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# Redefining National Security in Latin America

Woodrow Wilson Center, November 16-17, 1992

Workshop Report

## Outline

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I. Introduction

The Cold War provided a framework for the interpretation of national security and conflict resolution in Latin America. The definition of a nation's security interests and goals was profoundly influenced by the superpower rivalry for global hegemony. With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of bipolarity, Latin America confronts a new and evolving international system. How will the nations of Latin America redefine their national security interests in the post-Cold War world? Will the United States continue its dominant role in the region? Will effective regional and national security agendas for peace and security develop and what are the most effective mechanisms for the resolution of conflict in the hemisphere?

*Global Transformations and Peace: Arms Control, Disarmament and the Resolution of Conflicts in the Western Hemisphere* is an ambitious project conducted by a group of Latin American and United States scholars in an endeavor to reach an understanding of current and future Latin American national security interests. Based in Chile's *Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales* (FLACSO) and the Latin America Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and funded by a generous grant from the MacArthur Foundation, Latin American scholars initiated the project by examining the current security agenda in several countries. Papers were prepared on Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Venezuela and the Caribbean, and Central America, based on national or subregional meetings of policymakers and representatives of the private sector, government, and academia. In the second stage of the project, the conclusions of the national and subregional analyses were brought together and compared. During the *Redefining National Security in Latin America* workshop held at the Woodrow Wilson Center, November 16-17, 1992, members of the team presented the results of their research. The goal of this workshop report is to describe the issues raised during the
individual country presentations and discuss the major themes developed by the workshop participants.

The *Redefining National Security in Latin America* workshop allowed scholars the opportunity to explain and discuss their findings with other researchers and experts in the field. Workshop participants sought to identify commonalities and to integrate the views of regional and national analyses in an effort to prepare for the last stage of the project: the formulation of a collective agenda of critical national security issues for Latin America in the post-Cold War era.
II. Workshop Introduction

Augusto Varas, a senior researcher at FLACSO and co-director of the project, provided an introduction to the *Redefining National Security in Latin America* workshop. Varas began with an overview of the stages and the basic goal of the "Global Transformations and Peace" project. As indicated, there are three steps to the project: a series of subregional workshops on individual countries and regions; the *Redefining National Security* workshop; and a final report in 1993.

Varas identified the fundamental characteristics that define the changing global security milieu. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting end of bipolarity are principal developments shaping the international system. Varas described the evolving multipolar system as international polyarchy. During the Cold War, the basic model of economic development followed by Latin American nations was import substitution industrialization, an inward-looking approach that emphasized internal markets. Accordingly, security interests tended to focus on domestic concerns, such as guerrilla insurgency and potential conflict with neighboring countries. Within the last decade, Latin American countries have changed their approach to economic development, organizing their economies around the outward-looking principles of free markets and trade. This strategy has profoundly influenced the formulation of security policy. In addition, democracy is the dominant form of government in the hemisphere. International polyarchy, outward oriented development, and democratic forms of government are the parameters creating a new security context in the Western Hemisphere.

Despite the momentous changes sweeping the globe, Latin America cannot escape the regional domination of the United States. According to Varas, the U.S. is the unchallenged
hegemon in the Western Hemisphere, and, as in the past, Latin American security interests will depend heavily on how the U.S. defines and deals with its global commitments. In particular, Latin America must continue to tolerate the U.S. "permanent tendency" to act unilaterally, as in the invasion of Panama and recent dealings with Haiti. The basic security goals of the U.S. Department of Defense, such as prevention of the rise of another superpower and the ability to act independently if collective action fails, imply a unipolar view of the world by Washington. Varas asserted that there remains a significant difference between the ability of the U.S. to identify its primary interests and implement appropriate programs in the hemisphere. For example, the Bush Administration recognized drug trafficking as a military policy issue, yet several Latin American militaries reject involvement in the drug war, confounding U.S. objectives. To date, Varas concluded, there is no major U.S. national security program—no military equivalent of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative.
III. Brazil’s Strategic Outlook

