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THE PERUVIAN REVOLUTION IN RETROSPECT:
TWENTY YEARS LATER

RAPPORTEUR'S REPORT
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INTRODUCTION

The year 1968 witnessed a number of important events in the world arena, one of which, the Prague Spring, has already been discussed and commemorated through a reexamination at the Wilson Center. For those interested in Latin America, another "Spring"—the Lima Spring—brought in a new regime that created great hope and expectations for significant change in Peru. The Peruvian Revolution effected a remarkably peaceful transfer of authority from Francisco Belaunde Terry's democratic, yet unpopular, government to the military government of Velasco. The military regime enjoyed a good deal of both external and internal support, as it proposed a number of reformist measures previously developed by the military at the Center for Higher Military Studies (CAEM) in Lima with additional influence from Peruvian intellectuals and developmentalists from the United Nation's Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). In short, this unusual military regime—at least for Latin America—generated a new spirit of reform and ideas and appeared to be heading in the right direction.

Twenty years later, as we reevaluate the Revolution, Peru is burdened with widespread poverty, stagnation, and political instability. Although not necessarily a consequence of the policies of the military regime, the present predicament offers a somewhat sobering reflection, given the enthusiasm and high hopes of 1968. The Wilson Center has this year housed two fellows who are experts on Peru and who came to The Wilson Center to explore the Revolution and its consequences. Francois Bourricaud, from the University of Paris, wrote one of the definitive interpretations of the Peruvian Revolution, Power and Society in Contemporary Peru, and is currently...
reflecting on his work in light of the outcomes. Enrique Mayer, from the University of Illinois-Urbana, is a Peruvian anthropologist currently doing an assessment of the agrarian reform of the Velasco years, one of the more significant developments of the military government. In this discussion Bourricaud and Mayer were joined by two other specialists on Peru. Francisco Sagasti, now an economist at the World Bank, served as an advisor under the Velasco administration, which attempted to follow a new pattern of development, including a planned program for better adaptation in the transfer of technology. Billie-Jean Isbell, a former Wilson Center fellow and an anthropologist from Cornell University, is studying the more recent development of the Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path, guerrilla movement. Though not in existence during the military regime, it is interesting to note the possible relationship between this new revolutionary movement and that of 1968. The following pages offer a summary of the reflections of these four guest speakers.

FRANCOIS BOURRICAUD

Given the complexity and ambiguity of the so-called Peruvian Revolution, one is tempted to try to use a few catch words, which though they have their limitations, can be of great use when one begins his own reflection. As such, the Velasco regime could be classified as what Barrington Moore would classify as an attempt toward conservative modernization or, perhaps more appropriate to the Peruvian case, a conservative revolution.¹ Moore refers to well-known episodes of European history, including the Bismarck regime’s

movement toward the development of a nation-state with a clear-cut, effective center of power. Moore saw it as a conservative operation in the sense that Bismarck brought Germany out of the morass of an indefinite soul-searching and built a state through authoritarian procedures, despite the fact that many of his goals were in basic agreement with those of the liberals of the Frankfurt parliament. The Bismarck government, then, offered a much broader and more comprehensive agenda than the typical conservative regime but, based on the failure of the liberals to implement their program effectively, Bismarck chose to execute his in an authoritarian manner. It was, in effect, an attempt to reach some of the achievements of democracy through non-democratic procedures and means.

In many respects, the Velasco government generated a similar ambiguity, which is one of the reasons it is so difficult to find an acceptable label for the leaders and develop a global judgement of that period. A few questions might help to achieve a more consistent and systematic assessment of the era.

First of all, what about the state of affairs that led up to the entrance of the military regime? At the time of the Revolution the country clearly was not in a crisis situation; however, two prevailing features of the time created a certain degree of displeasure with the overall system of government. The discredited presidency of Belaúnde Terry, who was concluding his term of office, coincided with an economic recuperation from the downturn of 1967 thanks to the somewhat belated—if not too late—passage of economic reform legislation by a reluctant congress.

