NPIHP Working Paper Series
The NPIHP Working Paper Series is designed to provide a speedy publications outlet for historians who have gained access to newly-available archives and sources and would like to share their results.
Issues in this Series
NPIHP Working Paper #1. If India had presented the world with a nuclear fait accompli, the eminent Indian journalist Amalendu Das Gupta mused in 1987, “the Americans and their allies would have been angry; the Russians would have been unhappy."
Between Aid and Restriction: Changing Soviet Policies toward China’s Nuclear Weapons Program: 1954-1960
Based on newly-available archival material from Chinese sources, NPIHP Working Paper #2 explores the relationship between Soviet Union and China during the 1950s and 1960s as the latter sought to establish their atomic industry and develop a nuclear weapon with Soviet scientific and technological assistance.
NPIHP Working Paper #3. Jayita Sarkar explores technological collaboration between the French and Indian Atomic Energy Commissions, using new archival documents to expose how shared opposition to U.S. information censorship and the desire to preserve foreign policy independence fostered nuclear collaboration between the two nations.
Sergey Radchenko draws on Soviet and Russian documents from 1991-1993 to argue that the first North Korean crisis began partly as a result of the policy choices of key regional players. Radchenko investigates Russia’s policy towards North Korea during this period, and how this policy may have inadvertently complicated the situation on the Korean Peninsula.
Despite its legal status, Germany has never been an ordinary non-nuclear weapons state. In "The Persistent Legacy: Germany's Place in the Nuclear Order," Andreas Lutsch explores the historical dimensions of Germany's ambiguous position in the global nuclear order and re-examines Germany's efforts to revise its NATO role as a host for US nuclear weapons.
Yogesh Joshi explores how new archival evidence from the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library on the 1974 PNE and the origins of India's nuclear submarine program can inform strategic discourse on India's nuclear weapons program.