Brazil plays a critical but complicated role in national security issues in Latin America. Thomaz Costa, a researcher at the National Research Council in Brasília and a member of the policy planning staff of the Brazilian presidency, began the presentations of individual research papers with "Brazil’s Strategic Outlook." His work focused on the development of Brazilian defense issues in the post-Cold War period, using techniques that included interviews with government officials and academics. Costa explained, however, that academic research in Brazil on public policy issues was impeded by recent political disturbances caused by the impeachment process of former president Collor de Mello. Extensive changes of government personnel and rotations in command of the armed forces and foreign ministry have made it difficult to conduct interviews. The civilian and military officials who were interviewed reported that international security was not critical to the national agenda at this time, and believed that it would be best to avoid introducing defense issues in public presentations or inter-bureaucratic debates. On-the-record discussions would have to wait until political stability returned to Brasília. Meanwhile, officials were willing to reveal their opinions only in private talks. In addition, national security issues are not publicly debated in Brazil. Thus, many potential interviewees felt that they were not prepared or qualified to discuss topics of international security or national defense.

Costa’s research confirmed the general feeling that the end of the Cold War heralds significant changes in the international political system and that all of Brazil’s external policies will have to be reviewed. Although there is agreement among officials that change is forthcoming, there is a high level of uncertainty regarding the direction in which the global system is evolving. The factors that shape world politics are in flux, such as the hegemonic role of the U.S., the formation of commercial megablocs, international economic integration, the rise...
of Europe and Japan as economic rivals of the U.S., and many other trends. Unsettled global conditions have created confusion among many security analysts and public officials as there are multiple future global scenarios.

Both government officials and private individuals considered the international security environment generally favorable to Brazil. As during the Cold War, Brazilians believe that a direct foreign threat to national security does not exist. Many officials pointed out that Brazil would be satisfied with the status quo in its international relations. Lacking a significant immediate threat to internal or external security, defense is not a high priority.

Despite a general acceptance of the current international situation of Brazil, the longstanding ambition to make Brazil a major world power endures. Brazil needs economic growth, and many individuals argue that only as a major political power can Brazil secure the proper conditions for greater economic development. As the country grows, it will be able to further shape its international environment, and therefore its future. The arguments supporting an increased hegemonic role for Brazil are bolstered by the continued acceptance of conspiracy theories by many officials and private individuals. Many people still believe that the G-7 work in concert to maintain hegemonic control over markets and resources and that the international status quo works against Brazilian development.

Developments in the Amazon region are the primary security concerns for the Brazilian armed forces. Some interviewees believed that foreign powers, especially the U.S., seek to control the potential wealth of the region or end its economic exploitation. In response, Brazilians affirm their territorial hegemony, asserting that the Amazon belongs exclusively to Brazil and Brazilians alone have the right to decide its future. In addition, the Amazon region's
vast international borders are permeable to drug traffickers and foreign guerrilla insurgents who regularly cross the border. The threat behooves greater military presence in the region.

As in virtually all of Latin America, the drug war is a critical security issue in Brazil. There is strong opposition, both within and outside the armed forces, to the employment of military forces to combat drug traffickers. The issue is considered to be a police problem and is classified as a "civic mission." There is a consensus among military officers that the armed forces are neither trained nor equipped to fight the drug war and that illegal narcotics threaten the command structure and institutions through corruption and the arbitrary use of force. This position contradicts policies asserted by Washington's version of the drug war, causing insecurity and uncertainty among Brazilian officials about overall United States schemes for Latin America.

During the early 1980s, Brazil possessed a major arms industry, exporting significant amounts of weaponry with fairly advanced technology. In recent years, however, the Brazilian local arms industry has been scraped. The few companies that survive are currently seeking joint ventures with foreign companies in order to stay in business.