The economic picture of 1968 appeared relatively good: inflation was stable and production was moderately increasing. Nevertheless, due to the
scandalous political situation and other difficulties, the overall morale of
the country was very low. Consequently, the military government moved into
the palace of the Constitutional president with a great degree of conviction
and support. Given the atmosphere of relative economic stability, the
Peruvian military's entry into government differed from that of other Latin
American military juntas of the time. Unlike the 1964 Brazilian crisis or the
1973 Chilean crisis, the situation in Peru—where the elites were not bound
to rigid economic change—did not call for what Alfred Stepan identifies as
the exclusionary methods undertaken by the military regimes of Peru's South
American neighbors.\(^2\)

A second question attempts to identify or define the nature of the *golpe*.
Was the term "*golpe institucional*" deserved and how do we define
institutional? Institutional means that the coup is not perpetrated by an
individual caudillo for his own personalistic regime and that the army,
acting as an institution or body, lends its own institutional authority to
the policy which the military government enforces. But the situation in Peru
was much more complex than that. For one thing, the military overthrow in
Peru was obviously not a coup in the traditional sense; moreover, the
personal role of General Velasco, the five or six young military leaders
surrounding him and the people located in strategic places within the army
was decisive. Although the government propaganda of the period would seem to
indicate that the "army" had moved in, one must distinguish between the army,
the navy, and the air force and between the individual members within each
group. For within each branch, there were those who took a back seat, so to

\(^2\) Alfred C. Stepan and Juan J. Linz, editors, *The Breakdown of
speak, to the more active, the more ambitious and the more audacious "radicales". So was it a golpe institucional? Yes, but with many reservations.

Third, what kind of military rulers were taking office and in what respect were they different from their counterparts elsewhere? These leaders, it should be noted, were highly ideological as a result of their preparation at CAEM, the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares, which offered courses to the high-ranking military officers preparing for their promotion from colonel to general. The curriculum to which these officers—eighty percent of whom were from the army—were exposed digressed from the typical, technical program of studies characteristic of most military schools. In the 1950's CAEM began to show signs of a significant change in interest as evidenced by the content of its papers and military journals, from articles dedicated to strategy or military technology to topics which deal with general problems of national security, or of development.

A second distinguishing characteristic of the Peruvian military can be seen in its special relationship with the local intelligentsia, which was a fairly rich and complex group. These intellectuals came from both the universities and various technical positions within the government, such as the Ministerio de Obras, which combined and contributed to the "new" military mind. In addition, the very open and witty articles and editorials found in the newspapers of the time—sometimes devoid of any good faith—illustrate the lively and active part many thinkers took under the Velasco regime.

Despite the military's interest in the intellectuals, they were nonetheless proud of being different from them. They distinguished themselves due to their self-perceived role as decision-makers: "Nosotros
somos ejecutivos." Although the others said interesting things, the military did not see them as totally reliable because of the tendency of some to identify with Marxism.

So what kind of ideology was the military proposing? One indication can be found in the military's perception of their enemies or the ideology they were fighting against. First, they opposed the "gringos", or at least distrusted them, in addition to the oligarchy—those Peruvian families who supported the international capitalists. Based on General Velasco's statements, it is obvious he also strongly disliked the Communists; however, he did not see them as a threat due to their small ranks among intellectuals and passionate thinkers. The dogmatic beliefs of the military centered around the current belief or thinking on development, modernization, and industrialization yet the idea of "dependencia" seemed absent from their vocabulary. This developmentalism called for agrarian reform, import substitution and so on, but as would be seen later, failed to take under consideration the problem of population growth. Perhaps this illustrates the fact that despite the good intentions of the military, businessmen, and many intellectuals to modernize and improve the country, they only had a superficial knowledge of how to achieve it. They preached development and were for it, but that was about all.

A fifth point questions the strategy (the statement of the goals) and the tactics of the military group. The basic and fundamental flaw of the military was that though they had goals and a strategy, they did not have tactics. They basically vacillated between two tactics as the mood struck them or according to the circumstances. The first vacillation deals with the polar opposition between confrontation and compromise. Confrontation was
used at the time of land reform implementation and with the foreign investors, and allowed Velasco to impose himself upon his peers and upon public opinion. Rather than radicalizing the already existing agrarian law, for example, Velasco chose to attack or confront the northern and coastal domains in order to fulfill his desire to "quebrar el espinaso de la oligarquía" (to break the oligarchy's back). He took the same attitude toward the International Petroleum Corporation. Although such confrontation paid off in the short term, it was not as effective in the long term. Compromise served as an alternative to confrontation, but it is difficult to discern when the first tactic was followed as a matter of preference and when they genuinely sought the second alternative. Such ambiguity allowed those sensitive to the confrontational aspect to speak of a radicalization process. Others denied that a real revolution was occurring and saw it, rather as a renegotiation between the government and the oligarchy. In this latter interpretation, the former induced the latter to divest its interest in some sectors in order to invest interests into sectors the government deemed more profitable and in the interest of the country.

