nothing prevents the ministers of foreign affairs from gathering when the need arises. But why do we need to create yet another organ—beyond the Political Consultative Committee—with a permanent character that would give orders to other representatives[?].

Gomułka: The ministers possess the powers granted to them by their governments. A meeting of ministers is not a permanent organ that would replace the Consultative Committee. For example, in preparation for our current conference, the deputy [foreign] ministers gathered earlier....

Dej: Nobody is preventing our ministers from gathering and exchanging views. Why is a special statute necessary for this matter?

Brezhnev: In order to give expression to our unity and our striving for more consolidated work.

Dej: Neither the ministers of foreign affairs nor their deputies will define the policy of our countries; they will carry out the directives they receive. If any of our countries comes forward with such a proposition, we should define why we are calling the meeting and for what issue.

Gomułka: Of course, we would demand that, for we believe that there are too few consultations among us. They are necessary for the sake of working out a common line. For example, Khrushchev did not consult with us about his desire to go visit the FRG. And after all, that affected all of us. Or a second example: Rapacki⁸⁴ came forward at the UN with a proposal related to the question of European security. We feel guilty that we did not consult with the other socialist countries on this issue, although the proposal was presented in a very general form. Now, we would like to consult about its concrete contents. If you do not want to participate, we will consult with those countries that want to. Many events occur in the international arena. Don't you think that we should exchange views on these subjects?

Dej: Fine, but why a statute?

Gomułka: And why shouldn't we approve a statute? Until now, there was no statute, and count how many consultations were there?

Dej: And what guarantee do you have that they will take place now?

Gomułka: If we approve the statute and the Romanian government demands—a Romanian minister presents such a proposal—then we will be obligated to participate in such a consultation.

Dej: If it has to do with imposing moral obligations, there is no need to approve a statute....

Ulbricht: In the course of the last year-and-a-half, no consultations occurred; that is, we did not carry out the resolutions of the Warsaw Pact, despite the fact that individual states had a number of [political] initiatives. We want to insure that the resolutions of the Warsaw Pact are carried out by regularly convening such meetings....

⁸⁴ The Polish foreign minister, Adam Rapacki.

Dej: We would ask that these issues be left aside because we want to have time to reflect upon the text of the communiqué.

Gomuka: I want to be precise. You are opposed to approving a statute regarding regular meetings of the [foreign] ministers?

Dej: Yes, we are opposed to a statute....

AAN, KC PZPR, sygn. 2662, pp. 152-190.

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