Although Brazil is basically satisfied with the current territorial situation, there are potential conflicts and unsolved disputes pending with neighbors on its vast perimeter. Costa discovered that most Brazilians interviewed considered the potential threats between Brazil and neighbor countries as asymmetrical—countries do not share equal stakes in the outcomes of disputes. Potential conflict, however, could be ameliorated by the progress of international economic integration. In particular, MERCOSUL (Southern Cone Common Market) is currently the most important factor shaping foreign relations and most officials assert that the potential impact of integration in defense planning will be consequential. Benefits will result after
integration is carried out, not concomitantly. In addition, Costa pointed out during the discussion session that while there are potential benefits from increased integration, there could be negative consequences from the failure of the integration effort, especially in stimulating extreme forms of nationalism.

Since the beginning of the Collor presidency, civil-military relations have significantly changed. It appears that the armed forces forged new alliances with political forces in Congress in an effort to gain support for military budget demands. Military officials complained that their equipment was out-of-date and that the armed forces were unable to perform many routine training exercises. The country's military can scarcely deploy highly trained infantry units, with limited air cover, for anti-guerrilla operations, and does not have a force structure capable of engaging in an international confrontation. Brazil does not even feel properly equipped and trained to accept participation in international peace-keeping operations.

In general, Costa concluded that Brazil lacks a coordinated national security policy, the product of highly fragmented management of national security issues. According to Costa, the lack of presidential directives, inter-bureaucratic overlapping, and three separated military branches have left the nation without a sense of direction and national purpose. Meanwhile, the military forces have demanded a stronger definition of their role.
IV. The Case of Argentina

Rut Diamint's paper, entitled "Cooperation for Peace Policies--the Case of Argentina," began with an examination of the key antecedents in recent history that have shaped current Argentine security issues. Diamint, a researcher at EURAL, emphasized the armed forces' historic tendency to dominate domestic civilian affairs. Most recently, during the late 1970s, the armed forces concluded that the civilian government could not manage the threat of guerrilla insurgency. The military dictatorship that consequently took control of Argentina launched the Proceso--a campaign to eradicate the perceived enemies of the state. This undertaking demonstrates the degree to which domestic concerns have been central to the definition of national security in Argentina. While in many countries war colleges play an important role in interpreting national security interests, in Argentina, military definitions of security have been manifested through the direct actions the armed forces have taken against civilian governments.

Once the domestic situation was considered under control, the military junta turned to the issue of territorial sovereignty. It declared that the Malvinas/Falkland Islands, occupied by the British, were Argentine territories. Apparently the armed forces believed that Britain would not defend islands 8,000 miles from London. This mistake led to a war and a humiliating defeat for the Argentine forces at the hand of British troops. Diamint asserted that the Argentine armed forces committed fundamental errors in evaluating internal and external security. These miscalculations clearly indicate the degree to which the definitions of national security were unrealistic during this period.

Although the armed forces attempted to distance themselves from the daily activities of the Proceso and the Dirty War, they were profoundly affected by the corruption,
bureaucratization, inefficiency, and illegality that characterized the campaign of state terror. Moreover, the defeat in the Malvinas War unleashed a scornful rejection of military rule by Argentine society. By 1982, the military was clearly in retreat and a democratic transition began. However, Diamint points out that while the military was defeated, it was never destroyed. Its basic command structure remained intact. During the succeeding Radical Party (Unión Cívica Radical) administration, the armed forces recuperated and launched political initiatives.

The task of defining Argentina’s national security interests during the Alfonsín Administration was eclipsed by the severe conflict between the armed forces and civilian government. Alfonsín was the only democratically elected Latin American president to bring officers to trial for crimes committed during a military government and, predictably, he met stiff resistance from the armed forces. In addition, the new administration attempted to reform the military structure. The armed forces, however, rejected the government’s attempts to impose civilian control. Because of the struggle over control and the prosecution of human rights abusers, the possibility of a recognition by the armed forces of the benefits of democracy, such as the professionalization of the armed forces without political obligations, was nonexistent. The situation led to several military uprisings against Alfonsín.

Paradoxically, when the civilian government and armed forces clashed, plans for further strategic weapons systems development continued. The Condor II project, financed by secret funds and incorporating German technology, proceeded unabated. Only years later would the project be scrapped.