The oscillation between the authoritarian style and participatory democracy illustrates a second vacillation in tactics. The decree law on cooperativas, the imposition of the comunidad industrial, the fact that the military did not build its own party to support Velasco as a candidate, and the eventual establishment of SINAMOS as a top down mobilizing vehicle demonstrate the regime's authoritarian, or non-democratic, tactics. At the same time, however, statements about full democracy and internal participation could be heard.

A final question about whether the movement worked or did not work and why
shall remain open. It moved more concertedly and with less disorder than did the Bolivian Revolution of 1952 and avoided the collapse into totalitarianism of the Cuban Revolution of 1959, because the military institution remained intact and returned to the barracks in 1980. A number of positive but ambiguous assessments of the movement center around the mobilization process. There were also positive, though possibly unintended consequences of the regime, such as the mobilization of the peasants which was accelerated in the 1970s. The strongly rooted and established local and national unions that resulted from the agrarian reform, for example, could be perceived as a positive outcome, as they helped to contribute to the democratization of the country.

From a sociological point of view, however, the style of leadership and government was one of the most negative aspects of the military administration, for they had goals but did not have a policy. The absence of policy derives from the fact that although the military took on the appearance of an intellectual leadership, they were very much uninformed about what was happening around them. It is clear now, for example, that the military, as it drafted its agrarian reform program, was thinking of the Peru of the 1920's. They lacked information about the situation in the mountains and the lack of land or the near total disruption of the hacienda system. In short, the well-meaning "ejecutivos" ignored many of the more basic rules of administration and therefore lacked any real effectiveness.

ENRIQUE MAYER

The focus of Mayer's presentation was the agrarian reform carried out under the Velasco regime. This drastic reform was implemented by the
military, the group least expected to bring about agrarian reform. Furthermore, the military seized the cotton and sugar estates, Peru's major exports, from the oligarchy. Reform, the military argued, was necessary to improve the efficiency of Peruvian agriculture and to rid the nation of its feudal past.

From the early 1940s and into the 1960s, agrarian reform was touted as a necessary first step in the development process in the Andean nations. The Mexican revolution and its subsequent agrarian reform provided the impetus for change. The goals were to both redistribute the land and remove the shame of the hacendado system. If agricultural efficiency did not improve, Peru would have rural unrest.

Agrarian reform was not supported by everyone. In the 1950s, there was a movement against agrarian reform based on the claim that most farms, producers of the leading export and food for the nation, were run efficiently and progressively. Furthermore, agrarian reform opponents believed that the Indians were incapable of running the farms efficiently and would simply resort to subsistence farming instead of producing for the cities. Economies of scale were also thought to dictate that larger farms were necessary for efficient production. Since such drastic reform could lead to a bloodbath, opponents of land reform argued that education should precede reform.

The Velasco reforms were quick and encountered little opposition. The government paid land owners for their equipment and livestock and issued bonds for the land expropriated. The reform had three main objectives. The first was to remove the main obstacle to development, the conservative landed oligarchy. The government also wanted to redistribute land to the peasants while avoiding a technical regression into peasant agriculture. In other
words, to avoid a switch from latifundia to minifundia (which opponents had predicted). Land reform was carried out through a complex system of official organizations and supported by extensive use of legal terminology.

In 1968 the Peruvian coast had an efficient, modern agriculture system of plantations farmed by unionized wage labor. The highlands, in contrast, were characterized by their diversity. Large scale sheep farming coexisted with small inefficient subsistence farming. The jungle was not used for agriculture and some proposed the colonization of the jungle instead of agrarian reform. In fact, this plan was later carried out and the jungle region is currently the most productive region in Peru in terms of both food production and coffee and coca exports.

