The Next Generation in Russia and Ukraine: Agents of Change?
Although polling data from as recently as 2002 indicated that Russian and Ukrainian youth held comparable attitudes toward democracy, the situation changed leading up to 2004, according to Nadia Diuk, senior director, Europe and Eurasia, National Endowment for Democracy, and member, Kennan Institute Advisory Council, at a recent Kennan Institute talk. Evidence of this was seen during the Orange Revolution of 2004, which involved large numbers of young people in politics for the first time in post-1991 Ukraine, she asserted. As a cultural phenomenon, she added, the weeks of street protests focused on youth culture, featuring performances by rock bands and appeals for change. In Russia, a similar phenomenon has not taken place, partly because the middle class is predominantly made up of young people who often work in jobs where loyalty to the government is encouraged, Diuk noted.
According to Diuk, the Orange Revolution was led by and focused on youth. Young people and youth groups formed the backbone of the street protests. Subsequently, many of these groups have gone in different directions, she said. "Pora" (literally, "It's Time"), Ukraine's largest youth group during the Orange Revolution, split into two branches. The so-called "yellow" Pora has become a political party often working in tandem with the Reform and Order Party. "Black" Pora, on the other hand, has chosen to register as a civic organization and engage in non-partisan activity, such as election monitoring. Diuk noted that a small but significant number of young people have broken through and have been appointed to prominent positions in government and in party leadership, including: Youth Minister Yuri Pavlenko (age 33); Vyacheslav Kyrylenko (age 39), the leader of the Our Ukraine People's Union party; and Foreign Minister Arseniy Yatseniuk (age 33). Of the major parties and blocs running for parliament, the Our Ukraine-People's Self Defense Bloc appears to have made the most direct appeal to young people, as reflected in the relatively young average age (39) of the top ten figures on its party list.
Diuk observed that youth participation in Russian politics is following a different path. According to Diuk, Russia's young generation is generally seen as part of the emerging middle class. As such, Russian youth is more likely to stay loyal to the Russian state and the political status quo. Moreover, Nashi (literally "Ours"), the major Russian youth organization, was itself endorsed if not created by the Russian state and was used by the authorities to build loyalty to the government. Nashi's political platform, which mixes anti-Americanism and anti-fascism, was designed to further ensure that young people remained loyal to the Russian state.
Diuk noted that the average age of Russia's political elite remained relatively high and that there was no indication that they were willing to concede power to a younger generation anytime soon. That being said, young people with democratic leanings have sometimes succeeded in finding new outlets for political protest, such as posting videos on YouTube, a video-sharing website. Whereas youth had served as agents of change in Ukraine, Diuk observed, Russian youth was largely being used to maintain the status quo.
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