Diamint explained that Alfonsín’s successor, Carlos Menem, has profoundly redefined
national security since assuming office in 1989. He has based Argentina's new strategy on "realismo periférico," which maintains that Argentina is dependent on the industrial countries, positioned on the periphery, vulnerable, and of little vital interest to superpowers; it should thus develop security policies accordingly. As a result, Argentina is exploring the development of a closer relationship with the U.S., not in an effort to reap significant political benefits from the alliance, but to eliminate obstacles to an advantageous commercial relationship. Under these circumstances, Argentina must accept a high degree of U.S. hegemony and its concomitant policies.

Members of Menem's administration, particularly in the Ministry of Defense, are opposed to the current foreign policy course. They support alternative policies that would allow more autonomy in choosing strategic alliances and the liberty to develop military technologies. This point of view represents a recurrent theme in national security definitions in Argentina and Latin America: At what point does the hegemony of the United States become excessive and interfere with national defense? While the dominance of the U.S. is generally an accepted condition, debate remains as to when to "draw the line" and assert different priorities. According to Diamint, these two basic tendencies coexist in the government and explain contradictions and incoherence in recent reforms of the armed forces.

International changes and economic realities have greatly restricted the debate over U.S. hegemony. With the end of the Cold War, the U.S. remains the dominant global superpower, unopposed in the Western Hemisphere. The ability of a nation of the Western Hemisphere to follow a truly independent foreign policy agenda is limited. The Menem administration has redefined Argentina's strategic alliances in two important directions: diplomatic relations with England were reestablished and membership in the non-aligned movement was repudiated. The
Bush Administration praised Argentina as a leader in the non-proliferation movement, as demonstrated by bilateral accords with Brazil, the Declaration of Mendoza, and the end of the Condor II project.

International organizations currently play an expanded role in Argentine policy. For example, increased importance has been assigned to the functions of the Organization of American States (OAS). In an effort to reinforce the trend toward democracy in Latin America, the Argentine representative to the OAS recommended that membership be suspended for governments that come to power through undemocratic means. The Menem administration also launched an initiative to establish some form of cooperation with NATO. Argentina has taken the lead in seeking multilateral solutions to the problems in Haiti, Peru, El Salvador, and Cuba.

A central theme in Menem’s new strategy is the reinsertion of Argentina into the international community. For example, an Argentine contingent was sent to participate in the Persian Gulf War and to form part of the U.N. peace-keeping force in Yugoslavia. Increased international participation has been complemented by the outward-oriented economic program that stresses privatization and seeks to attract direct foreign investment. Argentina now has a different vision of the world and a different vision of itself. It is seeking to establish for itself an image as a reliable partner and a responsible member of the international community.
V. The Caribbean

With the end of the Cold War, the Caribbean faces a new regional agenda. The Soviet Union is no longer perceived as an external threat to the area and national security is not an overriding concern. Instead, nations are concentrating on economic cooperation and positioning themselves in relation to NAFTA. Although continued North American military and economic strength ensures U.S. hegemony in the Caribbean, the role of the U.S. is changing dramatically. Andrés Serbín, from INVESP, addressed these issues in his presentation, "Peace and Cooperation in the Caribbean." He began by asserting that the national security interests of the Caribbean are distinct from the rest of Latin America. The region is strongly influenced by the leverage of the U.S., and is dramatically affected by changes in the definition of U.S. national security. Serbín asserted that with the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region, a political vacuum is forming. Also, Cuba’s influence in the area has declined precipitously. In the wake of these changes, there has been an increase role of European countries. Recently, British Commonwealth links to the region have led to increased financial and military presence of the former colonial power. Since the Malvinas Islands war there has been a strong British naval presence. In addition, French influence has increased through stronger relations with Guadalupe. The Caribbean is a channel of communication between France and the Pacific French communities.