The highlands are of greatest interest in terms of the Velasco reform. The hacendados had held the land since colonial times and forced the peasants to work on the haciendas as serfs. A hacienda may have been listed on paper as covering 100,000 square hectares but the hacendado probably used very little of that land himself. The remainder was parceled out to the peasants for subsistence farming or was inhospitable to agriculture. Some of the crops grown by the peasants on their lands were sold by the hacendado as another form of exploitation.

Communities also had colonial titles to land. These large land holdings were, as the hacienda, viewed as a single holding by the law despite their being used by many people. Most of the land was parcelled out to individuals as on the hacienda. Communities reserved one or two plots, maintained by the members of the community, to produce crops which were then sold to raise money for the community to fund schools and other projects. The organization of the hacienda and the community was very similar despite period
literature's efforts to differentiate between them.

Communities had become well versed in litigating to protect their holdings. Velasco sought to change the laws so that the communities would receive the land yet not control it since they were not as efficient. The "alphabet soup organizations" were established to run each community's agricultural activities.³ The goal was to preserve the efficient parts of community agriculture and to use them to develop the smaller plots around the community lands, i.e. the peasant sector. Efficient farms could be used as distributors of profits and also to produce food for the cities and for export.

Land was given to the communities only if they promised to farm it collectively. The communities also became shareholders of the former haciendas, but agricultural production was supervised by agronomists. Agrarian Societies of Social Interest were formed as shareholder corporations in which the agronomist acted as manager and the peasants received earnings; working for wages instead of obligation as under the hacienda. The peasants, though unsure how long the program would last, gave their qualified support to the new reforms.

Agrarian reform led to a concentration of land, not a deconcentration as was intended. In one case near Cuzco, for example, 90 haciendas and 15 communities were combined into one super-corporation where peasants sat on the board of directors but the co-op was run by agronomists. This super-co-op did not return any profits and it is unknown who received the benefits of the co-op.

³ Mayer uses the term "alphabet soup" because the organizations were referred to by acronyms much like the New Deal agencies of the U.S. under Roosevelt.
Nearly 8.5 million hectares of land were transferred to 400,000 families. Over 600 cooperatives were created as well as 58 societies of agricultural interest, 1000 peasant groups (pre-cooperatives) and 515 pre-communities. Despite these large numbers, only 20% of all possible beneficiaries received land. Additionally, only 31.5% of the most needy families benefitted from the Velasco reform. Land ownership did not change drastically in Peru. Moreover, the new managers were neither as savvy, as locally oriented, nor as careful managers as the hacendados. They also lacked the local power which the hacendados had exercised. The peasants were the employers and exercised their authority by reducing salaries or firing the technocrats both in the coastal and highlands regions.

Large state capitalism failed because of a lack of investment as well as because of ecological and technical limitations. Only small areas, those already or formerly under cultivation, could be used by the cooperatives. Output could increase in those areas but not enough to compensate for the declines in other areas. State entrepreneurs were less efficient than private owners. There were weaknesses in design and unfair macroeconomic policies such as food imports, low prices, and inflation. Additionally, weak international markets did not provide the conditions for the crops (established on shaky grounds) to survive. In short, there was an unrealistic assessment of what existed before the reform was implemented.

A number of errors were made before the implementation of the agrarian reform program that contributed to its failure. Poor use and analysis was made of the statistics available to the reformers. Haciendas and communities

4 Mayer refers to a study written by José María Caballero, an economist at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, that analyzed pre-reform conditions.
were counted as single land holdings instead of numerous small plots. Production estimates greatly exaggerated the potential of the redistributed land. Since 98% of the land in the highlands was already in peasant hands, and 80% already in minifundio production, there was actually very little land to redistribute. Of the remaining land, half of it stayed with the hacendado as his maximum holding and the rest was assigned to a collective. Here too, expectations exceeded physical capacity. Finally, and perhaps most interesting, Caballero points out that since the hacienda had already been virtually extinguished as a social institution, reform merely gave an official stamp to something already taking place. Agrarian reform prevented further peasant take-overs of land. At present, the peasants have largely disbanded the co-ops and returned to the old ways of farming.

In the highlands, agriculture had relied largely on the minifundio and has become even more so since the reform began. Food production for the cities and for export has collapsed while subsistence farming has intensified. In fact, the only food Peru produces for itself is derived from subsistence farming. Peasants do produce some cash crops for the markets and have not behaved as Marx assumed.

