Beyond the Divide? Sino-Japanese Relations and the Implications for the United States

At a May 7 event sponsored by the Asia Program, the speakers agreed that Sino-Japanese economic relations are strong, and political relations are warming, but still fragile. There was consensus that it is vitally important to the United States that these two East Asia giants get along; the United States cannot stand idly by and simply hope for the best.

Michael Yahuda, professor emeritus at the London School of Economics, and a Woodrow Wilson Fellow, began his presentation by describing the strength of the Sino-Japanese economic relationship. China is now Japan's most important trading partner, having surpassed the United States. Japan is also the largest investor in China. Nevertheless, the division between the two countries in other areas is wide and deep. Although Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Japan last month helped to "melt the ice," differences remain.

These differences include resurgent nationalism, territorial disputes, and issues of history. In the 1990s, for various reasons, anti-Japanese sentiment in China grew, and anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan increased. Additionally, the two resurgent powers have not thought through where to place each other in the changing distribution of power in Asia. Over the last year or so, especially since the replacement of Prime Minister Koizumi with Prime Minister Abe, Chinese leaders have sought to damp down anti-Japanese sentiment. Nevertheless, Japan's new initiatives with the United States, India, Australia and the European Union seem to the Chinese like moves to encircle them. Japan remains concerned about China's growing military build-up, and its lack of transparency.

U.S. policy is to deal separately with China and Japan. Yahuda doubted that in the long run this policy could be sustained. One solution would be to have more of an intense trilateral dialogue, on a whole range of issues, a kind of strategic dialogue among the three countries. The trouble with this approach, said Yahuda, is that neither China nor Japan may be ready for such an approach. The United States needs to recognize the security dilemma developing between China and Japan. Japan is seeking more modern weapons systems. China is seeking the military capability to deter U.S. intervention in the Taiwan Strait. The United States is well-positioned to ameliorate such suspicions.

Jing Huang of the Brookings Institution agreed that Premier Wen Jiabao's recent visit to Japan has helped reduce frictions between the two countries. He said that Beijing realizes a stable Sino-Japanese relationship is indispensable to sustain China's development and stability. Huang also agreed that the differences between the two remain deep. There is the clash of different political systems, different approaches to Taiwan and North Korea, negative coverage of each other in their respective media, and the fact that China's rapid rise is changing the strategic balance in the region.

Moreover, nationalist sentiment is rising in both countries. One cause of China's nationalism is negative, said Huang, the feeling of "victimhood" in reaction to China's "century of shame." The other, according to Huang, is positive, the nationalism growing out of pride over China's accomplishments during the last two decades. Huang felt that the more positive aspect of nationalism is growing in China. In addition, the leadership recognizes that angry nationalism is a two-edged sword. If the public starts complaining about too much Japanese influence in China, for example, such complaints can easily turn into attacks on the leadership for allowing such Japanese influence. Huang noted that for the United States, the necessary balancing act is to engage more with China without weakening the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Amy Searight of George Washington University first noted that within Japan there are different views regarding how to deal with China. She called it a "shifting consensus," noting that the Japanese themselves describe the bilateral relationship as "hot economics, cold politics." She said that Japan has a reasonably coherent strategy toward China regarding the bilateral economic relationship. However, on the political side, there is much more inconsistency, with many different voices.

Prime Minister Abe has shown more pragmatism toward China than his predecessor, and China has reciprocated. The big question for the immediate future of Sino-Japanese relations is whether or not Abe will visit Yasukuni Shrine. On this point, Abe has been ambiguous. (This discussion took place before it was learned that Abe had sent a gift to the shrine.) Searight then asked the question if, over time, Japan could handle being No. 2 in Asia. Her personal view was that Japan would be able to accept "co-leadership" in the region. The issue, then, would be if China could accept co-leadership as well.

Alan Romberg of the Stimson Center stated that neither China nor Japan was on an aggressive path. Neither wants conflict, and both need each other for economic development. Over the past 10 years, Sino-Japanese relations have grown worse in certain areas, such as over the issue of Taiwan. Some say that for the United States, this is not all bad, as it has moved the U.S.-Japan relationship closer. Romberg asserted that souring Sino-Japanese relations is not in the interests of the United States. It reduces cooperation, and runs the risk of actual tension. For example, there are ocean and territorial disputes between the two. The United States has a treaty to defend Japan if attacked. What if China attacked Japan, for example, over the Senkakus Islands? Although Romberg thought the likelihood minimal, it nonetheless underscored that the United States has a direct interest in conflict not breaking out between the two countries.

Romberg also brought up the possibility of trilateral discussions among the United States, China and Japan on issues of concern, such as the joint development of energy policies, cooperation in disaster relief, and joint naval cooperation. He declared that Washington cannot simply ignore the status of Sino-Japanese relations and hope for the best. Overall, he described the Sino-Japanese relationship as "quite fragile," and said the United States cannot be a bystander.

Drafted by Mark Mohr, Asia Program Associate
Robert M. Hathaway, Director, Asia Program. Ph: (202) 691-4020