But European influence will remain minimal; it cannot challenge the U.S. role. According to Serbín, increased economic integration could "fill the growing political vacuum" in the region. Negotiations and interactions on economic issues tend to extend into international politics. The two principal vehicles for increased economic cooperation are CARICOM (Caribbean Common Market) and the Group of Three (G-3) (Venezuela, Colombia and Mexico).
Endeavors to create a common economic zone in the region peaked during the 1970s and these forces are currently being revived after nearly a decade of relative disinterest. The process is being facilitated by the outward looking orientations of nations' economies. There have been initiatives by the CARICOM group together with Central America to increase their participation in international fora. In addition, the role of the G-3 could be crucial in a future transition to democracy in Cuba. Serbín concluded that there is an emerging role of the "middle powers" in the promotion of stability. Several workshop participants disagreed, arguing that U.S. dominance will continue indefinitely and there is no major role for third countries.

Serbín pointed out the differences in perspectives toward security issues between the U.S. and the countries of the Caribbean Basin. Aside from the longstanding issue of Cuba, the key U.S. security concerns focus on three issues: control of drug trafficking, immigration to U.S. territory, and the environment. The Caribbean countries, on the other hand, focus on four issues: the remnants of the Cold War and the influence of Cuba in the region, the relations between CARICOM and the G-3, the differences within the G-3, and accelerated integration between Venezuela and Colombia. The last issue, increased economic cooperation between Venezuela and Colombia, has elicited a very strong negative reaction from the Venezuelan military and the general population, and has demonstrated the increased polarization between the security concerns of the armed forces and the economic priorities of the government's technocrats. Economic imperatives cannot eclipse nationalism and traditional interstate rivalries. As Costa pointed out in his paper on Brazil, economic integration efforts have a profound impact on national security perceptions and the setting of national priorities.

Drug trafficking is a critical concern to all actors in the region. Yet, there is a fundamental difference between U.S. and Latin American perceptions of the threat of drugs.
The U.S. fights drugs in an attempt to prevent distribution and consumption on its city streets. Nations of the Caribbean, on the other hand, are fighting for political stability, particularly the smaller countries. At all times, the goals of fighting the drug war are subservient to political and economic imperatives.

Serbin concluded his discussion by reasserting his conviction that by the end of the decade, U.S. involvement will be significantly reduced. If the U.S. military budget is cut, a military withdrawal is inevitable. The U.S. must encourage increased collective security and other nations in the region must be prepared to take up the slack.
VI. The Case of Peru

Juan Velit, a researcher from the Peruvian International Studies Center, discussed major themes in Peruvian history in "Cooperation for Peace: A Peruvian Perspective." Traditionally, Peruvian national security concerns have been centered on external threats; the result of repeated interference and intervention by neighboring countries. During the wars of independence against Spanish colonialism, Lima was a loyalist stronghold, and independence came in 1821 as the consequence of an outside force—General San Martín. During the battles, Peru lost a large amount of territory as the new nation struggled to win its sovereignty. Autonomy, however, did not ensure security. Following independence, border disputes with neighboring countries led to violent confrontations, the most severe being the War of the Pacific (1879-83), during which Peru lost nitrate rich territory to Chile. For most of Peru’s history, the armed forces has been concerned, at one time or another, with each of its five neighbors, and has perceived a constant security threat from Chile and Ecuador.

Defense related issues in Peru were significantly altered by the 1968 military coup that brought General Juan Velasco Alvarado to power. Up to that point, the Peruvian armed forces had maintained strong relations with the U.S., purchasing its equipment from North American sources. However, the radical economic policies implemented by the military regime, such as the nationalization of the foreign owned International Petroleum Company and agrarian reform, seriously damaged relations with the U.S. Once in power, the armed forces modernized the military structure. Unable to purchase U.S. equipment, Peru acquired a substantial amount of material from the Soviet Union and Western Europe, further disturbing the U.S. State Department. The military regime also closed its two hundred mile ocean boundary, causing confrontations with other countries over the use of Peruvian waters by foreign fishing vessels.
Peru became diplomatically and ideologically isolated from the U.S. and conservative military regimes on the continent, and formed closer relations with Cuba and Allende’s Chile.