Indian communities have been strengthened, growing at 11% per year, despite the government's efforts to circumvent them. Currently there are 3000 Indian communities operating in the traditional manner of minifundia and limited collective land. The Indians protect their land and attack weakening communities together. They have become the strongest and most important units of macropolitics and policy in the highlands.

The dual nature continues inside communities and co-operatives. Production on community fields is down while single plot production is up.
Most of the remaining co-ops have trouble surviving due to salary and management problems.

The community as a unit has become a strengthened area of democratic participation. They vote every two years and there are no problems with the transfer of power. Why hasn't Peruvian political strife extended into the highland communities (or if it has, how have they managed to conceal it)? The communities are carriers of "voz y voto" (voice and vote) and will be heard in the future. The agrarian reform institutions have come under attack from all directions. The communities attack the cooperatives or engage in peaceful occupation of the lands not in use, forcing the managers to buy off the communities by distributing additional lands to them. Many of the cooperatives have been bombed as the communities attempt to destroy the cooperative system. Sendero Luminoso threatens to invade the cooperatives and promises to do so if the communities do not act. Thus, a contest is taking place in Peru to determine who among the communities, the government, and Sendero can redistribute the land most quickly.

Peru is now experiencing a reversion to small scale peasant agriculture, and this requires a shift in policy government and in agricultural political thinking as well as in development aid. The millions of small-scale cash-cropping peasants need different forms of support than did the cooperatives. Current price and subsidy policy and high inflation rates make cash-crop production a losing proposition. The communities are thus vulnerable to Sendero take over.

FRANCISCO SAGASTI

Structure

An analysis of the Velasco government's performance reveals both good and
bad. One of the military's best qualities was a willingness to undertake reforms including the willingness to take risks on issues which everyone agreed something should be done and to introduce substantive changes. He credits CAEM (José del Carmen Marín specifically) for the military's desire to do this. The experience with the guerrillas created, within the military, a social conscience which tilted the military toward a more radical position. The military regime also created the basis for the modern Peruvian state by creating a panoply of legal structures, a budget process, and a tax structure, among others.

There were other positive aspects but the military government had its faults as well. The military had inadequate knowledge about what was going on, and this necessitated a great deal of improvisation. The military also was unable to see the Peruvian revolution in a wider context, despite the success of its foreign policy. The leaders had a sense of being ahead of the times when in fact the country was two or three decades behind its Latin American neighbors in many respects.

Intelligentsia

The military government had a basic mistrust of an independent intelligentsia and anyone with technical expertise who was not totally subordinate to its command. This mistrust went beyond using the intelligentsia for the government's purposes to a complete disregard for the capacity to generate and utilize knowledge. This disregard led to the demise of the education system and destruction of the university structure. The

5 José del Carmen Marín wrote the first book about CAEM. In it, he identified the ideas used by the Velasco regime.
index for university spending per student was 100 in 1960 (the base year), rose to 267 in 1967 and then fell to 41 by 1985. (Bourricaud interjected that the number of students and universities had tripled and doubled respectively.)

The increased spending on the physical sciences (encouraged by Valdivia, not Velasco) from 1972-75 was followed by what amounted to a systematic destruction of the research system. The industrial expansion of the period was thus undermined by the military's misuse of the human resource base. The revolutionaries were a well intentioned but highly incompetent group which did not want to face the challenges presented by the universities. When students protested against Velasco, he responded with a "let them struggle on their own" attitude.

Democracy and Participation

In the years before the coup it was widely accepted that structural changes were necessary to resolve the crisis. One of the groups with power, the military, the Church, or the oligarchy, had to impose those changes. The logical candidate was, by elimination, the military. By infiltrating the command structure, the military might be enticed to use its power to make the necessary changes and then return to the barracks.

This early support of the coup by students and the intelligentsia waned as disenchantment with the closed system grew. The leaders believed that it was their job to make the decisions and then leave their justification to the advisors. The "ejecutivos criollos" remained in office and the thinkers

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6 A pejorative expression referring to administrators of wily agility rather than technical competence and integrity.
were removed from the cabinet, according to Sagasti, once an advisor to
Alberto Jimenez de Lucia, Minister of Industry.

