The Beautiful Game and an Anxious Review: The FIFA World Cup and the US-Mexico Partnership

As the 2026 World Cup kicks off alongside pivotal USMCA reviews, North America’s ability to coordinate border mobility and match security under intense political scrutiny will define the next chapter of US-Mexico relations.

World Cup Trophy

The North American bloc faces a major stress test with the sixth-year joint review of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) starting July 1. While the process was once expected to be largely procedural, new trade tactics from the second Trump administration have shifted expectations from review to renegotiation. While an unprecedented tariff strategy reframes market access as leverage for non-trade issues, contentious political messaging between heads of state and retaliatory measures threatens continental cohesion.

At the same time, North America will co-host the 2026 FIFA World Cup. From June 11 to July 19, 104 matches will be played across 16 host cities in the largest international soccer tournament ever organized. Throughout the World Cup, the co-hosts will collaborate on security, mobility, and customs. These are key areas of cooperation outlined by the USMCA. They also broadly encompass the policy concessions that the US has sought from Mexico, including the targeting of cartel networks, curbing undocumented migration, and ensuring regulatory enforcement.

In May, the Office of the US Trade Representative announced a series of bilateral negotiating rounds with Mexico extending through the week of July 20. The timeline closely mirrors the World Cup schedule. As a result, matches will simultaneously provide leaders with the opportunity to convene outside of formal negotiations and demonstrate the USMCA’s effects on tournament logistics and security operations.

Blended Securities, Tangible Results

In 2025, the US exchanged $878.2 billion in goods with Mexico. However, while the economies are more integrated than ever, the Trump administration has decompartmentalized economic policy and national security. This was demonstrated by the administration’s rationale for invoking Section 232 tariffs on “imports [that] ‘threaten to impair’ US national security.” For Mexico, delivering on the US’ regional priorities such as fentanyl seizures and combatting cartel networks has become a necessity for all areas of trade.

In a January call with Mexico’s foreign minister, Secretary of State Marco Rubio emphasized the need for “tangible results” on regional security. Shortly thereafter, Mexican forces killed Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) leader Nemesio Oseguera-Cervantes, known as “El Mencho,” in an operation supported by CIA intelligence. Following the operation, a wave of retaliatory violence carried out by CJNG members broke out around Guadalajara. In addition to temporarily shuttering schools and public infrastructure, the violence caused FIFA officials to consider relocating the city’s World Cup playoff games.

Ultimately, Mexican authorities insisted on keeping the World Cup in Guadalajara and in March they announced Plan Kukulcán. The strategy, benefitting from intelligence sharing with the US, will dispatch 100,000 armed forces, police personnel, military jets, and drone surveillance to host cities through the end of July. Still, intelligence cooperation is perceived as merely a baseline commitment by Washington DC. What remains to be seen is if, throughout the course of the tournament, Mexico can leverage that intelligence to quickly respond to security threats and coordinate security forces between competition venues.

While the goalposts of “tangible results” are vague, trade representatives will point to the successes of security cooperation during the World Cup as evidence of the countries negotiating in good faith. Any security failures, on the other hand, will further jeopardize the already tenuous trust between Washington DC and Mexico City.

Mobility, Customs Enforcement, and Staying Onside

This year’s World Cup is the first to share hosting responsibilities between three countries, presenting a new challenge for regional border infrastructure. The US Department of State expects 5 to 7 million travelers to the US for the tournament. Between October 1, 2025, and April 30, 2026, US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) approved over 5 million applications for the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) and saw over 1.6 million applications for Trusted Traveler Programs including Global Entry, SENTRI, and NEXUS.

While the volume of registrations for visa waiver and trusted traveler programs is encouraging, challenges are likely to emerge for fan travel from Latin America. Soccer powerhouses such as Argentina (ranked third in the world by FIFA) and Brazil (ranked sixth), whose nationals are not required to possess a visa to enter Mexico, are not included in the US visa waiver program. While an expedited FIFA PASS (Priority Appointment Scheduling System) program was created for ticket holding fans in mid-April, it has facilitated fewer than 20,000 appointments for the necessary B1 or B2 visas. With their first matches held stateside, incompatible visa processes may present a roadblock to full stadiums at the group stage. This is to say nothing of the four qualifying countries – Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, Iran, and Senegal – facing full or partial travel bans.