Efforts by the military government to modernize the Peruvian armed forces were continued at the beginning of the Belaunde administration, the first civilian government in the 1980 transition to democratic rule. Military officials apparently still perceived a serious external threat to the country’s security, and several Mirage 2000 fighter planes were purchased from France. But the economic crisis that swept across Latin America after 1982 resulted in severe balance of payments crises, making it impossible for Peru to continue purchasing modern arms. Upon taking office in 1985, Alan García initiated a program to reduce further the acquisition of new armaments.

With return of democratic rule, the Peruvian government was confronted with a new and dangerous threat: the insurgency of Sendero Luminoso. Initially, the guerrilla insurgency was handled by the police. The Belaunde administration was reluctant to grant more authority to the armed forces. After all, they had only recently relinquished control of the state. As the guerrilla threat increased and became linked to drug trafficking, the Peruvian armed forces became involved and Sendero was considered a critical national security concern.

Sendero also acted as a catalyst for improving U.S.-Peruvian military relations. The threat of a communist takeover, coupled with the demands of the drug war, has led to increased cooperation between the two countries. U.S. involvement in Peru, however, shares a basic characteristic described by other researchers at the workshop: the North Americans and the Peruvians have very different approaches to the drug war. According to Velit, the U.S. views the drug war and counterinsurgency efforts as two separate issues. Peru, on the other hand,
believes the two should be closely linked.

Before the April 5, 1992 autogolpe, President Alberto Fujimori enjoyed good relations with the U.S. military. The new Peruvian president was amenable to Washington's drug control policies. But Fujimori also believed that Peru confronted a fundamental problem of governability that eclipsed any U.S. policy objectives. Fujimori's dissolution of Congress has created a difficult situation for U.S. foreign policy; Washington must balance its opposition to the end of democratic rule, even if temporary, with the goals of fighting the drug war. The consensus within the Bush administration was that Fujimori was making a sincere effort to restore full democratic conditions.
VII. Central America

During the first session of the second day of the *Redefining National Security* workshop, Luis Guillermo Solís-Rivera of the Arias Foundation in San José, Costa Rica, presented "From War to Integration: Democratic Transition and Security Issues in Central America." Solís began the presentation by explaining the new circumstances that have confronted Latin America since the signing of the Esquipulas II agreements in 1987. Four developments were identified. First, political relations among the nations of the region have been normalized. Although past conflicts have not been resolved, there are no fundamental disagreements that can be expected to cause major political divisions. Second, the end of the Cold War had a very positive impact on the region. Central America was major arena of Cold War conflict and the end of superpower rivalry has facilitated regional peace. The establishment of emerging democracies is the third major development. All five nations are now ruled by freely elected leaders. And, fourth, civil society has gained a more effective role in policymaking. Non-governmental actors influence decisionmaking and the formation of policy.

These major factors have influenced national security by diminishing tensions in the region, reducing the ideological component of conflict, and broadening the political space for interstate negotiation. Currently (aside from a recent resurgence of border conflict between Guatemala and Belize) there are no major sources of political tension between states.

Solís noted the differences between the armed forces in Central America and those of South America. Unlike other Latin American nations, armed forces were not present in Central America during the wars of independence. Before the establishment of national armies around the turn of the century, there were only private armies, funded by local strongmen. The U.S.
actively promoted the formation of national armies and praetorian guards. Full autonomy of the armed forces came only in the 1970s when financial independence was secured. More recently, the military establishments have demonstrated an increasing tendency to act independently from the nations’ ruling elites. Overall, the armed forces in Central America do not view themselves as the victims of democracy, as in South America, but as its founding fathers.

Solís asserted that Central America must develop a "New Security Model," which he defined as armed forces of a purely defensive nature, a reasonable balance of forces among the nations of the subregion, and a political system based on democracy. This framework for a redefinition of defense policy must take into consideration the following characteristics: the threat from neighboring countries is negligible; the role of the armed forces as guarantors of state sovereignty has been distorted by the overwhelming presence of the U.S.; there is no extra-regional military threat and foreign military bases are not needed; and the main external threat to the region is narcotrafficking. Additionally, the absence of an external military threat, as had been provided by the Cold War and the constant possibility of "communist subversion," creates a dilemma for Central America. Without the perception of internal or external threat there is no argument for opposing the reduction of the armed forces, which would diminish the power and support of social forces currently in power. Alternatively, if the role of the armed forces changes significantly, the military could grow to dispute the hegemony of the civilians in government.