Lessons from the 1968 Revolution

Democratic procedures, no matter how imperfect, must be preserved if
headway is to be made toward democracy. The military mentality is alien to
what is necessary to govern a multi-faceted, pluralistic society. Three
characteristics of the military mind can be identified which make them
ineffective rulers. First of all, the military is based on a strong chain of
command. This is incompatible with the mid-level management decisions
necessary in government. Secondly, the military tends to view all situations
in black and white. The real world is, of course, full of shades of grey.
Finally, in a typical military career, thirty years are spent saying yes and
the final one or two spent giving orders. Middle-level negotiating skills
are never developed which is a weakness in government where decisions cannot
always be left to the high command.

The military revolution failed because it was a military revolution. The
characteristics outlined above, combined with the ignorance and
incompetence, were incompatible with the changes being introduced. This
fundamental contradiction undermined the revolution. Democracy is a
necessary condition of development because the social learning process will
guarantee or sustain development. Construction by consensus will build the
strongest system but the military, by nature, cannot work this way.

Finally Sagasti referred to the problems with Sendero. He quoted from
Weber who defined the state as the entity that has a legitimate monopoly on
violence within the borders of a specified territory. Peru has an oligopoly
on violence—many groups believe they have the legitimate right to carry out acts of violence. Peru must restore the oligopoly to a single entity. This is one of the key failures of the Velasco regime because the roots of the present predicament lie in that administration.

BILLIE JEAN ISBELL

The Velasco government contributed to the birth of Sendero. Isbell compared the histories of several Peruvian villages in the provinces of Chuschi and Andahuaylas. Both provinces are in the department of Apurimic. Chuschi is the birthplace of the Sendero movement. In May 1980 four masked students from the University of Huamanga seized the town hall and burned the ballots for an upcoming election. This attack on the state marked the birth of Sendero. Isbell reviewed the events and discussed why Sendero was unable to form and maintain a base in Chuschi.

Sendero grew out of the contradictions of local historical conditions. Its early success and support was lost when the tactics changed radically in late 1982. The first act carried out by Sendero in a new village was the execution of a common enemy which demonstrated that Sendero's information was good enough to know whom to target. In Chuschi, the enemy was the cattle rustler while in Andahuaylas it was the public official.

Agrarian reform contributed to Sendero's tactics by creating an enemy. The reform removed the hacendados but created a vacuum in their place. This void was filled by the petty bourgeois who saw a new economic opportunity. Those who benefitted from the reform in a concrete manner were targeted by Sendero.

Like the Velasco regime, Sendero has an image of the highlands based on
the writings of Mariátegui, that is, an idealized, romanticized view that does not reflect the truth. Sendero also refers to a revolutionary calendar at the local level. The peasants perceived a very different reality. Thus both Velasco and Sendero built an ideological base and their strategies on an mythological view of the Andes and with different goals in mind. The failures of both the Velasco regime and Sendero are based on their neglect of the region's diversity. Communities of the region have been fighting each other for years and continue to do so today. In fact, the violence has generalized in such a way that communities will ally with the military on one occasion and with Sendero on another in order to rid themselves of perceived enemies (another community). Marxist or Maoist rhetoric is not used when the peasants discuss Sendero. Instead its successes and failures are analyzed on a tangible level.

Sendero's knowledge of the enemies which could be fought to gain support in Chuschi led Isbell to suggest that the village was selected because it had not had a hacendado experience. Earlier revolutionary efforts in the 1950s and 60s had erred by trying to entice ex-hacienda natives to join the rebellion. These natives refused to participate. Isbell adds that in the 1970s there had been a great deal of agitation for land which, fueled by agrarian reform, prompted peasants to seize anything they perceived to be a threat. In Andahuaylas, Sendero took advantage of the established peasant political organization, again reflecting their knowledge of the region.

From May 1980 until December of 1981, Sendero conducted two simultaneous campaigns in the Rio Pampas region. The first of these was a moralization campaign that included the execution of public enemies and the litigation of familial disputes. The second was the campaign for organization. Five
committees were usually established, one each for intellectuals, women, youth, peasants and workers. Because there were no wage laborers in Chuschi, the workers committee was not created. The two campaigns enabled Sendero to control at least nine villages in the Rio Pampa region by the end of 1981. In December, a group of 2000 peasants invaded the University of Huamanga's experimental agriculture station at Alpachaca. 7 The station was seen as a foreign endeavour that had alienated the sixteen local peasant families by introducing technology completely extraneous to the peasants' agricultural activity. The invaders planted crops as a community at the station but could not harvest them because of the heightened military presence in the region.