At the same time, the highly visible deployment of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents has had a chilling effect on attendance (a continuation of the trend from the 2025 Club World Cup also hosted by the US). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has offered mixed reassurances. CBP announced in a since deleted tweet that its agents would be “booted and suited” ahead of the 2025 Club World Cup. More recently, Secretary of Homeland Security Markwayne Mullin told a CBS interviewer that “when they’re at these sporting events, [ICE] is not out there doing immigration enforcement” and is instead focused on counterfeit products including tickets and clothing. However, when pressed on the possibility of immigration enforcement, he added, “ICE always says immigration enforcement. We’re always going to do that.”

While the USMCA facilitates temporary business entry for North American citizens, any negative effects on fan travel and tournament attendance will spotlight the need for greater collaboration on regional tourism and travel policy. The bipartisan USMCA Travel and Tourism Resiliency Act, introduced to the US Congress in February, would require the US Trade Representative to form a Travel and Tourism Trade Working Group during USMCA negotiations. Currently under Senate Finance committee review, proponents will cite trends in World Cup tourism to elevate the bill’s urgency.

Even while some processes have been created to facilitate the movement of players, officials, and fans, border agents have not been able to project the degree to which traffic will increase at specific ports of entry. Beyond the movement of fans and teams, the tournament will elevate goods flows including those of equipment, merchandise, and apparel. The unpredictability of traffic at ports of entry paired with stricter inspection protocols is likely to generate bottlenecks, especially if staffing shortages and confusion over tariff rules complicate transit. Are USMCA provisions up to the task of enforcing rules of origin, protecting intellectual property, and facilitating professional and tourist travel across a 39-day tournament schedule? Negotiators will receive live answers to these questions as they convene in both government offices and in arena suites across North America.

Outlet Passes

While Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has been combative in response to tariffs and bluster about the “51st state,” President Claudia Sheinbaum has walked a tightrope between diplomacy and protecting Mexico’s sovereignty ahead of the joint review. Carney has been adamant that Canada will not serve as a “supplicant” to the US while revisiting the USMCA, and no bilateral US-Canada negotiations have been scheduled prior to July 1. Where does that position Mexico, which by all accounts has adopted a more conciliatory approach? How does Mexico avoid a pattern of supplication during trade negotiations when it delivers “tangible results” to meet US demands?

Should American negotiators move the goal posts of security and border cooperation too far, Mexico can leverage its relationships beyond the US to hold the line. In September 2025, Prime Minister Carney and President Sheinbaum met to discuss the bilateral relationship and outline its future should the USMCA not survive. The potential to better align on critical minerals, energy, infrastructure, and investor confidence is being met with a greater appetite from Ottawa and Mexico City than ever before, driven by the perceived volatility of Washington, DC. Beyond North America, Mexico diversifies its trade relationships in Latin America through partnerships such as the Pacific Alliance (including Chile, Colombia, and Peru). Additionally, while President Sheinbaum issued new tariffs on Chinese imports just three days before meetings with US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer on April 20, the fact remains that China is Mexico’s second largest trading partner. The US can ill afford to alienate Mexico as a pivot point into South America, where China has expanded its influence in recent years.

Ultimately, the preference of all countries - US, Mexico, and Canada - is to sustain the trilateral relationship, even if significant changes will be negotiated. In early June, representatives of both Mexico and Canada called for extending the trade pact by 16 years. No matter the rhetoric and posturing between North America’s leaders, the three are bound to a shared future by trade, geography, and soccer. As July 1 approaches, it becomes increasingly clear that a smooth renewal of the USMCA is a fantasy. However, the World Cup can serve as a balm for the inevitable irritants of renegotiating the world’s second largest trade bloc.

Recall the 1986 World Cup, when the controversy around FIFA’s last-minute handover of hosting duties to Mexico and subsequent outrage from the US soccer federation took a backseat to Maradona’s immortal “hand of God” and “Goal of the Century” performance. Eight years later, the 1994 World Cup in the US would coincide with the launch of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), both serving to highlight the integration of regional economies, cultures, and sport. The beautiful game will again play a role in the outcome of geopolitics, with higher stakes in 2026 than ever before. At its best, the coordination of tournament security, cross-border movement, and regulatory enforcement will strengthen the case of USMCA renewal. It will also remind fans and heads of state alike of the inextricable relationships that tie the US and Mexico, and all of North America together.

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