Can the military and democracy coexist in Central America? Solís argued that historically, the stronger the military in a country, the weaker was its democratic system, and vice-versa. This creates a difficult situation as new democratic regimes attempt to reduce the strength of the armed forces. In Nicaragua, for example, Daniel Ortega has resisted efforts to
diminish the nation’s military strength, asserting that the army is the guarantor of sovereignty. Yet, civilian government is confronted with fiscal and political needs to curtail military spending, and Humberto Ortega’s seeming independence as head of the army makes many civilian politicians nervous. This issue is becoming a serious bone of contention among political parties.
VIII. The Case of Chile

During the second half of the morning session, Francisco Rojas-Aravena, of FLACSO-Santiago, provided a brief review of current Chilean security concerns by affirming a theme common to all the researchers' presentations: the changing international security milieu has affected research on Chile differently from other nations of Latin America. As global changes force nations to reformulate concepts of national security, there are two tendencies in Chilean thought. First, many political leaders and academics are searching for ways to redefine fundamentally concepts of defense. The end of the cold war has created opportunities for Chile to adopt a new national and international approach to security.

A second trend in Chilean thought, predominant among conservative members of the military, opposes reformulation of national security priorities and maintains traditional concepts of threat. The world has changed, but it is not necessarily a safer place, and although the new international order has diminished certain dangers, it has created others. Although the strategic threat of global nuclear war and superpower conflict has been significantly reduced, the potential for economic conflict among regional blocs and the forces of nationalism have emerged. Chile is particularly threatened because of its open economy—it cannot be "an island to the world." This situation exposes the nation to a host of international hazards.

Rojas listed the primary security concerns of the Chilean armed forces. The Chilean army is concerned with the territorial disputes between Brazil and its neighboring countries (Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru) and with the permeability of the lengthy Brazilian border. Although not directly involved in the Brazil issue, the uncertainty of the situation compels the Chilean armed forces to be prepared for a variety of possible future scenarios. Another issue
not directly affecting Chile, but with potentially harmful side-effects, is civil war in Peru and Colombia. Increased internal conflict in those countries would increase the flow of immigrants seeking safe refuge in Chile. The drug war is also a security issue. The influence of narcotrafficking is not nearly as severe a problem as in some neighboring nations, and the Chilean armed forces want to maintain this situation.

Relations between the United States and Chile have improved. The friction between the two nations during the years of military dictatorship has been replaced by increased economic and political cooperation. Chile has actively courted better relations with the U.S. in the hope of eventually signing a free trade agreement. Nevertheless, the Chilean military remains suspicious of U.S. motives. For example, the armed forces have planned to increase Chilean control over naval passage through the Straits of Magellan and Chilean Antarctica, but the United States has worked to prevent this strategic maneuver. Also, the Chilean Navy’s desire to control an extended area off its coast and maintain surveillance of the entire southern Pacific is not supported by the U.S.

The Chilean armed forces share a goal with other military establishments on the continent: modernization. As the economy grows, military equipment and training should also improve and advanced technology has become a pivotal characteristic of an effective fighting force. Modernization, it is hoped, will also lead to professionalization and the permanent exclusion of generals from domestic politics. The process, however, faces budgetary constraints and will take time.
VIII. U.S. Security Policy for Latin America and the Caribbean

During the last segment of the Redefining National Security workshop, Nina Serafino outlined her paper, "U.S. Security Policy for Latin America and the Caribbean: Current Situation and Prospects." Serafino's research seeks to identify current U.S. national security and policy activities toward Latin America and the Caribbean. Every participant's research concluded that the U.S. remains a dominant actor in the Western Hemisphere and that future U.S. policies are a critical component of Latin American security.