The willingness of the peasants to follow Sendero into this attack stemmed from a combination of factors. The development program of the Velasco regime had been, according to Diaz Martinez, a complete failure. He cites numerous examples of failed projects including a 1966 Inter-American Development Bank potato project in Cangallo that failed because a disease-prone variety of potato was planted. The agrarian reform program, as mentioned earlier, created a void filled by the petty bourgeois who also became the representatives of the state, holding offices such as alcalde, judge and provincial representatives. Mestizo/Indian tension and suspicion of the state increased. This tension provides a basis for understanding the early support of Sendero and was fueled by Sendero-planned activities which were viewed, in the short run, not as ideological but as attacks on the state to remove enemies and simplify land invasions.

When Sendero decided to engage in armed confrontation, the peasants could


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no longer coalesce in local tactics. The change in tactics, in late 1982, made Sendero's goals and programs inconsistent with the peasant's vision of change. In early December 1982 Sendero organized a celebration to commemorate the birth of the popular army. Eight prisoners, petty bureaucrats from the Chuschi area, were tried by Sendero and then the celebration began. However the popular army never actually participated in armed conflict, for the Senderistas fled across the puna, leaving only women, children and older men to face the military. The popular army was thus born in a symbolic confrontation with the military that was followed by a planned retreat.

When the Army arrived in Chuschi on December 20 they did not immediately pursue the guerrillas but instead captured four elderly men. One of these men was blown up with a home-made grenade left by Sendero. After the Army left, Sendero leaders returned to celebrate their victory. The peasants saw no victory, however, and refused to celebrate. This marked the end of the close relationship between the peasants of the Rio Pampa valley and Sendero.

In February of 1983 the people of Chuschi flew white flags from the municipal building and requested that a military defense post be established. This extraordinary event never would have happened if Sendero had not changed its tactics in 1983. The presence of the Army brought about a period of heavy oppression. The centuries old local conflict was now played out with military involvement. One of Chuschi’s neighboring villages had 80% of its men "disappeared" while Chuschi lost only six men between 1983 and 1985. This disparity of numbers indicates that the people of Chuschi used the military to attack their enemies, playing out their long standing conflict.

Ronald Berg and Harold Skar did studies of local histories in Peru during
Berg, who worked in Andahuaylas, attributes Sendero's early successes to their ability to quickly identify the village's enemies. In Andahuaylas, these were bureaucrats and leaders of the cooperatives. In fact, Sendero's first action in Andahuaylas was to blow up a cooperative's tractor. In the Spring of 1982, Sendero assassinated public figures including agrarian judges and co-op leaders in their campaign to attack anything they could not control. Berg says that Sendero was given nervous respect in Andahuaylas. Nevertheless, the peasants eventually felt that Sendero had gone too far since some of the executed merchants did not deserve to die. There was a change in the peasants' attitude, but ambivalent feelings prevailed. For example, in 1981-82, Sendero members were called terrorists but by 1985-86 they were referred to as compañeros, implying sympathy for radical change but an uncertainty about the future.

Harold Skar also worked in the Andahuaylas region and his report is very similar to those of Isbell and Berg. The first Sendero execution in the village Skar studied was of a former hacendado turned judge. This judge would only hear cases of those who first worked on his land. This post-reform method of forced labor meant that often cases dragged on in order to extract more labor. Sendero named the man an enemy in 1981 but did not kill him until 1985. The peasants applauded this action but changed their opinion of Sendero when the hacienda's alcohol stills were destroyed. This

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additional action removed the peasants' ability to participate in the market economy.

Sendero's initial strategy was effective and generated support for the movement. When the tactics changed, the peasants were left between the guerrillas and the military. A majority of the 12,000 plus casualties have been peasants and the repression continues today.

The Sendero experience has provided some positive benefits for the people. The disruption of community life in the 1982-85 period prompted a mass out-migration. Those people who are now returning to the villages are somewhat modernized due to their experiences in the cities. Those who comprise the civil-religious hierarchy are now literate and posses an understanding of the state. Thus the state is forced to negotiate with a different kind of peasant. The politicized and organized peasantry, a product of the Velasco era, can act as a buffer between Sendero's rigid program based on Mariátegui's romanticized notion of Andean communities and the state. The peasants' desire to protect their access to the market is a major dividing line between peasant and Sendero.

