A Europe of Extremes: Pro- and Anti-European Constituencies in Old and New Europe

Long before the 2004 EU enlargement, and before the failed referendums on the EU constitution in France and the Netherlands, there has been concern that certain constituencies in the EU have lost faith in European integration. These signals came in the form of national elections, in which radical, nationalist and populist parties have been gaining popular support, such as Jean-Marie Le Pen in France and Vadim Tudor in Romania. In her presentation, Alina Mungiu Pippidi analyzed the nature of anti-europeanism, making a distinction between the EU-15 and the new member states from postcommunist Europe, using the shorthand of "old" and "new" Europe.

Basing her research on the World Values Survey, Pippidi found that sentiments and motivations for being pro- or anti-European vary greatly between old and new Europe. She presented four portraits of pro-Europeans and anti-Europeans in old and new Europe. In the EU-15, people who favor the EU tend to be wealthy and well educated. They tend to see that they have more to gain in a united Europe. Since they read European press, they feel more European, see the EU as a political and economic actor and are better able to conceptualize Europe. Moreover, supporters of the EU in Western Europe tend to have less interest in material values.

In new Europe, the portrait of a pro-European is similar in that they tend to be urban, wealthy and well educated. However, pro-Europeans in East Europe are very interested in material values and have other right-wing traits, such as being staunch anti-communists, concerned with security and strongly supportive of NATO. At the same time, people who support the EU distrust their national governments and hope that EU accession will help overcome inequality at the domestic level. EU bureaucrats in Brussels are perceived to be "clean," and many people in East Europe (mistakenly) believe that after enlargement, they would be governed primarily from Brussels, which would be preferable to being governed by corrupt local leaders. Pippidi explained that this misconception is behind the relatively low turnout in last year's European Parliament elections in Eastern Europe: East Europeans were not interested in electing local representatives to serve in European institutions, because they saw EU accession as a way to escape being governed by corrupt East Europeans!

Pippidi equates anti-EU sentiments in both "old" and "new" Europe with populism, which is characterized by the fear of change, nostalgia for a perceived golden age, and a persecution syndrome. There is considerable divergence between the old and new EU members. Anti-EU populists in "old" Europe believe that the EU has gone too fast, both in its geographical expansion and in its deepening political and economic integration. They tend to be less educated, middle class or blue-collar workers. The strongest support comes from the so-called "traumatized" blue-collar workers who are unemployed, retired or have a history of unemployment.

In "new" Europe, populism is not essentially about the EU, but is a broad-based mixture of left- and right-wing anti-political, anti-establishment sentiments, which makes them relatively hard to isolate. The most salient issues seem to be that populists are against minorities, and indeed quite xenophobic. In some countries, such as Russia, they also tend to be strongly anti-Western. Often they are also supporters of the past authoritarian regime and do not believe in multi-party democracy. Thus, populists in "old" and "new" Europe are very different. If, Pippidi added, East European populists resemble those in the West, it is because they are actively copying their styles. Nevertheless, their motives and agendas remain quite distinct.

The fear that anti-European sentiments could destroy the Union is probably unrealistic. The practical reasons for creating a strong economic bloc in Europe are seen as generally beneficial by almost all groups. But populist, nationalist sentiments are helping to shelve the idealistic goals of a united Europe. Pippidi predicts that these idealistic goals, related to deeper political integration, will eventually be dropped in favor of the practical concerns of cooperation to guarantee a global market share for Europe.