The President's Big Middle East Speech
As President Obama contemplates giving a major address on the Arab world and Middle East, he shouldn't get carried away. Public Policy Scholar Aaron David Miller cautions that the president's rhetoric shouldn't exceed the United States' capacity to act.
The wise and cautious George Shultz famously said that when the United States doesn't have a policy or has an ineffective one, the pressure grows to give a speech.
As the president contemplates giving a major address on the Arab world and Middle East, this is surely not his problem, at least as it pertains to the administration's response to the Arab spring (Egypt and Tunisia) and the Arab winter (Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Bahrain). Given the range and speed of the challenges it confronted, the Obama team has fared pretty well.
That the administration's reaction to all these changes sometimes seemed to be a giant game of Whac-a-Mole in its response to the latest pop-up uprising spoke less to its failings and more to the nature of the problem.
It's understandable that the administration wants to rationalize its approach so that there's consistency and high principles, and a speech would try to do that.
But the president shouldn't get carried away. The last thing he needs is a doctrine that injects ideological rigidity where flexibility is required. It's just not possible to harmonize American interests and values across the board. We intervened militarily in Libya where Qadhafi was killing his own people; we didn't in Syria where Assad was killing his. And we called for Qadhafi to step down but left the Khalifas in Bahrain and President Saleh in Yemen alone because we have important interests in both places.
On the Arab-Israeli issue, however, Shultz's advice may apply. The administration has lacked an effective strategy; to give a speech without real follow-up seems ill-timed and ill-advised, particularly now, when the administration's critics will say it's a carrot for Abbas (and Hamas) and a stick against Israel. There is value in putting the United States on record as supporting the feasibility and desirability of an end game on the big issues. But Woody Allen was wrong; 90 percent of life isn't just showing up; it's showing up at the right time.
Fighting with Israel will be necessary if an agreement is to be reached. But why fight now over a nonexistent peace process? And why put out U.S. policy positions that will be picked apart, devalued, and trivialized, when negotiations may be months away?
Words matter; deeds matter more. Whatever speech is given, the rhetoric shouldn't exceed the United States' capacity to act—otherwise, American credibility disappears in the gap.