Where are the Sendero recruits coming from? The majority are alienated, dislocated youth who believe in revolutionary change. Some also participate on an ideological basis. This group is comprised of the sons and daughters of the uneducated peasants who were educated during the Velasco regime. In Ayacucho it was an education of ideology which asked not "shall we have a revolution?" but "what kind?". Some of the youth also see Sendero as a messianic "death cult". One additional issue which warrants further discussion is why so many women are involved with Sendero.

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DISCUSSION

The discussion period was brief due to the length of the four presentations. However the questions asked provided some additional information about three of the four papers presented.

The first commentator made a comparison to Mexico where the mass movement is led by women who have had a falling out with the Church. He asked Isbell whether there might be a parallel between Sendero and these anti-spiritual groups and if Sendero actively recruits women.

Isbell responded by explaining that Sendero formed women's organizations early in its existence. (This may be another example of their understanding of the region) The women of Ayacucho have an historically strong economic base. Women inherit from women (and men from men) so they have a control of property, money, and resources that has given them a customary role in local politics. Edith Lagos, a woman beaten to death for her participation in Sendero, has become an almost mythical heroine. One particular Quechua myth says that Lagos had a child with Abimael Guzman (the leader of Sendero) who they named Ilia (or messenger in Quechua). When Lagos was beaten to death, the legend states that her son was brought to Denmark by Guzman. Thus, there is a potential for return not unlike that of Christ. This follows from the greater religious expression in the aftermath of Sendero. The statue of Edith Lagos looks like The Virgin but she carries a gun instead of a baby. So strong is the image of a woman fighting in Ayacucho that the military felt compelled to destroy Lagos' grave because of the number of pilgrims who wanted to visit it.

The second questioner asked Sagasti about the potential for development in Peru. Sagasti replied that his view, and not necessarily that of the
Bank, was that development would take place if two extremes could be avoided. The two extremes he mentions are first, the bloodbath theory and second the "Lebanization" of Peru. The bloodbath theory, espoused by both far left and far right, is that Peru needs years of killing to resolve the crisis. The second extreme, which might occur, is that Peru will become a number of territories within one country as in Lebanon.¹⁰

Sagasti said that a 1983-85 study on the future of Peru says that a small increase in agricultural productivity would yield impressive gains. He suggests that a return to 1968 levels, when food imports were lower and the people were better nourished, is a goal for the nation. This goal requires the return to simple common-sense agricultural methods. If this were done, the levels of per capita income reached in 1974, could be reached again by 1997.

Isbell commented that the people of Ayacucho expect progress and government aid to help them make a positive change after the violence. Sagasti replied that the necessary change could come from several places on the political level (he did not elaborate on these). He hoped that the next president will not face the same problems that Alan Garcia faced. Peru needs long-term change but these goals must be transferred into short and medium term proposals. He seemed optimistic about the chances for success.

The final question of the period concerned agrarian reform. Mayer was asked about his views on the best structure for agriculture. The participant also believed that the issue should not be why Sendero has grown but why it has not grown further in light of the current situation. Additionally, the

¹⁰ Sagasti alluded to this in Part Three, Democracy and Participation, of his paper.
speaker noted that Velasco was the most popular president in the past thirty or forty years.

Mayer responded that his paper only addressed what had happened in the past. In the highlands there are large numbers of small (under two hectares) farms which produce a diverse group of products for subsistence farming and for market sale. These subsistence farmers are arranged in communal organizations which can, with government cooperation, be agents of commercialization, technification and management control. Peru will not establish Chinese communes nor Israeli kibbutzim but it can rely on what is essentially peasant agriculture. Mayer added that this implies small producers growing enough crops to sell in order to buy the things they need. He acknowledges that this is not a sound agricultural base for the twentieth century but it is what now exists in Peru. He believes that it will be more advantageous for Peru to organize what exists rather than trying to start from scratch with a "pie in the sky" project. In large countries, the young often leave the rural areas to find work in the cities. With a sufficiently strong urban base, this type of migration would allow Peru to reforest marginal lands.