Uncertainty is a central characteristic of U.S. security strategy. Warfare planning, according to Serafino, no longer considers global nuclear confrontation, but multiple simultaneous regional crises. Forecasting such events is difficult.

Current U.S. strategy rests on four major objectives. First, U.S. forces seek to deter the rise of international aggression. Second, threats to U.S. security, such as terrorism, and North American citizens abroad are to be countered. Third, the U.S. will seek to stabilize the global arms situation and military balance. And, fourth, democratic reforms and free market economies are to be promoted.

Beyond general U.S. policies, Serafino examined activities specific to Latin America. Washington's priorities and objectives in the region are based on SOUTHCOM mission priorities. A U.S. Army general explained to Serafino, the primary objectives of SOUTHCOM are to support the counterdrug effort, help sustain the negotiated peace settlement in El Salvador, promote democracy in Panama, and enhance the professionalism of the South and Central American militaries.
In fulfillment of these specific goals, the U.S. response centers on a "forward presence" in the region—a conventional response calling for temporary or permanent stationing of troops. Civilians refer to the situation as "peacetime engagement." Thus, the U.S. maintains troops in many Latin American countries and forces are active in the effort to curb the production of illegal drugs.

U.S. security policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean in the post-Cold War period continues to be largely a function of U.S. strategy elsewhere in the world. Global defense doctrine is currently undergoing a transformation of concepts, objectives, and capabilities that will inevitably affect U.S. thinking about Latin America. These changes are not only a function of the obvious strategic factors, but will reflect changes in force structures, procedures, and military technology. Regional factors, such as the end of civil conflict in Central America, drug trafficking, and the implementation of the Panama Canal Treaty requiring the withdrawal of U.S. troops are also creating changes.
IX. The Future of Conflict Resolution in the Western Hemisphere

If the Cold War was a major determinant of conflict resolution in the Western Hemisphere, there should be a significant difference in dispute settlement behavior before and after the Cold War. In the paper, "The Future of Conflict Resolution in the Western Hemisphere: International Influence," David Mares investigated the possible effects the end of the Cold War on future conflicts in Latin America. Dealing strictly with international disputes, Mares examined conflict disputes among Latin American nations since 1917. Conflict was divided into three categories; moderate use of force, war, and peaceful resolution. More than one hundred fifty Latin American Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDIs) were researched and the results indicate that disputes among states decreased during the Cold War. Mares asserted that common explanations for the paucity of war in Latin America, such as the role of mediation of foreign powers and economic interdependence, are inadequate. Democracy, diplomacy and a rough balance of power are more promising factors.

Two additional hypotheses were also examined: the cold war was either an ideological battle or a bipolar power struggle. Research revealed that ideology--capitalism versus socialism--was not a significant determinant of conflict. During the Cold War, the U.S. was a unipolar force in the Western Hemisphere. Under these conditions, the U.S. acted as the policeman of the hemisphere. During this period, one would predict a decrease in conflict for fear of U.S. involvement. U.S. being unipolar in the region, however, did not determine the willingness of nations to go to war.

Mares also asked the question: Is the end of the Cold War a watershed in the history of conflict resolution? Are nation-states changing? He presented a succinct analysis of the major
political changes occurring at the international level, relating them to the conflict resolution theme. He asserted that although there have been major international changes with the end of the Cold War, the forces of nationalism are as strong as ever. Newly emerging concepts of security, such as the importance of economic well-being, are not significantly influencing national defense policy. In addition, the concept of global community, interconnectedness, and the possibility of collective military security are not changing international relations.

Mares' research led to three basic conclusions. First, during the time period under review, international factors do not have significant impact on whether a conflict was resolved through the use of war. Second, because the Cold War was not a major determinant of interstate disputes, current international changes are not likely to decrease significantly the relevance of the use of war as a policy tool. Third, although full scale war is relatively rare, disputes between Latin American nations have regularly escalated to a point at which use of force is utilized to communicate interest.